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Close air support

Navy's Curtiss Helldiver, resulting in the Henschel Hs 123, which was later replaced by the famous Junkers Ju 87 Stuka. Experience in the Spanish Civil War lead to the creation of five ground-attack groups in 1938, four of which would be equipped with Stukas. The Luftwaffe matched its material acquisitions with advances in the air-ground coordination. General Wolfram von Richthofen organized a limited number of air liaison detachments that were attached to ground units of the main effort. These detachments existed to pass requests from the ground to the air, and receive reconnaissance reports, but they were not trained to guide aircraft onto targets. These preparations did not prove fruitful in the invasion of Poland, where the Luftwaffe focused on interdiction and dedicated few assets to close air support. But the value of CAS was demonstrated at the crossing of the Meuse River during the Invasion of France in 1940. General Heinz Guderian, one of the creators of the combined-arms tactical doctrine commonly known as "blitzkrieg", believed the best way to provide cover for the crossing would be a continuous stream of ground attack aircraft on French defenders. Though few guns were hit, the attacks kept the French under cover and prevented them from manning their guns. Aided by the sirens attached to Stukas, the psychological impact was disproportional to the destructive power of close air support (although as often as not, the Stukas were used as tactical bombers instead of close air support, leaving much of the actual work to the older Hs 123 units for the first years of the war). In addition, the reliance on air support over artillery reduced the demand for logistical support through the Ardennes. Though there were difficulties in coordinating air support with the rapid advance, the Germans demonstrated consistently superior CAS tactics to those of the British and French defenders. Later, on the Eastern front, the Germans would devise visual ground signals to mark friendly units and to indicate direction and distance to enemy emplacements. Despite these accomplishments, German CAS was not perfect and suffered from the same misunderstanding and interservice rivalry that plagued other nations' air arms, and friendly fire was not uncommon. For example, on the eve of the Meuse offensive, Guderian's superior cancelled his CAS plans and called for high-altitude strikes from medium bombers, which would have required halting the offensive until the air strikes were complete. Fortunately for the Germans, his order was issued too late to be implemented, and the Luftwaffe commander followed the schedule he had previously worked out with Guderian. As late as November 1941, the Luftwaffe refused to provide Erwin Rommel with an air liaison officer for the Afrika Korps, because it "would be against the best use of the air force as a whole." German CAS was also extensively used on the Eastern Front during the period 1941–1943. Their decline was caused by the growing strength of the Red Air Force and the redeployment of assets to defend against American and British strategic bombardment. Luftwaffe's loss of air superiority, combined with a declining supply of aircraft and fuel, crippled their ability to provide effective CAS on the western front after 1943. RAF and USAAF: The Royal Air Force (RAF) entered the war woefully unprepared to provide CAS. In 1940 during the Battle of France, the Royal Air Force and Army headquarters in France were located at separate positions, resulting in unreliable communications. After the RAF was withdrawn in May, Army officers had to telephone the War Office in London to arrange for air support. The stunning effectiveness of German air-ground coordination spurred change. On the basis of tests in Northern Ireland in August 1940, Group Captain A. H. Wann RAF and Colonel J.D. Woodall (British Army) issued the Wann-Woodall Report, recommending the creation of a distinct tactical air force liaison officer (known colloquially as "tentacles") to accompany Army divisions and brigades. Their report spurred the RAF to create an RAF Army Cooperation Command and to develop tentacle equipment and procedures placing an Air Liaison Officer with each brigade. Although the RAF was working on its CAS doctrine in London, officers in North Africa improvised their own coordination techniques. In October 1941, Sir Arthur Tedder and Arthur Coningham, senior RAF commanders in North Africa, created joint RAF-Army Air Support Control staffs at each corps and armored division headquarters, and placed a Forward Air Support Link at each brigade to forward air support requests. When trained tentacle teams arrived in 1942, they cut response time on support requests to thirty minutes. It was also in the North Africa desert that the cab rank strategy was developed. It used a series of three aircraft, each in turn directed by the pertinent ground control by radio. One aircraft would be attacking, another in flight to the battle area, while a third was being refuelled and rearmed at its base. If the first attack failed to destroy the tactical target, the aircraft in flight would be directed to continue the attack. The first aircraft would land for its own refuelling and rearming once the third had taken off. The CAS tactics developed and refined by the British during the campaign in North Africa served as the basis for the Allied system used to subsequently gain victory in the air over Germany in 1944 and devastate its cities and industries. The use of forward air control to guide close air support (CAS) aircraft, so as to ensure that their attack hits the intended target and not friendly troops, was first used by the British Desert Air Force in North Africa, but not by the USAAF until operations in Salerno. During the North African Campaign in 1941 the British Army and the Royal Air Force established Forward Air Support Links (FASL), a mobile air support system using ground vehicles. Light reconnaissance aircraft would observe enemy activity and report it by radio to the FASL which was attached at brigade level. The FASL was in communication (a two-way radio link known as a "tentacle") with the Air Support Control (ASC) Headquarters attached to the corps or armoured division which could summon support through a Rear Air Support Link with the airfields. They also introduced the system of ground direction of air strikes by what was originally termed a "Mobile Fighter Controller" traveling with the forward troops. The controller rode in the "leading tank or armoured car" and directed a "cab rank" of aircraft above the battlefield. This system of close co-operation first used by the Desert Air Force, was steadily refined and perfected, during the campaigns in Italy, Normandy and Germany. By the time the Italian Campaign had reached Rome, the Allies had established air superiority. They were then able to pre-schedule strikes by fighter-bomber squadrons; however, by the time the aircraft arrived in the strike area, oftentimes the targets, which were usually trucks, had fled. The initial solution to fleeing targets was the British "Rover" system. These were pairings of air controllers and army liaison officers at the front but able to switch communications seamlessly from one brigade to another – hence Rover. Incoming strike aircraft arrived with pre-briefed targets, which they would strike 20 minutes after arriving on station only if the Rovers had not directed them to another more pressing target. Rovers might call on artillery to mark targets with smoke shells, or they might direct the fighters to map grid coordinates, or they might resort to a description of prominent terrain features as guidance. However, one drawback for the Rovers was the constant rotation of pilots, who were there for fortnightly stints, leading to a lack of institutional memory. US commanders, impressed by the British tactics at the Salerno landings, adapted their own doctrine to include many features of the British system. At the start of the War, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) had, as its principal mission, the doctrine of strategic bombing. This incorporated the unerring belief that unescorted bombers could win the war without the advent of ground troops. This doctrine proved to be fundamentally flawed. However, during the entire course of the war the USAAF top brass clung to this doctrine, and hence operated independently of the rest of the Army. Thus it was initially unprepared to provide CAS, and in fact, had to be dragged "kicking and screaming" into the CAS function with the ground troops. USAAF doctrinal priorities for tactical aviation were, in order, air superiority, isolation of the battlefield via supply interdiction, and thirdly, close air support. Hence, during the North African Campaign, CAS was poorly executed, if at all. So few aerial assets were assigned to U.S. troops that they fired on anything in the air. And in 1943, the USAAF changed their radios to a frequency incompatible with ground radios. The situation improved during the Italian Campaign, where American and British forces, working in close cooperation, exchanged CAS techniques and ideas. There, the AAF's XII Air Support Command and the Fifth U.S. Army shared headquarters, meeting every evening to plan strikes and devising a network of liaisons and radios for communications. However, friendly fire continued to be a concern – pilots did not know recognition signals and regularly bombed friendly units, until an A-36 was shot down in self-defense by Allied tanks. The expectation of losses to friendly fire from the ground during the planned invasion of France prompted the black and white invasion stripes painted on all Allied aircraft from 1944. In 1944, USAAF commander Lt. Gen.

mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv

Close air support

So few aerial assets were assigned to U.S. troops that they fired on anything in the air. And in 1943, the USAAF changed their radios to a frequency incompatible with ground radios. The situation improved during the Italian Campaign, where American and British forces, working in close cooperation, exchanged CAS techniques and ideas. There, the AAF's XII Air Support Command and the Fifth U.S. Army shared headquarters, meeting every evening to plan strikes and devising a network of liaisons and radios for communications. However, friendly fire continued to be a concern – pilots did not know recognition signals and regularly bombed friendly units, until an A-36 was shot down in self-defense by Allied tanks. The expectation of losses to friendly fire from the ground during the planned invasion of France prompted the black and white invasion stripes painted on all Allied aircraft from 1944. In 1944, USAAF commander Lt. Gen. Henry ("Hap") Arnold acquired 2 groups of A-24 dive bombers, the army version of the Navy's SBD-2, in response to the success of the Stuka and German CAS. Later, the USAAF developed a modification of the North American P-51 Mustang with dive brakes – the North American A-36 Apache. However, there was no training to match the purchases. Though Gen. Lesley McNair, commander of Army Ground Forces, pushed to change USAAF priorities, the latter failed to provide aircraft for even major training exercises. Six months before the invasion of Normandy, 33 divisions had received no joint air-ground training. The USAAF saw the greatest innovations in 1944 under General Elwood Quesada, commander of IX Tactical Air Command, supporting the First U.S. Army. He developed the "armored column cover", where on-call fighter-bombers maintained a high-level of availability for important tank advances, allowing armor units to maintain a high tempo of exploitation even when they outran their artillery assets. He also used a modified antiaircraft radar to track friendly attack aircraft to redirect them as necessary, and experimented with assigning fighter pilots to tours as forward air controllers to familiarize them with the ground perspective. In July 1944, Quesada provided VHF aircraft radios to tank crews in Normandy. When the armored units broke out of the Normandy beachhead, tank commanders were able to communicate directly with overhead fighter-bombers. However, despite the innovation, Quesada focused his aircraft on CAS only for major offensives. Typically, both British and American attack aircraft were tasked primarily to interdiction, even though later analysis showed them to be twice as dangerous as CAS. XIX TAC, under the command of General Otto P. Weyland used similar tactics to support the rapid armored advance of General Patton's Third Army in its drive across France. Armed reconnaissance was a major feature of XIX TAC close air support, as the rapid advance left Patton's Southern flank open. Such was the close nature of cooperation between the Third Army and XIX TAC that Patton actually counted on XIX TAC to guard his flanks. This close air support from XIX TAC was credited by Patton as having been a key factor in the rapid advance and success of his Third Army. The American Navy and Marine Corps used CAS in conjunction with or as a substitute for the lack of available artillery or naval gunfire in the Pacific theater. Navy and Marine F6F Hellcats and F4U Corsairs used a variety of ordnance such as conventional bombs, rockets and napalm to dislodge or attack Japanese troops using cave complexes in the latter part of the Second World War. Red Air Force: The Soviet Union's Red Air Force quickly recognized the value of ground-support aircraft. As early as the Battles of Khalkhyn Gol in 1939, Soviet aircraft had the task of disrupting enemy ground operations. This use increased markedly after the June 1941 Axis invasion of the Soviet Union. Purpose-built aircraft such as the Ilyushin Il-2 Sturmovik proved highly effective in blunting the activity of the Panzers. Joseph Stalin paid the Il-2 a great tribute in his own inimitable manner: when a particular production factory fell behind on its deliveries, Stalin sent the following cable to the factory manager: "They are as essential to the Red Army as air and bread". Korean War: From Navy experiments with the KGW-1 Loon, the Navy designation for the German V-1 flying bomb, Marine Captain Marian Cranford Dalby developed the AN/MPQ-14, a system that enabled radar-guided bomb release at night or in poor weather. Though the Marine Corps continued its tradition of intimate air–ground cooperation in the Korean War, the newly created United States Air Force (USAF) again moved away from CAS, now to strategic bombers and jet interceptors. Though eventually the Air Force supplied sufficient pilots and forward air controllers to provide battlefield support, coordination was still lacking. Since pilots operated under centralized control, ground controllers were never able to familiarize themselves with pilots, and requests were not processed quickly. Harold K. Johnson, then commander of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division (later Army Chief of Staff) commented regarding CAS: "If you want it, you can't get it. If you can get it, it can't find you. If it can find you, it can't identify the target. If it can identify the target, it can't hit it. But if it does hit the target, it doesn't do a great deal of damage anyway." It is unsurprising, then, that MacArthur excluded USAF aircraft from the airspace over the Inchon Landing in September 1950, instead relying on Marine Aircraft Group 33 for CAS. In December 1951, Lt. Gen. James Van Fleet, commander of the Eighth U.S. Army, formally requested the United Nations Commander, Gen. Mark Clark, to permanently attach an attack squadron to each of the four army corps in Korea. Though the request was denied, Clark allocated many more Navy and Air Force aircraft to CAS. Despite the rocky start, the USAF would also work to improve its coordination efforts. It eventually required pilots to serve 80 days as forward air controllers (FACs), which gave them an understanding of the difficulties from the ground perspective and helped cooperation when they returned to the cockpit. The USAF also provided airborne FACs in critical locations. The Army also learned to assist, by suppressing anti-aircraft fire prior to air strikes. The U.S. Army wanted a dedicated USAF presence on the battlefield to reduce fratricide, or the harm of friendly forces. This preference led to the creation of the air liaison officer (ALO) position. The ALO is an aeronautically rated officer that has spent a tour away from the cockpit, serving as the primary adviser to the ground commander on the capabilities and limitations of airpower. The Korean War revealed important flaws in the application of CAS. Firstly, the USAF preferred interdiction over fire support while the Army regarded support missions as the main concern for air forces. Then, the Army advocated a degree of decentralization for good reactivity, in contrast with the USAF-favored centralization of CAS. The third point dealt with the lack of training and joint culture, which are necessary for an adequate air-ground integration. Finally, USAF aircraft were not designed for CAS: "the advent of jet fighters, too fast to adjust their targets, and strategic bombers, too big to be used on theatre, rendered CAS much harder to implement". Vietnam and the CAS role debate: During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the US Army began to identify a dedicated CAS need for itself. The Howze Board, which studied the question, published a landmark report describing the need for a helicopter-based CAS requirement. However, the Army did not follow the Howze Board recommendation initially. Nevertheless, it did eventually adopt the use of helicopter gunships and attack helicopters in the CAS role. Though the Army gained more control over its own CAS due to the development of the helicopter gunship and attack helicopter, the Air Force continued to provide fixed-wing CAS for Army units. Over the course of the war, the adaptation of The Tactical Air Control System proved crucial to the improvement of Air Force CAS. Jets replaced propeller-driven aircraft with minimal issues. The assumption of responsibility for the air request net by the Air Force improved communication equipment and procedures, which had long been a problem. Additionally, a major step in satisfying the Army's demands for more control over their CAS was the successful implementation of close air support control agencies at the corps level under Air Force control. Other notable adaptations were the usage of airborne Forward Air Controllers (FACs), a role previously dominated by FACs on the ground, and the use of B-52s for CAS. U.S. Marine Corps Aviation was much more prepared for the application of CAS in the Vietnam War, due to CAS being its central mission. In fact, as late as 1998, Marines were still claiming in their training manuals that "Close air support (CAS) is a Marine Corps innovation." One of the main debates taking place within the Marine Corps during the war was whether to adopt the helicopter gunship as a part of CAS doctrine and what its adoption would mean for fixed-wing CAS in the Marine Corps. The issue would eventually be put to rest, however, as the helicopter gunship proved crucial in the combat environment of Vietnam.

mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv

Close air support

Other notable adaptations were the usage of airborne Forward Air Controllers (FACs), a role previously dominated by FACs on the ground, and the use of B-52s for CAS. U.S. Marine Corps Aviation was much more prepared for the application of CAS in the Vietnam War, due to CAS being its central mission. In fact, as late as 1998, Marines were still claiming in their training manuals that "Close air support (CAS) is a Marine Corps innovation." One of the main debates taking place within the Marine Corps during the war was whether to adopt the helicopter gunship as a part of CAS doctrine and what its adoption would mean for fixed-wing CAS in the Marine Corps. The issue would eventually be put to rest, however, as the helicopter gunship proved crucial in the combat environment of Vietnam. Though helicopters were initially armed merely as defensive measures to support the landing and extraction of troops, their value in this role led to the modification of early helicopters as dedicated gunship platforms. Though not as fast as fixed-wing aircraft and consequently more vulnerable to anti-aircraft weaponry, helicopters could use terrain for cover, and more importantly, had much greater battlefield persistence owing to their low speeds. The latter made them a natural complement to ground forces in the CAS role. In addition, newly developed anti-tank guided missiles, demonstrated to great effectiveness in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, provided aircraft with an effective ranged anti-tank weapon. These considerations motivated armies to promote the helicopter from a support role to a combat arm. Though the U.S. Army controlled rotary-wing assets, coordination continued to pose a problem. During wargames, field commanders tended to hold back attack helicopters out of fear of air defenses, committing them too late to effectively support ground units. The earlier debate over control over CAS assets was reiterated between ground commanders and aviators. Nevertheless, the US Army incrementally gained increased control over its CAS role. In the mid-1970s, after Vietnam, the USAF decided to train an enlisted force to handle many of the tasks the ALO was saturated with, to include terminal attack control. Presently, the ALO mainly serves in the liaison role, the intricate details of mission planning and attack guidance left to the enlisted members of the Tactical Air Control Party. NATO and AirLand Battle: Since their 1977 introduction into modern military practice for close air support purposes, General Crosbie E. Saint provided the AH-64 Apache the doctrinal cover for use in AirLand Battle operations such as in the NATO European theatre. Aircraft: Various aircraft can fill close air support roles. Military helicopters are often used for close air support and are so closely integrated with ground operations that in most countries they are operated by the army rather than the air force. Fighters and ground attack aircraft like the A-10 Thunderbolt II provide close air support using rockets, missiles, bombs, and strafing runs. During the Second World War, a mixture of dive bombers and fighters were used for CAS missions. Dive bombing permitted greater accuracy than level bombing runs, while the rapid altitude change made it more difficult for anti aircraft gunners to track. The Junkers Ju 87 Stuka is a well known example of a dive bomber built for precision bombing but which was successfully used for CAS. It was fitted with wind-blown sirens on its landing gear to enhance its psychological effect. Some variants of the Stuka were equipped with a pair of 37 mm (1.5 in) Bordkanone BK 3,7 cannons mounted in under-wing gun pods, each loaded with two six-round magazines of armour-piercing tungsten carbide-cored ammunition, for anti-tank operations. Other than the North American A-36 Apache, a P-51 Mustang modified with dive brakes, the Americans and British used no dedicated CAS aircraft in the Second World War, preferring fighters or fighter-bombers that could be pressed into CAS service. While some aircraft, such as the Hawker Typhoon and the P-47 Thunderbolt, performed admirably in that role, there were a number of compromises that prevented most fighters from making effective CAS platforms. Fighters were usually optimized for high-altitude operations without bombs or other external ordnance – flying at low level with bombs quickly expended fuel. Cannons had to be mounted differently for strafing – strafing required a further and lower convergence point than aerial combat did. Of the Allied powers that fought in the Second World War, the Soviet Union used specifically designed ground attack aircraft more than the UK and US. Such aircraft included the Ilyushin Il-2, the single most produced military aircraft at any point in world history. The Soviet military also frequently deployed the Polikarpov Po-2 biplane as a ground attack aircraft. The Royal Navy Hawker Sea Fury fighters and the U.S. Vought F4U Corsair and Douglas A-1 Skyraider were operated in a ground attack capacity during the Korean War. Outside of the conflict, there were numerous other occasions that the Sea Fury was used as a ground attack platform. Cuban Sea Furies, operated by the Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria ("Revolutionary Air Force"; FAR), were used to oppose the US-orchestrated Bay of Pigs Invasion to attack incoming transport ships and disembarking ground forces alike. The A-1 Skyraider also saw later use, especially throughout the Vietnam War. In the Vietnam War, the United States introduced a number of fixed and rotary wing gunships, including several cargo aircraft that were refitted as gun platforms to serve as CAS and air interdiction aircraft. The first of these to emerge was the Douglas AC-47 Spooky, which was converted from the Douglas C-47 Skytrain/Douglas DC-3. Some commentators have remarked on the high effectiveness of the AC-47 in the CAS role. The USAF developed several other platforms following on from the AC-47, including the Fairchild AC-119 and the Lockheed AC-130. The AC-130 has had a particularly lengthy service, being used extensively during the War in Afghanistan, the Iraq War and the US military intervention in Libya during the early twenty-first century. Multiple variants of the AC-130 have been developed and it has continued to be modernised, including the adoption of various new armaments. Usually close support is thought to be only carried out by fighter-bombers or dedicated ground-attack aircraft, such as the A-10 Thunderbolt II (Warthog) or Su-25 (Frogfoot) or attack helicopters such as the AH-64 Apache, but even large high-altitude bombers have successfully filled close support roles using precision-guided munitions. During Operation Enduring Freedom, the lack of fighter aircraft forced military planners to rely heavily on US bombers, particularly the B-1B Lancer, to fill the CAS role. Bomber CAS, relying mainly on GPS guided weapons and laser-guided JDAMs has evolved into a devastating tactical employment methodology and has changed US doctrinal thinking regarding CAS in general. With significantly longer loiter times, range, and weapon capacity, bombers can be deployed to bases outside of the immediate battlefield area, with 12-hour missions being commonplace since 2001. After the initial collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, airfields in Afghanistan became available for continuing operations against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This resulted in a great number of CAS operations being undertaken by aircraft from Belgium (F-16 Fighting Falcon), Denmark (F-16), France (Mirage 2000D), the Netherlands (F-16), Norway (F-16), the United Kingdom (Harrier GR7s, GR9s and Tornado GR4s) and the United States (A-10, F-16, AV-8B Harrier II, F-15E Strike Eagle, F/A-18 Hornet, F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, UH-1Y Venom). The use of information technology to direct and coordinate precision air support has increased the importance of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in using CAS. Laser, GPS, and battlefield data transfer are routinely used to coordinate with a wide variety of air platforms able to provide CAS. The 2003 joint CAS doctrine reflects the increased use of electronic and optical technology to direct targeted fires for CAS. Air platforms communicating with ground forces can also provide additional aerial-to-ground visual search, ground-convoy escort, and enhancement of command and control (C2), assets which can be particularly important for low intensity conflict. Doctrine: MCWP 3-23.1: CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (PDF). U.S. Marine Corps. 30 July 1998. JP 3-09.3: Close Air Support (PDF). Joint Chiefs of Staff. 25 November 2014. See also: Artillery observer Attack aircraft Counter-insurgency aircraft, a specific type of CAS aircraft Flying Leathernecks Forward air control Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance Pace-Finletter MOU 1952 Tactical bombing, a general term for the type of bombing that includes CAS and air interdiction References: Citations: Bibliography: External links: Can Our Jets Support the Guys on the Ground? – Popular Science The Forward Air Controller Association The ROMAD Locator The home of the current ground FAC Operation Anaconda: An Airpower Perspective Archived 2019-07-14 at the Wayback Machine – Close air support during Operation Anaconda, United States Airforce, 2005.

mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv

Coast guard

History: United Kingdom: The predecessor of Britain's modern His Majesty's Coastguard was established in 1809 as the Waterguard, a department of the HM Customs and Excise authority, which was originally devoted to the prevention of smuggling. At the time, due to high UK taxation on liquors such as brandy, as well as tobacco and other luxuries, smuggling of such cargos from places such as France, Belgium, and Holland was an attractive proposition for criminals. The barrels of brandy and other contraband were landed from the ships on England's beaches at night in small boats and later sold for profit, as later depicted in the Doctor Syn series of books by Russell Thorndike. The Coastguard was also responsible for giving assistance to shipwrecks. Each Waterguard station was issued with a Manby mortar, which had been invented by Captain George William Manby in 1808. The mortar fired a shot with a line attached from the shore to the wrecked ship and was used for many years. This was the origin of the Coastguard's life saving role. In 1821 a committee of inquiry recommended that responsibility for the Preventative Waterguard be transferred to the Board of Customs. The Treasury agreed and (in a memorandum dated 15 January 1822) directed that the preventative services, which consisted of the Preventative Water Guard, cruisers, and riding officers should be placed under the authority of the Board of Customs and in future should be named the "Coastguard". In 1845 the Coastguard was subordinated to the Admiralty. In 1829 the first UK Coastguard instructions were published and dealt with discipline and directions for carrying out preventative duties. They also stipulated that, when a ship was wrecked, the Coastguard was responsible for taking all possible action to save lives, to take charge of the vessel and to protect property. United States: In the United States, the United States Coast Guard was created in 1915 by the merger of two other federal agencies. The first, the United States Revenue Cutter Service, founded in 1790 and known until 1894 as the United States Revenue-Marine, was a maritime customs enforcement agency that also assumed a supporting role to the United States Navy in wartime. The second, the United States Life-Saving Service, was formed in 1848 and consisted of life saving crews stationed at points along the United States East Coast. The Coast Guard later absorbed the United States Lighthouse Service in 1939 and the functions of the Bureau of Navigation and Steamboat Inspection via a two-step process in 1942 and 1946. Role: Among the responsibilities that may be entrusted to a coast guard service are: search and rescue, enforcement of maritime law, safety of vessels, maintenance of seamarks, and border control. During wartime, some national coast guard organisations might have a role as a naval reserve force with responsibilities in harbor defenses, port security, naval counter-intelligence and coastal patrols. The coast guard may, varying by jurisdiction, be a branch of a country's military, a law enforcement agency, or a search and rescue body. For example, the United States Coast Guard is a specialized military branch with law enforcement authority, whereas the United Kingdom's His Majesty's Coastguard (HMCG) is a civilian organisation whose primary role is search and rescue. Most coast guards operate ships and aircraft including helicopters and seaplanes that are either owned or leased by the agency in order to fulfil their respective roles. Some coast guards, such as the Irish Coast Guard, have only a very limited law enforcement role, usually in enforcing maritime safety law, such as by inspecting ships docked in their jurisdiction. In cases where the coast guard is primarily concerned with coordinating rather than executing rescue operations, lifeboats are often provided by civilian voluntary organisations, such as the Royal National Lifeboat Institution in the United Kingdom and Ireland, whilst aircraft may be provided by the countries' armed forces, such as the search and rescue Sea Kings formerly operated by the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, in addition to any of the HMCG's own helicopters. Racing stripes: Beginning in 1964 with the United States Coast Guard, many coast guards around the world have adopted high visibility color schemes to differentiate their coast guard vessels from the vessels of their respective navies. A frequent element is a high contrast "racing stripe" on the outer hull. While no international agreement exists to adopt it as a uniform marking, the 2009/2010 edition of Jane's Fighting Ships showed 61 nations had adopted some form of this stripe pattern for their coastal patrol and rescue vessels. List of coast guards by country: The following lists a selected number of Coast Guards around the world, illustrating the varied roles they play in the respective governments and the countries they operate in: Argentina: The Argentine Naval Prefecture, in Spanish Prefectura Naval Argentina or PNA, is a service of the Argentine Republic's Security Ministry charged with protecting the country's rivers, lakes and maritime territory. It therefore fulfills the functions of other countries' coast guards, and furthermore acts as a gendarmerie force policing navigable rivers and lakes. They belonged to the Ministry of Defence until the 1980s, and the corps' highest official was a Navy rear-admiral. They have since been transferred to the Ministry of Interior and, more recently, to the newly created Ministry of Security. However, in the case of armed conflict, they can be put under the Navy's command. Australia: Responsibilities for traditional coast guard duties in Australia are distributed across various federal, state and community volunteer agencies. Federal: The Maritime Border Command is the de facto coast guard of Australia. The Maritime Border Command is a joint unit of the Australian Defence Force (the Royal Australian Navy Patrol Force and the Royal Australian Air Force Surveillance and Response Group) and the Australian Border Force (Marine Unit and Coastwatch aircraft). It is responsible for border protection in the exclusive economic zone of Australia and its 19,650 kilometres of coastline and issues such as illegal fishing and exploitation of natural resources, maritime terrorism and piracy, biosecurity threats, and marine pollution. The Australian Maritime Safety Authority is responsible for maritime safety and seaworthiness of Australian and foreign vessels in Australian waters including compulsory pilotage, aids to navigation, the Australian Rescue Coordination Centre and coordination of search and rescue operations, and management of Australia's international maritime obligations. The Australian Fisheries Management Authority is responsible for the management and sustainable use of fisheries resources and for combating illegal fishing activities in the Australian Fishing Zone. The Australian Federal Police supports the Maritime Border Command and particularly the Australian Border Force with criminal investigations, law enforcement and national security matters. The Office of Transport Security has various responsibilities for maritime security. State: Each State Government also has agencies with coast guard responsibilities. For example, in Queensland, Maritime Safety Queensland is responsible for maritime safety and the Queensland Police Service has a water police unit for law enforcement along the coastline, in waterways, and for Queensland islands. Community: In addition, there are several private volunteer coast guard organizations, the two largest organizations being the Royal Volunteer Coastal Patrol (established in 1937) and the Australian Volunteer Coast Guard (established in 1961). These volunteer organizations have no law enforcement powers, and are essentially auxiliary Search and Rescue services. In NSW these two organisations have joined to become Marine Rescue in 2009. Bangladesh: The Bangladesh Coast Guard (Bengali transliteration: বাংলাদেশ কোস্ট গার্ড; translated from English: বাংলাদেশ উপকূল রক্ষক); BCG is the maritime law enforcement force of Bangladesh. It is a paramilitary force which is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Its officers are transferred from the Bangladesh Navy. The Bangladesh Coast Guard also performs the duty of maritime border security of Bangladesh. The headquarters is located in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Currently the coast guard has 3,339 personnel Barbados: Belize: The Belize Coast Guard (BCG) mission includes maritime safety, maritime security, marine resources protection, maintaining sovereignty over Belize sea space, and naval defence of Belize. Coast Guard men and women are deployed around the clock patrolling the internal waters and territorial seas. On the northern frontier, their joint operating base at Consejo protects the local economy from the negative impacts of illegal contraband and acts as the northern cut off for drug trafficking. On their southern boundary they stand guard at the Sarstoon river ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity of Belize. They stand ready for anything (Utrinque Paratus ). The Coast Guard Service coordinates its activities with the Belize Defence Force and the Belize Police Department. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Having 18 kilometres of coastline only, Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a force dedicated to defend its coast. The duty of patrolling its coastline falls to the Granična policija (English: Border Police). Brazil: In addition to the roles of a traditional navy, the Brazilian Navy also carries out the role of organizing the merchant navy and other operational safety missions traditionally conducted by a coast guard. Other roles include: Conducting national maritime policy, and implementing and enforcing laws and regulations with respect to the sea and inland waters. Canada: The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) is a civilian service under the Department of Fisheries and Oceans responsible for patrolling the world's longest coastline of 243,042 km (~151,000 mi). The CCG holds responsibility for all marine search and rescue throughout Canada.

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Coast guard

The Coast Guard Service coordinates its activities with the Belize Defence Force and the Belize Police Department. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Having 18 kilometres of coastline only, Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a force dedicated to defend its coast. The duty of patrolling its coastline falls to the Granična policija (English: Border Police). Brazil: In addition to the roles of a traditional navy, the Brazilian Navy also carries out the role of organizing the merchant navy and other operational safety missions traditionally conducted by a coast guard. Other roles include: Conducting national maritime policy, and implementing and enforcing laws and regulations with respect to the sea and inland waters. Canada: The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) is a civilian service under the Department of Fisheries and Oceans responsible for patrolling the world's longest coastline of 243,042 km (~151,000 mi). The CCG holds responsibility for all marine search and rescue throughout Canada. The CCG coordinates search and rescue operations with the Canadian Armed Forces, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and other organizations. The CCG maintains and operates seamarks, coastal light stations, vessel traffic services, marine pollution response services, marine communications systems, and provides icebreaking services. The CCG also operates all Federal scientific research and hydrographic survey vessels. To accomplish these tasks, the CCG has a sizable fleet of vessels and aircraft, all serviced from various bases and smaller stations located on three coasts (Atlantic, Arctic, Pacific) and the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River. The Canadian Coast Guard College is located near Sydney, Nova Scotia. China: The China Coast Guard (CCG) (Chinese: 中国海警) serves as a coordinating body for maritime search and rescue in the territorial waters of the People's Republic of China. It was formed on 2013 as an amalgamation of four agencies: the Public Security Border Troops under the Ministry of Public Security, China Maritime Safety Administration, China Marine Surveillance, and China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command. In March 2018, it was placed under the leadership of the People's Armed Police, which is under the direct command of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Hong Kong: In Hong Kong, law enforcement duties are carried out by the Marine Region of the Hong Kong Police Force and the Customs and Excise Department (Ports and Maritime Command of the Boundary and Ports Branch). The Hong Kong Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (HKMRCC) co-ordinates search and rescue vessels, aircraft and other resources of the Fire Services Department, Government Flying Service, Marine Department and the Marine Police. Macau: In Macau, coast guard responsibilities fall under the purview of the Macau Customs Service, which is in charge of conducting CG duties. The Marine and Water Bureau, which is under the Secretariat for Transport and Public Works (Macau), helps in coordinating search and rescue operations in the region. It's done via the Search and Rescue Coordination Centre, formed under the Vessel Traffic Control Centre of Macao (Macao VTS). Croatia: The Croatian Coast Guard (Croatian: Obalna straža Republike Hrvatske) is a division of the Croatian Navy responsible for protecting the interests of the Republic of Croatia at sea. The Croatian Navy is composed of classical naval forces structured into a flotilla and the Coast Guard that solely consists of ships with peacetime duties, e.g. protection of ecology, fishing, control of tankers, ballast waters, combat against terrorism, trafficking of people, narcotics, and similar. On September 13, 2007, the Croatian Parliament passed a bill establishing the Croatian Coast Guard. The Coast Guard's mission is protect sovereign rights and carry out Croatia's jurisdiction in the Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone, the continental shelf and the high seas. The Coast Guard will also monitor vessels sailing in the Croatian territorial waters. If vessels are caught violating Croatian or international regulations and disregard warnings by the Coast Guard, Coast Guard ships and airplanes are authorized to pursue them and if necessary open fire, while taking care not to jeopardize the lives of the vessel's crew. Under the law, the commander of the Coast Guard is a Navy officer who is appointed and relieved of duty by the President of the Republic at the government's proposal. Cyprus: The Cyprus Port and Marine Police (Greek Λιμενική και Ναυτική Αστυνομία – Limeniki kai Nautiki Astinomia) fulfills the functions of other countries' coast guards for the Republic of Cyprus. Cyprus is an island country in the Eastern Mediterranean with about 1/3 of the island is under control of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus after 1974 Cypriot coup d'état and following Turkish military Invasion based on Treaty of Guarantee (1960). Due to the country's geopolitical situation, size, the recent discovery in 2011 of the Aphrodite gas field in its Exclusive Economic Zone and Cyprus Police being the main national Law enforcement agency, the duties and responsibilities of the Cyprus Port and Marine Police are many and sometimes complex. It is a unit of the Cyprus Police, which resides under the Ministry of Justice and Public Order (Cyprus). However it can support the Cyprus Navy in wartime which resides under the Ministry of Defence. It is staffed by Police Officers which can be transferred to and from other units and agencies of the Cyprus Police and are tasked with the primary mission of policing the country's sea borders and the law enforcement of the waters around it. The unit is equipped with patrol boats and radars but it does not operate its own helicopters. Instead, it operates in combination with the aerial unit of the Cyprus Police, the Cyprus Police Aviation Unit. Main roles include law enforcement against illicit activities such as smuggling (due to the fact that although the Customs and Excise Department is a separate agency under the Ministry of Finance, it does not have an operational or tactical team of its own), terrorism, piracy, illegal fishing, Illegal drug trade, illegal immigration and is also assigned with Search and Rescue (SAR) duties. For counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations, the units operate in combination with the Special Anti-Terrorist Squad which is part of the Emergency Response Unit of the Cyprus Police. Although the prominent agencies responsible for all Search and Rescue operations are conducted by Cyprus Police Units, the agency responsible to organize the SAR system, to co-ordinate, to control and direct SAR operations in the region that the Republic of Cyprus is responsible for (which coincides with the Nicosia FIR) is the Cyprus Joint Rescue Coordination Center or JRCC Larnaca, which is an independent agency of the Ministry of Defence. Djibouti: The Djiboutian Coast Guard, part of the Djiboutian Armed Forces, is a humanitarian and security service. It protects Djibouti's borders and economic and security interests and defends its territorial waters and its Exclusive Economic Zone. Egypt: The Egyptian Coast Guard, part of the Egyptian Navy, is responsible for the onshore protection of public installations near the coast and the patrol of coastal waters to prevent smuggling. France: In the French Republic, Affaires maritimes is the closest organization to a coast guard. In each region, a naval admiral, called Maritime Prefect, is in charge of coordination of all state services for action at sea by the (Navy, the Affaires maritimes, the Maritime Gendarmerie and the Coastguard Service of the French Customs. A charity, Société Nationale de Sauvetage en Mer, provides most life saving duties at the local level. Georgia: The Georgian Coast Guard is the maritime arm of the Georgian Border Police, within the Ministry for Internal Affairs. It is responsible for the maritime protection of the entire 310 km (190 mi) coastline of Georgia, as well as the Georgian territorial waters. The primary missions of the service are administration of the territorial waters, marine pollution protection, maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, port security and maritime defense. The former Georgian Navy was absorbed into the Coast Guard in 2009. The headquarters and a principal Coast Guard base are located at the Black Sea port of Poti. A second smaller base is in Batumi, Adjaria. Besides the Poti-based force, the Coast Guard also includes a special counter-terrorist Detachment. Maritime surveillance radar stations are maintained at Anaklia, Poti, Supsa, Chakvi, and Gonio, providing coverage of all territorial seas. Germany: The German Federal Coast Guard, known as the Küstenwache, is both a civilian service and a law enforcement organisation, staffed with both police officers and certain civilians from the various German federal agencies associated with maritime administration with responsibility for the coordination of all law enforcement activities within its jurisdiction in the Federal Republic of Germany. Greece: The Hellenic Coast Guard (Greek: Λιμενικό Σώμα-Ελληνική Ακτοφυλακή, romanized: Limeniko Soma-Elliniki Aktofylaki, lit. 'Harbor Corps-Hellenic Coast Guard') is the national coast guard of the Republic of Greece. It is a paramilitary organization that can support the Hellenic Navy in wartime, but resides under separate civilian control in times of peace. It was founded in 1919 by an Act of Parliament and the legal framework for its function was reformed in 1927. Haiti: The Haitian Coast Guard is an operational unit of the Haitian National Police.

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Greece: The Hellenic Coast Guard (Greek: Λιμενικό Σώμα-Ελληνική Ακτοφυλακή, romanized: Limeniko Soma-Elliniki Aktofylaki, lit. 'Harbor Corps-Hellenic Coast Guard') is the national coast guard of the Republic of Greece. It is a paramilitary organization that can support the Hellenic Navy in wartime, but resides under separate civilian control in times of peace. It was founded in 1919 by an Act of Parliament and the legal framework for its function was reformed in 1927. Haiti: The Haitian Coast Guard is an operational unit of the Haitian National Police. It is one of the few law enforcement organisations in the world to combine water policing and coast guard duties while remaining as a policing unit. It operates primarily as a law enforcement agency, with secondary responsibilities in search and rescue. Iceland: The Icelandic Coast Guard has primarily been a law enforcement organisation but is also in charge of national defences. It has also involved with the Republic of Iceland's contributions to expeditionary operations and conducted military exercises. For example, Operation Enduring Freedom and Northern Challenge. India: The Indian Coast Guard (ICG) is under the Ministry of Defence. It has responsibility for search and rescue, enforcing the maritime law of anti-smuggling, immigration and shipping regulations and protecting the country's maritime and offshore resources. With 40 plus aircraft and 150 plus vessels and ships Indian Coast Guards is defending one of the longest coastline of Indian Ocean Region (IOR) Iran: The Iranian NEDSA controls the south entry point. The Border Guard Command Marine faraja sea also performs maritime duties in the north alongside the Iranian Navy. Indonesia: Maritime Law Enforcement in Indonesia is conducted by multiple government agencies, including the Indonesian Navy, Indonesian Maritime Security Agency, Indonesian Sea and Coast Guard, Directorate General of Marine and Fisheries Resources Surveillance, and National Police Water Unit. There has been plans to amalgamate these different maritime law enforcement agencies to become a singular national 'sea and coast guard agency'. In March 2022, the government issue regulation on Governance of Maritime Security, Safety and Law Enforcement at Indonesia's Territorial Water and Jurisdiction and designate Maritime Security Agency as coordinating body for all maritime law enforcement agencies. Ireland: The Irish Coast Guard (IRCG) makes up one arm of the Maritime Safety Services, the other being the Maritime Safety Directorate. Both arms are due to merge into a new "one stop shop" agency for all maritime safety matters. The purpose of the Irish Coast Guard is: To reduce the loss of life within the Irish Search and Rescue Region and on rivers, lakes and waterways and to protect the quality of the marine environment within the Irish Pollution Responsibility Zone, Harbours and Maritime Local Authority areas and to preserve property. To promote safety standards, and by doing so, prevent, as far as possible, the loss of life at sea and on inland waters and other areas, and to provide an effective emergency response service. Isle of Man: The Isle of Man is a Crown dependency in the Irish Sea between Ireland and the United Kingdom. It is not part of the United Kingdom, but historically relied upon the UK Coastguard. However, the UK Coastguard withdrew in 1988, and the Isle of Man Government formed its own Coastguard in 1989. Its key functions are coastal patrol, pollution control, and shore-based search and rescue. It also co-operates with other agencies as part of the Isle of Man Inland Search and Rescue Group. It maintains the Isle of Man's Marine Operations Centre (control room), but it has no aircraft, and contracts air-sea rescue to the UK Coastguard. Italy: In the Republic of Italy, the Guardia Costiera is part of the Italian Navy under the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport. They have responsibility for enforcement of shipping and maritime safety regulations, as well as performing search and rescue duties Japan: In Japan, the Japan Coast Guard is under the oversight of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and is responsible for the protection of the coast-lines and islands of Japan. Jersey: The Island of Jersey Coastguard is the coastguard service of the Government of Jersey, an independent Crown dependency located near to northern France. Its main responsibilities are safety at sea, maritime security and law enforcement, search and rescue services (with partner agencies), and protection of the marine environment. "Channel Islands AirSearch" works with the Coastguard service on search and rescue operations, and therefore the Coastguard does not maintain its own aircraft. Kenya: The Kenya Coast Guard Service is a specialized maritime force of the Republic of Kenya, responsible for law enforcement on national waters, including on the oceans, lakes and rivers. The force is mandated to maintain maritime safety, security, pollution control and sanitation. It is also responsible for apprehending and prosecuting offenders. Libya: The Libyan Coast Guard, part of the Libyan Navy, is responsible for the onshore protection of public installations near the coast and the patrol of coastal waters to prevent smuggling. South Korea: The Korea Coast Guard (Korean: 해양경찰청; Hanja: 海洋警察廳, Revised Romanization: Haeyang-gyeongchal-cheong, Maritime Police Agency) is responsible for maritime safety and control off the coast of the Republic of Korea/South Korea. The KCG is an external branch of the R.O.K.'s Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries during peacetime. Malaysia: In Malaysia, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency is part of the Malaysian Coast Guard and is under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The agency is headed by a director general who is appointed by the Yang Di Pertuan Agong on the advice of the prime minister while other personnel are appointed by the Public Services Commission. In times of war, crisis or emergency, the agency may be placed under the command of the Malaysian Armed Forces. It was formed to combat the rise of piracy in the Strait of Malacca. Personnel often work very closely with the Royal Malaysian Navy and Royal Malaysian Air Force. The agency utilizes its resources in a maritime law enforcement and search and rescue capacity. Mexico: The Maritime Search and Rescue (Búsqueda y Rescate Marítimo) is a coast guard-type unit of the Mexican Navy. Its primary mission is search and rescue operations within 50 miles (80 km) of the Mexican coastline. Netherlands: The Kingdom of The Netherlands Coastguard (Dutch: Kustwacht Nederland) is a national organization responsible for various services along The Netherlands' ocean coastline (mainly search and rescue services). Caribbean Netherlands: The Dutch Caribbean Coastguard (Dutch: Kustwacht Caraïbisch Gebied) is the coast guard of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the Caribbean, providing search & rescue, and maritime law enforcement in Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba. New Zealand: The Royal New Zealand Coastguard is a civilian volunteer charitable organisation, providing search and rescue services to coastal waterways and some lakes in New Zealand. Smaller incidents are coordinated by the New Zealand Police, who may call on the services and resources of the coastguard. Larger incidents are managed by the Rescue Coordination Centre New Zealand (RCCNZ), with support from the Royal New Zealand Defence Force. Norway: The Royal Norwegian Coast Guard, or Kystvakten in Norwegian, is a part of the Royal Norwegian Navy, but has separate vessels, many of which are purpose-built. Coast guard vessels have the prefix KV. Four of these vessels are capable of embarking one or more helicopters. Norway's exclusive economic zone, the Coast Guard's area of responsibility, is about 2.2 million square kilometers, one of the largest in Europe. Pakistan: In Pakistan, there are two agencies operating on the coast: Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (PMSA) under the Pakistan Navy Pakistan Coast Guards (PCG) under the Pakistan Army. The MSA is a military force operated by the Navy under the direction of Ministry of Defence. It is responsible for the strategic security of Pakistan's coastlines, as well as law enforcement within the country's exclusive economic zone. The Pakistani Coast Guards is placed under the Pakistan Army and has responsibilities for conducting riverine operations, protecting coastal areas and shores of Karachi. Peru: Philippines: In the Republic of the Philippines, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) is a maritime law enforcement agency operating under the Department of Transportation of the Republic of the Philippines government. It is tasked with the broader enforcement of maritime laws, especially against smuggling, illegal fishing, drug trafficking, and piracy. It patrols the country's 36,289-kilometer coastline and hundreds of islands, and is also involved in maritime search and rescue (SAR) missions, as well as the protection of the marine environment. The Philippine Coast Guard also serves as an attached service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in wartime. Poland: In Poland, the law enforcement coast guard role is performed by the Maritime Branch of the Polish Border Guard (Morski Oddział Straży Granicznej). It is part of the Polish Border Guard. Search and Rescue (SAR) role of coast guard is performed by Maritime Search and Rescue Service (Morska Służba Poszukiwania i Ratownictwa).

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It is tasked with the broader enforcement of maritime laws, especially against smuggling, illegal fishing, drug trafficking, and piracy. It patrols the country's 36,289-kilometer coastline and hundreds of islands, and is also involved in maritime search and rescue (SAR) missions, as well as the protection of the marine environment. The Philippine Coast Guard also serves as an attached service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in wartime. Poland: In Poland, the law enforcement coast guard role is performed by the Maritime Branch of the Polish Border Guard (Morski Oddział Straży Granicznej). It is part of the Polish Border Guard. Search and Rescue (SAR) role of coast guard is performed by Maritime Search and Rescue Service (Morska Służba Poszukiwania i Ratownictwa). Recently, government published plans to integrate Maritime SAR Service within Maritime Authorities (the two remaining local offices: Maritime Office in Gdynia and Maritime Office in Szczecin), as supposedly efficiency and cost improving measures (already disbanded Maritime Office in Slupsk and split operational area between remaining two Offices). Operational structure (SAR assets, etc.) shall remain mostly unchanged, moving only administrative duties to Maritime Authorities' two local offices. Portugal: In Portugal, the coast guard role is performed by several government agencies that, together, form the Maritime Authority System (Sistema de Autoridade Marítima or SAM). The SAM includes the Portuguese Navy, the National Republican Guard (GNR), the Portuguese Air Force, the Border and Immigration Service (SEF), the Civil Protection Authority, the National Medical Emergency Institute and the Criminal Investigation Police (PJ). The National Maritime Authority (Autoridade Marítima Nacional or AMN) is the branch of the Portuguese Navy responsible for its coast guard role. The function of AMN is performed by the Chief of Staff of the Navy himself, supported in this role by the Directorate of the Maritime Authority, which includes the Maritime Police, the Lifeguard Institute, the Lighthouse Department and the several harbourmasters. Besides the specific assets of the Directorate of Maritime Authority entirely dedicated to the coast guard role, the AMN also has at its disposal the other Portuguese Navy's assets that can be used both for military and public service missions. The vessels operated within the SAM include the Maritime Police patrol boats, the Lifeguard Institute lifeboats, the harbourmasters harbour boats, the GNR Coastal Control Unit' surveillance boats and the Portuguese Navy's naval ships. The aircraft operated within the SAM include fixed-wing aircraft from the Portuguese Air Force and helicopters from the Navy, the Air Force and the Civil Protection Authority. Russia: Russia's Coast Guard (Береговая охрана России) operates under the auspices of the Border Guard Service of Russia (itself a branch of the FSB Federal Security Service). Its remit encompasses the twelve-mile limit of all Russian territorial and coastal waters and, being equipped with frigates, corvettes, fast patrol boats, hydrofoils, helicopters, and light aircraft, it has considerable combat capability on behalf of the continent-wide border guard of the Russian Federation. For inland waters operations Russia has the National Guard Naval Service Corps, established in 1978, while inland waters SAR operations are also under the purview of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. Singapore: In Singapore, the Police Coast Guard (PCG) is an operational department of the Singapore Police Force. Functions of the coast guard were transferred from the Republic of Singapore Navy to what was then the Marine Police in February 1993. The Marine Police was thus restructured and renamed as the Police Coast Guard, one of the few law enforcement organizations in the world to combine water policing and coast guard duties while remaining as a policing unit. It operates primarily as a law enforcement agency, with secondary responsibilities in search and rescue. South Africa: South Africa does not have a dedicated coast guard service in its military; the South African Navy handles coast guard-like duties. In 2017 it was reported that South Africa was looking into establishing a coast guard. Spain: The Kingdom of Spain operates several coast guard agencies. The Sociedad de Salvamento y Seguridad Marítima, also known as Salvamento Marítimo, or by its acronym SASEMAR, is the body in charge of maritime traffic control, safety and rescue operations, as well as protection of the maritime environment, but lacks any law enforcement responsibilities. The agency runs 20 rescue coordination centres (RCC), employs a staff of 1500 and operates a fleet of 19 vessels, 54 boats, 11 helicopters and 3 airplanes. Border protection functions in the Kingdom of Spain are carried out by the Civil Guard (Servicio Marítimo de la Guardia Civil), with a staff of 1100 and a fleet of 67 patrol vessels and speedboats. Maritime customs functions are the responsibility of the Servicio de Vigilancia Aduanera with 13 aircraft and a surface fleet of 2 high seas cutters; 18 high speed patrol vessels; and 21 medium-sized and smaller patrol vessels. Salvamento Marítimo operates in the four international SAR areas assigned to Spain: Atlántico, Canarias, Estrecho and Mediterráneo, covering a combined extension of 1.5 million square kilometers. During a maritime emergency, Salvamento Marítimo is responsible for the coordination of other possible responders, like the Spanish Navy or the Servicio Aéreo de Rescate, that comprises squadrons 801, 802 and 803 of the Spanish Air Force. Coordination on land, sea and air are made with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and cooperative European Union Galicia: The autonomous community of Galicia has its own separate coast guard service, the Servizo de Gardacostas de Galicia or simply Gardacostas de Galicia. It is the Galician Government agency responsible for coastal and fisheries surveillance; maritime search and rescue; and protection of the sea environment. The Gardacostas de Galicia operates a fleet of more than 20 vessels and two helicopters, from the bases of Viveiro, Ferrol, A Coruña, Muxía, Porto do Son, Ribeira, Vilagarcía de Arousa, Pontevedra and Vigo. The Gardacostas de Galicia was created in 2004, by the amalgamation of the former Servizo de Vixilancia Pesqueira (Galician Fisheries Surveillance Service) and the Servizo de Busca e Salvamento (Galician Search and Rescue Service). Sri Lanka: In Sri Lanka, until 2009 a Coast Guard Unit existed under the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, responsible for fishery and natural resource protection coastal areas. A new Department of Coast Guard was created under the Department of Coast Guard Bill presented to parliament in 2009. The department would be under the purview of the Ministry of Defense and be staffed by civilian personnel. The department's responsibilities include search and rescue, law enforcement within the country's Exclusive economic zone, conducting anti-smuggling and anti-immigration operations, suppression of terrorist activities in territorial waters of Sri Lanka. Sweden: The Swedish Coast Guard (Swedish: Kustbevakningen) is a Swedish civilian government agency with combination of police tasks, border control, maritime rescue and environmental control. Coast Guard officers carries the same equipment to regular Swedish police officers. Tasks: maritime surveillance and other control and inspection tasks as well as environmental cleanup after oil spills at sea co-ordinate the civilian needs for maritime surveillance and maritime information follow international development within the field and take part in international efforts to establish border controls, law enforcement at sea, environmental protection at sea and other maritime surveillance tasks. The Swedish Coast Guard carries out some of its surveillance by air (from its base in Skavsta near Stockholm), and some on ice and snow (from its Luleå station). It also has marine duties on Lake Vänern, Europe's third largest lake, operating out of Vänersborg. Taiwan: The Coast Guard Administration is both a military and a law enforcement organization. The CGA is considered a civilian law enforcement agency under the administration of the Executive Yuan, though during wartime it may be incorporated as part of the ROC military. Its primary roles are ensuring the safety and security of territorial waters and coordinating search and rescue efforts. The CGA includes a Maritime Patrol Directorate General and a Coast Patrol Directorate General. Officers of the Maritime Patrol Directorate General are law enforcement officials, but officers of the Coast Patrol Directorate General are considered soldiers who have partial law-enforcement power. Trinidad and Tobago: The Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard (TTCG) is the maritime division of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force. It is within the government portfolio of the Ministry of National Security. The Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard reports to the Chief of Defence Staff. The TTCG is responsible surveillance, search and rescue, fisheries enforcement, pollution enforcement, and counter-narcotics operations for maritime jurisdiction of Trinidad and Tobago. Turkey: The Turkish Coast Guard of the Republic of Turkey (Turkish: Sahil Güvenlik Komutanlığı) is a branch of the Turkish Armed Forces and was initially founded in 1859. During peacetime, it is under the command of the Ministry of Interior. However, during war or emergency time, it falls under the command of the Turkish Navy. On July 13, 1982, it was assigned to the Turkish Gendarmerie becoming both a military and a law enforcement service. Finally, the organization obtained its current form on January 1, 1985.

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It is within the government portfolio of the Ministry of National Security. The Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard reports to the Chief of Defence Staff. The TTCG is responsible surveillance, search and rescue, fisheries enforcement, pollution enforcement, and counter-narcotics operations for maritime jurisdiction of Trinidad and Tobago. Turkey: The Turkish Coast Guard of the Republic of Turkey (Turkish: Sahil Güvenlik Komutanlığı) is a branch of the Turkish Armed Forces and was initially founded in 1859. During peacetime, it is under the command of the Ministry of Interior. However, during war or emergency time, it falls under the command of the Turkish Navy. On July 13, 1982, it was assigned to the Turkish Gendarmerie becoming both a military and a law enforcement service. Finally, the organization obtained its current form on January 1, 1985. The Coast Guard is responsible for enforcement of Turkish maritime law and controlling of the Republic of Turkey's coasts in the responsibility area. It is also the main search and rescue coordination authority for the Turkish coastal zone. The Coast Guard consists of four area commands, as the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara and adjacent straits, the Aegean Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea. The Turkish Coast Guard maintains a fleet of coastal patrol ships and small craft, as well as helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. Ukraine: Ukrainian Sea Guard is the coast guard service of Ukraine, subordinated to its Border Guard Service, the local successor of the Soviet Border Troops Naval Units that have been similarly responsible for coast guard tasks. However, there were some interchanges in units, ships and personnel between Sea Guard and the Ukrainian Navy. Operates four sea guard detachment; a sea guard cutters division in Mariupol; a special-purpose sea guard cutters division in Yalta; and a riverine Dnieper sea guard cutters division in Kyiv. Sea guard administration is split between the Azov-Black seas regional administration in Simferopol and the Southern regional administration in Odesa. Service persons of the Sea Guard wear either the black uniform similar to Ukrainian Navy, but decorated with some green elements (traditional for border guard), or a common uniform of the Border Guard. United Kingdom: In the United Kingdom, His Majesty's Coastguard fulfill six of the nine functions required by the IMO; Search and Rescue, Pollution Response, Vessel Traffic Management, Maritime Safety, Accident and Disaster Response, and Maritime Security. The other three IMO functions; Customs/Border Control, Fisheries Control and Law Enforcement, are undertaken by the UK Border Force, Environment Agency and local police forces, respectively. The maintenance of seamarks is the responsibility of Trinity House (in England and Wales), the Northern Lighthouse Board (in Scotland) and the Commissioners of Irish Lights (in Northern Ireland). HM Coastguard is a civilian agency - as the duties traditionally associated with a military coast guard service are spread around the Civil Service and British Armed Forces, unlike other coast guard services around the world. It is a Category 1 emergency responder alongside the United Kingdom's regional police, fire, and ambulance services. Lifeboat services are provided by the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, or other independent lifeboat stations not affiliated with the RNLI, all under the coordination of the Coastguard. HM Coastguard wet leases commercial helicopters — Sikorsky S-92s and AgustaWestland AW189s — to provide aerial search and rescue cover around Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as well as the United Kingdom's emergency towing vessel fleet in areas not served by tug brokers. On the coastline, HM Coastguard maintains a network of cliff and mud rescue teams, comprising around 4,000 volunteers, and can call upon the National Coastwatch Institution which mans many former Coastguard lookout stations around the coast. It is part of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, which in itself is an executive agency of the Department for Transport. Scotland: The Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency (SFPA) is responsible for both deterring illegal fishing in Scottish waters, as well as monitoring the compliance of the fisheries industry in Scotland with the relevant Scottish and European Union laws on fisheries. British Overseas Territories: Royal Bermuda Regiment The Bermuda Regiment Coast Guard is responsible for Maritime Law Enforcement and Search & Rescue in Bermudian Territorial waters. BRCG works in partnership with the Bermuda Police Service. Cayman Islands Coast Guard The Cayman Islands Coast Guard is responsible for Maritime Law Enforcement and Search & Rescue in Caymanian Territorial waters. CICG works in partnership with Royal Cayman Islands Police Service, Cayman Islands Regiment, Cayman Islands Customs & Border Control, and Cayman Islands Immigration Service. United States: Formed in 1915 by the merger of the United States Revenue Cutter Service (established as the United States Revenue-Marine in 1790 and renamed in 1894) and the United States Life-Saving Service (established in 1848), and later absorbing the United States Lighthouse Service in 1939 and the functions of the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation in 1942 and 1946, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) is a military service, a law enforcement agency, and regulatory agency. It is one of the eight uniformed services of the United States and one of the six services of the United States Armed Forces. Its role includes enforcement of U.S. maritime law, coastal defense, search and rescue, environmental protection, aids to navigation, and regulation of maritime industries. During peacetime the USCG falls under the administration of the United States Department of Homeland Security (previously the U.S. Department of Transportation, 1967–2003, and the United States Department of the Treasury, 1915–1967). During wartime, the USCG may, at the direction of the President of the United States, report to the Secretary of the Navy; its resources, however, are integrated into U.S. military operations in wartime (see 14 U.S.C. §§ 3–4). As of 2022, the Coast Guard had 40,757 Coast Guardsmen on active duty, 6,240 reservists, approximately 26,000 auxiliarists, and over 7,100 full-time civilian employees. The Coast Guard maintains an extensive fleet of 243 coastal and ocean-going patrol ships, tenders, tugs and icebreakers called "Cutters", and 1650 smaller boats, as well as an extensive aviation division consisting of 201 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. While the U.S. Coast Guard is next to the smallest of the U.S. armed service branches, in terms of size, the U.S. Coast Guard is the world's largest coast guard. USCG helicopters are equipped with hoists to rescue survivors and also play a major role in law enforcement. The helicopters are able to land and take off from USCG cutters, making them an indispensable tool in fighting illegal drug traffic and the influx of undocumented immigrants attempting to illegally enter the country. The fixed-wing aircraft are used for long range search and rescue and law enforcement patrols. A construction and repair shipyard has been maintained since 1899 in the Baltimore Harbor area at Curtis Bay, United States Coast Guard Yard at Curtis Bay, Maryland Today's lighthouses on the American coasts are all maintained by the U.S. Coast Guard, from the previous old U.S. Lighthouse Service. The list of active light houses, lighted beacons, etc. that provide detailed information on aids to navigation with their locations and characteristic signals is currently maintained by the U.S. Coast Guard in its Light List issued each year. The USCG has a small service academy, equivalent to both the United States Military Academy and the United States Naval Academy in terms of students earning a 4-year degree and commission upon graduation. The United States Coast Guard Academy is much smaller in size (approx. 1,000 students) and is located at New London, Connecticut. All enlisted Coast Guardsmen attend boot camp at Cape May, New Jersey. Several other federal, state and local agencies operate maritime police and security units with law enforcement and search and rescue functions similar to the Coast Guard. Examples include the New Hampshire Marine Patrol and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Air and Marine Operations, along with state Naval Militia. Uruguay: In the Republic of Uruguay, the Coast Guard (Spanish: Prefectura Nacional Naval-PRENA) is a part of the Navy. It is tasked with the broader enforcement of maritime laws, especially against smuggling, illegal fishing, drug trafficking and piracy. It patrols the country's coastline, and is also involved in maritime search and rescue (SAR) missions, as well as the protection of the marine environment. The Uruguayan Coast Guard also frequently patrols coast areas via-foot and on patrol vehicles which they are assigned jurisdictions which are called Subprefecturas. Prefectura is also responsible for the International Port of Montevideo operability. Even though the Uruguayan Coast guard is a Military Organization they frequently help out law enforcement agencies. It must also maintain the safety of navigation and be a maritime authority on rivers, the Atlantic Ocean, The River Plate and lakes in the jurisdiction of the Navy and intervene in the flagging of vessels. In 2015, there are plans for the Uruguayan Coast Guard to pass and depend entirely on the Ministry of Interior, meaning it would not be a military unit anymore.

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Coast guard

It is tasked with the broader enforcement of maritime laws, especially against smuggling, illegal fishing, drug trafficking and piracy. It patrols the country's coastline, and is also involved in maritime search and rescue (SAR) missions, as well as the protection of the marine environment. The Uruguayan Coast Guard also frequently patrols coast areas via-foot and on patrol vehicles which they are assigned jurisdictions which are called Subprefecturas. Prefectura is also responsible for the International Port of Montevideo operability. Even though the Uruguayan Coast guard is a Military Organization they frequently help out law enforcement agencies. It must also maintain the safety of navigation and be a maritime authority on rivers, the Atlantic Ocean, The River Plate and lakes in the jurisdiction of the Navy and intervene in the flagging of vessels. In 2015, there are plans for the Uruguayan Coast Guard to pass and depend entirely on the Ministry of Interior, meaning it would not be a military unit anymore. Vietnam: Vietnam Coast Guard (VCG; Vietnamese: Cảnh sát biển Việt Nam) is directly under the administration of the Vietnamese Government, and it patrols and controls in accordance with the laws of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and international treaties concerned such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Besides maritime search and rescue (SAR) missions, Vietnam Coast Guard missions include protection the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the waters of Vietnam; protection of natural resources; prevention of environmental pollution; detection and prevention of acts of smuggling, piracy and illegal transportation and trafficking of illegal narcotics or precursors. Besides the mentioned "official coast guard", Vietnam also organizes an alternative maritime law enforcement force, which is the Vietnam Fisheries Surveillance. While theoretically focusing at counter illegal fishing behaviors and administer fisheries activities in the Vietnamese water corresponding to its name, the Fisheries Surveillance also shares VCG's missions to perform SAR and represents Vietnam's national interest and sovereignty exercises in the sea with its strong fleet of more than 100 medium-sized patrol vessels. See also: Border guard Chief Coastguard Maritime Security Regimes Port security References: External links: Download records of service of the UK Coastguard 1816-1947 Coast Guard Navik DB Admit Card 2020

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Cold war (general term)

Origins of the term: The expression "cold war" was rarely used before 1945. Some writers credit the fourteenth century Spaniard Don Juan Manuel for first using the term (in Spanish) regarding the conflict between Christianity and Islam; however the term employed was "tepid" rather than "cold". The word "cold" first appeared in a faulty translation of his work in the 19th century. In 1934, the term was used in reference to a faith healer who received medical treatment after being bitten by a snake. The newspaper report referred to medical staff's suggestion that faith had played a role in his survival as a "truce in the cold war between science and religion". Regarding its contemporary application to a conflict between nation-states, the phrase appears for the first time in English in an anonymous editorial published in The Nation Magazine in March 1938 titled "Hitler's Cold War". The phrase was then used sporadically in newspapers throughout the summer of 1939 to describe the nervous tension and spectre of arms-buildup and mass-conscription prevailing on the European continent (above all in Poland) on the eve of World War II. It was described as either a "cold war" or a "hot peace" in which armies were amassing in many European countries. Graham Hutton, Associate Editor of The Economist used the term in his essay titled "The Next Peace" published in the August 1939 edition of The Atlantic Monthly (today The Atlantic). It elaborated on the notion of cold war perhaps more than any English-language invocation of the term to that point, and garnered a least one sympathetic reaction in a subsequent newspaper column. The Poles claimed that this period involved "provocation by manufactured incidents." It was also speculated that cold war tactics by the Germans could weaken Poland's resistance to invasion. During the war, the term was also used in less lasting ways, for example to describe the prospect of winter warfare, or in opinion columns encouraging American politicians to make a cool-headed assessment before deciding whether to join the war or not. At the end of World War II, George Orwell used the term in the essay "You and the Atom Bomb" published on October 19, 1945, in the British magazine Tribune. Contemplating a world living in the shadow of the threat of nuclear war, he warned of a "peace that is no peace", which he called a permanent "cold war". Orwell directly referred to that war as the ideological confrontation between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. Moreover, in The Observer of March 10, 1946, Orwell wrote that "[a]fter the Moscow conference last December, Russia began to make a 'cold war' on Britain and the British Empire." The definition which has now become fixed is of a war waged through indirect conflict. The first use of the term in this sense, to describe the post–World War II geopolitical tensions between the USSR and its satellites and the United States and its western European allies, is attributed to Bernard Baruch, an American financier and presidential advisor. In South Carolina, on April 16, 1947, he delivered a speech (by journalist Herbert Bayard Swope) saying, "Let us not be deceived: we are today in the midst of a cold war." Newspaper reporter-columnist Walter Lippmann gave the term wide currency, with the book Cold War (1947). The term "hot war" is also occasionally used by contrast, but remains rare in literature on military theory. According to academic Covell Meyskens, the term "cold war" was not employed in China during the Maoist era. Tensions labeled a cold war: Since the US–USSR Cold War (1947–1991), a number of global and regional tensions have also been called a cold war. 16th-century England and Spain: In his 1964 article of Francis Drake's New Albion claim, Adolph S. Oko Jr. described certain 16th century tensions between England and Spain as a cold war. Great Game: The Great Game, a colonial confrontation that occurred between the 19th century British and Russian Empires in Asia, has been variously described as a cold war, though this has also been disputed. Second Cold War: The Second Cold War, also called Cold War II, Cold War 2.0, or the New Cold War, is a term describing post-Cold-War era of political and military tensions between the United States and Russia and/or China. Middle East: Malcolm H. Kerr first coined the term "Arab Cold War" to refer to a political conflict inside the Arab world between Nasserist republics defending Arab socialism, Pan-Arabism, and Arab nationalism led by Nasser's Egypt, against traditionalist monarchies led by Saudi Arabia. An Atlantic Council member Bilal Y. Saab, an About.com writer Primoz Manfreda, an Iranian scholar Seyyed Hossein Mousavian and a Princeton University scholar Sina Toossi, journalist Kim Ghattas, Foreign Policy journalist Yochi Dreazen, Brookings Institution researcher Sultan Barakat, and Newsweek journalist Jonathan Broder use the term "cold war" to refer to tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In February 2016, a University of Isfahan professor Ali Omidi dismissed the assumptions that the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia would grow tense. South Asia: Commentator Ehsan Ahrari, writer Bruce Riedel, political commentator Sanjaya Baru and Princeton University academic Zia Mian have used the term "cold war" since 2002 to refer to long-term tensions between India and Pakistan, which were part of British India until its partition in 1947. East Asia: Naval Postgraduate School academic Edward A. Olsen, British politician David Alton, York University professor Hyun Ok Park, and University of Southern California professor David C. Kang used the term to refer to tensions between North Korea and South Korea, which have been divided since the end of World War II in 1945. They interchangeably called it the "Korean Cold War". In August 2019, the North Korean government said that further US–South Korean military cooperation would prompt North Korea to "trigger a new cold war on the Korean Peninsula and in the region." China's Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng, The Diplomat editor Shannon Tiezzi, and The Guardian columnist Simon Tisdall used the term to refer to tensions between China and Japan. China and the Soviet Union: British writer Edward Crankshaw used the term to also refer to the Sino-Soviet relations after the Sino-Soviet split. "Spy wars" also occurred between the USSR and China. China and India: Imran Ali Sandano of the University of Sindh, Arup K. Chatterjee of the Jindal Global Law School, journalist Bertil Lintner, writer Bruno Maçães, politician-lawyer P. Chidambaram, politician and journalist Sanjay Jha, and some others use the terms like "new cold war" to refer to growing tensions between China and India. US cold civil war: In spring 2017, professor emeritus Angelo Codevilla used the term "cold civil war" to criticize "the ruling class—government bureaucracies, the judiciary, academia, media, associated client groups, Democratic officials, and Democrat-controlled jurisdictions"—and what Codevilla considered "against a majority of the American people and their way of life." In 2017 and 2019, journalist Carl Bernstein criticized then-President Donald Trump, whom he called in 2019 "a sham, a con, a grifter [...] president of the United States", for exacerbating what Bernstein considered "cold civil war", citing in 2017 Trump administration's scapegoating of Hillary Clinton amid the Mueller special counsel investigation and in 2019 his efforts to appeal "prejudices" of his supporters toward "the other side" whom they wanted "wiped out". The Washington Post columnist Matt Bai in January 2021 used "a Cold Civil War" in reference to the US "imminent disunion", especially by rural Americans who "live increasingly in their own reality, nourished by their own 'alternative facts' and led by their own reckless leaders" and "separate themselves from [American] urban culture and establishment media". A media studies professor David A. Love in March 2021 criticized the US Republican Party for instigating "a cold civil war by pushing for unprecedented voter suppression measures targeting minority and marginalised communities". A Governing magazine contributor Tony Woodlief in October 2021 criticized "political pundits", their use of the term, and their emphases of political class divide for "overlook[ing] ample data illuminating substantial common ground among Americans." See also: Iron Curtain Decolonization References: Further reading: Mello Morales, Frank. "Cold War' – The (Pre)history of a term". Alliierten Museum. Retrieved 29 September 2022.

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Cold-weather warfare

History: Northern and Eastern Europe were the venues for some well-documented winter campaigns. During World War II several actions took place above the Arctic Circle. Recent cold-weather conflicts have occurred in the Himalayas. Pre–1800: In 1242, the Teutonic Order lost the Battle on the Ice on Lake Peipus to Novgorod. In 1520, the decisive Battle of Bogesund between Sweden and Denmark occurred on the ice of lake Åsunden. In 1643 or 1644, Prince Rupert made an abortive attack on the Parliamentarian stronghold of Aylesbury England. 500 men are reported to have frozen to death on 21 January. On 25 January a sudden thaw caused a bridge to collapse over the River Weaver, splitting Royalist cavalry forces at the Battle of Nantwich resulting in their defeat. The 1557 Siege of Katsurayama was fought between the forces of the Japanese daimyō Takeda Shingen and Uesugi Kenshin as part of the Kawanakajima campaigns. Katsurayama castle was a strategically vital Uesugi stronghold in the contested Shinano Province and, when it was isolated from reinforcements due to late snow in early 1557, the Takeda clan used this opportunity to seize it under Baba Nobuharu, shielded from view by heavy snowfall. Sweden and Denmark fought several wars during the 16th and 17th centuries. As a great deal of Denmark consists of islands, it was usually safe from invasion, but in January 1658, most of the Danish waters froze. Charles X Gustav of Sweden led his army across the ice of the Belts to besiege Copenhagen. The war ended with the treaty of Roskilde, a treaty very favorable to the Swedish. During the Great Northern War, Swedish king Charles XII set off to invade Moscow, but was eventually defeated at the Battle of Poltava after being weakened by cold weather and scorched earth tactics. Sweden suffered more casualties during the same war as Carl Gustaf Armfeldt with 6,000 men tried to invade Trondheim. Three thousand of them died of exposure in the snow during the Carolean Death March. 19th century: During the Finnish War, the Russian army unexpectedly crossed the frozen Gulf of Bothnia from Finland to Åland and, by 19 March 1809, reached the Swedish shore within 70 kilometres (43 mi) from the Swedish capital, Stockholm. This daring maneuvre decided the outcome of the war. Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 resulted in retreat in the face of winter with the majority of the French army succumbing to frostbite and starvation, rather than combat injuries. The Battle of Weihaiwei was a battle of the First Sino-Japanese War in the winter of 1895 in Weihai, Shandong, China between the forces of the Japan and Qing China. Through a well coordinated offensive of both naval and land forces, hampered by snow and cold, the Japanese destroyed the forts on shore and sank much of the Chinese fleet. 20th century: World War I: During the First World War, soldiers on the Western front involved in trench warfare were forced to deal with freezing conditions, trench foot, frostbite, and disease. The winter of 1916-17 was exceptionally cold, which caused great hardship and deaths among the soldiers. Equipment and vehicles also were not suited for the freezing conditions. At the Battle of Sarikamish, Ottoman troops were unprepared for winter fighting and suffered major losses, with 25,000 freezing to death before the battle even began. On the Italian front, fighting bogged down in trench warfare but at mountain elevations. On White Friday, thousands of troops from both sides were killed in avalanches in the Dolomites. World War II: The Finnish Army used ski troops during the Winter War and the Second World War in which the numerically-superior but road-bound Soviet forces were vulnerable to attack by mobile, white-clad ski troops, approaching from untracked, frozen terrain. The Wehrmacht maintained elite mountain troops, Gebirgsjäger. They were organized in small, specialized units, which relied on pack animals. Typical weapons were light machine guns, mortars, and anti-tank guns. Control of ridge lines was paramount, using a limited number of outposts. They operated on the principles of fewer arms, but more ammunition per weapon and the economical use thereof. In Operation Barbarossa in 1941, both Russian and German soldiers had to endure terrible conditions during the Russian winter. The German-Finnish joint offensive against Murmansk (Operation Silver Fox) in 1941 saw heavy fighting in the Arctic environment. Subsequently, the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation conducted by the Soviet Army against the Wehrmacht in 1944 in northern Finland and Norway drove the Germans out. In late 1944, Finland turned against its former cobelligerents of Nazi Germany under Soviet pressure and pressured the Germans to withdraw in the ensuing Lapland War. While use of ski infantry was common in the Soviet Army, Germany formed only one division for movement on skis. From June 1942 to August 1943, the United States and Canada fought the Japanese in the Aleutian Islands Campaign in the Alaska Territory. In the Arctic: The following actions were fought in the Arctic by land and naval forces in World War II between 1941 and 1945 in the following theaters of operations: Finland – The Winter War was a military conflict between the Soviet Union (USSR) and Finland. It began with a Soviet invasion of Finland on 30 November 1939, three months after the outbreak of World War II, and ended three and a half months later with the Moscow Peace Treaty on 13 March 1940. In the Battle of Suomussalmi, Finns leveraged cold weather to disadvantage the Soviet enemy troops by targeting field kitchens and campfires for their attacks, thereby denying those troops warmth and nutrition. The Finns rotated their troops so that they could regularly return to warm shelters to recuperate after an attack or patrol. Heavy Soviet equipment and their associated troops were restricted to roads, while Finnish ski troops had broad mobility to outflank the enemy. The threat of Finnish snipers, whom the Russians called "cuckoos", further demoralized the Soviets. The Finns mined ice routes over lakes to sink Soviet equipment. The Lapland War was fought between Finland and Germany from September 1944 to April 1945 in Finland's northernmost Lapland Province. It included: Operation Birke (birch) was a German operation late in World War II in Finnish Lapland to protect access to nickel. Operation Nordlicht (northern lights) was a German scorched-earth retreat operation in Finland during the end of World War II. The Petsamo–Kirkenes Offensive was a major military offensive during World War II, mounted by the Soviet Army against the Wehrmacht in 1944 in northern Finland and Norway. Norway – The liberation of Finnmark was a military operation, lasting from 23 October 1944 until 26 April 1945, in which Soviet and Norwegian forces wrestled away control of Finnmark, the northernmost county of Norway, from Germany. It started with a major Soviet offensive that liberated Kirkenes. Northern Russia – Operation Silver Fox was a joint German–Finnish military operation offensive during World War II. It failed to achieve its main goal to cut off and ultimately capture the key Soviet port at Murmansk through attacks from Finnish and Norwegian territory. Spitsbergen – Operation Gauntlet was a Combined Operations raid by Canadian troops, with British Army logistics support and Free Norwegian Forces servicemen on the Norwegian island of Spitsbergen, 600 miles (970 km) south of the North Pole, from 25 August to 3 September 1941. Operation Fritham was a Norwegian military operation, based from British soil, that had the goal of securing the rich coal mines on the island of Spitsbergen (a part of Svalbard) and denying their use to Nazi Germany. Operation Zitronella (Citronella) was an eight-hour German raid on Spitzbergen on 8 September 1943. This marks the highest latitude at which a land battle has ever been fought. However, given the extreme conditions, the German and Allied troops were at times compelled to assist each other to survive. United States – The Aleutian Islands Campaign was a campaign conducted by both the United States and Imperial Japan from 3 June 1942 to 15 August 1943 in Attu and Kiska, part of the Aleutian Islands in Alaska during World War II. Post World War II: The Battle of Chosin Reservoir was a stark example of cold affecting military operations in the Korean War. There were many cold injuries and malfunctions of materiel, both vehicles and weapons. The Sino-Indian War was a Himalayan border conflict between China and India that occurred in 1962. India initiated a Forward Policy in which it placed outposts along the border in 1961. China launched simultaneous offensives in Ladakh and across the McMahon Line on 20 October 1962. Chinese troops advanced over Indian forces in both theaters. Much of the fighting took place in harsh mountain conditions, entailing large-scale combat at altitudes of over 4,000 metres (14,000 feet). Many troops on both sides succumbed to the freezing cold temperatures.

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Cold-weather warfare

Post World War II: The Battle of Chosin Reservoir was a stark example of cold affecting military operations in the Korean War. There were many cold injuries and malfunctions of materiel, both vehicles and weapons. The Sino-Indian War was a Himalayan border conflict between China and India that occurred in 1962. India initiated a Forward Policy in which it placed outposts along the border in 1961. China launched simultaneous offensives in Ladakh and across the McMahon Line on 20 October 1962. Chinese troops advanced over Indian forces in both theaters. Much of the fighting took place in harsh mountain conditions, entailing large-scale combat at altitudes of over 4,000 metres (14,000 feet). Many troops on both sides succumbed to the freezing cold temperatures. Argentine troops suffered from cold-wet conditions, holding positions in the 1982 Falklands War. The Siachen conflict is a military confrontation between India and Pakistan over the disputed Siachen Glacier region in Kashmir. The conflict began in 1984 with India's successful Operation Meghdoot during which it gained control over all of the Siachen Glacier. A cease-fire went into effect in 2003. Historical lessons learned: Paton offered a 2001 overview of human factors pertaining to cold in military operations. The understanding of cold injuries evolved in the 19th and 20th centuries; understanding of the causes and treatment of frostbite and trench foot improved. In the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese learned the importance of foot care, keeping feet dry and warm with replacement socks. In World War I, doctors realized that trench foot was a prolonged exposure to cold, wet conditions on the feet, which were exacerbated by the use of tight puttees, bandage-like leg wrappings. The Soviet invasion of Finland during the Winter War showed the power of asymmetric warfare on the Finnish side, where small units were able to cut the road-bound Soviet invading troops into segments, like firewood, and vanquish each segment. The small units arrived silently on skis or with light artillery pulled by reindeer over frozen, untracked terrain, using winter conditions as an advantage. Although the Soviet Union gained territory from the Finns, it was at the cost of 200,000 fatalities against 25,000 on the Finnish side. The German invasion of the Soviet Union induced more than 250,000 cold injuries in one year. The French Army occupying the Maginot Line experienced 12,000 cold injuries. Experiences from the disastrous 1941 German advance on Moscow in winter conditions led to the 1942 Taschenbuch für den Winterkrieg ("Pocket book for Winter War"), which highlighted ideal approaches to handling winter, but acknowledged that improvisation in the field would be necessary when supplies were lacking. The Soviet troops in that period had felt-lined boots and quilted uniforms, but the Germans continued fighting in their summer uniforms. German handbook: The Taschenbuch für den Winterkrieg manual contains sections on the influence and duration of winter, the seasons of mud and thaw, preparation for winter warfare, winter combat methods and maintaining morale, including the use of reading material, lectures, movies, and "strength through joy" exercises. Other sections cover marches, the maintenance of roads, winter bivouacs and shelter, construction of winter positions, camouflage and concealment, identification of the enemy, clothing, rations, evacuation of the wounded, care and use of weapons and equipment, signal communication, and winter mobility. The manual was designed to provide information at the officer level for indoctrination of troops via the non-commissioned officer ranks. The scope of the manual is to train troops in the following areas: Protection of personnel, vehicles and weapons against snow and cold Training personnel to be hardened against the conditions encountered and able to improvise shelter from found materials Mobility on skis, winter roads, ice crossings, and conversion of wheeled vehicles into tracked versions Construction of positions and obstacles in frozen terrain Combat in deep snow and severe cold Some highlights include addressing: Human factors – Providing the right level of clothing to maintain agility and avoid overheating. Maintaining a slow, steady marching pace to avoid chilling down in the wind. Boosting morale with up-to-date newspapers from home and nearby areas. Providing improvised shelters and bivouacs. Hygiene, emphasizing cleanliness. Mobility – Setting up and maintaining winter roads and trails. Warming up engines for reliable starting. Positions and fortifications – Using logs and snow as materials to provide trenches and gun emplacements. Care of equipment – Keeping equipment dry, when possible, and substituting low-temperature lubricants for oils and hydraulic fluids. Soviet experience: The Soviet Army learned from its 1939–40 Winter War experiences and the 1941 German advance on Moscow. The high command realized that it must prepare entire divisions for winter warfare in 1942, beginning with warm uniforms, winter equipment (skis, etc.), and training for winter operations. Analysis of previous experiences resulted in a series of manuals that covered flight, engineer, and combat arms operations in winter. Issues covered included: Flight operations – Reduced daylight, snow drifting, cold temperatures impeded the added need for air transport. Engineer operations – Engineer troops build new roadways, airfields, water crossings, and encampments with water supply. They destroy obstacles, requiring engineering equipment. Regular troops entrench tanks, construct tank obstacles, and build simple shelters. Combat arms operations – Addressing the German methods of defense with automatic weapons strongholds, supplemented with mines, wires, and anti-tank obstacles. Against these, the Russians used coordinated massed fire. In his 1981 paper, Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies, Chew draws on experiences from the Allied-Soviet War in Northern Russia during the Winter of 1918–19, the destruction of the Soviet 44th Motorized Rifle Division, and Nazi–Soviet Warfare during World War II to derive winter warfare factors pertaining to military tactics, materiel and personnel: Tactics – Defensive positions are highly advantageous because of the ability to maintain warmth and protection, compared to attacking in extreme cold. Mobility and logistical support are often restricted by snow, requiring plowing or compacting it to accommodate wide-tracked vehicles or sleds. Infantry movement in deep snow requires skis or snowshoes to avoid exhaustion. Sound carries well over crusted snow, diminishing the element of surprise. Explosives are useful for excavating foxholes and larger shelters in frozen ground. Attacking field kitchens and encampments deprives the enemy of food and shelter. Rapid removal of the wounded from the battlefield is essential to their survival in the cold. Materiel – Weapons and vehicles require special lubricants to operate at low temperatures. Mines are unreliable in winter, owing to deep snow that may cushion the fuse or form an ice bridge over the detonator. Personnel – Proper winter clothing is required to maintain body heat and to avoid such cold injuries as frostbite. Troop efficiency and survival requires either making use of available shelter or providing portable shelter. Land operations: Operational factors encompass planning for the climate and weather in which military operations are required with snow, ice, mud and cold being the primary considerations. Military tactics, materiel, combat engineering and military medicine all require specialized adaptations to the conditions encountered in cold weather. Cold and mountainous regions: In its 2016 "Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations" manual, the United States Army defines cold regions as "where cold temperatures, unique terrain, and snowfall have a significant effect on military operations for one month or more each year." It describes regions that are either severely cold or moderately cold, each comprising approximately one quarter of the Earth's land mass. Severely cold – Where mean annual air temperatures stay below freezing, maximum snow depths exceed 60 centimetres (24 in), and ice covers lakes and rivers for more than 180 days each year. Moderately cold – Where the mean temperatures during the coldest month are below freezing. The manual also delineates the principal mountain ranges of the world, which lie along broad belts which encircle the Pacific basin and then lead westward across Eurasia into North Africa. Secondarily, rugged chains of mountains lie along the Atlantic margins of the Americas and Europe. Weather conditions: Temperature, wind, snow, and thaw are the primary conditions that affect the winter battlescape. Temperature: The U.S. Army groups cold temperatures using categories. The temperature categories are (with quoted summaries): Wet cold – From 39 to 20 °F (4 to −7 °C). Wet cold conditions occur when wet snow and rain often accompany wet cold conditions. This type of environment is more dangerous to troops and equipment than the colder, dry cold environments because the ground becomes slushy and muddy and clothing and equipment becomes perpetually wet and damp. Dry cold – From 19 to −4 °F (−7 to −20 °C). Dry cold conditions are easier to live in than wet cold conditions. Like in wet cold conditions, proper equipment, training and leadership are critical to successful operations. Wind chill is a complicating factor in this type of cold. The dry cold environment is the easiest of the four cold weather categories to survive in because of low humidity and the ground remains frozen. As a result, people and equipment are not subject to the effects of the thawing and freezing cycle, and precipitation is generally in the form of dry snow. Intense cold – From −5 to −25 °F (−21 to −32 °C). This temperature range can affect the mind as much as the body.

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Cold-weather warfare

Dry cold – From 19 to −4 °F (−7 to −20 °C). Dry cold conditions are easier to live in than wet cold conditions. Like in wet cold conditions, proper equipment, training and leadership are critical to successful operations. Wind chill is a complicating factor in this type of cold. The dry cold environment is the easiest of the four cold weather categories to survive in because of low humidity and the ground remains frozen. As a result, people and equipment are not subject to the effects of the thawing and freezing cycle, and precipitation is generally in the form of dry snow. Intense cold – From −5 to −25 °F (−21 to −32 °C). This temperature range can affect the mind as much as the body. Simple tasks take longer and require more effort than in warmer temperatures and the quality of work degrades as attention-to-detail diminishes. Clothing becomes more bulky to compensate for the cold so troops lose dexterity. Commanders consider these factors when planning operations and assigning tasks. Extreme cold – From −25 to −40 °F (−32 to −40 °C). In extreme cold the challenge of survival becomes paramount as personnel withdraw into themselves. Weapons, vehicles and munitions are likely to fail in this environment. Hazardous cold – From −40 °F (−40 °C) and below. Units require extensive training before operating in these temperature extremes. The combined cooling effect of ambient temperature and wind (wind chill) is an important factor that affects troops. Snow: For military purposes, the U.S. Army categorizes snow as light, moderate, or heavy. Each classification affects visibility and ground movement due to accumulation and is quoted below: Light snow – Visibility is equal to or greater than 5⁄8 mile (1,000 m) in falling snow. A trace to one inch (2.5 cm) per hour accumulates. Moderate snow – Visibility is 5⁄16 to 1⁄2 mile (500 to 800 m) in falling snow. One to three inches (2.5 to 7.6 cm) per hour accumulates. Heavy snow – Visibility is less than 1⁄4 mile (400 m) in falling snow. Three inches (7.6 cm) or more inches per hour accumulates. Snow and snowdrifts can create advantages on the battlefield by filling in ditches and vehicle tracks and flattening the terrain. It also creates hollows on the downwind side of obstacles, such as trees, buildings, and bushes, which provide observation points or firing positions. Snowdrifts may provide cover for soldiers to approach an objective. Soviet Army doctrine cited 30 centimetres (12 in) as the threshold snow depth that impairs mobility for troops, cavalry and vehicles, except tanks for which the threshold was 50 centimetres (20 in). Thaw: Thawing conditions can impair mobility and put soldiers at risk of trench foot by turning soil to mud; it can also weaken and break up ice cover on bodies of water. Maintaining roads becomes more difficult during spring-thaw run-off periods and requires mud removal by heavy equipment. Slushy and muddy ground causes clothing and equipment to become wet, damp and dirty. Muddy conditions greatly inhibited Napoleon's ability to maneuver in Russia in the autumn of 1812 and also the German attempt to take Moscow in the autumn of 1941. The 1942 Taschenbuch für den Winterkrieg acknowledges that neither tracked nor wheeled vehicles can maneuver during conditions of thaw and that aircraft operations must be constrained to concrete runways. It addresses minimizing the use of roads during this period and dismantling bridges that are likely to be taken out by ice floes. It emphasizes how positions in frozen soil must be improved to avoid deterioration from thaw and the necessity of changing uniforms from ones for cold to those for wet conditions. Tactics: The dominant tactical concern in cold conditions is the ability to maneuver in vehicles or on foot. Additionally, during winter, night operations become the norm at higher latitudes with their long periods of darkness. Snow enhances night vision because of high reflectivity and the visibility of combatants against the white background. Mounted movement: The German Taschenbuch für den Winterkrieg emphasizes reconnaissance to ascertain the conditions and capacity of the roads to be used. It describes snow clearing from roads and recovery of bogged-down vehicles. Soviet Army doctrine emphasized the use of sleds for transporting machine guns and mortars over snow, towed in a train by tracked tractors. It addressed the need to pre-heat tanks for use in winter and their application in advance of marching troops to take out enemy positions. Finnish military doctrine calls for small-unit movements with Anti-tank guided missiles and multiple launch rocket systems to attack foreign forces that have entered the country. U.S. Army guidance advocates that over snow-covered terrain, vehicles may be employed to establish and maintain trails by establishing a well concealed track with the first vehicle, followed by a vehicle traveling offset from the track of the first, to flatten the trail, and subsequent vehicles widening and flattening the trail. Marked trails avoid obliteration in snowstorms or drifting conditions. In mountainous terrain, tracked vehicles, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and cavalry fighting vehicles, rarely accompany dismounted infantry in the assault. Instead, they assist forces by occupying positions where they can use their firepower to isolate enemy objectives. Dismounted movement: The German Taschenbuch describes preparation and conduct of marches and advocates maintaining slow, steady progress with brief stops to avoid exposure to the wind, and the provision of warm beverages by support vehicles along the way. Soviet Army doctrine emphasized the use of ski troops for dismounted operations over snow. U.S. Army guidance explains that troops moving in a wedge-like "column" formation travel more slowly, with no one breaking the trail in undisturbed snow, than the in-line file formation. Therefore, column formation is reserved for imminent enemy contact. As slope angle increases, the amount of travel time is likely to increase substantially. Water crossings: The German Taschenbuch describes the assessment and reinforcement of ice crossings and also the opportunity to use them as tank traps by removing the ice and bridging the gap with a weak structure, disguised as reinforced ice. It offers the following guidance for crossing ice sheets: The Soviet Army was an early adopter of a protocol for winter warfare. Its doctrine described the assessment and reinforcement of ice crossings and suggested the use of frozen lakes and rivers as expeditionary airfields, located close to the front to take advantage of short daylight hours in winter. According to the U.S. Army, rivers found in cold regions may be major obstacles. Subarctic rivers usually have many braided channels and swift currents. During spring and early winter, rivers may become impassable due to freezing or thawing ice flows. Once firmly frozen, rivers may offer routes for both mounted and dismounted movement. Some swampy areas do not freeze solidly during the coldest periods of winter to support troop movements. Nonetheless, it is possible to construct "ice bridges" to thicken an iced-over waterway, using pumps or some other means of flooding the ice-covered area, when temperatures are below −12 °C (10 °F) and the pre-existing natural ice is thicker than 10 centimetres (3.9 in) to support the construction activity. Snow camouflage: Armies have made use of improvised and official snow camouflage uniforms and equipment since the First World War, such as in the fighting in the Dolomite Mountains between Austria-Hungary and Italy. Snow camouflage was used far more widely in the Second World War by the Wehrmacht, the Finnish Army, the Soviet Army and others. Since then, snow variants of disruptively patterned camouflage for uniforms have been introduced, sometimes with digital patterns. For example, the Bundeswehr has a Schneetarn (snow) variant of its widely used Flecktarn pattern. Soviet Army doctrine emphasized the importance of camouflage over positions and the need to remove telltale signs of artillery actions, such as smoke stains or shell casings. It also cited the usefulness of decoy targets. It describes the establishment of breastworks made from snow 2 to 3 metres (7 to 10 ft) thick, ice 1.5 metres (5 ft) thick or soil and wood 0.9 metres (3 ft) thick. Materiel: Snow, ice and cold temperatures affect munitions and military vehicles. Munitions – Snow, ice, frozen ground, and low temperatures affect mine-laying operations. Burying mines in a frost layer may be difficult, requiring mines to be placed on top of the ground and then camouflaged. Snow or ice may prevent detonation, owing to freezing the firing device or isolating from pressure above. This can be mitigated with plastic laid over the top of the mine. Vehicles – Adaptations of military vehicles to winter operations include tire chains for maintaining traction of wheeled vehicles. Diesel engines start less well in cold and may require pre-heating or idling during cold periods. A variety of military vehicles have been developed for over-snow travel, including the Sisu Nasu, BvS 10, and M29 Weasel. Military engineering: Military engineers design and construct transportation and troop-support facilities. In cold climates frozen ground can make digging difficult. Soviet Army doctrine gave them the responsibility to establish build and maintain routes, including water crossings, build and destroy obstacles that require special equipment, construct and maintain airfields, and to build shelter for personnel.

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Cold-weather warfare

Snow or ice may prevent detonation, owing to freezing the firing device or isolating from pressure above. This can be mitigated with plastic laid over the top of the mine. Vehicles – Adaptations of military vehicles to winter operations include tire chains for maintaining traction of wheeled vehicles. Diesel engines start less well in cold and may require pre-heating or idling during cold periods. A variety of military vehicles have been developed for over-snow travel, including the Sisu Nasu, BvS 10, and M29 Weasel. Military engineering: Military engineers design and construct transportation and troop-support facilities. In cold climates frozen ground can make digging difficult. Soviet Army doctrine gave them the responsibility to establish build and maintain routes, including water crossings, build and destroy obstacles that require special equipment, construct and maintain airfields, and to build shelter for personnel. Operations that didn't require special equipment were left to other troops. The Taschenbuch describes a variety of ways to employ local resources to create roads, shelters and fortifications. Engineers provide roadways, landing zones, shelter, water supply and wastewater disposal, and electrical power to encampments. Roadway and landing zones require heavy equipment, which is more fatiguing to operate in the cold and necessary to protect from freezing. Snowstorms require cleanup and spring thaw requires management of thawed soil. Landing zones require stabilization of dust and snow to avoid blinding helicopter pilots. The U.S. Army has cold-weather adaptive kits for providing water and electrical utilities. The tactical engineer has limited options for providing a water supply; they are in order of ease of provision: drawing water from rivers or lakes, melting ice or snow, or drilling wells. Water supply and treatment is especially challenging in the cold. U.S. Army tactical water purification systems require a winter kit operate between 32 and −25 °F (0 and −32 °C). Water storage may require heating. Water source exploitation may require augering through ice, if shaped charges are not available. The water distribution system can be subject to freezing and clogging from frazil ice. Where chemical treatment is used, it takes longer to dissolve in the treated water. Medicine: Three types of cold injury can occur in the theater, hypothermia, trench foot, and frostbite in ascending amount of exposure to cold temperatures. Hypothermia: Hypothermia occurs when the body core temperature drops below 35 °C (95 °F). Symptoms depend on the temperature and range from shivering and mental confusion to increased risk of the heart stopping. The treatment of mild hypothermia involves warm drinks, warm clothing and physical activity. In those with moderate hypothermia heating blankets and warmed intravenous fluids are recommended. People with moderate or severe hypothermia should be moved gently. In severe hypothermia extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) or cardiopulmonary bypass may be useful. In those without a pulse cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is indicated along with the above measures. Rewarming is typically continued until a person's temperature is greater than 32 °C (90 °F). Adequate insulation from clothing is the best way to avoid hypothermia in the field. Trench foot: Trench foot is a medical condition caused by prolonged exposure of the feet to damp, unsanitary, and cold conditions at temperatures as warm as 16 °C (61 °F) for as few as 13 hours. Exposure to these environmental conditions causes deterioration and destruction of the capillaries and leads to morbidity of the surrounding flesh. Affected feet may become numb, affected by erythema (turning red) or cyanosis (turning blue) as a result of poor blood supply, and may begin emanating a decaying odour if the early stages of necrosis (tissue death) set in. As the condition worsens, feet may also begin to swell. Advanced trench foot often involves blisters and open sores, which lead to fungal infections. If left untreated, trench foot usually results in gangrene, which may require amputation. If trench foot is treated properly, complete recovery is normal, though it is marked by severe short-term pain when feeling returns. Trench foot affected tens of thousands of soldiers engaged in trench warfare in World War I. Keeping feet warm and dry, or at least changing into warm and dry replacement footgear, is the best way to avoid trench foot. Frostbite: Frostbite is localized damage to skin and other tissues due to freezing. At or below 0 °C (32 °F), blood vessels close to the skin start to constrict, and blood is shunted away from the extremities. The same response may also be a result of exposure to high winds. This constriction helps to preserve core body temperature. In extreme cold, or when the body is exposed to cold for long periods, this protective strategy can reduce blood flow in some areas of the body to dangerously low levels. This lack of blood leads to the eventual freezing and death of skin tissue in the affected areas. Frostbite was responsible for over one million casualties in wars in the 20th century. Adequate insulation from clothing is the best way to avoid hypothermia in the field. Training by nation: The following nations report regular training programs in cold-weather warfare: Canada – In 2008, the Canadian Forces established the Nanisivik Naval Facility, a winter warfare training center above the arctic circle in Resolute, Nunavut for annual exercises. China – The People's Liberation Army trains annually in regions subject to harsh winter conditions. Lightly armed border patrol units are mounted on horseback or snowmobiles and are expected to provide early detection of incursion. Finland – The Finnish Defence Forces train every conscript for skiing and Arctic warfare regardless of the branch, approximately 25,000 soldiers per year. Finland also trains U.S. Army students in Arctic warfare. Germany – The Bundeswehr maintains its mountain troops in Bavaria. After the 2001 disbandment of the 1st Mountain Division, mountain troops were reorganized as the Gebirgsjägerbrigade 23 with a strength of 5,000 Troops. India – The Indian Army trains 100 officers and 400 non-commissioned officers and junior commissioned officers annually, at its High Altitude Warfare School. Its graduates are assigned to the Siachen Glacier border garrison. Iran – Members of the 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade train for warfare on snow at their winter camp in Emamzadeh Hashem, Iran. Italy - The Alpini are the Italian Army's specialist mountain infantry. Established in 1872, they are the oldest active mountain infantry in the world. Japan – In the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, the Cold Weather Combat Training Unit (冬季戦技教育隊, Tōki Sengi Kyōiku-tai) is mandated for research and training for cold-weather warfare. The Winter Ranger Course (冬季遊撃課程, Tōki-Yūgeki-katei), the advanced post-graduate ranger training for cold-weather warfare, is established by this unit. Norway – Hosts an annual, multi-national winter exercise Cold Response course. In 2016, the participants came from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway. Russian Federation – Russia trains combined forces in winter annually. In 2013, it held four winter readiness exercises under shorter-than-usual notice, according to Wilk: A February exercise with seven thousand soldiers, several hundred fighting vehicles and 48 aircraft and helicopters and three March exercises, one using seven thousand soldiers, 250 fighting vehicles, 50 artillery units, 20 aircraft and helicopters as well as 36 warships. Training occurs at the Far Eastern Higher Combined Arms Command School in Blagoveshchensk in the Amur Oblast of eastern Russia. The school covers mountain and Arctic warfare and qualifies officers as "Commanders of Motorized Rifle Platoons (Arctic)". Sweden - Since 1999 Sweden has operated the Swedish Armed Forced Winter Unit as apart of the Norrbotten Regiment in northern Sweden. The unit acts as the Swedish centre of knowledge regarding arctic warfare and is responsible for the development and training of arctic warfare doctrine. In 2024, an officer of the unit (Fredrik Flink) was awarded the Defense Meritorious Service Medal from the United States Special Operations Command for his role in training and developing arctic warfare doctrine for the 10th Special Forces Group. United Kingdom – Royal Navy sailors and Royal Marines train in Norway above the Arctic Circle. The Royal Marines Mountain Leader Training Cadre is the UK premier cold-weather troop detachment. United States – The U.S. military maintains cold-weather and mountain warfare training centers at the Army Northern Warfare Training Center at Fort Wainwright, Fairbanks, Alaska, the Army Mountain Warfare School at Camp Ethan Allen, Jericho, Vermont, the Special Forces Command Mountaineering Warfare Training Detachment at Fort Carson, Colorado Springs, Colorado, the U.S. Air Force Arctic Survival School at Eielson AFB, Alaska, and the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, in Bridgeport, California. Naval operations: Subfreezing conditions have significant implications for naval operations. The 1988 U.S.

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Cold-weather warfare

United Kingdom – Royal Navy sailors and Royal Marines train in Norway above the Arctic Circle. The Royal Marines Mountain Leader Training Cadre is the UK premier cold-weather troop detachment. United States – The U.S. military maintains cold-weather and mountain warfare training centers at the Army Northern Warfare Training Center at Fort Wainwright, Fairbanks, Alaska, the Army Mountain Warfare School at Camp Ethan Allen, Jericho, Vermont, the Special Forces Command Mountaineering Warfare Training Detachment at Fort Carson, Colorado Springs, Colorado, the U.S. Air Force Arctic Survival School at Eielson AFB, Alaska, and the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, in Bridgeport, California. Naval operations: Subfreezing conditions have significant implications for naval operations. The 1988 U.S. Navy Cold Weather Handbook for Surface Ships outlines effects on: icing on the topsides of ships, ship systems, underway replenishment, flight operations, and personnel. It also discusses preparations for cold-weather fleet operations. Topside icing on ships: Topside icing is a serious hazard to ships operating in sub-freezing temperatures. Thick layers of ice can form on decks, sides, superstructures, deck mounted machinery, antennas and combat systems. The presence of topside ice has many adverse effects, principally it: Increases ship displacement Decreases freeboard Impairs operation of deck machinery Impedes personnel movement on deck Restricts helicopter operations Disrupts operation of radio and radars Combat systems degradation: Icing may prevent a warship from conducting any type of offensive operations, including restraining the doors of a vertical launch systems, binding gears, shafts, hinges and pedestals. Other effects include sluggish performance of lubricants, increased failure rate of seals, plugs and O-rings, frozen magazine sprinkler systems, excessively long warm-up times for electronics or weapon system electronics, and freeze up of compressed-air-operated components. Arctic operations: Global climate change has opened the waters of the Arctic along the northern shores of Alaska, Russia and Canada. The region is rich in natural resources. Countries abutting the Arctic Ocean have shown greater military patrol activity. The Military Times reported in 2015 that Russia had reactivated ten military bases, had increased surface ship and aircraft patrols of its Northern Fleet, and had conducted missile tests in the region. The U.S. Navy plans to have sufficient assets by 2030 to respond militarily in the Arctic. As of 2015, it conducted regular submarine patrols, but few air or surface ship operations. Russia had twelve ice breakers versus two for the U.S.. As of 2013, Canada had six ice breakers. In 2016, Canada announced the building of five ice-breaking Arctic and offshore patrol ships. See also: References: Further reading: Govan, Thomas P. (1946). Training for Mountain and Winter Warfare, Study No. 23. The Army Ground Forces. Historical Section- Army Ground Forces. Armstrong, Richard N.; Joseph G., Welsh (2014), Winter Warfare: Red Army Orders and Experiences, Cass series on Soviet military theory and practice, Routledge, p. 208, ISBN 9781135211547, retrieved 12 December 2016 External links: Bundeswehr Training Video 1959 Bundeswehr Lehrfilm - "Der Einzelschütze im Hochwinter" 1959 – 1959 German Army training film, "Individual protection in deep winter" – German narration

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Colonial war

Description: Classification: Traditionally, wars could be divided into three categories: wars of conquest, wars of liberation, and wars between states. These classifications can likewise be distinguished among colonial wars. Still, the term "colonial war" typically refers to a war of conquest. Wars of conquest, in a colonial context, can be further broken down into two stages: a period of typically brief, regular warfare between an invading power and an indigenous force (which may be, in comparison to the invader, irregular in composition or organization) followed by a period of irregular warfare. Counter-insurgency operations may be undertaken in order to prepare territory for settlement. Once a foothold has been established by an incoming power, it may launch expeditions into neighboring territory in retaliation against hostility or to neutralize a potential enemy. Common characteristics: Colonial wars differed from "regular" wars (conflicts between neighboring states) in several ways. The first was that they were more political affairs than military ones. In contrast to regular wars, in which the goals of the belligerents were limited, colonial wars were absolute; conquering powers sought to exert total and permanent control over a territory and its population and ensure lasting stability. In spite of this, resources allotted to colonial campaigns were with few exceptions limited. The meanings of defeat and victory were usually more complicated in colonial wars, as in many cases the invading power would face a belligerent that was not encapsulated by a city, government or ruler. There was often less of a distinction between indigenous citizens and the regular armed forces of defending nations. This lack of centralized authority meant that formal peace agreements were rarely made. Without government structures that could be taken over, administration of conquered peoples and territory was more difficult. To counter this colonial armies would establish or rebuild markets, schools and other public entities following a conflict, as the Americans did in the Philippines following the Spanish–American War. In contrast to indigenous forces, European armies (the most common colonizing forces) were always professional forces, removed from the general population. Tasked with the work of rebuilding and administering colonies, colonial armies were often active while regular armies in mother countries remained idle until conflict arose. As such, soldiers in these armies would develop their own military culture and practices. Most of a colonial soldier's knowledge would come from direct experience and not from a formal military education. European armies were almost always technically superior to the indigenous forces they faced, though this could not always be used to their advantage, as equipment like heavy artillery required roads (often not present) and deploying formations such as cavalry presented great logistical challenges. European armies also maintained good discipline, had high morale, were well trained and were educated in their possible deployments and in performing maneuvers. Regardless of the skill of their commanders, native armies usually lacked such cohesion and understanding of warfare. Colonial powers also employed colonial troops in their campaigns, most of whom were of a mixed composition between metropolitan men and officers and indigenous conscripts. Historical era: Colonial warfare became prevalent in the late 15th century as European powers increasingly seized overseas territories and began colonizing them. The era of colonial wars is generally considered to have ended following the conclusion of the Portuguese Colonial War in 1974, though some consider the Falklands War of 1982 to be the last true colonial war. Colonial wars are considered to be some of the first instances of irregular warfare and resulted in some of the first studies of counter-insurgency practices. Policy, strategy, and tactics: Colonial military practices and tactics were usually regarded as secondary to regular warfare by colonial powers. Due to this emphasis on more direct conflicts, imperial operations and development in colonial ventures often received less attention from the armed forces of nations responsible for them. Locally stationed military officials sometimes developed and conducted their own war policies free from metropolitan restraint. Other times, metropolitan policy was implemented at their discretion. French commanders cared little for state policy when conducting their campaigns in Western Sudan in the 1870s and 1880s, while German soldiers in Africa frequently operated contrary to the directions of the colonial bureaucracy. Colonial wars often strained relations between civil and military officials, who competed for control over policy. As in total war, invading powers often directed actions against indigenous non-combatants and local economies. This included the burning of villages, theft of cattle, and systematic destruction of crops as committed by the French in pacification campaigns in Algeria, and the Germans in the Herero Wars of southern Africa. In extreme cases, some powers advocated for the extermination of troublesome peoples, as the Germans did following the Herero conflict, resulting in the Herero and Namaqua genocide. Such actions were usually undertaken when there was a lack of political or military goals for an invader to achieve (if there was no central government to seize or organized army to subdue) as a means to subjugate local populations. European powers held the common perception that Asians and Africans "only understood the language of violence" so that they would not be subdued but through heavy-handed means. They refused to make concessions to indigenous forces for fear of appearing weak. Invading powers were much more easily frustrated when an indigenous force chose to wage a guerrilla war instead of committing to pitched battles, such as in the Franco-Hova Wars or the First Indochina War. Indigenous leaders such as Abdelkader ibn Muhieddine of Algeria, Mahmadu Lamine of Senegal, and Samori Ture of the Wassoulou Empire were able to resist European colonialism for years after disregarding traditional methods and using guerrilla tactics instead. In practice, regular and irregular forms of warfare generally happened within quick succession of one another. A handful of traditional battles were won by indigenous Asian and African forces with numerical superiority or the element of surprise over colonial powers, but over time they faced staggering losses and discouraging defeats. Such trends were marked by the German suppression of the Maji Maji Rebellion, the defeat of the Zulus at the hands of British forces at the Battle of Rorke's Drift, and the destruction of Mahdist cavalry by British Maxim machine guns at the Battle of Omdurman. Britain and France developed field manuals to prepare soldiers for colonial warfare, whereas Germany lacked a defined system for educating its troops on colonial deployment. Artillery was used by colonizers primarily as a means to demoralize indigenous fighters. Indigenous forces were usually made up of foot soldiers. North America: The first major colonial wars in North America were fought by Spanish conquistadors. Up until the American Revolutionary War, most of the colonial conflicts in North America, if they were not amphibious operations, took place in the wilderness. Most of the first British colonists in the region were farmers and merchants, not professional soldiers. At the onset of the Colony of Virginia they underwent military drilling and fortified their settlements. However, this practice was soon abandoned and a militia system was adopted. Regular militias consisted of all able males from 16 to 60 years of age who used their own firearms and served without pay. Training was minimal and occurred once a year, at which point militiamen would have to demonstrate their proficiency with their weapons. In the areas under the greatest threat from Native Americans, the militias would garrison several fortified dwellings, though militiamen usually defended their own homes. From these militias, paid "rangers" were hired to patrol the frontier line and occasionally conduct offensive raids on Native American villages. With the exception of the raiding expeditions of the French and Indian War, the majority of early colonial campaigns between colonizing powers in North America were fought in order to secure strategic forts. The purpose of nearly all movements against forts was to bring sufficient artillery close enough to breach their walls. As such, any typical attack involved the transport of cannon by a labor force, covered by an escort of troops, which would then be used to secure a compromised fort. On the American frontier in the United States, experienced Native trackers were employed as auxiliary scouts to gather intelligence on hostile Native Americans' positions and movements. Most Native Americans performed hit-and-run attacks on United States troops and settlers, often with horses. If their camp was discovered, their activities would be disrupted, usually via an early morning surprise assault. Trackers were usually native or mixed-race, though some were white. Indigenous people were often demoralized when they saw other natives working with United States forces. Native American tribes in west were culturally predisposed to political and military independence. In turn, they struggled to unite against white settlers from the east, and were often distracted from doing so by internal conflicts of their own. Some individual tribes even had trouble uniting among themselves. Still, some managed to form coalitions, such as the alliance between the Sioux, Arapaho, and Cheyenne which dominated the northern region of the Great Plains during the mid-nineteenth century. Regardless, all native peoples were at an economic and industrial disadvantage to the United States. Africa: The first colonial wars in Africa occurred between the Portuguese and various coastal inhabitants as the former sought to expand its trading empire with Asia. In spite of their efforts, the Portuguese conquistadors were only able to establish limited territorial holdings in Sub-Saharan regions, facing tropical disease and organized resistance from Africans armed with iron weapons. They were also greatly outnumbered and encountered difficulty in getting their muskets to function in the humid climate. In the 1600s and 1700s, other European powers such as the Dutch, the British, and the French began to take interest in Africa as a means to supply slaves to their American colonies. They gradually established their own enclaves along the West African coast where they could actively trade with local rulers.

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Colonial war

Regardless, all native peoples were at an economic and industrial disadvantage to the United States. Africa: The first colonial wars in Africa occurred between the Portuguese and various coastal inhabitants as the former sought to expand its trading empire with Asia. In spite of their efforts, the Portuguese conquistadors were only able to establish limited territorial holdings in Sub-Saharan regions, facing tropical disease and organized resistance from Africans armed with iron weapons. They were also greatly outnumbered and encountered difficulty in getting their muskets to function in the humid climate. In the 1600s and 1700s, other European powers such as the Dutch, the British, and the French began to take interest in Africa as a means to supply slaves to their American colonies. They gradually established their own enclaves along the West African coast where they could actively trade with local rulers. This remained the state of affairs up through the early 1800s, as few Europeans showed interest in claiming large territories in the continent. The European colonial campaigns in Africa were generally conducted by European forces with support from native troops. While European soldiers were generally more reliable, they were susceptible to diseases in tropical climates that local Africans had adjusted to, making it more optimal (less money had to be spent on medical treatment) for the latter to be deployed in Sub-Saharan environments. As such, European formations were often deployed on the continent for limited periods of time, while native units were used for longer expeditions. The powers concurred that the "African methods of warfare" were "inherently cruel". Such logic was used to justify the commission of atrocities in conflict. African peoples were relatively disjointed, leading European powers to employ a strategy of divide and rule, aggravate internal tensions, and make use of collaborationism. In response, African leaders sometimes formed coalitions. General Thomas Robert Bugeaud oversaw the first deployment of mobile columns in a colonial war in 1840 when he ordered formations to raid and plunder Arab settlements to aid in the French pacification of Algeria upon realizing that local civilians were playing a key role in the war effort. By the early 20th century, colonial campaigns in Africa had become increasingly "modern". Colonial powers were forced to commit larger bodies of troops for conquest or to suppress rebellion, as the British had to in the Second Boer War or the Italians did in their conquest of Libya. Some of this was due to the fact that in many —but not all— places the technological gap between European armies and native forces had shrunk considerably, mostly with the proliferation of quick-firing rifles. Most of this change was brought on by the evolution of Africans' tactics and strategy. They had abandoned pitched battles and had instead adopted methods of guerrilla warfare. In this fashion, the Boers (in South Africa), the Herero and Nama (in German South-West Africa), the Moroccans, and the Libyans all enjoyed considerable success against their opponents before their eventual respective defeats. Asia: Asia, like Europe, was home to several powerful empires. Between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries both dramatically increased their commercial activities, especially with one another. However, unlike Europe, Asia's military capabilities developed very little. Most Asian armies were drawn up by local ruling elites from fighting classes of men with whom they had personal ties. They were funded by plunder, rent payments, and taxes. However, payment through taxes was frequently undermined by corrupt individuals in imperial bureaucracies, who would embezzle the funds for personal use. This changed significantly with the widespread adoption of gunpowder between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, giving rise to renewed imperial power in China and Japan. Cannon capable of breaching fortified walls and ending sieges was the principal weapon. However, once the new artillery was incorporated into imperial forces, there was little incentive to experiment with new military technologies or forms of organization. Any major recruitment overhauls were likely to upset local power structures. With the suppression of nomadic steppe raiders (through the use of muskets) and the relatively limited presence of European merchantmen, there was little external pressure to alter their methods of warfare. The Asian empires also began to experience internal divisions. Competition between local elites over tax revenue burdened populaces, contributing greatly to the collapse of the Mughal Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Population growth also strained farmers and their children, breeding sectarian violence in China in the 1770s. Meanwhile, European states were frequently warring with one another, and developed new weapons and tactics to maintain military dominance. Drilling allowed for the conscription and recruitment of masses of unskilled men who would be disciplined in the performance of maneuvers. New tax systems made it possible to fund standing armies and ensure soldiers a regular salary. Enhanced power structures solidified the control commanders and political leaders had over their forces, making them effective even when operating far from seats of authority. The Industrial Revolution further increased Europeans' technological capabilities. Ultimately, Asia's antiquated governments and military establishment were unable to match the Europeans' institutions. European military dominance over Asia would become apparent in India in the eighteenth century and in China and Japan in the nineteenth century. As in Africa, European colonial ventures in Asia were usually bolstered by native soldiers. Oceania: The Queensland Native Mounted Police Force regularly employed native trackers against Indigenous Australians' communities. The force was disbanded in the 1890s after all of the native populations had been subjugated. See also: Colonialism Insurgency and counter-insurgency Society of Colonial Wars Notes: Citations: References: == Further reading ==

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Combat engineer

Combat engineer organization: Combat engineers play a key role in all armed forces of the world. They are invariably found closely integrated into the force structure of divisions, combat brigades, and smaller fighting units. Combat support formations: In many countries, combat engineers provide combat support members of a broader military engineering corps or branch. Other nations have distinct combat engineering corps or branches; they are separate from other types of military engineers. The Danish military engineers' corps, for example, is almost entirely organized into one regiment of combat engineers, simply named Ingeniørregimentet ("The Engineering Regiment"). Combat arms formations: Combat engineer battalions are usually a part of a brigade combat team. During the War in Afghanistan and the 2003–2011 Iraq War, the U.S. Army tasked its combat engineers with route clearance missions designed to counter rising threats of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). To increase the effectiveness of these units, EOD and mechanic teams were typically embedded with the combat engineer platoon. Due to rising IED threats, the U.S. Army sends some combat engineers to complete Explosive Ordnance Clearance Agent training. Special operations units: Individual combat engineers are often assigned as a component of both covert and overt direct action special operations teams. For example, the active duty US Army Special Forces and its two reserve components, the 19th SFG and 20th SFG of the US Army National Guard, employ combat engineer sergeants designated by MOS 18C. A Green Berets Operational Detachment Alpha, more commonly known as an "A-Team", typically consists of 12 men, two of whom are combat engineer sergeants. Another example is the Israeli Yahalom unit, which is a special operations engineering unit, that possess the abilities of sabotage, demolition of explosives and tunnel warfare. Terminology: A general combat engineer is often called a pioneer or sapper, terms derived respectively from the French and British armies. In some armies, pioneer and sapper indicate specific military ranks and levels of combat engineers, who work under fire in all seasons and may be allocated to different corps, as they were in the former Soviet Army, or they may be organized in the same corps. Geomatics (surveying and cartography) is another area of military engineering but is often performed by the combat engineers of some nations and in other cases is a separate responsibility, as was formerly the case in the Australian Army. While the officers of a combat engineer unit may be professionally certified civil or mechanical engineers, the non-commissioned members are generally not. Sapper: In the British, Indian, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand armies, a sapper is a soldier who has specialized combat engineer training. The term "sapper" in the U.S. Army refers to a person who either possesses the combat engineer military occupational specialty or who has graduated from the Sapper Leader Course, more commonly called "Sapper School." In Sapper School, volunteers from the ranks of combat engineers and other military occupational specialties (most of whom serve in the combat arms) undergo training in combat engineer and infantry battle drills, expedient demolitions, threat weapons, unarmed combat, mountaineering, and water operations. Some of the training in this 28-day course, arguably one of the most challenging in the U.S. Army, features covert infiltration techniques or survival skills. In the Israeli Defense Forces, sapper (פלס) is a military profession code denoting a combat engineer who has graduated from various levels of combat engineering training. Sapper 05 is the basic level, Sapper 06 is the general level, Sapper 08 is the combat engineer commander's level, and Sapper 11 is the combat engineer officer level. All IDF sappers are also trained as Rifleman 07, matching infantry. In the Canadian Army, it is a term for soldiers that have completed the basic Combat Engineer training. In the Portuguese Army, a sapador de engenharia (engineering sapper) is a soldier of the engineering branch that has specialized combat engineer training. A sapador de infantaria (infantry sapper) is a soldier of the infantry branch that has a similar training and that usually serves in the combat support sapper platoon of an infantry battalion. The Italian Army uses the term guastatori for their combat engineers. Pioneer: In the Finnish army, pioneeri is the private equivalent rank in the army for a soldier who has completed the basic combat engineering training. Naval engineers retain the rank matruusi but bear the pioneeri insignia on their sleeves. The German Bundeswehr uses the term Pionier for their combat engineers and other specialized units, who are associated with Special Forces to clear obstacles and perform engineering duties. Also the combat engineers in the Austro-Hungarian k.u.k. Forces were called "Pioniere". Assault pioneer: In the British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand armies, an assault pioneer is an infantry soldier with some limited combat engineer training in clearing obstacles during assaults and light engineering duties. Until recently, assault pioneers were responsible for the operation of flamethrowers. Field engineer: Field engineer is a term used (or formerly used) in many Commonwealth armies. In modern usage, it is often synonymous with combat engineer. However, the term originally identified those military engineers who supported an army operating in the field instead of garrison engineers who built and supported permanent fixed bases. In its original usage, "field engineering" would have been inclusive of but broader than "combat engineering." Specialisations: Sappers specialising in tunnel warfare may be known as miners. In the French army, combat engineers specialising in bridge-building are pontoniers. Practices and techniques: Combat engineers are force multipliers and enhance the survival of other troops through the use and practice of camouflage, reconnaissance, communications and other services. These include the construction of roads, bridges, field fortifications, obstacles and the construction and running of water points. In these roles, combat engineers use a wide variety of hand and power tools. They are also responsible for construction rigging, the use of explosives, and the carrying out of demolitions, obstacle clearance, and obstacle construction, assault of fortifications, use of assault boats in water obstacle crossings, helipad construction, general construction, route reconnaissance and road reconnaissance, and erecting communication installations. Combat engineers build and run water distribution points, carrying out water filtration, and NBC decontamination when necessary, and storage prior to distribution. All these role activities and technologies are divided into several areas of combat engineering: Mobility: Improving the ability of one's own force to move around the battlefield. Combat engineers typically support this role through reduction of enemy obstacles which include point and row minefields, anti-tank ditches, wire obstacles, concrete, and metal anti-vehicle barriers, and improvised explosive devices (IED) and wall and door breaching in urban terrain. Mechanized combat engineer units also have armored vehicles capable of laying short bridges for limited gap-crossing. Clearing terrain obstacles Overcoming trenches and ditches Opening routes for armored fighting vehicles Constructing roads and bridges Route clearance Countermobility: Building obstacles to prevent the enemy from moving around the battlefield. Destroying bridges, blocking roads, creating airstrips, digging trenches, etc. Can also include planting land mines and anti-handling devices when authorized and directed to do so. When the defender must retreat it is often desirable to destroy anything that may be of use to the enemy, particularly bridges, as their destruction can slow the advance of the attackers. Planting land mines Digging trenches and ditches Demolishing roads and bridges Explosive material handling: The placement of land mines to create minefields and their maintenance and removal. Clearing fields of land mines Demolition Assault: Opening routes during an assault Demolishing enemy structures (using bulldozers or explosive charges). Defense structures: Building structures which enable one's own soldiers to survive on the battlefield. Examples include trenches, bunkers, shelters, and armored vehicle fighting positions. Defensive fortifications are designed to prevent intrusion into the inner works by infantry. For minor defensive locations, these may only consist of simple walls and ditches. The design principle is to slow down the advance of attackers to where they can be destroyed by defenders from sheltered positions. Most large fortifications are not a single structure but rather a concentric series of fortifications of increasing strength. Building fortifications Building outposts Building fences Defense against WMD weapon threats Equipment and vehicles: Combat engineers employ a wide range of transportation vehicles and equipment and use weapons unique to the engineers, including those used in land mine warfare. Equipment used by combat engineers: Basic combat engineering tools include safe use of: driving tools and chopping tools (hammers, mauls, sledges, screwdriver, and bits) cutting tools and smoothing tools (saws, chisels, planes, files and rasps, brush-cutting tools, miscellaneous cutting tools) drilling tools, boring tools, and countersinking tools measuring tools, leveling tools and layout tools (rules, tapes, marking tools, levels, plumb bobs, squares) gripping tools, prying tools, and twisting tools (pliers, wrenches, bars) holding tools, raising tools, and grinding tools (vises, clamps, jacks, grinders, and oilstones) timber handling tools and climbing tools; digging tools (shovels, posthole diggers, picks, and mattocks) portable power tools and trailer-mounted tools (electric tool trailer and generator, portable power tools) miscellaneous tools.

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Combat engineer

Vehicles: Obstacle breaching: For obstacle breaching, including minefields, the combat engineers use a variety of vehicles, explosive devices, and plastic explosives including: Minefield breaching devices Dozer blade Mine rollers Bangalore torpedo Antipersonnel Obstacle Breaching System Mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC) Bomb disposal robots Explosives, mines, and bombs Field-deployable bridges, for example, French EFA and Bailey bridge. Historical publications: The Basic Field Manual, Engineer Soldier's Handbook, 2 June 1943 (FM 21-105) was written to provide guidance to a new combat engineer in the United States. See also: 17th Armored Engineer Battalion Engineer Combat Battalion List of combat engineering corps Military engineering == References ==

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Combat information center

Overview: CICs are widely depicted in film and television treatments, frequently with large maps, numerous computer consoles and radar and sonar repeater displays or consoles, as well as the almost ubiquitous grease-pencil annotated polar plot on an edge-lighted transparent plotting board. At the time the CIC concept was born, the projected map-like polar display (PPI scopes) with the ship at the center was making its way into radar displays displacing the A-scope which was simply a time-delayed blip showing a range on the cathode ray tube display of an oscilloscope. Such polar plots are used routinely in navigation and military action management to display time-stamped range and bearing information to the CIC decision makers. A single 'mark' (range and bearing datum) bears little actionable decision-making information by itself. A succession of such data tells much more, including whether the contact is closing or opening in range, an idea of its speed and direction (these are calculable, even from bearings-only data, given sufficient observations and knowledge of tactics), the relation to other contacts and their ranges and behaviors. Harvesting such data sets from the polar plots and computers (Common to sonar, radar and lidar) allows the CIC crew to plot the data correctly on a chart or map at the correct range and bearing, and to calculate the course and speed of the contact accurately, giving the set a vast expansion to include future positions, given unchanged relative courses and relative speeds. A CIC in a naval context brings together and manages information on the warship's status and its surroundings, and supplies this to the commanding officer, who would generally be present on the nearby bridge or where plots can be viewed and, if one is aboard, a flag officer who might have their own separate flag bridge and fleet CIC. CICs or operations centers in other command contexts have the same function: information ordering, gathering, and presentation to the decision makers. The methods and materials may vary, but the provision of information & options to a leader remain the same. Some control, assistance, and coordination functions may be delegated to the CIC staff or directly to the CIC officer, such as overseeing the mode and prioritization of sensor resources such as radar monitoring, targeting, or sonar activities; communications to external sources and assets. On US aircraft carriers this area is called the combat direction center (CDC). The United States developed their Command Information Center concept circa the winter of 1942–1943 and implemented it in a surge of refitting and retraining during 1943 after post-battle action analyses of battles in 1942 from the battle of the Coral Sea through the losses at Ironbottom Sound during the protracted Solomon Islands campaign. In British usage this area may be known as an aircraft direction room; together with the operations room they form an "operations headquarters". The British aircraft direction room evolved from the fighter direction office, a primitive means of controlling an aircraft carrier's aircraft through radio and radar. In September, 1942, HMS Victorious underwent a refit that included installation of an aircraft direction room. Development: The idea of such a centralized control room can be found in science fiction as early as The Struggle for Empire (1900). Early versions were used in World War II; according to Rear Admiral Cal Laning, the idea for a command information center was taken “specifically, consciously, and directly” from the spaceship Directrix in the Lensman novels of E. E. Smith, Ph.D., and influenced by the works of his friend and collaborator Robert Heinlein, a retired American naval officer. After the numerous losses during the various naval battles off Guadalcanal during the war of attrition in the Solomon Islands campaign and the Battle of Guadalcanal, the United States Navy employed operational analysis, determined many of their losses were due to procedure and disorganization, and implemented the Combat Information Centers, building on what was initially called "radar plot" according to an essay CIC Yesterday and Today by the Naval Historical Center. That same article points out that in 1942 radar, radar procedure, battle experiences, needs, and the operations room all grew up together as needs developed and experience was gained and training spread, all in fits and starts, beginning with the earliest radar uses in the Pacific battles starting with the Coral Sea, when radar gave rise to the first tentative attempt to vector an Air CAP to approaching Japanese flights, maturing somewhat before the Battle of Midway, where post-battle analysis of Coral Sea's results had given more confidence in the abilities and processes of a centralized control room. The Naval History & Heritage Command essay notes that growing the responsibility of the nascent CIC organization necessarily upset the old order of doing, who was reporting to whom, and most of all, of communications protocols where now CICs within a task group were, when possible, joined in permanent communication links to even the lowliest destroyer escort or fleet auxiliary, adding the eyes and reports of their lookouts to those of similar watch-standers about the fleet as a whole. In short the CICs continually grew for a time, superseding old organizational structure and supplanting them with a new system filtering and shaping information to a newly empowered command group. The tasks and facilities put at the service of the CICs also grew within a ship. While in 1943 a destroyer CIC might just have been configured for anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare tasks, by the Battle of the Philippine Sea when set out as radar pickets had to undertake forward air controller (FAC) functions and somehow jam in air search radar and anti-air action control functions. From that beginning, were added the corporate experiences of the continuing series of naval air and naval surface actions around and about the Battle of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands campaign. By late 1943 when the first new construction carriers of the Essex-class fleet carriers and the Independence-class light carriers with many associated fleet vessels had reinforced the refitted USS Enterprise (CV-6) and the USS Saratoga (CV-3), the U.S. Navy was prepared to take the offensive and began evolving CIC procedures and operational doctrine for a fleet of carriers. There has been an evolution of electronics (computer) equipment and user interfaces used in such installations over time. Modern CIC equipment is built up from many connected embedded systems. See also: List of established military terms Glossary of military abbreviations Command and control Comprehensive Display System Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Mission control center Naval Tactical Data System Situation room Tactical communications USS Moosehead (IX-98), a destroyer converted into a floating CIC simulator during WW2 to train CIC personnel References: External links: CIC room (World War II) CIC manual (World War II) Naval Ordnance and Gunnery, 1958 USS Sterett, CIC 1968 -1991 Modern RN Ops Room US Navy Surface Warfare Officer School – Division Officer Training Surface CIC Air CIC Sub-Surface CIC

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Combat training

Hand-to-hand combat: Hand-to-hand combat (melee) is combat at very close range, attacking the opponent with the body (striking, kicking, strangling, etc.) and/or with a melee weapon (knives, swords, batons, etc.), as opposed to a ranged weapon. Hand-to-hand combat can be further divided into three sections depending on the distance and positioning of the combatants: Clinch fighting Ground fighting Stand-up fighting Military combat: Military combat always involves between two or more opposing military forces in warfare. Military combat situations can involve multiple groups, such as guerilla groups, insurgents, domestic and/or foreign governments. A military combat situation is known either as a battle or a war, depending on the size of the fighting and which geographical areas in which it occurs. Combat effectiveness has always demanded that the personnel maintain strategic preparedness by being sufficiently trained, armed, equipped, and funded to carry out combat operations in the unit to which they are assigned. Warfare falls under the law of war, which govern its purposes and conduct, and protect the rights of combatants and non-combatants. References: Sources: Martin van Creveld: The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat, from the Marne to Turkey. Maine, New England 2007. Further reading: Wong, Leonard. 2006. "Combat Motivation in Today's Soldiers: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute."Armed Forces & Society, vol. 32: pp. 659–663. Gifford, Brian. 2005. "Combat Casualties and Race: What Can We Learn from the 2003-2004 Iraq Conflict?" Armed Forces & Society, vol. 31: pp. 201–225. Herspring, Dale. 2006. "Undermining Combat Readiness in the Russian Military, 1992-2005." Armed Forces & Society, Jul 2006; vol. 32: pp. 513–531. Ben-Shalom, Uzi; Lehrer, Zeev; and Ben-Ari, Eyal. 2005. "Cohesion during Military Operations: A Field Study on Combat Units in the Al-Aqsa Intifada." Armed Forces & Society, vol. 32: pp. 63–79. Woodruff, Todd; Kelty, Ryan; Segal, Archie Cooper, David R. 2006. "Propensity to Serve and Motivation to Enlist among American Combat Soldiers." Armed Forces & Society, Apr 2006; vol. 32: pp. 353–366. Dienstfrey, Stephen. 1988. "Women Veterans' Exposure to Combat." Armed forces & Society, vol. 14: pp. 549–558.

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Combined arms

Ancient warfare: Combined arms operations date back to antiquity, where armies would usually field a screen of skirmishers to protect their spearmen during the approach to contact. Especially in the case of the Greek hoplites, however, the focus of military thinking lay almost exclusively on the heavy infantry. In more elaborate situations armies of various nationalities fielded different combinations of light, medium, or heavy infantry, cavalry, chariotry, camelry, elephantry, and artillery (mechanical weapons). Combined arms in this context was how to best use the cooperating units, variously armed with side-arms, spears, or missile weapons in order to coordinate an attack to disrupt and then destroy the enemy. Philip II of Macedon greatly improved upon the limited combined arms tactics of the Greek city-states and combined the newly created Macedonian phalanx with heavy cavalry and other forces. The phalanx would hold the opposing line in place, until the heavy cavalry could smash and break the enemy line by achieving local superiority. The early Republic Roman Legion was a combined arms force and consisted of five classes of troops. Lightly equipped velites acted as skirmishers armed with light javelins. The hastati and principes formed the main attacking strength of the legion with swords and pila, whilst the triarii formed the defensive backbone of the legion fighting as spearmen (initially as a denser Greek phalanx and later as a looser spear wall formation) with long spears and large shields. The fifth class of troops were the equites (the cavalry), which were used for scouting, pursuit and to guard the flanks. The Legion then became notionally a unit of heavy infantrymen armed with just sword and pilum, and fielded with a small attached auxiliary skirmishers and missile troops, and incorporated a small cavalry unit. The legion was sometimes also incorporated into a higher-echelon combined arms unit – e.g., in one period it was customary for a general to command two legions plus two similarly sized units of auxiliaries, lighter units useful as screens or for combat in rough terrain. Later during the Roman Empire, auxiliary soldiers outnumbered the core legionary troops. The army of the Han dynasty is also an example, fielding mêlée infantry (equipped with a variety of different weapons ranging from swords to pikes to halberd-like weapons), archers, crossbowmen, and cavalry (ranging from horse archers to heavy lancers). One recorded tactical formation during the Han dynasty included three ranks of halberds, swordsmen, and spearmen, supported by crossbows, and with cavalry on the flanks. Civilizations such as the Carthaginians and Sassanids also were known to have fielded a combination of infantry supported by powerful cavalry. Middle Ages: At the Battle of Hastings (1066) English infantry fighting from behind a shield wall were defeated by a Norman army consisting of archers, foot soldiers (infantry), and mounted knights (cavalry). One of the tactics used by the Normans was to tempt the English to leave the shield wall to attack retreating Norman infantry only to destroy them in the open with cavalry. Likewise Scottish sheltrons – which had been developed to counter the charges by English heavy cavalry, and had been used successfully against English cavalry at the Battle of Stirling Bridge (1297) – were destroyed at the Battle of Falkirk (1298) by English archers acting in concert with mounted knights. Both Hastings and Falkirk showed how combined arms could be used to defeat enemies relying on only one arm. The English victories of Crécy, Poitiers and Agincourt were examples of a simple form of combined arms, with a combination of dismounted knights forming a foundation for formations of English longbowmen. The lightly protected longbowmen could down their French opponents at a distance, whilst the armoured men-at-arms could deal with any Frenchmen who made it to the English lines. This is the crux of combined arms: to allow a combination of forces to achieve what would be impossible for its constituent elements to do alone. During the Middle Ages military forces used combined arms as a method of winning battles and furthering a war leader or king's long-term goals. Some historians claim that during the Middle Ages there was no strategic or tactical art to military combat. Kelly DeVries uses the Merriam-Webster definition of combat "as a general military engagement". In the pursuit of a leader's goals and self-interest tactical and strategic thinking was used along with taking advantage of the terrain and weather in choosing when and where to give battle. The simplest example is the combination of different specialties such as archers, infantry, cavalry (knights or shock mounted troops), and even peasant militia. At times, each force fought on its own and won or lost depending on the opposing military competence. During the Middle Ages leaders utilized a combination of these skilled and unskilled forces to win battles. An army that has multiple skills available can engage a larger force that incorporates mainly one or two types of troops. Each type of military formation – infantry, archers, cavalry, or peasants – has certain advantages that the other does not have. Infantry allows a force to hold ground and in the event of overwhelming enemy forces withdraw into terrain that mounted troops cannot maneuver as easily, thus negating the advantage of the horse. Archers provide standoff with their bows or crossbows. Cavalry can maneuver faster and provide fast attack before the enemy has had time to prepare defenses. Peasants are more numerous and cheaper on the royal coffers. Over the long term the army can cross-train and learn the skills of the specialties to increase combat effectiveness. This is known as a combat multiplier today. The combination of the different skills help provide a commander the flexibility to minimize risk when it comes to engagements. The overall objective of any military force is to fight and win, while also preserving the largest number of combatants to carry on the larger strategic aims of the king. This can be seen in some of the engagements during the Middle Ages. Examples of middle ages combined arms use in battle: The effective use of combined arms can – in conjunction with strategic and tactical considerations – overwhelm opposing forces, even those which are numerically superior. The use of terrain and weather can also aid in the use of combined arms to bring about the desired results of the commander of a military force. Crecy-en-Ponthieu Mid-1346, at the battle of Crecy-en-Ponthieu, an English army numbering between 3,000 and 20,000 mixed troops set up a defensive line for the oncoming French forces numbering nearly 100,000 mixed troops. The English being in a defensive position dismounted their knights to augment the infantry forces on the lines of defense. The location of the English archers is unclear from the sources – either on the flanks, intermingled with the line troops, or behind the lines. But in the most likely scenario, they were formed up along the flanks according to prior positions in previous battles. The French arrived on the battlefield and sent their crossbowmen in advance of the cavalry to assault the English lines. The effectiveness of the crossbowmen was limited by rain having soaked the strings of the crossbows, reducing their effectiveness. The English archers had been able to keep their bow strings dry and only used them when the crossbowmen were in range. This led to the massacre of the crossbowmen and a retreat of the survivors, who were then trampled by the advancing French cavalry. This also disrupted an already disorganized advance after a long march to the battlefield by the cavalry. The piecemeal assault of the French forces would lead to an English victory. Battle of Morgarten In 1315, Swiss peasants, archers, and infantry at Morgarten were able to ambush a larger Austrian force. The Swiss had rebelled against Austrian rule and funneled the Austrian forces into easily defended passes in the Swiss mountains. The peasants and archers on the high ground effectively rained down arrows and rocks to disorganize the Austrian forces and the infantry charged in forcing the advance guard to retreat into the main body causing more confusion, as well as a general military retreat by the Austrian military. Battle of Auberoche In 1345, an English army of about 1,200 men had been moving through the Périgord region of Gascony. The French army had caught up outside the town of Auberoche but did not know the English had hidden in the woods near where the French had encamped upon arrival. During the evening meal the French were surprised by an attack under the cover of English archers. The disorganized French forces were slaughtered and had no choice but to withdraw. 15th to 18th centuries: Generally the savanna cavalries of West Africa used a combined arms approach, seldom operating without supporting infantry. The French army of the Valois kings, composed of heavily armoured gendarmes (professional versions of the medieval knight), Swiss and Landsknecht mercenary pikemen, and heavy cannons took form during the transition from the medieval way of war to the early modern period. The late 15th century saw the development of combined pike and shot formations in Europe, starting with the colunelas of the Spanish general Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, evolving into the tercios of Hapsburg Spain and the Imperial Army of the Holy Roman Empire during the 16th century.

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Combined arms

During the evening meal the French were surprised by an attack under the cover of English archers. The disorganized French forces were slaughtered and had no choice but to withdraw. 15th to 18th centuries: Generally the savanna cavalries of West Africa used a combined arms approach, seldom operating without supporting infantry. The French army of the Valois kings, composed of heavily armoured gendarmes (professional versions of the medieval knight), Swiss and Landsknecht mercenary pikemen, and heavy cannons took form during the transition from the medieval way of war to the early modern period. The late 15th century saw the development of combined pike and shot formations in Europe, starting with the colunelas of the Spanish general Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, evolving into the tercios of Hapsburg Spain and the Imperial Army of the Holy Roman Empire during the 16th century. In Japan, at the battle of Nagashino (長篠の戦い) in 1575, forces of the Oda clan successfully employed combined arms against the Takeda clan, which heavily relied on cavalry. The Oda army erected palisades to protect their ashigaru musketeers that shot down the Takeda cavalry while their samurai cut down any enemies who managed to approach melee range. The 17th century saw increasing use of combined arms at lower (regimental) level. King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden was the proponent of the idea. For fire support he attached teams of "commanded musketeers" to cavalry units and fielded light 3-pounder guns to provide infantry units with organic artillery. In the eighteenth century, the concept of the legion was revived. Legions now consisted of musketeers, light infantry, dragoons and artillery in a brigade sized force. These legions often combined professional military personnel with militia. Perhaps the most notable example is the use of light cavalry, light infantry and light horse artillery in advance detachments by France's La Grande Armée during the Napoleonic Wars. Napoleonic Wars: After 25 years of near continuous warfare, the armies that met at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 were organized in a similar manner – into corps which contained infantry, cavalry and artillery (see Order of battle of the Waterloo Campaign), and used similar combined arms tactics. Within each corps were divisions of infantry or cavalry made up of brigades and an artillery unit. An army would usually also have reserves of all three arms under the direct command of the army commander which could be sent in support of any corps or division of a corps to increase any arm which the army general considered necessary. The great French cavalry charge commanded by Marshal Ney during the battle failed to break Wellington's squares of infantry and Ney's failure to supplement his cavalry with sufficient horse artillery to break the squares open is usually given as a major contributing factor in the failure. It is an example of why generals needed to use combined arms to overcome the tactics used by enemy officers to frustrate an attack by a single arm of an army. In contrast the 27th (Inniskilling) suffered 478 casualties from an initial strength of 750 because of their exposure to attack by French combined arms. They were located near the centre of Wellington's line, but unlike most of the rest of Wellington's infantry were in a declivity on the exposed side of the Mont-Saint-Jean escarpment. Exposed as they were, they were forced to stand in square for most of the day for fear of cavalry attack and so made an easy dense target for Napoleon's massed artillery. 20th-century developments: First World War: The development of modern combined arms tactics began in the First World War. Early in the Western Front, fighting descended into stagnant trench warfare. Generals on both sides applied conventional military thinking to the new weapons and situations that they faced. In these early stages, tactics typically consisted of heavy artillery barrages followed by massed frontal assaults against well entrenched enemies. These tactics were largely unsuccessful and resulted in large loss of life. As the war progressed new combined arms tactics were developed, often described then as the "all arms battle". These included direct close artillery fire support for attacking soldiers (the creeping barrage), air support and mutual support of tanks and infantry. One of the first instances of combined arms was the Battle of Cambrai, in which the British used tanks, artillery, infantry, small arms and air power to break through enemy lines. Previously such a battle would have lasted months with many hundreds of thousands of casualties. Co-ordination and planning were the key elements, and the use of combined arms tactics in the Hundred Days Offensive in 1918 allowed the Allied forces to exploit breakthroughs in the enemy trenches, forcing the surrender of the Central Powers. Second World War: In World War II combined arms was a fundamental part of some operational doctrines like Heinz Guderian's Blitzkrieg, or the Soviet deep battle doctrine, which was based on combining tanks, mobile units (mechanised infantry or cavalry) and infantry, while supported by artillery. Cold War years: In 1963 the United States Marine Corps formalized the concept of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force, which combined Marine aviation and Marine ground units for expeditionary missions. The Vietnam War had a profound influence on the development of the US Army's combined arms doctrine. Due to the very difficult terrain that prevented access to the enemy-held areas of operation, troops were often deployed by air assault. For this reason, US troops in Vietnam saw six times more combat than in preceding wars, due to less time spent on logistic delays. The result: an infantry unit increased in effectiveness by a factor of four for its size, when supported with helicopter-delivered ammunition, food and fuel. In time the US Army in Vietnam also learned to combine helicopter operations and airmobile infantry with the armoured and artillery units operating from fire support bases as well as the US brown-water navy and USAF close air support units supporting them. AirLand Battle was the overall conceptual framework that formed the basis of the US Army's European warfighting doctrine from 1982 into the late 1990s. AirLand Battle emphasized close coordination between land forces acting as an aggressively maneuvering defense, and air forces attacking rear-echelon forces feeding those front line enemy forces. In the 1991 Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf used a mix of strikes by fixed-wing aircraft including carpet bombing and precision bombing in combination with large numbers of strikes by attack helicopters. During the ground assault phase, tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles supported by attack aircraft swept over remaining forces. The front line moved forward at upwards of 40–50 km/h at the upper limit of the Army's tracked vehicles. Post Cold War (1992–present): In 2000, the US Army began developing a new set of doctrines intended to use information superiority to wage warfare. Six pieces of equipment were crucial for this: AWACS (for Airborne early warning and control), JSTARS (for Airborne ground surveillance), GPS, VHF SINCGARS (for ground and airborne communications), and ruggedized computers. The mix is supplemented by satellite photos and passive reception of enemy radio emissions, forward observers with digital target designation, specialized scouting aircraft, anti-artillery radars and gun-laying software for artillery. Based on this doctrine, many US ground vehicles moved across the landscape alone. If they encountered an enemy troop or vehicle concentration, they would assume a defensive posture, lay down as much covering fire as they could, designate the targets for requested air and artillery assets. Within a few minutes, on station aircraft would direct their missions to cover the ground vehicle. Within a half-hour heavy attack forces would concentrate to relieve the isolated vehicle. In an hour and a half the relieved vehicle would be resupplied. See also: Joint warfare Battlegroup (army) Organic unit Network-centric warfare Maneuver warfare References: Bibliography: Thornton, John Kelly (1999). Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500–1800. Routledge. ISBN 1857283937 Further reading: House, Jonathan M. (1984). "Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A survey of 20th-century tactics, doctrine, and organization". University Press of the Pacific. US Army Command General Staff College. Perry, Roland (2004). Monash: The Outsider Who Won a War. Sydney: Random House.

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Command and control

Overview: US perspective: The US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines command and control as: "The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. Source: JP 1". The edition of the Dictionary "As Amended Through April 2010" elaborates, "Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission." However, this sentence is missing from the "command and control" entry for the edition "As Amended Through 15 August 2014." Commanding officers are assisted in executing these tasks by specialized staff officers and enlisted personnel. These military staff are a group of officers and enlisted personnel that provides a bi-directional flow of information between a commanding officer and subordinate military units. The purpose of a military staff is mainly that of providing accurate, timely information which by category represents information on which command decisions are based. The key application is that of decisions that effectively manage unit resources. While information flow toward the commander is a priority, information that is useful or contingent in nature is communicated to lower staffs and units. Computer security industry: This term is also in common use within the computer security industry and in the context of cyberwarfare. Here the term refers to the influence an attacker has over a compromised computer system that they control. For example, a valid usage of the term is to say that attackers use "command and control infrastructure" to issue "command and control instructions" to their victims. Advanced analysis of command and control methodologies can be used to identify attackers, associate attacks, and disrupt ongoing malicious activity. Derivative terms: There is a plethora of derivative terms that emphasize various aspects, uses, and sub-domains of C2. These terms are accompanied by numerous associated abbreviations. For example, in addition to C2, command and control is often abbreviated as C2 and sometimes as C&C "Command and control" have been coupled with: Collaboration Communication / communications Computers / computing Electronic warfare Interoperability Reconnaissance Surveillance Target acquisition and others. Some of the more common variations include: AC2 - Aviation command & control C2I – Command, control & intelligence C2I – command, control & information (a less common usage) R2C2I - rapid advanced manufacturing, command, control & intelligence [developed by SICDRONE] C2IS – command and control information systems C2ISR – C2I plus surveillance and reconnaissance C2ISTAR – C2 plus ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance) C3 – command, control & communication (human activity focus) C3 – command, control & communications (technology focus) C3 – consultation, command, and control [NATO] C3I – 4 possibilities; the most common is command, control, communications and intelligence C3ISTAR – C3 plus ISTAR C3ISREW – C2ISR plus communications plus electronic warfare (technology focus) C3MS - cyber command and control mission system C3/SA - C3 plus situational awareness C4, C4I, C4ISR, C4ISTAR, C4ISREW, C4ISTAREW – plus computers (technology focus) or computing (human activity focus) C4I2 – command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and interoperability C5I – command, control, communications, computers, collaboration and intelligence C5I – command, control, communications, computers, cyber and intelligence (US Army) C6ISR – command, control, communications, computers, cyber-defense and combat systems and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance MDC2 - multi-domain command and control NC2 − nuclear command and control NC3 − nuclear command and control and communications and others. Command: The exercise of authority based upon certain knowledge to attain an objective. Control: The process of verifying and correcting activity such that the objective or goal of command is accomplished. Communication: Ability to exercise the necessary liaison to exercise effective command between tactical or strategic units to command. Computers: The computer systems and compatibility of computer systems. Also includes data processing. Intelligence: Includes collection as well as analysis and distribution of information. Command and control centers: A command and control center is typically a secure room or building in a government, military or prison facility that operates as the agency's dispatch center, surveillance monitoring center, coordination office and alarm monitoring center all in one. Command and control centers are operated by a government or municipal agency. Various branches of the US military such as the US Coast Guard and Navy have command and control centers. They are also common in many large correctional facilities. A command and control center that is used by a military unit in a deployed location is usually called a "command post". A warship has a combat information center for tactical control of the ship's resources, but commanding a fleet or joint operation requires additional space for commanders and staff plus C4I facilities provided on a flagship (e.g., aircraft carriers), sometimes a command ship or upgraded logistics ship such as USS Coronado. Command and control warfare: Command and control warfare encompasses all the military tactics that use communications technology. It can be abbreviated as C2W. An older name for these tactics is "signals warfare", derived from the name given to communications by the military. Newer names include information operations and information warfare. The following techniques are combined: Cyber operations with the physical destruction of enemy communications facilities. The objective is to deny information to the enemy and so disrupt its command and control capabilities. At the same time precautions are taken to protect friendly command and control capabilities against retaliation. In addition to targeting the enemy's command and control, information warfare can be directed to the enemy's politicians and other civilian communications. Electronic warfare (EW) Military deception Operations security (OPSEC) Psychological operations (PSYOP) Psychological warfare See also: US and other NATO specific: Other Military Institute of Telecommunications and Information Technologies References: Citations: Sources: External links: Command and control definitions and procedures, UK College of Policing International Command and Control Institute Understanding Command and Control by D. S. Alberts and R. E. Hayes (2006)

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Command hierarchy

Military chain of command: In a military context, the chain of command is the line of authority and responsibility along which orders are passed within a military unit and between different units. In simpler terms, the chain of command is the succession of leaders through which command is exercised and executed. Orders are transmitted down the chain of command, from a responsible superior, such as a commissioned officer, to lower-ranked subordinate(s) who either execute the order personally or transmit it down the chain as appropriate, until it is received by those expected to execute it. "Command is exercised by virtue of office and the special assignment of members of the Armed Forces holding military rank who are eligible to exercise command." In general, military personnel give orders only to those directly below them in the chain of command and receive orders only from those directly above them. A service member who has difficulty executing a duty or order and appeals for relief directly to an officer above his immediate commander in the chain of command is likely to be disciplined for not respecting the chain of command. Similarly, an officer is usually expected to give orders only to his or her direct subordinate(s), even if only to pass an order down to another service member lower in the chain of command than said subordinate. The concept of chain of command also implies that higher rank alone does not entitle a higher-ranking service member to give commands to anyone of lower rank. For example, an officer of unit "A" does not directly command lower-ranking members of unit "B", and is generally expected to approach an officer of unit "B" if he requires action by members of that unit. The chain of command means that individual members take orders from only one superior and only give orders to a defined group of people immediately below them. If an officer of unit "A" does give orders directly to a lower-ranked member of unit "B", it would be considered highly unusual (i.e., a faux pas, or extraordinary circumstances, such as a lack of time or inability to confer with the officer in command of unit "B") as officer "A" would be seen as subverting the authority of the officer of unit "B". Depending on the situation or the standard procedure of the military organization, the lower-ranked member being ordered may choose to carry out the order anyway, or advise that it has to be cleared with his or her own chain of command first, which in this example would be with officer "B". Refusal to carry out an order is almost always considered insubordination; the only exception usually allowed is if the order itself is illegal (i.e., the person carrying out the order would be committing an illegal act). (See superior orders.) In addition, within combat units, line officers are in the chain of command, but staff officers in specialist fields (such as medical, dental, legal, supply, and chaplain) are not, except within their own specialty. For example, a medical officer in an infantry battalion would be responsible for the combat medics in that unit but would not be eligible to command the battalion or any of its subordinate units. The term is also used in a civilian management context describing comparable hierarchical structures of authority. Such structures are included in Fire Departments, Police Departments, and other organizations that have a paramilitary command or power structure. Sociology: In sociology, command hierarchy is seen as the most visible element of a "power network." In this model, social capital is viewed as being mobilized in response to orders that move through the hierarchy leading to the phrase "command and control". Features: Regardless of the degree of control or results achieved, and regardless of how the hierarchy is justified and rationalized, certain aspects of a command hierarchy tend to be similar: rank – especially military rank – "who outranks whom" in the power structure unity of command – each member of the hierarchy has one and only one superior, precluding the possibility of contradictory orders strict accountability – those who issue orders are responsible for the consequences, not those who carry them out (with the exception of illegal orders, as previously noted) strict feedback rules – complaints go up the hierarchy to those with power to deal with them, not down to those who do not have that power detailed rules for decision making – what criteria apply and when standardized language and terminology some ethics and key beliefs in common, usually enforced as early as recruiting and screening of recruits Problems: However, people of such compatible views often have similar systemic biases because they are from the same culture. Such problems as groupthink or willingness to accept one standard of evidence internal to the group, but require drastically higher evidence from outside, are common. In part to address these problems, much modern management science has focused on reducing reliance on command hierarchy especially for information flow, since the cost of communications is now low, and the cost of management mistakes is higher. It is also easier to replace managers, so they have a personal interest in more distributed responsibility and perhaps more consensus decision making. Ubiquitous command and control posits for military organizations, a generalisation from hierarchies to networks that allows for the use of hierarchies when they are appropriate, and non-hierarchical networks when they are inappropriate. This includes the notion of mission agreement, to support "edge in" as well as "top-down" flow of intent. See also: Control (management) Command (military formation) Hierarchical organization Incident Command System Command and control Military rank Directive control == References ==

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Command of the sea

Historic command of the sea during the age of sail: National capabilities: Historically, many powers attempted to extend command of the sea into peacetime, imposing taxes or other restrictions on shipping using areas of open sea. For example, Venice claimed the Adriatic Sea, and exacted a heavy toll from vessels navigating its northern waters. Genoa and France each claimed portions of the western Mediterranean Sea. Denmark and Sweden claimed to share the Baltic Sea between them. Spain claimed dominion over the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico, and Portugal over the Indian Ocean and all the Atlantic Ocean south of Morocco (Hall, 148-9). Asymmetric countermeasures: During the age of sail, there were two primary counter measures to another power holding control of the sea: smuggling, and privateering. Smuggling helped to ensure that a country could continue trading (and obtaining food and other vital supplies) even when under blockade, while privateering allowed the weaker power to disrupt the stronger power's trade. As these measures, which are examples of asymmetric warfare, came from non-governmental and sometimes criminal organizations, they fell into disfavor with stronger governments. The 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law banned privateering. That treaty was ratified by relatively few countries, but has become the customary law of the sea. Historic command of the sea in the era of steam: A more modern countermeasure, similar to privateering, was the use of submarine warfare by Germany during World War I and World War II to attack allied merchant shipping primarily in the Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and Baltic Sea. Historic command of the sea in the era of naval aviation: During World War II, aircraft also became an effective countermeasure to command of the sea, since ships could not defend themselves well against air attack. The Battle of Britain was largely an attempt by Germany to eliminate the Royal Air Force, so that it would not be able to defend the Royal Navy from air attack and even to allow a maritime invasion of Great Britain proper. The entire Japanese naval strategy during World War II in the Pacific was to acquire command of the sea by largescale destruction of Allied naval power, until their fleet was either destroyed or rendered irrelevant by the Battle of Leyte Gulf giving command of the sea to the Allies. Modern command of the sea: Advanced navies, with access to surveillance satellites and large-scale submarine detection systems, can rarely be surprised at sea, but cannot be everywhere. Individual ships of advanced navies can be vulnerable at sea (e.g., the USS Stark hit by an Iraqi aircraft-delivered anti-ship missile while patrolling the Persian Gulf) or in port (e.g., by the suicide attack on the USS Cole.) "Blue-water" naval capability means that a fleet is able to operate on the "high seas." While traditionally a distinction was made between the coastal brown-water navy, operating in the littoral zone to 200 nautical miles (370 km), and a seagoing blue-water navy, a new term, "green-water navy," has been created by the U.S. Navy, which refers to the coastal submarines and fast attack boats of many nations, the larger littoral combat corvettes and similar vessels of a substantial number of powers, and amphibious vessels ranging from elderly LSTs to complex S/VTOL carriers and other specialized ships. In modern warfare blue-water navy implies self-contained force protection from sub-surface, surface and airborne threats and a sustainable logistic reach, allowing a persistent presence at range. In some maritime environments such a defence is given by natural obstacles, such as the Arctic ice shelf. The US Navy studied a concept for an economically priced ship capable of surface and subsurface sea control with ASW helicopters and STOVL fighters for light air defense but not large enough to be well suited to power projection known as a Sea Control Ship. This small aircraft carrier was not built by the US although a long deck Amphibious assault ship equipped with STOVL fighters and ASW helicopters instead of its primary transport helicopters is operating in a secondary sea control role. Requirements for modern sea control: During the Falklands War, the British lacked long-range Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), which led to ship losses and major damage to others, when the Argentinian attack aircraft came into the view of ship radar at approximately the same time they would fire antiship missiles, and only a short time before they made bombing attacks. A number of navies have learned this lesson. Many navies with STOVL carriers have developed helicopter-mounted AWACS like the British and Spanish Westland Sea King AEW, Italian EH-101 AEW, and the Russian Ka-31 AEW helicopter. Recently the French with a new larger CATOBAR aircraft carrier obtained the US E-2 Hawkeye AWACS aircraft. An example for the difference between a blue-water navy and a green-water navy: "...The first should be a 'green-water active defense' that would enable the People's Liberation Army Navy to protect China's territorial waters and enforce its sovereignty claims in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. The second phase would be to develop a blue-water navy capable of projecting power into the western Pacific . . . Liu [commander in chief of the PLAN 1982-88 and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission 1989-97] believed that in order to fulfill a blue-water capability, the PLAN had to obtain aircraft carriers . . ." Aircraft carriers are deployed with other specialized vessels in carrier battle groups, providing protection against sub-surface, surface and airborne threats. As there is no clear definition of a blue-water navy, the status is disputed. Given the importance of naval aviation, the term may be considered to be strongly linked to the maintenance of aircraft carriers capable of operating in the oceans. "In the early 80s there was a bitter and very public battle fought over whether or not to replace Australia's last aircraft carrier, HMAS Melbourne. Senior Royal Australian Navy personnel warned without a carrier, Australia would be vulnerable to all types of threat. One ex-Chief of Navy went so far as to claim that we" (the Australians) "would no longer have a blue-water navy (one capable of operating away from friendly coasts)." Yet although the Royal Thai Navy operates a sea-going carrier, the RTN is not absolutely a "blue-water navy." Countermeasures to imposed command: While a blue-water navy can project sea control power into another nation's littoral, it remains susceptible to threats from less capable forces. Sustainment and logistics at range yield high costs and there may be a saturation advantage over a deployed force through the use of land-based air or surface-to-surface missile assets (whether on terrain-following or ballistic trajectories), diesel-electric submarines, or asymmetric tactics such as Fast Inshore Attack Craft. An example of this vulnerability was the October 2000 USS Cole bombing in Aden. In response to these threats, the U.S. Navy has developed the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). See also: Battleplan (documentary TV series) Air supremacy Naval blockade Sea denial Alfred Thayer Mahan Maritime republics Maritime power Thalassocracy References: Notes: Sources: WE Hall, Treatise on International Law, 4th ed., 1895.

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Commerce raiding

Privateering: The first sort of commerce raiding was for nations to commission privateers. Early instances of this type of warfare were by the English and Dutch against the Spanish treasure fleets of the 16th century, which resulted in financial gain for both captain and crew upon capture of enemy vessels ("prizes"). 17th and 18th centuries: Privateers formed a large part of the total military force at sea during the 17th and 18th centuries. In the First Anglo-Dutch War, English privateers attacked the trade on which the United Provinces entirely depended, capturing over 1,000 Dutch merchant ships. During the subsequent war with Spain, Spanish and Flemish privateers in the service of the Spanish Crown, including the notorious Dunkirkers, captured 1,500 English merchant ships, which provided a major boost to the flagging Dutch trade. Dutch privateers and others also attacked English trade, whether coastal, Atlantic, or Mediterranean, in the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch wars. During the Nine Years' War, French policy strongly encouraged privateers, including the famous Jean Bart, to attack English and Dutch shipping. England lost roughly 4,000 merchant ships during the war. In the following War of Spanish Succession, privateer attacks continued, Britain losing 3,250 merchant ships. Parliament passed an updated Cruisers and Convoys Act in 1708, allocating regular warships to the defence of trade. In the War of Austrian Succession, the Royal Navy was able to concentrate more on defending British ships. Britain lost 3,238 merchantmen, a smaller fraction of her merchant marine than the enemy losses of 3,434. While French losses were proportionally severe, the smaller but better-protected Spanish trade suffered the least, and Spanish privateers enjoyed much of the best plunder of enemy merchantmen, particularly in the West Indies. Napoleonic Wars: During Britain's wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, the Royal Navy dominated the seas. France adopted a guerre de course strategy by licensing civilian privateers to seize British shipping. British East Indiamen of the time were therefore heavily armed to protect themselves against such raids, at the cost of considerable speed and maneuverability. Some East Indiamen, such as Arniston, were successfully able to fend off these attacks in other parts of the world; others, such as when Kent met Confiance in 1800, were less fortunate. U.S. and British privateers also actively raided each other's shipping during the War of 1812. American Civil War: During the American Civil War, the Confederate Navy operated a fleet of commissioned Confederate States Navy commerce raiders. These differed from privateers as they were state-owned ships with orders to destroy enemy commerce rather than privately owned ships with letters of marque. Steel navies: By the 1880s, the navies of Europe began to deploy warships made of iron and steel. The natural evolution that followed was the installation of more powerful guns to penetrate such warships, followed by specialized armor plating, followed by larger guns and the development of effective torpedoes (followed by armored belts below the waterline to protect against them). This "arms spiral" (which included the development of high explosive and armor-piercing shells) shifted focus from capture of "prizes" (that meant financial gain for captain and crew of the responsible vessel, and their government, when the prize and her cargo were auctioned) to destruction of enemy warships. First seen at the Sinope in 1853, the change was little appreciated until 1905, when at Tsushima seven pre-dreadnoughts were sent to the bottom, and the only prizes were those that had voluntarily surrendered. World War I: World War I saw Germany conducting a commerce war ("Handelskrieg") against Britain and her allies, principally with U-boats, but also with merchant raiders and light cruisers, and even occasionally with naval airships. World War II: During World War II, the Battle of the Atlantic saw Nazi Germany conducting commerce raiding against Britain and its allies, again using U-boats, auxiliary cruisers, and small groups of cruisers and battleships (surface raiders). The goal was to wage a tonnage war against the British Empire, destroying merchant shipping (and its cargoes) faster than they could be replaced, ultimately strangling the island nation by cutting off supplies it was inevitably dependent upon. Limitations set by the Treaty of Versailles meant Germany had been unable to build a large battle fleet between the World Wars as she had in the time leading up to the World War I; instead, she chose to covertly develop her U-boat fleet. Submarines were cheaper and quicker to build than capital ships. This meant Germany was not able to fight battles between fleets, and relied on commerce raiding instead. The extreme early success of Kriegsmarine U-boat wolfpacks led to the Allied development of an extensive and naval resource-straining convoy system. In addition to U-boats Germany also deployed the small numbers of surface warships she possessed, such as the Deutschland "pocket battleships", her auxiliary cruisers, and a number of commercial vessels converted into merchant raiders, perhaps the most famous being Atlantis. During World War II, elements of the United States Navy based in Brazil conducted operations in the Atlantic against German commerce raiders and blockade runners. In the Pacific, the U.S. Navy operated against Japanese merchant shipping, as well as engaging in offensive operations against ships of the Japanese Imperial Navy. The bulk of the Japanese merchant marine was sunk by American submarines. By the end of the war, only 12% of Japan's pre-war merchant tonnage was still afloat. The Indian Ocean raid was a naval sortie by the Carrier Striking Task Force of the Japanese Navy from 31 March to 10 April 1942 against Allied shipping and bases in the Indian Ocean. It was an early engagement of the Pacific campaign of World War II. The staff of the Imperial Japanese Navy decided to send some raiders to Indian Ocean waters during December 12, 1941 – July 12, 1942. The Germans had already been operating in the area and conducted mutual aid with Japanese submarines, in the form of re-supply and military intelligence. The Indian Ocean was the largest operating area involving direct contact between the two Axis partners, in which their primary objective was to keep pressure on the shipping lanes. The Japanese Navy participated in some commerce raiding, but concentrated its efforts toward a "decisive battle" in the Pacific, which never took place. See also: Axis naval activity in Australian waters Demoralization (warfare) German auxiliary cruiser Atlantis Indian Ocean raid Japanese raiders in Indian Ocean Campaign Merchant raider Naval strategy Piracy Privateer Q-ship Tonnage war Unrestricted submarine warfare Notes: References: L, Klemen (2000). "Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941–1942". Archived from the original on 2011-07-26. Retrieved 2021-03-30. Lehmann, Ernst A.; Mingos, Howard. The Zeppelins: The Development of the Airship, with the Story of the Zepplin Air Raids in the World War. * Further reading: Brown, David. Warship Losses Of World War II. 1995. ISBN 1-55750-914-X. Blair, Clay, Jr. Silent Victory. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975. Mahan, Alfred, Captain. Influence of Seapower on History. Reeman, Douglas. The Last Raider. Arrow Books. ISBN 0-09-905580-5. Novel detailing the last voyage of a WWI German commerce raider. Chapter VI: "THE NORTH SEA PATROL—THE ZEPPELINS AT JUTLAND"(online chapter).

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Conquest

Methods of conquest: The Ottomans used a method of gradual, non-military conquest in which they established suzerainty over their neighbours and then displaced their ruling dynasties. This concept was first systematized by Halil İnalcık. Conquests of this sort did not involve violent revolution but were a process of slow assimilation, established by bureaucratic means such as registers of population and resources as part of the feudal timar system. Ancient conquests: The ancient civilized peoples conducted wars on a large scale that were, in effect, conquests. In Egypt the effects of invasion and conquest are to be seen in different racial types represented in paintings and sculptures. Improved agriculture production was not conducive to peace; it allowed for specialization which included the formation of ever-larger militaries and improved weapon technology. This, combined with growth of population and political control, meant war became more widespread and destructive. Thus, the Aztecs; Incas; the African Kingdoms Dahomey and Benin; and the ancient civilizations of Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria and Persia all stand out as more militaristic than the less organized societies around them. Military adventures were on a larger scale and effective conquest for the first time became feasible. Leading to migration: Military conquest has been one of the most persistent causes of human migrations. There is a significant influence of migration and conquest on political development and state formation. Conquest leading to migration has contributed to race mixture and cultural exchange. The latter points influence on conquest has been of far greater significance in the evolution of society. Conquest brings humans into contact, even though it is a hostile contact. Plunder: Plunder has in all times and places been a result of war, the conquerors taking whatever things of value they find. The desire for it has been one of the most common causes of war and conquest. The state: In the formation of the modern state, the conspicuous immediate causes are the closely related facts of migration and conquest. The state has increased civilization and allowed increased cultural contact allowing for a cultural exchange and stimulus; frequently the conquerors have taken over the culture of their subjects. Subjugation: With subjugation, further class distinctions arise. The conquered people are enslaved; thus the widest possible social classes are produced: the enslaved and the free. The slaves are put to work to support the upper classes, who regard war as their chief business. The state is in origin a product of war and exists primarily as an enforced peace between conquerors and conquered. From slavery and from conquest, another result of war, sprang differentiation of classes and occupations termed the division of labour. Through conquest, society became divided into a ruling militant class and a subject industrial class. The regulative function devolved upon the conquering soldiers and operations side to the serfs and slaves. Culture after conquest: After a conquest where a minority imposes itself on a majority, it usually adopts the language and religion of the majority, through this force of numbers and because a strong government can be maintained only through the unity of these two important facts. In other cases, especially when the conquerors create or maintain strong cultural or social institutions, the conquered culture could adopt norms or ideas from the conquering culture to expedite interactions with the new ruling class. These changes were often imposed on the conquered people by force, particularly during religiously motivated conquests. Post-World War II: Scholars have debated the existence of a norm against conquest since 1945. Conquest of large swaths of territory has been rare, but states have since 1945 continued to pursue annexation of small swaths of territory. See also: War of aggression, discusses post-WW2 prohibition against wars of conquest Invasion Right of conquest Victory == References ==

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Conscientious objector

History: Many conscientious objectors have been executed, imprisoned, or otherwise penalized when their beliefs led to actions conflicting with their society's legal system or government. The legal definition and status of conscientious objection has varied over the years and from nation to nation. Religious beliefs were a starting point in many nations for legally granting conscientious objector status. The earliest recorded conscientious objector, Maximilianus, was conscripted into the Roman Army in the year 295, but "told the Proconsul in Numidia that because of his religious convictions he could not serve in the military". He was executed for this, and was later canonized as Saint Maximilian. An early recognition of conscientious objection was granted by William the Silent to the Dutch Mennonites in 1575. They could refuse military service in exchange for a monetary payment. Formal legislation to exempt objectors from fighting was first granted in mid-18th-century Great Britain following problems with attempting to force Quakers into military service. In 1757, when the first attempt was made to establish a British Militia as a professional national military reserve, a clause in the Militia Ballot Act allowed Quakers exemption from military service. In the United States, conscientious objection was permitted from the country's founding, although regulation was left to individual states prior to the introduction of conscription. International law: Universal Declaration of Human Rights: In 1948, the issue of the right to "conscience" was dealt with by the United Nations General Assembly in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It reads: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. The proclamation was ratified during the General Assembly on 10 December 1948 by a vote of 48 in favour, 0 against, with 8 abstentions. In 1974, the Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, Seán MacBride said, in his Nobel Lecture, "To the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights one more might, with relevance, be added. It is 'The Right to Refuse to Kill'." In 1976, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights entered into force. It was based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and was originally created in 1966. Nations that have signed this treaty are bound by it. Its Article 18 begins: "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion." However, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights left the issue of conscientious objection inexplicit, as in this quote from War Resisters International: "Article 18 of the Covenant does put some limits on the right [to freedom of thought, conscience and religion], stating that [its] manifestations must not infringe on public safety, order, health or morals. Some states argue that such limitations [on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion] would [derivatively] permit them to make conscientious objection during time of war a threat to public safety, or mass conscientious objection a disruption to public order, ... [Some states] even [argue] that it is a 'moral' duty to serve the state in its military." On 30 July 1993, explicit clarification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 18 was made in the United Nations Human Rights Committee general comment 22, Paragraph 11: "The Covenant does not explicitly refer to a right to conscientious objection, but the Committee believes that such a right can be derived from article 18, inasmuch as the obligation to use lethal force may seriously conflict with the freedom of conscience and the right to manifest one's religion or belief." In 2006, the committee has found for the first time a right to conscientious objection under article 18, although not unanimously. In 1997, an announcement of Amnesty International's forthcoming campaign and briefing for the UN Commission on Human Rights included this quote: "The right to conscientious objection to military service is not a marginal concern outside the mainstream of international human rights protection and promotion." In 1998, the Human Rights Commission reiterated previous statements and added "states should ... refrain from subjecting conscientious objectors ... to repeated punishment for failure to perform military service". It also encouraged states "to consider granting asylum to those conscientious objectors compelled to leave their country of origin because they fear persecution owing to their refusal to perform military service ..." In 2001, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union recognised the right to conscientious objection. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status: The Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (the Handbook) of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) states: 171. Not every conviction, genuine though it may be, will constitute a sufficient reason for claiming refugee status after desertion or draft-evasion. It is not enough for a person to be in disagreement with his government regarding the political justification for a particular military action. Where, however, the type of military action, with which an individual does not wish to be associated, is condemned by the international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct, punishment for desertion or draft-evasion could, in the light of all other requirements of the definition, in itself be regarded as persecution. National law: United States: At least two state constitutions have recognized an individual right not to bear arms. Pennsylvania's Constitution of 1790 states "Those who conscientiously scruple to bear arms, shall not be compelled to do so; but shall pay an equivalent for personal service." New Hampshire's Constitution of 1784 states "No person, who is conscientiously scrupulous about the lawfulness of bearing arms, shall be compelled thereto." Selective conscientious objection: Air Commodore Lionel Charlton, of the British Royal Air Force (RAF), served in the military from 1898 to 1928. In 1923 he selectively refused to serve in the RAF Iraq Command. (He later went on to serve as Air Officer Commanding No 3 Group.) On 4 June 1967, John Courtney Murray, an American Jesuit priest and theologian, delivered an address at Western Maryland College concerning a more specific type of conscientious objection: "the issue of selective conscientious objection, conscientious objection to particular wars, or as it is sometimes called, discretionary armed service." On 8 March 1971, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in the case of Gillette v. United States that "the exemption for those who oppose 'participation in war in any form' applies to those who oppose participating in all war and not to those who object to participation in a particular war only." On 14 September 2003, in Israel, 27 reserve pilots and former pilots refused to serve in only specific missions. These specific missions included "civilian population centers" in "the [occupied] territories". These pilots clarified: "We ... shall continue to serve in the Israel Defense Forces and the Air Force for every mission in defense of the state of Israel." On 25 May 2005, journalist Jack Random wrote the following: "The case of Sergeant Kevin Benderman (Iraq War Resister) raises the burning issue of selective conscientious objection: While it is universally accepted that an individual cannot be compelled against conscience to war in general, does the same hold for an individual who objects, in the depths of the soul, to a particular war?" Religious motives: Cases of behavior which could be considered as religiously motivated conscientious objection are historically attested long before the modern term appeared. For example, the Medieval Orkneyinga Saga mentions that Magnus Erlendsson, Earl of Orkney – the future Saint Magnus – had a reputation for piety and gentleness, and because of his religious convictions refused to fight in a Viking raid on Anglesey, Wales, instead staying on board his ship singing psalms. The reasons for refusing to perform military service are varied. Many conscientious objectors cite religious reasons. Unitarian Universalists object to war in their sixth principle "The goal of world community with peace, liberty and justice for all". Members of the Historic Peace Churches such as Quakers, Anabaptists (Mennonites, Amish, Old Order Mennonite, Conservative Mennonites, the Bruderhof Communities and Church of the Brethren), as well as Holiness Pacifists such as the Reformed Free Methodist Church, Emmanuel Association of Churches, the Immanuel Missionary Church and Church of God (Guthrie, Oklahoma), object to war from the conviction that Christian life is incompatible with military action, because Jesus enjoins his followers to love their enemies and to refuse violence. The Book of Discipline of the Reformed Free Methodist Church teaches: Militarism is contrary to the spirit of the New Testament and the teachings of Jesus Christ. Even from humanitarian principles alone, it is utterly indefensible. It is our profound and God-given conviction that none of our people be required to participate in war of any form and that these God-given convictions of our members be respected. Since the American Civil War, Seventh-day Adventists have been known as non-combatants, and have done work in hospitals or to give medical care rather than combat roles, and the church has upheld the non-combative position.

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Conscientious objector

The Book of Discipline of the Reformed Free Methodist Church teaches: Militarism is contrary to the spirit of the New Testament and the teachings of Jesus Christ. Even from humanitarian principles alone, it is utterly indefensible. It is our profound and God-given conviction that none of our people be required to participate in war of any form and that these God-given convictions of our members be respected. Since the American Civil War, Seventh-day Adventists have been known as non-combatants, and have done work in hospitals or to give medical care rather than combat roles, and the church has upheld the non-combative position. Jehovah's Witnesses and Christadelphians, refuse to participate in the armed services on the grounds that they believe they should be neutral in worldly conflicts and often cite the latter portion of Isaiah 2:4 which states, "...neither shall they learn war anymore". Other objections can stem from a deep sense of responsibility toward humanity as a whole, or from simple denial that any government possesses the moral authority to command warlike behavior from its citizens. The varied experiences of non-combatants are illustrated by those of Seventh-day Adventists when there was mandatory military service: "Many Seventh-day Adventists refuse to enter the army as combatants, but participate as medics, ambulance drivers, etc. During World War II in Germany, many SDA conscientious objectors were sent to concentration camps or mental institutions; some were executed. Some Seventh-day Adventists volunteered for the US Army's Operation Whitecoat, participating in research to help others. The Church preferred to call them "conscientious participants", because they were willing to risk their lives as test subjects in potentially life-threatening research. Over 2,200 Seventh-day Adventists volunteered in experiments involving various infectious agents during the 1950s through the 1970s in Fort Detrick, MD." Earlier, a schism arose during and after World War I between Seventh-day Adventists in Germany who agreed to serve in the military if conscripted and those who rejected all participation in warfare—the latter group eventually forming a separate church (the Seventh Day Adventist Reform Movement). In the early Christian Church followers of Christ refused to take up arms. In as much as they [Jesus' teachings] ruled out as illicit all use of violence and injury against others, clearly implied [was] the illegitimacy of participation in war ... The early Christians took Jesus at his word, and understood his inculcations of gentleness and non-resistance in their literal sense. They closely identified their religion with peace; they strongly condemned war for the bloodshed which it involved. After the Roman Empire officially embraced Christianity, the just war theory was developed in order to reconcile warfare with Christian belief. After Theodosius I made Christianity an official religion of the Empire, this position slowly developed into the official position of the Western Church. In the 11th century, there was a further shift of opinion in the Latin-Christian tradition with the crusades, strengthening the idea and acceptability of holy war. Objectors became a minority. Some theologians see the Constantinian shift and the loss of Christian pacifism as the great failing of the Church. Ben Salmon was a Catholic conscientious objector during World War I and outspoken critic of Just War theology. The Catholic Church denounced him and The New York Times described him as a "spy suspect". The US military (in which he was never inducted) charged him with desertion and spreading propaganda, then sentenced him to death (this was later revised to 25 years hard labor). On June 5, 1917, Salmon wrote in a letter to President Wilson: Regardless of nationality, all men are brothers. God is "our Father who art in heaven". The commandment "Thou shalt not kill" is unconditional and inexorable. ... The lowly Nazarene taught us the doctrine of non-resistance, and so convinced was he of the soundness of that doctrine that he sealed his belief with death on the cross. When human law conflicts with Divine law, my duty is clear. Conscience, my infallible guide, impels me to tell you that prison, death, or both, are infinitely preferable to joining any branch of the Army. Nowadays, the Catholic Church teaches that "Public authorities should make equitable provision for those who for reasons of conscience refuse to bear arms; these are nonetheless obliged to serve the human community in some other way." (point 2311 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church) Because of their conscientious objection to participation in military service, whether armed or unarmed, Jehovah's Witnesses have often faced imprisonment or other penalties. In Greece, for example, before the introduction of alternative civilian service in 1997, hundreds of Witnesses were imprisoned, some for three years or even more for their refusal. In Armenia, young Jehovah's Witnesses were imprisoned because of their conscientious objection to military service; this was discontinued in November 2013. The government of South Korea also imprisons hundreds for refusing the draft. In Switzerland, virtually every Jehovah's Witness is exempted from military service. For believers in Indian religions, the opposition to warfare may be based on either the general idea of ahimsa, nonviolence, or on an explicit prohibition of violence by their religion, e.g., for a Buddhist, one of the five precepts is "Pānātipātā veramaṇi sikkhāpadam samādiyāmi", or "I undertake the precept to refrain from destroying living creatures", which is in obvious opposition to the practice of warfare. The 14th Dalai Lama has stated that war "should be relegated to the dustbin of history". On the other hand, many Buddhist sects, especially in Japan, have been thoroughly militarized, warrior monks (yamabushi or sōhei) participating in the civil wars. Hindu beliefs do not go against the concept of war, as seen in the Gita. Both Sikhs and Hindus believe war should be a last resort and should be fought to sustain life and morality in society. Followers of the Baháʼí Faith are advised to do social service instead of active army service, but when this is not possible because of obligations in certain countries, the Baháʼí laws include loyalty to one's government, and the individual should perform the army service. Some practitioners of pagan religions, particularly Wicca, may object on the grounds of the Wiccan rede, which states "An it harm none, do what ye will" (or variations). The threefold law may also be grounds for objection. A notable example of a conscientious objector was the Austrian devout Roman Catholic Christian Franz Jägerstätter, who was executed on August 9, 1943, for openly refusing to serve in the Nazi Wehrmacht, consciously accepting the penalty of death. He was declared Blessed by Pope Benedict XVI in 2007 for dying for his beliefs, and is viewed as a symbol of self-sacrificing resistance. Alternatives for objectors: Some conscientious objectors are unwilling to serve the military in any capacity, while others accept noncombatant roles. While conscientious objection is usually the refusal to collaborate with military organizations, as a combatant in war or in any supportive role, some advocate compromising forms of conscientious objection. One compromising form is to accept non-combatant roles during conscription or military service. Alternatives to military or civilian service include serving an imprisonment or other punishment for refusing conscription, falsely claiming unfitness for duty by feigning an allergy or a heart condition, delaying conscription until the maximum drafting age, or seeking refuge in a country which does not extradite those wanted for military conscription. Avoiding military service is sometimes labeled draft dodging, particularly if the goal is accomplished through dishonesty or evasive maneuvers. However, many people who support conscription will distinguish between "bona fide" conscientious objection and draft dodging, which they view as evasion of military service without a valid excuse. Conservative Mennonites do not object to serving their country in peaceful alternatives (alternative service) such as hospital work, farming, forestry, road construction and similar occupations. Their objection is in being part in any military capacity whether noncombatant or regular service. During World War II and the Korean, Vietnam war eras they served in many such capacities in alternative I-W service programs initially through the Mennonite Central Committee and now through their own alternatives. Despite the fact that international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe (CoE) regard and promote conscientious objection as a human right, as of 2004, it still does not have a legal basis in most countries. Among the roughly one-hundred countries that have conscription, only thirty countries have some legal provisions, 25 of them in Europe. In Europe, most countries with conscription more or less fulfill international guidelines on conscientious objection legislation (except for Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, Finland and Russia) today. In many countries outside Europe, especially in armed conflict areas (e.g. Democratic Republic of the Congo), conscientious objection is punished severely. In 1991, The Peace Abbey established the National Registry for Conscientious Objection where people can publicly state their refusal to participate in armed conflict. Informed Consent Violations: In some cases, conscientious objectors have been interned in concentration-camp-like conditions, which would be coercive for objectors to "volunteer" for quasi-ethical experimentation.

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Conscientious objector

Among the roughly one-hundred countries that have conscription, only thirty countries have some legal provisions, 25 of them in Europe. In Europe, most countries with conscription more or less fulfill international guidelines on conscientious objection legislation (except for Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, Finland and Russia) today. In many countries outside Europe, especially in armed conflict areas (e.g. Democratic Republic of the Congo), conscientious objection is punished severely. In 1991, The Peace Abbey established the National Registry for Conscientious Objection where people can publicly state their refusal to participate in armed conflict. Informed Consent Violations: In some cases, conscientious objectors have been interned in concentration-camp-like conditions, which would be coercive for objectors to "volunteer" for quasi-ethical experimentation. Such a technique was used in the Minnesota Starvation Experiment whereby objectors agreed to be starved to near-death conditions in exchange for their freedom and Operation Whitecoat where objectors were deliberately exposed to biological weapons and would gain their freedom if they survived. Conscientious objection around the world: Belgium: Conscription was mandatory to all able-bodied Belgian males until 1994, when it was suspended. Civilian service was possible since 1963. Objectors could apply for the status of conscience objector. When granted, they did an alternative service with the civil service or with a socio-cultural organisation. The former would last 1.5 times as long as the shortest military service, the latter twice as long. After their service, objectors are not allowed to take jobs that require them to carry weapons, such as police jobs, until the age of 42. Since conscription was suspended in 1994 and military service is voluntary, the status of conscience objector can not be granted anymore in Belgium. Canada: Mennonites and other similar peace churches in Canada were automatically exempt from any type of service during Canada's involvement in World War I by provisions of the Order in Council of 1873 yet initially, many were imprisoned until the matter was again resettled. With pressure of public opinion, the Canadian government barred entry of additional Mennonite and Hutterite immigrants, rescinding the privileges of the Order in Council. During Canada's involvement in World War II, Canadian conscientious objectors were given the options of noncombatant military service, serving in the medical or dental corps under military control or working in parks and on roads under civilian supervision. Over 95% chose the latter and were placed in Alternative Service camps. Initially the men worked on road building, forestry and firefighting projects. After May 1943, as the labour shortage developed within the nation and another Conscription Crisis burgeoned, men were shifted into agriculture, education and industry. The 10,700 Canadian objectors were mostly Mennonites (63%) and Dukhobors (20%). Colombia: Conscientious objection is recognised in Colombia. Czechoslovakia: In Czechoslovakia, those not willing to enter mandatory military service could avoid it by signing a contract for work lasting years in unattractive occupations, such as mining. Those who did not sign were imprisoned. Both numbers were tiny. After the communist party lost its power in 1989, alternative civil service was established. As of 2006, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia have abolished conscription. The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in both countries now guarantees the right to refuse military service on grounds on conscience or religious belief. Denmark: Any male getting drafted, but unwilling to serve, has the possibility to avoid military service by instead serving community service for the duration of the conscription. Eritrea: There is no right to conscientious objection to military service in Eritrea – which is of an indefinite length – and those who refuse the draft are imprisoned. Some Jehovah's Witness conscientious objectors have been in jail since 1994. Finland: Finland introduced conscription in 1881, but its enforcement was suspended in 1903 as part of Russification. During the Finnish Civil War in 1918, conscription was reintroduced for all able-bodied men. In 1922, the option of noncombatant military service was introduced, but service in the military remained compulsory on pain of imprisonment. After the struggle of pacifist Arndt Pekurinen a law was passed providing for a peacetime-only alternative to military service, or civilian service (Finnish siviilipalvelus). The law was dubbed "Lex Pekurinen" after him. During the Winter War, Pekurinen and other conscientious objectors were imprisoned, and Pekurinen was eventually executed at the front in 1941, during the Continuation War. After the war, a conscientious objector's civilian service lasted 16 months, whereas military service was 8 months at its shortest. To qualify for civilian service, an objector had to explain his conviction before a board of inspection that included military officers and clergymen. In 1987, the duration of the service was shortened to 13 months and the board of inspection was abolished. In 2008, the term was further shortened to 12 months to match the duration of the longest military service (that of officer trainees and technical crew). Today, a person subject to conscription may apply for civilian service at any time before or during his military service, and the application is accepted as a matter of course. A female performing voluntary military service can quit her service anytime during the first 45 days, however, if she wants to quit after those 45 days she would be treated like a male and assigned to civilian service. Persons who have completed their civilian service during peacetime have, according to the legislation enacted in 2008, the right to serve in non-military duties also during a crisis situation. They may be called to serve in various duties with the rescue services or other necessary work of a non-military nature. Persons who declare themselves to be conscientious objectors only after a crisis has started must, however, prove their conviction before a special board. Before the new legislation, the right to conscientious objection was acknowledged only in peacetime. The changes to the service term and to the legal status of objectors during a crisis situation were made as a response to human rights concerns voiced by several international bodies, who are overseeing the implementation of human rights agreements. These organisations had demanded Finland to take measures to improve its legislation concerning conscientious objectors, which they considered discriminatory. None of these organisations have yet raised concerns on the current legislation. There are a small number of total objectors who refuse even civilian service, and are imprisoned for six months. This is not registered into the person's criminal record. France: The creation of a legal status for conscientious objectors in France was the subject of a long struggle involving for instance or the much-publicised trials of Protestant activists Jacques Martin, Philippe Vernier and Camille Rombault in 1932–1933 or the hunger strike of anarchist Louis Lecoin in 1962. The legal status law was passed in December 1963, 43 years (and many prison sentences) after the first requests. In 1983, a new law passed by socialist Interior Minister Pierre Joxe considerably improved this status, simplifying the conditions under which the status would be granted. Conscientious objectors were then free to choose an activity in the social realm where they would spend their civil service time. However, in order to avoid too many applications for civil service at the expense of the military, the duration of the civil service is however kept twice as long as the military service. The effect of these laws was suspended in 2001 when compulsory military service was abolished in France. The special prison at Strasbourg for Jehovah's Witnesses, who refuse to join any military, was also abolished. Since 1986, the associations defending conscientious objection in France have chosen to celebrate their cause on 15 May. Germany: Nazi Germany: In Nazi Germany, conscientious objection was not recognized in the law. In theory, objectors would be drafted and then court-martialled for desertion. The practice was even harsher: going beyond the letter of an already extremely flexible law, conscientious objection was considered subversion of military strength, a crime normally punished with death. On 15 September 1939, August Dickmann, a Jehovah's Witness, and the first conscientious objector of the war to be executed, died by a firing squad at the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Among others, Franz Jägerstätter was executed after his conscientious objection, on the grounds that he could not fight for an evil force. East Germany: After World War II in East Germany, there was no official right to conscientious objection. Nevertheless, and uniquely among the Eastern bloc, objections were accepted and the objectors assigned to construction units. They were however part of the military, so that a fully civilian alternative did not exist. Also, "construction soldiers" were discriminated against in their later professional life. West Germany and reunified Germany: According to Article 4(3) of the German constitution: "No person may be forced against their conscience to perform armed military service. Details shall be regulated by a federal law."

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Conscientious objector

On 15 September 1939, August Dickmann, a Jehovah's Witness, and the first conscientious objector of the war to be executed, died by a firing squad at the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Among others, Franz Jägerstätter was executed after his conscientious objection, on the grounds that he could not fight for an evil force. East Germany: After World War II in East Germany, there was no official right to conscientious objection. Nevertheless, and uniquely among the Eastern bloc, objections were accepted and the objectors assigned to construction units. They were however part of the military, so that a fully civilian alternative did not exist. Also, "construction soldiers" were discriminated against in their later professional life. West Germany and reunified Germany: According to Article 4(3) of the German constitution: "No person may be forced against their conscience to perform armed military service. Details shall be regulated by a federal law." According to Article 12a, a law may be passed to require every male from the age of 18 to military service called Wehrdienst; also, a law can require conscientious objectors to perform non-military service instead called Wehrersatzdienst, literally "military replacement service", or colloquially Zivildienst. These laws were applicable and demanded compulsory service in the German armed forces (German: Bundeswehr) until the abolition of draft in 2011. Initially, each conscientious objector had to appear in person to a panel hearing at the draft office (or contest a negative decision at the administrative court). The suspension of the procedure (1977), allowing to "object with a post card", was ruled unconstitutional in 1978. Beginning in 1983, competence was shifted to the Kreiswehrersatzamt (district military replacement office), which had discretion to either approve or reject a conscientious objection, which had to consist of a detailed written statement by an applicant giving reasons as to why the applicant was conscientiously objecting. This was generally just a formality, and objections were not often rejected. In later years in particular however, with the rise of the Internet, conscientious objections fell into disrepute because of the ease of being able to simply download existing example objections. It earned some conscientious objections the suspicion of an applicant simply attempting an easy way out of military service. On the other hand, certain organizations within the German peace movement had been offering pamphlets for decades giving suggestions to applicants as to the proper wording and structure of an objection which would have the greatest chances of success. Following a 1985 Federal Constitution Court decision, Wehrersatzdienst could be no simple choice of convenience for an applicant, but he had to cite veritable conflict of conscience which made him unable to perform any kind of military service at all. If there was doubt about the true nature of an objector's application, he could be summoned to appear before a panel at the Kreiswehrersatzamt to explain his reasons in person. An approved conscientious objection in any case then meant that an applicant was required by law to perform Wehrersatzdienst. Complete objection both to military and replacement service was known as Totalverweigerung; it was illegal and could be punished with a fine or a suspended custodial sentence. Nearly the only legal way to get both out of military service and replacement service was to be deemed physically unfit for military service. Both men who entered military service and those who wanted to go into replacement service had to pass a military physical examination at the military replacement office. Five categories/levels of physical fitness, or Tauglichkeitsstufen, existed. Tauglichkeitsstufe 5, in short T5, meant that a person was rejected for military service and thus also did not need to enter replacement service. T5 status was usually only granted if a person had physical or mental disabilities or was otherwise significantly impaired, such as due to very poor eyesight or debilitating chronic illnesses. However, in the last years of the draft, T5 was increasingly given to potential recruits with only minor physical or mental handicaps. Another way to get out of service completely was the two brothers rule, which stated that if two older brothers had already served in the military, any following male children of a family were exempt from service. Due to West Berlin's special status between the end of the Second World War and 1990 as a city governed by foreign military powers, draft did not apply within its borders. This made Berlin a safe haven for many young people who chose to move to the city to prevent criminal court repercussions for Totalverweigerung. As Totalverweigerer were often part of the far-left political spectrum, this was one factor which spawned a politically active left-wing and left-wing radical scene in the city. Wehrersatzdienst was for a long time considerably longer than military service, by up to a third, even when the duration of service was gradually reduced following reunification and the end of the Cold War. This was held by some as a violation of constitutional principles, but was upheld in several court decisions based on the reasoning that former service personnel could be redrafted for military exercises called Wehrübungen, while somebody who had served out his replacement service could not. Moreover, work conditions under military service typically involved more hardship and inconvenience than Wehrersatzdienst. In 2004, military service and Wehrersatzdienst were then made to last equal lengths of time. Military service and draft were controversial during much of their existence. Reasons included the consideration that Germans could be made to fight against their fellow Germans in East Germany. Moreover, draft only applied to men, which was seen as gender based discrimination by some, but was often countered by the argument that women usually gave up their careers either temporarily or permanently to raise their children. With the end of the Cold War and the German military's primary purpose of defending its home territory increasingly looking doubtful, draft also began to become more arbitrary, as only certain portions of a particular birth year were drafted (usually those in very healthy physical condition), while others were not. This was seen as a problem of Wehrgerechtigkeit, or equal justice of military service. Then-German President Roman Herzog said in a 1994 speech (which was frequently cited as an argument for draft abolition) that only the necessity for national defense, not any other arguments can justify draft. On the other hand, this logic tended to not be extended to men serving Wehrersatzdienst, as they usually worked in fields of public health, elderly care, medical assistance or assistance for the disabled. Their relatively low-paid work was seen as an ever more important backbone of a health sector which was grappling with rapidly increasing costs of care. In 2011 the mandatory draft was abolished in Germany, mainly due to a perceived lack of aforementioned necessity. The Bundeswehr now solely relies on service members who deliberately choose it as a career path. Neither Article 12a (establishing the possibility of draft) nor Article 4 (3) (permitting conscientious objection) have been removed from the German Constitution. In theory, this makes a full reversion to draft (and Wehrersatzdienst) possible, if it is thought to be necessary. Hungary: Conscription was suspended in Hungary in 2004. Before being drafted anyone can apply for the status of conscientious objector and fulfill his duties in unarmed military service or civilian service. Israel: All Israeli citizens and permanent residents are liable to military service. However, the Ministry of Defense has used its discretion under article 36 of this law to automatically exempt all non-Jewish women and all Arab men, except for the Druze, from military service ever since Israel was established. Israeli Arabs may volunteer to perform military service, but very few do so (except among the Bedouin population of Israel). In discussing the status of the armed forces shortly after the founding of the State of Israel, representatives of orthodox religious parties argued that yeshiva students should be exempt from military service. This derives from the Jewish tradition that if a man wants to dedicate his life to religious study, society must allow him to do so. The request of orthodox political parties to "prevent neglect of studying the Torah" was granted by the authorities. But in recent years this exemption practice has become the subject of debate in Israeli society, as the absolute and the relative numbers of the men who received this exemption rose sharply. In 2012, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled in the case of Ressler et al. v. The Knesset et al.. that the blanket exemption granted to ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students was ultra vires the authority of the Minister of Defence, and that it violated Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and was, therefore, unconstitutional. As for conscientious objection, in 2002, in the case of David Zonschein et al. v. Military Advocate General et al., the Supreme Court reiterated its position that selective conscientious objection was not permitted, adding that conscientious objection could only be recognized in cases of general objection to military service. Women can claim exemption from military service on grounds of conscience under arts. 39 (c) and 40 of the Defense Service Law, according to which religious reasons can be grounds for exemption. Italy: Until 2004 conscription was mandatory to all able-bodied Italian males.

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Conscientious objector

In 2012, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled in the case of Ressler et al. v. The Knesset et al.. that the blanket exemption granted to ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students was ultra vires the authority of the Minister of Defence, and that it violated Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and was, therefore, unconstitutional. As for conscientious objection, in 2002, in the case of David Zonschein et al. v. Military Advocate General et al., the Supreme Court reiterated its position that selective conscientious objection was not permitted, adding that conscientious objection could only be recognized in cases of general objection to military service. Women can claim exemption from military service on grounds of conscience under arts. 39 (c) and 40 of the Defense Service Law, according to which religious reasons can be grounds for exemption. Italy: Until 2004 conscription was mandatory to all able-bodied Italian males. Those who were born in the last months of the year typically used to serve in the Navy, unless judged unable for ship service (in this case they could be sent back to Army or Air Force). Until 1972, objectors were considered as traitors and tried by a military tribunal; after 1972, objectors could choose an alternative civilian service, which was eight months longer than standard military service (fifteen months, then twelve, as for Army and Air Force, 24 months, then eighteen, then twelve as for the Navy). Since such length was judged too punitive, an arrangement was made to make the civilian service as long as the military service. Since 2004, Italian males no longer need to object because military service has been turned into volunteer for both males and females. Marshall Islands: In the Republic of the Marshall Islands no person can be conscripted if, after being afforded a reasonable opportunity to do so, he has established that he is a conscientious objector to participation in war (Marshall Islands Constitution Article II Section 11). The Netherlands: Conscription was mandatory to all able-bodied Dutch males until 1 May 1997, when it was suspended. The Law on conscientious objections military services is active since 27 September 1962. Objectors have to work a third time longer in civil service than is normal for military service. The civil service have to be provided by government services, or by institutions designated for employment of conscientious objectors designated by the Secretary of Social Affairs and Employment, who work in the public interest. New Zealand: In 1916 conscription was introduced in New Zealand, with only Quakers, Christadelphians, and Seventh-day Adventists having automatic exemption from the conscription. During the First World War, between 1,500 and 2,000 objectors and defaulters were convicted, or came under state control, for their opposition to war. At least 64 of these were still at Waikeria Prison on 5 March 1919 – some of whom had gone on hunger strike in protest. Also during the First World War fourteen objectors, including Archibald Baxter, were forcibly sent to the front lines and were subject to Field Punishment No. 1, which "involved being tethered tightly by the wrists to a sloping pole to ensure their bodies hung with their hands taking all their weight." During World War Two, conscription was re-introduced in 1940 and 5000 men applied for an exemption on the grounds of conscientious objection. Of these, 800 were imprisoned for the length of the war, and were barred from voting for ten years when they were released following the end of the war. In the contemporary setting, there is no statute or case law which deal with conscientious objection. But, the OHCHR believes that the Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the ratification of Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights creates a legal framework which enables conscientious objection. Romania: In Romania, as of 23 October 2006 conscription was suspended, therefore, the status of conscience objector does not apply. This came about due to a 2003 constitutional amendment which allowed the parliament to make military service optional. The Romanian Parliament voted to abolish conscription in October 2005, with the vote formalizing one of many military modernization and reform programs that Romania agreed to when it joined NATO. Russia: The Russian Empire allowed Russian Mennonites to run and maintain forestry service units in South Russia in lieu of their military obligation. The program was under church control from 1881 through 1918, reaching a peak of seven thousand conscientious objectors during World War I. An additional five thousand Mennonites formed complete hospital units and transported wounded from the battlefield to Moscow and Ekaterinoslav hospitals. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, Leon Trotsky issued a decree allowing alternative service for religious objectors whose sincerity was determined upon examination. Vladimir Chertkov, a follower of Leo Tolstoy, chaired the United Council of Religious Fellowships and Groups, which successfully freed 8000 conscientious objectors from military service during the Russian Civil War. The law was not applied uniformly and hundreds of objectors were imprisoned and over 200 were executed.The United Council was forced to cease activity in December 1920, but alternative service was available under the New Economic Policy until it was abolished in 1936. Unlike the earlier forestry and hospital service, later conscientious objectors were classified "enemies of the people" and their alternative service was performed in remote areas in a gulag-like environment in order to break their resistance and encourage enlistment. In the present day, Russian draft legislation allows people to choose an alternative civilian service for religious or ideological reasons. Most objectors are employed in healthcare, construction, forestry and post industries, serving 18 to 21 months. Serbia: Serbia introduced civil service for Conscientious objectors in 2009. the service lasted 9 months and people serving were task to help out in government facilities such as post offices, kindergartens, hospitals etc. In 2020 during covid-19 they were called to help prepare military hospitals for the influx of military and civilian patients. When civil service was introduced the mandatory military service period was reduced from 12 months to 6 months. Mandatory military service was abolished in 2011. South Africa: During the 1980s, hundreds of South African white males dodged the draft, refused the call-up or objected to conscription in the South African Defence Force. Some simply deserted, or joined organisations such as the End Conscription Campaign, an anti-war movement banned in 1988, while others fled into exile and joined the Committee on South African War Resistance. Most lived in a state of internal exile, forced to go underground within the borders of the country until a moratorium on conscription was declared in 1993. Opposition to the Angolan War, was rife in English-speaking campuses, and later the war in the townships became the focus of these groupings. South Korea: The terminology conscientious objector technically has not existed in Korean dictionary until recently. In fact, significant majority of Korean citizens simply associate conscientious objectors with draft dodging, and are unaware of the fact that conscientious objector draftees in other westernized countries are required to serve in alternative services. Since the establishment of the Republic of Korea, thousands of conscientious objectors had no choice but to be imprisoned as criminals. Every year about 500 young men, mostly Jehovah's Witnesses, are arrested for refusing the draft. South Korea's stance has drawn criticism from The U.N. Human Rights Committee, which argues that South Korea is violating article 18 of the ICCPR, which guarantees freedom of thought and conscience. In 2006, 2010, and again in 2011 the U.N. Human Rights Committee, after reviewing petitions from South Korean conscientious objectors, declared that the government was violating Article 18 of the ICCPR, the provision that guarantees the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The government's National Action Plan (NAP) for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has not shown a clear stance on the pressing human rights issues such as, among other things, the rights of conscientious objectors to military service. In September 2007, the government announced a program to give conscientious objectors an opportunity to participate in alternative civilian service. The program stipulates three years of civilian service that is not connected with the military in any way. However, that program has been postponed indefinitely after the succeeding administration took office in 2008. The government argues that introducing an alternative service would jeopardize national security and undermine social equality and cohesion. This is amid an increasing number of countries which retain compulsory service have introduced alternatives. In addition, some countries, including those with national security concerns have shown that alternative service can be successfully implemented. On 15 January 2009 the Korean Presidential Commission on Suspicious Deaths in the Military released its decision acknowledging that the government was responsible for the deaths of five young men, who were Jehovah's Witnesses and had forcibly been conscripted into the army. The deaths resulted from "the state's anti-human rights violence" and "its acts of brutality" during the 1970s that continued into the mid-1980s. This decision is significant since it is the first one recognizing the state's responsibility for deaths resulting from violence within the military.

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Conscientious objector

However, that program has been postponed indefinitely after the succeeding administration took office in 2008. The government argues that introducing an alternative service would jeopardize national security and undermine social equality and cohesion. This is amid an increasing number of countries which retain compulsory service have introduced alternatives. In addition, some countries, including those with national security concerns have shown that alternative service can be successfully implemented. On 15 January 2009 the Korean Presidential Commission on Suspicious Deaths in the Military released its decision acknowledging that the government was responsible for the deaths of five young men, who were Jehovah's Witnesses and had forcibly been conscripted into the army. The deaths resulted from "the state's anti-human rights violence" and "its acts of brutality" during the 1970s that continued into the mid-1980s. This decision is significant since it is the first one recognizing the state's responsibility for deaths resulting from violence within the military. According to the commission's decision, "the beatings and acts of brutality committed against them by military officials were attempts to compel and coerce them to act against their conscience (religion) and were unconstitutional, anti-human rights acts that infringed severely upon the freedom of conscience (religion) guaranteed in the Constitution." The records of conscientious objectors to military service are kept by a governmental investigative body as criminal files for five years. As a consequence, conscientious objectors are not allowed to enter a government office and apply for any type of national certification exam. It is also very unlikely that they will be employed by any company that inquires about criminal records.Conscientious objectors ... often spend the rest of their lives tainted by their decision... Criminal records from draft dodging make it difficult for objectors to find good jobs and the issue of army service is often raised by potential employers during job interviews. From 2000 to 2008, Korean Military Manpower Administration said that at least 4,958 men have objected to service in the military because of religious beliefs. Among those, 4,925 were Jehovah's Witnesses, 3 were Buddhists, and the other 30 refused the mandatory service because of conscientious objections other than religious reasons. Since 1950, there have been more than 16,000 Jehovah's Witnesses sentenced to a combined total of 31,256 years for refusing to perform military service. If alternative service is not provided, some 500 to 900 young men will continue to be added each year to the list of conscientious objectors criminalized in Korea. In 2015, Lee Yeda was the first conscientious objector to be allowed to live in France via asylum. In June 2018, the Constitutional Court ruled 6–3 that Article 5 of the country's Military Service Act is unconstitutional because it fails to provide an alternative civilian national service for conscientious objectors. As of 2018, 19,300 South Korean conscientious objectors had gone to prison since 1953. The Defense Ministry said it would honor the ruling by introducing alternative services as soon as possible. On 1 November 2018, the Supreme Court of Korea decided that conscientious objection is a valid reason to refuse mandatory military service, and vacated and remanded the appellate court's decision finding a Jehovah's Witness guilty of the objection. Spain: Conscientious objection was not permitted in Francoist Spain. Conscientious objectors usually refused to serve on religious grounds, such as being Jehovah's Witnesses, and were placed in prison for the duration of their sentences. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 acknowledged conscientious objectors. The Spanish parliament established a longer service (Prestación Social Sustitutoria) as an alternative to the Army. In spite of this, a strong movement appeared that refused both services. The Red Cross was the only important organisation employing objectors. Because of this, the waiting lists for the PSS were long, especially in areas like Navarre, where pacifism, Basque nationalism and a low unemployment rate discouraged young males from the army. Thousands of insumisos (non-submittants) publicly refused the PSS, and hundreds were imprisoned. In addition a number of those in the military decided to refuse further duties. A number of people not liable for military service made declarations of self-incrimination, stating that they had encouraged insumisión. The government, fearing popular reaction, reduced the length of service and instead of sentencing insumisos to prison declared them unfit for public service. Fronting the decreasing birth rate and the popular opposition to an army seen as a continuating institution of one of the pillars of the dictatorship's regime, the Spanish government tried to modernise the model carried from the Franco era, professionalizing it and thus bringing an end to conscription by the end of 2001. The new army tried to provide an education for civilian life and participated in peace operations in Bosnia. Taiwan: There is the possibility of avoiding military service by instead serving civilian services for the duration of the conscription. Turkey: Conscientious objection is highly controversial in Turkey. Turkey and Azerbaijan are the only two countries refusing to recognize conscientious objection and sustain their membership in the Council of Europe. In January 2006, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found Turkey had violated article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (prohibition of degrading treatment) in a case dealing with the conscientious objection of Osman Murat Ülke. In 2005, Mehmet Tarhan was sentenced to four years in a military prison as a conscientious objector (he was unexpectedly released in March 2006). Journalist Perihan Mağden was tried by a Turkish court for supporting Tarhan and advocating conscientious objection as a human right; but later, she was acquitted. As of March 2011, there were 125 objectors including 25 female objectors in Turkey. Another 256 people of Kurdish origin also had announced their conscientious objection to military service. Conscientious objector İnan Süver was named a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International. On 14 November 2011, the Ministry of Justice announced a draft proposal to legalise conscientious objection in Turkey and that it was to take effect two weeks after approval by the President to the change. This decision to legalize by the Turkish government was because of pressure from the European Court of Human Rights. The ECHR gave the Turkish government a deadline until the end of 2011 to legalize conscientious objection. The draft was withdrawn afterwards. A commission was founded within the National Assembly of the Republic to write a new constitution in 2012. The commission is still in negotiations on various articles and conscientious objection is one of the most controversial issues. United Kingdom: The United Kingdom recognised the right of individuals not to fight in the 18th century following major problems with attempting to force Quakers into military service. The Militia Ballot Act of 1757 allowed Quakers to be excluded from service in the Militia. It then ceased to be a major issue, since Britain's armed forces were generally all-volunteer. Press gangs were used to strengthen army and navy rolls on occasions from the 16th to the early 19th centuries. Pressed men did have the right of appeal, in the case of sailors, to the Admiralty. The Royal Navy last took pressed men during the Napoleonic Wars. A more general right to refuse military service was not introduced until the First World War. Britain introduced conscription with the Military Service Act of January 1916, which came into full effect on 2 March 1916. The Act allowed for objectors to be absolutely exempted, to perform alternative civilian service or to serve as a non-combatant in the army Non-Combatant Corps, according to the extent to which they could convince a Military Service Tribunal of the quality of their objection. Around 16,000 men were recorded as conscientious objectors, with Quakers, traditionally pacifist, forming a large proportion: 4,500 objectors were exempted on condition of doing civilian "work of national importance", such as farming, forestry or social service; and 7,000 were conscripted into the specially-created Non-Combatant Corps. Six thousand were refused any exemption and forced into main army regiments; if they then refused to obey orders, they were court-martialled and sent to prison. Thus, the well-known pacifist and religious writer Stephen Henry Hobhouse was called up in 1916: he and many other Quaker activists took the unconditionalist stand, refusing both military and alternative service, and on enforced enlistment were court-martialled and imprisoned for disobedience. Conscientious objectors formed only a tiny proportion of Military Service Tribunals' cases over the conscription period, estimated at 2 per cent. Tribunals were notoriously harsh towards conscientious objectors, reflecting widespread public opinion that they were lazy, degenerate, ungrateful 'shirkers' seeking to benefit from the sacrifices of others. In an attempt to press the issue, in May 1916 a group of thirty-five objectors, including the Richmond Sixteen, were taken to France as conscripts and given military orders, the disobedience of which would warrant a death sentence. These men, known as "The Frenchmen", refused; the four ringleaders were formally sentenced to death by court-martial but immediately reprieved, with commutation to ten-years' penal servitude.

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Conscientious objector

Conscientious objectors formed only a tiny proportion of Military Service Tribunals' cases over the conscription period, estimated at 2 per cent. Tribunals were notoriously harsh towards conscientious objectors, reflecting widespread public opinion that they were lazy, degenerate, ungrateful 'shirkers' seeking to benefit from the sacrifices of others. In an attempt to press the issue, in May 1916 a group of thirty-five objectors, including the Richmond Sixteen, were taken to France as conscripts and given military orders, the disobedience of which would warrant a death sentence. These men, known as "The Frenchmen", refused; the four ringleaders were formally sentenced to death by court-martial but immediately reprieved, with commutation to ten-years' penal servitude. Although a few objectors were accepted for non-combatant service in the Royal Army Medical Corps, acting as nursing/paramedic assistants, the majority of non-combatants served in the Non-Combatant Corps on non-lethal stores, road and railway building and general labouring in the UK and France. Conscientious objectors who were deemed not to have made any useful contribution to the state were formally disenfranchised (through a clause inserted in the Representation of the People Act 1918 at the insistence of back-bench MPs) for the five years 1 September 1921 – 31 August 1926, but as it was a last-minute amendment there was no administrative machinery to enforce it, which was admitted to be a "dead letter". Britain's conscription legislation of 1916 did not apply to Ireland, despite it then being part of the United Kingdom. In 1918 the Army's manpower shortage led to passing a further act enabling conscription in Ireland if and when the government saw fit. In the event, the government never saw fit, although the legislation led to the Conscription Crisis of 1918. British conscription in the Second World War did not apply to Northern Ireland. Many Irishmen volunteered to fight in both world wars. The various parts of the British Empire and Commonwealth had their own laws: in general, all the larger countries of the Empire participated, and some were, in proportion to their population, major participants in the First World War. In the Second World War, following the National Service (Armed Forces) Act 1939, there were nearly 60,000 registered Conscientious Objectors. Testing by tribunals resumed, this time by special Conscientious Objection Tribunals chaired by a judge, and the effects were much less harsh. If objectors were not a member of the Quakers or some similar pacifist organisation, it was generally enough to say that they objected to "warfare as a means of settling international disputes", a phrase from the Kellogg–Briand Pact of 1928. The tribunals could grant full exemption, exemption conditional on alternative service, exemption only from combatant duties, or dismiss the application. Of the 61,000 who were registered, 3,000 were given complete exemption; 18,000 applications were initially dismissed, but a number of such applicants succeeded at the Appellate Tribunal, sometimes after a "qualifying" sentence of three-months' imprisonment for an offence deemed to have been committed on grounds of conscience. Of those directed to non-combatant military service almost 7,000 were allocated to the Non-Combatant Corps, re-activated in mid-1940; its companies worked in clothing and food stores, in transport, or any military project not requiring the handling of "material of an aggressive nature". In November 1940 it was decided to allow troops in the NCC to volunteer for work in bomb disposal and over 350 men volunteered. Other non-combatants worked in the Royal Army Medical Corps. For conscientious objectors exempted conditional upon performing civil work, acceptable occupations were farm work, mining, firefighting and the ambulance service. About 5,500 objectors were imprisoned, most charged with refusal to attend a medical examination as a necessary preliminary to call-up after being refused exemption, and some charged with non-compliance with the terms of conditional exemption. A further 1,000 were court-martialled by the armed forces and sent to military detention barracks or civil prisons. Unlike the First World War, most sentences were relatively short, and there was no pattern of continually repeated sentences. The social stigma attached to 'conchies' (as they were called) was considerable; regardless of the genuineness of their motives, cowardice was often imputed. Conscription in the United Kingdom was retained, with rights of conscientious objection, as National Service until the last call-up in 1960 and the last discharge in 1963. The use of all volunteer soldiers was hoped to remove the need to consider conscientious objectors. Ever since the First World War, there have been volunteer members of the armed forces who have developed a conscientious objection to service; a procedure was devised for them in the Second World War and with adaptations, it continues. United States: There are currently legal provisions in the United States for recognizing conscientious objection, both through the Selective Service System and through the Department of Defense. The United States recognizes religious and moral objections, but not selective objections. Conscientious objectors in the United States may perform either civilian work or noncombatant service in lieu of combatant military service. Historically, conscientious objectors have been persecuted in the United States. After the Selective Service System was founded during World War I, such persecutions decreased in frequency, and recognition for conscientious objectors grew. Other countries: As of 2005, conscientious objectors in several countries may serve as field paramedics in the army (although some do not consider this a genuine alternative, as they feel it merely helps to make war more humane instead of preventing it). Alternatively, they may serve without arms, although this, too, has its problems. In certain European countries such as Austria, Greece and Switzerland, there is the option of performing an alternative civilian service, subject to the review of a written application or after a hearing about the state of conscience. In Greece, the alternative civilian service is twice as long as the corresponding military service; in Austria Zivildienst is one-third times longer, the Swiss Zivildienst is one and one-half times longer than military service. In 2005, the Swiss parliament considered whether willingness to serve one and a half times longer than an army recruit was sufficient proof of sincerity, citing that the cost of judging the state of conscience of a few thousand men per year was too great. Conscientious objection in professional forces: Only two European Union countries – Germany and the Netherlands – recognize the right to conscientious objection for contract and professional military personnel. In the United States, military personnel who come to a conviction of conscientious objection during their tour of duty must appear in front of a panel of experts, which consists of psychiatrists, military chaplains and officers. In Switzerland, the panel consists entirely of civilians, and military personnel have no authority whatsoever. In Germany, the draft has been suspended since 2011. See also: References: Further reading: Alexander, Paul, (2008),Peace to War: Shifting Allegiances in the Assemblies of God. Telford, PA: Cascadia Publishing/Herald Press. A history and analysis of conscientious objection in the Assemblies of God, the largest Pentecostal denomination. Barker, Rachel. Conscience, government and war: Conscientious objection in Great Britain 1939–45 (Routledge, 2021). Bennett, Scott H. (2003). Radical Pacifism: The War Resisters League and Gandhian Nonviolence in America, 1915–1963. (Syracuse Univ. Press). Brennan, Jason. "Conscientious tax objection: why the liberal state must accommodate tax resisters." Public Affairs Quarterly 26.2 (2012): 141–159. Keim, Albert N. (1990). The CPS Story: An Illustrated History of Civilian Public Service, pp. 75–79. Good Books. ISBN 1-56148-002-9 online Gingerich, Melvin (1949), Service for Peace, A History of Mennonite Civilian Public Service, Mennonite Central Committee. Krahn, Cornelius, Gingerich, Melvin & Harms, Orlando (Eds.) (1955). The Mennonite Encyclopedia, Volume I, pp. 76–78. Mennoniite Publishing House. Magelssen, Morten. "When should conscientious objection be accepted?" Journal of Medical Ethics 38.1 (2012): 18–21. online Matthews, Mark (2006). Smoke Jumping on the Western Fire Line: Conscientious Objectors during World War II, University of Oklahoma Press. ISBN 978-0806137667 Moorehead, Caroline (1987). Troublesome People: Enemies of War, 1916–86, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, ISBN 0-241-12105-1 Quakers in Britain — Conscientious Objectors. Smith, C. Henry (1981). Smith's Story of the Mennonites. Revised and expanded by Cornelius Krahn. Newton, Kansas: Faith and Life Press. pp. 299–300, 311.

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Conscientious objector

76–78. Mennoniite Publishing House. Magelssen, Morten. "When should conscientious objection be accepted?" Journal of Medical Ethics 38.1 (2012): 18–21. online Matthews, Mark (2006). Smoke Jumping on the Western Fire Line: Conscientious Objectors during World War II, University of Oklahoma Press. ISBN 978-0806137667 Moorehead, Caroline (1987). Troublesome People: Enemies of War, 1916–86, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, ISBN 0-241-12105-1 Quakers in Britain — Conscientious Objectors. Smith, C. Henry (1981). Smith's Story of the Mennonites. Revised and expanded by Cornelius Krahn. Newton, Kansas: Faith and Life Press. pp. 299–300, 311. ISBN 0-87303-069-9. Robb, Linsey. "The 'Conchie Corps': Conflict, Compromise and Conscientious Objection in the British Army, 1940–1945." Twentieth Century British History 29.3 (2018): 411–434. online Tinnelly CM, Joseph T. "The Conscientious Objector Under the Selective Service Act of 1940." St. John's Law Review 15.2 (2013): 6+ online. Primary sources: Bennett, Scott H. (2005). Army GI, Pacifist CO: The World War II Letters of Frank and Albert Dietrich (Fordham Univ. Press). McNair, Donald (2008) A Pacifist at War: Military Memoirs of a Conscientious Objector in Palestine 1917–1918 Anastasia Press, Much Hadham ISBN 978-0-9536396-1-8 Mock, Melanie Springer (2003). Writing Peace: The Unheard Voices of Great War Mennonite Objectors, Cascadia Publishing House. ISBN 1-931038-09-0 U.S. Selective Service, "Conscientious Objection and Alternative Service: Who Qualifies Archived 2017-04-27 at the Wayback Machine" Further viewing: Rick Tejada-Flores, Judith Ehrlich (2000), "The good war and those who refused to fight it"; Paradigm Productions in association with the Independent Television Service, aired on PBS. Catherine Ryan, Gary Weimberg (2008), "Soldiers of Conscience"; Luna Productions. Aired on the PBS nonfiction series POV. Molly Stuart, Amitai Ben-Abba (2019), "Objector"; Java Films. A documentary about Israeli conscientious objector Atalya Ben-Abba, premiered at IDFA. – "Objector". IMDb. 2019. Retrieved 2 October 2021. External links: Schleif, Luke: Conscientious Objectors, in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War. Patterson, David S.: Pacifism, in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War. Alternative Service in the Second World War: Conscientious Objectors in Canada 1939–1945 The National Registry for Conscientious Objection International Conscientious Objectors' Day (War Resisters' International) of Human Rights factsheet on case law on conscientious objection "Making a Choice: Conscientious Objection or Refusing to Register" (Resisters.info) The European Bureau for Conscientious Objection Refusing to Kill: conscientious objection and human rights in World War I. Peace Pledge Union, 2006. Watch His Conscience: A Short History Of The Conscientious Objector. By Michael D. Peabody Catholic Peace Fellowship The Right to Refuse to Bear Arms – the most authoritative recent world survey on provisions for conscientious objection to military service, by War Resisters' International A Conscientious Objector's Guide to the UN Human Rights System You have no enemies. A Call for Conscientious Objection. By Dieter Duhm "Hacksaw Ridge" A film about conscientious objector, Desmond T.Doss who received 'Medal of Honor' in WW2. Objector – a 2019 documentary about Israeli conscientious objector Atalya Ben-Abba. International Conscientious Objectors' Day

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Conscription

History: In pre-modern times: Ilkum: Around the reign of Hammurabi (1791–1750 BC), the Babylonian Empire used a system of conscription called Ilkum. Under that system those eligible were required to serve in the royal army in time of war. During times of peace they were instead required to provide labour for other activities of the state. In return for this service, people subject to it gained the right to hold land. It is possible that this right was not to hold land per se but specific land supplied by the state. Various forms of avoiding military service are recorded. While it was outlawed by the Code of Hammurabi, the hiring of substitutes appears to have been practiced both before and after the creation of the code. Later records show that Ilkum commitments could become regularly traded. In other places, people simply left their towns to avoid their Ilkum service. Another option was to sell Ilkum lands and the commitments along with them. With the exception of a few exempted classes, this was forbidden by the Code of Hammurabi. Medieval period: Medieval levies: Under the feudal laws on the European continent, landowners in the medieval period enforced a system whereby all peasants, freemen commoners and noblemen aged 15 to 60 living in the countryside or in urban centers, were summoned for military duty when required by either the king or the local lord, bringing along the weapons and armor according to their wealth. These levies fought as footmen, sergeants, and men at arms under local superiors appointed by the king or the local lord such as the arrière-ban in France. Arrière-ban denoted a general levy, where all able-bodied males age 15 to 60 living in the Kingdom of France were summoned to go to war by the King (or the constable and the marshals). Men were summoned by the bailiff (or the sénéchal in the south). Bailiffs were military and political administrators installed by the King to steward and govern a specific area of a province following the king's commands and orders. The men summoned in this way were then summoned by the lieutenant who was the King's representative and military governor over an entire province comprising many bailiwicks, seneschalties and castellanies. All men from the richest noble to the poorest commoner were summoned under the arrière-ban and they were supposed to present themselves to the King or his officials. In medieval Scandinavia the leiðangr (Old Norse), leidang (Norwegian), leding, (Danish), ledung (Swedish), lichting (Dutch), expeditio (Latin) or sometimes leþing (Old English), was a levy of free farmers conscripted into coastal fleets for seasonal excursions and in defence of the realm. The bulk of the Anglo-Saxon English army, called the fyrd, was composed of part-time English soldiers drawn from the freemen of each county. In the 690s laws of Ine of Wessex, three levels of fines are imposed on different social classes for neglecting military service. Some modern writers claim military service in Europe was restricted to the landowning minor nobility. These thegns were the land-holding aristocracy of the time and were required to serve with their own armour and weapons for a certain number of days each year. The historian David Sturdy has cautioned about regarding the fyrd as a precursor to a modern national army composed of all ranks of society, describing it as a "ridiculous fantasy": The persistent old belief that peasants and small farmers gathered to form a national army or fyrd is a strange delusion dreamt up by antiquarians in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries to justify universal military conscription. In feudal Japan the shogun decree of 1393 exempted money lenders from religious or military levies, in return for a yearly tax. The Ōnin War weakened the shogun and levies were imposed again on money lenders. This overlordism was arbitrary and unpredictable for commoners. While the money lenders were not poor, several overlords tapped them for income. Levies became necessary for the survival of the overlord, allowing the lord to impose taxes at will. These levies included tansen tax on agricultural land for ceremonial expenses. Yakubu takumai tax was raised on all land to rebuild the Ise Grand Shrine, and munabechisen tax was imposed on all houses. At the time, land in Kyoto was acquired by commoners through usury and in 1422 the shogun threatened to repossess the land of those commoners who failed to pay their levies. Military slavery: The system of military slaves was widely used in the Middle East, beginning with the creation of the corps of Turkic slave-soldiers (ghulams or mamluks) by the Abbasid caliph al-Mu'tasim in the 820s and 830s. The Turkic troops soon came to dominate the government, establishing a pattern throughout the Islamic world of a ruling military class, often separated by ethnicity, culture and even religion by the mass of the population, a paradigm that found its apogee in the Mamluks of Egypt and the Janissary corps of the Ottoman Empire, institutions that survived until the early 19th century. In the middle of the 14th century, Ottoman Sultan Murad I developed personal troops to be loyal to him, with a slave army called the Kapıkulu. The new force was built by taking Christian children from newly conquered lands, especially from the far areas of his empire, in a system known as the devşirme (translated "gathering" or "converting"). The captive children were forced to convert to Islam. The Sultans had the young boys trained over several years. Those who showed special promise in fighting skills were trained in advanced warrior skills, put into the sultan's personal service, and turned into the Janissaries, the elite branch of the Kapıkulu. A number of distinguished military commanders of the Ottomans, and most of the imperial administrators and upper-level officials of the Empire, such as Pargalı İbrahim Pasha and Sokollu Mehmet Paşa, were recruited in this way. By 1609, the Sultan's Kapıkulu forces increased to about 100,000. In later years, Sultans turned to the Barbary Pirates to supply their Jannissaries corps. Their attacks on ships off the coast of Africa or in the Mediterranean, and subsequent capture of able-bodied men for ransom or sale provided some captives for the Sultan's system. Starting in the 17th century, Christian families living under the Ottoman rule began to submit their sons into the Kapikulu system willingly, as they saw this as a potentially invaluable career opportunity for their children. Eventually the Sultan turned to foreign volunteers from the warrior clans of Circassians in southern Russia to fill his Janissary armies. As a whole the system began to break down, the loyalty of the Jannissaries became increasingly suspect. Mahmud II forcibly disbanded the Janissary corps in 1826. Similar to the Janissaries in origin and means of development were the Mamluks of Egypt in the Middle Ages. The Mamluks were usually captive non-Muslim Iranian and Turkic children who had been kidnapped or bought as slaves from the Barbary coasts. The Egyptians assimilated and trained the boys and young men to become Islamic soldiers who served the Muslim caliphs and the Ayyubid sultans during the Middle Ages. The first mamluks served the Abbasid caliphs in 9th-century Baghdad. Over time they became a powerful military caste. On more than one occasion, they seized power, for example, ruling Egypt from 1250 to 1517. From 1250 Egypt had been ruled by the Bahri dynasty of Kipchak origin. Slaves from the Caucasus served in the army and formed an elite corps of troops. They eventually revolted in Egypt to form the Burgi dynasty. The Mamluks' excellent fighting abilities, massed Islamic armies, and overwhelming numbers succeeded in overcoming the Christian Crusader fortresses in the Holy Land. The Mamluks were the most successful defence against the Mongol Ilkhanate of Persia and Iraq from entering Egypt. On the western coast of Africa, Berber Muslims captured non-Muslims to put to work as laborers. They generally converted the younger people to Islam and many became quite assimilated. In Morocco, the Berber looked south rather than north. The Moroccan Sultan Moulay Ismail, called "the Bloodthirsty" (1672–1727), employed a corps of 150,000 black slaves, called his Black Guard. He used them to coerce the country into submission. In modern times: Modern conscription, the massed military enlistment of national citizens (levée en masse), was devised during the French Revolution, to enable the Republic to defend itself from the attacks of European monarchies. Deputy Jean-Baptiste Jourdan gave its name to the 5 September 1798 Act, whose first article stated: "Any Frenchman is a soldier and owes himself to the defense of the nation." It enabled the creation of the Grande Armée, what Napoleon Bonaparte called "the nation in arms", which overwhelmed European professional armies that often numbered only into the low tens of thousands.

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Conscription

In Morocco, the Berber looked south rather than north. The Moroccan Sultan Moulay Ismail, called "the Bloodthirsty" (1672–1727), employed a corps of 150,000 black slaves, called his Black Guard. He used them to coerce the country into submission. In modern times: Modern conscription, the massed military enlistment of national citizens (levée en masse), was devised during the French Revolution, to enable the Republic to defend itself from the attacks of European monarchies. Deputy Jean-Baptiste Jourdan gave its name to the 5 September 1798 Act, whose first article stated: "Any Frenchman is a soldier and owes himself to the defense of the nation." It enabled the creation of the Grande Armée, what Napoleon Bonaparte called "the nation in arms", which overwhelmed European professional armies that often numbered only into the low tens of thousands. More than 2.6 million men were inducted into the French military in this way between the years 1800 and 1813. The defeat of the Prussian Army in particular shocked the Prussian establishment, which had believed it was invincible after the victories of Frederick the Great. The Prussians were used to relying on superior organization and tactical factors such as order of battle to focus superior troops against inferior ones. Given approximately equivalent forces, as was generally the case with professional armies, these factors showed considerable importance. However, they became considerably less important when the Prussian armies faced Napoleon's forces that outnumbered their own in some cases by more than ten to one. Scharnhorst advocated adopting the levée en masse, the military conscription used by France. The Krümpersystem was the beginning of short-term compulsory service in Prussia, as opposed to the long-term conscription previously used. In the Russian Empire, the military service time "owed" by serfs was 25 years at the beginning of the 19th century. In 1834 it was decreased to 20 years. The recruits were to be not younger than 17 and not older than 35. In 1874 Russia introduced universal conscription in the modern pattern, an innovation only made possible by the abolition of serfdom in 1861. New military law decreed that all male Russian subjects, when they reached the age of 20, were eligible to serve in the military for six years. In the decades prior to World War I universal conscription along broadly Prussian lines became the norm for European armies, and those modeled on them. By 1914 the only substantial armies still completely dependent on voluntary enlistment were those of Britain and the United States. Some colonial powers such as France reserved their conscript armies for home service while maintaining professional units for overseas duties. World Wars: The range of eligible ages for conscripting was expanded to meet national demand during the World Wars. In the United States, the Selective Service System drafted men for World War I initially in an age range from 21 to 30 but expanded its eligibility in 1918 to an age range of 18 to 45. In the case of a widespread mobilization of forces where service includes homefront defense, ages of conscripts may range much higher, with the oldest conscripts serving in roles requiring lesser mobility. Expanded-age conscription was common during the Second World War: in Britain, it was commonly known as "call-up" and extended to age 51. Nazi Germany termed it Volkssturm ("People's Storm") and included boys as young as 16 and men as old as 60. During the Second World War, both Britain and the Soviet Union conscripted women. The United States was on the verge of drafting women into the Nurse Corps because it anticipated it would need the extra personnel for its planned invasion of Japan. However, the Japanese surrendered and the idea was abandoned. During the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army conscripted nearly 30 million men. Arguments against conscription: Sexism: Men's rights activists, feminists, and opponents of discrimination against men: 102  have criticized military conscription, or compulsory military service, as sexist. The National Coalition for Men, a men's rights group, sued the US Selective Service System in 2019, leading to it being declared unconstitutional by a US Federal Judge. The federal district judge's opinion was unanimously overturned on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit. In September 2021, the House of Representatives passed the annual Defense Authorization Act, which included an amendment that states that "all Americans between the ages of 18 and 25 must register for selective service." This amendment omitted the word "male", which would have extended a potential draft to women; however, the amendment was removed before the National Defense Authorization Act was passed. Feminists have argued, first, that military conscription is sexist because wars serve the interests of what they view as the patriarchy; second, that the military is a sexist institution and that conscripts are therefore indoctrinated into sexism; and third, that conscription of men normalizes violence by men as socially acceptable. Feminists have been organizers and participants in resistance to conscription in several countries. Conscription has also been criticized on the ground that, historically, only men have been subjected to conscription. Men who opt out or are deemed unfit for military service must often perform alternative service, such as Zivildienst in Austria, Germany and Switzerland, or pay extra taxes, whereas women do not have these obligations. In the US, men who do not register with the Selective Service cannot apply for citizenship, receive federal financial aid, grants or loans, be employed by the federal government, be admitted to public colleges or universities, or, in some states, obtain a driver's license. Involuntary servitude: Many American libertarians oppose conscription and call for the abolition of the Selective Service System, arguing that impressment of individuals into the armed forces amounts to involuntary servitude. For example, Ron Paul, a former U.S. Libertarian Party presidential nominee, has said that conscription "is wrongly associated with patriotism, when it really represents slavery and involuntary servitude". The philosopher Ayn Rand opposed conscription, opining that "of all the statist violations of individual rights in a mixed economy, the military draft is the worst. It is an abrogation of rights. It negates man's fundamental right—the right to life—and establishes the fundamental principle of statism: that a man's life belongs to the state, and the state may claim it by compelling him to sacrifice it in battle." In 1917, a number of radicals and anarchists, including Emma Goldman, challenged the new draft law in federal court, arguing that it was a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude. However, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the draft act in the case of Arver v. United States on 7 January 1918, on the ground that the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war and to raise and support armies. The Court also relied on the principle of the reciprocal rights and duties of citizens. "It may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government in its duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military service in case of need and the right to compel." Economic: It can be argued that in a cost-to-benefit ratio, conscription during peacetime is not worthwhile. Months or years of service performed by the most fit and capable subtract from the productivity of the economy; add to this the cost of training them, and in some countries paying them. Compared to these extensive costs, some would argue there is very little benefit; if there ever was a war then conscription and basic training could be completed quickly, and in any case there is little threat of a war in most countries with conscription. In the United States, every male resident is required by law to register with the Selective Service System within 30 days following his 18th birthday and be available for a draft; this is often accomplished automatically by a motor vehicle department during licensing or by voter registration. According to Milton Friedman the cost of conscription can be related to the parable of the broken window in anti-draft arguments. The cost of the work, military service, does not disappear even if no salary is paid. The work effort of the conscripts is effectively wasted, as an unwilling workforce is extremely inefficient. The impact is especially severe in wartime, when civilian professionals are forced to fight as amateur soldiers. Not only is the work effort of the conscripts wasted and productivity lost, but professionally skilled conscripts are also difficult to replace in the civilian workforce. Every soldier conscripted in the army is taken away from his civilian work, and away from contributing to the economy which funds the military. This may be less a problem in an agrarian or pre-industrialized state where the level of education is generally low, and where a worker is easily replaced by another. However, this is potentially more costly in a post-industrial society where educational levels are high and where the workforce is sophisticated and a replacement for a conscripted specialist is difficult to find. Even more dire economic consequences result if the professional conscripted as an amateur soldier is killed or maimed for life; his work effort and productivity are lost.

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The impact is especially severe in wartime, when civilian professionals are forced to fight as amateur soldiers. Not only is the work effort of the conscripts wasted and productivity lost, but professionally skilled conscripts are also difficult to replace in the civilian workforce. Every soldier conscripted in the army is taken away from his civilian work, and away from contributing to the economy which funds the military. This may be less a problem in an agrarian or pre-industrialized state where the level of education is generally low, and where a worker is easily replaced by another. However, this is potentially more costly in a post-industrial society where educational levels are high and where the workforce is sophisticated and a replacement for a conscripted specialist is difficult to find. Even more dire economic consequences result if the professional conscripted as an amateur soldier is killed or maimed for life; his work effort and productivity are lost. Arguments for conscription: Political and moral motives: Jean Jacques Rousseau argued vehemently against professional armies since he believed that it was the right and privilege of every citizen to participate to the defense of the whole society and that it was a mark of moral decline to leave the business to professionals. He based his belief upon the development of the Roman Republic, which came to an end at the same time as the Roman Army changed from a conscript to a professional force. Similarly, Aristotle linked the division of armed service among the populace intimately with the political order of the state. Niccolò Machiavelli argued strongly for conscription and saw the professional armies, made up of mercenary units, as the cause of the failure of societal unity in Italy. Other proponents, such as William James, consider both mandatory military and national service as ways of instilling maturity in young adults. Some proponents, such as Jonathan Alter and Mickey Kaus, support a draft in order to reinforce social equality, create social consciousness, break down class divisions and allow young adults to immerse themselves in public enterprise. Charles Rangel called for the reinstatement of the draft during the Iraq War not because he seriously expected it to be adopted but to stress how the socioeconomic restratification meant that very few children of upper-class Americans served in the all-volunteer American armed forces. Economic and resource efficiency: It is estimated by the British military that in a professional military, a company deployed for active duty in peacekeeping corresponds to three inactive companies at home. Salaries for each are paid from the military budget. In contrast, volunteers from a trained reserve are in their civilian jobs when they are not deployed. It was more financially beneficial for less-educated young Portuguese men born in 1967 to participate in conscription than to participate in the highly competitive job market with men of the same age who continued to higher education. Drafting of women: Throughout history, women have only been conscripted to join armed forces in a few countries, in contrast to the universal practice of conscription from among the male population. The traditional view has been that military service is a test of manhood and a rite of passage from boyhood into manhood. In recent years, this position has been challenged on the basis that it violates gender equality, and some countries, especially in Europe, have extended conscription obligations to women. Nations that in present-day actively draft women into military service are Eritrea, Israel, Mozambique, Norway, North Korea, Myanmar, and Sweden. Norway introduced female conscription in 2015, making it the first NATO member to have a legally compulsory national service for both men and women. In practice only motivated volunteers are selected to join the army in Norway. Sweden introduced female conscription in 2010, but it was not activated until 2017. This made Sweden the second nation in Europe to draft women, and the second in the world to draft women on the same formal terms as men. Israel has universal female conscription, although it is possible to avoid service by claiming a religious exemption and over a third of Israeli women do so. Finland introduced voluntary female conscription in 1995, giving women between the ages of 18 and 29 an option to complete their military service alongside men. Denmark will extend conscription to women from 2027. Sudanese law allows for conscription of women, but this is not implemented in practice. In the United Kingdom during World War II, beginning in 1941, women were brought into the scope of conscription but, as all women with dependent children were exempt and many women were informally left in occupations such as nursing or teaching, the number conscripted was relatively few. In the Soviet Union, there was never conscription of women for the armed forces, but the severe disruption of normal life and the high proportion of civilians affected by World War II after the German invasion attracted many volunteers for "The Great Patriotic War". Medical doctors of both sexes could and would be conscripted (as officers). Also, the Soviet university education system required Department of Chemistry students of both sexes to complete an ROTC course in NBC defense, and such female reservist officers could be conscripted in times of war. The United States came close to drafting women into the Nurse Corps in preparation for a planned invasion of Japan. In 1981 in the United States, several men filed lawsuit in the case Rostker v. Goldberg, alleging that the Selective Service Act of 1948 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by requiring that only men register with the Selective Service System (SSS). The Supreme Court eventually upheld the Act, stating that "the argument for registering women was based on considerations of equity, but Congress was entitled, in the exercise of its constitutional powers, to focus on the question of military need, rather than 'equity.'" In 2013, Judge Gray H. Miller of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas ruled that the Service's men-only requirement was unconstitutional, as while at the time Rostker was decided, women were banned from serving in combat, the situation had since changed with the 2013 and 2015 restriction removals. Miller's opinion was reversed by the Fifth Circuit, stating that only the Supreme Court could overturn the Supreme Court precedence from Rostker. The Supreme Court considered but declined to review the Fifth Circuit's ruling in June 2021. In an opinion authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor and joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Brett Kavanaugh, the three justices agreed that the male-only draft was likely unconstitutional given the changes in the military's stance on the roles, but because Congress had been reviewing and evaluating legislation to eliminate its male-only draft requirement via the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service (NCMNPS) since 2016, it would have been inappropriate for the Court to act at that time. On 1 October 1999, in Taiwan, the Judicial Yuan of the Republic of China in its Interpretation 490 considered that the physical differences between males and females and the derived role differentiation in their respective social functions and lives would not make drafting only males a violation of the Constitution of the Republic of China. Though women are not conscripted in Taiwan, transsexual persons are exempt. In 2018, the Netherlands started including women in its draft registration system, although conscription is not currently enforced for either sex. France and Portugal, where conscription was abolished, extended their symbolic, mandatory day of information on the armed forces for young people - called Defence and Citizenship Day in France and Day of National Defence in Portugal – to women in 1997 and 2008, respectively; at the same time, the military registry of both countries and obligation of military service in case of war was extended to women. Conscientious objection: A conscientious objector is an individual whose personal beliefs are incompatible with military service, or, more often, with any role in the armed forces. In some countries, conscientious objectors have special legal status, which augments their conscription duties. For example, Sweden allows conscientious objectors to choose a service in the weapons-free civil defense. The reasons for refusing to serve in the military are varied. Some people are conscientious objectors for religious reasons. In particular, the members of the historic peace churches are pacifist by doctrine, and Jehovah's Witnesses, while not strictly pacifists, refuse to participate in the armed forces on the ground that they believe that Christians should be neutral in international conflicts. By country: Austria: Every male citizen of the Republic of Austria from the age of 17 up to 50, specialists up to 65 years is liable to military service. However, besides mobilization, conscription calls to a six-month long basic military training in the Bundesheer can be done up to the age of 35. For men refusing to undergo this training, a nine-month lasting community service is mandatory. Belgium: Belgium abolished the conscription in 1994. The last conscripts left active service in February 1995. To this day (2019), a small minority of the Belgian citizens supports the idea of reintroducing military conscription, for both men and women. Bulgaria: Bulgaria had conscription for males above 18 until it was ended in 2008. Due to a shortfall in the army of some 5,500 soldiers, parts of the former ruling coalition have expressed their support for the return of conscription, most notably Krasimir Karakachanov.

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However, besides mobilization, conscription calls to a six-month long basic military training in the Bundesheer can be done up to the age of 35. For men refusing to undergo this training, a nine-month lasting community service is mandatory. Belgium: Belgium abolished the conscription in 1994. The last conscripts left active service in February 1995. To this day (2019), a small minority of the Belgian citizens supports the idea of reintroducing military conscription, for both men and women. Bulgaria: Bulgaria had conscription for males above 18 until it was ended in 2008. Due to a shortfall in the army of some 5,500 soldiers, parts of the former ruling coalition have expressed their support for the return of conscription, most notably Krasimir Karakachanov. Opposition towards this idea from the main coalition partner, GERB, saw a compromise in 2018, where instead of conscription, Bulgaria could have possibly introduced a voluntary military service by 2019 where young citizens can volunteer for a period of 6 to 9 months, receiving a basic wage. However, this has not gone forward. Cambodia: Since the signing of the Peace Accord in 1993, there has been no official conscription in Cambodia. Also the National Assembly has repeatedly rejected to reintroduce it due to popular resentment. However, in November 2006, it was reintroduced. Although mandatory for all males between the ages of 18 and 30 (with some sources stating up to age 35), less than 20% of those in the age group are recruited amidst a downsizing of the armed forces. Canada: Compulsory service in a sedentary militia was practiced in Canada as early as 1669. In peacetime, compulsory service was typically limited to attending an annual muster, although the Canadian militia was mobilized for longer periods during wartime. Compulsory service in the sedentary militia continued until the early 1880s when Canada's sedentary Reserve Militia system fell into disuse. The legislative provision that formally made every male inhabitant aged 16 to 60 member of the Reserve Militia was removed in 1904, replaced with provisions that made them theoretically "liable to serve in the militia". Conscription into a full-time military service had only been instituted twice by the government of Canada, during both world wars. Conscription into the Canadian Expeditionary Force was practiced in the last year of the First World War in 1918. During the Second World War, conscription for home defence was introduced in 1940 and for overseas service in 1944. Conscription has not been practiced in Canada since the end of the Second World War in 1945. China: Universal conscription in China dates back to the State of Qin, which eventually became the Qin Empire of 221 BC. Following unification, historical records show that a total of 300,000 conscript soldiers and 500,000 conscript labourers constructed the Great Wall of China. In the following dynasties, universal conscription was abolished and reintroduced on numerous occasions. As of 2011, universal military conscription is theoretically mandatory in China, and reinforced by law. However, due to the large population of China and large pool of candidates available for recruitment, the People's Liberation Army has always had sufficient volunteers, so conscription has not been required in practice. Cuba: Cyprus: Military service in Cyprus has a deep rooted history entangled with the Cyprus problem. Military service in the Cypriot National Guard is mandatory for all male citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as any male non-citizens born of a parent of Greek Cypriot descent, lasting from the 1 January of the year in which they turn 18 years of age to 31 December, of the year in which they turn 50. All male residents of Cyprus who are of military age (16 and over) are required to obtain an exit visa from the Ministry of Defense. Currently, military conscription in Cyprus lasts up to 14 months. Denmark: Conscription is known in Denmark since the Viking Age, where one man out of every 10 had to serve the king. Frederick IV of Denmark changed the law in 1710 to every 4th man. The men were chosen by the landowner and it was seen as a penalty. Since 12 February 1849, every physically fit man must do military service. According to §81 in the Constitution of Denmark, which was promulgated in 1849: Every male person able to carry arms shall be liable with his person to contribute to the defence of his country under such rules as are laid down by Statute. — Constitution of DenmarkThe legislation about compulsory military service is articulated in the Danish Law of Conscription. National service takes 4–12 months. It is possible to postpone the duty when one is still in full-time education. Every male turning 18 will be drafted to the 'Day of Defence', where they will be introduced to the Danish military and their health will be tested. Physically unfit persons are not required to do military service. It is only compulsory for men, while women are free to choose to join the Danish army. Almost all of the men have been volunteers in recent years, 96.9% of the total number of recruits having been volunteers in the 2015 draft. After lottery, one can become a conscientious objector. Total objection (refusal from alternative civilian service) results in up to 4 months jailtime according to the law. However, in 2014 a Danish man, who signed up for the service and objected later, got only 14 days of home arrest. In many countries the act of desertion (objection after signing up) is punished harder than objecting the compulsory service. Eritrea: Estonia: Estonia adopted a policy of ajateenistus (literally "time service") in late 1991, having inherited the concept from Soviet legislature. According to §124 of the 1992 constitution, "Estonian citizens have a duty to participate in national defence on the bases and pursuant to a procedure provided by a law", which in practice means that men aged 18–27 are subject to the draft. In the formative years, conscripts had to serve an 18-month term. An amendment passed in 1994 shortened this to 12 months. Further revisions in 2003 established an eleven-month term for draftees trained as NCOs and drivers, and an eight-month term for rank & file. Under the current system, the yearly draft is divided into three "waves" - separate batches of eleven-month conscripts start their service in January and July while those selected for an eight-month term are brought in on October. An estimated 3200 people go through conscript service every year. Conscripts serve in all branches of the Estonian Defence Forces except the air force which only relies on paid professionals due to its highly technical nature and security concerns. Historically, draftees could also be assigned to the border guard (before it switched to an all-volunteer model in 2000), a special rapid response unit of the police force (disbanded in 1997) or three militarized rescue companies within the Estonian Rescue Board (disbanded in 2004). Finland: Conscription in Finland is part of a general compulsion for national military service for all adult males (Finnish: maanpuolustusvelvollisuus; Swedish: totalförsvarsplikt) defined in the 127§ of the Constitution of Finland. Conscription can take the form of military or of civilian service. According to 2021 data, 65% of Finnish males entered and finished the military service. The number of female volunteers to annually enter armed service had stabilised at approximately 300. The service period is 165, 255 or 347 days for the rank and file conscripts and 347 days for conscripts trained as NCOs or reserve officers. The length of civilian service is always twelve months. Those electing to serve unarmed in duties where unarmed service is possible serve either nine or twelve months, depending on their training. Any Finnish male citizen who refuses to perform both military and civilian service faces a penalty of 173 days in prison, minus any served days. Such sentences are usually served fully in prison, with no parole. Jehovah's Witnesses are no longer exempted from service as of 27 February 2019. The inhabitants of demilitarized Åland are exempt from military service. By the Conscription Act of 1951, they are, however, required to serve a time at a local institution, like the coast guard. However, until such service has been arranged, they are freed from service obligation. The non-military service of Åland has not been arranged since the introduction of the act, and there are no plans to institute it. The inhabitants of Åland can also volunteer for military service on the mainland. As of 1995, women are permitted to serve on a voluntary basis and pursue careers in the military after their initial voluntary military service. The military service takes place in Finnish Defence Forces or in the Finnish Border Guard. All services of the Finnish Defence Forces train conscripts. However, the Border Guard trains conscripts only in land-based units, not in coast guard detachments or in the Border Guard Air Wing.

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The inhabitants of demilitarized Åland are exempt from military service. By the Conscription Act of 1951, they are, however, required to serve a time at a local institution, like the coast guard. However, until such service has been arranged, they are freed from service obligation. The non-military service of Åland has not been arranged since the introduction of the act, and there are no plans to institute it. The inhabitants of Åland can also volunteer for military service on the mainland. As of 1995, women are permitted to serve on a voluntary basis and pursue careers in the military after their initial voluntary military service. The military service takes place in Finnish Defence Forces or in the Finnish Border Guard. All services of the Finnish Defence Forces train conscripts. However, the Border Guard trains conscripts only in land-based units, not in coast guard detachments or in the Border Guard Air Wing. Civilian service may take place in the Civilian Service Center in Lapinjärvi or in an accepted non-profit organization of educational, social or medical nature. Germany: Between 1956 and 2011 conscription was mandatory for all male citizens in the German federal armed forces (German: Bundeswehr), as well as for the Federal Border Guard (Bundesgrenzschutz) in the 1970s (see Border Guard Service). With the end of the Cold War the German government drastically reduced the size of its armed forces. The low demand for conscripts led to the suspension of compulsory conscription in 2011. Since then, only volunteer professionals serve in the Bundeswehr. Greece: Since 1914 Greece has been enforcing mandatory military service, currently lasting 12 months (but historically up to 36 months) for all adult men. Citizens discharged from active service are normally placed in the reserve and are subject to periodic recalls of 1–10 days at irregular intervals. Universal conscription was introduced in Greece during the military reforms of 1909, although various forms of selective conscription had been in place earlier. In more recent years, conscription was associated with the state of general mobilisation declared on 20 July 1974, due to the crisis in Cyprus (the mobilisation was formally ended on 18 December 2002). The duration of military service has historically ranged between 9 and 36 months depending on various factors either particular to the conscript or the political situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Although women are employed by the Greek army as officers and soldiers, they are not obliged to enlist. Soldiers receive no health insurance, but they are provided with medical support during their army service, including hospitalization costs. Greece enforces conscription for all male citizens aged between 19 and 45. In August 2009, duration of the mandatory service was reduced from 12 months as it was before to 9 months for the army, but remained at 12 months for the navy and the air force. The number of conscripts allocated to the latter two has been greatly reduced aiming at full professionalization. Nevertheless, mandatory military service at the army was once again raised to 12 months in March 2021, unless served in units in Evros or the North Aegean islands where duration was kept at 9 months. Although full professionalization is under consideration, severe financial difficulties and mismanagement, including delays and reduced rates in the hiring of professional soldiers, as well as widespread abuse of the deferment process, has resulted in the postponement of such a plan. Iran: In Iran, all men who reach the age of 18 must do about two years of compulsory military service in the IR police department or Iranian army or Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Before the 1979 revolution, women could serve in the military. However, after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, some Ayatollahs considered women's military service to be disrespectful to women by the Pahlavi government and banned women's military service in Iran. Therefore, Iranian women and girls were completely exempted from military service, which caused Iranian men and boys to oppose. In Iran, men who refuse to go to military service are deprived of their citizenship rights, such as employment, health insurance, continuing their education at university, finding a job, going abroad, opening a bank account, etc. Iranian men have so far opposed mandatory military service and demanded that military service in Iran become a job like in other countries, but the Islamic Republic is opposed to this demand. Some Iranian military commanders consider the elimination of conscription or improving the condition of soldiers as a security issue and one of Ali Khamenei's powers as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, so they treat it with caution. In Iran, usually wealthy people are exempted from conscription. Some other men can be exempted from conscription due to their fathers serving in the Iran-Iraq war. Israel: There is a mandatory military service for all men and women in Israel who are fit and 18 years old. Men must serve 32 months while women serve 24 months, with the vast majority of conscripts being Jewish. Some Israeli citizens are exempt from mandatory service: Non-Jewish Arab citizens Permanent residents (non-civilian) such as the Druze of the Golan Heights Male Ultra-Orthodox Jews can apply for deferment to study in Yeshiva and the deferment tends to become an exemption, although some do opt to serve in the military Female religious Jews, as long as they declare they are unable to serve due to religious grounds. Most of whom opt for the alternative of volunteering in the national service Sherut Leumi All of the exempt above are eligible to volunteer to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), as long as they declare so. Male Druze and male Circassian Israeli citizens are liable for conscription, in accordance with agreement set by their community leaders (their community leaders however signed a clause in which all female Druze and female Circassian are exempt from service). A few male Bedouin Israeli citizens choose to enlist to the Israeli military in every draft (despite their Muslim-Arab background that exempt them from conscription). Lithuania: Lithuania abolished its conscription in 2008. In May 2015, the Lithuanian parliament voted to reintroduce conscription and the conscripts started their training in August 2015. From 2015 to 2017 there were enough volunteers to avoid drafting civilians. Luxembourg: Luxembourg practiced military conscription from 1948 until 1967. Moldova: Moldova has a 12-month conscription for all males between 18 and 27 years. However, a citizen who completed a military training course at a military department is exempted from conscription. Netherlands: Conscription, which was called "Service Duty" (Dutch: dienstplicht) in the Netherlands, was first employed in 1810 by French occupying forces. Napoleon's brother Louis Bonaparte, who was King of Holland from 1806 to 1810, had tried to introduce conscription a few years earlier, unsuccessfully. Every man aged 20 years or older had to enlist. By means of drawing lots it was decided who had to undertake service in the French army. It was possible to arrange a substitute against payment. Later on, conscription was used for all men over the age of 18. Postponement was possible, due to study, for example. Conscientious objectors could perform an alternative civilian service instead of military service. For various reasons, this forced military service was criticized at the end of the twentieth century. Since the Cold War was over, so was the direct threat of a war. Instead, the Dutch army was employed in more and more peacekeeping operations. The complexity and danger of these missions made the use of conscripts controversial. Furthermore, the conscription system was thought to be unfair as only men were drafted. In the European part of Netherlands, compulsory attendance has been officially suspended since 1 May 1997. Between 1991 and 1996, the Dutch armed forces phased out their conscript personnel and converted to an all-professional force. The last conscript troops were inducted in 1995, and demobilized in 1996. The suspension means that citizens are no longer forced to serve in the armed forces, as long as it is not required for the safety of the country. Since then, the Dutch army has become an all-professional force. However, to this day, every male and – from January 2020 onward – female citizen aged 17 gets a letter in which they are told that they have been registered but do not have to present themselves for service. Norway: Conscription was constitutionally established the 12 April 1907 with Kongeriket Norges Grunnlov § 119.. As of March 2016, Norway currently employs a weak form of mandatory military service for men and women. In practice recruits are not forced to serve, instead only those who are motivated are selected. About 60,000 Norwegians are available for conscription every year, but only 8,000 to 10,000 are conscripted. Since 1985, women have been able to enlist for voluntary service as regular recruits. On 14 June 2013 the Norwegian Parliament voted to extend conscription to women, resulting in universal conscription in effect from 2015. This made Norway the first NATO member and first European country to make national service compulsory for both sexes.

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Norway: Conscription was constitutionally established the 12 April 1907 with Kongeriket Norges Grunnlov § 119.. As of March 2016, Norway currently employs a weak form of mandatory military service for men and women. In practice recruits are not forced to serve, instead only those who are motivated are selected. About 60,000 Norwegians are available for conscription every year, but only 8,000 to 10,000 are conscripted. Since 1985, women have been able to enlist for voluntary service as regular recruits. On 14 June 2013 the Norwegian Parliament voted to extend conscription to women, resulting in universal conscription in effect from 2015. This made Norway the first NATO member and first European country to make national service compulsory for both sexes. In earlier times, up until at least the early 2000s, all men aged 19–44 were subject to mandatory service, with good reasons required to avoid becoming drafted. There is a right of conscientious objection. As of 2020 Norway did not reach gender equity in conscription with only 33% of all conscripted being women. In addition to the military service, the Norwegian government draft a total of 8,000 men and women between 18 and 55 to non-military Civil defence duty. (Not to be confused with Alternative civilian service.) Former service in the military does not exclude anyone from later being drafted to the Civil defence, but an upper limit of total 19 months of service applies. Neglecting mobilisation orders to training exercises and actual incidents, may impose fines. Russia: The Russian Armed Forces draw personnel from various sources. In addition to conscripts, the 2022 Russian mobilization on account of the Russian invasion of Ukraine revealed Russian irregular units in Ukraine and Russian penal military units as sources of manpower. This adds to the BARS (Russia), the National Guard of Russia and the Russian volunteer battalions. Serbia: As of 1 January 2011, Serbia no longer practises mandatory military service. Prior to this, mandatory military service lasted 6 months for men. Conscientious objectors could however opt for 9 months of civil service instead. On 15 December 2010, the Parliament of Serbia voted to suspend mandatory military service. The decision fully came into force on 1 January 2011. South Africa: There was mandatory military conscription for all white men in South Africa from 1968 until the end of apartheid in 1994. Under South African defense law, young white men had to undergo two years' continuous military training after they leave school, after which they had to serve 720 days in occasional military duty over the next 12 years. The End Conscription Campaign began in 1983 in opposition to the requirement. In the same year the National Party government announced plans to extend conscription to white immigrants in the country. South Korea: Sweden: Sweden had conscription (Swedish: värnplikt) for men between 1901 and 2010. During the last few decades it was selective. Since 1980, women have been allowed to sign up by choice, and, if passing the tests, do military training together with male conscripts. Since 1989 women have been allowed to serve in all military positions and units, including combat. In 2010, conscription was made gender-neutral, meaning both women and men would be conscripted on equal terms. The conscription system was simultaneously deactivated in peacetime. Seven years later, referencing increased military threat, the Swedish Government reactivated military conscription. Beginning in 2018, both men and women are conscripted. Taiwan: Taiwan, officially the Republic of China (ROC), maintains an active conscription system. All qualified male citizens of military age are now obligated to receive 4-month of military training. In December 2022, President Tsai Ing-wen led the government to announce the reinstatement of the mandatory 1-year active duty military service from January 2024. United Kingdom: The United Kingdom introduced conscription to full-time military service for the first time in January 1916 (the eighteenth month of World War I) and abolished it in 1920. Ireland, then part of the United Kingdom, was exempted from the original 1916 military service legislation, and although further legislation in 1918 gave power for an extension of conscription to Ireland, the power was never put into effect. Conscription was reintroduced in 1939, in the lead up to World War II, and continued in force until 1963. Northern Ireland was exempted from conscription legislation throughout the whole period. In all, eight million men were conscripted during both World Wars, as well as several hundred thousand younger single women. The introduction of conscription in May 1939, before the war began, was partly due to pressure from the French, who emphasized the need for a large British army to oppose the Germans. From early 1942 unmarried women age 20–30 were conscripted (unmarried women who had dependent children aged 14 or younger, including those who had illegitimate children or were widows with children were excluded). Most women who were conscripted were sent to the factories, but they could volunteer for the Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS) and other women's services. Some women served in the Women's Land Army: initially volunteers but later conscription was introduced. However, women who were already working in a skilled job considered helpful to the war effort, such as a General Post Office telephonist, were told to continue working as before. None was assigned to combat roles unless she volunteered. By 1943 women were liable to some form of directed labour up to age 51. During the Second World War, 1.4 million British men volunteered for service and 3.2 million were conscripted. Conscripts comprised 50% of the Royal Air Force, 60% of the Royal Navy and 80% of the British Army. The abolition of conscription in Britain was announced on 4 April 1957, by new prime minister Harold Macmillan, with the last conscripts being recruited three years later. United States: Conscription in the United States ended in 1973, but males aged between 18 and 25 are required to register with the Selective Service System to enable a reintroduction of conscription if necessary. President Gerald Ford had suspended mandatory draft registration in 1975, but President Jimmy Carter reinstated that requirement when the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan five years later. Consequently, Selective Service registration is still required of almost all young men. There have been no prosecutions for violations of the draft registration law since 1986. Males between the ages of 17 and 45, and female members of the US National Guard may be conscripted for federal militia service pursuant to 10 U.S. Code § 246 and the Militia Clauses of the United States Constitution. In February 2019, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas ruled that male-only conscription registration breached the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. In National Coalition for Men v. Selective Service System, a case brought by a non-profit men's rights organization the National Coalition for Men against the U.S. Selective Service System, judge Gray H. Miller issued a declaratory judgment that the male-only registration requirement is unconstitutional, though did not specify what action the government should take. That ruling was reversed by the Fifth Circuit. In June 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the decision by the Court of Appeals. Other countries: Conscription in Australia Conscription in Egypt Conscription in France Conscription in Gibraltar Conscription in Malaysia Conscription in Mexico Conscription in Myanmar Conscription in New Zealand Conscription in North Korea Conscription in Russia Conscription in Singapore Conscription in South Korea Conscription in Switzerland Conscription in Turkey Conscription in Ukraine Conscription in the Ottoman Empire Conscription in the Russian Empire Conscription in Vietnam Conscription in Georgia Conscription in Mozambique See also: References: Further reading: External links: The dictionary definition of conscription at Wiktionary Media related to Conscription at Wikimedia Commons

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Containment

Earlier uses of term: Both Americans and Europeans were aware with significant historical antecedents. In the 1850s, anti-slavery forces in the United States developed a free soil strategy of containment to stop the expansion of slavery until it later collapsed. Historian James Oakes explains the strategy: The Federal government would surround the south with free states, free territories, and free waters, building what they called a 'cordon of freedom' around slavery, hemming it in until the system's own internal weaknesses forced the slave states one by one to abandon slavery. Between 1873 and 1877, Germany repeatedly intervened in the internal affairs of France's neighbors. In Belgium, Spain, and Italy, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck exerted strong and sustained political pressure to support the election or appointment of liberal, anticlerical governments. That was part of an integrated strategy to promote republicanism in France by strategically and ideologically isolating the clerical-monarchist regime of President Patrice de MacMahon. It was hoped that by surrounding France with a number of liberal states, French Republicans could defeat MacMahon and his reactionary supporters. The modern concept of containment provides a useful model for understanding the dynamics of this policy. After the 1917 October Revolution in Russia, there were calls by Western leaders to isolate the Bolshevik government, which seemed intent on promoting worldwide revolution. In March 1919, French Premier Georges Clemenceau called for a cordon sanitaire, a ring of non-communist states, to isolate Soviet Russia. Translating that phrase, US President Woodrow Wilson called for a "quarantine." The World War I allies launched an incursion into Russia, as after the Bolshevik Revolution, Vladimir Lenin withdrew the country from the First World War, allowing Germany to reallocate troops to face the Allied forces on the Western Front. Concurrently, President Wilson became increasingly aware of the human rights violations perpetuated by the new Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, and opposed the new regime's militant atheism and advocacy of a command economy. He also was concerned that Marxism–Leninism would spread to the remainder of the Western world, and intended his landmark Fourteen Points partially to provide liberal democracy as an alternative worldwide ideology to Communism. Despite reservations, the United States, as a result of the fear of Japanese expansion into Russian-held territory and their support for the Allied-aligned Czech Legion, sent a small number of troops to Northern Russia and Siberia. The United States also provided indirect aid such as food and supplies to the White Army. The incursion was unpopular at home and lacked a cohesive strategy, leading the allies to ultimately withdraw from Russia. The U.S. initially refused to recognize the Soviet Union, but President Franklin D. Roosevelt reversed the policy in 1933 in the hope to expand American export markets. The Munich Agreement of 1938 was a failed attempt to contain Nazi expansion in Europe. The U.S. tried to contain Japanese expansion in Asia from 1937 to 1941, and Japan reacted with its attack on Pearl Harbor. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 during World War II, the U.S. and the Soviet Union found themselves allied against Germany and used rollback to defeat the Axis powers: Germany, Italy, and Japan. Origin (1944–1947): Key State Department personnel grew increasingly frustrated with and suspicious of the Soviets as the war drew to a close. Averell Harriman, U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, once a "confirmed optimist" regarding U.S.–Soviet relations, was disillusioned by what he saw as the Soviet betrayal of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising as well as by violations of the February 1945 Yalta Agreement concerning Poland. Harriman would later have a significant influence in forming Truman's views on the Soviet Union. In February 1946, the U.S. State Department asked George F. Kennan, then at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, why the Russians opposed the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. He responded with a wide-ranging analysis of Russian policy now called the Long Telegram: Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work with fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to the logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to the logic of force. For this reason, it can easily withdraw—and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Kennan's cable was hailed in the State Department as "the appreciation of the situation that had long been needed." Kennan himself attributed the enthusiastic reception to timing: "Six months earlier the message would probably have been received in the State Department with raised eyebrows and lips pursed in disapproval. Six months later, it would probably have sounded redundant." Clark Clifford and George Elsey produced a report elaborating on the Long Telegram and proposing concrete policy recommendations based on its analysis. This report, which recommended "restraining and confining" Soviet influence, was presented to Truman on September 24, 1946. In January 1947, Kennan drafted an essay entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Navy Secretary James Forrestal gave permission for the report to be published in the journal Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym "X." Biographer Douglas Brinkley has dubbed Forrestal "godfather of containment" on account of his work in distributing Kennan's writing. The use of the word "containment" originates from this so-called "X Article": "In these circumstances, it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." Kennan later turned against the containment policy and noted several deficiencies in his X Article. He later said that by containment he meant not the containment of Soviet Power "by military means of a military threat, but the political containment of a political threat." Second, Kennan admitted a failure in the article to specify the geographical scope of "containment", and that containment was not something he believed the United States could necessarily achieve everywhere successfully. Harry S. Truman: After Republicans gained control of Congress in the 1946 elections, President Truman, a Democrat, made a dramatic speech that is often considered to mark the beginning of the Cold War. In March 1947, he requested that Congress appropriate $400 million in aid to the Greek and Turkish governments, which were fighting communist subversion. Truman pledged to, "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." This pledge became known as the Truman Doctrine. Portraying the issue as a mighty clash between "totalitarian regimes" and "free peoples", the speech marks the adoption of containment as official US policy. Congress appropriated the money. Truman's motives on that occasion have been the subject of considerable scholarship and several schools of interpretation. In the orthodox explanation of Herbert Feis, a series of aggressive Soviet actions in 1945–1947 in Poland, Iran, Turkey, and elsewhere awakened the American public to the new danger to freedom to which Truman responded. In the revisionist view of William Appleman Williams, Truman's speech was an expression of longstanding American expansionism. In the realpolitik view of Lynn E. Davis, Truman was a naive idealist who unnecessarily provoked the Soviets by couching disputes in terms like democracy and freedom that were alien to the communist vision. According to a psychological analysis by Deborah Larson, Truman felt a need to prove his decisiveness and feared that aides would make unfavorable comparisons between him and his predecessor, Roosevelt. "I am here to make decisions, and whether they prove right or wrong I am going to take them", he once said. The drama surrounding the announcement of the Truman Doctrine catered to the president's self-image of a strong and decisive leader, but his real decision-making process was more complex and gradual. The timing of the speech was not a response to any particular Soviet action but to the fact that the Republican Party had just gained control of Congress. Truman was little involved in drafting the speech and did not himself adopt the hard-line attitude that it suggested until several months later. The British, with their own position weakened by economic distress, urgently called on the U.S. to take over the traditional British role in Greece. Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson took the lead in Washington, warning congressional leaders in late February 1947 that if the United States did not take over from the British, the result most probably would be a "Soviet breakthrough" that "might open three continents to Soviet penetration." Truman was explicit about the challenge of communism taking control of Greece. He won wide support from both parties as well as experts in foreign policy inside and outside the government. It was strongly opposed by the left, notably by former Vice President Henry A. Wallace, who ran against Truman in the 1948 presidential campaign. Truman, under the guidance of Acheson, followed up his speech with a series of measures to contain Soviet influence in Europe, including the Marshall Plan, or European Recovery Program, and NATO, a 1949 military alliance between the U.S. and Western European nations. Because containment required detailed information about communist moves, the government relied increasingly on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Established by the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA conducted espionage in foreign lands, some of it visible, more of it secret. Truman approved a classified statement of containment policy called NSC 20/4 in November 1948, the first comprehensive statement of security policy ever created by the United States.

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Containment

He won wide support from both parties as well as experts in foreign policy inside and outside the government. It was strongly opposed by the left, notably by former Vice President Henry A. Wallace, who ran against Truman in the 1948 presidential campaign. Truman, under the guidance of Acheson, followed up his speech with a series of measures to contain Soviet influence in Europe, including the Marshall Plan, or European Recovery Program, and NATO, a 1949 military alliance between the U.S. and Western European nations. Because containment required detailed information about communist moves, the government relied increasingly on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Established by the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA conducted espionage in foreign lands, some of it visible, more of it secret. Truman approved a classified statement of containment policy called NSC 20/4 in November 1948, the first comprehensive statement of security policy ever created by the United States. The Soviet Union's first nuclear test in 1949 prompted the National Security Council to formulate a revised security doctrine. Completed in April 1950, it became known as NSC 68. It concluded that a massive military buildup was necessary to deal with the Soviet threat. According to the report, drafted by Paul Nitze and others: In the words of the Federalist (No. 28) "The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief." The mischief may be a global war or it may be a Soviet campaign for limited objectives. In either case, we should take no avoidable initiative which would cause it to become a war of annihilation, and if we have the forces to defeat a Soviet drive for limited objectives it may well be to our interest not to let it become a global war. Alternative strategies: There were three alternative policies to containment under discussion in the late 1940s. The first was a return to isolationism, minimizing American involvement with the rest of the world, a policy that was supported by conservative Republicans, especially from the Midwest, including former President Herbert Hoover and Senator Robert A. Taft. However, many other Republicans, led by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, said that policy had helped cause World War II and so was too dangerous to revive. The second policy was a continuation of the détente policies that aimed at friendly relationships with the Soviet Union, especially trade. Roosevelt had been the champion of détente, but he was dead, and most of his inner circle had left the government by 1946. The chief proponent of détente was Henry Wallace, a former vice president and the Secretary of Commerce under Truman. Wallace's position was supported by far-left elements of the CIO, but they were purged in 1947 and 1948. Wallace ran against Truman on the Progressive Party ticket in 1948, but his campaign was increasingly dominated by Communists, which helped to discredit détente. The third policy was rollback, an aggressive effort to undercut or destroy the Soviet Union itself. Military rollback against the Soviet Union was proposed by James Burnham and other conservative strategists in the late 1940s. After 1954, Burnham and like-minded strategists became editors and regular contributors to William F. Buckley Jr.'s National Review magazine. Truman himself adopted a rollback strategy in the Korean War after the success of the Inchon landings in September 1950, only to reverse himself after the Chinese counterattack two months later and revert to containment. General Douglas MacArthur called on Congress to continue the rollback policy, but Truman fired him for insubordination. Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, a rollback strategy was considered against communism in Eastern Europe from 1953 to 1956. Eisenhower agreed to a propaganda campaign to roll back the influence of communism psychologically, but he refused to intervene in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, mainly for fear that it would cause World War III. Since late 1949, when the Soviets had successfully tested an atomic bomb, they had been known to possess nuclear weapons. Korea: The U.S. followed containment when it first entered the Korean War to defend South Korea from a communist invasion by North Korea. Initially, this directed the action of the U.S. to only push back North Korea across the 38th Parallel and restore South Korea's sovereignty, thereby allowing North Korea's survival as a state. However, the success of the Inchon landing inspired the U.S. and the United Nations to adopt a rollback strategy instead and to overthrow communist North Korea, thus allowing nationwide elections under UN auspices. General Douglas MacArthur then advanced across the 38th Parallel into North Korea. The Chinese, fearful of a possible U.S. presence on their border or even an invasion by them, then sent in a large army and defeated the UN forces, pushing them back below the 38th parallel. Truman publicly hinted that he might use his "ace in the hole" of the atomic bomb, but Mao was unmoved. The episode was used to support the wisdom of the containment doctrine as opposed to rollback. The Communists were later pushed back to roughly around the original border, with minimal changes. Truman criticized MacArthur's focus on absolute victory and adopted a "limited war" policy. His focus shifted to negotiating a settlement, which was finally reached in 1953. For his part, MacArthur denounced Truman's "no-win policy." Dulles: Many Republicans, including John Foster Dulles, were concerned that Truman had been too timid. In 1952, Dulles called for rollback and the eventual liberation of Eastern Europe. Dulles was named secretary of state by incoming President Eisenhower, but Eisenhower's decision not to intervene during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, which was put down by the Soviet Army, made containment a bipartisan doctrine. Eisenhower relied on clandestine CIA actions to undermine hostile governments and used economic and military foreign aid to strengthen governments supporting the American position in the Cold War. Cuba: In the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the top officials in Washington debated using rollback to get rid of Soviet nuclear missiles, which were threatening the United States. There was fear of a nuclear war until a deal was reached in which the Soviets would publicly remove their nuclear weapons, the United States would secretly remove its missiles from Turkey and to avoid invading Cuba. The policy of containing Cuba was put into effect by President John F. Kennedy and continued until 2015. Vietnam: Senator Barry Goldwater, the Republican candidate for president in 1964, challenged containment and asked, "Why not victory?" President Lyndon Johnson, the Democratic nominee, answered that rollback risked nuclear war. Johnson explained containment doctrine by quoting the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but not further." Goldwater lost to Johnson in the 1964 election by a wide margin. Johnson adhered closely to containment during the Vietnam War. Rejecting proposals by General William Westmoreland for U.S. ground forces to advance into Laos and cut communist supply lines, Johnson gathered a group of elder statesmen called The Wise Men. The group included Kennan, Acheson and other former Truman advisors. Rallies in support of the troops were discouraged for fear that a patriotic response would lead to demands for victory and rollback. Military responsibility was divided among three generals so that no powerful theater commander could emerge to challenge Johnson as MacArthur had challenged Truman. Nixon, who replaced Johnson in 1969, referred to his foreign policy as détente, a relaxation of tension. Although it continued to aim at restraining the Soviet Union, it was based on political realism, thinking in terms of national interest, as opposed to crusades against communism or for democracy. Emphasis was placed on talks with the Soviet Union concerning nuclear weapons called the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Nixon reduced U.S. military presence in Vietnam to the minimum required to contain communist advances, in a policy called Vietnamization. As the war continued, it grew less popular. A Democratic Congress forced Nixon, a Republican, to abandon the policy in 1973 by enacting the Case–Church Amendment, which ended U.S. military involvement in Vietnam and led to successful communist invasions of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Afghanistan: President Jimmy Carter came to office in 1977 and was committed to a foreign policy that emphasized human rights. However, in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, containment was again made a priority. The wording of the Carter Doctrine (1980) intentionally echoed that of the Truman Doctrine. Reagan Doctrine: Following the communist victory in Vietnam, Democrats began to view further communist advances as inevitable, but Republicans returned to the rollback doctrine. Ronald Reagan, a long-time advocate of rollback, was elected U.S. president in 1980. He took a more aggressive approach to dealings with the Soviets and believed that détente was misguided and peaceful coexistence was tantamount to surrender. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, American policymakers worried that the Soviets were making a run for control of the Persian Gulf. Throughout the 1980s, under a policy that came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine, the United States provided technical and economic assistance to the Afghan guerrillas (mujahideen) fighting against the Soviet army. After the Cold War: The conclusion of the Cold War in 1992 marked the official end of the containment policy, but the U.S. kept its bases in the areas around Russia, such as those in Iceland, Germany, and Turkey. Much of the policy later helped influence U.S.

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Containment

Ronald Reagan, a long-time advocate of rollback, was elected U.S. president in 1980. He took a more aggressive approach to dealings with the Soviets and believed that détente was misguided and peaceful coexistence was tantamount to surrender. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, American policymakers worried that the Soviets were making a run for control of the Persian Gulf. Throughout the 1980s, under a policy that came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine, the United States provided technical and economic assistance to the Afghan guerrillas (mujahideen) fighting against the Soviet army. After the Cold War: The conclusion of the Cold War in 1992 marked the official end of the containment policy, but the U.S. kept its bases in the areas around Russia, such as those in Iceland, Germany, and Turkey. Much of the policy later helped influence U.S. foreign policy towards China in the 21st century. See also: Appeasement Cordon sanitaire (international relations) Domino theory Détente Isolationism Marshall Plan Rollback Truman Doctrine Dual containment (Iran-Iraq containment) United States foreign policy toward the People's Republic of China References: Further reading: Borhi, László. "Rollback, liberation, containment, or inaction? US policy and eastern Europe in the 1950s." Journal of Cold War Studies 1.3 (1999): 67–110. Duiker, William. US containment policy and the conflict in Indochina (Stanford University Press, 1994). Gaddis, John Lewis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War. 2004, a standard scholarly history Gaddis, John Lewis. George F. Kennan: An American Life (Penguin, 2012). Garthoff, Raymond L. Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet relations from Nixon to Reagan (1985) Garthoff, Raymond L. The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (1994) Hopkins, Michael F. "Continuing Debate And New Approaches In Cold War History," Historical Journal (2007), 50: 913–934 doi:10.1017/S0018246X07006437 Iatrides, John O. "George F. Kennan and the birth of containment: the Greek test case." World Policy Journal 22.3 (2005): 126–145. online Inboden III, William. Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945–1960: The Soul of Containment (2008) Kennan, George F., American Diplomacy, (University of Chicago Press. 1984). ISBN 0-226-43147-9 Logevall, Fredrik. "A Critique of Containment." Diplomatic History 28.4 (2004): 473–499. McConachie, Bruce. American Theatre and the Culture of the Cold War: Producing and Contesting Containment, 1947–1962 (University of Iowa Press, 2003). Nadel, Alan. Containment culture: American narratives, postmodernism, and the atomic age (Duke University Press, 1995). Ngoei, Wen-Qing. Arc of Containment: Britain, the United States, and Anticommunism in Southeast Asia. (Cornell University Press 2019) Ostermann, Christian F. Between containment and rollback: the United States and the Cold War in Germany (Stanford UP, 2021). Pieper, Moritz A. (2012). "Containment and the Cold War: Reexaming the Doctrine of Containment as a Grand Strategy Driving US Cold War Interventions". StudentPulse.com. Retrieved August 22, 2012. Soddu, Marco. "Truman Administration's Containment Policy in Light of the French Return to Indochina." Foreign Policy Journal (2012): 1–7. online Spalding, Elizabeth. The first cold warrior: Harry Truman, containment, and the remaking of liberal internationalism (UP of Kentucky, 2006). Historiography and memory: Anderson, Sheldon R. "Condemned to Repeat it:" lessons of History" and the Making of US Cold War Containment Policy (Lexington Books, 2008). Corke, Sarah-Jane. "History, historians and the Naming of Foreign Policy: A Postmodern Reflection on American Strategic thinking during the Truman Administration," Intelligence and National Security, Autumn 2001, Vol. 16 Issue 3, pp. 146–63. Drew, S. Nelson, and Paul H. Nitze. NSC-68 forging the strategy of containment (iane Publishing, 1994). Garthoff, Raymond L. A journey through the Cold War: a memoir of containment and coexistence (Brookings Institution Press, 2004). Kort, Michael. The Columbia Guide to the Cold War (1998) External links: EDSITEment's Lesson Strategy of Containment 1947–1948 Article on Containment. Archived April 25, 2016, at the Wayback Machine.

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Conventional warfare

History: Formation of state: The state was first advocated by Plato but found more acceptance in the consolidation of power under the Roman Catholic Church. European monarchs then gained power as the Catholic Church was stripped of temporal power and was replaced by the divine right of kings. In 1648, the powers of Europe signed the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the religious violence for purely political governance and outlook, signifying the birth of the modern state. Within the statist paradigm, only the state and its appointed representatives may bear arms and enter into war. In fact, war then became understood only as a conflict between sovereign states. Monarchs strengthened that idea and gave it the force of law. Any noble had been allowed to start a war, but European monarchs had to consolidate military power in response to the Napoleonic Wars. Clausewitzian paradigm: Prussia was one of the countries that tried to amass military power. Carl von Clausewitz, one of Prussia's officers, wrote On War, a work rooted solely in the world of the state. All other forms of intrastate conflict, such as rebellion, are not accounted for because in theoretical terms, he could not account for warfare before the state. However, near the end of his life, he grew increasingly aware of the importance of non-state military actors, as is revealed in his conceptions of "the people in arms", which he noted arose from the same social and political sources as traditional interstate warfare. Practices such as raiding or blood feuds were then labeled criminal activities and stripped of legitimacy. That war paradigm reflected the view of most of the modernized world in the early 21st century, as is verified by examination of the conventional armies of the time: large, high-maintenance, and technologically-advanced armies designed to compete against similarly-designed forces. Clausewitz also forwarded the issue of casus belli. Wars had been fought for social, religious, or even cultural reasons, and Clausewitz taught that war is merely "a continuation of politics by other means." It is a rational calculation in which states fight for their interests (whether they are economic, security-related, or otherwise) once normal discourse has broken down. Prevalence: Most modern wars have been conducted using conventional means. Confirmed use of biological warfare by a nation state has not occurred since 1945, and chemical warfare has been used only a few times (the latest known confrontation in which it was utilized being the Syrian Civil War). Nuclear warfare has only occurred once: the American bombing of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Since World War II: The state and Clausewitzian principles peaked in the World Wars, during the 20th century, but they also laid the groundwork for their dilapidation from nuclear proliferation. During the Cold War, the superpowers sought to avoid open conflict between their respective forces, as both sides recognized that such a clash could very easily escalate and quickly involve nuclear weapons. Instead, the superpowers fought each other through their involvement in proxy wars, military buildups, and diplomatic standoffs. Thus, no two nuclear powers have yet fought a conventional war directly except for two brief skirmishes between China and Soviet Union in the 1969 Sino-Soviet conflict and between India and Pakistan in the 1999 Kargil War. However, conventional wars have been fought since 1945 between countries without nuclear weapons, such as the Iran–Iraq War and Eritrean–Ethiopian War, or between a nuclear state and a weaker non-nuclear state, like the Gulf War and Russo-Ukrainian War. See also: Asymmetric warfare Guerrilla warfare Low-intensity operations Psychological warfare Unconventional warfare References: External links: "Changing Nature of Warfare". National Intelligence Council. 2004. Archived from the original on June 15, 2006. Retrieved January 30, 2006. Stathis Kalyvas (2003). "The Sociology of Civil Wars: Warfare and Armed Groups". Armed Groups Project. Archived from the original on October 9, 2006. Retrieved January 30, 2006.

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Counter attack

Analyzing historical counterattacks: In the past, there have been many notable counterattacks which have changed the course of a war. To be specific, Operation Bagration and the Battle of Austerlitz are good examples of the proper execution of a counterattack. Operation Bagration: Operation Bagration during World War II was one of the largest counterattacks in military history. In the summer of 1944 the assault by around 1.7 million Red Army soldiers successfully put the Red Army on the offensive in the Eastern Front after Nazi Germany in Operation Barbarossa had captured the territory against the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941. The Soviet counterattack focused on Belorussia, but prior to the counterattack starting, the Soviet Union fooled Nazi military leaders into believing that the attack would take place further south, near Ukraine. To aid the deception, the Red Army established fake army camps in Ukraine and after German reconnaissance planes reported Soviet troop concentrations in the area, panzer and infantry divisions were rushed south from Belorussia, leaving it vulnerable to a major assault. To support the attack, partisan groups in German-controlled territory were instructed to destroy German railroads to hamper German efforts to transport supplies and troops throughout the occupied territories and further weaken German Army Group Centre in Ukraine. On 22 June 1944, the attack on Belarus by 1.7 million Soviet troops began and overwhelmed the depleted Germans defenders. On 3 July, the Red Army captured Minsk, and later the rest of Belorussia. Operation Bagration was a huge Soviet success and opened a direct route to Berlin after the fall of Belorussia, leading to the Red Army beginning to take over the territory that had been taken by the Wehrmacht three years before. Battle of Austerlitz: Another military battle that utilized the counterattack tactic was the Battle of Austerlitz on 2 December 1805. While fighting the Austrian and Russian armies, Napoleon purposely made it seem as if his men were weak from the fighting in several cases. Napoleon had his men retreat in an attempt to lure the Allies to battle. He purposely left his right flank open and vulnerable. This deceived the Allies into attacking and the Allies fell into Napoleon's trap. When the Allied troops went to attack Napoleon’s right flank, Napoleon quickly filled up the right flank so the attack was not effective. However, on the Allied side, a large gap was left open in the middle of the Allied front line due to troops leaving to attack the French right flank. Noticing the large hole in the middle of the Allied lines, Napoleon attacked the middle and had his forces also flank around both sides, eventually surrounding the Allies. With the Allies completely surrounded, the battle was over. The Battle of Austerlitz was a successful counterattack because the French army defended off the Allied attack and quickly defeated the Allies. Napoleon deceived the Allies. He made his men seem weak and near defeat. Battle of St. Vith: The Battle of St. Vith was part of the Battle of the Bulge, which began on 16 December 1944, and represented the right flank in the advance of the German center, 5th Panzer-Armee (Armored Army), toward the ultimate objective of Antwerp. Given the task of countering the German advance, US General Bruce C. Clarke decided that a mobile defense was the best solution. Knowing that the German army was aiming for an objective far behind the battle line, he decided that they could afford to lose a few kilometers a day - the idea being that a slowing down of the advance was as good as stopping them outright, since the Germans were limited by time. The mobile defense he used at St. Vith involved the use of M36 tank destroyers acting as a base of fire to resist the oncoming German armored thrust, slowing them down enough to then counter-attack them with a force of M4 Sherman tanks. Artillery and Infantry were involved in this process as a combined arms force. The key was not to engage the Germans in a pitched battle, but to slow their advance enough to ruin their offensive timetable. The counter-attacks ensured that the German forces could not break through the slowly retreating forces. Clarke's success was one of the first times armor had been used in a mobile defense. See also: Cult of the offensive Battleplan (documentary TV series) Notes and references: Bibliography: Briggs, Clarence E., (ed.), translated by Oliver L. Spaulding, Roots of Strategy: 3 Military Classics : Von Leeb's Defense, Von Freytag-Loringhoven's the Power of Personality in War, Erfurth's Surprise, Stackpole Books, 1991 Department of Defense (US); Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Published by: United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. Retrieved: 13 October 2008. Further reading: Bruce Schneier (2003). Beyond Fear. Springer. pp. 173–175. ISBN 9780387026206. Glover S. Johns (2002). The Clay Pigeons of St. Lo. Stackpole Books. pp. 174–175. ISBN 9780811726047.

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Counter battery fire

Background: Indirect fire was introduced so that artillery could fire from behind cover to reduce its exposure to enemy artillery by making itself more difficult to find. While armies were doing this, little thought was given to the need for counter-counter measures. Perhaps the only means of finding concealed guns was observation from kites or balloons. However, effective counter-battery fire needs far more than a single method of observation. Counter-battery (CB) fire emerged and developed extremely quickly during World War I. Since that war, CB has continued to evolve, mainly due to improvements in technology. The targets of CB fire are usually the enemy's guns, launchers and mortars, both the materiel and the men serving them. The formal NATO definition of the term counter-battery is "fire delivered for the purpose of destroying or neutralising the enemy's fire support system", with the note that it may be proactive or reactive. This may be achieved by attacks on any part of the field artillery system. In some armies at some periods CB has been called counter-bombardment, and occasionally counter-mortar has been handled separately. Functions: There are four functions in the system for CB fire: Target acquisition CB intelligence CB fire control CB fire units Target acquisition: Target acquisition is the source of information for CB intelligence. It may produce accurate locations for enemy fire units or merely inputs to a more complex process for locating and assessing hostile artillery. At the end of World War I, the following were recognised as the principal sources of artillery intelligence, this seems to be in descending order of usefulness: Aeroplanes (i.e., visual observation) Aeroplane photography Survey sections (i.e., flash spotting) Sound ranging sections Balloon observation Ground observers (artillery and intelligence posts of other arms) Liaison officers (artillery at infantry brigade HQs, these obtained reports of enemy artillery activity) Officers' patrols Secret agents and epatries Captured documents and prisoners' statements Listening sets (i.e., monitoring enemy communications) Intercepted wireless (by wireless compass stations) Apart from balloons and officers' patrols, these sources continued to play their part in World War II, and their technology improved, although flash spotting became less useful as ranges increased and flashless (or low flash) propellants became widespread. A successor to officers' patrols had an isolated emergence in Italy when Canadian artillery observers were put ashore behind German lines and established themselves to observe gun positions. Sound ranging and flash spotting both required enemy guns to fire. Furthermore, other methods such as radio direction finding and information from prisoners are insufficiently precise to "fix" a target for artillery attack. Information from others may not be received quickly and hence be out of date, the hostile battery having moved. These methods were joined by radar in World War II; while this could detect a shell in flight the gun that fired it could not usually be seen and the shell's elliptical trajectory made it impossible to extrapolate backwards with the technology of that time. However, mortar bombs have a parabolic trajectory (as do guns firing at high angles) defined by a simple mathematical equation with two points on the parabolic curve. It was therefore possible to deduce a mortar's position by tracking its bomb and recording two points on its trajectory. Another method that emerged was crater examination, this could reveal the azimuth back to the hostile gun or mortar and study of fragments could reveal its type. However, while it was a useful source of information it was not sufficiently accurate to give a location for the firer. Most armies abandoned flash spotting in the 1950s. However, several new target acquisition technologies emerged. These included: UAVs, about 1960 an Unmanned Air Vehicle, the SD-1, entered artillery service. This early UAV used wet film photography by day or night, had short range and short endurance. However, being under artillery control they were responsive to CB needs, which was just as well because other forms of air reconnaissance were becoming less available and were not notably timely. Other UAVs, including drones (flying a programmed course) duly emerged, including the ability to transmit imagery in real-time. Next, in the 1970s Hughes Aircraft developed the US Firefinder RADAR system and created the algorithms that could extrapolate a gun's position from a segment of an elliptic trajectory. It's likely the Soviet Union created similar algorithms. Non-communications ELINT, which can detect and locate radars, including those used by artillery is an often overlooked source. A few armies established artillery observation patrol units to operate in likely artillery deployment areas behind the enemy's forward units. On the modern battlefield various radars are able to detect vehicles or stationary guns on the ground, although this is far from a perfect information source. Look-down radar from high altitude aircraft are able to detect vehicles over a very wide range, but are unable to determine what type of vehicles they are and are susceptible to radar reflectors and similar countermeasures. The information is useful but requires further sources of information to accurately determine which contacts are the target. Millimeter wave radar (such as the AH-64 Apache's Longbow Radar) are able to very accurately detect the types of vehicles observed but are much shorter ranged. The arrival of highly networked combat systems allows for data from multiple sources to be cross referenced very quickly. As a result, modern counter battery fire is generally as a result of a wide array of different possible information sources working together to provide targets in close to real time. Sound ranging systems have also evolved with newer technology, such as Hostile Artillery Locating (HALO) and similar systems developed in other countries. CB intelligence: CB intelligence applies the intelligence cycle and principles to CB. It uses information about hostile artillery from all sources to maintain detailed records and apply specialist techniques that exploit the nature of artillery fire to produce: Intelligence about hostile artillery positions The enemy artillery order of battle Intelligence about hostile artillery activity and deployment and assessments of its wider implications CB intelligence is usually combined with CB fire control (see below), although intelligence purists recognise this is not good practice and the two were separate in the British forces in France in World War I. In both World Wars CB intelligence and CB control were found to be most effective when they were at corps level. However, the final year of World War 2 showed that the counter mortar battle was really one for brigade level. Since that war CB has tended to move to lower levels and in some armies has grown into a wider deep supporting fire organisation. CB fire control: It does not always make tactical sense to attack hostile batteries the moment they are located. This is magnified by the challenges of targeting hostile batteries. There are many factors, and their significance depends on the circumstances. The first issue for targeting is that it is difficult to knock out a battery, although smart munitions against SP guns may change this. As the quoted definition states, "destroy" is one possibility; another is "neutralization": to render the battery temporarily ineffective or unusable, including by suppressing it or forcing it to move. However, "suppression" only lasts while CB fire is falling, and if a hostile battery moves then it has to be found again. Sometimes it is best just to record the location of the hostile battery and leave it for later. An additional issue for the use of counter battery fire is the finite artillery resources available for use in a given situation. CB fire units: The final aspect of the CB equation is having available CB fire units and appropriate munitions. Typically these are general supporting fire units, but direct supporting fire units are also used if they are available and not fully occupied by their primary role. With conventional HE shells it may require the concentrated fire of 5–10 batteries to deal effectively with one hostile battery. Hence a value of multiple rocket launchers is their ability to deliver a heavy and concentrated attack from relatively few launchers. Counter-measures: Counter-measures to CB fire have emerged throughout history. These include: Digging in. In World War I, even heavy artillery was dug-in with several feet of overhead protection. Even today North Korean artillery is widely thought to be resistant to CB fire because of its deeply entrenched positions. More generally precision munitions have decreased the value of digging. Encasing guns in armour. Fully armoured self-propelled guns were introduced to provide protection against conventional HE (High Explosive) fire. Shoot-and-scoot tactics, in which a self-propelled artillery vehicle or towed gun fires a single round or salvo and immediately begins moving. Shoot-and-scoot tactics were first used in World War II by Soviet Katyusha rocket launchers. Spreading out. Increasing the dispersion of guns in a position has been aided by computers for technical fire control. Introduction of guns with self-survey and orientation has led to the concept of gun maneuver areas where the troops, platoons or sections of a battery keep moving around, although it is questionable how sustainable this is. Concealment. While firing guns cannot escape sound-ranging and radar detection, concealment and deception can reduce the likelihood of discovery from other methods. Counter-battery fire, being prepared to reply to enemy counter-battery fire with counter-battery fire of your own. Human shields. The practice of embedding artillery assets within a civilian population to discourage enemy counter-battery fire, based on the assumption that a counter-battery strike would damage and destroy civilian infrastructures as well as killing innocent non-combatants. The legal protections afforded to non-combatants mean such tactics would generally constitute a war crime. Of course there are many potential target nodes in the field artillery system, including those dedicated to finding hostile artillery.

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Counter battery fire

Introduction of guns with self-survey and orientation has led to the concept of gun maneuver areas where the troops, platoons or sections of a battery keep moving around, although it is questionable how sustainable this is. Concealment. While firing guns cannot escape sound-ranging and radar detection, concealment and deception can reduce the likelihood of discovery from other methods. Counter-battery fire, being prepared to reply to enemy counter-battery fire with counter-battery fire of your own. Human shields. The practice of embedding artillery assets within a civilian population to discourage enemy counter-battery fire, based on the assumption that a counter-battery strike would damage and destroy civilian infrastructures as well as killing innocent non-combatants. The legal protections afforded to non-combatants mean such tactics would generally constitute a war crime. Of course there are many potential target nodes in the field artillery system, including those dedicated to finding hostile artillery. Attacking these may significantly blind the enemy's CB capability—counter-countermeasures. See also: AMOS or Advanced MOrtar System Archer Artillery System Artillery Surveillance and Target Acquisition Counter-battery radar Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Flash spotting References: Sources: General Sir Martin Farndale History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery - Western Front 1914-18 Maj Gen AGL McNaughton The Development of Artillery in the Great War, Canadian Defence Quarterly Vol 6 No 2, January 1929 Peter Chasseaud Artillery's Astrologers: A History of British Survey and Mapping on the Western Front, 1914-1918 NATO AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions

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Counter-insurgency

Models: Counterinsurgency is normally conducted as a combination of conventional military operations and other means, such as demoralization in the form of propaganda, Psy-ops, and assassinations. Counter-insurgency operations include many different facets: military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency. To understand counterinsurgency, one must understand insurgency to comprehend the dynamics of revolutionary warfare. Counter-insurgency focuses on bridging these gaps. Insurgents take advantage of social issues known as gaps. When the gaps are wide, they create a sea of discontent, creating the environment in which the insurgent can operate. In The Insurgent Archipelago, John Mackinlay puts forward the concept of an evolution of the insurgency from the Maoist paradigm of the golden age of insurgency to the global insurgency of the start of the 21st century. He defines this distinction as "Maoist" and "post-Maoist" insurgency. Counterinsurgency theorists: Santa Cruz de Marcenado: The third Marques of Santa Cruz de Marcenado (1684–1732) is probably the earliest author who dealt systematically in his writings with counterinsurgency. In his Reflexiones Militares, published between 1726 and 1730, he discussed how to spot early signs of an incipient insurgency, prevent insurgencies, and counter them, if they could not be warded off. Strikingly, Santa Cruz recognized that insurgencies are usually due to real grievances: "A state rarely rises up without the fault of its governors." Consequently, he advocated clemency towards the population and good governance, to seek the people's "heart and love". B. H. Liddell Hart: Liddell Hart attributed the failure of counterinsurgencies to various causes. First, as pointed out in the Insurgency addendum to the second version of his book Strategy: The Indirect Approach, a popular insurgency has an inherent advantage over any occupying force. He showed as a prime example the French occupation of Spain during the Napoleonic wars. Whenever Spanish forces managed to constitute themselves into a regular fighting force, the superior French forces beat them every time. However, once dispersed and decentralized, the irregular nature of the rebel campaigns proved a decisive counter to French superiority on the battlefield. Napoleon's army had no means of effectively combating the rebels, and in the end, their strength and morale were so sapped that when Wellington was finally able to challenge French forces in the field, the French had almost no choice but to abandon the situation. Counterinsurgency efforts may be successful, especially when the insurgents are unpopular. The Philippine–American War, the Shining Path in Peru, and the Malayan Emergency have been the sites of failed insurgencies. Hart also points to the experiences of T. E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt during World War I as another example of the power of the rebel/insurgent. Though the Ottomans often had advantages in manpower of more than 100 to 1, the Arabs' ability to materialize out of the desert, strike, and disappear again often left the Turks reeling and paralyzed, creating an opportunity for regular British forces to sweep in and finish the Turkish forces off. In both the preceding cases, the insurgents and rebel fighters were working in conjunction with or in a manner complementary to regular forces. Such was also the case with the French Resistance during World War II and the National Liberation Front during the Vietnam War. The strategy in these cases is for the irregular combatant to weaken and destabilize the enemy to such a degree that victory is easy or assured for the regular forces. However, in many modern rebellions, one does not see rebel fighters working in conjunction with regular forces. Rather, they are home-grown militias or imported fighters who have no unified goals or objectives save to expel the occupier. According to Liddell Hart, there are few effective counter-measures to this strategy. So long as the insurgency maintains popular support, it will retain all of its strategic advantages of mobility, invisibility, and legitimacy in its own eyes and the eyes of the people. So long as this is the situation, an insurgency essentially cannot be defeated by regular forces. David Galula: David Galula gained his practical experience in counterinsurgency as a French Army officer in the Algerian War. His theory of counterinsurgency is not primarily military, but a combination of military, political and social actions under the strong control of a single authority. Galula proposes four "laws" for counterinsurgency: The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory. Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority. Support of the population may be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite party. Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, then gaining the support of the population, and eventually strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area by area, using a pacified territory as a basis of operation to conquer a neighboring area. Galula contends that: A victory [in a counterinsurgency] is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent's forces and his political organization. ... A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population. ... In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at the grassroots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population. With his four principles in mind, Galula goes on to describe a general military and political strategy to put them into operation in an area that is under full insurgent control: In a Selected Area 1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents. 2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent come back in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives. 3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas. 4. Destroy the local insurgent political organization. 5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities. 6. Test those authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units. 7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement. 8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants. According to Galula, some of these steps can be skipped in areas that are only partially under insurgent control, and most of them are unnecessary in areas already controlled by the government. Thus the essence of counterinsurgency warfare is summed up by Galula as "Build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward." Robert Thompson: Robert Grainger Ker Thompson wrote Defeating Communist Insurgency in 1966, wherein he argued that a successful counterinsurgency effort must be proactive in seizing the initiative from insurgents. Thompson outlines five basic principles for a successful counterinsurgency: The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country that is politically and economically stable and viable; The government must function in accordance with the law; The government must have an overall plan; The government must give priority to defeating political subversion, not the guerrilla fighters; In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first. David Kilcullen: In "The Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency", Dr. David Kilcullen, the Chief Strategist of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the U.S. State Department in 2006, described a framework for interagency cooperation in counterinsurgency operations. His pillars – Security, Political and Economic – support the overarching goal of Control, but are based on Information: This is because perception is crucial in developing control and influence over population groups. Substantive security, political and economic measures are critical but to be effective they must rest upon, and integrate with a broader information strategy. Every action in counterinsurgency sends a message; the purpose of the information campaign is to consolidate and unify this message. ... Importantly, the information campaign has to be conducted at a global, regional and local level — because modern insurgents draw upon global networks of sympathy, support, funding and recruitment. Kilcullen considers the three pillars to be of equal importance because unless they are developed in parallel, the campaign becomes unbalanced: too much economic assistance with inadequate security, for example, simply creates an array of soft targets for the insurgents. Similarly, too much security assistance without political consensus or governance simply creates more capable armed groups. In developing each pillar, we measure progress by gauging effectiveness (capability and capacity) and legitimacy (the degree to which the population accepts that government actions are in its interest).

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Counter-insurgency

Substantive security, political and economic measures are critical but to be effective they must rest upon, and integrate with a broader information strategy. Every action in counterinsurgency sends a message; the purpose of the information campaign is to consolidate and unify this message. ... Importantly, the information campaign has to be conducted at a global, regional and local level — because modern insurgents draw upon global networks of sympathy, support, funding and recruitment. Kilcullen considers the three pillars to be of equal importance because unless they are developed in parallel, the campaign becomes unbalanced: too much economic assistance with inadequate security, for example, simply creates an array of soft targets for the insurgents. Similarly, too much security assistance without political consensus or governance simply creates more capable armed groups. In developing each pillar, we measure progress by gauging effectiveness (capability and capacity) and legitimacy (the degree to which the population accepts that government actions are in its interest). The overall goal, according to this model, "is not to reduce violence to zero or to kill every insurgent, but rather to return the overall system to normality — noting that 'normality' in one society may look different from normality in another. In each case, we seek not only to establish control, but also to consolidate that control and then transfer it to permanent, effective, and legitimate institutions." Martin van Creveld: Military historian Martin van Creveld, noting that almost all attempts to deal with insurgency have ended in failure, advises: The first, and absolutely indispensable, thing to do is throw overboard 99 percent of the literature on counterinsurgency, counter guerrilla, counterterrorism, and the like. Since most of it was written by the losing side, it is of little value. In examining why so many counterinsurgencies by powerful militaries fail against weaker enemies, Van Creveld identifies a key dynamic that he illustrates by the metaphor of killing a child. Regardless of whether the child started the fight or how well armed the child is, an adult in a fight with a child will feel that he is acting unjustly if he harms the child and foolish if the child harms him; he will, therefore, wonder if the fight is necessary. Van Creveld argues that "by definition, a strong counterinsurgent who uses his strength to kill the members of a small, weak organization of insurgents – let alone the civilian population by which it is surrounded, and which may lend it support – will commit crimes in an unjust cause," while "a child who is in a serious fight with an adult is justified in using every and any means available – not because he or she is right, but because he or she has no choice." Every act of insurgency becomes, from the perspective of the counterinsurgent, a reason to end the conflict, while also being a reason for the insurgents to continue until victory. Trường Chinh, second in command to Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam, wrote in his Primer for Revolt: The guiding principle of the strategy for our whole resistance must be to prolong the war. To protract the war is the key to victory. Why must the war be protracted? ... If we throw the whole of our forces into a few battles to try to decide the outcome, we shall certainly be defeated and the enemy will win. On the other hand, if while fighting we maintain our forces, expand them, train our army and people, learn military tactics ... and at the same time wear down the enemy forces, we shall weary and discourage them in such a way that, strong as they are, they will become weak and will meet defeat instead of victory. Van Creveld thus identifies "time" as the key factor in counterinsurgency. In an attempt to find lessons from the few cases of successful counterinsurgency, of which he lists two clear cases: the British efforts during The Troubles of Northern Ireland and the 1982 Hama massacre carried out by the Syrian government to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood, he asserts that the "core of the difficulty is neither military nor political, but moral" and outlines two distinct methods. The first method relies on superb intelligence, provided by those who know the natural and artificial environment of the conflict as well as the insurgents. Once such superior intelligence is gained, the counterinsurgents must be trained to a point of high professionalism and discipline such that they will exercise discrimination and restraint. Through such discrimination and restraint, the counterinsurgents do not alienate members of the populace besides those already fighting them, while delaying the time when the counterinsurgents become disgusted by their own actions and demoralized. General Patrick Walters, the British commander of troops in Northern Ireland, explicitly stated that his objective was not to kill as many terrorists as possible but to ensure that as few people on both sides were killed. In the vast majority of counterinsurgencies, the "forces of order" kill far more people than they lose. In contrast and using very rough figures, the struggle in Northern Ireland had cost the United Kingdom three thousand fatal casualties. Of the three thousand, about seventeen hundred were civilians...of the remaining, a thousand were British soldiers. No more than three hundred were terrorists, a ratio of three to one. If the prerequisites for the first method – excellent intelligence, superbly trained and disciplined soldiers and police, and an iron will to avoid being provoked into lashing out – are lacking, van Creveld posits that counterinsurgents who still want to win must use the second method exemplified by the Hama massacre. In 1982, the regime of Syrian president Hafez al-Assad was on the point of being overwhelmed by the countrywide insurgency of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Assad sent a Syrian Army division under his brother Rifaat to the city of Hama, known to be the center of the resistance. Following a counterattack by the Brotherhood, Rifaat used his heavy artillery to demolish the city, killing between 10-25,000 people, including many women and children. Asked by reporters what had happened, Hafez al-Assad exaggerated the damage and deaths, promoted the commanders who carried out the attacks, and razed Hama's well-known great mosque, replacing it with a parking lot. With the Muslim Brotherhood scattered, the population was so cowed that it would be years before opposition groups dared to disobey the regime again and, van Creveld argues, the massacre most likely saved the regime and prevented a bloody civil war. Van Creveld condenses al-Assad's strategy into five rules while noting that they could easily have been written by Niccolò Machiavelli: There are situations in which cruelty is necessary, and refusing to apply necessary cruelty is a betrayal of the people who put you into power. When pressed to cruelty, never threaten your opponent but disguise your intention and feign weakness until you strike. Once you decide to strike, it is better to kill too many than not enough. If another strike is needed, it reduces the impact of the first strike. Repeated strikes will also endanger the morale of the counterinsurgent troops; soldiers forced to commit repeated atrocities will likely begin to resort to alcohol or drugs to force themselves to carry out orders and will inevitably lose their military edge, eventually turning into a danger to their commanders. Act as soon as possible. More lives will be saved by decisive action early, than by prolonging the insurgency. The longer you wait, the more inured the population will be to bloodshed, and the more barbaric your action will have to be to make an impression. Strike openly. Do not apologize, make excuses about "collateral damage", express regret, or promise investigations. Afterwards, make sure that as many people as possible know of your strike; the media is useful for this purpose, but be careful not to let them interview survivors and arouse sympathy. Do not command the strike yourself, in case it doesn't work for some reason and you need to disown your commander and try another strategy. If it does work, present your commander to the world, explain what you have done and make certain that everyone understands that you are ready to strike again. Lorenzo Zambernardi: In "Counterinsurgency's Impossible Trilemma", Dr. Lorenzo Zambernardi, an Italian academic now working in the United States, clarifies the tradeoffs involved in counterinsurgency operations. He argues that counterinsurgency involves three main goals, but in real practice, a counterinsurgent needs to choose two goals out of three. Relying on economic theory, this is what Zambernardi labels the "impossible trilemma" of counterinsurgency. Specifically, the impossible trilemma suggests that it is impossible to simultaneously achieve: 1) force protection, 2) distinction between enemy combatants and non-combatants, and 3) the physical elimination of insurgents. According to Zambernardi, in pursuing any two of these three goals, a state must forgo some portion of the third objective. In particular, a state can protect its armed forces while destroying insurgents, but only by indiscriminately killing civilians as the Ottomans, Italians, and Nazis did in the Balkans, Libya, and Eastern Europe. It can choose to protect civilians along with its own armed forces instead, avoiding so-called collateral damage, but only by abandoning the objective of destroying the insurgents. Finally, a state can discriminate between combatants and non-combatants while killing insurgents, but only by increasing the risks for its own troops, because often insurgents will hide behind civilians, or appear to be civilians.

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Counter-insurgency

Specifically, the impossible trilemma suggests that it is impossible to simultaneously achieve: 1) force protection, 2) distinction between enemy combatants and non-combatants, and 3) the physical elimination of insurgents. According to Zambernardi, in pursuing any two of these three goals, a state must forgo some portion of the third objective. In particular, a state can protect its armed forces while destroying insurgents, but only by indiscriminately killing civilians as the Ottomans, Italians, and Nazis did in the Balkans, Libya, and Eastern Europe. It can choose to protect civilians along with its own armed forces instead, avoiding so-called collateral damage, but only by abandoning the objective of destroying the insurgents. Finally, a state can discriminate between combatants and non-combatants while killing insurgents, but only by increasing the risks for its own troops, because often insurgents will hide behind civilians, or appear to be civilians. So a country must choose two out of three goals and develop a strategy that can successfully accomplish them while sacrificing the third objective. Zambernardi's theory posits that to protect populations, which is necessary to defeat insurgencies and to physically destroy an insurgency, the counterinsurgent's military forces must be sacrificed, risking the loss of domestic political support. Akali Omeni: Another writer who explores a trio of features relevant to understanding counterinsurgency is Akali Omeni. Within the contemporary context, COIN warfare by African militaries tends to be at the margins of the theoretical debate – even though Africa today is faced with a number of deadly insurgencies. In Counter-insurgency in Nigeria, Omeni, a Nigerian academic, discusses the interactions between certain features away from the battlefield, which account for battlefield performance against insurgent warfare. Specifically, Omeni argues that the trio of historical experience, organisational culture (OC) and doctrine, help explain the institution of COIN within militaries and their tendency to reject the innovation and adaptation often necessary to defeat insurgency. These three features, furthermore, influence and can undermine the operational tactics and concepts adopted against insurgents. The COIN challenge, therefore, is not just operational; it also is cultural and institutional before ever it reflects on the battlefield. According to Omeni, institutional isomorphism is a sociological phenomenon that constrains the habits of a military (in this case, the Nigerian military) to the long-established, yet increasingly ineffective, ideology of the offensive in irregular warfare. As Omeni writes, Whereas the Nigerian military's performance against militias in the Niger Delta already suggested the military had a poor grasp of the threat of insurgent warfare; it was further along the line, as the military struggled against Boko Haram's threat, that the extent of this weakness was exposed. At best, the utility of force, for the Nigerian military, had become but a temporary solution against the threat of insurgent warfare. At worst, the existing model has been perpetuated at such high cost, that urgent revisionist thinking around the idea of counterinsurgency within the military institution may now be required. Additionally, the military's decisive civil war victory, the pivot in Nigeria's strategic culture towards a regional role, and the institutional delegitimization brought about by decades of coups and political meddling, meant that much time went by without substantive revisionism to the military's thinking around its internal function. Change moreover, where it occurred, was institutionally isomorphic and not as far removed from the military's own origins as the intervening decades may have suggested. Further, the infantry-centric nature of the Nigerian Army's battalions, traceable back to the Nigerian Civil War back in the 1960s, is reflected in the kinetic nature of the Army's contemporary COIN approach. This approach has failed to defeat Boko Haram in the way many expected. Certainly, therefore, the popular argument today, which holds that the Nigerian Army has struggled in COIN due to capabilities shortcomings, holds some merit. However, a full-spectrum analysis of the Nigeria case suggests that this popular dominant narrative scarcely scratches the surface of the true COIN challenge. This population-centered challenge, moreover, is one that militaries across the world continue to contend with. And in attempting to solve the COIN puzzle, state forces over the decades have tried a range of tactics. Information-centric theory: Starting in the early 2000s, micro-level data has transformed the analysis of effective counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Leading this work is the "information-centric" group of theorists and researchers, led by the work of the Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) group at Princeton University, and the Conflict and Peace, Research and Development (CPRD) group at the University of Michigan. Berman, Shapiro, and Felter have outlined the modern information-centric model. In this framework, the critical determinant of counterinsurgent success is information about insurgents provided to counterinsurgents, such as insurgent locations, plans, and targets. Information can be acquired from civilian sources (human intelligence, HUMINT), or through signals intelligence (SIGINT). Jeffrey Treistman: Dr. Jeffrey Treistman previously served with the US Department of State as the Policy Advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Salam al-Zaubai. In his book, When Bad States Win: Rethinking Counterinsurgency Strategy, he found little evidence to support the ‘hearts and minds’ approach to counterinsurgency. “There is little robust generalizable evidence that population-centric approaches are effective,” he argued. In contrast to other COIN theorists, Treistman examined how the gross violation of international law and human rights affected war outcomes. He developed a theory of barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy — the indiscriminate use of violence against civilians to defeat insurgents. He proposed that under certain conditions, genocide, rape, torture, repression, and other human rights violations could succeed in suppressing a rebellion. Treistman theorized that moderate levels of violence against civilians would not be effective in dissuading insurgents. But if counterinsurgents increased their lethality, cruelty, and violence against civilians it would successfully deter insurgents. “The overwhelming and brutal application of force against civilians,” he argued, “will squash domestic opposition.” Treistman thus proposed a convex function to model the relationship between barbarism and counterinsurgency outcomes. Moderate levels of repression are insufficient and counterproductive, but as a counterinsurgent increases the degree of lethality and repression it is more likely to defeat insurgents. “Widespread indiscriminate violence and political repression increase the odds of a government victory. As a result, bad states may sometimes defeat insurgencies.” Tactics: "Drain the sea" tactic: With regard to tactics, the terms "drain the sea" or "drain the water" involves the forced relocation or elimination of the civilian population ("water") to expose the rebels or insurgents ("fish"). In other words, relocation deprives the aforementioned of the support, cover, and resources of the local population. This is typically targeted in that it specifically targets the demographic that supports the insurgency in a limited area where insurgency is taking place, but is indiscriminate from an individual perspective. Examples of use of this technique in counterinsurgency include Bar Kokhba revolt, Second Anglo-Boer War, Greek Civil War, General Order No. 11 (1863) in the American Civil War, Rohingya conflict, and Xinjiang conflict. "Draining the sea" can also be accomplished through genocide by killing the population blamed for the insurgency. During World War II, Nazi Germany's counterinsurgency (Bandenbekämpfung, lit. 'bandit fighting') became intertwined with the Final Solution. Indiscriminate violence also has a deterrent effect. Edward Luttwak stated, "A massacre once in a while remained an effective warning for decades." A downside of such methods of counterinsurgency is their severity may provoke increased resistance from the targeted population. In contemporary times, concerns about public opinion and international law can rule out counterinsurgency campaigns using indiscriminate violence. Assassination of leaders: Assassination of leaders can be a successful counterinsurgency tactic. Oil spot: The oil spot approach is the concentration of counterinsurgent forces into an expanding, secured zone. The origins of the expression is to be found in its initial use by Marshal Hubert Lyautey, the main theoretician of French colonial warfare and counterinsurgency strategy. The oil spot approach was later one of the justifications given in the Pentagon Papers for the Strategic Hamlet Program. Cordon and search: Cordon and search is a military tactic, one of the basic counterinsurgency operations in which an area is cordoned off and premises are searched for weapons or insurgents. Other related operations are "Cordon and knock" and "Cordon and kick". "Cordon and search" is part of a new doctrine called Stability and Support Operations or SASO. It is a technique used where there is no hard intelligence of weapons in the house and therefore is less intense than a normal house search. It is used in urban neighborhoods. The purpose of the mission is to search a house with as little inconvenience to the resident family as possible. Air operations: Air power can play an important role in counterinsurgency, capable of carrying out a wide range of operations: Transportation in support of combatants and civilians alike, including casualty evacuations; Intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance; Psychological operations, through leaflet drops, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasts; Air-to-ground attack against 'soft' targets.

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Other related operations are "Cordon and knock" and "Cordon and kick". "Cordon and search" is part of a new doctrine called Stability and Support Operations or SASO. It is a technique used where there is no hard intelligence of weapons in the house and therefore is less intense than a normal house search. It is used in urban neighborhoods. The purpose of the mission is to search a house with as little inconvenience to the resident family as possible. Air operations: Air power can play an important role in counterinsurgency, capable of carrying out a wide range of operations: Transportation in support of combatants and civilians alike, including casualty evacuations; Intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance; Psychological operations, through leaflet drops, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasts; Air-to-ground attack against 'soft' targets. Public diplomacy: In General David Petraeus' Counterinsurgency Field Manual, one of the many tactics described to help win in counterinsurgency warfare involves the use of public diplomacy through military means. Counterinsurgency is effective when it is integrated "into a comprehensive strategy employing all instruments of national power," including public diplomacy. The goal of COIN operations is to render the insurgents as ineffective and non-influential, by having strong and secure relations with the population of the host nation. An understanding of the host nation and the environment that the COIN operations will take place in is essential. Public diplomacy in COIN warfare is only effective when there is a clear understanding of the culture and population at hand. One of the largest factors needed for defeating an insurgency involves understanding the populace, how they interact with the insurgents, how they interact with non-government organizations in the area, and how they view the counterinsurgency operations themselves. Ethics is a common public diplomacy aspect that is emphasized in COIN warfare. Insurgents win their war by attacking internal will and the international opposition. To combat these tactics, the counterinsurgency operations need to treat their prisoners and detainees humanely and according to American values and principles. By doing this, COIN operations show the host nation's population that they can be trusted and that they are concerned about the well-being of the population to be successful in warfare. A population that expects the incumbent government to deliver public goods, services, and security frequently supports the counterinsurgency, and a major event that increases popular expectations of future public goods and service delivery can trigger a shift in public attitudes away from the insurgency and toward the counterinsurgency. "Political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of the conflict and undermining the insurgency." These programs are essential in order to gain the support of the population. These programs are designed to make the local population feel secure, safe, and more aligned with the counterinsurgency efforts; this enables the citizens of the host nation to trust the goals and purposes of the counterinsurgency efforts, as opposed to the insurgents'. A counterinsurgency is a battle of ideas and the implementation and integration of these programs is important for success. Social, political and economic programs should be coordinated and administered by the host nation's leaders, as well. Successful COIN warfare allows the population to see that the counterinsurgency efforts are including the host nation in their re-building programs. The war is fought among the people and for the people between the insurgents and the counterinsurgents. A counterinsurgency is won by utilizing strategic communications and information operations successfully. A counterinsurgency is a competition of ideas, ideologies, and socio-political movements. In order to combat insurgent ideologies one must understand the values and characteristics of the ideology or religion. Additionally, counterinsurgency efforts need to understand the culture of which the insurgency resides, in order to strategically launch information and communication operations against the insurgent ideology or religion. Counterinsurgency information operatives need to also identify key audiences, communicators, and public leaders to know whom to influence and reach out to with their information. Information operations: Public diplomacy in information operations can only be achieved by a complete understanding of the culture it is operating in. Counterinsurgency operations must be able to perceive the world from the locals' perspective. To develop a comprehensive cultural picture counterinsurgency efforts should invest in employing "media consultants, finance and business experts, psychologists, organizational network analysts, and scholars from a wide range of disciplines." Most importantly, counterinsurgency efforts need to be able to understand why the local population is drawn into the insurgent ideology, like what aspects are appealing and how insurgents use the information to draw their followers into the ideology. Counterinsurgency communication efforts need a baseline understanding of values, attitudes, and perceptions of the people in the area of operations to conduct successful public diplomacy to defeat the enemy. Developing information and communication strategies involve providing a legitimate alternate ideology, improving security and economic opportunity, and strengthening family ties outside of the insurgency. In order to conduct public diplomacy through these means, counterinsurgency communication needs to match its deeds with its words. Information provided through public diplomacy during a counterinsurgency cannot lie, the information and communication to the people always have to be truthful and trustworthy in order to be effective at countering the insurgents. Public diplomacy in counterinsurgency to influence the public thoughts and ideas is a long time engagement and should not be done through negative campaigning about the enemy. Conducting public diplomacy through relaying information and communicating with the public in a counterinsurgency is most successful when a conversation can happen between the counterinsurgency team and the local population of the area of operation. Building rapport with the public involves "listening, paying attention, and being responsive and proactive" which is sufficient for the local population to understand and trust the counterinsurgency efforts and vice versa. This relationship is stringent upon the counterinsurgents keeping their promises, providing security to the locals, and communicating their message directly and quickly in times of need. Understanding and influencing the cognitive dimension of the local population is essential to winning counterinsurgency warfare. The people's perception of legitimacy about the host nation and the foreign country's counterinsurgency efforts is where success is determined. "The free flow of information present in all theaters via television, telephone, and Internet, can present conflicting messages and quickly defeat the intended effects." Coordination between the counterinsurgency operations, the host nation, and the local media in the information presented to the public is essential to showing and influencing how the local population perceives the counterinsurgency efforts and the host nation. Public opinion, the media, and rumors influence how the people view counterinsurgency, the government hosting their efforts, and the host nation legitimacy. The use of public diplomacy to strategically relay the correct messages and information to the public is essential to success in a counterinsurgency operation. For example, close relationships with media members in the area is essential to ensure that the locals understand the counterinsurgency objectives and feel secure with the host nation government and the counterinsurgency efforts. If the local media is not in sync with the counterinsurgency operatives then they could spread incomplete or false information about the counterinsurgency campaign to the public. "Given Al Qaeda's global reach, the United States must develop a more integrated strategic communication strategy for counter-insurgency with its allies to diminish violent rhetoric, improve its image abroad, and detect, deter, and defeat this social movement at its many levels." Information operations and communicative abilities are one of the largest and most influential aspects of public diplomacy within a counterinsurgency. Public diplomacy is especially important as modern insurgents are more easily able to gain support through a variety of sources, both local and transnational, thanks to advances in increased communication and globalization. Consequently, modern counter-insurgency requires attention to be focused on an insurgency's ecosystem from the national to the local level, in order to deprive the insurgency of support and prevent future insurgent groups from forming. Specific doctrines: Vietnam War: During the Vietnam War, counterinsurgency initially formed part of the earlier war as Diem had implemented the poorly-conceived Strategic Hamlet Program, a similar model to the Malayan Emergency that had the opposite effect by leading to increased recruitment to the Viet Cong. Similarly economic and rural development formed a key strategy as part of Rural Affairs development. While the earlier war was marked by considerable emphasis on counterinsurgency programs, the US Armed Forces initially relied on very little, if any, theoretical doctrine of counterinsurgency during the Ground-Intervention phase. Conventional warfare using massive firepower and the failure to implement adequate counterinsurgency had extremely negative effects, which was the strategy that the NVA adeptly used to countering by the protracted political and military warfare model. After the replacement of General William Westmoreland, newer concepts were tried including a revival of earlier COIN strategies including Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support. The US and its allies later implemented the Phoenix Program, which targeted the Viet Cong political infrastructure through capture, defection or assassination of Viet Cong members. The program was very successful at suppressing Viet Cong political and revolutionary activities. Malaya: British forces used the relocation method with considerable success during the Malayan Emergency. The Briggs Plan, implemented fully in 1950, relocated Chinese Malayans into protected "New Villages", designated by British forces. By the end of 1951, some 400,000 ethnic Chinese had moved into the fortifications.

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Conventional warfare using massive firepower and the failure to implement adequate counterinsurgency had extremely negative effects, which was the strategy that the NVA adeptly used to countering by the protracted political and military warfare model. After the replacement of General William Westmoreland, newer concepts were tried including a revival of earlier COIN strategies including Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support. The US and its allies later implemented the Phoenix Program, which targeted the Viet Cong political infrastructure through capture, defection or assassination of Viet Cong members. The program was very successful at suppressing Viet Cong political and revolutionary activities. Malaya: British forces used the relocation method with considerable success during the Malayan Emergency. The Briggs Plan, implemented fully in 1950, relocated Chinese Malayans into protected "New Villages", designated by British forces. By the end of 1951, some 400,000 ethnic Chinese had moved into the fortifications. Of that population, the British forces formed a "Home Guard", an armed resistance against the Malayan Communist Party, an implementation that was later mirrored by the Strategic Hamlet Program, which used by US forces in South Vietnam. Despite British claims of a victory in the Malayan Emergency, the military historian Martin van Creveld noted that the results of the counterinsurgency, the withdrawal of British forces and the establishment of an independent state, are identical to those of Aden, Kenya and Cyprus, which are not considered victories. Dutch Empire: The Dutch formulated a new strategy of counterinsurgency warfare during the Aceh War by deploying light-armed Marechaussee units and using scorched-earth tactics. In 1898 Van Heutsz was proclaimed governor of Aceh, and with his lieutenant, who later became Dutch Prime Minister, Hendrikus Colijn, they finally conquered most of Aceh. They followed Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje's suggestions of finding cooperative uleebalang or secular chiefs to support them in the countryside and to isolate the resistance from its rural support base. During the South Sulawesi Campaign, Captain Raymond Westerling of the KST, Special Forces of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army used the Westerling Method. Westerling ordered the registration of all Javanese arriving in Makassar because of the large numbers of Javanese participating in the Sulawesi resistance. He also used scouts to infiltrate local villages and to identify members of the resistance. Based on their information and that of the Dutch military intelligence service, the DST surrounded one of more suspected villages during night and drove the population to a central location. At daybreak, the operation began, often led by Westerling. Men would be separated from women and children. From the information gathered, Westerling exposed certain people as terrorists and murderers, who were shot without any further investigation. Afterwards, Westerling forced local communities to refrain from supporting guerillas by swearing on the Quran, and it established local self-defence units with some members recruited from former guerrillas deemed as "redeemable". Westerling directed eleven operations throughout the campaign. He succeeded in eliminating the insurgency and undermining local support for the Republicans. His actions restored Dutch rule in southern Sulawesi. However, the Netherlands East Indies government and the Dutch Army command soon realised that Westerling's notoriety led to growing public criticism. In April 1947, the Dutch government instituted an official inquiry of his controversial methods. Westerling was put on the sidelines and was relieved of his duties in November 1948. France: France had major counterinsurgency wars in its colonies in Indochina and Algeria. McClintock cited the basic points of French doctrine as: Quadrillage (an administrative grid of population and territory) Ratissage (cordoning and "raking") Regroupement (relocating and closely controlling a suspect population) 'Tache d'huile' – The 'oil spot' strategy Recruitment of local leaders and forces Paramilitary organization and militias Much of the thinking was informed by the work of earlier leading French theoreticians of colonial warfare and counterinsurgency, Marshals Bugeaud, Gallieni and Lyautey. WMcClintock cites the 1894 Algerian governor, Jules Cambon, as saying, "By destroying the administration and local government we were also suppressing our means of action.... The result is that we are today confronted by a sort of human dust on which we have no influence and in which movements take place which are unknown to us". Cambon's philosophy, however, did not seem to survive into the Algerian War of Independence(1954–1962). Indochina: Post-war doctrine, as in Indochina, took a more drastic view of "Guerre Révolutionnaire", which presented an ideological and global war with a commitment to total war. Countermeasures, in principle, needed to be both political and military: "No measure was too drastic to meet the new threat of revolution". French forces taking control from the Japanese did not seem to negotiate seriously with nationalist elements in what was to become Vietnam, which reaped the consequences of overconfidence at Điện Biên Phủ. It occurred to various commanders that soldiers who were trained to operate as guerrillas would have a strong sense of how to fight guerrillas. Before the partition of French Indochina, French Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (GCMA), led by Roger Trinquier, took on this role, drawing on French experience with the Jedburgh teams. GCMA, operating in Tonkin and Laos under French intelligence, was complemented by Commandos Nord Viêt-Nam in the North. In those missions, the SOF teams lived and fought with the locals. One Laotian, who became an officer, was Vang Pao, who was to become a general in Hmong and Laotian operations in Southeast Asia while the US forces increased their role. Algeria: The French counterinsurgency in colonial Algeria was a savage one. The 1957 Battle of Algiers resulted in 24,000 detentions, with most tortured and an estimated 3,000 killed. It may have broken the National Liberation Front infrastructure in Algiers, but it also killed off French legitimacy as far as "hearts and minds" went. Counterinsurgency requires an extremely capable intelligence infrastructure that is endowed with human sources and deep cultural knowledge. That contributes to the difficulty of foreign, as opposed to indigenous, powers in counterinsurgency operations. One of France's most influential theorists was Roger Trinquier. The Modern Warfare counterinsurgency strategy, described by Trinquier, who had led anti-communist guerrillas in Indochina, was a strong influence on French efforts in Algeria. Trinquier suggested three principles: separate the guerrilla from the population that supports it; occupy the zones from which the guerrillas previously operated, make the area dangerous for the insurgents and turn the people against the guerrilla movement; and co-ordinate actions over a wide area and for a long enough time that the guerrilla is denied access to the population centres that could support him. Trinquier's view was that torture had to be extremely focused and limited, but many French officers considered its use to be corrosive to their own side. There were strong protests among French leaders: the Army's most decorated officer, General Jacques Pâris de Bollardière, confronted General Jacques Massu, the commander of French forces in the Battle of Algiers, over orders institutionalizing torture, as "an unleashing of deplorable instincts which no longer knew any limits". He issued an open letter condemning the danger to the army of the loss of its moral values "under the fallacious pretext of immediate expediency" and was imprisoned for sixty days. As some of the French Army protested, others increased the intensity of their approach, which led to an attempted military coup against the French Fourth Republic itself. Massu and General Raoul Salan led a 1958 coup in Algiers to demand a new republic under Charles de Gaulle. When de Gaulle's policies toward Algeria, such as a 1961 referendum on Algerian self-determination, did not meet the expectations of the colonial officers, Salan formed the underground Organisation armée secrète (OAS), a right-wing terrorist group, whose actions included a 1962 assassination attempt against de Gaulle himself. West Africa: France has had taken Barnett's Leviathan role in Chad and Ivory Coast, the latter on two occasions, most significantly in 2002–2003. The situation with France and Ivory Coast is not a classic FID situation, as France attacked Ivorian forces that had provoked UN peacekeepers. Another noteworthy instance of counterinsurgency in West Africa is the Nigerian Armed Forces experience against the Boko Haram insurgency. Military operations against Boko Haram occur predominantly in the far northeast areas of Nigeria. The operations have been ongoing since June 2011 and have greatly expanded within the Lake Chad Basin sub-region of West Africa. India: There have been many insurgencies in India since its independence in 1947. The Kashmir insurgency, which started by 1989, was brought under control by the Indian government and violence has been reduced. A branch of the Indian Army, known as the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), was created for the sole purpose of destroying the insurgency in Kashmir, and it has played a major role in doing so.

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Counter-insurgency

The situation with France and Ivory Coast is not a classic FID situation, as France attacked Ivorian forces that had provoked UN peacekeepers. Another noteworthy instance of counterinsurgency in West Africa is the Nigerian Armed Forces experience against the Boko Haram insurgency. Military operations against Boko Haram occur predominantly in the far northeast areas of Nigeria. The operations have been ongoing since June 2011 and have greatly expanded within the Lake Chad Basin sub-region of West Africa. India: There have been many insurgencies in India since its independence in 1947. The Kashmir insurgency, which started by 1989, was brought under control by the Indian government and violence has been reduced. A branch of the Indian Army, known as the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), was created for the sole purpose of destroying the insurgency in Kashmir, and it has played a major role in doing so. The RR was well supported by Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and state government police. The Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) is located in the northeastern town of Vairengte in the Indian state of Mizoram. Personnel from countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Bangladesh and Vietnam have attended this school. Portugal: Portugal's experience in counterinsurgency resulted from the "pacification" campaigns conducted in the Portuguese African and Asian colonies in the late 19th century and the early 20th century. In the 1960s and the early 1970s, Portugal conducted large-scale counterinsurgency operations in Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique against independentist guerrillas supported by the Eastern Bloc and China, as well by some Western countries. Although the campaigns are collectively known as the "Portuguese Colonial War", there were in fact three different ones: the Angolan Independence War, the Guinea-Bissau War of Independence and the Mozambican War of Independence. The situation was unique in that small armed forces, those of Portugal, conducted three counterinsurgency wars at the same time in three different theatres of operations separated by thousands of kilometres. For those operations, Portugal developed its own counterinsurgency doctrine. Russia and Soviet Union: The most familiar Russian counterinsurgency is the War in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. However, throughout the history of the Russian Empire, the Russians fought many counterinsurgencies as new Caucasian and Central Asian territory were occupied. It was in those conflicts that the Russians developed the following counterinsurgency tactics: Deploy a significant number of troops Isolate the area from outside assistance Establish tight control of major cities and towns Build lines of forts to restrict insurgent movement Destroy the springs of resistance through destruction of settlements, livestock, crops etc. Those tactics, generally speaking, were carried over into Soviet use following the 1917 revolution for the most part except for the integration of political-military command. This tactical blueprint saw use following the First and Second World Wars in Dagestan, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia, Lithuania and Ukraine. That doctrine was ultimately shown to be inadequate in the Soviet War in Afghanistan, mostly because of insufficient troop commitment, and in the Wars in Chechnya. United States: The United States has conducted counterinsurgency campaigns during the Philippine–American War, the Vietnam War, the post-2001 War in Afghanistan, and the Iraq War. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in increased interest in counterinsurgency within the American military, which was exemplified by the 2006 publication of a new joint Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, which replaced the documents separately published by the Army and Marine Corps 20–25 years prior. Views of the doctrine contained in the manual have been mixed. The 2014 version of FM 3-24/MCWP 3–33.5 acquired a new title, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, it consists of three main parts, Part one provides strategic and operational context, part two provides the doctrine for understanding insurgencies, and part three provides doctrine for defeating an insurgency. In short, FM 3-24/MCWP 3–33.5 is organized to provide the context of a problem, the problem, and possible solutions. William B. Caldwell IV wrote: The law of armed conflict requires that, to use force, "combatants" must distinguish individuals presenting a threat from innocent civilians. This basic principle is accepted by all disciplined militaries. In the counterinsurgency, disciplined application of force is even more critical because our enemies camouflage themselves in the civilian population. Our success in Iraq depends on our ability to treat the civilian population with humanity and dignity, even as we remain ready to immediately defend ourselves or Iraqi civilians when a threat is detected. In the recent conflicts the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) has been increasingly involved conducting special operations especially the training and development of other states' military and security forces. This is known in the special operations community as foreign internal defense. It was announced 14 January 2016 that 1,800 soldiers from the 101st's Headquarters and its 2nd Brigade Combat Team will deploy soon on regular rotations to Baghdad and Erbil to train and advise Iraqi Army and Kurdish Peshmerga forces who are expected in the coming months to move toward Mosul, the Islamic State's de facto headquarters in Iraq. The 101st Airborne Division will serve an integral role in preparing Iraqi ground troops to expel the Islamic State group from Mosul, Defense Secretary Ash Carter told the division's soldiers during a January 2016 visit to Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Defense Secretary Ash Carter told the 101st Airborne Division that "The Iraqi and Peshmerga forces you will train, advise and assist have proven their determination, their resiliency, and increasingly, their capability, but they need you to continue building on that success, preparing them for the fight today and the long hard fight for their future. They need your skill. They need your experience." Foreign internal defense policymaking has subsequently aided in Iraqi successes in reclaiming Tikrit, Baiji, Ramadi, Fallujah, and Mosul from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Recent evaluations of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan have yielded mixed results. A comprehensive study by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction concluded that "the U.S. government greatly overestimated its ability" to use COIN and stabilization tactics for long-term success. The report found that "successes in stabilizing Afghan districts rarely lasted longer than the physical presence of coalition troops and civilians." These findings are corroborated by scholarly studies of U.S. counterinsurgency activities in Afghanistan, which determined that backlashes by insurgents and the local population were common. See also: References: Notes Further reading: Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), ISBN 0-521-54869-1. Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "Tunnel at the End of the Light: A Critique of U.S. Counter-terrorist Grand Strategy," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2002), pp. 549–563. Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How to Lose a War on Terror: A Comparative Analysis of a Counterinsurgency Success and Failure", in Jan Ångström and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Eds., Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War. (London: Frank Cass, 2007). Burgoyne, Michael L. and Albert J. Marckwardt (2009). The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa With E. D. Swinton's "The Defence of Duffer's Drift". University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-08093-2. Callwell, C. E., Small Wars: Their Principles & Practice. (Bison Books, 1996), ISBN 0-8032-6366-X. Cassidy, Robert M. Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War. (Stanford University Press, 2008). Catignani, Sergio. Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the two Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army. (Routledge, 2008), ISBN 978-0-415-43388-4. Corum, James. Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency. (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith, 2008), ISBN 0-7603-3080-8. Corum, James. Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy. (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith, 2007), ISBN 0-7603-2868-4. Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. (Wesport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1964), ISBN 0-275-99269-1. Derradji Abder-Rahmane. The Algerian Guerrilla Campaign Strategy & Tactics. (Edwin Mellen Press, 1997) Erickson, Edward J.

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(Routledge, 2008), ISBN 978-0-415-43388-4. Corum, James. Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency. (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith, 2008), ISBN 0-7603-3080-8. Corum, James. Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy. (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith, 2007), ISBN 0-7603-2868-4. Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. (Wesport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1964), ISBN 0-275-99269-1. Derradji Abder-Rahmane. The Algerian Guerrilla Campaign Strategy & Tactics. (Edwin Mellen Press, 1997) Erickson, Edward J. (2019) A Global History of Relocation in Counterinsurgency Warfare. Bloomsbury Academic ISBN 9781350062580 Jacobsen, Kurt. (2010) Pacification and its Discontents. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm/University of Chicago Press, 2010. Joes, James Anthony. Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency. (University Press of Kentucky, 2004), ISBN 0-8131-9170-X. Karnow, Stanley (1997). Vietnam: A history. New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-670-84218-6. Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. (Hurst, 2009). Kilcullen, David. Counterinsurgency. (Hurst, 2010). Kitson, Frank, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping. (1971) Mackinlay, John. The Insurgent Archipelago. (Hurst, 2009). Mao Zedong. Aspects of China's Anti-Japanese Struggle (1948). Melson, Charles D. "German Counter-Insurgency Revisited." Journal of Slavic Military Studies 24#1 (2011): 115–146. online Merom, Gil. How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), ISBN 0-521-00877-8 Petersen, Roger D. (2024). Death, Dominance, and State-Building: The United States in Iraq and the Future of American Intervention. Oxford University Press. Polack, Peter (2019) Guerrilla Warfare: Kings of Revolution. Haverstown, Pennsylvania: Casemate. ISBN 9781612006758 Thompson, Robert (1966) Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam.. London: Chatto & Windus. Tomes, Robert (Spring 2004) "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare", Parameters Van Creveld, Martin (2008) The Changing Face of War: Combat from the Marne to Iraq, New York: Ballantine. ISBN 978-0-89141-902-0 Zambernardi, Lorenzo. "Counterinsurgency's Impossible Trilemma", The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2010), pp. 21–34. External links: Small Wars Journal: Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Research page Terrorism prevention in Russia: one year after Beslan "Inside Counterinsurgency" by Stan Goff, ex – U.S. Special Forces "Instruments of Statecraft – U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940–1990" by Michael McClintock "The Warsaw Ghetto Is No More" by SS Brigade Commander Jürgen Stroop Military forces in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations at JihadMonitor.org "Bibliography: Theories of Limited War and Counterinsurgency" by Edwin Moise (Vietnam-era) "Bibliography: Doctrine on Insurgency and Counterinsurgency" Edwin Moise (contemporary) "Military Briefing Book" news regarding counter-insurgency Max Boot – Invisible Armies, YouTube video, length 56:30, Published on Mar 25, 2013 U.S. Army/Marine corps counter insurgency field manual, pdf document

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Analyzing historical counterattacks: In the past, there have been many notable counterattacks which have changed the course of a war. To be specific, Operation Bagration and the Battle of Austerlitz are good examples of the proper execution of a counterattack. Operation Bagration: Operation Bagration during World War II was one of the largest counterattacks in military history. In the summer of 1944 the assault by around 1.7 million Red Army soldiers successfully put the Red Army on the offensive in the Eastern Front after Nazi Germany in Operation Barbarossa had captured the territory against the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941. The Soviet counterattack focused on Belorussia, but prior to the counterattack starting, the Soviet Union fooled Nazi military leaders into believing that the attack would take place further south, near Ukraine. To aid the deception, the Red Army established fake army camps in Ukraine and after German reconnaissance planes reported Soviet troop concentrations in the area, panzer and infantry divisions were rushed south from Belorussia, leaving it vulnerable to a major assault. To support the attack, partisan groups in German-controlled territory were instructed to destroy German railroads to hamper German efforts to transport supplies and troops throughout the occupied territories and further weaken German Army Group Centre in Ukraine. On 22 June 1944, the attack on Belarus by 1.7 million Soviet troops began and overwhelmed the depleted Germans defenders. On 3 July, the Red Army captured Minsk, and later the rest of Belorussia. Operation Bagration was a huge Soviet success and opened a direct route to Berlin after the fall of Belorussia, leading to the Red Army beginning to take over the territory that had been taken by the Wehrmacht three years before. Battle of Austerlitz: Another military battle that utilized the counterattack tactic was the Battle of Austerlitz on 2 December 1805. While fighting the Austrian and Russian armies, Napoleon purposely made it seem as if his men were weak from the fighting in several cases. Napoleon had his men retreat in an attempt to lure the Allies to battle. He purposely left his right flank open and vulnerable. This deceived the Allies into attacking and the Allies fell into Napoleon's trap. When the Allied troops went to attack Napoleon’s right flank, Napoleon quickly filled up the right flank so the attack was not effective. However, on the Allied side, a large gap was left open in the middle of the Allied front line due to troops leaving to attack the French right flank. Noticing the large hole in the middle of the Allied lines, Napoleon attacked the middle and had his forces also flank around both sides, eventually surrounding the Allies. With the Allies completely surrounded, the battle was over. The Battle of Austerlitz was a successful counterattack because the French army defended off the Allied attack and quickly defeated the Allies. Napoleon deceived the Allies. He made his men seem weak and near defeat. Battle of St. Vith: The Battle of St. Vith was part of the Battle of the Bulge, which began on 16 December 1944, and represented the right flank in the advance of the German center, 5th Panzer-Armee (Armored Army), toward the ultimate objective of Antwerp. Given the task of countering the German advance, US General Bruce C. Clarke decided that a mobile defense was the best solution. Knowing that the German army was aiming for an objective far behind the battle line, he decided that they could afford to lose a few kilometers a day - the idea being that a slowing down of the advance was as good as stopping them outright, since the Germans were limited by time. The mobile defense he used at St. Vith involved the use of M36 tank destroyers acting as a base of fire to resist the oncoming German armored thrust, slowing them down enough to then counter-attack them with a force of M4 Sherman tanks. Artillery and Infantry were involved in this process as a combined arms force. The key was not to engage the Germans in a pitched battle, but to slow their advance enough to ruin their offensive timetable. The counter-attacks ensured that the German forces could not break through the slowly retreating forces. Clarke's success was one of the first times armor had been used in a mobile defense. See also: Cult of the offensive Battleplan (documentary TV series) Notes and references: Bibliography: Briggs, Clarence E., (ed.), translated by Oliver L. Spaulding, Roots of Strategy: 3 Military Classics : Von Leeb's Defense, Von Freytag-Loringhoven's the Power of Personality in War, Erfurth's Surprise, Stackpole Books, 1991 Department of Defense (US); Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Published by: United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. Retrieved: 13 October 2008. Further reading: Bruce Schneier (2003). Beyond Fear. Springer. pp. 173–175. ISBN 9780387026206. Glover S. Johns (2002). The Clay Pigeons of St. Lo. Stackpole Books. pp. 174–175. ISBN 9780811726047.

mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv

Counter-recruitment

Rationale: The rationale for counter-recruitment activity may be based on any of the following reasons: The view that war is immoral - see pacifism. The view that some military organizations are a tool of imperialism - see anti-imperialism. Evidence from Australia, Canada, France, the UK, and the US that abusive behaviour such as bullying, racism, sexism and sexual violence, and homophobia are common in military organizations. See, for example, Women in the military and Sexual orientation and gender identity in military service. Evidence from the UK and US that military training and employment lead to higher rates of mental health and behavioural problems than are usually found in civilian life, particularly after personnel have left the armed forces. Evidence from Germany, Israel, the UK, and the US that recruiting practices sanitise war, glorify the role of military personnel, and obscure the risks and obligations of military employment, thereby misleading potential recruits, particularly adolescents from socio-economically deprived backgrounds. Evidence from Germany, the UK, and elsewhere that recruiters target, and capitalise on the precarious position of socio-economically deprived young people as potential recruits. The fact that some armed forces rely on children aged 16 or 17 to fill their ranks, and evidence from Australia, Israel, the UK and from the Vietnam era in the US that these youngest recruits are most likely to be adversely affected by the demands and risks of military life. Armed forces spokespeople have defended the status quo by recourse to the following: The view that military organizations provide a valuable public service. Anecdotal evidence that military employment benefits young people. The view that duty of care policies protect recruits from harm. Activity: Examples of counter-recruitment activity are: Research and analysis of military recruitment practices, and of the effects and outcomes of military employment. Legal advocacy (aimed at changing legislation) and political advocacy (aimed at changing policy) to regulate or limit the scope of military recruitment. Consciousness-raising to raise awareness and concern about military recruitment practices and the effects of military training and employment. Providing information to potential recruits about the risks and obligations of enlistment, or discouraging enlistment. Satirising the propagandistic glorification of military personnel. In the United States: Counter-recruitment (which has long been a strategy of pacifist and other anti-war groups) received a boost in the United States with the unpopularity of the war in Iraq and brief recruitment difficulties of branches of the U.S. military, particularly the Army; although the Army has met, or exceeded, its recruitment goals year after year during that period. Beginning in early 2005, the U.S. counter-recruitment movement grew, particularly on high school and college campuses, where it is often led by students who see themselves as targeted for military service in a war they do not support. Early history: The counter-recruitment movement was the successor to the anti-draft movement with the end of conscription in the United States in 1973, just after the end of the Vietnam War. The military increased its recruiting efforts, with the total number of recruiters, recruiting stations, and dollars spent on recruiting each more than doubling between 1971 and 1974. Anti-war and anti-draft activists responded with a number of initiatives, using tactics similar to those used by counter-recruiters today. Activists distributed leaflets to students, publicly debated recruiters, and used equal-access provisions to obtain space next to recruiters to dispute their claims. The American Friends Service Committee (A.F.S.C.) and the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors (C.C.C.O.) began publishing counter-recruitment literature and attempting to coordinate the movement nationally. These organizations have been continuously involved in counter-recruitment to the present day. High schools: Most counter-recruitment work in the U.S. is focused at the policy level of public school systems. This work is generally done by parents and grandparents of school-aged children, and the most common activity is information and advocacy with school officials (principals, school boards, etc.) and with the general population in their local school area. CR at the K12 level is categorically different from other movements, since most of the students are underaged minors and parents are their legal custodians and guardians, not the schools. The most common policy goal is that the frequency of military recruiters' visits to public schools, their locations in schools, and their types of activities be controlled rather than unlimited. Many of the larger urban school districts have implemented such guidelines since 2001. Other goals have included "truth in recruiting", that counselors or curriculum elements be implemented to address the deficiency in high school students' understanding of war and the military life, rather than allowing military recruiters to perform that role. On high school campuses, counter-recruitment activists since 2001 have also focused around a provision of the No Child Left Behind Act, which requires that high schools provide contact and other information to the military for all of their students who do not opt out. Counter-recruitment campaigns have attempted to change school policy to ban recruiters regardless of the loss of federal funds, to be active about informing students of their ability to opt out, and/or to allow counter-recruiters access to students equal to the access given to military recruiters. These political campaigns have had some success, particularly in the Los Angeles area, where one has been led by the Coalition Against Militarism in Our Schools, and the San Francisco Bay Area. A simpler and easier, though perhaps less effective, strategy by counter-recruiters has been to show up before or after the school day and provide students entering or exiting their school with opt-out forms, produced by the local school district or by a sympathetic national legal organization such as the American Civil Liberties Union or the National Lawyers Guild. Organizations which have attempted to organize such campaigns on a national scale include A.F.S.C. and C.C.C.O., the Campus Antiwar Network (C.A.N.), and the War Resisters League. Code Pink, with the Ruckus Society, has sponsored training camps on counter-recruitment as well as producing informational literature for use by counter-recruiters. United for Peace and Justice has counter-recruitment as one of its seven issue-specific campaigns. Mennonite Central Committee is another resource on the subject. Some of these organizations focus on counter-recruitment in a specific sector, such as high schools or colleges, while the National network Opposing the Militarization of Youth, founded in 2004, deals with the larger issue of militarism as it affects young people and society. In Canada: In response to the Canadian Forces' role as a member of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, an anti-war movement developed in Canada which has tried to utilize counter-recruitment as a part of its efforts. In particular, Operation Objection emerged as the umbrella counter-recruitment campaign in Canada. Operation Objection claimed to have active counter-recruitment operations in 8 to 10 Canadian cities. However, coordinated attempts at counter-recruitment activism in Canada have been fairly limited as of late, and for the most part, unsuccessful. In the 2005–06 academic year at York University, the York Federation of Students, a federation representing ten of the university's student unions, clashed with a Canadian Forces recruiter forcibly removing the recruiter and the kiosk from the Student Center. York University maintains that the Canadian Forces have the same right to recruit as any other employer participating in career fairs on campus. On October 25, 2007, an attempt by the student union at the University of Victoria to ban Canadian Forces from participating in career fairs on campus failed when the student body voted overwhelmingly in favour of allowing the Canadian military to participate in recruitment and career development activities available to students. Approximately 500 students, five times the usual attendance, appeared at the Annual General Meeting of the University of Victoria Students' Society (UVSS), and voted to defeat the motion proposed to stop the Canadian Forces from appearing on campus at career development events, with an estimated 25 votes in favour of the ban. Those voting against the ban argued that the ban was a restriction on freedom of choice and an infringement of students' free speech, that it went beyond the mandate of student government, and that student union executives should not be advocating policy that does not reflect the views of the fee-paying student body. In November 2007, the Minister of Education for Prince Edward Island, Gerard Greenan, was requested by the Council of Canadians to ban military recruitment on PEI campuses. The Minister responded that military service "is a career and... we think its right to let the Armed Forces have a chance to present this option to students." See also: Antimilitarism Military recruitment Recruit training Military personnel Women in the military Children in the military Sexual harassment in the military References: External links: The 2004 Official US Military School Recruiting Program Handbook Mennonite Central Committee National Network Opposing the Militarization of Youth, founded in 2004, deals with the larger issue of militarism as it affects young people. Hagopian, A.; Barker, K. (2011). "Should we end military recruiting in high schools as a matter of child protection and public health?". American Journal of Public Health. 101 (1): 19–23. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2009.183418. PMC 3000735. PMID 21088269.

mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv

Counterattack

Analyzing historical counterattacks: In the past, there have been many notable counterattacks which have changed the course of a war. To be specific, Operation Bagration and the Battle of Austerlitz are good examples of the proper execution of a counterattack. Operation Bagration: Operation Bagration during World War II was one of the largest counterattacks in military history. In the summer of 1944 the assault by around 1.7 million Red Army soldiers successfully put the Red Army on the offensive in the Eastern Front after Nazi Germany in Operation Barbarossa had captured the territory against the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941. The Soviet counterattack focused on Belorussia, but prior to the counterattack starting, the Soviet Union fooled Nazi military leaders into believing that the attack would take place further south, near Ukraine. To aid the deception, the Red Army established fake army camps in Ukraine and after German reconnaissance planes reported Soviet troop concentrations in the area, panzer and infantry divisions were rushed south from Belorussia, leaving it vulnerable to a major assault. To support the attack, partisan groups in German-controlled territory were instructed to destroy German railroads to hamper German efforts to transport supplies and troops throughout the occupied territories and further weaken German Army Group Centre in Ukraine. On 22 June 1944, the attack on Belarus by 1.7 million Soviet troops began and overwhelmed the depleted Germans defenders. On 3 July, the Red Army captured Minsk, and later the rest of Belorussia. Operation Bagration was a huge Soviet success and opened a direct route to Berlin after the fall of Belorussia, leading to the Red Army beginning to take over the territory that had been taken by the Wehrmacht three years before. Battle of Austerlitz: Another military battle that utilized the counterattack tactic was the Battle of Austerlitz on 2 December 1805. While fighting the Austrian and Russian armies, Napoleon purposely made it seem as if his men were weak from the fighting in several cases. Napoleon had his men retreat in an attempt to lure the Allies to battle. He purposely left his right flank open and vulnerable. This deceived the Allies into attacking and the Allies fell into Napoleon's trap. When the Allied troops went to attack Napoleon’s right flank, Napoleon quickly filled up the right flank so the attack was not effective. However, on the Allied side, a large gap was left open in the middle of the Allied front line due to troops leaving to attack the French right flank. Noticing the large hole in the middle of the Allied lines, Napoleon attacked the middle and had his forces also flank around both sides, eventually surrounding the Allies. With the Allies completely surrounded, the battle was over. The Battle of Austerlitz was a successful counterattack because the French army defended off the Allied attack and quickly defeated the Allies. Napoleon deceived the Allies. He made his men seem weak and near defeat. Battle of St. Vith: The Battle of St. Vith was part of the Battle of the Bulge, which began on 16 December 1944, and represented the right flank in the advance of the German center, 5th Panzer-Armee (Armored Army), toward the ultimate objective of Antwerp. Given the task of countering the German advance, US General Bruce C. Clarke decided that a mobile defense was the best solution. Knowing that the German army was aiming for an objective far behind the battle line, he decided that they could afford to lose a few kilometers a day - the idea being that a slowing down of the advance was as good as stopping them outright, since the Germans were limited by time. The mobile defense he used at St. Vith involved the use of M36 tank destroyers acting as a base of fire to resist the oncoming German armored thrust, slowing them down enough to then counter-attack them with a force of M4 Sherman tanks. Artillery and Infantry were involved in this process as a combined arms force. The key was not to engage the Germans in a pitched battle, but to slow their advance enough to ruin their offensive timetable. The counter-attacks ensured that the German forces could not break through the slowly retreating forces. Clarke's success was one of the first times armor had been used in a mobile defense. See also: Cult of the offensive Battleplan (documentary TV series) Notes and references: Bibliography: Briggs, Clarence E., (ed.), translated by Oliver L. Spaulding, Roots of Strategy: 3 Military Classics : Von Leeb's Defense, Von Freytag-Loringhoven's the Power of Personality in War, Erfurth's Surprise, Stackpole Books, 1991 Department of Defense (US); Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Published by: United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. Retrieved: 13 October 2008. Further reading: Bruce Schneier (2003). Beyond Fear. Springer. pp. 173–175. ISBN 9780387026206. Glover S. Johns (2002). The Clay Pigeons of St. Lo. Stackpole Books. pp. 174–175. ISBN 9780811726047.

mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv

Counterinsurgency

Models: Counterinsurgency is normally conducted as a combination of conventional military operations and other means, such as demoralization in the form of propaganda, Psy-ops, and assassinations. Counter-insurgency operations include many different facets: military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency. To understand counterinsurgency, one must understand insurgency to comprehend the dynamics of revolutionary warfare. Counter-insurgency focuses on bridging these gaps. Insurgents take advantage of social issues known as gaps. When the gaps are wide, they create a sea of discontent, creating the environment in which the insurgent can operate. In The Insurgent Archipelago, John Mackinlay puts forward the concept of an evolution of the insurgency from the Maoist paradigm of the golden age of insurgency to the global insurgency of the start of the 21st century. He defines this distinction as "Maoist" and "post-Maoist" insurgency. Counterinsurgency theorists: Santa Cruz de Marcenado: The third Marques of Santa Cruz de Marcenado (1684–1732) is probably the earliest author who dealt systematically in his writings with counterinsurgency. In his Reflexiones Militares, published between 1726 and 1730, he discussed how to spot early signs of an incipient insurgency, prevent insurgencies, and counter them, if they could not be warded off. Strikingly, Santa Cruz recognized that insurgencies are usually due to real grievances: "A state rarely rises up without the fault of its governors." Consequently, he advocated clemency towards the population and good governance, to seek the people's "heart and love". B. H. Liddell Hart: Liddell Hart attributed the failure of counterinsurgencies to various causes. First, as pointed out in the Insurgency addendum to the second version of his book Strategy: The Indirect Approach, a popular insurgency has an inherent advantage over any occupying force. He showed as a prime example the French occupation of Spain during the Napoleonic wars. Whenever Spanish forces managed to constitute themselves into a regular fighting force, the superior French forces beat them every time. However, once dispersed and decentralized, the irregular nature of the rebel campaigns proved a decisive counter to French superiority on the battlefield. Napoleon's army had no means of effectively combating the rebels, and in the end, their strength and morale were so sapped that when Wellington was finally able to challenge French forces in the field, the French had almost no choice but to abandon the situation. Counterinsurgency efforts may be successful, especially when the insurgents are unpopular. The Philippine–American War, the Shining Path in Peru, and the Malayan Emergency have been the sites of failed insurgencies. Hart also points to the experiences of T. E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt during World War I as another example of the power of the rebel/insurgent. Though the Ottomans often had advantages in manpower of more than 100 to 1, the Arabs' ability to materialize out of the desert, strike, and disappear again often left the Turks reeling and paralyzed, creating an opportunity for regular British forces to sweep in and finish the Turkish forces off. In both the preceding cases, the insurgents and rebel fighters were working in conjunction with or in a manner complementary to regular forces. Such was also the case with the French Resistance during World War II and the National Liberation Front during the Vietnam War. The strategy in these cases is for the irregular combatant to weaken and destabilize the enemy to such a degree that victory is easy or assured for the regular forces. However, in many modern rebellions, one does not see rebel fighters working in conjunction with regular forces. Rather, they are home-grown militias or imported fighters who have no unified goals or objectives save to expel the occupier. According to Liddell Hart, there are few effective counter-measures to this strategy. So long as the insurgency maintains popular support, it will retain all of its strategic advantages of mobility, invisibility, and legitimacy in its own eyes and the eyes of the people. So long as this is the situation, an insurgency essentially cannot be defeated by regular forces. David Galula: David Galula gained his practical experience in counterinsurgency as a French Army officer in the Algerian War. His theory of counterinsurgency is not primarily military, but a combination of military, political and social actions under the strong control of a single authority. Galula proposes four "laws" for counterinsurgency: The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory. Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority. Support of the population may be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite party. Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, then gaining the support of the population, and eventually strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area by area, using a pacified territory as a basis of operation to conquer a neighboring area. Galula contends that: A victory [in a counterinsurgency] is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent's forces and his political organization. ... A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population. ... In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at the grassroots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population. With his four principles in mind, Galula goes on to describe a general military and political strategy to put them into operation in an area that is under full insurgent control: In a Selected Area 1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents. 2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent come back in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives. 3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas. 4. Destroy the local insurgent political organization. 5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities. 6. Test those authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units. 7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement. 8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants. According to Galula, some of these steps can be skipped in areas that are only partially under insurgent control, and most of them are unnecessary in areas already controlled by the government. Thus the essence of counterinsurgency warfare is summed up by Galula as "Build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward." Robert Thompson: Robert Grainger Ker Thompson wrote Defeating Communist Insurgency in 1966, wherein he argued that a successful counterinsurgency effort must be proactive in seizing the initiative from insurgents. Thompson outlines five basic principles for a successful counterinsurgency: The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country that is politically and economically stable and viable; The government must function in accordance with the law; The government must have an overall plan; The government must give priority to defeating political subversion, not the guerrilla fighters; In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first. David Kilcullen: In "The Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency", Dr. David Kilcullen, the Chief Strategist of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the U.S. State Department in 2006, described a framework for interagency cooperation in counterinsurgency operations. His pillars – Security, Political and Economic – support the overarching goal of Control, but are based on Information: This is because perception is crucial in developing control and influence over population groups. Substantive security, political and economic measures are critical but to be effective they must rest upon, and integrate with a broader information strategy. Every action in counterinsurgency sends a message; the purpose of the information campaign is to consolidate and unify this message. ... Importantly, the information campaign has to be conducted at a global, regional and local level — because modern insurgents draw upon global networks of sympathy, support, funding and recruitment. Kilcullen considers the three pillars to be of equal importance because unless they are developed in parallel, the campaign becomes unbalanced: too much economic assistance with inadequate security, for example, simply creates an array of soft targets for the insurgents. Similarly, too much security assistance without political consensus or governance simply creates more capable armed groups. In developing each pillar, we measure progress by gauging effectiveness (capability and capacity) and legitimacy (the degree to which the population accepts that government actions are in its interest).

mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv

Counterinsurgency

Substantive security, political and economic measures are critical but to be effective they must rest upon, and integrate with a broader information strategy. Every action in counterinsurgency sends a message; the purpose of the information campaign is to consolidate and unify this message. ... Importantly, the information campaign has to be conducted at a global, regional and local level — because modern insurgents draw upon global networks of sympathy, support, funding and recruitment. Kilcullen considers the three pillars to be of equal importance because unless they are developed in parallel, the campaign becomes unbalanced: too much economic assistance with inadequate security, for example, simply creates an array of soft targets for the insurgents. Similarly, too much security assistance without political consensus or governance simply creates more capable armed groups. In developing each pillar, we measure progress by gauging effectiveness (capability and capacity) and legitimacy (the degree to which the population accepts that government actions are in its interest). The overall goal, according to this model, "is not to reduce violence to zero or to kill every insurgent, but rather to return the overall system to normality — noting that 'normality' in one society may look different from normality in another. In each case, we seek not only to establish control, but also to consolidate that control and then transfer it to permanent, effective, and legitimate institutions." Martin van Creveld: Military historian Martin van Creveld, noting that almost all attempts to deal with insurgency have ended in failure, advises: The first, and absolutely indispensable, thing to do is throw overboard 99 percent of the literature on counterinsurgency, counter guerrilla, counterterrorism, and the like. Since most of it was written by the losing side, it is of little value. In examining why so many counterinsurgencies by powerful militaries fail against weaker enemies, Van Creveld identifies a key dynamic that he illustrates by the metaphor of killing a child. Regardless of whether the child started the fight or how well armed the child is, an adult in a fight with a child will feel that he is acting unjustly if he harms the child and foolish if the child harms him; he will, therefore, wonder if the fight is necessary. Van Creveld argues that "by definition, a strong counterinsurgent who uses his strength to kill the members of a small, weak organization of insurgents – let alone the civilian population by which it is surrounded, and which may lend it support – will commit crimes in an unjust cause," while "a child who is in a serious fight with an adult is justified in using every and any means available – not because he or she is right, but because he or she has no choice." Every act of insurgency becomes, from the perspective of the counterinsurgent, a reason to end the conflict, while also being a reason for the insurgents to continue until victory. Trường Chinh, second in command to Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam, wrote in his Primer for Revolt: The guiding principle of the strategy for our whole resistance must be to prolong the war. To protract the war is the key to victory. Why must the war be protracted? ... If we throw the whole of our forces into a few battles to try to decide the outcome, we shall certainly be defeated and the enemy will win. On the other hand, if while fighting we maintain our forces, expand them, train our army and people, learn military tactics ... and at the same time wear down the enemy forces, we shall weary and discourage them in such a way that, strong as they are, they will become weak and will meet defeat instead of victory. Van Creveld thus identifies "time" as the key factor in counterinsurgency. In an attempt to find lessons from the few cases of successful counterinsurgency, of which he lists two clear cases: the British efforts during The Troubles of Northern Ireland and the 1982 Hama massacre carried out by the Syrian government to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood, he asserts that the "core of the difficulty is neither military nor political, but moral" and outlines two distinct methods. The first method relies on superb intelligence, provided by those who know the natural and artificial environment of the conflict as well as the insurgents. Once such superior intelligence is gained, the counterinsurgents must be trained to a point of high professionalism and discipline such that they will exercise discrimination and restraint. Through such discrimination and restraint, the counterinsurgents do not alienate members of the populace besides those already fighting them, while delaying the time when the counterinsurgents become disgusted by their own actions and demoralized. General Patrick Walters, the British commander of troops in Northern Ireland, explicitly stated that his objective was not to kill as many terrorists as possible but to ensure that as few people on both sides were killed. In the vast majority of counterinsurgencies, the "forces of order" kill far more people than they lose. In contrast and using very rough figures, the struggle in Northern Ireland had cost the United Kingdom three thousand fatal casualties. Of the three thousand, about seventeen hundred were civilians...of the remaining, a thousand were British soldiers. No more than three hundred were terrorists, a ratio of three to one. If the prerequisites for the first method – excellent intelligence, superbly trained and disciplined soldiers and police, and an iron will to avoid being provoked into lashing out – are lacking, van Creveld posits that counterinsurgents who still want to win must use the second method exemplified by the Hama massacre. In 1982, the regime of Syrian president Hafez al-Assad was on the point of being overwhelmed by the countrywide insurgency of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Assad sent a Syrian Army division under his brother Rifaat to the city of Hama, known to be the center of the resistance. Following a counterattack by the Brotherhood, Rifaat used his heavy artillery to demolish the city, killing between 10-25,000 people, including many women and children. Asked by reporters what had happened, Hafez al-Assad exaggerated the damage and deaths, promoted the commanders who carried out the attacks, and razed Hama's well-known great mosque, replacing it with a parking lot. With the Muslim Brotherhood scattered, the population was so cowed that it would be years before opposition groups dared to disobey the regime again and, van Creveld argues, the massacre most likely saved the regime and prevented a bloody civil war. Van Creveld condenses al-Assad's strategy into five rules while noting that they could easily have been written by Niccolò Machiavelli: There are situations in which cruelty is necessary, and refusing to apply necessary cruelty is a betrayal of the people who put you into power. When pressed to cruelty, never threaten your opponent but disguise your intention and feign weakness until you strike. Once you decide to strike, it is better to kill too many than not enough. If another strike is needed, it reduces the impact of the first strike. Repeated strikes will also endanger the morale of the counterinsurgent troops; soldiers forced to commit repeated atrocities will likely begin to resort to alcohol or drugs to force themselves to carry out orders and will inevitably lose their military edge, eventually turning into a danger to their commanders. Act as soon as possible. More lives will be saved by decisive action early, than by prolonging the insurgency. The longer you wait, the more inured the population will be to bloodshed, and the more barbaric your action will have to be to make an impression. Strike openly. Do not apologize, make excuses about "collateral damage", express regret, or promise investigations. Afterwards, make sure that as many people as possible know of your strike; the media is useful for this purpose, but be careful not to let them interview survivors and arouse sympathy. Do not command the strike yourself, in case it doesn't work for some reason and you need to disown your commander and try another strategy. If it does work, present your commander to the world, explain what you have done and make certain that everyone understands that you are ready to strike again. Lorenzo Zambernardi: In "Counterinsurgency's Impossible Trilemma", Dr. Lorenzo Zambernardi, an Italian academic now working in the United States, clarifies the tradeoffs involved in counterinsurgency operations. He argues that counterinsurgency involves three main goals, but in real practice, a counterinsurgent needs to choose two goals out of three. Relying on economic theory, this is what Zambernardi labels the "impossible trilemma" of counterinsurgency. Specifically, the impossible trilemma suggests that it is impossible to simultaneously achieve: 1) force protection, 2) distinction between enemy combatants and non-combatants, and 3) the physical elimination of insurgents. According to Zambernardi, in pursuing any two of these three goals, a state must forgo some portion of the third objective. In particular, a state can protect its armed forces while destroying insurgents, but only by indiscriminately killing civilians as the Ottomans, Italians, and Nazis did in the Balkans, Libya, and Eastern Europe. It can choose to protect civilians along with its own armed forces instead, avoiding so-called collateral damage, but only by abandoning the objective of destroying the insurgents. Finally, a state can discriminate between combatants and non-combatants while killing insurgents, but only by increasing the risks for its own troops, because often insurgents will hide behind civilians, or appear to be civilians.

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Specifically, the impossible trilemma suggests that it is impossible to simultaneously achieve: 1) force protection, 2) distinction between enemy combatants and non-combatants, and 3) the physical elimination of insurgents. According to Zambernardi, in pursuing any two of these three goals, a state must forgo some portion of the third objective. In particular, a state can protect its armed forces while destroying insurgents, but only by indiscriminately killing civilians as the Ottomans, Italians, and Nazis did in the Balkans, Libya, and Eastern Europe. It can choose to protect civilians along with its own armed forces instead, avoiding so-called collateral damage, but only by abandoning the objective of destroying the insurgents. Finally, a state can discriminate between combatants and non-combatants while killing insurgents, but only by increasing the risks for its own troops, because often insurgents will hide behind civilians, or appear to be civilians. So a country must choose two out of three goals and develop a strategy that can successfully accomplish them while sacrificing the third objective. Zambernardi's theory posits that to protect populations, which is necessary to defeat insurgencies and to physically destroy an insurgency, the counterinsurgent's military forces must be sacrificed, risking the loss of domestic political support. Akali Omeni: Another writer who explores a trio of features relevant to understanding counterinsurgency is Akali Omeni. Within the contemporary context, COIN warfare by African militaries tends to be at the margins of the theoretical debate – even though Africa today is faced with a number of deadly insurgencies. In Counter-insurgency in Nigeria, Omeni, a Nigerian academic, discusses the interactions between certain features away from the battlefield, which account for battlefield performance against insurgent warfare. Specifically, Omeni argues that the trio of historical experience, organisational culture (OC) and doctrine, help explain the institution of COIN within militaries and their tendency to reject the innovation and adaptation often necessary to defeat insurgency. These three features, furthermore, influence and can undermine the operational tactics and concepts adopted against insurgents. The COIN challenge, therefore, is not just operational; it also is cultural and institutional before ever it reflects on the battlefield. According to Omeni, institutional isomorphism is a sociological phenomenon that constrains the habits of a military (in this case, the Nigerian military) to the long-established, yet increasingly ineffective, ideology of the offensive in irregular warfare. As Omeni writes, Whereas the Nigerian military's performance against militias in the Niger Delta already suggested the military had a poor grasp of the threat of insurgent warfare; it was further along the line, as the military struggled against Boko Haram's threat, that the extent of this weakness was exposed. At best, the utility of force, for the Nigerian military, had become but a temporary solution against the threat of insurgent warfare. At worst, the existing model has been perpetuated at such high cost, that urgent revisionist thinking around the idea of counterinsurgency within the military institution may now be required. Additionally, the military's decisive civil war victory, the pivot in Nigeria's strategic culture towards a regional role, and the institutional delegitimization brought about by decades of coups and political meddling, meant that much time went by without substantive revisionism to the military's thinking around its internal function. Change moreover, where it occurred, was institutionally isomorphic and not as far removed from the military's own origins as the intervening decades may have suggested. Further, the infantry-centric nature of the Nigerian Army's battalions, traceable back to the Nigerian Civil War back in the 1960s, is reflected in the kinetic nature of the Army's contemporary COIN approach. This approach has failed to defeat Boko Haram in the way many expected. Certainly, therefore, the popular argument today, which holds that the Nigerian Army has struggled in COIN due to capabilities shortcomings, holds some merit. However, a full-spectrum analysis of the Nigeria case suggests that this popular dominant narrative scarcely scratches the surface of the true COIN challenge. This population-centered challenge, moreover, is one that militaries across the world continue to contend with. And in attempting to solve the COIN puzzle, state forces over the decades have tried a range of tactics. Information-centric theory: Starting in the early 2000s, micro-level data has transformed the analysis of effective counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Leading this work is the "information-centric" group of theorists and researchers, led by the work of the Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) group at Princeton University, and the Conflict and Peace, Research and Development (CPRD) group at the University of Michigan. Berman, Shapiro, and Felter have outlined the modern information-centric model. In this framework, the critical determinant of counterinsurgent success is information about insurgents provided to counterinsurgents, such as insurgent locations, plans, and targets. Information can be acquired from civilian sources (human intelligence, HUMINT), or through signals intelligence (SIGINT). Jeffrey Treistman: Dr. Jeffrey Treistman previously served with the US Department of State as the Policy Advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Salam al-Zaubai. In his book, When Bad States Win: Rethinking Counterinsurgency Strategy, he found little evidence to support the ‘hearts and minds’ approach to counterinsurgency. “There is little robust generalizable evidence that population-centric approaches are effective,” he argued. In contrast to other COIN theorists, Treistman examined how the gross violation of international law and human rights affected war outcomes. He developed a theory of barbarism as a counterinsurgency strategy — the indiscriminate use of violence against civilians to defeat insurgents. He proposed that under certain conditions, genocide, rape, torture, repression, and other human rights violations could succeed in suppressing a rebellion. Treistman theorized that moderate levels of violence against civilians would not be effective in dissuading insurgents. But if counterinsurgents increased their lethality, cruelty, and violence against civilians it would successfully deter insurgents. “The overwhelming and brutal application of force against civilians,” he argued, “will squash domestic opposition.” Treistman thus proposed a convex function to model the relationship between barbarism and counterinsurgency outcomes. Moderate levels of repression are insufficient and counterproductive, but as a counterinsurgent increases the degree of lethality and repression it is more likely to defeat insurgents. “Widespread indiscriminate violence and political repression increase the odds of a government victory. As a result, bad states may sometimes defeat insurgencies.” Tactics: "Drain the sea" tactic: With regard to tactics, the terms "drain the sea" or "drain the water" involves the forced relocation or elimination of the civilian population ("water") to expose the rebels or insurgents ("fish"). In other words, relocation deprives the aforementioned of the support, cover, and resources of the local population. This is typically targeted in that it specifically targets the demographic that supports the insurgency in a limited area where insurgency is taking place, but is indiscriminate from an individual perspective. Examples of use of this technique in counterinsurgency include Bar Kokhba revolt, Second Anglo-Boer War, Greek Civil War, General Order No. 11 (1863) in the American Civil War, Rohingya conflict, and Xinjiang conflict. "Draining the sea" can also be accomplished through genocide by killing the population blamed for the insurgency. During World War II, Nazi Germany's counterinsurgency (Bandenbekämpfung, lit. 'bandit fighting') became intertwined with the Final Solution. Indiscriminate violence also has a deterrent effect. Edward Luttwak stated, "A massacre once in a while remained an effective warning for decades." A downside of such methods of counterinsurgency is their severity may provoke increased resistance from the targeted population. In contemporary times, concerns about public opinion and international law can rule out counterinsurgency campaigns using indiscriminate violence. Assassination of leaders: Assassination of leaders can be a successful counterinsurgency tactic. Oil spot: The oil spot approach is the concentration of counterinsurgent forces into an expanding, secured zone. The origins of the expression is to be found in its initial use by Marshal Hubert Lyautey, the main theoretician of French colonial warfare and counterinsurgency strategy. The oil spot approach was later one of the justifications given in the Pentagon Papers for the Strategic Hamlet Program. Cordon and search: Cordon and search is a military tactic, one of the basic counterinsurgency operations in which an area is cordoned off and premises are searched for weapons or insurgents. Other related operations are "Cordon and knock" and "Cordon and kick". "Cordon and search" is part of a new doctrine called Stability and Support Operations or SASO. It is a technique used where there is no hard intelligence of weapons in the house and therefore is less intense than a normal house search. It is used in urban neighborhoods. The purpose of the mission is to search a house with as little inconvenience to the resident family as possible. Air operations: Air power can play an important role in counterinsurgency, capable of carrying out a wide range of operations: Transportation in support of combatants and civilians alike, including casualty evacuations; Intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance; Psychological operations, through leaflet drops, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasts; Air-to-ground attack against 'soft' targets.

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Other related operations are "Cordon and knock" and "Cordon and kick". "Cordon and search" is part of a new doctrine called Stability and Support Operations or SASO. It is a technique used where there is no hard intelligence of weapons in the house and therefore is less intense than a normal house search. It is used in urban neighborhoods. The purpose of the mission is to search a house with as little inconvenience to the resident family as possible. Air operations: Air power can play an important role in counterinsurgency, capable of carrying out a wide range of operations: Transportation in support of combatants and civilians alike, including casualty evacuations; Intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance; Psychological operations, through leaflet drops, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasts; Air-to-ground attack against 'soft' targets. Public diplomacy: In General David Petraeus' Counterinsurgency Field Manual, one of the many tactics described to help win in counterinsurgency warfare involves the use of public diplomacy through military means. Counterinsurgency is effective when it is integrated "into a comprehensive strategy employing all instruments of national power," including public diplomacy. The goal of COIN operations is to render the insurgents as ineffective and non-influential, by having strong and secure relations with the population of the host nation. An understanding of the host nation and the environment that the COIN operations will take place in is essential. Public diplomacy in COIN warfare is only effective when there is a clear understanding of the culture and population at hand. One of the largest factors needed for defeating an insurgency involves understanding the populace, how they interact with the insurgents, how they interact with non-government organizations in the area, and how they view the counterinsurgency operations themselves. Ethics is a common public diplomacy aspect that is emphasized in COIN warfare. Insurgents win their war by attacking internal will and the international opposition. To combat these tactics, the counterinsurgency operations need to treat their prisoners and detainees humanely and according to American values and principles. By doing this, COIN operations show the host nation's population that they can be trusted and that they are concerned about the well-being of the population to be successful in warfare. A population that expects the incumbent government to deliver public goods, services, and security frequently supports the counterinsurgency, and a major event that increases popular expectations of future public goods and service delivery can trigger a shift in public attitudes away from the insurgency and toward the counterinsurgency. "Political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of the conflict and undermining the insurgency." These programs are essential in order to gain the support of the population. These programs are designed to make the local population feel secure, safe, and more aligned with the counterinsurgency efforts; this enables the citizens of the host nation to trust the goals and purposes of the counterinsurgency efforts, as opposed to the insurgents'. A counterinsurgency is a battle of ideas and the implementation and integration of these programs is important for success. Social, political and economic programs should be coordinated and administered by the host nation's leaders, as well. Successful COIN warfare allows the population to see that the counterinsurgency efforts are including the host nation in their re-building programs. The war is fought among the people and for the people between the insurgents and the counterinsurgents. A counterinsurgency is won by utilizing strategic communications and information operations successfully. A counterinsurgency is a competition of ideas, ideologies, and socio-political movements. In order to combat insurgent ideologies one must understand the values and characteristics of the ideology or religion. Additionally, counterinsurgency efforts need to understand the culture of which the insurgency resides, in order to strategically launch information and communication operations against the insurgent ideology or religion. Counterinsurgency information operatives need to also identify key audiences, communicators, and public leaders to know whom to influence and reach out to with their information. Information operations: Public diplomacy in information operations can only be achieved by a complete understanding of the culture it is operating in. Counterinsurgency operations must be able to perceive the world from the locals' perspective. To develop a comprehensive cultural picture counterinsurgency efforts should invest in employing "media consultants, finance and business experts, psychologists, organizational network analysts, and scholars from a wide range of disciplines." Most importantly, counterinsurgency efforts need to be able to understand why the local population is drawn into the insurgent ideology, like what aspects are appealing and how insurgents use the information to draw their followers into the ideology. Counterinsurgency communication efforts need a baseline understanding of values, attitudes, and perceptions of the people in the area of operations to conduct successful public diplomacy to defeat the enemy. Developing information and communication strategies involve providing a legitimate alternate ideology, improving security and economic opportunity, and strengthening family ties outside of the insurgency. In order to conduct public diplomacy through these means, counterinsurgency communication needs to match its deeds with its words. Information provided through public diplomacy during a counterinsurgency cannot lie, the information and communication to the people always have to be truthful and trustworthy in order to be effective at countering the insurgents. Public diplomacy in counterinsurgency to influence the public thoughts and ideas is a long time engagement and should not be done through negative campaigning about the enemy. Conducting public diplomacy through relaying information and communicating with the public in a counterinsurgency is most successful when a conversation can happen between the counterinsurgency team and the local population of the area of operation. Building rapport with the public involves "listening, paying attention, and being responsive and proactive" which is sufficient for the local population to understand and trust the counterinsurgency efforts and vice versa. This relationship is stringent upon the counterinsurgents keeping their promises, providing security to the locals, and communicating their message directly and quickly in times of need. Understanding and influencing the cognitive dimension of the local population is essential to winning counterinsurgency warfare. The people's perception of legitimacy about the host nation and the foreign country's counterinsurgency efforts is where success is determined. "The free flow of information present in all theaters via television, telephone, and Internet, can present conflicting messages and quickly defeat the intended effects." Coordination between the counterinsurgency operations, the host nation, and the local media in the information presented to the public is essential to showing and influencing how the local population perceives the counterinsurgency efforts and the host nation. Public opinion, the media, and rumors influence how the people view counterinsurgency, the government hosting their efforts, and the host nation legitimacy. The use of public diplomacy to strategically relay the correct messages and information to the public is essential to success in a counterinsurgency operation. For example, close relationships with media members in the area is essential to ensure that the locals understand the counterinsurgency objectives and feel secure with the host nation government and the counterinsurgency efforts. If the local media is not in sync with the counterinsurgency operatives then they could spread incomplete or false information about the counterinsurgency campaign to the public. "Given Al Qaeda's global reach, the United States must develop a more integrated strategic communication strategy for counter-insurgency with its allies to diminish violent rhetoric, improve its image abroad, and detect, deter, and defeat this social movement at its many levels." Information operations and communicative abilities are one of the largest and most influential aspects of public diplomacy within a counterinsurgency. Public diplomacy is especially important as modern insurgents are more easily able to gain support through a variety of sources, both local and transnational, thanks to advances in increased communication and globalization. Consequently, modern counter-insurgency requires attention to be focused on an insurgency's ecosystem from the national to the local level, in order to deprive the insurgency of support and prevent future insurgent groups from forming. Specific doctrines: Vietnam War: During the Vietnam War, counterinsurgency initially formed part of the earlier war as Diem had implemented the poorly-conceived Strategic Hamlet Program, a similar model to the Malayan Emergency that had the opposite effect by leading to increased recruitment to the Viet Cong. Similarly economic and rural development formed a key strategy as part of Rural Affairs development. While the earlier war was marked by considerable emphasis on counterinsurgency programs, the US Armed Forces initially relied on very little, if any, theoretical doctrine of counterinsurgency during the Ground-Intervention phase. Conventional warfare using massive firepower and the failure to implement adequate counterinsurgency had extremely negative effects, which was the strategy that the NVA adeptly used to countering by the protracted political and military warfare model. After the replacement of General William Westmoreland, newer concepts were tried including a revival of earlier COIN strategies including Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support. The US and its allies later implemented the Phoenix Program, which targeted the Viet Cong political infrastructure through capture, defection or assassination of Viet Cong members. The program was very successful at suppressing Viet Cong political and revolutionary activities. Malaya: British forces used the relocation method with considerable success during the Malayan Emergency. The Briggs Plan, implemented fully in 1950, relocated Chinese Malayans into protected "New Villages", designated by British forces. By the end of 1951, some 400,000 ethnic Chinese had moved into the fortifications.

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Conventional warfare using massive firepower and the failure to implement adequate counterinsurgency had extremely negative effects, which was the strategy that the NVA adeptly used to countering by the protracted political and military warfare model. After the replacement of General William Westmoreland, newer concepts were tried including a revival of earlier COIN strategies including Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support. The US and its allies later implemented the Phoenix Program, which targeted the Viet Cong political infrastructure through capture, defection or assassination of Viet Cong members. The program was very successful at suppressing Viet Cong political and revolutionary activities. Malaya: British forces used the relocation method with considerable success during the Malayan Emergency. The Briggs Plan, implemented fully in 1950, relocated Chinese Malayans into protected "New Villages", designated by British forces. By the end of 1951, some 400,000 ethnic Chinese had moved into the fortifications. Of that population, the British forces formed a "Home Guard", an armed resistance against the Malayan Communist Party, an implementation that was later mirrored by the Strategic Hamlet Program, which used by US forces in South Vietnam. Despite British claims of a victory in the Malayan Emergency, the military historian Martin van Creveld noted that the results of the counterinsurgency, the withdrawal of British forces and the establishment of an independent state, are identical to those of Aden, Kenya and Cyprus, which are not considered victories. Dutch Empire: The Dutch formulated a new strategy of counterinsurgency warfare during the Aceh War by deploying light-armed Marechaussee units and using scorched-earth tactics. In 1898 Van Heutsz was proclaimed governor of Aceh, and with his lieutenant, who later became Dutch Prime Minister, Hendrikus Colijn, they finally conquered most of Aceh. They followed Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje's suggestions of finding cooperative uleebalang or secular chiefs to support them in the countryside and to isolate the resistance from its rural support base. During the South Sulawesi Campaign, Captain Raymond Westerling of the KST, Special Forces of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army used the Westerling Method. Westerling ordered the registration of all Javanese arriving in Makassar because of the large numbers of Javanese participating in the Sulawesi resistance. He also used scouts to infiltrate local villages and to identify members of the resistance. Based on their information and that of the Dutch military intelligence service, the DST surrounded one of more suspected villages during night and drove the population to a central location. At daybreak, the operation began, often led by Westerling. Men would be separated from women and children. From the information gathered, Westerling exposed certain people as terrorists and murderers, who were shot without any further investigation. Afterwards, Westerling forced local communities to refrain from supporting guerillas by swearing on the Quran, and it established local self-defence units with some members recruited from former guerrillas deemed as "redeemable". Westerling directed eleven operations throughout the campaign. He succeeded in eliminating the insurgency and undermining local support for the Republicans. His actions restored Dutch rule in southern Sulawesi. However, the Netherlands East Indies government and the Dutch Army command soon realised that Westerling's notoriety led to growing public criticism. In April 1947, the Dutch government instituted an official inquiry of his controversial methods. Westerling was put on the sidelines and was relieved of his duties in November 1948. France: France had major counterinsurgency wars in its colonies in Indochina and Algeria. McClintock cited the basic points of French doctrine as: Quadrillage (an administrative grid of population and territory) Ratissage (cordoning and "raking") Regroupement (relocating and closely controlling a suspect population) 'Tache d'huile' – The 'oil spot' strategy Recruitment of local leaders and forces Paramilitary organization and militias Much of the thinking was informed by the work of earlier leading French theoreticians of colonial warfare and counterinsurgency, Marshals Bugeaud, Gallieni and Lyautey. WMcClintock cites the 1894 Algerian governor, Jules Cambon, as saying, "By destroying the administration and local government we were also suppressing our means of action.... The result is that we are today confronted by a sort of human dust on which we have no influence and in which movements take place which are unknown to us". Cambon's philosophy, however, did not seem to survive into the Algerian War of Independence(1954–1962). Indochina: Post-war doctrine, as in Indochina, took a more drastic view of "Guerre Révolutionnaire", which presented an ideological and global war with a commitment to total war. Countermeasures, in principle, needed to be both political and military: "No measure was too drastic to meet the new threat of revolution". French forces taking control from the Japanese did not seem to negotiate seriously with nationalist elements in what was to become Vietnam, which reaped the consequences of overconfidence at Điện Biên Phủ. It occurred to various commanders that soldiers who were trained to operate as guerrillas would have a strong sense of how to fight guerrillas. Before the partition of French Indochina, French Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (GCMA), led by Roger Trinquier, took on this role, drawing on French experience with the Jedburgh teams. GCMA, operating in Tonkin and Laos under French intelligence, was complemented by Commandos Nord Viêt-Nam in the North. In those missions, the SOF teams lived and fought with the locals. One Laotian, who became an officer, was Vang Pao, who was to become a general in Hmong and Laotian operations in Southeast Asia while the US forces increased their role. Algeria: The French counterinsurgency in colonial Algeria was a savage one. The 1957 Battle of Algiers resulted in 24,000 detentions, with most tortured and an estimated 3,000 killed. It may have broken the National Liberation Front infrastructure in Algiers, but it also killed off French legitimacy as far as "hearts and minds" went. Counterinsurgency requires an extremely capable intelligence infrastructure that is endowed with human sources and deep cultural knowledge. That contributes to the difficulty of foreign, as opposed to indigenous, powers in counterinsurgency operations. One of France's most influential theorists was Roger Trinquier. The Modern Warfare counterinsurgency strategy, described by Trinquier, who had led anti-communist guerrillas in Indochina, was a strong influence on French efforts in Algeria. Trinquier suggested three principles: separate the guerrilla from the population that supports it; occupy the zones from which the guerrillas previously operated, make the area dangerous for the insurgents and turn the people against the guerrilla movement; and co-ordinate actions over a wide area and for a long enough time that the guerrilla is denied access to the population centres that could support him. Trinquier's view was that torture had to be extremely focused and limited, but many French officers considered its use to be corrosive to their own side. There were strong protests among French leaders: the Army's most decorated officer, General Jacques Pâris de Bollardière, confronted General Jacques Massu, the commander of French forces in the Battle of Algiers, over orders institutionalizing torture, as "an unleashing of deplorable instincts which no longer knew any limits". He issued an open letter condemning the danger to the army of the loss of its moral values "under the fallacious pretext of immediate expediency" and was imprisoned for sixty days. As some of the French Army protested, others increased the intensity of their approach, which led to an attempted military coup against the French Fourth Republic itself. Massu and General Raoul Salan led a 1958 coup in Algiers to demand a new republic under Charles de Gaulle. When de Gaulle's policies toward Algeria, such as a 1961 referendum on Algerian self-determination, did not meet the expectations of the colonial officers, Salan formed the underground Organisation armée secrète (OAS), a right-wing terrorist group, whose actions included a 1962 assassination attempt against de Gaulle himself. West Africa: France has had taken Barnett's Leviathan role in Chad and Ivory Coast, the latter on two occasions, most significantly in 2002–2003. The situation with France and Ivory Coast is not a classic FID situation, as France attacked Ivorian forces that had provoked UN peacekeepers. Another noteworthy instance of counterinsurgency in West Africa is the Nigerian Armed Forces experience against the Boko Haram insurgency. Military operations against Boko Haram occur predominantly in the far northeast areas of Nigeria. The operations have been ongoing since June 2011 and have greatly expanded within the Lake Chad Basin sub-region of West Africa. India: There have been many insurgencies in India since its independence in 1947. The Kashmir insurgency, which started by 1989, was brought under control by the Indian government and violence has been reduced. A branch of the Indian Army, known as the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), was created for the sole purpose of destroying the insurgency in Kashmir, and it has played a major role in doing so.

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The situation with France and Ivory Coast is not a classic FID situation, as France attacked Ivorian forces that had provoked UN peacekeepers. Another noteworthy instance of counterinsurgency in West Africa is the Nigerian Armed Forces experience against the Boko Haram insurgency. Military operations against Boko Haram occur predominantly in the far northeast areas of Nigeria. The operations have been ongoing since June 2011 and have greatly expanded within the Lake Chad Basin sub-region of West Africa. India: There have been many insurgencies in India since its independence in 1947. The Kashmir insurgency, which started by 1989, was brought under control by the Indian government and violence has been reduced. A branch of the Indian Army, known as the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), was created for the sole purpose of destroying the insurgency in Kashmir, and it has played a major role in doing so. The RR was well supported by Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and state government police. The Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) is located in the northeastern town of Vairengte in the Indian state of Mizoram. Personnel from countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Bangladesh and Vietnam have attended this school. Portugal: Portugal's experience in counterinsurgency resulted from the "pacification" campaigns conducted in the Portuguese African and Asian colonies in the late 19th century and the early 20th century. In the 1960s and the early 1970s, Portugal conducted large-scale counterinsurgency operations in Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique against independentist guerrillas supported by the Eastern Bloc and China, as well by some Western countries. Although the campaigns are collectively known as the "Portuguese Colonial War", there were in fact three different ones: the Angolan Independence War, the Guinea-Bissau War of Independence and the Mozambican War of Independence. The situation was unique in that small armed forces, those of Portugal, conducted three counterinsurgency wars at the same time in three different theatres of operations separated by thousands of kilometres. For those operations, Portugal developed its own counterinsurgency doctrine. Russia and Soviet Union: The most familiar Russian counterinsurgency is the War in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. However, throughout the history of the Russian Empire, the Russians fought many counterinsurgencies as new Caucasian and Central Asian territory were occupied. It was in those conflicts that the Russians developed the following counterinsurgency tactics: Deploy a significant number of troops Isolate the area from outside assistance Establish tight control of major cities and towns Build lines of forts to restrict insurgent movement Destroy the springs of resistance through destruction of settlements, livestock, crops etc. Those tactics, generally speaking, were carried over into Soviet use following the 1917 revolution for the most part except for the integration of political-military command. This tactical blueprint saw use following the First and Second World Wars in Dagestan, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia, Lithuania and Ukraine. That doctrine was ultimately shown to be inadequate in the Soviet War in Afghanistan, mostly because of insufficient troop commitment, and in the Wars in Chechnya. United States: The United States has conducted counterinsurgency campaigns during the Philippine–American War, the Vietnam War, the post-2001 War in Afghanistan, and the Iraq War. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in increased interest in counterinsurgency within the American military, which was exemplified by the 2006 publication of a new joint Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, which replaced the documents separately published by the Army and Marine Corps 20–25 years prior. Views of the doctrine contained in the manual have been mixed. The 2014 version of FM 3-24/MCWP 3–33.5 acquired a new title, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, it consists of three main parts, Part one provides strategic and operational context, part two provides the doctrine for understanding insurgencies, and part three provides doctrine for defeating an insurgency. In short, FM 3-24/MCWP 3–33.5 is organized to provide the context of a problem, the problem, and possible solutions. William B. Caldwell IV wrote: The law of armed conflict requires that, to use force, "combatants" must distinguish individuals presenting a threat from innocent civilians. This basic principle is accepted by all disciplined militaries. In the counterinsurgency, disciplined application of force is even more critical because our enemies camouflage themselves in the civilian population. Our success in Iraq depends on our ability to treat the civilian population with humanity and dignity, even as we remain ready to immediately defend ourselves or Iraqi civilians when a threat is detected. In the recent conflicts the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) has been increasingly involved conducting special operations especially the training and development of other states' military and security forces. This is known in the special operations community as foreign internal defense. It was announced 14 January 2016 that 1,800 soldiers from the 101st's Headquarters and its 2nd Brigade Combat Team will deploy soon on regular rotations to Baghdad and Erbil to train and advise Iraqi Army and Kurdish Peshmerga forces who are expected in the coming months to move toward Mosul, the Islamic State's de facto headquarters in Iraq. The 101st Airborne Division will serve an integral role in preparing Iraqi ground troops to expel the Islamic State group from Mosul, Defense Secretary Ash Carter told the division's soldiers during a January 2016 visit to Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Defense Secretary Ash Carter told the 101st Airborne Division that "The Iraqi and Peshmerga forces you will train, advise and assist have proven their determination, their resiliency, and increasingly, their capability, but they need you to continue building on that success, preparing them for the fight today and the long hard fight for their future. They need your skill. They need your experience." Foreign internal defense policymaking has subsequently aided in Iraqi successes in reclaiming Tikrit, Baiji, Ramadi, Fallujah, and Mosul from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Recent evaluations of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan have yielded mixed results. A comprehensive study by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction concluded that "the U.S. government greatly overestimated its ability" to use COIN and stabilization tactics for long-term success. The report found that "successes in stabilizing Afghan districts rarely lasted longer than the physical presence of coalition troops and civilians." These findings are corroborated by scholarly studies of U.S. counterinsurgency activities in Afghanistan, which determined that backlashes by insurgents and the local population were common. See also: References: Notes Further reading: Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), ISBN 0-521-54869-1. Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "Tunnel at the End of the Light: A Critique of U.S. Counter-terrorist Grand Strategy," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2002), pp. 549–563. Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How to Lose a War on Terror: A Comparative Analysis of a Counterinsurgency Success and Failure", in Jan Ångström and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Eds., Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War. (London: Frank Cass, 2007). Burgoyne, Michael L. and Albert J. Marckwardt (2009). The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa With E. D. Swinton's "The Defence of Duffer's Drift". University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-08093-2. Callwell, C. E., Small Wars: Their Principles & Practice. (Bison Books, 1996), ISBN 0-8032-6366-X. Cassidy, Robert M. Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War. (Stanford University Press, 2008). Catignani, Sergio. Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the two Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army. (Routledge, 2008), ISBN 978-0-415-43388-4. Corum, James. Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency. (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith, 2008), ISBN 0-7603-3080-8. Corum, James. Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy. (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith, 2007), ISBN 0-7603-2868-4. Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. (Wesport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1964), ISBN 0-275-99269-1. Derradji Abder-Rahmane. The Algerian Guerrilla Campaign Strategy & Tactics. (Edwin Mellen Press, 1997) Erickson, Edward J.

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Counterinsurgency

(Routledge, 2008), ISBN 978-0-415-43388-4. Corum, James. Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency. (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith, 2008), ISBN 0-7603-3080-8. Corum, James. Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy. (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith, 2007), ISBN 0-7603-2868-4. Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. (Wesport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1964), ISBN 0-275-99269-1. Derradji Abder-Rahmane. The Algerian Guerrilla Campaign Strategy & Tactics. (Edwin Mellen Press, 1997) Erickson, Edward J. (2019) A Global History of Relocation in Counterinsurgency Warfare. Bloomsbury Academic ISBN 9781350062580 Jacobsen, Kurt. (2010) Pacification and its Discontents. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm/University of Chicago Press, 2010. Joes, James Anthony. Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency. (University Press of Kentucky, 2004), ISBN 0-8131-9170-X. Karnow, Stanley (1997). Vietnam: A history. New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-670-84218-6. Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. (Hurst, 2009). Kilcullen, David. Counterinsurgency. (Hurst, 2010). Kitson, Frank, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping. (1971) Mackinlay, John. The Insurgent Archipelago. (Hurst, 2009). Mao Zedong. Aspects of China's Anti-Japanese Struggle (1948). Melson, Charles D. "German Counter-Insurgency Revisited." Journal of Slavic Military Studies 24#1 (2011): 115–146. online Merom, Gil. How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), ISBN 0-521-00877-8 Petersen, Roger D. (2024). Death, Dominance, and State-Building: The United States in Iraq and the Future of American Intervention. Oxford University Press. Polack, Peter (2019) Guerrilla Warfare: Kings of Revolution. Haverstown, Pennsylvania: Casemate. ISBN 9781612006758 Thompson, Robert (1966) Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam.. London: Chatto & Windus. Tomes, Robert (Spring 2004) "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare", Parameters Van Creveld, Martin (2008) The Changing Face of War: Combat from the Marne to Iraq, New York: Ballantine. ISBN 978-0-89141-902-0 Zambernardi, Lorenzo. "Counterinsurgency's Impossible Trilemma", The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2010), pp. 21–34. External links: Small Wars Journal: Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Research page Terrorism prevention in Russia: one year after Beslan "Inside Counterinsurgency" by Stan Goff, ex – U.S. Special Forces "Instruments of Statecraft – U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940–1990" by Michael McClintock "The Warsaw Ghetto Is No More" by SS Brigade Commander Jürgen Stroop Military forces in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations at JihadMonitor.org "Bibliography: Theories of Limited War and Counterinsurgency" by Edwin Moise (Vietnam-era) "Bibliography: Doctrine on Insurgency and Counterinsurgency" Edwin Moise (contemporary) "Military Briefing Book" news regarding counter-insurgency Max Boot – Invisible Armies, YouTube video, length 56:30, Published on Mar 25, 2013 U.S. Army/Marine corps counter insurgency field manual, pdf document

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Court-martial

Hyphenation: Court-martial is hyphenated in US usage, whether used as a noun or verb. However, in British usage, a hyphen is used to distinguish between the noun, "court martial", and the verb, "to court-martial". Composition: Usually, a court-martial takes the form of a trial with a presiding judge, a prosecutor and a defense attorney (all trained lawyers as well as officers). The precise format varies from one country to another and may also depend on the severity of the accusation. Jurisdiction: Courts-martial have the authority to try a wide range of military offences, many of which closely resemble civilian crimes like fraud, theft or perjury. Others, like cowardice, desertion, and insubordination, are purely military crimes. Military offences are defined in the Armed Forces Act 2006 for members of the British Military. Regulations for the Canadian Forces are found in the Queen's Regulations and Orders as well as the National Defence Act. For members of the United States Armed Forces offenses are covered under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). These offences, as well as their corresponding punishments and instructions on how to conduct a court-martial, are explained in detail based on each country and/or service. By country: Canada: In Canada, there is a two-tier military trial system. Summary trials are presided over by superior officers, while more significant matters are heard by courts martial, which are presided over by independent military judges serving under the independent Office of the Chief Military Judge. Appeals are heard by the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada. Capital punishment in Canada was abolished generally in 1976, and for military offences in 1998. Harold Pringle was the last Canadian soldier executed pursuant to a court martial, in 1945, having been convicted of murder. China: The Military Court of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is the highest level military court (High Military Court, a special people's court executing the authority of the High People's Court) established by the People's Republic of China within the Chinese People's Liberation Army with jurisdiction over the nation's armed forces (including the People's Liberation Army and the People's Armed Police), organized as a unit under the dual leadership of the Supreme People's Court and the Political and Legal Committee of the Central Military Commission. Finland: In Finland, the military has jurisdiction over two types of crimes: those that can be committed only by military personnel and those normal crimes by military persons where both the defendant and the victim are military persons or organizations and the crime has been defined in law as falling under military jurisdiction. The former category includes military offences such as various types of disobedience and absence without leave, while the latter category includes civilian crimes such as murder, assault, theft, fraud and forgery. However, war crimes and sexual crimes are not under military jurisdiction.: § 2  In crimes where the military has jurisdiction, the military conducts the investigation. In non-trivial cases, this is done by the investigative section of Defence Command or by civilian police, but trivial cases are investigated by the defendant's own unit. The civilian police has always the right to take the case from the military.: §§28, 35, 39  If the case does not warrant a punishment greater than a fine or a disciplinary punishment, the punishment is given summarily by the company, battalion or brigade commander, depending on severity of the crime. If the brigade commander feels that the crime warrants a punishment more severe than he can give, he refers the case to the local district attorney who commences prosecution.: §§46–48  The crimes with military jurisdiction are handled by the civilian district court which has a special composition. In military cases, the court consists of a civilian legally trained judge and two military members: an officer and a warrant officer, an NCO or a private soldier. The verdict and the sentence are decided by a majority of votes. However, the court cannot give a more severe sentence than the learned member supports. The appeals can be made as in civilian trials. If a court of appeals handles a military matter, it will have an officer member with at least a major's rank. The Supreme Court of Finland has, in military cases, two general officers as members.: Ch. 3  Courts-martial proper are instituted only during a war, by decree of the government. Such courts-martial have jurisdiction over all crimes committed by military persons. In addition, they may handle criminal cases against civilians in areas where ordinary courts have ceased operation, if the matter is urgent. Such courts-martial have a learned judge as a president and two military members: an officer and an NCO, warrant officer or a private soldier. The verdicts of a war-time court-martial can be appealed to a court of appeals.: Ch. 6 Germany: The Basic Law (Grundgesetz) (adopted after the Second World War in 1949) establishes in Art. 96 para. 2 that courts-martial can be established by federal law. Such courts-martial would take action in a State of Defense (Verteidigungsfall) or against soldiers abroad or at sea. Greece: The existence of military courts, naval courts and air courts is provided for in the Constitution of Greece, which in article 96 paragraph 4 states that: "Special laws define: a. Those related to military courts, naval courts and air courts, to the jurisdiction of which private individuals cannot be subject". The first chapter of the procedural part of the Military Penal Code (MPC) regulates the matters related to the courts and judicial persons that make up the Military Justice. Specifically in article 167 of the MPC, it is defined that criminal justice in the Army is awarded by the military courts (military courts, air courts, naval courts, review court) and the Supreme Court. India: There are four kinds of courts-martial in India. These are the General Court Martial (GCM), District Court Martial (DCM), Summary General Court Martial (SGCM) and Summary Court Martial (SCM). According to the Army Act, army courts can try personnel for all kinds of offenses, except for murder and rape of a civilian, which are primarily tried by a civilian court of law. The President of India can use his judicial power under Article 72 of the constitution to pardon, reprieve, respite or remission of punishment or sentence given by a court martial. Ireland: Courts martial are provided for in the Constitution of Ireland, which states in Article 38.4.1 that: "Military tribunals may be established for the trial of offences against military law alleged to have been committed by persons while subject to military law and also to deal with a state of war or armed rebellion." There are three classes of courts martial in the Irish Defence Forces: The Summary Court-Martial (SCM) is tried by a Military Judge sitting alone. Sentences are limited to six months imprisonment. The Limited Court-Martial (LCM) is tried by a Military Judge and a board of three members of the Defence Forces. Sentences are limited to two years imprisonment. The General Court-Martial (GCM) is tried by a Military Judge and a board of five members of the Defence Forces. The GCM has no sentencing limit. Officers of Lieutenant-Colonel rank and higher can only be tried by a GCM. Israel: Outside of the Israeli settlements, the West Bank remains under direct Israeli military rule, and under the jurisdiction of martial law in the form of military courts. The international community maintains that Israel does not have sovereignty in the West Bank, and considers Israel's control of the area to be the longest military occupation in modern history. The military court system for the occupied territories, modeled partially on the British military court system set up in 1937, was established in 1967, and had been called the institutional centerpiece of the occupation, and within it West Bank Palestinians are treated as "foreign civilians". The measures it applies, combining elements of colonial administration and martial law, cover not only incidents involving recourse to violence but many other activities, non-violent protests, political and cultural statements and the way Palestinians are allowed to move or associate with each other. Some of the problematic facets of the system Palestinian prisoners are subject to are, according to sociology professor Lisa Hajjar; prolonged detention of suspects incommunicado, impeding a client's access to his lawyer, the routine use of coercion under interrogation to obtain confessions and the introduction of "secret evidence". Indonesia: In Indonesia, any criminal offense conducted by military personnel will be held in trial by military court. There are four levels of military jurisdiction: Military Court (Pengadilan Militer), composed of one major as presiding judge, two captains as judge, one captain as military prosecuting attorney, and one second lieutenant as clerk of court. High Military Court (Pengadilan Militer Tinggi), composed of one lieutenant colonel as presiding judge, two majors as judge, one major as military prosecuting attorney, and one captain as clerk of court. Supreme Military Court (Pengadilan Militer Utama), composed of one colonel as presiding judge, two lieutenant colonels as judge, one lieutenant colonel as military prosecuting attorney, and one major as clerk of court. Warzone Military Court (Pengadilan Militer Pertempuran), composed of one colonel as presiding judge, two lieutenant colonels as judge, one lieutenant colonel as military prosecuting attorney, and one major as clerk of court. This level of military court only applies during wartime.

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Court-martial

There are four levels of military jurisdiction: Military Court (Pengadilan Militer), composed of one major as presiding judge, two captains as judge, one captain as military prosecuting attorney, and one second lieutenant as clerk of court. High Military Court (Pengadilan Militer Tinggi), composed of one lieutenant colonel as presiding judge, two majors as judge, one major as military prosecuting attorney, and one captain as clerk of court. Supreme Military Court (Pengadilan Militer Utama), composed of one colonel as presiding judge, two lieutenant colonels as judge, one lieutenant colonel as military prosecuting attorney, and one major as clerk of court. Warzone Military Court (Pengadilan Militer Pertempuran), composed of one colonel as presiding judge, two lieutenant colonels as judge, one lieutenant colonel as military prosecuting attorney, and one major as clerk of court. This level of military court only applies during wartime. The judges will receive temporary rank the same as the defendant if the rank of the defendant is higher than the judges. Luxembourg: In Luxembourg, there are three levels of military jurisdiction: The lowest is the Council of War which is composed of one lieutenant-colonel (or higher), one captain (or higher) and one civilian judge of a District Court. The Military Court of Appeal is composed of two high magistrates of a civilian Court of Appeal and one Major (or higher). At the top is the Military High Court which deals not only with military cases, but also with acts of high treason, sabotage, organized forms of terrorism and crimes against humanity. It is composed of two magistrates of a civilian Court of Appeal, one judge of a civilian District Court and one Lieutenant-Colonel (or higher) of the Army. Netherlands: In the Netherlands, members of the military are tried by a special military section of the civilian court in Arnhem. This section consists of a military member and two civilian judges. The decision whether or not to prosecute is primarily made by the (civilian) attorney general. New Zealand: Service members of the New Zealand Defence Force are tried under a court martial for offences pertaining to the most serious offences against the Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971. Offences such as mutiny, murder, sexual offences, serious assaults, drug offences, or offences where the maximum punishment exceeds a 7-year prison term will be heard by court martial. Below this 7-year threshold the accused is dealt with by their commanding officer in what is known as a summary trial. During court martial the appointed judge is either a New Zealand High Court or District Court judge and they preside over the trial. Defendants are assigned legal counsel, and for the prosecution, a lawyer is assigned who generally comes from a military background. The judge advocate is usually made up of senior NZDF officers and warrant officers who hear the defence and prosecution evidence during court martial. Punishment on guilty findings of a defendant will see them face being charged with a punishment such as serious reprimand, loss of rank, dismissal from the NZDF, or being sent to military or civilian prison. Poland: In Poland, military courts are military garrison courts and military district courts. They are criminal courts with jurisdiction over offences committed by soldiers in active military service, as well as certain offences committed by civilian military personnel and soldiers of the armed forces of foreign countries (Article 647 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Garrison courts rule in the first instance, appeals against their decisions and orders are heard by district courts, which also have first-instance jurisdiction in the most serious cases. The Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court then acts as the second instance; in addition, cassation appeals against judgments rendered in the second instance are heard in the Criminal Chamber. The military courts are therefore subject to the adjudicatory supervision of the Supreme Court (which, by the way, follows from Article 183(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland), and the Minister of Justice has superior organizational and administrative supervision. Philippines: In 2005, ex-AFP Major General Carlos Garcia (PMA Class of 1971, assigned comptroller of the AFP was court martialled for violating two articles of the Articles of War for the alleged Php 303 million Peso Money Laundering/Plunder and direct Bribery against him. Singapore: Under the Singapore Armed Forces Act, any commissioned officer is allowed to represent servicemen when they are tried for military offences in the military courts. The cases are heard at the Court-Martial Centre at Kranji Camp II. Some of the courts martial in Singapore include that of Capt. G. R. Wadsworth in 1946 due to use of insubordinate language and, in the modern day, misbehaviour by conscripted servicemen. Thailand: The governing law in Thailand's military courts is the Military Court Organisation Act 1955 (Thai: พระราชบัญญัติธรรมนูญศาลทหาร พ.ศ. ๒๔๙๘). The act allows the Judge Advocate General of Thailand (Thai: เจ้ากรมพระธรรมนูญ) to establish court regulations. In wartime or during the imposition of martial law, military courts may adopt special procedures. United Kingdom: The court martial is one of the Military Courts of the United Kingdom. The Armed Forces Act 2006 establishes the court martial as a permanent standing court. Previously courts-martial were convened on an ad hoc basis with several traditions, including usage of swords. The court martial may try any offence against service law. The court is made up of a judge advocate, and between three and seven (depending on the seriousness of the offence) officers and warrant officers. Rulings on matters of law are made by the judge advocate alone, whilst decisions on the facts are made by a majority of the members of the court, not including the judge advocate, and decisions on sentence by a majority of the court, this time including the judge advocate. United States: Most commonly, courts-martial in the United States are convened to try members of the U.S. military for violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which is the U.S. military's criminal code. However, they can also be convened for other purposes, including military tribunals and the enforcement of martial law in an occupied territory. Courts-martial are governed by the rules of procedure and evidence laid out in the Manual for Courts-Martial, which contains the Rules for Courts-Martial, Military Rules of Evidence, and other guidance. There are three types: Special, Summary, and General. Fictional examples: In Herman Melville's novella Billy Budd (first published 1924), the title character is convicted at a drumhead court-martial of striking and killing his superior officer on board HMS Indomitable, is sentenced to death, and is hanged. The novella has been adapted for the stage, film and television; notably in Benjamin Britten's 1951 opera Billy Budd. In C.S. Forester's 1938 novel Flying Colours, Captain Horatio Hornblower is court-martialled for the loss of HMS Sutherland. He is "most honourably acquitted". In Michael Morpurgo's novel Private Peaceful, the main character of "Tommo" reflects on the childhoods of himself and his brother, Charlie as Charlie awaits a court martial during WWI, which he receives at the end of the story for disobeying orders and cowardice in the face of the enemy. Several courts-martial occur in the British naval TV series Warship, including notably that of Lieutenant Palfrey, a Royal Marines officer accused of killing a foreign officer during a military exercise, and that of Fleet Air Arm pilot Edward Glenn, brother of Alan Glenn, one the principal characters, charged with a range of offences relating to a dangerous flight manœuvre. In the Star Trek: The Next Generation episode "The Battle" it was stated that, as the loss of a starship was a court martial offense, Picard was court-martialled for the loss of the Stargazer, zealously prosecuted by Phillipa Louvois. In the end, he was absolved of all charges. The 1992 movie A Few Good Men (and the play on which it was based) deals almost entirely with the court martial of two enlisted Marines. In the 2008 to 2014 sci-fiction animated TV show "Star Wars: The Clone Wars's 2011 fourth season's episode "Plan of Dissent" clone troopers Fives and Jesse, both serving in the Grand Army of the Republic, act against orders from their acting superior in a war situation and in revenge are threatened with court-martial and consequent execution. They found themselves court-martialed and about to be executed by firing squad in the next episode, although the final execution did not happen despite them being found guilty See also: Cashiering Military trial films References: Notes: Citations: Sources: Further reading: Macomb, Alexander, Major General of the United States Army, The Practice of Courts Martial, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1841) 154 pages. Macomb, Alexander, A Treatise on Martial Law, and Courts-Martial as Practiced in the United States.

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Court-martial

In the 2008 to 2014 sci-fiction animated TV show "Star Wars: The Clone Wars's 2011 fourth season's episode "Plan of Dissent" clone troopers Fives and Jesse, both serving in the Grand Army of the Republic, act against orders from their acting superior in a war situation and in revenge are threatened with court-martial and consequent execution. They found themselves court-martialed and about to be executed by firing squad in the next episode, although the final execution did not happen despite them being found guilty See also: Cashiering Military trial films References: Notes: Citations: Sources: Further reading: Macomb, Alexander, Major General of the United States Army, The Practice of Courts Martial, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1841) 154 pages. Macomb, Alexander, A Treatise on Martial Law, and Courts-Martial as Practiced in the United States. (Charleston: J. Hoff, 1809), republished (New York: Lawbook Exchange, June 2007), ISBN 1-58477-709-5, ISBN 978-1-58477-709-0, 340 pages. External links: Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), United States (2008 Edition) PDF document 2002 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), United States Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 2004, United States Website for the Office of the Chief Military Judge of the Canadian Forces The Court Martial Act 2007 of New Zealand "the definition of court-martial". www.dictionary.com.

mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv

Covert operation

US law: Under US law, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) must lead covert operations unless the president finds that another agency should do so and informs Congress. The CIA's authority to conduct covert action comes from the National Security Act of 1947. President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12333 titled United States Intelligence Activities in 1984. This order defined covert action as "special activities", both political and military, that the US Government could legally deny. The CIA was also designated as the sole authority under the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act and in Title 50 of the United States Code Section 413(e). The CIA must have a "Presidential Finding" issued by the President in order to conduct these activities under the Hughes-Ryan amendment to the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act. These findings are then monitored by the oversight committees in both the US Senate and House of Representatives. As a result of this framework, the CIA "receives more oversight from the Congress than any other agency in the federal government", according to one author. The Special Activities Division (SAD) is a division of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, responsible for Covert Action and "Special Activities". These special activities include covert political influence and paramilitary operations. Impact: According to a 2018 study by University of Chicago political scientist Austin Carson, covert operations may have the beneficial effect of preventing escalation of disputes into full-blown wars. He argues that keeping military operations secret can limit escalation dynamics, as well as insulate leaders from domestic pressures while simultaneously allowing them communicating their interest to the adversary in keeping a war contained. He finds that covert operations are frequently detected by other major powers. Domestic settings: To go "undercover" (that is, to go on an undercover operation) is to avoid detection by the object of one's observation, and especially to disguise one's own identity (or use an assumed identity) for the purposes of gaining the trust of an individual or organization in order to learn or confirm confidential information, or to gain the trust of targeted individuals to gather information or evidence. Undercover operations are traditionally employed by law enforcement agencies and private investigators; those in such roles are commonly referred to as undercover agents. History: Law enforcement has carried out undercover work in a variety of ways throughout the course of history, but Eugène François Vidocq (1775–1857) developed the first organized (though informal) undercover program in France in the early 19th century, from the late First Empire through most of the Bourbon Restoration period of 1814 to 1830. At the end of 1811 Vidocq set up an informal plainclothes unit, the Brigade de la Sûreté ("Security Brigade"), which was later converted to a security police unit under the Prefecture of Police. The Sûreté initially had eight, then twelve, and, in 1823, twenty employees. One year later, it expanded again, to 28 secret agents. In addition, there were eight people who worked secretly for the Sûreté, but instead of a salary, they received licences for gambling halls. A major portion of Vidocq's subordinates comprised ex-criminals like himself. Vidocq personally trained his agents, for example, in selecting the correct disguise based on the kind of job. He himself went out hunting for criminals too. His memoirs are full of stories about how he outsmarted crooks by pretending to be a beggar or an old cuckold. At one point, he even simulated his own death. In England, the first modern police force was established in 1829 by Sir Robert Peel as the Metropolitan Police of London. From the start, the force occasionally employed plainclothes undercover detectives, but there was much public anxiety that its powers were being used for the purpose of political repression. In part due to these concerns, the 1845 official Police Orders required all undercover operations to be specifically authorized by the superintendent. It was only in 1869 that Police commissioner Edmund Henderson established a formal plainclothes detective division. The first Special Branch of police was the Special Irish Branch, formed as a section of the Criminal Investigation Department of the MPS in London in 1883, initially to combat the bombing campaign that the Irish Republican Brotherhood had begun a few years earlier. This pioneering branch became the first to receive training in counter-terrorism techniques. Its name was changed to Special Branch as it had its remit gradually expanded to incorporate a general role in counter terrorism, combating foreign subversion and infiltrating organized crime. Law enforcement agencies elsewhere established similar Branches. In the United States, a similar route was taken when the New York City Police Department under police commissioner William McAdoo established the Italian Squad in 1906 to combat rampant crime and intimidation in the poor Italian neighborhoods. Various federal agencies began their own undercover programs shortly afterwards – Charles Joseph Bonaparte founded the Bureau of Investigation, the forerunner of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in 1908. Secret police forces in the Eastern Bloc also used undercover operatives. Participation in criminal activities: Undercover agents may engage in criminal activities as part of their investigation. Joh defined the term authorized criminality to describe this phenomenon, which she restricts primarily to undercover law enforcement officers, excluding confidential informants. These criminal activities are primarily used to "provide opportunities for the suspect to engage in the target crime" and to maintain or bolster their cover identity. However, these crimes must be necessary to advance the investigation otherwise they may be prosecutable like any other crime. The FBI requires that such activities must be sanctioned and necessary for the investigation; they also stipulate that agents may not instigate criminal activity (to avoid entrapment) or participate in violence except for self-defense or the defense of others. Most other legislation surrounding authorized criminality is not uniform and is a patchwork of federal and state laws. Risks: There are two principal problems that can affect agents working in undercover roles. The first is the maintenance of identity and the second is the reintegration back into normal duty. Living a double life in a new environment presents many problems. Undercover work is one of the most stressful jobs a special agent can undertake. The largest cause of stress identified is the separation of an agent from friends, family and his normal environment. This simple isolation can lead to depression and anxiety. There is no data on the divorce rates of agents, but strain on relationships does occur. This can be a result of a need for secrecy and an inability to share work problems, and the unpredictable work schedule, personality and lifestyle changes and the length of separation can all result in problems for relationships. Stress can also result from an apparent lack of direction of the investigation or not knowing when it will end. The amount of elaborate planning, risk, and expenditure can pressure an agent to succeed, which can cause considerable stress. The stress that an undercover agent faces is considerably different from his counterparts on regular duties, whose main source of stress is the administration and the bureaucracy. As the undercover agents are removed from the bureaucracy, it may result in another problem. The lack of the usual controls of a uniform, badge, constant supervision, a fixed place of work, or (often) a set assignment could, combined with their continual contact with the organized crime, increase the likelihood for corruption. This stress may be instrumental in the development of drug or alcohol abuse in some agents. They are more prone to the development of an addiction as they suffer greater stress than other police, they are isolated, and drugs are often very accessible. Police, in general, have very high alcoholism rates compared to most occupational groups, and stress is cited as a likely factor. The environment that agents work in often involves a very liberal exposure to the consumption of alcohol, which in conjunction with the stress and isolation could result in alcoholism. There can be some guilt associated with going undercover due to betraying those who have come to trust the officer. This can cause anxiety or even, in very rare cases, sympathy with those being targeted. This is especially true with the infiltration of political groups, as often the agent will share similar characteristics with those they are infiltrating like class, age, ethnicity or religion. This could even result in the conversion of some agents. The lifestyle led by undercover agents is very different compared to other areas in law enforcement, and it can be quite difficult to reintegrate back into normal duties. Agents work their own hours, they are removed from direct supervisory monitoring, and they can ignore the dress and etiquette rules. So resettling back into the normal police role requires the shedding of old habits, language and dress. After working such free lifestyles, agents may have discipline problems or exhibit neurotic responses. They may feel uncomfortable, and take a cynical, suspicious or even paranoid world view and feel continually on guard. Other risks include capture, death and torture. Plainclothes law enforcement: Undercover agents should not be confused with law enforcement officers who wear plainclothes—that is, to wear civilian clothing, instead of wearing a uniform, to avoid detection or identification as a law enforcement officer. However, plainclothes police officers typically carry normal police equipment and normal identification. Police detectives are assigned to wear plainclothes by not wearing the uniform typically worn by their peers. Police officers in plainclothes must identify themselves when using their police powers; however, they are not always required to identify themselves on demand and may lie about their status as a police officer in some situations (see sting operation). Sometimes, police might drive an unmarked vehicle or a vehicle which looks like a taxi.

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Covert operation

After working such free lifestyles, agents may have discipline problems or exhibit neurotic responses. They may feel uncomfortable, and take a cynical, suspicious or even paranoid world view and feel continually on guard. Other risks include capture, death and torture. Plainclothes law enforcement: Undercover agents should not be confused with law enforcement officers who wear plainclothes—that is, to wear civilian clothing, instead of wearing a uniform, to avoid detection or identification as a law enforcement officer. However, plainclothes police officers typically carry normal police equipment and normal identification. Police detectives are assigned to wear plainclothes by not wearing the uniform typically worn by their peers. Police officers in plainclothes must identify themselves when using their police powers; however, they are not always required to identify themselves on demand and may lie about their status as a police officer in some situations (see sting operation). Sometimes, police might drive an unmarked vehicle or a vehicle which looks like a taxi. Controversies: Examples: See also: References: Further reading: Statutory Procedures Under Which Congress Is To Be Informed of U.S. Intelligence Activities, Including Covert Actions by Alfred Cumming, 18 January 2006 (HTML) – Congressional Research Service Joh, Elizabeth (2009). "Breaking The Law To Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in Crime" (PDF). Stanford Law Review. Channel 4 (2011). Confessions of an Undercover Cop.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link) Documentary about Mark Kennedy (policeman). Hattenstone, Simon (25 March 2011). "Mark Kennedy: Confessions of an undercover cop". The Guardian. Jeans, Chris (Director and Producer); Russell, Mike (Narrator) (1988). "Confessions of an Undercover Cop". America Undercover. HBO. Documentary featuring the work of ex-cop Mike Russell, whose undercover work for the New Jersey State Police led to the arrests of over 41 members of the Genovese crime family, and of corrupt prison officials and a state senator Johnson, Loch K. The third option: covert action and American foreign policy (Oxford University Press, 2022). Russell, Mike; Picciarelli, Patrick W. (6 August 2013). Undercover Cop: How I Brought Down the Real-Life Sopranos (First ed.). Thomas Dunne Books. ISBN 978-1-250-00587-8. Whited, Charles (1973). The Decoy Man: The Extraordinary Adventures of an Undercover Cop. Playboy Press/Simon & Schuster. ASIN B0006CA0QG. External links: RAW and Bangladesh Richard Hersh Statement to House Judiciary Democratic Congressional Briefing, 20 January 2006 (HTML) via thewall.civiblog.org Full Transcript, House Judiciary Democratic Membership Briefing "Constitution in Crisis: Domestic Surveillance and Executive Power" 20 January 2006 (HTML) via thewall.civiblog.org "Big Brother is Watching You Part 1 – 902 MI Group TALON Project Summary, Spreadsheet, Rep. Wexler response, and News Coverage collection (includes Shane Harris's "TIA Lives On") via thewall.civiblog.org Steath Network Operations Centre – Covert Communication Support System

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Crossfire

Trench warfare: The tactic of using overlapping arcs of fire came to prominence during World War I where it was a feature of trench warfare. Machine guns were placed in groups, called machine-gun nests, and they protected the front of the trenches. Many people died in futile attempts to charge across the no man's land where these crossfires were set up. After these attacks many bodies could be found in the no man's land. "Caught in the crossfire": To be "caught in the crossfire" is an expression that often refers to unintended casualties (bystanders, etc.) who were killed or wounded by being exposed to the gunfire of a battle or gun fight, such as in a position to be hit by bullets of either side. The phrase has come to mean any injury, damage or harm (physical or otherwise) caused to a third party due to the action of belligerents (collateral damage). == References ==

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Crossing the T

Tactics: When going into battle, ships would assume a battle line formation called "line astern", in which one vessel follows another in one or more parallel lines. This allows each ship to fire over wide arcs without lofting salvos of projectiles over friendly vessels. Each ship in the line generally engages its opposite number in the enemy battle line which moves in a parallel course. However, moving ahead of the enemy line on a perpendicular course (crossing the T) enables a ship to launch salvos at the same target with both the forward and rear turrets, maximizing the chances for a hit. It also makes ranging errors less critical for the ship doing the crossing, while simultaneously more critical for the ship being crossed. In military terms, this is known as "enfilade fire". The tactic, designed for heavily armed and armoured battleships, was used with varying degrees of success with more lightly armed and armoured cruisers and heavy cruisers. Advances in gun manufacturing and fire-control systems allowed engagements at increasingly long range, from approximately 6,000 yards (5.5 km; 2.9 nautical miles) at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905 to 20,000 yards (18 km; 9.8 nautical miles) at the Battle of Jutland in 1916. The introduction of brown powder, which burned less rapidly than black powder, allowed longer barrels, which allow greater accuracy; and because it expands less sharply than black powder, it puts less strain on the insides of the barrel, allowing guns to last longer and to be manufactured to tighter tolerances. The addition of radar allowed World War II-era ships to fire farther, more accurately, and at night. Battles: Notable battles in which warships crossed the T include: Battle of Tsushima (1905) – Japanese Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō, by use of wireless communications and the proper deployment of reconnaissance, had positioned his fleet in such a way as to bring the Russian fleet to battle, "irrespective of speeds". Tōgō had preserved for himself the interior lines of movement, while forcing the longer lines of movement upon his opponent, whichever course the Russian admiral should take; and by his selected positioning had the effect of "throwing the Russian broadsides more and more out of action". "He had headed him" (crossed his T). The Russian admiral, other than retreat or surrender, had no other option other than "charging Tōgō's battle line" or "accepting a formal pitched battle". Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky chose the latter, resulting in his total defeat in the only decisive fleet action in naval history fought solely by modern battleships. Rozhestvensky was severely wounded during the battle and was taken prisoner. Seven battleships were sunk, and one was captured by the Japanese. Battle of Elli (1912) – Rear Admiral Pavlos Kountouriotis, aboard the Greek cruiser Georgios Averof at a speed of 20 knots (37 km/h), crossed the T of the Turkish fleet on December 13, 1912. Averof concentrated her fire against the Ottoman flagship, forcing the Turks to retreat. Battle of Jutland (1916) – Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, leader of the British Grand Fleet, was able to cross the T twice against the German High Seas Fleet, but the German fleet was both times able to escape by reversing course in poor visibility. Battle of Cape Esperance (1942) – the first United States (U.S.) naval night battle victory over the Japanese when a U.S. force of cruisers and destroyers under Admiral Norman Scott crossed the T of a cruiser–destroyer force under Aritomo Gotō. Gotō's force was approaching Guadalcanal on October 11, 1942 to bombard Henderson Field in support of a Tokyo Express reinforcement mission when it was surprised and defeated by Scott's force in a confused night battle. Gotō died of his wounds shortly after the battle, and lost the cruiser Furutaka along with three destroyers. Scott's forces were in an ideal position in many respects, but squandered their advantage with a navigational error that eventually resulted in friendly fire on out-of-formation destroyers. Also the available radar data was not reaching the commanders of the flotilla and/or was not properly interpreted. Battle of Surigao Strait (1944) – the most recent time a battle line crossed the T, this engagement took place during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, in the Philippines during World War II. Early on October 25, 1944, Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf was guarding the southern entrance to Leyte Gulf at the northern end of Surigao Strait. He commanded a line of six battleships flanked by numerous heavy and light cruisers. A smaller Japanese force under Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura came up the strait, aware of the formidable strength of the American force but nonetheless pressing on. Half of Nishimura's fleet was eliminated by the Americans' destroyer torpedoes, but the Japanese admiral continued on with his remaining few ships. Oldendorf's battleships were arrayed in a line perpendicular to the direction of the approaching Japanese ships, and they unleashed their radar-directed fire-power upon Japanese vessels, whose return fire was ineffectual due to the lack of radar fire control and earlier battle damage. Nishimura went down with his ship. Despite this, however, Yamashiro's guns, along with cruiser Mogami, managed to severely damage an American destroyer. This was the last time the T was crossed in an engagement between battleships, and the last occasion on which battleships fought each other. See also: Raking fire Enfilade and defilade Notes: Further reading: Mahan, Alfred Thayer (1906). Reflections, Historic and Other, Suggested By The Battle Of The Japan Sea. By Captain A. T. Mahan, US Navy. US Naval Institute Proceedings magazine, (Article) June 1906, Volume XXXVI, No. 2, Heritage Collection. Morison, Adm. Samuel Eliot. History of Naval Operations in World War II. Larrabee, Eric. Commander-in-Chief: Franklin D. Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War.

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Culminating point

See also: Defence in depth Loss-of-strength gradient Strategic depth References: External links: The Culminating Point of Attack Culminating Points Archived 2015-09-23 at the Wayback Machine

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Cyberwarfare

Definition: There is ongoing debate over how cyberwarfare should be defined and no absolute definition is widely agreed upon. While the majority of scholars, militaries, and governments use definitions that refer to state and state-sponsored actors, other definitions may include non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, companies, political or ideological extremist groups, hacktivists, and transnational criminal organizations depending on the context of the work. Examples of definitions proposed by experts in the field are as follows. 'Cyberwarfare' is used in a broad context to denote interstate use of technological force within computer networks in which information is stored, shared, or communicated online.Raymond Charles Parks and David P. Duggan focused on analyzing cyberwarfare in terms of computer networks and pointed out that "Cyberwarfare is a combination of computer network attack and defense and special technical operations." According to this perspective, the notion of cyber warfare brings a new paradigm into military doctrine. Paulo Shakarian and colleagues put forward the following definition of "cyber war" in 2013, drawing on Clausewitz's definition of war: "War is the continuation of politics by other means":Cyber war is an extension of policy by actions taken in cyber space by state or nonstate actors that constitute a serious threat to a nation's security or are conducted in response to a perceived threat against a nation's security. Taddeo offered the following definition in 2012: The warfare grounded on certain uses of ICTs within an offensive or defensive military strategy endorsed by a state and aiming at the immediate disruption or control of the enemy's resources, and which is waged within the informational environment, with agents and targets ranging both on the physical and non-physical domains and whose level of violence may vary upon circumstances. Robinson et al. proposed in 2015 that the intent of the attacker dictates whether an attack is warfare or not, defining cyber warfare as "the use of cyber attacks with a warfare-like intent." In 2010, the former US National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism, Richard A. Clarke, defined cyberwarfare as "actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption". The target's own cyber-physical infrastructure may be used by the adversary in case of a cyber conflict, thus weaponizing it. Controversy of term: There is debate on whether the term "cyber warfare" is accurate. In 2012, Eugene Kaspersky, founder of Kaspersky Lab, concluded that "cyberterrorism" is a more accurate term than "cyberwar." He states that "with today's attacks, you are clueless about who did it or when they will strike again. It's not cyber-war, but cyberterrorism." Howard Schmidt, former Cyber Security Coordinator in the Obama administration, said that "there is no cyberwar... I think that is a terrible metaphor and I think that is a terrible concept. There are no winners in that environment." Some experts take issue with the possible consequences linked to the warfare goal. In 2011, Ron Deibert, of Canada's Citizen Lab, warned of a "militarization of cyberspace", as militaristic responses may not be appropriate. However, to date, even serious cyber-attacks that have disrupted large parts of a nation's electrical grid (230,000 customers, Ukraine, 2015) or affected access to medical care, thus endangering life (UK National Health Service, WannaCry, 2017) have not led to military action. In 2017, Oxford academic Lucas Kello proposed a new term, "Unpeace", to denote highly damaging cyber actions whose non-violent effects do not rise to the level of traditional war. Such actions are neither warlike nor peace-like. Although they are non-violent, and thus not acts of war, their damaging effects on the economy and society may be greater than those of some armed attacks. This term is closely related to the concept of the "grey zone", which came to prominence in 2017, describing hostile actions that fall below the traditional threshold of war. But as Kello explained, technological unpeace differs from the grey zone as the term is commonly used in that unpeace by definition is never overtly violent or fatal, whereas some grey-zone actions are violent, even if they are not acts of war. Cyberwarfare vs. cyber war: The term "cyberwarfare" is distinct from the term "cyber war". Cyberwarfare includes techniques, tactics and procedures that may be involved in a cyber war, but the term does not imply scale, protraction or violence, which are typically associated with the term "war", which inherently refers to a large-scale action, typically over a protracted period of time, and may include objectives seeking to utilize violence or the aim to kill. A cyber war could accurately describe a protracted period of back-and-forth cyber attacks (including in combination with traditional military action) between warring states. To date, no such action is known to have occurred. Instead, armed forces have responded with tit-for-tat military cyber actions. For example, in June 2019, the United States launched a cyber attack against Iranian weapons systems in retaliation to the shooting down of a US drone in the Strait of Hormuz. Cyberwarfare and cyber sanctions: In addition to retaliatory digital attacks, countries can respond to cyber attacks with cyber sanctions. Sometimes, it is not easy to detect the attacker, but suspicions may focus on a particular country or group of countries. In these cases, unilateral and multilateral economic sanctions can be used instead of cyberwarfare. For example, the United States has frequently imposed economic sanctions related to cyber attacks. Two Executive Orders issued during the Obama administration, EO 13694 of 2015 and EO 13757 of 2016, specifically focused on the implementation of the cyber sanctions. Subsequent US presidents have issued similar Executive Orders. The US Congress has also imposed cyber sanctions in response to cyberwarfare. For example, the Iran Cyber Sanctions Act of 2016 imposes sanctions on specific individuals responsible for cyber attacks. Types of threat: Types of warfare: Cyber warfare can present a multitude of threats towards a nation. At the most basic level, cyber attacks can be used to support traditional warfare. For example, tampering with the operation of air defenses via cyber means in order to facilitate an air attack. Aside from these "hard" threats, cyber warfare can also contribute towards "soft" threats such as espionage and propaganda. Eugene Kaspersky, founder of Kaspersky Lab, equates large-scale cyber weapons, such as Flame and NetTraveler which his company discovered, to biological weapons, claiming that in an interconnected world, they have the potential to be equally destructive. Espionage: Traditional espionage is not an act of war, nor is cyber-espionage, and both are generally assumed to be ongoing between major powers. Despite this assumption, some incidents can cause serious tensions between nations, and are often described as "attacks". For example: Massive spying by the US on many countries, revealed by Edward Snowden. After the NSA's spying on Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel was revealed, the Chancellor compared the NSA with the Stasi. The NSA recording nearly every cell phone conversation in the Bahamas, without the Bahamian government's permission, and similar programs in Kenya, the Philippines, Mexico and Afghanistan. The "Titan Rain" probes of American defense contractors computer systems since 2003. The Office of Personnel Management data breach, in the US, widely attributed to China. The security firm Area 1 published details of a breach that compromised one of the European Union's diplomatic communication channels for three years. Out of all cyber attacks, 25% of them are espionage based. Sabotage: Computers and satellites that coordinate other activities are vulnerable components of a system and could lead to the disruption of equipment. Compromise of military systems, such as C4ISTAR components that are responsible for orders and communications could lead to their interception or malicious replacement. Power, water, fuel, communications, and transportation infrastructure all may be vulnerable to disruption. According to Clarke, the civilian realm is also at risk, noting that the security breaches have already gone beyond stolen credit card numbers, and that potential targets can also include the electric power grid, trains, or the stock market. In mid-July 2010, security experts discovered a malicious software program called Stuxnet that had infiltrated factory computers and had spread to plants around the world. It is considered "the first attack on critical industrial infrastructure that sits at the foundation of modern economies," notes The New York Times. Stuxnet, while extremely effective in delaying Iran's nuclear program for the development of nuclear weaponry, came at a high cost. For the first time, it became clear that not only could cyber weapons be defensive but they could be offensive. The large decentralization and scale of cyberspace makes it extremely difficult to direct from a policy perspective. Non-state actors can play as large a part in the cyberwar space as state actors, which leads to dangerous, sometimes disastrous, consequences. Small groups of highly skilled malware developers are able to as effectively impact global politics and cyber warfare as large governmental agencies. A major aspect of this ability lies in the willingness of these groups to share their exploits and developments on the web as a form of arms proliferation. This allows lesser hackers to become more proficient in creating the large scale attacks that once only a small handful were skillful enough to manage.

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Cyberwarfare

Stuxnet, while extremely effective in delaying Iran's nuclear program for the development of nuclear weaponry, came at a high cost. For the first time, it became clear that not only could cyber weapons be defensive but they could be offensive. The large decentralization and scale of cyberspace makes it extremely difficult to direct from a policy perspective. Non-state actors can play as large a part in the cyberwar space as state actors, which leads to dangerous, sometimes disastrous, consequences. Small groups of highly skilled malware developers are able to as effectively impact global politics and cyber warfare as large governmental agencies. A major aspect of this ability lies in the willingness of these groups to share their exploits and developments on the web as a form of arms proliferation. This allows lesser hackers to become more proficient in creating the large scale attacks that once only a small handful were skillful enough to manage. In addition, thriving black markets for these kinds of cyber weapons are buying and selling these cyber capabilities to the highest bidder without regard for consequences. Denial-of-service attack: In computing, a denial-of-service attack (DoS attack) or distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS attack) is an attempt to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users. Perpetrators of DoS attacks typically target sites or services hosted on high-profile web servers such as banks, credit card payment gateways, and even root nameservers. DoS attacks often leverage internet-connected devices with vulnerable security measures to carry out these large-scale attacks. DoS attacks may not be limited to computer-based methods, as strategic physical attacks against infrastructure can be just as devastating. For example, cutting undersea communication cables may severely cripple some regions and countries with regards to their information warfare ability. Electrical power grid: The federal government of the United States admits that the electric power grid is susceptible to cyberwarfare. The United States Department of Homeland Security works with industries to identify vulnerabilities and to help industries enhance the security of control system networks. The federal government is also working to ensure that security is built in as the next generation of "smart grid" networks are developed. In April 2009, reports surfaced that China and Russia had infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid and left behind software programs that could be used to disrupt the system, according to current and former national security officials. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) has issued a public notice that warns that the electrical grid is not adequately protected from cyber attack. China denies intruding into the U.S. electrical grid. One countermeasure would be to disconnect the power grid from the Internet and run the net with droop speed control only. Massive power outages caused by a cyber attack could disrupt the economy, distract from a simultaneous military attack, or create a national trauma. Iranian hackers, possibly Iranian Cyber Army pushed a massive power outage for 12 hours in 44 of 81 provinces of Turkey, impacting 40 million people. Istanbul and Ankara were among the places suffering blackout. Howard Schmidt, former Cyber-Security Coordinator of the US, commented on those possibilities: It's possible that hackers have gotten into administrative computer systems of utility companies, but says those aren't linked to the equipment controlling the grid, at least not in developed countries. [Schmidt] has never heard that the grid itself has been hacked. In June 2019, Russia said that its electrical grid has been under cyber-attack by the United States. The New York Times reported that American hackers from the United States Cyber Command planted malware potentially capable of disrupting the Russian electrical grid. Propaganda: Cyber propaganda is an effort to control information in whatever form it takes, and influence public opinion. It is a form of psychological warfare, except it uses social media, fake news websites and other digital means. In 2018, Sir Nicholas Carter, Chief of the General Staff of the British Army stated that this kind of attack from actors such as Russia "is a form of system warfare that seeks to de-legitimize the political and social system on which our military strength is based". Jowell and O'Donnell (2006) state that "propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist" (p. 7). The internet is the most important means of communication today. People can convey their messages quickly across to a huge audience, and this can open a window for evil. Terrorist organizations can exploit this and may use this medium to brainwash people. It has been suggested that restricted media coverage of terrorist attacks would in turn decrease the number of terrorist attacks that occur afterwards. Economic disruption: In 2017, the WannaCry and Petya (NotPetya) cyber attacks, masquerading as ransomware, caused large-scale disruptions in Ukraine as well as to the U.K.'s National Health Service, pharmaceutical giant Merck, Maersk shipping company and other organizations around the world. These attacks are also categorized as cybercrimes, specifically financial crime because they negatively affect a company or group. Surprise cyber attack: The idea of a "cyber Pearl Harbor" has been debated by scholars, drawing an analogy to the historical act of war. Others have used "cyber 9/11" to draw attention to the nontraditional, asymmetric, or irregular aspect of cyber action against a state. Motivations: There are a number of reasons nations undertake offensive cyber operations. Sandro Gaycken, a cyber security expert and adviser to NATO, advocates that states take cyber warfare seriously as they are viewed as an attractive activity by many nations, in times of war and peace. Offensive cyber operations offer a large variety of cheap and risk-free options to weaken other countries and strengthen their own positions. Considered from a long-term, geostrategic perspective, cyber offensive operations can cripple whole economies, change political views, agitate conflicts within or among states, reduce their military efficiency and equalize the capacities of high-tech nations to that of low-tech nations, and use access to their critical infrastructures to blackmail them. Military: With the emergence of cyber as a substantial threat to national and global security, cyber war, warfare and/or attacks also became a domain of interest and purpose for the military. In the U.S., General Keith B. Alexander, first head of USCYBERCOM, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that computer network warfare is evolving so rapidly that there is a "mismatch between our technical capabilities to conduct operations and the governing laws and policies. Cyber Command is the newest global combatant and its sole mission is cyberspace, outside the traditional battlefields of land, sea, air and space." It will attempt to find and, when necessary, neutralize cyberattacks and to defend military computer networks. Alexander sketched out the broad battlefield envisioned for the computer warfare command, listing the kind of targets that his new headquarters could be ordered to attack, including "traditional battlefield prizes – command-and-control systems at military headquarters, air defense networks and weapons systems that require computers to operate." One cyber warfare scenario, Cyber-ShockWave, which was wargamed on the cabinet level by former administration officials, raised issues ranging from the National Guard to the power grid to the limits of statutory authority. The distributed nature of internet based attacks means that it is difficult to determine motivation and attacking party, meaning that it is unclear when a specific act should be considered an act of war. Examples of cyberwarfare driven by political motivations can be found worldwide. In 2008, Russia began a cyber attack on the Georgian government website, which was carried out along with Georgian military operations in South Ossetia. In 2008, Chinese "nationalist hackers" attacked CNN as it reported on Chinese repression on Tibet. Hackers from Armenia and Azerbaijan have actively participated in cyberwarfare as part of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, with Azerbaijani hackers targeting Armenian websites and posting Ilham Aliyev's statements. Jobs in cyberwarfare have become increasingly popular in the military. All four branches of the United States military actively recruit for cyber warfare positions. Civil: Potential targets in internet sabotage include all aspects of the Internet from the backbones of the web, to the internet service providers, to the varying types of data communication mediums and network equipment. This would include: web servers, enterprise information systems, client server systems, communication links, network equipment, and the desktops and laptops in businesses and homes. Electrical grids, financial networks, and telecommunications systems are also deemed vulnerable, especially due to current trends in computerization and automation. Hacktivism: Politically motivated hacktivism involves the subversive use of computers and computer networks to promote an agenda, and can potentially extend to attacks, theft and virtual sabotage that could be seen as cyberwarfare – or mistaken for it. Hacktivists use their knowledge and software tools to gain unauthorized access to computer systems they seek to manipulate or damage not for material gain or to cause widespread destruction, but to draw attention to their cause through well-publicized disruptions of select targets. Anonymous and other hacktivist groups are often portrayed in the media as cyber-terrorists, wreaking havoc by hacking websites, posting sensitive information about their victims, and threatening further attacks if their demands are not met. However, hacktivism is more than that. Actors are politically motivated to change the world, through the use of fundamentalism. Groups like Anonymous, however, have divided opinion with their methods. Income generation: Cyber attacks, including ransomware, can be used to generate income.

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Cyberwarfare

Hacktivists use their knowledge and software tools to gain unauthorized access to computer systems they seek to manipulate or damage not for material gain or to cause widespread destruction, but to draw attention to their cause through well-publicized disruptions of select targets. Anonymous and other hacktivist groups are often portrayed in the media as cyber-terrorists, wreaking havoc by hacking websites, posting sensitive information about their victims, and threatening further attacks if their demands are not met. However, hacktivism is more than that. Actors are politically motivated to change the world, through the use of fundamentalism. Groups like Anonymous, however, have divided opinion with their methods. Income generation: Cyber attacks, including ransomware, can be used to generate income. States can use these techniques to generate significant sources of income, which can evade sanctions and perhaps while simultaneously harming adversaries (depending on targets). This tactic was observed in August 2019 when it was revealed North Korea had generated $2 billion to fund its weapons program, avoiding the blanket of sanctions levied by the United States, United Nations and the European Union. Private sector: Computer hacking represents a modern threat in ongoing global conflicts and industrial espionage and as such is presumed to widely occur. It is typical that this type of crime is underreported to the extent they are known. According to McAfee's George Kurtz, corporations around the world face millions of cyberattacks a day. "Most of these attacks don't gain any media attention or lead to strong political statements by victims." This type of crime is usually financially motivated. Non-profit research: But not all those who engage in cyberwarfare do so for financial or ideological reasons. There are institutes and companies like the University of Cincinnati or the Kaspersky Security Lab which engage in cyberwarfare so as to better understand the field through actions like the researching and publishing of new security threats. Preparedness: A number of countries conduct exercise to increase preparedness and explore the strategy, tactics and operations involved in conducting and defending against cyber attacks against hostile states, this is typically done in the form of war games. The Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCE), part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have conducted a yearly war game called Locked Shields since 2010 designed to test readiness and improve skills, strategy tactics and operational decision making of participating national organizations. Locked Shields 2019 saw 1200 participants from 30 countries compete in a red team vs. blue team exercise. The war game involved a fictional country, Berylia, which was "experiencing a deteriorating security situation, where a number of hostile events coincide with coordinated cyber attacks against a major civilian internet service provider and maritime surveillance system. The attacks caused severe disruptions in the power generation and distribution, 4G communication systems, maritime surveillance, water purification plant and other critical infrastructure components". CCDCE describe the aim of the exercise was to "maintain the operation of various systems under intense pressure, the strategic part addresses the capability to understand the impact of decisions made at the strategic and policy level." Ultimately, France was the winner of Locked Shields 2019. The European Union conducts cyber war game scenarios with member states and foreign partner states to improve readiness, skills and observe how strategic and tactical decisions may affect the scenario. As well as war games which serve a broader purpose to explore options and improve skills, cyber war games are targeted at preparing for specific threats. In 2018 the Sunday Times reported the UK government was conducting cyber war games which could "blackout Moscow". These types of war games move beyond defensive preparedness, as previously described above and onto preparing offensive capabilities which can be used as deterrence, or for "war". Cyber activities by nation: Approximately 120 countries have been developing ways to use the Internet as a weapon and target financial markets, government computer systems and utilities. Asia: China: According to Fritz, China has expanded its cyber capabilities and military technology by acquiring foreign military technology. Fritz states that the Chinese government uses "new space-based surveillance and intelligence gathering systems, Anti-satellite weapon, anti-radar, infrared decoys, and false target generators" to assist in this quest, and that they support their "Informatisation" of their military through "increased education of soldiers in cyber warfare; improving the information network for military training, and has built more virtual laboratories, digital libraries and digital campuses." Through this informatisation, they hope to prepare their forces to engage in a different kind of warfare, against technically capable adversaries. Foreign Policy magazine put the size of China's "hacker army" at anywhere from 50,000 to 100,000 individuals. Diplomatic cables highlight US concerns that China is using access to Microsoft source code and 'harvesting the talents of its private sector' to boost its offensive and defensive capabilities. While China continues to be held responsible for a string of cyber-attacks on a number of public and private institutions in the United States, India, Russia, Canada, and France, the Chinese government denies any involvement in cyber-spying campaigns. The administration maintains the position that China is also victim to an increasing number of cyber-attacks. Most reports about China's cyber warfare capabilities have yet to be confirmed by the Chinese government. In June 2015, the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) announced that it had been the target of a data breach targeting the records of as many as four million people. Later, FBI Director James Comey put the number at 18 million. The Washington Post has reported that the attack originated in China, citing unnamed government officials. Operation Shady RAT is a series of cyber attacks starting mid-2006, reported by Internet security company McAfee in August 2011. China is widely believed to be the state actor behind these attacks which hit at least 72 organizations including governments and defense contractors. The 2018 cyberattack on the Marriott hotel chain that collected personal details of roughly 500 million guests is now known to be a part of a Chinese intelligence-gathering effort that also hacked health insurers and the security clearance files of millions more Americans, The hackers, are suspected of working on behalf of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the country's Communist-controlled civilian spy agency. On 14 September 2020, a database showing personal details of about 2.4 million people around the world was leaked and published. A Chinese company, Zhenhua Data compiled the database. According to the information from "National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System", which is run by State Administration for Market Regulation in China, the shareholders of Zhenhua Data Information Technology Co., Ltd. are two natural persons and one general partnership enterprise whose partners are natural persons. Wang Xuefeng, who is the chief executive and the shareholder of Zhenhua Data, has publicly boasted that he supports "hybrid warfare" through manipulation of public opinion and "psychological warfare". In February 2024 The Philippines announced that it had successfully fought off a cyber attack which was traced to hackers in China. Several government websites were targeted including the National coast watch and personal website of the president of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. In May 2024 The UK announced that it had taken a database offline that is used by its defense ministry after coming under a cyber attack attributed to the Chinese state. India: The Department of Information Technology created the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) in 2004 to thwart cyber attacks in India. That year, there were 23 reported cyber security breaches. In 2011, there were 13,301. That year, the government created a new subdivision, the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC) to thwart attacks against energy, transport, banking, telecom, defense, space and other sensitive areas. The executive director of the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) stated in February 2013 that his company alone was forced to block up to ten targeted attacks a day. CERT-In was left to protect less critical sectors. A high-profile cyber attack on 12 July 2012 breached the email accounts of about 12,000 people, including those of officials from the Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, Defense Research and Development Organizations (DRDO), and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP). A government-private sector plan being overseen by National Security Advisor (NSA) Shivshankar Menon began in October 2012, and intends to boost up India's cyber security capabilities in the light of a group of experts findings that India faces a 470,000 shortfall of such experts despite the country's reputation of being an IT and software powerhouse. In February 2013, Information Technology Secretary J. Satyanarayana stated that the NCIIPC was finalizing policies related to national cyber security that would focus on domestic security solutions, reducing exposure through foreign technology. Other steps include the isolation of various security agencies to ensure that a synchronised attack could not succeed on all fronts and the planned appointment of a National Cyber Security Coordinator. As of that month, there had been no significant economic or physical damage to India related to cyber attacks. On 26 November 2010, a group calling itself the Indian Cyber Army hacked the websites belonging to the Pakistan Army and the others belong to different ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance, Pakistan Computer Bureau, Council of Islamic Ideology, etc. The attack was done as a revenge for the Mumbai terrorist attacks. On 4 December 2010, a group calling itself the Pakistan Cyber Army hacked the website of India's top investigating agency, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The National Informatics Center (NIC) has begun an inquiry.

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Other steps include the isolation of various security agencies to ensure that a synchronised attack could not succeed on all fronts and the planned appointment of a National Cyber Security Coordinator. As of that month, there had been no significant economic or physical damage to India related to cyber attacks. On 26 November 2010, a group calling itself the Indian Cyber Army hacked the websites belonging to the Pakistan Army and the others belong to different ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance, Pakistan Computer Bureau, Council of Islamic Ideology, etc. The attack was done as a revenge for the Mumbai terrorist attacks. On 4 December 2010, a group calling itself the Pakistan Cyber Army hacked the website of India's top investigating agency, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The National Informatics Center (NIC) has begun an inquiry. In July 2016, Cymmetria researchers discovered and revealed the cyber attack dubbed 'Patchwork', which compromised an estimated 2500 corporate and government agencies using code stolen from GitHub and the dark web. Examples of weapons used are an exploit for the Sandworm vulnerability (CVE-2014–4114), a compiled AutoIt script, and UAC bypass code dubbed UACME. Targets are believed to be mainly military and political assignments around Southeast Asia and the South China Sea and the attackers are believed to be of Indian origin and gathering intelligence from influential parties. The Defence Cyber Agency, which is the Indian Military agency responsible for Cyberwarfare, is expected to become operational by November 2019. Philippines: The Chinese are being blamed after a cybersecurity company, F-Secure Labs, found a malware, NanHaiShu, which targeted the Philippines Department of Justice. It sent information in an infected machine to a server with a Chinese IP address. The malware which is considered particularly sophisticated in nature was introduced by phishing emails that were designed to look like they were coming from an authentic sources. The information sent is believed to be relating to the South China Sea legal case. South Korea: In July 2009, there were a series of coordinated denial of service attacks against major government, news media, and financial websites in South Korea and the United States. While many thought the attack was directed by North Korea, one researcher traced the attacks to the United Kingdom. Security researcher Chris Kubecka presented evidence multiple European Union and United Kingdom companies unwittingly helped attack South Korea due to a W32.Dozer infections, malware used in part of the attack. Some of the companies used in the attack were partially owned by several governments, further complicating cyber attribution. In July 2011, the South Korean company SK Communications was hacked, resulting in the theft of the personal details (including names, phone numbers, home and email addresses and resident registration numbers) of up to 35 million people. A trojaned software update was used to gain access to the SK Communications network. Links exist between this hack and other malicious activity and it is believed to be part of a broader, concerted hacking effort. With ongoing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea's defense ministry stated that South Korea was going to improve cyber-defense strategies in hopes of preparing itself from possible cyber attacks. In March 2013, South Korea's major banks – Shinhan Bank, Woori Bank and NongHyup Bank – as well as many broadcasting stations – KBS, YTN and MBC – were hacked and more than 30,000 computers were affected; it is one of the biggest attacks South Korea has faced in years. Although it remains uncertain as to who was involved in this incident, there has been immediate assertions that North Korea is connected, as it threatened to attack South Korea's government institutions, major national banks and traditional newspapers numerous times – in reaction to the sanctions it received from nuclear testing and to the continuation of Foal Eagle, South Korea's annual joint military exercise with the United States. North Korea's cyber warfare capabilities raise the alarm for South Korea, as North Korea is increasing its manpower through military academies specializing in hacking. Current figures state that South Korea only has 400 units of specialized personnel, while North Korea has more than 3,000 highly trained hackers; this portrays a huge gap in cyber warfare capabilities and sends a message to South Korea that it has to step up and strengthen its Cyber Warfare Command forces. Therefore, in order to be prepared from future attacks, South Korea and the United States will discuss further about deterrence plans at the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). At SCM, they plan on developing strategies that focuses on accelerating the deployment of ballistic missiles as well as fostering its defense shield program, known as the Korean Air and Missile Defense. North Korea: Africa: Egypt: In an extension of a bilateral dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Ethiopian government websites have been hacked by the Egypt-based hackers in June 2020. Europe: Cyprus: The New York Times published an exposé revealing an extensive three-year phishing campaign aimed against diplomats based in Cyprus. After accessing the state system the hackers had access to the European Union's entire exchange database. By login into Coreu, hackers accessed communications linking all EU states, on both sensitive and not so sensitive matters. The event exposed poor protection of routine exchanges among European Union officials and a coordinated effort from a foreign entity to spy on another country. "After over a decade of experience countering Chinese cyberoperations and extensive technical analysis, there is no doubt this campaign is connected to the Chinese government", said Blake Darche, one of the Area 1 Security experts – the company revealing the stolen documents. The Chinese Embassy in the US did not return calls for comment. In 2019, another coordinated effort took place that allowed hackers to gain access to government (gov.cy) emails. Cisco's Talos Security Department revealed that "Sea Turtle" hackers carried out a broad piracy campaign in the DNS countries, hitting 40 different organizations, including Cyprus. Estonia: In April 2007, Estonia came under cyber attack in the wake of relocation of the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn. The largest part of the attacks were coming from Russia and from official servers of the authorities of Russia. In the attack, ministries, banks, and media were targeted. This attack on Estonia, a seemingly small Baltic state, was so effective because of how most of Estonian government services are run online. Estonia has implemented an e-government, where banking services, political elections, taxes, and other components of a modern society are now all done online. France: In 2013, the French Minister of Defense, Mr Jean-Yves Le Drian, ordered the creation of a cyber army, representing its fourth national army corps (along with ground, naval and air forces) under the French Ministry of Defense, to protect French and European interests on its soil and abroad. A contract was made with French firm EADS (Airbus) to identify and secure its main elements susceptible to cyber threats. In 2016 France had planned 2600 "cyber-soldiers" and a 440 million euros investment for cybersecurity products for this new army corps. An additional 4400 reservists constitute the heart of this army from 2019. Germany: In 2013, Germany revealed the existence of their 60-person Computer Network Operation unit. The German intelligence agency, BND, announced it was seeking to hire 130 "hackers" for a new "cyber defence station" unit. In March 2013, BND president Gerhard Schindler announced that his agency had observed up to five attacks a day on government authorities, thought mainly to originate in China. He confirmed the attackers had so far only accessed data and expressed concern that the stolen information could be used as the basis of future sabotage attacks against arms manufacturers, telecommunications companies and government and military agencies. Shortly after Edward Snowden leaked details of the U.S. National Security Agency's cyber surveillance system, German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich announced that the BND would be given an additional budget of 100 million Euros to increase their cyber surveillance capability from 5% of total internet traffic in Germany to 20% of total traffic, the maximum amount allowed by German law. Netherlands: In the Netherlands, Cyber Defense is nationally coordinated by the National Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC). The Dutch Ministry of Defense laid out a cyber strategy in 2011. The first focus is to improve the cyber defense handled by the Joint IT branch (JIVC). To improve intel operations, the intel community in the Netherlands (including the military intel organization, MIVD) has set up the Joint Sigint Cyber Unit (JSCU). The Ministry of Defense oversees an offensive cyber force, called Defensive Cyber Command (DCC). Norway: Russia: It has been claimed that Russian security services organized a number of denial of service attacks as a part of their cyber-warfare against other countries, most notably the 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia and the 2008 cyberattacks on Russia, South Ossetia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. One identified young Russian hacker said that he was paid by Russian state security services to lead hacking attacks on NATO computers. He was studying computer sciences at the Department of the Defense of Information. His tuition was paid for by the FSB. Russian, South Ossetian, Georgian and Azerbaijani sites were attacked by hackers during the 2008 South Ossetia War. In October 2016, Jeh Johnson the United States Secretary of Homeland Security and James Clapper the U.S. Director of National Intelligence issued a joint statement accusing Russia of interfering with the 2016 United States presidential election.

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Norway: Russia: It has been claimed that Russian security services organized a number of denial of service attacks as a part of their cyber-warfare against other countries, most notably the 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia and the 2008 cyberattacks on Russia, South Ossetia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. One identified young Russian hacker said that he was paid by Russian state security services to lead hacking attacks on NATO computers. He was studying computer sciences at the Department of the Defense of Information. His tuition was paid for by the FSB. Russian, South Ossetian, Georgian and Azerbaijani sites were attacked by hackers during the 2008 South Ossetia War. In October 2016, Jeh Johnson the United States Secretary of Homeland Security and James Clapper the U.S. Director of National Intelligence issued a joint statement accusing Russia of interfering with the 2016 United States presidential election. The New York Times reported the Obama administration formally accused Russia of stealing and disclosing Democratic National Committee emails. Under U.S. law (50 U.S.C.Title 50 – War and National Defense, Chapter 15 – National Security, Subchapter III Accountability for Intelligence Activities) there must be a formal Presidential finding prior to authorizing a covert attack. Then U.S. vice president Joe Biden said on the American news interview program Meet The Press that the United States will respond. The New York Times noted that Biden's comment "seems to suggest that Mr. Obama is prepared to order – or has already ordered – some kind of covert action". Sweden: In January 2017, Sweden's armed forces were subjected to a cyber-attack that caused them to shutdown a so-called Caxcis IT system used in military exercises. Ukraine: According to CrowdStrike from 2014 to 2016, the Russian APT Fancy Bear used Android malware to target the Ukrainian Army's Rocket Forces and Artillery. They distributed an infected version of an Android app whose original purpose was to control targeting data for the D-30 Howitzer artillery. The app, used by Ukrainian officers, was loaded with the X-Agent spyware and posted online on military forums. The attack was claimed by Crowd-Strike to be successful, with more than 80% of Ukrainian D-30 Howitzers destroyed, the highest percentage loss of any artillery pieces in the army (a percentage that had never been previously reported and would mean the loss of nearly the entire arsenal of the biggest artillery piece of the Ukrainian Armed Forces). According to the Ukrainian army this number is incorrect and that losses in artillery weapons "were way below those reported" and that these losses "have nothing to do with the stated cause". In 2014, the Russians were suspected to use a cyber weapon called "Snake", or "Ouroboros," to conduct a cyber attack on Ukraine during a period of political turmoil. The Snake tool kit began spreading into Ukrainian computer systems in 2010. It performed Computer Network Exploitation (CNE), as well as highly sophisticated Computer Network Attacks (CNA). On 23 December 2015 the Black-Energy malware was used in a cyberattack on Ukraine's power-grid that left more than 200,000 people temporarily without power. A mining company and a large railway operator were also victims of the attack. Ukraine saw a massive surge in cyber attacks during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Several websites belonging to Ukrainian banks and government departments became inaccessible. United Kingdom: MI6 reportedly infiltrated an Al Qaeda website and replaced the instructions for making a pipe bomb with the recipe for making cupcakes. In October 2010, Iain Lobban, the director of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), said the UK faces a "real and credible" threat from cyber attacks by hostile states and criminals and government systems are targeted 1,000 times each month, such attacks threatened the UK's economic future, and some countries were already using cyber assaults to put pressure on other nations. On 12 November 2013, financial organizations in London conducted cyber war games dubbed "Waking Shark 2" to simulate massive internet-based attacks against bank and other financial organizations. The Waking Shark 2 cyber war games followed a similar exercise in Wall Street. Middle East: Iran: Iran has been both victim and perpetrator of several cyberwarfare operations. Iran is considered an emerging military power in the field. In September 2010, Iran was attacked by the Stuxnet worm, thought to specifically target its Natanz nuclear enrichment facility. It was a 500-kilobyte computer worm that infected at least 14 industrial sites in Iran, including the Natanz uranium-enrichment plant. Although the official authors of Stuxnet haven't been officially identified, Stuxnet is believed to be developed and deployed by the United States and Israel. The worm is said to be the most advanced piece of malware ever discovered and significantly increases the profile of cyberwarfare. Iranian Cyber Police department, FATA, was dismissed one year after its creation in 2011 because of the arrest and death of Sattar Behesti, a blogger, in the custody of FATA. Since then, the main responsible institution for the cyberwarfare in Iran is the "Cyber Defense Command" operating under the Joint Staff of Iranian Armed Forces. The Iranian state sponsored group MuddyWater is active since at least 2017 and is responsible for many cyber attacks on various sectors. Israel: In the 2006 war against Hezbollah, Israel alleges that cyber-warfare was part of the conflict, where the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intelligence estimates several countries in the Middle East used Russian hackers and scientists to operate on their behalf. As a result, Israel attached growing importance to cyber-tactics, and became, along with the U.S., France and a couple of other nations, involved in cyber-war planning. Many international high-tech companies are now locating research and development operations in Israel, where local hires are often veterans of the IDF's elite computer units. Richard A. Clarke adds that "our Israeli friends have learned a thing or two from the programs we have been working on for more than two decades.": 8  In September 2007, Israel carried out an airstrike on a suspected nuclear reactor in Syria dubbed Operation Orchard. U.S. industry and military sources speculated that the Israelis may have used cyberwarfare to allow their planes to pass undetected by radar into Syria. Following US President Donald Trump's decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018, cyber warfare units in the United States and Israel monitoring internet traffic out of Iran noted a surge in retaliatory cyber attacks from Iran. Security firms warned that Iranian hackers were sending emails containing malware to diplomats who work in the foreign affairs offices of US allies and employees at telecommunications companies, trying to infiltrate their computer systems. Saudi Arabia: On 15 August 2012 at 11:08 am local time, the Shamoon virus began destroying over 35,000 computer systems, rendering them inoperable. The virus used to target the Saudi government by causing destruction to the state owned national oil company Saudi Aramco. The attackers posted a pastie on PasteBin.com hours prior to the wiper logic bomb occurring, citing oppression and the Al-Saud regime as a reason behind the attack. The attack was well staged according to Chris Kubecka, a former security advisor to Saudi Aramco after the attack and group leader of security for Aramco Overseas. It was an unnamed Saudi Aramco employee on the Information Technology team which opened a malicious phishing email, allowing initial entry into the computer network around mid-2012. Kubecka also detailed in her Black Hat USA talk Saudi Aramco placed the majority of their security budget on the ICS control network, leaving the business network at risk for a major incident. The virus has been noted to have behavior differing from other malware attacks, due to the destructive nature and the cost of the attack and recovery. US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta called the attack a "Cyber Pearl Harbor". Shamoon can spread from an infected machine to other computers on the network. Once a system is infected, the virus continues to compile a list of files from specific locations on the system, upload them to the attacker, and erase them. Finally the virus overwrites the master boot record of the infected computer, making it unusable. The virus has been used for cyber warfare against the national oil companies Saudi Aramco and Qatar's RasGas. Saudi Aramco announced the attack on their Facebook page and went offline again until a company statement was issued on 25 August 2012. The statement falsely reported normal business was resumed on 25 August 2012. However a Middle Eastern journalist leaked photographs taken on 1 September 2012 showing kilometers of petrol trucks unable to be loaded due to backed business systems still inoperable. On 29 August 2012 the same attackers behind Shamoon posted another pastie on PasteBin.com, taunting Saudi Aramco with proof they still retained access to the company network. The post contained the username and password on security and network equipment and the new password for the CEO Khalid Al- Falih The attackers also referenced a portion of the Shamoon malware as further proof in the pastie. According to Kubecka, in order to restore operations. Saudi Aramco used its large private fleet of aircraft and available funds to purchase much of the world's hard drives, driving the price up. New hard drives were required as quickly as possible so oil prices were not affected by speculation.

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The statement falsely reported normal business was resumed on 25 August 2012. However a Middle Eastern journalist leaked photographs taken on 1 September 2012 showing kilometers of petrol trucks unable to be loaded due to backed business systems still inoperable. On 29 August 2012 the same attackers behind Shamoon posted another pastie on PasteBin.com, taunting Saudi Aramco with proof they still retained access to the company network. The post contained the username and password on security and network equipment and the new password for the CEO Khalid Al- Falih The attackers also referenced a portion of the Shamoon malware as further proof in the pastie. According to Kubecka, in order to restore operations. Saudi Aramco used its large private fleet of aircraft and available funds to purchase much of the world's hard drives, driving the price up. New hard drives were required as quickly as possible so oil prices were not affected by speculation. By 1 September 2012 gasoline resources were dwindling for the public of Saudi Arabia 17 days after the 15 August attack. RasGas was also affected by a different variant, crippling them in a similar manner. Qatar: In March 2018 American Republican fundraiser Elliott Broidy filed a lawsuit against Qatar, alleging that Qatar's government stole and leaked his emails in order to discredit him because he was viewed "as an impediment to their plan to improve the country's standing in Washington." In May 2018, the lawsuit named Mohammed bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, brother of the Emir of Qatar, and his associate Ahmed Al-Rumaihi, as allegedly orchestrating Qatar's cyber warfare campaign against Broidy. Further litigation revealed that the same cybercriminals who targeted Broidy had targeted as many as 1,200 other individuals, some of whom are also "well-known enemies of Qatar" such as senior officials of the U.A.E., Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. While these hackers almost always obscured their location, some of their activity was traced to a telecommunication network in Qatar. United Arab Emirates: The United Arab Emirates has launched several cyber-attacks in the past targeting dissidents. Ahmed Mansoor, an Emirati citizen, was jailed for sharing his thoughts on Facebook and Twitter. He was given the code name Egret under the state-led covert project called Raven, which spied on top political opponents, dissidents, and journalists. Project Raven deployed a secret hacking tool called Karma, to spy without requiring the target to engage with any web links. In September 2021, three of the former American intelligence officers, Marc Baier, Ryan Adams, and Daniel Gericke, admitted to assisting the UAE in hacking crimes by providing them with advanced technology and violating US laws. Under a three-year deferred prosecution agreement with the Justice Department, the three defendants also agreed to pay nearly $1.7 million in fines to evade prison sentences. The court documents revealed that the Emirates hacked into the computers and mobile phones of dissidents, activists, and journalists. They also attempted to break into the systems of the US and rest of the world. North America: United States: Cyberwarfare in the United States is a part of the American military strategy of proactive cyber defence and the use of cyberwarfare as a platform for attack. The new United States military strategy makes explicit that a cyberattack is casus belli just as a traditional act of war. U.S. government security expert Richard A. Clarke, in his book Cyber War (May 2010), had defined "cyberwarfare" as "actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption.": 6  The Economist describes cyberspace as "the fifth domain of warfare," and William J. Lynn, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, states that "as a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace as a new domain in warfare . . . [which] has become just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space." When Russia was still a part of the Soviet Union in 1982, a portion of a Trans-Siberia pipeline within its territory exploded, allegedly due to a Trojan Horse computer malware implanted in the pirated Canadian software by the Central Intelligence Agency. The malware caused the SCADA system running the pipeline to malfunction. The "Farewell Dossier" provided information on this attack, and wrote that compromised computer chips would become a part of Soviet military equipment, flawed turbines would be placed in the gas pipeline, and defective plans would disrupt the output of chemical plants and a tractor factory. This caused the "most monumental nonnuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space." However, the Soviet Union did not blame the United States for the attack. In 2009, president Barack Obama declared America's digital infrastructure to be a "strategic national asset," and in May 2010 the Pentagon set up its new U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), headed by General Keith B. Alexander, director of the National Security Agency (NSA), to defend American military networks and attack other countries' systems. The EU has set up ENISA (European Union Agency for Network and Information Security) which is headed by Prof. Udo Helmbrecht and there are now further plans to significantly expand ENISA's capabilities. The United Kingdom has also set up a cyber-security and "operations centre" based in Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the British equivalent of the NSA. In the U.S. however, Cyber Command is only set up to protect the military, whereas the government and corporate infrastructures are primarily the responsibility respectively of the Department of Homeland Security and private companies. On 19 June 2010, United States Senator Joe Lieberman (I-CT) introduced a bill called "Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010", which he co-wrote with Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) and Senator Thomas Carper (D-DE). If signed into law, this controversial bill, which the American media dubbed the "Kill switch bill", would grant the president emergency powers over parts of the Internet. However, all three co-authors of the bill issued a statement that instead, the bill "[narrowed] existing broad presidential authority to take over telecommunications networks". In August 2010, the U.S. for the first time warned publicly about the Chinese military's use of civilian computer experts in clandestine cyber attacks aimed at American companies and government agencies. The Pentagon also pointed to an alleged China-based computer spying network dubbed GhostNet which was revealed in a 2009 research report. On 6 October 2011, it was announced that Creech AFB's drone and Predator fleet's command and control data stream had been keylogged, resisting all attempts to reverse the exploit, for the past two weeks. The Air Force issued a statement that the virus had "posed no threat to our operational mission". On 21 November 2011, it was widely reported in the U.S. media that a hacker had destroyed a water pump at the Curran-Gardner Township Public Water District in Illinois. However, it later turned out that this information was not only false, but had been inappropriately leaked from the Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center. In June 2012 the New York Times reported that president Obama had ordered the cyber attack on Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities. In August 2012, USA Today reported that the US conducted cyberattacks for tactical advantage in Afghanistan. According to a 2013 Foreign Policy magazine article, NSA's Tailored Access Operations (TAO) unit "has successfully penetrated Chinese computer and telecommunications systems for almost 15 years, generating some of the best and most reliable intelligence information about what is going on inside the People's Republic of China." In 2014, Barack Obama ordered an intensification of cyberwarfare against North Korea's missile program for sabotaging test launches in their opening seconds. On 24 November 2014, Sony Pictures Entertainment hack was a release of confidential data belonging to Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE). In 2016 President Barack Obama authorized the planting of cyber weapons in Russian infrastructure in the final weeks of his presidency in response to Moscow's interference in the 2016 presidential election. On 29 December 2016 United States imposed the most extensive sanctions against Russia since the Cold War, expelling 35 Russian diplomats from the United States. Economic sanctions are the most frequently used the foreign policy instruments by the United States today Thus, it is not surprising to see that economic sanctions are also used as counter policies against cyberattacks. According to Onder (2021), economic sanctions are also information gathering mechanisms for the sanctioning states about the capabilities of the sanctioned states. In March 2017, WikiLeaks published more than 8,000 documents on the CIA. The confidential documents, codenamed Vault 7 and dated from 2013 to 2016, include details on CIA's software capabilities, such as the ability to compromise cars, smart TVs, web browsers (including Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Mozilla Firefox, and Opera Software ASA), and the operating systems of most smartphones (including Apple's iOS and Google's Android), as well as other operating systems such as Microsoft Windows, macOS, and Linux. In June 2019, the New York Times reported that American hackers from the United States Cyber Command planted malware potentially capable of disrupting the Russian electrical grid.

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According to Onder (2021), economic sanctions are also information gathering mechanisms for the sanctioning states about the capabilities of the sanctioned states. In March 2017, WikiLeaks published more than 8,000 documents on the CIA. The confidential documents, codenamed Vault 7 and dated from 2013 to 2016, include details on CIA's software capabilities, such as the ability to compromise cars, smart TVs, web browsers (including Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Mozilla Firefox, and Opera Software ASA), and the operating systems of most smartphones (including Apple's iOS and Google's Android), as well as other operating systems such as Microsoft Windows, macOS, and Linux. In June 2019, the New York Times reported that American hackers from the United States Cyber Command planted malware potentially capable of disrupting the Russian electrical grid. The United States topped the world in terms of cyberwarfare intent and capability, according to Harvard University's Belfer Center Cyber 2022 Power Index, above China, Russia, the United Kingdom and Australia. In June 2023, the National Security Agency and Apple were accused by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) of compromising thousands of iPhones, including those of diplomats from China, Israel, NATO members, and Syria. Kaspersky Lab said many of its senior staff and managers were also hit by the ongoing attack, which it first suspected in early 2023. The oldest traces of infiltration date back to 2019. Kaspersky Lab said it had not shared the findings with Russian authorities until the FSB announcement. Cyber mercenary: A cyber mercenary is a non-state actor that carries out cyber attacks for Nation states for hire. State actors can use the cyber mercenaries as a front to try and distance themselves from the attack with plausible deniability. Cyberpeace: The rise of cyber as a warfighting domain has led to efforts to determine how cyberspace can be used to foster peace. For example, the German civil rights panel FIfF runs a campaign for cyberpeace − for the control of cyberweapons and surveillance technology and against the militarization of cyberspace and the development and stockpiling of offensive exploits and malware. Measures for cyberpeace include policymakers developing new rules and norms for warfare, individuals and organizations building new tools and secure infrastructures, promoting open source, the establishment of cyber security centers, auditing of critical infrastructure cybersecurity, obligations to disclose vulnerabilities, disarmament, defensive security strategies, decentralization, education and widely applying relevant tools and infrastructures, encryption and other cyberdefenses. The topics of cyber peacekeeping and cyber peacemaking have also been studied by researchers, as a way to restore and strengthen peace in the aftermath of both cyber and traditional warfare. Cyber counterintelligence: Cyber counter-intelligence are measures to identify, penetrate, or neutralize foreign operations that use cyber means as the primary tradecraft methodology, as well as foreign intelligence service collection efforts that use traditional methods to gauge cyber capabilities and intentions. On 7 April 2009, The Pentagon announced they spent more than $100 million in the last six months responding to and repairing damage from cyber attacks and other computer network problems. On 1 April 2009, U.S. lawmakers pushed for the appointment of a White House cyber security "czar" to dramatically escalate U.S. defenses against cyber attacks, crafting proposals that would empower the government to set and enforce security standards for private industry for the first time. On 9 February 2009, the White House announced that it will conduct a review of the country's cyber security to ensure that the Federal government of the United States cyber security initiatives are appropriately integrated, resourced and coordinated with the United States Congress and the private sector. In the wake of the 2007 cyberwar waged against Estonia, NATO established the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD CoE) in Tallinn, Estonia, in order to enhance the organization's cyber defence capability. The center was formally established on 14 May 2008, and it received full accreditation by NATO and attained the status of International Military Organization on 28 October 2008. Since Estonia has led international efforts to fight cybercrime, the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation says it will permanently base a computer crime expert in Estonia in 2009 to help fight international threats against computer systems. In 2015, the Department of Defense released an updated cyber strategy memorandum detailing the present and future tactics deployed in the service of defense against cyberwarfare. In this memorandum, three cybermissions are laid out. The first cybermission seeks to arm and maintain existing capabilities in the area of cyberspace, the second cybermission focuses on prevention of cyberwarfare, and the third cybermission includes strategies for retaliation and preemption (as distinguished from prevention). One of the hardest issues in cyber counterintelligence is the problem of cyber attribution. Unlike conventional warfare, figuring out who is behind an attack can be very difficult. Doubts about existence: In October 2011 the Journal of Strategic Studies, a leading journal in that field, published an article by Thomas Rid, "Cyber War Will Not Take Place" which argued that all politically motivated cyber attacks are merely sophisticated versions of sabotage, espionage, or subversion – and that it is unlikely that cyber war will occur in the future. Legal perspective: NIST, a cybersecurity framework, was published in 2014 in the US. The Tallinn Manual, published in 2013, is an academic, non-binding study on how international law, in particular the jus ad bellum and international humanitarian law, apply to cyber conflicts and cyber warfare. It was written at the invitation of the Tallinn-based NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence by an international group of approximately twenty experts between 2009 and 2012. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (members of which include China and Russia) defines cyberwar to include dissemination of information "harmful to the spiritual, moral and cultural spheres of other states". In September 2011, these countries proposed to the UN Secretary General a document called "International code of conduct for information security". In contrast, the United approach focuses on physical and economic damage and injury, putting political concerns under freedom of speech. This difference of opinion has led to reluctance in the West to pursue global cyber arms control agreements. However, American General Keith B. Alexander did endorse talks with Russia over a proposal to limit military attacks in cyberspace. In June 2013, Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin agreed to install a secure Cyberwar-Hotline providing "a direct secure voice communications line between the US cybersecurity coordinator and the Russian deputy secretary of the security council, should there be a need to directly manage a crisis situation arising from an ICT security incident" (White House quote). A Ukrainian international law scholar, Alexander Merezhko, has developed a project called the International Convention on Prohibition of Cyberwar in Internet. According to this project, cyberwar is defined as the use of Internet and related technological means by one state against the political, economic, technological and information sovereignty and independence of another state. Professor Merezhko's project suggests that the Internet ought to remain free from warfare tactics and be treated as an international landmark. He states that the Internet (cyberspace) is a "common heritage of mankind". On the February 2017 RSA Conference Microsoft president Brad Smith suggested global rules – a "Digital Geneva Convention" – for cyber attacks that "ban the nation-state hacking of all the civilian aspects of our economic and political infrastructures". He also stated that an independent organization could investigate and publicly disclose evidence that attributes nation-state attacks to specific countries. Furthermore, he said that the technology sector should collectively and neutrally work together to protect Internet users and pledge to remain neutral in conflict and not aid governments in offensive activity and to adopt a coordinated disclosure process for software and hardware vulnerabilities. A fact-binding body has also been proposed to regulate cyber operations. In popular culture: In films: Independence Day (1996) Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines (2003) Live Free or Die Hard (2007) Terminator Genisys (2015) Snowden (2016) Terminator: Dark Fate (2019) Documentaries Hacking the Infrastructure: Cyber Warfare (2016) by Viceland Cyber War Threat (2015) Darknet, Hacker, Cyberwar (2017) Zero Days (2016) The Perfect Weapon (2020) In television: "Cancelled", an episode of the animated sitcom South Park Series 2 of COBRA, a British thriller series, revolves around a sustained campaign of cyberwar against the United Kingdom and the British government's response to it. See also: References: Further reading: Andress, Jason. Winterfeld, Steve. (2011). Cyber Warfare: Techniques, Tactics and Tools for Security Practitioners. Syngress. ISBN 1-59749-637-5 Bodmer, Kilger, Carpenter, & Jones (2012). Reverse Deception: Organized Cyber Threat Counter-Exploitation. New York: McGraw-Hill Osborne Media. ISBN 0071772499, "ISBN 978-0071772495" Brenner, S. (2009). Cyber Threats: The Emerging Fault Lines of the Nation State. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-538501-2 Carr, Jeffrey. (2010). Inside Cyber Warfare: Mapping the Cyber Underworld. O'Reilly. ISBN 978-0-596-80215-8 Conti, Gregory. Raymond, David. (2017).

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Cyberwarfare

(2011). Cyber Warfare: Techniques, Tactics and Tools for Security Practitioners. Syngress. ISBN 1-59749-637-5 Bodmer, Kilger, Carpenter, & Jones (2012). Reverse Deception: Organized Cyber Threat Counter-Exploitation. New York: McGraw-Hill Osborne Media. ISBN 0071772499, "ISBN 978-0071772495" Brenner, S. (2009). Cyber Threats: The Emerging Fault Lines of the Nation State. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-538501-2 Carr, Jeffrey. (2010). Inside Cyber Warfare: Mapping the Cyber Underworld. O'Reilly. ISBN 978-0-596-80215-8 Conti, Gregory. Raymond, David. (2017). On Cyber: Towards an Operational Art for Cyber Conflict. Kopidion Press. ISBN 978-0692911563 Cordesman, Anthony H.; Cordesman, Justin G. (2002). Cyber-threats, Information Warfare, and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Defending the U.S. Homeland. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-275-97423-7. Costigan, Sean S.; Perry, Jake (2012). Cyberspaces and global affairs. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate. ISBN 9781409427544. Fritsch, Lothar & Fischer-Hübner, Simone (2019). Implications of Privacy & Security Research for the Upcoming Battlefield of Things. Journal of Information Warfare, 17(4), 72–87. Gaycken, Sandro. (2012). Cyberwar – Das Wettrüsten hat längst begonnen. Goldmann/Randomhouse. ISBN 978-3442157105 Geers, Kenneth. (2011). Strategic Cyber Security. NATO Cyber Centre. Strategic Cyber Security, ISBN 978-9949-9040-7-5, 169 pages Halpern, Sue, "The Drums of Cyberwar" (review of Andy Greenberg, Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin's Most Dangerous Hackers, Doubleday, 2019, 348 pp.), The New York Review of Books, vol. LXVI, no. 20 (19 December 2019), pp. 14, 16, 20. Harris, Shane (2014). @War: The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex. Eamon Dolan/Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. ISBN 978-0544251793. Hunt, Edward (2012). "US Government Computer Penetration Programs and the Implications for Cyberwar". IEEE Annals of the History of Computing. 34 (3): 4–21. doi:10.1109/mahc.2011.82. S2CID 16367311. Janczewski, Lech; Colarik, Andrew M. (2007). Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism. Idea Group Inc (IGI). ISBN 978-1-59140-992-2. Rid, Thomas (2012). "Cyber War Will Not Take Place". Journal of Strategic Studies. 35 (1): 5–32. doi:10.1080/01402390.2011.608939. S2CID 153828543. Woltag, Johann-Christoph: 'Cyber Warfare' in Rüdiger Wolfrum (Ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2012). External links: Media related to Cyberwarfare at Wikimedia Commons The Information Age at Wikibooks

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Cyberweapon

Characteristics: A cyberweapon is usually sponsored or employed by a state or non-state actor, meets an objective that would otherwise require espionage or the use of force, and is employed against specific targets. A cyberweapon performs an action that would normally require a soldier or spy, and which would be considered either illegal or an act of war if performed directly by a human agent of the sponsor during peacetime. Legal issues include violating the privacy of the target and the sovereignty of its host nation. Example of such actions are surveillance, data theft and electronic or physical destruction. While a cyberweapon almost certainly results in either direct or indirect financial damages to the target group, direct financial gains for the sponsor are not a primary objective of this class of agent. Often cyberweapons are associated with causing physical or functional harm to the system which it attacks, despite being software. However, there is no consensus on what officially constitutes a cyberweapon. Unlike malware used by script kiddies to organize botnets, where the ownership, physical location, and normal role of the machines attacked is largely irrelevant, cyberweapons show high selectivity in either or both of their employment and their operation. Before the attack, cyberweapons usually identify the target using different methods. Likewise, malware employed by fraudsters for the theft of personal or financial information demonstrates lower selectivity and wider distribution. Cyberweapons are dangerous for multiple reasons. They are typically difficult to track or defend against due to their lack of physical components. Their anonymity allows them to hide in systems undetected until their attack is unleashed. Many of these attacks exploit "zero days" (vulnerabilities in software that companies have zero days to fix). They are also significantly cheaper to produce than cyber defenses to protect against them. Oftentimes, cyberweapons from one force are obtained by an opposing force and are then repurposed to be used against the original force, as can be seen with the cyberweapons WannaCry and NotPetya. While the term cyber weapon is frequently used by the press, some articles avoid it, instead using terms such as "internet weapon", "hack", or "virus". Mainstream researchers debate the requirements of the term while still referring to the employment of the agent as a "weapon", and the software development community in particular uses the term more rarely. Examples: The following malware agents generally meet the criteria above, have been formally referred to in this manner by industry security experts, or have been described this way in government or military statements: Duqu Flame (malware) Great Cannon Mirai (malware) Stuxnet Wiper (malware) Pegasus (spyware) History: Stuxnet was among the first and one of the most influential cyberweapons. In 2010, it was launched by the United States and Israel to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. Stuxnet is considered to be the first major cyberweapon. Stuxnet was also the first time a nation used a cyberweapon to attack another nation. Following the Stuxnet attacks, Iran used cyberweapons to target top American financial institutions, including the New York Stock Exchange. Stuxnet was subsequently followed by Duqu in 2011 and Flame in 2012. Flame's complexity was unmatched at the time. It used vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows to spread. It specifically targeted Iranian oil terminals. In 2017 data breaches showed that supposedly secure hacking tools used by government agencies can be obtained − and sometimes exposed − by third parties. Furthermore, it was reported that after losing control of such tools the government appears to leave "exploits open to be re-used by scammers, criminals, or anyone else − for any purpose". Claudio Guarnieri, a technologist from Amnesty International states: "what we learn from the disclosures and leaks of the last months is that unknown vulnerabilities are maintained secret even after they've been clearly lost, and that is plain irresponsible and unacceptable". Also in that year WikiLeaks released the Vault 7 documents series that contain details of CIA exploits and tools with Julian Assange stating that they are working to "disarm" them before publication. Disarmament of cyber weapons may come in the form of contacting respective software vendors with information of vulnerabilities in their products as well as potential help with or autonomous development (for open source software) of patches. The exploitation of hacking tools by third parties has particularly affected the United States National Security Agency (NSA). In 2016, information about NSA hacking tools was captured by a Chinese hacking group, ATP3, that allowed them to reverse engineer their own version of the tool. It was subsequently used against European and Asian nations, though the United States was not targeted. Later that year, an anonymous group called the "Shadow Brokers" leaked what are widely believed to be NSA tools online. These two groups are not known to be affiliated, and ATP3 had access to the tools at least a year before the Shadow Brokers leak. The leaked tools were developed by the Equation Group, a cyberwarfare group with suspected ties to the NSA. Among the tools leaked by the Shadow Brokers was EternalBlue, which the NSA had used to exploit bugs in Microsoft Windows. This prompted Microsoft to issue updates to guard against the tool. When the Shadow Brokers publicly released EternalBlue, it was quickly used by North Korean and Russian hackers, who formed it into the ransomware WannaCry and NotPetya, respectively. NotPetya, which was initially launched in Ukraine but subsequently spread around the world, encrypted hard drives and forced users to pay a ransom fee for their data, despite never actually giving the data back. In September 2018, the United States Department of Defense officially confirmed that the United States uses cyberweapons to advance national interests. Potential Regulations: While there has been no full regulation of cyberweapons, possible systems of regulation have been proposed. One system would have cyberweapons, when not being used by a state, subject to criminal law of the country and, when being used by a state, subject to international laws on warfare. Most proposed systems rely on international law and enforcement to stop the inappropriate use of cyberweaponry. Considering the novelty of the weapons, there has also been discussion about how previously existing laws, not designed with cyberweapons in mind, apply to them. See also: Cyber-arms industry Cyberattack Cyberwarfare Exploit (computer security) List of cyber warfare forces Proactive cyber defence Zero-day (computing) References: External links: Prashant Mali, Jan 2018 Defining Cyber Weapon in Context of Technology and Law Stefano Mele, Jun 2013, Cyber-Weapons: Legal and Strategic Aspects (version 2.0) Stefano Mele, 30 September 2010, Cyberwarfare and its damaging effects on citizens Michael Riley and Ashlee Vance, 20 July 2011, Cyber Weapons: The New Arms Race

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Deep operation

History: Before deep battle: The Russian Empire had kept pace with its enemies and allies and performed well in its major conflicts up to the 19th century. However, despite some notable victories in the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) and in various Russo-Turkish Wars, defeats in the Crimean War (1853–1856), Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), the First World War (1914–1918), and the Polish-Soviet War (1918-1921) highlighted the weaknesses in Russian and Soviet military training, organization, and methodology . After the Russian Revolution of 1917, the new Bolshevik regime sought to establish an entirely new military system that reflected the Bolshevik revolutionary spirit. The new Red Army (founded in 1918) combined the old and new methods. It still relied on the country's enormous manpower reserves; however, the Soviet program to develop heavy industry, which began in 1929, also raised the technical standards of Soviet arms industries to the level of other European nations. Once that had been achieved, the Soviets turned their attention to solving the problem of military operational mobility. Primary advocates of the development included Alexander Svechin (1878–1938), Mikhail Frunze (1885–1925), and Mikhail Tukhachevsky (1893–1937). They promoted the development of military scientific societies and identified groups of talented officers. Many of these officers entered the Soviet Military Academy during Tukhachevsky's tenure as its commandant in 1921–1922. Others came later, particularly Nikolai Varfolomeev (1890–1939) and Vladimir Triandafillov (1894–1931), who made significant contributions to the use of technology in deep offensive operations. Roots of deep battle: In the aftermath of the wars with Japan as well as experiences gained during the Russian Civil War several senior Soviet Commanders called for a unified military doctrine. The most prominent was Mikhail Frunze. The call prompted opposition by Leon Trotsky. Frunze's position eventually found favour with the officer elements that had experienced the poor command and control of Soviet forces in the conflict with Poland during the Polish–Soviet War. That turn of events prompted Trotsky's replacement by Frunze in January 1925. The nature of this new doctrine was to be political. The Soviets were to fuse the military with the Bolshevik ideal, which would define the nature of war for the Soviet Union. The Soviets believed their most likely enemy would be the capitalist states of the west they had to defend themselves against before and that such a conflict was unavoidable. The nature of the war raised four major questions: Would the next war be won in one decisive campaign or would it be a long struggle of attrition? Should the Red Army be primarily offensive or defensive? Would the nature of battle be fluid or static? Would mechanized or infantry forces be more important? The discussion evolved into debate between those, like Alexander Svechin, who advocated a strategy of attrition, and others, like Tukhachevsky, who thought that a strategy of decisive destruction of the enemy forces was needed. The latter opinion was motivated in part by the condition of the Soviet Union's economy: the country was still not industrialized and thus was economically too weak to fight a long war of attrition. By 1928 Tukhachevsky's ideas had changed: he considered that given the nature and lessons of World War I, the next major war would almost certainly be one of attrition. He determined, however, that the vast size of the Soviet Union ensured that some mobility was still possible. Svechin accepted that and allowed for the first offensives to be fast and fluid; but ultimately he decided that it would come down to a war of position and attrition. That would require a strong economy and a loyal and politically-motivated population to outlast the enemy. The doctrine pursued by the Soviets was offensively oriented. Tukhachevsky's neglect of defense pushed the Red Army toward the decisive battle and cult of the offensive mentality, which along with other events, caused enormous problems in 1941. Unlike Tukhachevsky, Svechin determined the next war could be won only by attrition, not by a single or several decisive battles. Svechin also argued that a theory of alternating defensive and offensive action was needed. Within that framework, Svechin also recognised the theoretical distinction of operational art that lay between tactics and strategy. In his opinion the role of the operation was to group and direct tactical battles toward a series of simultaneous operational objectives along a wide frontage, either directly or indirectly, in order to achieve the stavka's ultimate strategic target(s). This became the blueprint for Soviet deep battle. In 1929, Vladimir Triandafillov and Tukhachevsky formed a partnership to create a coherent system of principles from the concept formed by Svechin. Tukhachevsky was to elaborate the principles of the tactical and operational phases of deep battle. In response to his efforts and in acceptance of the methodology, the Red Army produced the Provisional Instructions for Organizing the Deep Battle manual in 1933. This was the first time that "deep battle" was mentioned in official Red Army literature. Principles: Doctrine: Deep battle encompassed manoeuvre by multiple Soviet Army front-size formations simultaneously. It was not meant to deliver a victory in a single operation; instead, multiple operations, which might be conducted in parallel or successively, would induce a catastrophic failure in the enemy's defensive system. Each operation served to divert enemy attention and keep the defender guessing about where the main effort and the main objective lay. In doing so, it prevented the enemy from dispatching powerful mobile reserves to the area. The army could then overrun vast regions before the defender could recover. The diversion operations also frustrated an opponent trying to conduct an elastic defence. The supporting operations had significant strategic objectives themselves and supporting units were to continue their offensive actions until they were unable to progress any further. However, they were still subordinated to the main/decisive strategic objective determined by the Stavka. Each of the operations along the front would have secondary strategic goals, and one of those operations would usually be aimed towards the primary objective. The strategic objective, or mission, was to secure the primary strategic target. The primary target usually consisted of a geographical objective and the destruction of a proportion of the enemy armed forces. Usually the strategic missions of each operation were carried out by a Soviet front. The front itself usually had several shock armies attached to it, which were to converge on the target and encircle or assault it. The means of securing it was the job of the division and its tactical components, which Soviet deep battle termed the tactical mission. Terminology, force allocation and mission: The concept of deep battle was not just offensive. The theory took into account all forms of warfare and decided both the offensive and defensive should be studied and incorporated into deep battle. The defensive phase of deep battle involved identifying crucial strategic targets and securing them against attack from all directions. As with the offensive methods of deep battle, the target area would be identified and dissected into operational and tactical zones. In defence, the tactical zones, forward of the objective would be fortified with artillery and infantry forces. The outer and forwardmost defences would be heavily mined, making a very strong static defence position. The tactical zones would have several defence lines, one after the other, usually 12 kilometres from the main objective. In the zone 1–3 km from the main objective, shock forces, which contained the bulk of the Soviet combat formations, would be positioned. The goal of the defence in depth concept was to blunt the elite enemy forces, which would be first to breach the Soviet lines, several times, causing them to exhaust themselves. Once the enemy had become bogged down in Soviet defences, the operational reserves came into play. Being positioned behind the tactical zones, the fresh mobile forces consisting of mechanized infantry, foot infantry, armored forces, and powerful tactical air support would engage the worn down enemy in a counter-offensive and either destroy it by attacking its flank or drive it out of the Soviet tactical zone and into enemyheld territory as far as possible. Tukhachevsky's legacy: There are three standard doctrines about the military that help understand deep battle, as adopted by the US Army and the US Marine Corps: 1. Tactic The lowest level is tactical, an aspect of individual skill and organization size. 2. Strategy The highest level, an aspect of theater operation and the leadership of organization and of a government. 3. Operational Operational is the bridge between tactics and strategy. According to Colonel McPadden (US Army), the most precious legacy of Tukhachevsky is his concepts about all operations theory including the "operational art". Tukhachevsky is the first who used 'operational' as a systematic concept. According to McPadden, the main skill of a military commander is dependent on Tukhachevsky's theory, which is the ability to integrate tactics and strategy. This involves the capability of a commander on "the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles." Isserson; the factor of depth: Georgii Samoilovich Isserson (1898–1976) was a prolific writer on military tactics and operations.

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3. Operational Operational is the bridge between tactics and strategy. According to Colonel McPadden (US Army), the most precious legacy of Tukhachevsky is his concepts about all operations theory including the "operational art". Tukhachevsky is the first who used 'operational' as a systematic concept. According to McPadden, the main skill of a military commander is dependent on Tukhachevsky's theory, which is the ability to integrate tactics and strategy. This involves the capability of a commander on "the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles." Isserson; the factor of depth: Georgii Samoilovich Isserson (1898–1976) was a prolific writer on military tactics and operations. Among his most important works on operational art were The Evolution of Operational Art (1932 and 1937) and Fundamentals of the Deep Operation (1933). The latter work remains classified to this day. Isserson concentrated on depth and the role it played in operations and strategy. According to his view, strategy had moved on from Napoleonic times and the strategy of a single point (the decisive battle) and the Moltke era of linear strategy. The continuous front that developed in the First World War would not allow the flanking moves of the pre-1914 period. Isserson argued that the front had become devoid of open flanks and military art faced a challenge to develop new methods to break through a deeply echeloned defence. To this end he wrote that "we are at the dawn of a new epoch in military art, and must move from a linear strategy to a deep strategy." Isserson calculated that the Red Army's attack echelon must be 100 to 120 km deep. He estimated that enemy tactical defences, in about two lines, would be shallow in the first and stretch back 56 km. The second line would be formed behind and have 12–15 km of depth. Beyond that lay the operational depth, which would be larger and more densely-occupied than the first by embracing the railheads and supply stations to a depth of 50–60 km. There, the main enemy forces were concentrated. The third zone, beyond the operational depth was known as the strategic depth and served as the vital link between the country's manpower reservoirs and industrial power-supply sites and the area of military operations. In this zone lay the headquarters of the strategic forces, which included the army group level. Isserson much like Varfolomeev divided his shock armies, one for the task of breaking the enemy forward (or frontline defences) and the other to exploit the breakthrough and occupy the operational zone, while destroying enemy reserve concentrations as they attempted to counter the assault. The exploitation phase would be carried out by combined arms teams of mechanized airborne infantry and motorised forces. The breadth of the attack zone was an important factor in Soviet calculations. Isserson asserted an attack over a frontage of 70–80 km would be best. Three or four rifle corps would make a breakthrough along a front of 30 km. The breakthrough zone (only under favourable conditions) might be expanded to 48–50 km with another rifle corps. Under these conditions, a rifle corps would attack along a 10–12 km front, with each division in the corps' first echelon allocated a 6 kilometre frontage. A fifth supporting rifle corps would make diversionary attacks along the flanks of the main thrust to tie down counterresponses, confuse the enemy as to the area of the main thrust and delay its reserves from arriving. Tactical deep battle: Once the strategic objectives had been determined and operational preparation completed the Red Army would be tasked with assaulting the tactical zones of the enemy front in order to break through into its rear, allowing operationally mobile forces to invade the undefended enemy-held area to the rear. The Soviet rifle corps was essential to the tactical method. As the largest tactical unit it formed the central component of the tactical deep battle. The rifle corps usually formed part of a larger operational effort and would be reinforced with tanks, artillery and other weapons. Several corps would take part in the attack, some with defensive missions and others with offensive assignments. They were known as holding and shock groups, respectively. The order of battle was to encompass three echelons. The first echelon, acting as the first layer of forces, would come into immediate contact with opposing forces to break the tactical zones. The follow on echelons would support the breakthrough and the reserve would exploit it operationally. The holding group would be positioned on either flank of the combat zone to tie down enemy reinforcements via means of diversion attacks or blocking defence. Nevertheless, despite the diversion being a primary mission, the limited forces conducting holding actions would be assigned geographical objectives. Once the main thrust had defeated the enemy's main defence, the tactical holding forces were to merge with the main body of forces conducting the operations. In defence, the same principles would apply. The holding group would be positioned forward of the main defensive lines. The job of the holding echelons in that event was to weaken or halt the main enemy forces. If that was achieved, the enemy would be weakened sufficiently to be caught and impaled on the main defence lines. If that failed, and the enemy succeeded in sweeping aside the holding forces and breaching several of the main defence lines, mobile operational reserves, including tanks and assault aviation, would be committed. These forces would be allocated to holding and shock groups alike and were often positioned behind the main defences to engage the battle worn enemy thrust. The forces used to carry out the tactical assignments varied from 1933 to 1943. The number of shock armies, rifle corps, and divisions (mechanized and infantry) given to a strategic front constantly changed. By 1943, the year that the Red Army began to practice deep battle properly, the order of battle for each tactical unit under the command of a front were: Rifle army 3 rifle corps 7–12 rifle divisions 4 artillery regiments One field artillery regiment One anti-tank gun regiment anti-aircraft artillery regiment One mortar regiment One signal regiment One communication battalion One telegraph company One aviation communication troop Stavka operational forces 1–2 artillery divisions 3 artillery regiments 3 tank destroyer regiments 3–4 tank or self-propelled gun brigades 10 separate tank or self-propelled gun regiments 2 anti-aircraft divisions 1–2 mechanized corps These forces numbered some 80,000–130,000 men, 1,500–2,000 guns and mortars, 48-497 rocket launchers, and 30-226 self-propelled guns. Rifle corps 3 Rifle divisions One artillery regiment One signals battalion One sapper battalion Rifle division 3 Rifle regiments One artillery regiment One anti-tank battalion One sapper battalion One signal company One reconnaissance company The division numbered some 9,380 men (10,670 in a guards rifle division), 44 field guns, 160 mortars and 48 anti-tank guns. Deep operation: Soviet analysts recognised that it was not enough to break through the enemy tactical zone. Although that was the crucial first step, tactical deep battle offered no solution about how a force could sustain an advance beyond it and into the operational and strategic depths of an enemy front. The success of tactical action counted for little in an operational defensive zone that extended dozens of kilometres and in which the enemy held large reserves. Such enemy concentrations could prevent the exploitation of a tactical breakthrough and threaten the operational advance. That was demonstrated during the First World War, when initial breakthroughs were rendered useless by the exhaustion during the tactical effort, limited mobility, and a slow-paced advance and enemy reinforcements. The attacker was further unable to influence the fighting beyond the immediate battlefield because of the limited range, speed and reliability in the existing weapons. The attacker was often unable to exploit tactical success in even the most favourable circumstances, as his infantry could not push into the breach rapidly enough. Enemy reinforcements could then seal off the break in their lines. By the early 1930s, however, new weapons had come into circulation. Improvements in the speed and range of offensive weaponry matched those of its defensive counterparts. New tanks, aircraft and motorised vehicles were entering service in large numbers to form divisions and corps of air fleets, motorised and mechanized divisions. Those trends prompted the Red Army strategists to attempt to solve the problem of maintaining operational tempo with new technology. The concept was termed "deep operations" (glubokaya operatsiya), which emerged in 1936 and was placed within the context of deep battle in the 1936 Field Regulations. The deep operation was geared toward operations at the Army and or Front level and was larger, in terms of the forces engaged, than deep battle's tactical component, which used units not larger than corps size. The forces used in the operational phase were much larger. The Red Army proposed to use the efforts of air forces, airborne forces and ground forces to launch a "simultaneous blow throughout the entire depth of the enemy's operational defense" to delay its strongest forces positioned in the area of operations by defeating them in detail; to surround and destroy those units at the front (the tactical zone, by occupying the operational depth to its rear); and to continue the offensive into the defender's operational and strategic depth.

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Deep operation

The concept was termed "deep operations" (glubokaya operatsiya), which emerged in 1936 and was placed within the context of deep battle in the 1936 Field Regulations. The deep operation was geared toward operations at the Army and or Front level and was larger, in terms of the forces engaged, than deep battle's tactical component, which used units not larger than corps size. The forces used in the operational phase were much larger. The Red Army proposed to use the efforts of air forces, airborne forces and ground forces to launch a "simultaneous blow throughout the entire depth of the enemy's operational defense" to delay its strongest forces positioned in the area of operations by defeating them in detail; to surround and destroy those units at the front (the tactical zone, by occupying the operational depth to its rear); and to continue the offensive into the defender's operational and strategic depth. The central composition of the deep operation was the shock army, which acted either in co-operation with others or independently as part of a strategic front operation. Several shock armies would be subordinated to a strategic front. Triandafilov created this layout of force allocation for deep operations in his Character of Operations of Modern Armies, which retained its utility throughout the 1930s. Triandafilov assigned the shock army some 12–18 rifle divisions, in four to five corps. These units were supplemented with 16–20 artillery regiments and 8–12 tank battalions. By the time of his death in 1931, Triandafilov had submitted various strength proposals which included the assignment of aviation units to the front unit. This consisted of two or three aviation brigades of bomber aircraft and six to eight squadrons of fighter aircraft. Triandafilov's successor, Nikolai Efimovich Varfolomeev, was less concerned with developing the quantitative indices of deep battle but rather with the mechanics of the shock army's mission. Varfolomeev termed this as "launching an uninterrupted, deep and shattering blow" along the main axis of advance. Varfolomeev believed the shock army needed both firepower and mobility to destroy both enemy tactical defences, operational reserves and seize geographical targets or positions in harmony with other operationally independent, but strategically collaborative, offensives. Varfolomeev and composition of deep operations: Varfolomeev noted that deep and echeloned tactical and operational defences should call for equal or similar counter responses from the attacker. That allowed the attacker to deliver a deep blow at the concentrating point. The new technological advances would allow the echelon forces to advance the penetration of the enemy tactical zones quickly, denying the enemy defender the time to establish a new defensive line and bring up reinforcements to seal the breach. Varfolomeev sought to organise the shock armies into two echelon formations. The first was to be the tactical breakthrough echelon, composed of several rifle corps. These would be backed up by a series of second line divisions from the reserves to sustain the tempo of advance and to maintain momentum pressure upon the enemy. These forces would strike 15–20 km into enemy tactical defences to engage his forward and reserve tactical forces. Once they had been defeated, the Red Army Front was ready to release its fresh, and uncommitted operational forces to pass through the conquered tactical zone and exploit the enemy operational zones. The first echelon used raw firepower and mass to break the layered enemy defences, but the second echelon operational reserves combined firepower and mobility, which was lacking in the former. Operational units were heavily formed from mechanized, motorised and Cavalry forces. The forces would now seek to envelope the enemy tactical forces as yet-unengaged along the flanks of the breakthrough point. Other units would press on to occupy the operational zones and meet the enemy operational reserves as they moved through his rear to establish a new defence's line. While in the operational rear of the enemy, communications, and supply depots were prime targets for the Soviet forces. With his tactical zones isolated from reinforcements, reinforcements blocked from relieving them, the front would be indefensible. Such a method would instigate operational paralysis for the defender. In official literature Varfolomeev stated that the forces pursuing the enemy operational depth must advance between 20–25 km a day. Forces operating against the flanks of enemy tactical forces must advance as much as 40–45 km a day to prevent the enemy from escaping. According to a report by the Staff of the Urals Military district in 1936, a shock army would number 12 rifle divisions; a mechanized corps (from its Stavka operational reserve) and an independent mechanized brigade; three Cavalry divisions; a light-bomber brigade, two brigades of assault aviation, two squadrons of fighter and reconnaissance aircraft; six tank battalions; five artillery regiments; plus two heavy artillery battalions; two battalions of Chemical troops. The shock army would number some 300,000 men, 100,000 horses, 1,668 smaller-calibre and 1,550 medium and heavy calibre guns, 722 aircraft and 2,853 tanks. Deep operations engagement: Having organized the operational forces and secured a tactical breakthrough into the operational rear of the enemy front, several issues took shape about how the Red Army would engage the main operational enemy forces. Attacking in echelon formation denied the Soviet forces the chance to bring all their units to bear. That might lead to the defeat of a shock army against a superior enemy force. To avoid such a situation, echelon forces were to strike at the flanks of enemy concentrations for the first few days of the assault, while the main mobile forces caught up. The aim of this was to avoid a head-on clash and tie down enemy forces from reaching the tactical zones. The expected scope of the operation could be 150–200 km. If the attack proved successful at pinning the enemy in place and defeating its forces in battle, mechanized forces would break the flank and surround the enemy with infantry to consolidate the success. As the defender withdrew, mechanized cavalry and motorised forces would harass, cut off, and destroy his retreating columns which would also be assaulted by powerful aviation forces. The pursuit would be pushed as far into the enemy depth as possible until exhaustion set in. With the tactical zones defeated, and the enemy operational forces either destroyed or incapable of further defence, the Soviet forces could push into the strategic depth. Logistics: The development of Soviet operational logistics, the complex of rear service roles, missions, procedures, and resources intended to sustain military operations by army and front groupings) clearly occupied a prominent place within overall Soviet efforts to formulate or adapt warfighting approaches to new conditions. As Soviet military theorists and planners have long emphasised, logistic theory and practice are shaped by the same historical and technological developments that influence Soviet warfighting approaches at every level. In turn, they play a major role in defining directions and parameters for Soviet methods. Soviet theory recognised the need for logistic theory and practice that were consistent with other components of strategy, operational art, and tactics. Despite the many changes in the political, economic, and military environment and the quickening pace of technological change, logistical doctrine was an important feature of Soviet thinking. Intended outcomes; differences with other methodologies: During the 1930s, the resurgence of the German military in the era of the Third Reich saw German innovations in the tactical arena. The methodology used by the Germans in the Second World War was named by others blitzkrieg. There is a common misconception that blitzkrieg, which is not accepted as a coherent military doctrine, was similar to Soviet deep operations. The only similarities of the two doctrines were an emphasis on mobile warfare and offensive posture. Both similarities differentiated the doctrines from French and British doctrine of the time. Blitzkrieg emphasized the importance of a single strike on a Schwerpunkt (focal point) as a means of rapidly defeating an enemy; deep battle emphasized the need for multiple breakthrough points and reserves to exploit the breach quickly. The difference in doctrine can be explained by the strategic circumstances for the Soviet Union and Germany at the time. Germany had a smaller population but a better-trained army, and the Soviet Union had a larger population but a less-trained army. As a result, Blitzkrieg emphasized narrow front attacks in which quality could be decisive, but deep battle emphasized wider front attacks in which quantity could be used effectively. In principle, the Red Army would seek to destroy the enemy's operational reserves and its operational depth and occupy as much of his strategic depth as possible. Within the Soviet concept of deep operations was the principle of strangulation if the situation demanded it, instead of physically encircling the enemy and destroying him immediately. Triandafillov stated in 1929: The outcome in modern war will be attained not through the physical destruction of the opponent but rather through a succession of developing manoeuvres that will aim at inducing him to see his ability to comply further with his operational goals. The effect of this mental state leads to operational shock or system paralysis, and ultimately to the disintegration of his operational system. The success of the operational manoeuvre is attained through all-arms combat (combined arms) at the tactical level, and by combining a frontal holding force with a mobile column to penetrate the opponent's depth at the operational level. The element of depth is a dominant factor in the conduct of deep operations both in the offensive and defensive. The theory moved away from the Clausewitzian principle of battlefield destruction and the annihilation of enemy field forces, which obsessed the Germans. Instead deep operations stressed the ability to create conditions whereby the enemy loses the will to mount an operational defence.

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Deep operation

Triandafillov stated in 1929: The outcome in modern war will be attained not through the physical destruction of the opponent but rather through a succession of developing manoeuvres that will aim at inducing him to see his ability to comply further with his operational goals. The effect of this mental state leads to operational shock or system paralysis, and ultimately to the disintegration of his operational system. The success of the operational manoeuvre is attained through all-arms combat (combined arms) at the tactical level, and by combining a frontal holding force with a mobile column to penetrate the opponent's depth at the operational level. The element of depth is a dominant factor in the conduct of deep operations both in the offensive and defensive. The theory moved away from the Clausewitzian principle of battlefield destruction and the annihilation of enemy field forces, which obsessed the Germans. Instead deep operations stressed the ability to create conditions whereby the enemy loses the will to mount an operational defence. An example of the theory in practice is Operation Uranus in 1942. The Red Army in Stalingrad was allocated enough forces to hold the German Sixth Army in the city, which caused attrition that would force it to weaken its flanks to secure its centre. Meanwhile, reserves were built up, which then struck at the weak flanks. The Soviets broke through the German flanks, exploited the operational depth, and closed the pocket at Kalach-na-Donu. The operation left the German tactical zones largely intact, but by occupying the German operational depth and preventing their retreat the German Army forces were isolated. Instead of reducing the pocket immediately, the Soviets tightened their grip on the enemy forces and preferred to let the enemy weaken and surrender, starve him completely, or a combination of those methods before they delivered a final destructive assault. In that way, the Soviet tactical and operational method opted to besiege the enemy into submission, rather than destroy it physically and immediately. In that sense, the Soviet deep battle, in the words of one historian, "was radically different to the nebulous 'blitzkrieg'" method but produced similar, if more strategically-impressive, results. Impact of purges: Deep operations were first formally expressed as a concept in the Red Army's "Field Regulations" of 1929 and more fully developed in the 1935 Instructions on Deep Battle. The concept was finally codified by the army in 1936 in the Provisional Field Regulations of 1936. By 1937, the Soviet Union had the largest mechanized army in the world and a sophisticated operational system to operate it. However, the death of Triandafillov in an airplane crash and the Great Purge of 1937 to 1939 removed many of the leading officers of the Red Army, including Svechin, Varfolomeev and Tukhachevsky. The purge of the Soviet military liquidated the generation of officers that had given the Red Army the deep battle strategy, operations and tactics and who also had rebuilt the Soviet armed forces. Along with those personalities, their ideas were also dispensed with. Some 35,000 personnel, about 50 percent of the officer corps, three out of five marshals; 13 out of 15 army group commanders; 57 out of 85 corps commanders; 110 out of 195 division commanders; 220 out of 406 brigade commanders were executed, imprisoned or discharged. Stalin thus destroyed the cream of the personnel with operational and tactical competence in the Red Army. Other sources state that 60 out of 67 corps commanders, 221 out of 397 brigade commanders, 79 percent of regimental commanders, 88 percent of regimental chiefs of staff, and 87 percent of all battalion commanders were excised from the army by various means. Soviet sources admitted in 1988: In 1937–1938 ...all commanders of the armed forces, members of the military councils, and chiefs of the political departments of the military districts, the majority of the chiefs of the central administrations of the People's Commissariat of Defense, all corps commanders, almost all division and brigade commanders, about one-third of the regimental commissars, many teachers of higher or middle military and military-political schools were judged and destroyed. The deep operation concept was thrown out of Soviet military strategy, as it was associated with the denounced figures that created it. World War II: The abandonment of deep operations had a huge impact on Soviet military capability. Fully engaging in the Second World War (after the Winter War) after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Soviets struggled to relearn the concept. The surprise German invasion (Operation Barbarossa) subjected the Red Army to six months of disasters. The Red Army was shattered during the first two months. It then faced the task of surviving, reviving and maturing into an instrument that could compete with the Wehrmacht and achieve victory. Soviet military analysts and historians divide the war into three periods. The Red Army was primarily on the strategic defensive during the first period of war (22 June 1941 – 19 November 1942). By late 1942, the Soviets had recovered sufficiently to put their concept into practice. The second period of war (19 November 1942 – 31 December 1943), which commenced with the Soviet strategic counteroffensive at Stalingrad, was a transitional period marked by alternating attempts by both sides to secure strategic advantage. After that, deep battle was used to devastating effect, allowing the Red Army to destroy hundreds of Axis divisions. After the Battle of Kursk, the Soviets had firmly secured the strategic initiative and advanced beyond the Dnepr River. The Red Army maintained the strategic initiative during the third and final period of war (1944–1945) and ultimately played the central role in the Allied victory in Europe. Moscow counteroffensive: Deep battle plan: Operation Barbarossa had inflicted a series of severe defeats on the Red Army. The German Army Group North was besieging Leningrad, the Army Group South was occupying most of Ukraine and threatening Rostov-on-Don, the key to the Caucasus, and Army Group Centre had launched Operation Typhoon and was closing in on Moscow. The Stavka halted the Northern and Southern Army Groups but was confronted with the German forces approaching the Soviet capital. The Soviet strategy was the defence of the capital and if possible, the defeat and destruction of Army Group Centre. By late November the German pincers either side of the capital had stalled. The Stavka decided to launch a counter offensive. The operational goals were to strike into the enemy operational rear and envelop or destroy the German armies spearheading the attack on Moscow. It was hoped a thrust deeper into the German rear would induce a collapse of Army Group Centre. Outcome: Soviet rifle forces penetrated German tactical defenses and pushed into the operational depths on foot at slow speed. They were, however, deficient in staying power. Soon, growing infantry casualties brought every advance to an abrupt end. Soviet cavalry corps reinforced by rifle and tank brigades also penetrated into the German operational rear. Once there and reinforced by airborne or air-landed forces, they ruled the countryside, forests, and swamps but were unable to drive the more mobile Germans from the main communications arteries and villages. At best, they could force limited German withdrawals but only if in concert with pressure from forces along the front. At worst, these mobile forces were themselves encircled, only to be destroyed or driven from the German rear area when summer arrived. No encirclements ensued, and German forces halted the Soviet advance at the Mius River defenses. South of Moscow, the Red Army penetrated into the rear of the Second Panzer Army and advanced 100 kilometers deep into the Kaluga region. During the second phase of the Moscow counter offensive in January 1942, the 11th, 2nd Guards, and 1st Guards Cavalry Corps penetrated deep into the German rear area in an attempt to encircle German Army Group Center. Despite the commitment into combat of the entire 4th Airborne Corps, the cavalry corps failed to link up and became encircled in the German rear area. The ambitious Soviet operation failed to achieve its ultimate strategic aim, due largely to the fragile nature of Soviet operational mobile forces. Rzhev–Vyazma offensive: Deep battle plan: The Stavka judged that these operations had failed because of the Red Army's lack of large, coherent, mechanized, and armored formations capable of performing sustained operational maneuver. To remedy the problem, in April 1942 the Soviets fielded new tank corps consisting of three tank brigades and one motorized rifle brigade, totaling 168 tanks each. The Stavka placed these corps at the disposal of army and front commanders for use as mobile groups operating in tandem with older cavalry corps, which by now had also received a new complement of armour. The Stavka employed these new tank corps in an offensive role for the first time in early 1942. During this time, the Germans launched Operation Kremlin, a deception campaign to mislead the Stavka into believing that the main German attack in the summer would be aimed at Moscow. The Stavka were convinced that the offensive would involve Army Group South as a southern pincer against the Central Front protecting Moscow. To preempt the German assault, the Red Army launched two offensive operations, the Rzhev–Vyazma strategic offensive operation against Army Group Centre, and the Kharkov offensive operation (known officially as the Barvenkovo-Lozovaia offensive) against Army Group South.

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Deep operation

The Stavka placed these corps at the disposal of army and front commanders for use as mobile groups operating in tandem with older cavalry corps, which by now had also received a new complement of armour. The Stavka employed these new tank corps in an offensive role for the first time in early 1942. During this time, the Germans launched Operation Kremlin, a deception campaign to mislead the Stavka into believing that the main German attack in the summer would be aimed at Moscow. The Stavka were convinced that the offensive would involve Army Group South as a southern pincer against the Central Front protecting Moscow. To preempt the German assault, the Red Army launched two offensive operations, the Rzhev–Vyazma strategic offensive operation against Army Group Centre, and the Kharkov offensive operation (known officially as the Barvenkovo-Lozovaia offensive) against Army Group South. Both were directly linked as a spoiling offensives to break up and exhaust German formations before they could launch Operation Blue. The Kharkov operation was designed to attack the northern flank of German forces around Kharkov, to seize bridgeheads across the Donets River north east of the city. A southern attack would be made from bridgeheads seized by the winter-counter offensive in 1941. The operation was to encircle the Fourth Panzer Army and German Sixth Army as they advanced towards the Dnepr river. The operation led to the Second Battle of Kharkov. The battlefield plan involved the Soviet South Western Front. The South Western Front was to attack out of bridgeheads across the Northern Donets River north and south of Kharkov. The Soviets intended to exploit with a cavalry corps (the 3rd Guards) in the north and two secretly formed and redeployed tank corps (the 21st and 23rd) and a cavalry corps (the 6th) in the south. Ultimately the two mobile groups were to link up west of Kharkov and entrap the German Sixth Army. Once this was achieved, a sustained offensive into the Ukraine would enable the recovery of industrial regions. Outcome: In fact, primarily due to Stalin's overriding his subordinates' suggestions, the Stavka fell for the German ruse. Instead of attacking the southern pincer of the suspected Moscow operation, they ran into heavy concentrations of German forces that were to strike southward to the Soviet oilfields in the Caucasus, the actual aim of Operation Blue. Although the offensive surprised the Wehrmacht, the Soviets mishandled their mobile forces. Soviet infantry penetrated German defences to the consternation of the German commanders, but the Soviets procrastinated and failed to commit the two tank corps for six days. The corps finally went into action on 17 May simultaneously with a massive surprise attack by First Panzer Army against the southern flank of the Soviet salient. Over the next two days, the two tank corps disengaged, retraced their path, and engaged the new threat. But it was too late. The German counterattack encircled and destroyed the better part of three Soviet armies, the two tank corps and two cavalry corps, totaling more than 250,000 men. The Kharkov debacle demonstrated to Stalin and Soviet planners that they not only had to create larger armoured units, but they also had to learn to employ them properly. Operation Uranus and Third Kharkov: Deep battle plan: The Battle of Stalingrad, by October 1942, was allowing the Soviets an ever tighter grip on the course of events. Soviet strategy was simple: elimination of the enemy field army and the collapse of Army Group South. In operational terms, by drawing the German Army into the city of Stalingrad, they denied them the chance to practice their greater experience in mobile warfare. The Red Army was able to force its enemy to fight in a limited area, hampered by the city landscape, unable to use its mobility or firepower as effectively as in the open country. The German Sixth Army was forced to endure severe losses, which forced the OKW to strip its flanks to secure its centre. This left its poorly equipped Axis allies to defend its centre of gravity—its operational depth. When Soviet intelligence had reason to believe the Axis front was at its weakest, it would strike at the flanks and encircle the German Army (Operation Uranus). The mission of the Red Army, then, was to create a formidable barrier between the cut off German army and any relief forces. The aim of the Soviets was to allow the German army to weaken in the winter conditions and inflict attrition on any attempt by the enemy to relieve the pocket. When it was judged the enemy had weakened sufficiently, a strong offensive would finish the enemy field army off. These siege tactics would remove enemy forces to their rear. Having practised the deep battle phase which would destroy the enemy tactical units (the enemy corps and divisions) as well as the operational instrument, in this case the Sixth Army itself, it would be ready to launch the deep operation, striking into the enemy depth on a south-west course to Rostov using Kharkov as a springboard. The occupation of the former would enable the Red Army to trap the majority of Army Group South in the Caucasus. The only escape route left, through the Kerch Peninsula and into Crimea, would be the next target. The operation would enable the Red Army to roll up the Germans' southern front, thereby achieving its strategic aim. The operation would be assisted by diversion operations in the central and northern sector to prevent the enemy from dispatching operational reserves to the threatened area in a timely fashion. Outcome: Operation Uranus, the tactical deep battle plan, worked. However, the General Staff's deep operation plan was compromised by Joseph Stalin himself. Stalin's impatience forced Stavka into offensive action before it was ready. Logistically the Soviets were not yet prepared and the diversion operations further north were not yet ready to go into action. Nevertheless, Stalin's orders stood. Forced into premature action, the Red Army was able to concentrate enough forces to create a narrow penetration toward Kharkov. However, it was logistically exhausted and fighting an enemy that was falling back on its rear areas. The lack of diversionary operations allowed the German Army to recognise the danger, concentrate powerful mobile forces, and dispatch sufficient reserves to Kharkov. With the Red Army's flanks exposed, the Germans easily pinched off the salient and destroyed many Soviet formations during the Third Battle of Kharkov. The concept of the deep operation had not yet been fully understood by Stalin. However, Stalin recognised his own error, and from this point onward, stood back from military decision-making for the most part. The defeat meant the deep operation would fail to realise its strategic aim. The Third Battle of Kharkov had demonstrated the importance of diversion, or Maskirovka operations. Such diversions and deception techniques became a hallmark of Soviet offensive operations for the rest of the war. Kursk: Deep battle plan: The Battle of Kursk combined both the defensive and offensive side of deep battle. The nature of Soviet operations in the summer, 1943 was to gain the initiative and to hold it indefinitely. This meant achieving permanent superiority in the balance of forces, in operational procedure and maintaining initiative on the battlefield. The Soviet plan for the defence of the city Kursk involved all three levels of warfare coherently fused together. Soviet strategy, the top end of military art, was concerned with gaining the strategic initiative which would then allow the Red Army to stage further military operations to liberate Soviet territory lost in 1941 and 1942. To do this, the Stavka decided to achieve the goal through defensive means. The bulge in the front line around Kursk made it an obvious and tempting target to the Wehrmacht. Allowing the Germans to strike first at the target area allowed the Red Army the opportunity to wear down German Army formations against pre-prepared positions, thereby shaping the force in field ratio heavily against the enemy. Once the initiative had been achieved and the enemy had been worn down, strategic reserves would be committed to finish off the remaining enemy force. The success of this strategy would allow the Red Army to pursue its enemy into the economically rich area of Ukraine and recover the industrial areas, such as Kiev, which had been lost in 1941. Moreover, Soviet strategists recognised that Ukraine offered the best route through which to reach Germany's allies, such as Romania, with its oilfields, vital to Axis military operations. The elimination of these allies or a successful advance to their borders would deny Germany military resources, or at least destabilise the Axis bloc in the Balkans. The operational method revolved around outmanoeuvring their opponents. The nature of the bulge meant the Red Army could build strong fortifications in depth along the German axis of advance. Two rifle divisions defended the first belt, and one defended the second. A first belt division would only defend an area of 8–15 kilometres wide and 5–6 kilometres in depth. Successive defence belts would slow German forces down and force them to conduct slow and attritional battles to break through into the operational depths. Slowing the operational tempo of the enemy would also allow the Soviet intelligence analysts to keep track of German formations and their direction of advance, enabling Soviet reserve formations to be accurately positioned to prevent German spearheads breaking through each of the three main defence belts.

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Deep operation

The elimination of these allies or a successful advance to their borders would deny Germany military resources, or at least destabilise the Axis bloc in the Balkans. The operational method revolved around outmanoeuvring their opponents. The nature of the bulge meant the Red Army could build strong fortifications in depth along the German axis of advance. Two rifle divisions defended the first belt, and one defended the second. A first belt division would only defend an area of 8–15 kilometres wide and 5–6 kilometres in depth. Successive defence belts would slow German forces down and force them to conduct slow and attritional battles to break through into the operational depths. Slowing the operational tempo of the enemy would also allow the Soviet intelligence analysts to keep track of German formations and their direction of advance, enabling Soviet reserve formations to be accurately positioned to prevent German spearheads breaking through each of the three main defence belts. Intelligence would also help when initiating their own offensives (Operation Kutuzov and Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev) once the Germans had been bogged down in Soviet defences. The overwhelming contingent of Soviet armour and mechanised divisions was given to the operational reserves for this purpose. The tactical level relied heavily on fortified and static defences composed of infantry and artillery. Anti-tank guns were mounted throughout the entire depth of the defences. Few tanks were committed to the tactical zones and the nature of the defences would have robbed them of mobility. Instead, only a small number of tanks and self-propelled artillery were used to give the defences some mobility. They were distributed in small groups to enable localised counterattacks. Such tactics slowed the Germans, forcing them to expend strength and munitions on combating the Soviet forward zones. The Soviets had counted on the Germans being stopped within the tactical zones. To ensure that this occurred, they distributed large numbers of anti-AFV (armoured fighting vehicle) and anti-personnel mines to the defences. Outcome: The Germans began their offensive, as predicted, on 5 July 1943, under the codename Operation Citadel. The Soviets succeeded in limiting them to a slow advance. In the north, the German 9th Army advanced south from Orel. The Germans failed to breach the main defence lines, stalling at the third belt. The German armies had been forced to commit their mobile reserves to the breakthrough. This allowed the Soviets to conduct the operational and offensive phase of their plan; Operation Kutuzov. Striking the 2nd Panzer Army, the Soviet's fresh operational forces, heavily mechanized, threatened to cut off the German 9th Army. Had they succeeded, nothing would have stood between the Red Army and the strategic depth of German Army Group Centre's front. However the Germans were able to stem the advance by committing their mobile reserves and organize a withdrawal. Still, the two German armies had been worn down, and the Soviet forces in the north had won the strategic initiative. In the south, the Soviet plan did not work as effectively and the contingency plan had to be put into effect. The German formations succeeded in penetrating all three Soviet defence belts. This denied the Soviets the opportunity to pin them down in the tactical defence belts and release their operational reserves to engage the enemy on favourable terms. Instead, operational forces for Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev that were intended for the southern counteroffensive, were ordered to at and near Prokhorovka. This led to the Battle of Prokhorovka. While the tactical deployment and operational plan had not worked as flawlessly as it had in the north, the strategic initiative had still been won. Other campaigns: With improved material means and tactical aptitude enabling complicated large-unit maneuvers, the following later campaigns were able to exhibit an improved application of the Deep operation doctrine: Dnieper–Carpathian Offensive Operation Bagration Second Jassy-Kishinev Offensive Vistula–Oder Offensive Cold War: Central Europe: The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies used their massive superiority in numbers and the idea of Deep Battle to intimidate NATO over the Inner German border. Some Western observers predicted that the Warsaw Pact could use a mixture of speed and surprise to overrun Western Europe in around 48 hours. While massive air strikes using enormous numbers of aircraft would devastate NATO infrastructure and reinforcements, VDV (airborne units), Spetsnaz ("special purpose troops", i.e. special forces) and naval infantry would clear the way for the torrent of tank and motor-rifle divisions that would soon cross the border. The forward units of these tank and motor rifle divisions would be given the task, rather unusually, of avoiding engagements with the enemy and simply to advancing as far and as fast as possible, therefore enabling a victory before any replacement aircraft and REFORGER units came to Europe from North America. Asia: Ever since the 1960s when the Sino-Soviet alliance came to an abrupt end, the Soviet High Command considered invading China by deep battle offensive operations, envisaging a rapid drive deep towards the latter's main industrial centers before they could have a chance to mount a credible defense or even stage a counterattack. However, the extremely vast numbers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and their knowledge of the terrain, coupled with their then-recent possession of nuclear weapons, made such a drive the Soviets were to execute extremely unlikely. Although both sides nearly went to war in three separate occasions in 1968, 1969 and 1979 respectively, the Soviets were rather hesitant to go to war and invade China, thanks to the fact that both possessed huge armed forces and nuclear weapons at their disposal. 21st century: In the spring of 1999 came the crisis in Kosovo and NATO’s Operation Allied Force as a result of R2P doctrine. The combat operations featured no land warfare, and therefore no front line can be said to have existed. The air war over Serbia was a "deep battle" as Air Force bombed strategic targets and fielded forces. Army Major General Robert H. Scales came to the conclusion that the US needed "strategic pre-emption", defined as the "use of airpower to delay the enemy long enough for early arriving ground forces to position themselves between the enemy and his initial operational objectives." Major proponents: Mikhail Tukhachevsky Vladimir Triandafillov Georgii Isserson Nikolai Efimovich Varfolomeev Georgy Zhukov See also: Operational art Tank Corps (Soviet) Mechanized Corps (Soviet) Blitzkrieg References: Citations: Bibliography: Glantz, David M., Col (rtd.) Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle, Frank Cass, London, 1991a. ISBN 0-7146-4077-8. Glantz, David M. (1991b). The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Maneuver: Spearhead of the Offensive (1. publ. ed.). London u.a.: Cass. ISBN 0-7146-3373-9. Grant, Rebecca (1 June 2001). "Deep Strife". Air & Space Forces Magazine. Habeck, Mary. Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939. Cornell University Press, 2003. ISBN 0-8014-4074-2 Harrison, Richard W. The Russian Way of War: Operational Art 1904–1940. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2001. ISBN 0-7006-1074-X Krause, Michael and Phillips, Cody. Historical Perspectives of Operational Art. Center of Military History, United States Army. 2006. ISBN 978-0-16-072564-7 Naveh, Shimon (1997). In Pursuit of Military Excellence; The Evolution of Operational Theory. London: Francass. ISBN 0-7146-4727-6. Simpkin, Richard. Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevsky. London; Washington: Brassey's Defence, 1987. ISBN 0-08-031193-8. Watt, Robert. Feeling the Full Force of a Four Point Offensive: Re-Interpreting The Red Army's 1944 Belorussian and L'vov-Przemyśl Operations. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. ISSN 1351-8046 External links: Blythe, Wilson C. Jr. “The Conduct of War: Reemergence of Russian Military Strength Warrants Study of Soviet Operational Theory in the Interwar Era”, in The Officer (Winter 2015), accessible online at: https://www.academia.edu/31966162/The_Conduct_of_War_Re_emergence_of_Russian_Military_Strength_Warrants_Study_of_Soviet_Operational_Theory_in_the_Interwar_Era The Evolution of Operational Art by Georgii Isseson, 1936 – PDF, available on United States Army Combined Arms Center's website "Georgii Isserson: Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II": Video on YouTube, a lecture by Dr. Richard Harrison, via the official channel of the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center

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Defeat in detail

Use: In military strategy and tactics, a recurring theme is that units are strengthened by proximity to supporting units. Nearby units can fire on an attacker's flank, lend indirect fire support such as artillery, or maneuver to counterattack. Defeat in detail is the tactic of exploiting failures of an enemy force to coordinate and support the various smaller units that make up the force. An overwhelming attack on one defending subunit minimizes casualties on the attacking side and can be repeated a number of times against the defending subunits until all are eliminated. An attacker can successfully conduct the tactic of defeat in detail by exploiting the absolute weaknesses or comparative disadvantages in the deployment or structure of defending troops, as well as advantages such as maneuvering speed that the defender cannot match. In an asymmetric support structure, A can support B, but unit B cannot support unit A. For example, during World War I, when horse cavalry was still in use to some extent, aircraft could support cavalry, but cavalry had little or no ability to support aircraft. Thus, if a unit is equally suited for use against cavalry and aircraft, using it to eliminate enemy aircraft would have benefits that would last well into future engagements against enemy cavalry units weakened by their lack of support. However, using it against enemy cavalry, while leaving the enemy aircraft intact for subsequent engagements, would bring benefits only during that specific engagement. Weaknesses of defenders: Dug-in units that are spread out over so wide a distance that the maximum effective range of their weapons is significantly shorter than the distance between units, which prevents those units from supporting the flanks of neighboring units. Defending units on opposite sides of physical barriers such as hills, forests or rivers (but see the "reverse slope defence", now rendered obsolete by crewed and uncrewed aircraft, for a historically attested deliberate tactic). Defending units whose artillery support is too far to the rear and so cannot effectively engage attackers. Defending units that have no effective communications with their command structure and so cannot request assistance. Enabling methods: The following methods can enable the attacker to defeat the enemy in detail: Attacking one unit faster than other defending units can move to counter-attack. Attacking faster than the defending intelligence, communications, command or control systems can respond (exploiting the OODA loop). Disabling or disrupting systems required for one defending unit to support another (as by attacking communications, command, or control systems with air strikes, artillery attacks, or radio jamming). Examples: Strategic campaigns: 1796–1797: Napoleon Bonaparte's first campaign in Italy during the French Revolution, in which the French army of 37,000 men defeated 52,000 Piedmontese and Habsburg troops by rapid advances, which prevented the two nations' armies from combining. 10–15 February 1814: the Six Days' Campaign was a final series of victories by the forces of Napoleon, as the Sixth Coalition armies closed in on Paris. 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Shenandoah Valley campaign, in which Jackson defeated three Union commands (a total of 60,000 men) with his own command (of 17,000 men), by fighting each of the enemy columns in turn while the Union commands were separated from each other by impassable terrain or a significant distance. 1912–1913: The Balkan League's victory over the Ottoman Empire in the First Balkan War. 1914: The Battle of Tannenberg and the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes, with the Germans exploiting the geography of the Masurian Lakes and the personal antipathy between the Russian commanders to defeat the Russian Second Army and later the Russian First Army. 1941: Operation Compass, when the British defeated an Italian force more than four times larger in North Africa by exploiting the fact that the Italian defenses could not support each other. Tactical examples: The Battle of Gaugamela, in which Alexander the Great used his Companion Cavalry to charge Darius III Gallic tribes tried and nearly succeeded in defeating Julius Caesar's army in detail at the Battle of the Sabis. In the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, an army of Germans under Arminius exterminated Legio XVII, Legio XVIII and Legio XIX, Roman legions under Publius Quinctilius Varus. The Battle of Sluys, a naval battle fought on 24 June 1340 between England and France. The Battle of Pavia (1525), during the Italian War of 1521-1526 The Battle of Pratapgarh in which Shivaji defeated the army of Afzal Khan The Battle of the Little Bighorn (1876), in which George Armstrong Custer essentially orchestrated his own defeat by dividing his regiment in four portions, allowing the Sioux and Cheyenne to annihilate half of the 7th Cavalry The Battle of Raate Road, in Finland (1940) The Battle of Savo Island, a naval battle fought on 8-9 August 1942 in which Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa of the Imperial Japanese Navy was able to defeat Allied naval forces in detail, with only light damage to his own. See also: Horatii Big Wing Strategy of the central position Battle of annihilation Swarming (military) Lanchester's laws Battle of Cold Harbor References: Bay, Austin (December 31, 2002). "Can the U.S. Handle both Korea and Iraq?". StrategyPage.

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Defence in depth

Strategy: A conventional defence strategy would concentrate all military resources at a front line, which, if breached by an attacker, would leave the remaining defenders in danger of being outflanked and surrounded and would leave supply lines, communications, and command vulnerable. Defence in depth requires that a defender deploy their resources, such as fortifications, field works and military units at and well behind the front line. Although attackers may find it easier to breach the more weakly defended front line, as they advance, they continue to meet resistance. As they penetrate deeper, their flanks become vulnerable, and, should the advance stall, they risk being enveloped. The defence in depth strategy is particularly effective against attackers who are able to concentrate their forces and attack a small number of places on an extended defensive line. Defenders that can fall back to a succession of prepared positions can extract a high price from the advancing enemy while themselves avoiding the danger of being overrun or outflanked. Delaying the enemy advance mitigates the attacker's advantage of surprise and allows time to move defending units to make a defence and to prepare a counter-attack. A well-planned defence in depth strategy will deploy forces in mutually supportive positions and in appropriate roles. For example, poorly trained troops may be deployed in static defences at the front line, whereas better trained and equipped troops form a mobile reserve. Successive layers of defence may use different technologies against various targets; for example, dragon's teeth might present a challenge for tanks but is easily circumvented by infantry, while another barrier of wire entanglements has the opposite effects on the respective forces. Defence in depth may allow a defender to maximise the defensive possibilities of natural terrain and other advantages. The disadvantages of defence in depth are that it may be unacceptable for a defender to plan to give ground to an attacker. This may be because vital military or economic resources are close to the front line or because yielding to an enemy is unacceptable for political or cultural reasons. In addition, the continuous retreats that are required by defence in depth require the defender to have a high degree of mobility in order to retreat successfully, and they assume that the defender's morale will recover from the retreat. Examples: A possible early example of this came at the Battle of Cannae in 216 BC, when Hannibal employed this manoeuvre in order to encircle and destroy eight Roman legions, but that is disputed by some historians. Edward Luttwak used the term to describe his theory of the defensive strategy employed by the Late Roman army in the 3rd and 4th centuries AD. Later examples of defence in depth might be European hill forts and the development of concentric castles. These castles utilized many layers, including ditches, outer walls, towers, inner walls, and a keep, with some layers like the outer ditch intended to only slow attackers and reduce their coordination. In those examples, the inner layers of defence can support the outer layers with projectile fire and an attacker must breach each line of defence in turn with the prospect of significant losses, and the defenders have the option of falling back to fight again. On a strategic level, defence in depth was employed by the Byzantine military. In the American Revolutionary War's Battle of Cowpens, the American forces were positioned in three lines which soaked up the shock of the British charge and inflicted heavy casualties before the Americans were able to overrun the British who, at this point, had lost their cohesion. More recent examples of defence in depth include the multiple lines of trenches of the First World War and the following Turkish War of Independence where the Turks stopped the advance of the Greeks towards Ankara. Also plans for the defence of Britain against a potential German invasion in the Second World War. During the Battle of Normandy, Wehrmacht forces utilized the bocage of the area, flooding of fields, and strategic placement of defences to create successive lines of defences to slow the attacking Allies in hopes that reinforcements would arrive. The Pacific Theatre also had many examples of defence in depth, with the Japanese inflicting heavy casualties on the Americans in the Battles of Tarawa, Saipan, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. The best modern example of a successful defence in depth is that of the Battle of Kursk. During the battle, the Red Army deliberately drew the Germans into an attritional battle in multiple, well-prepared defensive lines, before launching massive counter-attacks on either side of the 9th Army in the north and the 4th Panzer Army in the south. The initial German offensive never fully penetrated the Red Army lines. By contrast, the subsequent Red Army counter-offensive pushed the front line hundreds of miles westwards. Colonel Francis J. Kelly discussed the employment of defence in depth in Army Special Forces camps during the Vietnam War. Kelly, a former U.S. Army Special Forces commander and author of Vietnam Studies U.S. Army Special Forces 1961–1971, stated in his work that the austere Special Forces fighting camps were highly functional and easily defended. While untested, this was also the planned NATO strategy in Europe during the Cold War at the Fulda Gap. However, by the 1980s, West Germany eventually pressured NATO to abandon this orthodox doctrine as it would have entailed allowing the country to be overrun by Warsaw Pact forces before they would be finally stopped. Instead, NATO agreed to an alternative doctrine of "Forward defence," which was criticized for not only being militarily senseless that would have quickly forced NATO to resort to tactical nuclear weapons when Warsaw Pact broke through with their considerable conventional forces, but also that enemy considered the doctrine so provocative and potentially aggressive that striking first seemed a viable option as a result. Application to other fields: The concept of defence-in-depth (DiD) is also applied in the fields of life-threatening technologies where it is critical to avoid a disaster, or to save lives. The safety of nuclear reactors and radioactive waste repositories also fundamentally relies on multiple systems and redundant barriers. The principle of redundancy is essential to prevent the occurrence of dramatic failures and in case where a failure would develop to retard the progression of a potentially disastrous event and to give extra time for taking again the control of the failed system. Ultimately, if a failure cannot be avoided, DiD also contributes to mitigate the consequences and to attenuate the negative impacts of the failure. Defence-in-depth is required to guarantee the robustness of vital systems, e.g. in nuclear technologies and for aerospace systems where safety is critical. The DiD approach can be applied to any sensitive technology: submarines and naval systems, biotechnology, pharmaceutic industry, informatics, bank and financial systems, etc. In nature, the immune system of most evolved organisms also appeals to multiple lines of defence in case a pathogen would defeat the first line of defence of cells, tissues and organs. The robustness of the scientific method also relies on multiple lines of evidence and multiple lines of reasoning: strong claims require strong and multiple evidence. The repeatability and the reproducibility of experimental and calculations results are essential to guarantee their robustness and correctness. This associated with the scientific questioning and a constant interrogative attitude is at the core of the self-correcting process guiding the science. Academics from Oxford University's Future of Humanity Institute also applied the concept of defence in depth to designing strategies for the prevention of existential catastrophes, especially those involving human extinction. See also: Bandwagoning Culminating point Deep operation Defence in depth (non-military) Defense in depth (nuclear engineering) Defence-in-depth (Roman military) Hedgehog defence List of military tactics Loss of Strength Gradient Scorched earth Strategic depth == References ==

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Defense ministry

Current ministries by country: Historical: Department of Defence (1901–21) (Australia) Department of Defence (1921–39) (Australia) Department of Defence Co-ordination (Australia, 1939–1942) Department of Defence Production (Australia, 1951–1958) Department of Defence Support (Australia, 1982–1984) Ministry of Defence (Artsakh) (1995–2023) Ministry of Defence (Czechoslovakia) (1918–1992) Ministry of National Defence (East Germany) (1956–1990) Ministry of Defence (Republika Srpska) (1992–2005) Ministry of Defense (Soviet Union) (1953–1992) Ministry of Defence (1947–1964) (United Kingdom) Lists: List of current defence ministers See also: Chief of defence Commander-in-chief War cabinet Secretariat of National Defense (Mexico) Ministry of War Defence diplomacy, refers to the pursuit of foreign policy objectives through the peaceful employment of defence resources and capabilities == References ==

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Defensive fighting position

Terminology: Tobruk type positions are named after the system of defensive positions constructed, initially, by the Italian Army at Tobruk, Libya. After Tobruk fell to the Allies in January 1941, the existing positions were modified and significantly expanded by the Australian Army which, along with other Allied forces, reused them in the Siege of Tobruk. A foxhole is one type of defensive strategic position. It is a "small pit used for cover, usually for one or two personnel, and so constructed that the occupants can effectively fire from it". It is known more commonly within United States Army slang as a "fighting position" or as a "ranger grave". It is known as a "fighting hole" in the United States Marine Corps, a "gun-pit" in Australian Army terminology, and a "fighting pit" in the New Zealand Army. In British and Canadian military argot it equates to a range of terms including slit trench, or fire trench (a trench deep enough for a soldier to stand in), a sangar (sandbagged fire position above ground) or shell scrape (a shallow depression that affords protection in the prone position), or simply—but less accurately—as a "trench". During the American Civil War the term "rifle pit" was recognized by both U.S. Army and Confederate Army forces. A protected emplacement or concealed post in which one or several machine guns are set up is known in U.S. English as a machine gun nest. History: During the fighting in North Africa (1942–43), U.S. forces employed the shell scrape. This was a very shallow excavation allowing one soldier to lie horizontally while shielding his body from nearby shell bursts and small arms fire. The shell scrape soon proved inadequate in this role, as the few inches of dirt above the soldier's body could often be penetrated by bullets or shell fragments. It also exposed the user to assault by enemy tanks, which could crush a soldier inside a shallow shell scrape by driving into it, then making a simple half-turn. After the Battle of Kasserine Pass (early 1943), U.S. troops increasingly adopted the modern foxhole, a vertical, bottle-shaped hole that allowed a soldier to stand and fight with head and shoulders exposed. The foxhole widened near the bottom to allow a soldier to crouch down while under intense artillery fire or tank attack. Foxholes could be enlarged to two-soldier fighting positions, as well as excavated with firing steps for crew-served weapons or sumps for water drainage or live enemy grenade disposal. Tobruks: The Germans used hardened fortifications in North Africa and later in other fortifications, such as the Atlantic Wall, that were in essence foxholes made from concrete. The Germans knew them officially as Ringstände; the Allies called them "Tobruks" because they had first encountered the structures during the fighting in Africa. Frequently, the Germans put a turret from an obsolete French or German tank on the foxhole. This gave the Tobruk enhanced firepower and the gunner protection from shrapnel and small arms. Modern designs: Modern militaries publish and distribute elaborate field manuals for the proper construction of DFPs in stages. Initially, a shallow "shell scrape" is dug, often called a ranger grave, which provides very limited protection. Each stage develops the fighting position, gradually increasing its effectiveness, while always maintaining functionality. In this way, a soldier can improve the position over time, while being able to stop at any time and use the position in a fight. Typically, a DFP is a pit or trench dug deep enough to stand in, with only the head exposed, and a small step at the bottom, called a fire step, that allows the soldier to crouch on to avoid fire and tank treads. The fire step usually slopes down into a deeper narrow slit called a grenade sump at the bottom to allow for live grenades to be kicked in to minimize damage from grenade fragments. When possible, DFPs are revetted with corrugated iron, star pickets and wire or local substitutes. Ideally, the revetting will also be dug in below ground level so as to minimise damage from fire and tank tracks. The revetting helps the DFP resist cave-in from near misses from artillery or mortars and tank tracks. Time permitting, DFPs can be enlarged to allow a machine gun crew and ammunition to be protected, as well as additional overhead cover via timbers. In training, DFPs are usually dug by hand or in some cases by mechanical trench diggers. On operations, explosives, especially shaped charges ("beehives"), may be used to increase the speed of development. Developing and maintaining DFPs is a constant and ongoing task for soldiers deployed in combat areas. For this reason, in some armies, infantry soldiers are referred to as "gravel technicians", as they spend so much time digging. Because of the large expenditure in effort and materials required to build a DFP, it is important to ensure that the DFP is correctly sited. In order to site the DFP, the officer in charge ("OIC") should view the ground from the same level that the intended user's weapons will be sighted from. Normally, the OIC will need to lie on his belly to obtain the required perspective. This ensures that the position will be able to cover the desired sector. See also: Pillbox (military) Sangar Spider hole Shell scrape Tett turret Trench warfare All-around defense/Perimeter defense Entrenching tool Notes: References: Westrate, Edwin V. (1944). Forward Observer. New York City: Stratford Press. External links: U.S. WWII Newsmap, "Foxholes are Life Savers", hosted by the UNT Libraries Digital Collections

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Demoralization (warfare)

Importance of morale: Morale is often perceived as a necessary precursor to success in international relations. Success most often goes to those who believe in their cause, as they more easily maintain a positive outlook that helps them work harder for it.: 88  High morale can directly contribute to "an economy of food, textiles, fuel, and other commodities, and to stimulate recruiting, employment in war industries, service in relief work, and the purchase of bonds".: 9  Writing in 1965, French philosopher and sociologist Jacques Ellul described the importance of morale in modern society by saying: The modern citizen is asked to participate in wars such as have never been seen before. All men must prepare for war, and for a dreadful type of war at that – dreadful because of its duration, the immensity of its operations, its tremendous losses, and the atrocity of the means employed. Moreover, participation in war is no longer limited to the duration of the war itself; there is the period of preparation for war, which becomes more and more intense and costly. Then there is the period in which to repair the ravages of war. People really live in a permanent atmosphere of war, and a superhuman war in every respect. Nowadays everybody is affected by war; everybody lives under its threat…The more demanded of man, the more powerful must be those motivations.: 142  Though variations are possible, the most common indicators of high morale are determination, enthusiasm, self-confidence, and a relative absence of criticism or complaint.: 8  While contributors to the level of morale are essentially endless, common examples consist of the level to which individuals identify with a nation or cause; have their basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter met; have confidence in the justness of their cause; have confidence in the ability of their cause to overcome obstacles; the means through which authorities instill discipline; and a sense of unity with other supporters of the cause.: 8 Psychological warfare: In an environment in which two belligerents compete, the chances of success greatly diminish if those whose actions are necessary lack faith in the justness of the cause or its chance for success or are discouraged, morally defeated, disconsolate, antagonistic, sullen, inattentive, or lazy.: 88  Demoralization can be used to lessen the chances of success for an opponent by fostering these attitudes, and it can generally be done in one of two ways: demoralization through objective conditions or demoralization through perception.: 8–9  Demoralization through objective conditions most commonly takes the form of a military defeat on the battlefield that has tangible consequences directly resulting in the indicators of a demoralized party, but it can also result from an adverse physical environment where basic needs go unmet.: 8  Demoralization through perception, however, is the most commonly referred to means of demoralization even though its operation and results like political warfare and psychological warfare in general, are the most difficult to gauge. That is the form of demoralization that is referred to as a tool of psychological warfare, and it is most commonly implemented through various forms of propaganda.: 8  Propaganda as a tool of demoralization refers to influencing opinion through significant symbols, through means such as rumors, stories, pictures, reports, and other means of social communication.: 9  Other means of political and psychological warfare, such as deception, disinformation, agents of influence, or forgeries, may also be used to destroy morale through psychological means so that belligerents start questioning the validity of their beliefs and actions.: xiii Means used: While demoralization may use propaganda, deception, disinformation, agents of influence, forgeries, or any other political warfare tool in isolation to accomplish its ends, a strategic demoralization effort will use more than one of these means as determined by its target and will not limit itself to the strict limits of attacking another belligerent's morale.: 161  A strategic demoralization campaign will navigate what Harold D. Lasswell describes as roughly three avenues of implementation: divert the hatred normally directed towards the enemy, thereby denying a unified outlet of frustration; sow seeds of self-doubt (classic demoralization); and provide a new focus of hatred and frustration.: 184  A strategic demoralization campaign should tailor its strategy to the specific target and situation.: 163–177 Denial of an enemy image: An important precursor to successful demoralization is an effort to deny the target the ability to project frustrations and hatred upon a common enemy.: 162  Such efforts will affect the tendency of the target's citizenry to project their discontent towards a common enemy identified by their government.: 162  As a result, frustrations will build until it is necessary to divert them elsewhere, and seeds of doubt are then sown in the minds of the citizenry who now question the capability of their leadership in identifying the most ominous threat.: 162–163  The operations of the German Gazette des Ardennes, published in occupied areas of France during World War I, are an example of this aspect of strategic demoralization.: 161–162  The Gazette des Ardennes regularly published propaganda articles that sought to deny the French of a German enemy image.: 162  Articles would carry such themes as: the Kaiser has always been known and respected for promoting peace, even among the British and French intellectual elite; the Kaiser is a kind and gentle family man; "all the stories about the German barbarities are poisonous lies"; German occupying soldiers are kind to and loved by French children; and Germans have an irrepressible love of music, religion, and morality that permeates wherever they are.: 162–163  The themes are illustrative of "defense by denial".: 163  Also possible to use is "defense by admission accompanied by justification".: 163  The technique would make the Gazette des Ardennes admit that a German atrocity occurred but then publish accounts that the event was exaggerated in earlier reports, that such events occurred in every army, and occurred least often in the German army.: 163  Articles that attempted to justify German unrestricted submarine warfare as an unavoidable consequence of the Allied blockade of Germany are also examples of defense by admission and justification.: 163 Sowing seeds of doubt and anxiety: Causing self-doubt or doubt in a cause is the simple definition most commonly ascribed to demoralization.: 189  It is one aspect of a successful strategic demoralization campaign but is the most pronounced and essential part.: 164  Lasswell stated, "the keynote in the preliminary spade work is the unceasing refrain: Your cause is hopeless. Your blood is spilt in vain.": 164  Propaganda can be an indispensable tool in fostering an environment of doubt and anxiety.: 89–90  Propaganda may be used to ensure the antagonist is the most feared party, give a feeling of nonworth to the target, exploit internal fissures inherent within the target group or use the element of surprise to show a target population that their leadership and cause are unable to protect them from the impending enemy threat.: 89–90  Many studies have been conducted that indicate fear is one of the most widespread psychological traits, and that trait can be manipulated for the purposes of demoralization if it can be expanded into anxiety.: 153  For anxiety to demoralize, it must result in a distancing of individuals or groups from their cause or leadership because they no longer believe them capable of offering a solution to the source of their anxiety.: 153  Real and conscious threats that normally inspire disquiet and fear can be made to cause anxiety and borderline neurosis through the use of such propaganda tools as fables and rumors.: 153–155  Using multiple tools of political warfare, such as deception, disinformation, agents of influence, or forgeries, can expedite the onset of anxiety by overwhelming the target with a constant onslaught of information that the current cause or leadership is incapable of relieving the anxiety now felt.: 153–155  That anxiety cannot be calmed through a rational explanation of facts and is exacerbated by such an approach.: 153–155  The newly-onset anxiety places mass groups of individuals on the border of neurosis and can make them feel conflicts inherent within society or their past.: 153–155  As a result of contradictions and threats, "man feels accused, guilty".: 155  The target will then begin their search for a cause that will provide a sense of righteousness.: 153–155  The pivotal moment of a successful demoralization campaign is when the target is doubt-ridden and anxious, the point at which individual members of a citizenry or group are detached from their current loyalty to their state or cause, and they are then able to be focused in another direction more suitable to the antagonist's needs.: 163 : 153–155  If not executed properly, the manufactured sense of anxiety can both backfire on antagonists and cause the subject to cling more closely to their original cause or government.

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Demoralization (warfare)

: 153–155  As a result of contradictions and threats, "man feels accused, guilty".: 155  The target will then begin their search for a cause that will provide a sense of righteousness.: 153–155  The pivotal moment of a successful demoralization campaign is when the target is doubt-ridden and anxious, the point at which individual members of a citizenry or group are detached from their current loyalty to their state or cause, and they are then able to be focused in another direction more suitable to the antagonist's needs.: 163 : 153–155  If not executed properly, the manufactured sense of anxiety can both backfire on antagonists and cause the subject to cling more closely to their original cause or government.: 153 Diverting frustrations and hatred to a new target: The most powerful strategy of demoralization is diversion, but it is a very difficult and multifaceted operation.: 163  Lasswell says, "To undermine the active hatred of the enemy for its present antagonist, his anger must be distracted to a new and independent object, beside which his present antagonist ceases to matter.": 163  Because it is such a distinct change, the diversion of hatred towards a new target is necessarily predicated upon the antagonist both diverting hatred away from themselves and fostering a level of anxiety that cannot be mitigated by their existing cause or leadership.: 163  Once antagonists meet the two precursors of demoralization, it is possible to "concentrate upon the particular object of animosity about which it is hoped to polarize the sentiment of the enemy".: 167  The diversion of hatred can be towards an ally, towards the enemy's government or governing class, or towards antistate sentiment to foster secession of minority nationalities if they exist.: 167–184  The attempt to exacerbate relations between allies is one method of diverting hatred from an enemy and was attempted by both the Allied and Central Powers in World War I.: 167–168  The Germans made efforts to dig up historical animosity between the French and British, using such themes as the British were just letting the French bleed for them and the British intended to stay on French soil, and they offered a German-French alliance against the British and to expand French colonial domain at the expense of the British Empire.: 167–168  The Allies tried to exacerbate the relationship between Austria-Hungary and Germany, using such themes as separate peace talks were being held with Austria-Hungary, Austria-Hungary had a plethora of food while Germans starved, Germans thought of Austrians as slaves, and the familiar promise of territorial expansion if Austria-Hungary abandoned their German alliance.: 168–169  The antagonist can also attempt to divert hatred and frustration upon the target's government or ruling class, the most widely attempted method.: 169  One technique of diverting such frustration is to convince a target that their government or leadership is committing unjust and immoral acts, which is especially effective if the antagonist can convince their target that their leadership has forced them to commit equally unjust and immoral acts out of trickery or desperation.: 189  If successfully implemented, the leadership of a cause can be made sufficiently troublesome to inspire revolution when there will be insufficient capacity to exercise active hatred towards the external enemy.: 169  Diverting frustration to one's own leadership is often the method most commonly seen in wartime propaganda, as the photographs below attest. With the implementation of modern warfare in World War I and all its associated stresses, "every belligerent took a hand in the perilous business of fomenting dissension and revolution abroad, reckless of the possible repercussions of a successful revolt".: 169  Examples from World War I included German forces providing revolutionary literature to Russian prisoners of war that were expected to return through exchange or release, French use of propaganda leaflets to demonstrate how unaffected by war the Kaiser and his family were, technical encouragement and amplification of national dissent, Wilsonian propaganda stressing peaceful settlement terms, British planting of stories attesting to underground German resistance movements and their subsequent oppression by the German government, propaganda deflecting war guilt, propaganda exposing or exaggerating the desired postwar peace terms, and the promotion of the belief that infidelity was rampant among soldiers and their families back home.: 169–173  The antagonist can attempt to divert frustration towards the growth of secessionist causes, which is possible in heterogeneous nations.: 173  Attempts are made to fan the flames of discontent one segment of the nation feels towards another.: 173  An example was the Congress of Oppressed Habsburg Nationalities in Rome in April 1918, all delegates signing a Declaration of Independence. Or actions were widely reported in US and European circles.: 175–178  Another successful example of this was the encouragement of Zionism as a means of securing Jewish support for World War I via the Balfour Declaration. The Central Powers likewise tried to encourage Ukrainian, Irish, Egyptian, North African, and Indian secessionist movements, but all efforts ultimately failed.: 175–178 Tactics: There are many tactics of pursuing a strategy of demoralization, the nature of the target and the environment at the time determining the best method to employ.: 164–167  Examples include: Insertions into neutral press: 178–184  Direct transmission (through publications or radio): 178–184  Books and pamphlets (such as J’accuse): 178–184  Forgeries, whether forged letters from home inspiring homesickness or forged government documents: 178–184  Tactical delivery systems (airplane or balloon drops, "trench mortars"): 178–184  Smuggling (use of printed propaganda for packing materials, camouflaging propaganda to appear as currency so it may be carried about freely): 178–184  Deception: 178–184  Disinformation: 178–184  Agents of influence: 178–184 Defense: Morale can be difficult to maintain, in large part by the diffuse nature of demoralization attacks, but a strong leadership can largely mitigate any such attacks against their group's morale.: 89–90  Morale will quickly deteriorate if members of the group perceive themselves as victims of injustice or indifference on part of their leadership, or they perceive their leadership as being acting ineptly, ignorantly, or for personal ambition.: 88  As noted by Angello Codevilla, the clearest indicators that morale can withstand a demoralization campaign are also hallmarks of a well-led organization, and can be explained through five main questions: Do the constituent parts of the group fear their own leadership more than the enemy? That can be either an authoritarian type of fear or a more democratic type of fear in which the members of a group fear contributing to the failure of their cause.: 89  Do the constituent parts of the group feel appreciated by their leadership? No human will work to their full potential if they do not feel appreciated, but those who feel appreciated will contribute remarkable amounts, including sacrifice of life.: 89  Do the constituent parts of the group feel their contributions are important, and others depend on their continued effort towards the cause? That is dependent on leadership engendering a hope of success if all members does their part, but excess attempts to inspire can invite cynicism.: 89  Do the constituent parts of the group have habits of loyalty and camaraderie? If so, high morale can be maintained in the most difficult circumstances out of a desire to avoid disappointing or endangering others.: 89  Do the constituent parts of the group have faith in their leaders and the chances of success? As Codevilla notes, "If the two disappear, soldiers tend to believe they have been sold out and throw away their weapons." Credibility is the bedrock of defense against demoralization, but unwelcome surprise is the greatest threat to morale.: 90 Examples: Chieu Hoi, a South Vietnamese campaign for defection from the Viet Cong. Operation Nifty Package, where the American military used loud music to encourage General Manuel Noriega to surrender. Tokyo Rose, a Japanese broadcaster who used a radio show to demoralize American soldiers in the Pacific. See also: References: External links: Der Spiegel on demoralization in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict Los Angeles Times on demoralization by air attacks

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Desert warfare

Properties and tactics: The barrenness of the desert makes the capture of key cities essential to ensure the ability to maintain control over important resources, primarily clean water, and being able to keep a military well supplied. As such, that makes sieges in conventional warfare more frequent, as the defender often prepares entrenched positions to protect the cities that supply them. Camouflage and cover: Many deserts have limited numbers of noticeable landmarks, which can make maneuvering through a desert difficult in terms of navigation and logistics. A lack of structures and objects can also make effective use of camouflage, cover, and concealment difficult. Mobility: Mobility is essential to a successful desert war, which explains the heavy use of armor in battles such as in the First and Second Battle of El Alamein during the North African campaign of World War II. It has been noted that mobility is so important in desert warfare that battles can sometimes begin to resemble naval engagements, since the actual possession of territory is less important than the positions of one's tanks (or ships). Unlike other types of terrain, which depend on roads, movement in deserts is often possible in all directions because of the wide open spaces. However, the resource-scarce desert environment means that availability of supplies can greatly constrict movement. Militaries often make use of cavalry to cross the large expanses of a harsh desert without increasing the exertion of the soldiers, who are already at a higher risk of dehydration because of the high temperatures during the day. There are many enemies to the desert fighter. They include aircraft and tanks, which can be extremely menacing to desert guerrillas because there is little way to equal such force. Additionally, there are few places to hide from such weapons in the desert environment since there are few obstructions. Another problem is the sand dunes, which can greatly affect mobility. With no firm and stable ground footing, it is easy to slide down or even get buried. Water scarcity: Lack of water and extreme heat can also cause complications in engaging in desert warfare. Military personnel consume much higher quantities of water in the desert from perspiration and so troop movements are often limited by water carrying capacity. The scarcity of water may lead to bases moving from one position to another to look for a water source. Harassing supply lines: In the context of guerilla warfare, the wide expanses of deserts can make it more difficult for large forces to defend their supply lines. Guerilla forces can use ambushes to their advantage and make their adversary deploy forces to protect railways or other infrastructure at great cost. That tactic was successfully used by T.E. Lawrence during the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. Health effects: Body temperature: In desert warfare, an individual's body temperature can reach unusual highs causing fever-like weakness and dehydration. Dehydration: An individual may have to face conditions of dehydration in desert warfare because of the lack of edible fluids and clean water. Fatigue: Fatigue and bodily stress caused by the heat can cause very serious discomfort. Glare: Sunlight can irritate eyesight or reduce visibility. Examples: Battles: Hajj caravan raid (924) Hajj caravan raid (1757) Battle of the Pyramids (1798) Battle of Omdurman (1898) Battle of El-Moungar (1903) Battle of Beersheba (1917) Battle of Gazala (1942) First Battle of El Alamein (1942) Second Battle of El Alamein (1942) Battle of Asal Uttar (1965) Battle of Longewala (1971) Wars: Muslim–Quraysh War (624–630) Saadian invasion of the Songhai Empire (1590–1599) Char Bouba war (1644–1674) French campaign in Egypt and Syria (1798–1801) Ottoman–Saudi War (1811–1818) War of the Pacific in the Atacama Desert (1879–1884) Anglo-Somali War (1900–1920) Middle Eastern theatre of World War I (1914–1918) Military operations in North Africa during World War I (1914–1918) Second Italo-Senussi War (1923–1932) Middle Eastern and North African theatres of World War II (1939–1945) Sand War (1963) Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 Six-Day War (1967) Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 Yom Kippur War (1973) Western Sahara War (1973–1991) Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) Chadian–Libyan War (1978–1987) Gulf War (1990–1991) Iraq War (2003–2011) 2011 Libyan civil war (2011) Tuareg rebellion (2012) War in Iraq (2013-2017) Current conflicts: Somali Civil War (1991–present) Insurgency in the Maghreb (2002–present) Syrian Civil War (2011–present) Mali War (2012–present) Nomadic conflict References: Further reading: Information site on Desert warfare, Iraq war Desert warfare: German experiences in WWII - Combined arms Research library

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Desertion

Desertion versus absence without leave: In the United States Army, United States Air Force, British Armed Forces, Australian Defence Force, New Zealand Defence Force, Singapore Armed Forces and Canadian Armed Forces, military personnel will become AWOL if absent from their post without a valid pass, liberty or leave. The United States Marine Corps, United States Navy, and United States Coast Guard generally refer to this as unauthorized absence. Personnel are dropped from their unit rolls after thirty days and then listed as deserters; however, as a matter of U.S. military law, desertion is not measured by time away from the unit, but rather: by leaving or remaining absent from their unit, organization, or place of duty, where there has been a determined intent to not return; if that intent is determined to be to avoid hazardous duty or shirk contractual obligation; if they enlist or accept an appointment in the same or another branch of service without disclosing the fact that they have not been properly separated from current service. People who are away for more than thirty days but return voluntarily or indicate a credible intent to return may still be considered AWOL. Those who are away for fewer than thirty days but can credibly be shown to have no intent to return (for example, by joining the armed forces of another country) may nevertheless be tried for desertion. On rare occasions, they may be tried for treason if enough evidence is found. There are similar concepts to desertion. Missing movement occurs when a member of the armed forces fails to arrive at the appointed time and place to deploy (or "move out") with their assigned unit, ship, or aircraft. In the United States Armed Forces, this is a violation of the Article 87 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The offense is similar to absence without leave but may draw more severe punishment. Failure to repair consists of missing a formation or failing to appear at an assigned place and time when so ordered. It is a lesser offense within Article 86 of the UCMJ. An additional duty status code — absent-unknown, or AUN — was established by the U.S. military in 2020 to prompt unit actions and police investigations during the first 48 hours that a service member is missing. By country: Australia: During the First World War, the Australian Government refused to allow members of the First Australian Imperial Force (AIF) to be executed for desertion, despite pressure from the British Government and military to do so. The AIF had the highest rate of soldiers going absent without leave of any of the national contingents in the British Expeditionary Force, and the proportion of soldiers who deserted was also higher than that of other forces on the Western Front in France. Austria: In 2011, Vienna decided to honour Austrian Wehrmacht deserters. On 24 October 2014, a Memorial for the Victims of Nazi Military Justice was inaugurated on Vienna's Ballhausplatz by Austria's President Heinz Fischer. The monument was created by German artist Olaf Nicolai and is located opposite the President's office and the Austrian Chancellery. The inscription on top of the three step sculpture features a poem by Scottish poet Ian Hamilton Finlay (1924–2006) with just two words: all alone. Colombia: In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Spanish: FARC) insurgency were highly affected by desertion during the armed conflict with the Military Forces of Colombia. The Colombian Ministry of Defense reported 19,504 deserters from the FARC between August 2002 and their collective demobilization in 2017, despite potentially severe punishment, including execution, for attempted desertion in the FARC. Organizational decline contributed to FARC's high desertion rate which peaked in the year 2008. A later stalemate between the FARC and government forces gave rise to the Colombian peace process. France: Many individuals who were conscripted by the French First Republic during the French Revolutionary Wars deserted. There were rough estimates to the number of individuals that deserted during the time of the Levée en masse, but due to many factors, like the inability to manage and keep track of all the armies or differentiating between men with similar names, the exact number is unclear. In 1800, the Minister of War (Carnot) reported that there were 175,000 deserters based on the number of individuals that sought the benefits following the amnesty put in place. From 1914 to 1918 between 600 and 650 French soldiers were executed for desertion. In 2013, a report for the French Ministry of Veteran Affairs recommended that they be pardoned. Conversely, France considered as highly praiseworthy the act of citizens of Alsace-Lorraine who during WWI deserted from the German army. After the war it was decided to award all such deserters the Escapees' Medal (French: Médaille des Évadés). Germany: During the First World War, only 18 Germans who deserted were executed. However, the Germans executed 15,000 men who deserted from the Wehrmacht during the Second World War. In June 1988 the Initiative for the Creation of a Memorial to Deserters who deserted the Wehrmacht came to life in Ulm. Ireland: Ireland was neutral during the Second World War; the Irish Army expanded to 40,000 men, but they had little to do once it became clear in 1942 that invasion (either by Nazi Germany or by the British Empire) was unlikely. Soldiers were put to work cutting trees and peat; morale was low and pay was bad. Of the 60,000 men who passed through the army in 1940–45, about 7,000 men deserted, about half of them deciding to fight on the Allied side, most joining the British Army. Once the war was over, the EPO 362 order meant deserters were allowed to return to Ireland; they were not imprisoned, but lost rights to an army pension and could not work for the state or claim unemployment benefits for 7 years. They were also seen as traitors by some Irish people in their homes. Decades after, the morality of their actions was debated; on the one hand, they had illegally abandoned their country's armed forces at a time when it was threatened with invasion — indeed, it was argued that their acts were treasonous at a time when Britain may have been planning to seize control of Ireland's ports (see Plan W); on the other hand, they chose to leave a safe if tedious posting in order to risk their lives fighting against fascism, and many were motivated by genuine idealism. In 2012, the Minister for Justice and Equality Alan Shatter issued a pardon and amnesty to all World War II-era deserters from the Irish Defence Forces. New Zealand: During the First World War 28 New Zealand soldiers were sentenced to death for desertion; of these, five were executed. These soldiers were posthumously pardoned in 2000 through the Pardon for Soldiers of the Great War Act. Those who deserted before reaching the front were imprisoned in what were claimed to be harsh conditions. Russia: During the 2022 Russian mobilization, the Putin-controlled State Duma of Russia adopted amendments to include the concepts of mobilization, martial law and wartime in the Criminal Code, and introduced several articles related to military operations. Desertion during a period of mobilization or wartime will be punished by up to 10 years in jail. In December 2022, Kazakhstan deported back to Russia a Russian officer who was trying to avoid the Russo-Ukrainian war. Soviet Union: Russian Civil War: In 1919, 616 "hardcore" deserters of the total 837,000 draft dodgers and deserters were executed following People's Commissar Leon Trotsky's draconian measures. According to Figes, "a majority of deserters (most registered as "weak-willed") were handed back to the military authorities, and formed into units for transfer to one of the rear armies or directly to the front". Even those registered as "malicious" deserters were returned to the ranks when the demand for reinforcements became desperate". Forges also noted that the Red Army instituted amnesty weeks to prohibit punitive measures against desertion which encouraged the voluntary return of 98,000-132,000 deserters to the army. World War II: Order No. 270, dated 16 August 1941, was issued by Joseph Stalin. The order required superiors to shoot deserters on the spot. Their family members were subjected to arrest. Order No. 227, dated 28 July 1942, directed that each Army must create "blocking detachments" (barrier troops) which would shoot "cowards" and fleeing panicked troops at the rear. Over the course of the war, the Soviets executed 158,000 troops for desertion. Soviet–Afghan War: Many Soviet soldier deserters of the Soviet–Afghan War explain their reasons for desertion as political and in response to internal disorganization and disillusionment regarding their position in the war. Analyses of desertion rates argue that motivations were far less ideological than individual accounts claim. Desertion rates increased prior to announcements of upcoming operations, and were highest during the summer and winter. Seasonal desertions were probably a response to the harsh weather conditions of the winter and immense field work required in the summer. A significant jump in desertion in 1989 when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan may suggest a higher concern regarding returning home, rather than an overall opposition towards the war itself.

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Desertion

Over the course of the war, the Soviets executed 158,000 troops for desertion. Soviet–Afghan War: Many Soviet soldier deserters of the Soviet–Afghan War explain their reasons for desertion as political and in response to internal disorganization and disillusionment regarding their position in the war. Analyses of desertion rates argue that motivations were far less ideological than individual accounts claim. Desertion rates increased prior to announcements of upcoming operations, and were highest during the summer and winter. Seasonal desertions were probably a response to the harsh weather conditions of the winter and immense field work required in the summer. A significant jump in desertion in 1989 when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan may suggest a higher concern regarding returning home, rather than an overall opposition towards the war itself. Inter-ethnic explanation for desertion: In the beginning of the Soviet invasion, the majority of Soviet forces were soldiers of Central Asian republics. The Soviets believed that shared ideologies between Muslim Central Asians and Afghan soldiers would build trust and morale within the army. However, Central Asians' longstanding historical frustrations with Moscow degraded soldiers' willingness to fight for the Red Army. As Afghan desertion grew and Soviet opposition was strengthened within Afghanistan, the Soviet plan overtly backfired. The personal histories of Central Asian ethnic groups – especially between Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Tajiks, caused tension within the Soviet military. Non-Russian ethnic groups easily related the situation in Afghanistan to Communist takeover of their own states' forced induction into the USSR. Ethnic Russians suspected Central Asians of opposition, and fighting within the army was prevalent. Upon entering Afghanistan, many Central Asians were exposed to the Qur’an for the first time uninfluenced by Soviet propagandist versions, and felt a stronger connection towards the opposition than their own comrades. The highest rates of desertion were found among border troops, ranging from 60 to 80% during the first year of the Soviet invasion. In these areas, strong ethnic clashes and cultural factors influenced desertion. As Afghan soldiers continued to desert the Soviet army, a united Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan began to form. Moderates and fundamentalists banded together to oppose Soviet intervention. The Islamic ideology solidified a strong base of opposition by January 1980, overriding ethnic, tribal, geographic and economic differences among Afghans willing to fight the Soviet invasion, which attracted Central Asian deserters. By March 1980, the Soviet army made an executive decision to replace Central Asian troops with the European sectors of the USSR to avoid further religious and ethnic complications, drastically reducing Soviet forces. Soviet disillusionment upon entering the war: Soviet soldiers entered the war under the impression that their roles were primarily related to the organization of Afghan forces and society. Soviet media portrayed the Soviet intervention as a necessary means of protecting the Communist uprising from outside opposition. Propaganda declared that Soviets were providing aid to villagers and improving Afghanistan by planting trees, improving public buildings and "generally acting as good neighbors". Upon entering Afghanistan, Soviet soldiers became immediately aware of the falsity of the reported situation. In major cities, Afghan youth that originally supported the leftist movement soon turned to Soviet oppositional forces for patriotic and religious reasons. The opposition built resistance in cities, calling Soviet soldiers infidels that were forcing an imperialist Communist invasive government on Afghanistan's people. As Afghan troops continued to abandon the Soviet army to support the mujahideen, they became anti-Russian and antigovernment. Opposition forces emphasized the Soviets' atheism, demanding support for the Muslim faith from civilians. The hostility shown towards soldiers, who entered the war believing their assistance was requested, grew defensive. The opposition circulated pamphlets within Soviet camps stationed in cities, calling for Afghan freedom from the aggressive Communist influence and a right to establish their own government. The native Afghan army fell from 90,000 to 30,000 by mid-1980, forcing Soviets into more extreme combative positions. The mujahideen's widespread presence among Afghan civilians in rural regions made it difficult for Soviet soldiers to distinguish between the civilians they believed they were fighting for and the official opposition. Soldiers who had entered the war with idealistic viewpoints of their roles were quickly disillusioned. Problems in Soviet army structure and living standards: The structure of the Soviet army, in comparison to the mujahideen, set the Soviets at a serious fighting disadvantage. While the mujahideen structure was based on kinship and social cohesion, the Soviet army was bureaucratic. Because of this, mujahideen could significantly weaken the Soviet army by the elimination of a field commander or officer. Resistance forces were locally based, more ready to address and mobilize the Afghan population for support. The Soviet army was centrally organized; its regime structure emphasized rank and position, paying less attention to the well-being and effectiveness of its army. The initial Soviet plan relied on Afghan troops' support in the mountainous regions of Afghanistan. The majority of the Afghan army support crumbled easily as forces lacked strong ideological support for Communism from the beginning. The Afghan army, comprising 100,000 men before 1978, was reduced to 15,000 within the first year of the Soviet invasion. Of the Afghan troops that remained, many were considered untrustworthy to Soviet troops. Afghans that deserted often took artillery with them, supplying the mujahideen. Soviet troops, to fill Afghan soldiers' place, were pushed into mountainous tribal regions of the East. Soviet tanks and modern warfare was ineffective in the rural, mountainous regions of Afghanistan. Mujahideen tactics of ambush prevented Soviets from developing successful counterattacks. In 1980, the Soviet army began to rely on smaller and more cohesive units, a response to mirror mujahideen tactics. A decrease in unit size, while solving organizational issues, promoted field leaders to head more violent and aggressive missions, promoting Soviet desertion. Often, small forces would engage in rapes, looting, and general violence beyond what higher ranks ordered, increasing negative sanctions in undesirable locations. Within the Soviet army, serious drug and alcohol problems significantly reduced the effectiveness of soldiers. Resources became further depleted as soldiers pushed into the mountains; drugs were rampantly abused and available, often supplied by Afghans. Supplies of heating fuel, wood, and food ran low at bases. Soviet soldiers often resorted to trading weapons and ammunition in exchange for drugs or food. As morale decreased and infections of hepatitis and typhus spread, soldiers became further disheartened. Soviet deserters to the mujahideen: Interviews with Soviet soldier deserters confirm that much of Soviet desertion was in response to widespread Afghan opposition rather than personal aggravation towards the Soviet army. Armed with modern artillery against ill-equipped villagers, Soviet soldiers developed a sense of guilt for the widespread killing of innocent civilians and their unfair artillery advantage. Soviet deserters found support and acceptance within Afghan villages. After entering the mujahideen, many deserters came to recognize the falsity of Soviet propaganda from the beginning. Unable to legitimize the unnecessary killing and mistreatment of the Afghan people, many deserters could not face returning home and justifying their own actions and the unnecessary deaths of comrades. Upon deserting to the mujahideen, soldiers immersed themselves into Afghan culture. Hoping to rectify their position as the enemy, deserters learned the Afghan language and converted to Islam. United Kingdom: Historically, one who was paid to enlist and then deserted could be arrested under a type of writ known as arrestando ipsum qui pecuniam recepit, or "For arresting one who received money". Napoleonic Wars: During the Napoleonic Wars desertion was a massive drain on British army resources, despite the threat of court martial and the possibility of capital punishment for the crime. Many deserters were harboured by citizens who were sympathetic to them. First World War: "306 British and Commonwealth soldiers were executed for...desertion during World War I," records the Shot at Dawn Memorial. Of these, 25 were Canadian, 22 Irishmen and five New Zealanders. "During the period between August 1914 and March 1920 more than 20,000 servicemen were convicted by courts-martial of offences which carried the death sentence. Only 3,000 of those men were ordered to be put to death and of those just over 10% were executed." Second World War: Throughout the Second World War, almost 100,000 British and Commonwealth troops deserted from the armed forces. Capital punishment for desertion was abolished in 1930 so most were imprisoned. Iraq War: On 28 May 2006, the UK military reported over 1,000 absent without leave since the beginning of the Iraq War, with 566 missing from 2005 and that part of 2006. The Ministry of Defence said that levels of absence were fairly constant and "only one person has been found guilty of deserting the Army since 1989".

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Desertion

"During the period between August 1914 and March 1920 more than 20,000 servicemen were convicted by courts-martial of offences which carried the death sentence. Only 3,000 of those men were ordered to be put to death and of those just over 10% were executed." Second World War: Throughout the Second World War, almost 100,000 British and Commonwealth troops deserted from the armed forces. Capital punishment for desertion was abolished in 1930 so most were imprisoned. Iraq War: On 28 May 2006, the UK military reported over 1,000 absent without leave since the beginning of the Iraq War, with 566 missing from 2005 and that part of 2006. The Ministry of Defence said that levels of absence were fairly constant and "only one person has been found guilty of deserting the Army since 1989". United States: Legal definition: According to the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice, desertion is defined as: (a) Any member of the armed forces who– (1) without authority goes or remains absent from his unit, organization, or place of duty with intent to remain away therefrom permanently; (2) quits his unit, organization, or place of duty with intent to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk important service; or (3) without being regularly separated from one of the armed forces enlists or accepts an appointment in the same or another one of the armed forces without fully disclosing the fact that he has not been regularly separated, or enters any foreign armed service except when authorized by the United States; is guilty of desertion. (b) Any commissioned officer of the armed forces who, after tender of his resignation and before notice of its acceptance, quits his post or proper duties without leave and with intent to remain away therefrom permanently is guilty of desertion. (c) Any person found guilty of desertion or attempt to desert shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the desertion or attempt to desert occurs at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct. War of 1812: The desertion rate for American soldiers in the War of 1812 was 12.7%, according to available service records. Desertion was especially common in 1814, when enlistment bonuses were increased from $16 to $124, inducing many men to desert one unit and enlist in another to get two bonuses. Mexican–American War: During the Mexican–American War, the desertion rate in the U.S. Army was 8.3% (9,200 out of 111,000), compared to 12.7% during the War of 1812 and usual peacetime rates of about 14.8% per year. Many men deserted in order to join another U.S. unit and get a second enlistment bonus. Others deserted because of the miserable conditions in camp, or in 1849–1850 were using the army to get free transportation to California, where they deserted to join the California Gold Rush. Several hundred deserters went over to the Mexican side; nearly all were recent immigrants from Europe with weak ties to the United States. The most famous group was the Saint Patrick's Battalion, about half of whom were Catholics from Ireland, anti-Catholic prejudice reportedly being another reason for desertion. The Mexicans issued broadsides and leaflets enticing U.S. soldiers with promises of money, land grants, and officers' commissions. Mexican guerrillas shadowed the U.S. Army, and captured men who took unauthorized leave or fell out of the ranks. The guerrillas coerced these men to join the Mexican ranks—threatening to kill them if they failed to comply. The generous promises proved illusory for most deserters, who risked execution if captured by U.S. forces. About fifty of the San Patricios were tried and hanged following their capture at Churubusco in August 1847. High desertion rates were a major problem for the Mexican army, depleting forces on the eve of battle. Most of the soldiers were peasants who had a loyalty to their village and family but not to the generals who conscripted them. Often hungry and ill, never well paid, under-equipped and only partially trained, the soldiers were held in contempt by their officers and had little reason to fight the Americans. Looking for their opportunity, many slipped away from camp to find their way back to their home village. American Civil War: During the American Civil War, both the Union and Confederacy had a desertion problem. From its 2.5 million or so men, the Union Army saw about 200,000 desertions. Over 100,000 deserted the Confederate army, which was less than a million men and possibly as little as a third the size of the Union Army. New York suffered 44,913 desertions by the war's end, and Pennsylvania recorded 24,050, with Ohio reporting desertions at 18,354. About 1 out of 3 deserters returned to their regiments, either voluntarily or after being arrested and being sent back. Many of the desertions were by "professional" bounty men, men who would enlist to collect the often large cash bonuses and then desert at the earliest opportunity to repeat another enlistment elsewhere. If caught they would face execution; otherwise it could prove a very lucrative criminal enterprise. The total number of Confederate deserters was officially 103,400. Desertion was a major factor for the Confederacy in the last two years of the war. According to Mark A. Weitz, Confederate soldiers fought to defend their families, not a nation. He argues that a hegemonic "planter class" brought Georgia into the war with "little support from non-slaveholders" (p. 12), and the ambivalence of non-slaveholders toward secession, he maintains, was the key to understanding desertion. The privations of the home front and camp life, combined with the terror of battle, undermined the weak attachment of southern soldiers to the Confederacy. For Georgian troops, Sherman's march through their home counties triggered the most desertions. Adoption of a localist identity caused soldiers to desert as well. When soldiers implemented a local identity, they neglected to think of themselves as Southerners fighting a Southern cause. When they replaced their Southern identity with their previous local identity, they lost their motive to fight and, therefore, deserted the army. A growing threat to the solidarity of the Confederacy was dissatisfaction in the Appalachian mountain districts caused by lingering unionism and a distrust of the slave power. Many of their soldiers deserted, returned home, and formed a military force that fought off regular army units trying to punish them. North Carolina lost 23% of its soldiers (24,122) to desertion. The state provided more soldiers per capita than any other Confederate state, and had more deserters as well. First World War: Desertion still occurred among American armed forces after the U.S. joined the First World War on 6 April 1917. Between 6 April 1917, and 31 December 1918, the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) charged 5,584 servicemen and convicted 2,657 for desertion. 24 AEF troops were eventually sentenced to death, but all managed to avoid execution after President Woodrow Wilson commuted their death sentences to prison terms. Deserters were often publicly humiliated. One U.S. Navy deserter, Henry Holscher, later joined a UK regiment and won the Military Medal. Second World War: Over 20,000 American soldiers were tried and sentenced for desertion. Forty-nine were sentenced to death, though forty-eight of these death sentences were subsequently commuted. Only one U.S. soldier, Private Eddie Slovik, was executed for desertion in World War II. Vietnam War: According to the Department of Defense, 503,926 United States servicemen deserted during the Vietnam War between 1 July 1966 to 31 December 1973. Some of these migrated to Canada. Among those who deserted to Canada were Andy Barrie, host of Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Radio's Metro Morning, and Jack Todd, sports columnist for the Montreal Gazette. Other countries also gave asylum to deserted U.S. soldiers. For example, Sweden allows asylum for foreign soldiers deserting from war, if the war does not align with the current goals of Swedish foreign policy. Iraq War: According to the Pentagon, more than 5,500 military personnel deserted in 2003–2004, following the Iraq invasion and occupation. The number had reached about 8,000 by the first quarter of 2006. Almost all of these soldiers deserted within the United States. There has been only one reported case of a desertion in Iraq. The Army, Navy, and Air Force reported 7,978 desertions in 2001, compared with 3,456 in 2005. The Marine Corps showed 1,603 Marines in desertion status in 2001. That had declined to 148 by 2005. Penalties: Before the Civil War, deserters from the Army were flogged; after 1861, tattoos or branding were also used. The maximum U.S. penalty for desertion in wartime remains death, but this punishment was last applied to Eddie Slovik in 1945. No U.S.

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Desertion

The number had reached about 8,000 by the first quarter of 2006. Almost all of these soldiers deserted within the United States. There has been only one reported case of a desertion in Iraq. The Army, Navy, and Air Force reported 7,978 desertions in 2001, compared with 3,456 in 2005. The Marine Corps showed 1,603 Marines in desertion status in 2001. That had declined to 148 by 2005. Penalties: Before the Civil War, deserters from the Army were flogged; after 1861, tattoos or branding were also used. The maximum U.S. penalty for desertion in wartime remains death, but this punishment was last applied to Eddie Slovik in 1945. No U.S. serviceman has received more than 24 months imprisonment for desertion or missing movement after September 11, 2001. A U.S. service member who is AWOL/UA may be punished with non-judicial punishment (NJP) or by court martial under Article 86 of the UCMJ for repeat or more severe offenses. Many AWOL/UA service members are also given a discharge in lieu of court-martial. The 2012 edition of the United States Manual for Courts-Martial states that:Any person found guilty of desertion or attempt to desert shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the desertion or attempt to desert occurs at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct. Legal status of desertion in cases of war crime: Under international law, ultimate "duty" or "responsibility" is not necessarily always to a "government" nor to "a superior", as seen in the fourth of the Nuremberg Principles, which states:The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him. Although a soldier under direct orders, in battle, is normally not subject to prosecution for war crimes, there is legal language supporting a soldier's refusal to commit such crimes, in military contexts outside of immediate peril. In 1998, UNCHR resolution 1998/77 recognized that "persons [already] performing military service may develop conscientious objections" while performing military service. This opens the possibility of desertion as a response to cases in which the soldier is required to perform crimes against humanity as part of his mandatory military duty. The principle was tested unsuccessfully in the case of U.S. Army deserter Jeremy Hinzman, which resulted in a Canadian federal immigration board rejecting refugee status to a deserter invoking Nuremberg Article IV. See also: Barratry (admiralty law) Canada and Iraq War resisters Conscientious objector Decimation (Roman army) Defection Draft evasion Green Cadres List of Iraq War resisters Mutiny No call, no show, in civilian employment Nuremberg Principle IV Resistance Inside the Army Running the gauntlet War resister Notes: References: Works cited: Further reading: David Cortright. Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance During the Vietnam War. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005. Charles Glass. Deserter: The Last Untold Story of the Second World War. Harperpress, 2013. Maria Fritsche. "Proving One's Manliness: Masculine Self-perceptions of Austrian Deserters in the Second World War". Gender & History, 24/1 (2012), pp. 35–55. Fred Halstead. GIs Speak Out Against the War: The Case of the Ft. Jackson 8. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970. Kevin Linch. "Desertion from the British Army during the Napoleonic Wars". Journal of Social History, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Summer 2016), pp. 808–828. Peter Rohrbacher. "Pater Wilhelm Schmidt im Schweizer Exil: Interaktionen mit Wehrmachtsdeserteuren und Nachrichtendiensten, 1943–1945". Paideuma: Mitteilungen zur Kulturkunde, no. 62 (2016), pp. 203–221. Jack Todd. Desertion: In the Time of Vietnam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2001. Chris Lombardi. I Ain’t Marching Anymore: Dissenters, Deserters, and Objectors to America’s Wars. New York: The New Press, 2020. External links: Missing movement Archived 31 December 2015 at the Wayback Machine from About.com Memorial to German World War II deserters in Ulm, Germany at the Sites of Memory webpage Memorial to all deserters in Stuttgart, Germany at the Sites of Memory webpage AWOL Information Archived 6 April 2015 at the Wayback Machine