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mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Geneva Protocol | Negotiation history: In the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the use of dangerous chemical agents was outlawed. In spite of this, the First World War saw large-scale chemical warfare. France used tear gas in 1914, but the first large-scale successful deployment of chemical weapons was by the German Empire in Ypres, Belgium in 1915, when chlorine gas was released as part of a German attack at the Battle of Gravenstafel. Following this, a chemical arms race began, with the United Kingdom, Russia, Austria-Hungary, the United States, and Italy joining France and Germany in the use of chemical weapons.
This resulted in the development of a range of horrific chemicals affecting lungs, skin, or eyes. Some were intended to be lethal on the battlefield, like hydrogen cyanide, and efficient methods of deploying agents were invented. At least 124,000 tons were produced during the war. In 1918, about one grenade out of three was filled with dangerous chemical agents. Around 1.3 million casualties of the conflict were attributed to the use of gas, and the psychological effect on troops may have had a much greater effect.
As protective equipment developed, the technology to destroy such equipment became a part of the arms race. The use of deadly poison gas was not only limited to combatants in the front but also civilians, as nearby civilian towns were at risk from winds blowing the poison gases through. Civilians living in towns rarely had any warning systems about the dangers of poison gas, as well as not having access to effective gas masks. The use of chemical weapons employed by both sides had inflicted an estimated 100,000-260,000 civilian casualties during the conflict. Tens of thousands or more, along with military personnel, died from scarring of the lungs, skin damage, and cerebral damage in the years after the conflict ended. In 1920 alone, over 40,000 civilians and 20,000 military personnel died from the chemical weapons effects.
The Treaty of Versailles included some provisions that banned Germany from either manufacturing or importing chemical weapons. Similar treaties banned the First Austrian Republic, the Kingdom of Bulgaria, and the Kingdom of Hungary from chemical weapons, all belonging to the losing side, the Central powers. Russian bolsheviks and Britain continued the use of chemical weapons in the Russian Civil War and possibly in the Middle East in 1920.
Three years after World War I, the Allies wanted to reaffirm the Treaty of Versailles, and in 1922 the United States introduced the Treaty relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare at the Washington Naval Conference. Four of the war victors, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Kingdom of Italy and the Empire of Japan, gave consent for ratification, but it failed to enter into force as the French Third Republic objected to the submarine provisions of the treaty.
At the 1925 Geneva Conference for the Supervision of the International Traffic in Arms the French suggested a protocol for non-use of poisonous gases. The Second Polish Republic suggested the addition of bacteriological weapons. It was signed on 17 June.
Historical assessment: Eric Croddy, assessing the Protocol in 2005, took the view that the historic record showed it had been largely ineffectual. Specifically it does not prohibit:
use against not-ratifying parties
retaliation using such weapons, so effectively making it a no-first-use agreement
use within a state's own borders in a civil conflict
research and development of such weapons, or stockpiling them
In light of these shortcomings, Jack Beard notes that "the Protocol (...) resulted in a legal framework that allowed states to conduct [biological weapons] research, develop new biological weapons, and ultimately engage in [biological weapons] arms races".
As such, the use of chemical weapons inside the nation's own territory against its citizens or subjects employed by Spain in the Rif War until 1927, Japan against Seediq indigenous rebels in Taiwan (then part of the Japanese colonial empire) in 1930 during the Musha Incident, Iraq against ethnic Kurdish civilians in the 1988 attack on Halabja during the Iran–Iraq War, and Syria or Syrian opposition forces during the Syrian civil war, nor use on Black Lives Matter protestors in the United States did not breach the Geneva Protocol.
Despite the U.S. having been a proponent of the protocol, the U.S. military and American Chemical Society lobbied against it, causing the U.S. Senate not to ratify the protocol until 1975, the same year when the United States ratified the Biological Weapons Convention.
Violations: Several state parties have deployed chemical weapons for combat in spite of the treaty. Italy used mustard gas against the Ethiopian Empire in the Second Italo-Ethiopian War. In World War II, Germany employed chemical weapons in combat on several occasions along the Black Sea, notably in Sevastopol, where they used toxic smoke to force Russian resistance fighters out of caverns below the city. They also used asphyxiating gas in the catacombs of Odesa in November 1941, following their capture of the city, and in late May 1942 during the Battle of the Kerch Peninsula in eastern Crimea, perpetrated by the Wehrmacht's Chemical Forces and organized by a special detail of SS troops with the help of a field engineer battalion. After the battle in mid-May 1942, the Germans gassed and killed almost 3,000 of the besieged and non-evacuated Red Army soldiers and Soviet civilians hiding in a series of caves and tunnels in the nearby Adzhimushkay quarry.
During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Iraq is known to have employed a variety of chemical weapons against Iranian forces. Some 100,000 Iranian troops were casualties of Iraqi chemical weapons during the war.
Subsequent interpretation of the protocol: In 1966, United Nations General Assembly resolution 2162B called for, without any dissent, all states to strictly observe the protocol. In 1969, United Nations General Assembly resolution 2603 (XXIV) declared that the prohibition on use of chemical and biological weapons in international armed conflicts, as embodied in the protocol (though restated in a more general form), were generally recognized rules of international law. Following this, there was discussion of whether the main elements of the protocol now form part of customary international law, and now this is widely accepted to be the case.
There have been differing interpretations over whether the protocol covers the use of harassing agents, such as adamsite and tear gas, and defoliants and herbicides, such as Agent Orange, in warfare. The 1977 Environmental Modification Convention prohibits the military use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects. Many states do not regard this as a complete ban on the use of herbicides in warfare, but it does require case-by-case consideration. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention effectively banned riot control agents from being used as a method of warfare, though still permitting it for riot control.
In recent times, the protocol had been interpreted to cover non-international armed conflicts as well international ones. In 1995, an appellate chamber in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia stated that "there had undisputedly emerged a general consensus in the international community on the principle that the use of chemical weapons is also prohibited in internal armed conflicts." In 2005, the International Committee of the Red Cross concluded that customary international law includes a ban on the use of chemical weapons in internal as well as international conflicts.
However, such views drew general criticism from legal authors. They noted that much of the chemical arms control agreements stems from the context of international conflicts. Furthermore, the application of customary international law to banning chemical warfare in non-international conflicts fails to meet two requirements: state practice and opinio juris. Jillian Blake & Aqsa Mahmud cited the periodic use of chemical weapons in non-international conflicts since the end of WWI (as stated above) as well as the lack of existing international humanitarian law (such as the Geneva Conventions) and national legislation and manuals prohibiting using them in such conflicts. Anne Lorenzat stated the 2005 ICRC study was rooted in "'political and operational issues rather than legal ones".
State parties: To become party to the Protocol, states must deposit an instrument with the government of France (the depositary power). Thirty-eight states originally signed the Protocol. France was the first signatory to ratify the Protocol on 10 May 1926. El Salvador, the final signatory to ratify the Protocol, did so on 26 February 2008. As of April 2021, 146 states have ratified, acceded to, or succeeded to the Protocol, most recently Colombia on 24 November 2015.
Reservations: A number of countries submitted reservations when becoming parties to the Geneva Protocol, declaring that they only regarded the non-use obligations as applying with respect to other parties to the Protocol and/or that these obligations would cease to apply with respect to any state, or its allies, which used the prohibited weapons. Several Arab states also declared that their ratification did not constitute recognition of, or diplomatic relations with, Israel, or that the provision of the Protocol were not binding with respect to Israel.
Generally, reservations not only modify treaty provisions for the reserving party, but also symmetrically modify the provisions for previously ratifying parties in dealing with the reserving party. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Geneva Protocol | El Salvador, the final signatory to ratify the Protocol, did so on 26 February 2008. As of April 2021, 146 states have ratified, acceded to, or succeeded to the Protocol, most recently Colombia on 24 November 2015.
Reservations: A number of countries submitted reservations when becoming parties to the Geneva Protocol, declaring that they only regarded the non-use obligations as applying with respect to other parties to the Protocol and/or that these obligations would cease to apply with respect to any state, or its allies, which used the prohibited weapons. Several Arab states also declared that their ratification did not constitute recognition of, or diplomatic relations with, Israel, or that the provision of the Protocol were not binding with respect to Israel.
Generally, reservations not only modify treaty provisions for the reserving party, but also symmetrically modify the provisions for previously ratifying parties in dealing with the reserving party.: 394 Subsequently, numerous states have withdrawn their reservations, including the former Czechoslovakia in 1990 prior to its dissolution, or the Russian reservation on biological weapons that "preserved the right to retaliate in kind if attacked" with them, which was dissolved by President Yeltsin.
According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." While some states have explicitly either retained or renounced their reservations inherited on succession, states which have not clarified their position on their inherited reservations are listed as "implicit" reservations.
Reservations
Notes
Non-signatory states: The remaining UN member states and UN observers that have not acceded or succeeded to the Protocol are:
Chemical weapons prohibitions:
References:
Further reading: Frederic Joseph Brown (2005). "Chapter 3: The Evolution of Policy 1922-1939 / Geneva Gas Protocol". Chemical warfare: a study in restraints. Transaction Publishers. pp. 98–110. ISBN 1-4128-0495-7.
Bunn, George. "Gas and germ warfare: international legal history and present status." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 65.1 (1970): 253+. online
Webster, Andrew. "Making Disarmament Work: The implementation of the international disarmament provisions in the League of Nations Covenant, 1919–1925." Diplomacy and Statecraft 16.3 (2005): 551–569.
External links:
The text of the protocol Archived 7 September 2013 at the Wayback Machine
Weapons of War: Poison Gas |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Grand strategy | Definition: There is no universally accepted definition of grand strategy. One common definition is that grand strategy is a state's strategy of how means (military and nonmilitary) can be used to advance and achieve national interests in the long-term.
Grand strategy expands on the traditional idea of strategy in three ways:
expanding strategy beyond military means to include diplomatic, financial, economic, informational, etc. means
examining internal in addition to external forces – taking into account both the various instruments of power and the internal policies necessary for their implementation (conscription, for example)
including consideration of periods of peacetime in addition to wartime
Thinkers differ as to whether grand strategy should serve to promote peace (as emphasized by B. H. Liddell Hart) or advance the security of a state (as emphasized by Barry Posen).
British military historian B. H. Liddell Hart played an influential role in popularizing the concept of grand strategy in the mid-20th century. Subsequent definitions tend to build on his. He defines grand strategy as follows:
[T]he role of grand strategy – higher strategy – is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy.
Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources – for to foster the people's willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution of power between the several services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy – which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent's will. ...
Furthermore, while the horizons of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace – for its security and prosperity.
History: In antiquity, the Greek word "strategy" referred to the skills of a general. By the sixth century, Byzantines distinguished between "strategy" (the means by which a general defends the homeland and defeats the enemy) and "tactics" (the science of organizing armies). Byzantine Emperor Leo VI distinguished between the two terms in his work Taktika.
Prior to the French Revolution, most thinkers wrote on military science rather than grand strategy. The term grand strategy first emerged in France in the 19th century. Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert, wrote an influential work, General Essay on Tactics, that distinguished between "tactics" and "grand tactics" (which scholars today would refer to as grand strategy). Emperor Leo's Taktika was shortly thereafter translated into French and German, leading most thinkers to distinguish between tactics and strategy.
Carl von Clausewitz proposed in an influential work that politics and war were intrinsically linked. Clausewitz defined strategy as "the use of engagements for the object of the war". Antoine-Henri Jomini argued that because of the intrinsically political nature of war that different types of wars (e.g. offensive wars, defensive wars, wars of expediency, wars with/without allies, wars of intervention, wars of conquest, wars of opinion, national wars, civil wars) had to be waged differently, thus creating the need for a grand strategy. Some contemporaries of Clausewitz and Jomini disputed the links between politics and war, arguing that politics ceases to be important once war has begun.
Narrow definitions, similar to those of Clausewitz, were commonplace during the 19th century. Towards the end of the 19th century and into the early 20th century (in particular with B. H. Liddell Hart's writings), some writers expanded the definition of strategy to refer to the distribution and application of military means to achieve policy objectives. For these thinkers, grand strategy was not only different from the operational strategy of winning a particular battle, but it also encompassed both peacetime and wartime policies. For them, grand strategy should operate for decades (or longer) and should not cease at war's end or begin at war's start.
In the 20th century, some thinkers argued that all manners of actions (political, economic, military, cultural) counted as grand strategy in an era of total warfare. However, most definitions saw a division of labor between the actions of political leaders and those of the executing military.
According to Helmuth von Moltke, the initial task of strategy was to serve politics and the subsequent task was to prepare the means to wage war. Moltke however warned that plans may not survive an encounter with the enemy. Other thinkers challenged Clausewitz's idea that politics could set the aims of war, as the aims of war would change during the war given the success or failure of military operations.These thinkers argued that strategy was a process that required adaptation to changing circumstances.
Scholarship on grand strategy experienced a resurgence in the late 1960s and 1970s. Bernard Brodie defined strategy as "guide to accomplishing something and doing it efficiently... a theory for action".
Historical examples: According to historian Hal Brands, "all states... do grand strategy, but many of them do not do it particularly well."
Peloponnesian War: One of the earlier writings on grand strategy comes from Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War, an account of the war between the Peloponnesian League (led by Sparta) and the Delian League (led by Athens).
Roman Empire: From the era of Hadrian, Roman emperors employed a military strategy of "preclusive security—the establishment of a linear barrier of perimeter defence around the Empire. The Legions were stationed in great fortresses".
These "fortresses" existed along the perimeter of the Empire, often accompanied by actual walls (for example, Hadrian's Wall). Due to the perceived impenetrability of these perimeter defenses, the Emperors kept no central reserve army. The Roman system of roads allowed for soldiers to move from one frontier to another (for the purpose of reinforcements during a siege) with relative ease. These roads also allowed for a logistical advantage for Rome over her enemies, as supplies could be moved just as easily across the Roman road system as soldiers. This way, if the legions could not win a battle through military combat skill or superior numbers, they could simply outlast the invaders, who, as historian E.A. Thompson wrote, "Did not think in terms of millions of bushels of wheat."
The emperor Constantine moved the legions from the frontiers to one consolidated roving army as a way to save money and to protect wealthier citizens within the cities. However, this grand strategy, according to some ancient sources, had costly effects on the Roman empire by weakening its frontier defenses and allowing it to be susceptible to outside armies coming in. Also, people who lived near the Roman frontiers would begin to look to the barbarians for protection after the Roman armies departed. This argument is considered to have originated in the writings of Eunapius As stated by the 5th century AD historian Zosimus: Constantine abolished this frontier security by removing the greater part of the soldiery from the frontiers to cities that needed no auxiliary forces. He thus deprived of help the people who were harassed by the barbarians and burdened tranquil cities with the pest of the military, so that several straightway were deserted. Moreover, he softened the soldiers who treated themselves to shows and luxuries. Indeed, to speak plainly, he personally planted the first seeds of our present devastated state of affairs – Zosimus
This charge by Zosimus is considered to be a gross exaggeration and inaccurate assessment of the situations in the fourth century under Constantine by many modern historians. B.H. Warmington, for instance, argues that the statement by Zosimus is "[an] oversimplification," reminding us that "the charge of exposure of the frontier regions is at best anachronistic and probably reflects Zosimus' prejudices against Constantine; the corruption of the soldiers who lived in the cities was a literary commonplace."
World War II: An example of modern grand strategy is the decision of the Allies in World War II to concentrate on the defeat of Germany first. The decision, a joint agreement made after the attack on Pearl Harbor (1941) had drawn the US into the war, was a sensible one in that Germany was the most powerful member of the Axis, and directly threatened the existence of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Conversely, while Japan's conquests garnered considerable public attention, they were mostly in colonial areas deemed less essential by planners and policy-makers. The specifics of Allied military strategy in the Pacific War were therefore shaped by the lesser resources made available to the theatre commanders.
Cold War: The US and the UK used a policy of containment as part of their grand strategy during the Cold War. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Grand strategy | World War II: An example of modern grand strategy is the decision of the Allies in World War II to concentrate on the defeat of Germany first. The decision, a joint agreement made after the attack on Pearl Harbor (1941) had drawn the US into the war, was a sensible one in that Germany was the most powerful member of the Axis, and directly threatened the existence of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Conversely, while Japan's conquests garnered considerable public attention, they were mostly in colonial areas deemed less essential by planners and policy-makers. The specifics of Allied military strategy in the Pacific War were therefore shaped by the lesser resources made available to the theatre commanders.
Cold War: The US and the UK used a policy of containment as part of their grand strategy during the Cold War.
In the United States: The conversation around grand strategy in the United States has evolved significantly since the country's founding, with the nation shifting from a strategy of continental expansion, isolation from European conflicts, and opposition to European empires in the Western hemisphere in its first century, to a major debate about the acquisition of an empire in the 1890s (culminating in the conquest of the Philippines and Cuba during the Spanish–American War), followed by rapid shifts between offshore balancing, liberal internationalism, and isolationism around the world wars. The Cold War saw increasing use of deep, onshore engagement strategies (including the creation of a number of permanent alliances, significant involvement in other states' internal politics, and a major counterinsurgency war in Vietnam.) With the end of the Cold War, an early strategic debate eventually coalesced into a strategy of primacy, culminating in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The aftershocks of this war, along with an economic downturn, rising national debt, and deepening political gridlock, have led to a renewed strategic debate, centered on two major schools of thought: primacy and restraint. A return to offshore balancing has also been proposed by prominent political scientists Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer.
In the 1990s: The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union removed the focal point of U.S. strategy: containing the Soviet Union. A major debate emerged about the future direction of U.S. foreign policy. In a 1997 article, Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross identified four major grand strategic alternatives in the debate:
neo-isolationism
selective engagement
cooperative security
primacy
Neo-isolationism: Stemming from a defensive realist understanding of international politics, what the authors call "neo-isolationism" advocates the United States remove itself from active participation in international politics in order to maintain its national security. It holds that because there are no threats to the American homeland, the United States does not need to intervene abroad. Stressing a particular understanding of nuclear weapons, the authors describe how proponents believe the destructive power of nuclear weapons and retaliatory potential of the United States assure the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of the United States, while the proliferation of such weapons to countries like Britain, France, China and Russia prevents the emergence of any competing hegemon on the Eurasian landmass. The United States' security and the absence of threats means that "national defense will seldom justify intervention abroad." Even further, its proponents argue that "the United States is not responsible for, and cannot afford the costs of, maintaining world order." They also believe that "the pursuit of economic well-being is best left to the private sector," and that the United States should not attempt to spread its values because doing so increases resentment towards the U.S. and in turn, decreases its security. In short, neo-isolationism advises the United States to preserve its freedom of action and strategic independence.
In more practical terms, the authors discuss how the implementation of a so-called "neo-isolationist" grand strategy would involve less focus on the issue of nuclear proliferation, withdrawal from NATO, and major cuts to the United States military presence abroad. The authors see a military force structure that prioritizes a secure nuclear second-strike capability, intelligence, naval and special operations forces while limiting the forward-deployment of forces to Europe and Asia.
Posen and Ross identify such prominent scholars and political figures as Earl Ravenal, Patrick Buchanan and Doug Bandow.
Selective engagement: With similar roots in the realist tradition of international relations, selective engagement advocates that the United States should intervene in regions of the world only if they directly affect its security and prosperity. The focus, therefore, lies on those powers with significant industrial and military potential and the prevention of war amongst those states. Most proponents of this strategy believe Europe, Asia and the Middle East matter most to the United States. Europe and Asia contain the great powers, which have the greatest military and economic impact on international politics, and the Middle East is a primary source of oil for much of the developed world. In addition to these more particular concerns, selective engagement also focuses on preventing nuclear proliferation and any conflict that could lead to a great power war, but provides no clear guidelines for humanitarian interventions.
The authors envision that a strategy of selective engagement would involve a strong nuclear deterrent with a force structure capable of fighting two regional wars, each through some combination of ground, air and sea forces complemented with forces from a regional ally. They question, however, whether such a policy could garner sustained support from a liberal democracy experienced with a moralistic approach to international relations, whether the United States could successfully differentiate necessary versus unnecessary engagement and whether a strategy that focuses on Europe, Asia and the Middle East actually represents a shift from current engagement.
In the piece, Barry Posen classified himself as a "selective engagement" advocate, with the caveat that the United States should not only act to reduce the likelihood of great power war, but also oppose the rise of a Eurasian hegemon capable of threatening the United States.
Robert J. Art argues that selective engagement is the best strategy for the twenty-first century because it is, by definition, selective. "It steers the middle course between an isolationist, unilateralist course, on the one hand, and world policeman, highly interventionist role, on the other." Therefore, Art, concludes, it avoids both overly restrictive and overly expansive definitions of U.S. interests, finding instead a compromise between doing too much and too little militarily. Additionally, selective engagement is the best strategy for achieving both realist goals—preventing WMD terrorism, maintaining great power peace, and securing the supply of oil; and liberal goals—preserving free trade, spreading democracy, observing human rights, and minimizing the impact of climate change. The realist goals represent vital interests and the liberal goals represent desirable interests. Desirable interests are not unimportant, Art maintains, but they are of lesser importance when a trade-off between them and vital interests must be made. Selective engagement, however, mitigates the effect of the trade-off precisely because it is a moderate, strategic policy.
Cooperative security: The authors write "the most important distinguishing feature of cooperative security is the proposition that peace is effectively indivisible." Unlike the other three alternatives, cooperative security draws upon liberalism as well as realism in its approach to international relations. Stressing the importance of world peace and international cooperation, the view supposes the growth in democratic governance and the use of international institutions will hopefully overcome the security dilemma and deter interstate conflict. Posen and Ross propose that collective action is the most effective means of preventing potential state and non-state aggressors from threatening other states. Cooperative security considers nuclear proliferation, regional conflicts and humanitarian crises to be major interests of the United States.
The authors imagine that such a grand strategy would involve stronger support for international institutions, agreements, and the frequent use of force for humanitarian purposes. Were international institutions to ultimately entail the deployment of a multinational force, the authors suppose the United States' contribution would emphasize command, control, communications and intelligence, defense suppression, and precision-guided munitions-what they considered at the time to be the United States' comparative advantage in aerospace power. Collective action problems, the problems of the effective formation of international institutions, the vacillating feelings of democratic populations, and the limitations of arms control are all offered by the authors as noted criticisms of collective security.
Primacy: Primacy is a grand strategy with four parts:
Military preponderance
Reassurances and containment of allies
Integration of other states into US-designed institutions
Limits to the spread of nuclear weapons
As a result, it advocates that the United States pursue ultimate hegemony and dominate the international system economically, politically and militarily, rejecting any return to bipolarity or multipolarity and preventing the emergence of any peer competitor. Therefore, its proponents argue that U.S. foreign policy should focus on maintaining U.S. power and preventing any other power from becoming a serious challenger to the United States. With this in mind, some supporters of this strategy argue that the U.S. should work to contain China and other competitors rather than engage them. In regards to humanitarian crises and regional conflicts, primacy holds that the U.S. should only intervene when they directly impact national security, more along the lines of selective engagement than collective security. It does, however, advocate for the active prevention of nuclear proliferation at a level similar to collective security.
Implementation of such a strategy would entail military forces at similar levels to those during the Cold War, with emphasis on military modernization and research and development. They note, however, that "the quest for primacy is likely to prove futile for five reasons": the diffusion of economic and technological capabilities, interstate balancing against the United States, the danger that hegemonic leadership will fatally undermine valuable multilateral institutions, the feasibility of preventive war and the dangers of imperial overstretch. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Grand strategy | With this in mind, some supporters of this strategy argue that the U.S. should work to contain China and other competitors rather than engage them. In regards to humanitarian crises and regional conflicts, primacy holds that the U.S. should only intervene when they directly impact national security, more along the lines of selective engagement than collective security. It does, however, advocate for the active prevention of nuclear proliferation at a level similar to collective security.
Implementation of such a strategy would entail military forces at similar levels to those during the Cold War, with emphasis on military modernization and research and development. They note, however, that "the quest for primacy is likely to prove futile for five reasons": the diffusion of economic and technological capabilities, interstate balancing against the United States, the danger that hegemonic leadership will fatally undermine valuable multilateral institutions, the feasibility of preventive war and the dangers of imperial overstretch.
Daniel Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University, outlines three arguments offered by primacy enthusiasts contending that military preeminence generates positive economic externalities. "One argument, which I label 'geoeconomic favoritism,' hypothesizes that the military hegemon will attract private capital because it provides the greatest security and safety to investors. A second argument posits that the benefits from military primacy flow from geopolitical favoritism: that sovereign states, in return for living under the security umbrella of the military superpower, voluntarily transfer resources to help subsidize the cost of the economy. The third argument postulates that states are most likely to enjoy global public goods under a unipolar distribution of military power, accelerating global economic growth and reducing security tensions. These public goods benefit the hegemon as much, if not more, than they do other actors." Drezner maintains the empirical evidence supporting the third argument is the strongest, though with some qualifiers. "Although the precise causal mechanism remain disputed, hegemonic eras are nevertheless strongly correlated with lower trade barriers and greater levels of globalization." However, Drezner highlights a caveat: The cost of maintaining global public goods catches up to the superpower providing them. "Other countries free-ride off of the hegemon, allowing them to grow faster. Technologies diffuse from the hegemonic power to the rest of the world, facilitating catch-up. Chinese analysts have posited that these phenomena, occurring right now, are allowing China to outgrow the United States."
Primacy vs. selective engagement: Barry Posen, director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, believes the activist U.S. foreign policy that continues to define U.S. strategy in the twenty-first century is an "undisciplined, expensive, and bloody strategy" that has done more harm than good to U.S. national security. "It makes enemies almost as fast as it slays them, discourages allies from paying for their own defense, and convinces powerful states to band together and oppose Washington's plans, further raising the costs of carrying out its foreign policy." The United States was able to afford such adventurism during the 1990s, Posen argues, because American power projection was completely unchallenged. Over the last decade, however, American power has been relatively declining while the Pentagon continues to "depend on continuous infusions of cash simply to retain its current force structure—levels of spending that the Great Recession and the United States' ballooning debt have rendered unsustainable."
Posen proposes the United States abandon its hegemonic strategy and replace it with one of restraint. This translates into jettisoning the quest of shaping a world that is satisfactory to U.S. values and instead advances vital national security interests: The U.S. military would go to war only when it must. Large troop contingents in unprecedentedly peaceful regions such as Europe would be significantly downsized, incentivizing NATO members to provide more for their own security. Under such a scenario, the United States would have more leeway in using resources to combat the most pressing threats to its security. A strategy of restraint, therefore, would help preserve the country's prosperity and security more so than a hegemonic strategy. To be sure, Posen makes clear that he is not advocating isolationism. Rather, the United States should focus on three pressing security challenges: preventing a powerful rival from upending the global balance of power, fighting terrorists, and limiting nuclear proliferation.
John Ikenberry of Princeton University and Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, both of Dartmouth College, push back on Posen's selective engagement thesis, arguing that American engagement is not as bad as Posen makes it out to be. Advocates of selective engagement, they argue, overstate the costs of current U.S. grand strategy and understate the benefits. "The benefits of deep engagement...are legion. U.S. security commitments reduce competition in key regions and act as a check against potential rivals. They help maintain an open world economy and give Washington leverage in economic negotiations. And they make it easier for the United States to secure cooperation for combating a wide range of global threats."
Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth are not convinced that the current U.S. grand strategy generates subsequent counterbalancing. Unlike the prior hegemons, the United States is geographically isolated and faces no contiguous great power rivals interested in balancing it. This means the United States is far less threatening to great powers that are situated oceans away, the authors claim. Moreover, any competitor would have a hard time matching U.S. military might. "Not only is the United States so far ahead militarily in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but its security guarantees also give it the leverage to prevent allies from giving military technology to potential U.S. rivals. Because the United States dominates the high-end defense industry, it can trade access to its defense market for allies' agreement not to transfer key military technologies to its competitors."
Finally, when the United States wields its security leverage, the authors argue, it shapes the overall structure of the global economy. "Washington wins when U.S. allies favor [the] status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances."
Ted Carpenter, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, believes that the proponents of primacy suffer from the "light-switch model," in which only two positions exist: on and off. "Many, seemingly most, proponents of U.S. preeminence do not recognize the existence of options between current policy of promiscuous global interventionism and isolationism." Adherence to the light switch model, Carpenter argues, reflects intellectual rigidity or an effort to stifle discussion about a range of alternatives to the status quo. Selective engagement is a strategy that sits in between primacy and isolationism and, given growing multipolarity and American fiscal precariousness, should be taken seriously. "Selectivity is not merely an option when it comes to embarking on military interventions. It is imperative for a major power that wishes to preserve its strategic insolvency. Otherwise, overextension and national exhaustion become increasing dangers." Carpenter thinks that off-loading U.S. security responsibility must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, the United States must refrain from using military might in campaigns that do not directly deal with U.S. interests. "If a sense of moral indignation, instead of a calculating assessment of the national interest, governs U.S. foreign policy, the United States will become involved in even more murky conflicts in which few if any tangible American interests are at stake."
Today: Posen has argued that the four schools of U.S. grand strategy that he identified in the 1990s have been replaced by just two: liberal hegemony, which came from a fusion of primacy and cooperative security, and restraint, which came from a fusion of neo-isolationism and selective engagement. Other scholars have proposed a third policy, offshore balancing.
Liberal hegemony: Proponents of liberal hegemony favor a world order in which the United States is a hegemon and uses this power advantage to create a liberal international system and at times use force to enforce or spread liberal values (such as individual rights, free trade, and the rule of law). The United States strives to retain overwhelming military power, under a theory that potential competitors will not even try to compete on the global stage. It also retains an extensive network of permanent alliance commitments around the world, using the alliance system both to advance and retain hegemonic power and to solidify emerging liberal political systems. According to Posen, this strategy sees "threats emanating from three major sources: failed states, rogue states, and illiberal peer competitors." Failed states, in this view, are sources of instability; rogue states can sponsor terrorism, acquire weapons of mass destruction, and behave unpredictably; illiberal peer competitors would compete directly with the United States and "would complicate the spread of liberal institutions and the construction of liberal states." Support for liberal hegemonic strategies among major thinkers in both political parties helps explain the broad elite support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2011 intervention in Libya, even though U.S. military involvement in those conflicts had been initiated by presidents of different parties. The chief difference on foreign policy between Republican and Democratic proponents of liberal hegemony, according to Posen, is on support for international institutions as a means to achieving hegemony.
Restraint: Proponents of a grand strategy of restraint call for the United States to significantly reduce its overseas security commitments and largely avoid involvement in conflicts abroad. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Grand strategy | Failed states, in this view, are sources of instability; rogue states can sponsor terrorism, acquire weapons of mass destruction, and behave unpredictably; illiberal peer competitors would compete directly with the United States and "would complicate the spread of liberal institutions and the construction of liberal states." Support for liberal hegemonic strategies among major thinkers in both political parties helps explain the broad elite support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2011 intervention in Libya, even though U.S. military involvement in those conflicts had been initiated by presidents of different parties. The chief difference on foreign policy between Republican and Democratic proponents of liberal hegemony, according to Posen, is on support for international institutions as a means to achieving hegemony.
Restraint: Proponents of a grand strategy of restraint call for the United States to significantly reduce its overseas security commitments and largely avoid involvement in conflicts abroad. America would take advantage of what Posen calls a "remarkably good" strategic position: "[The United States] is rich, distant from other great powers, and defended by a powerful nuclear deterrent. Other great powers are at present weaker than the United States, close to one another, and face the same pressures to defend themselves as does the United States." Proponents of strategic restraint argue, consistent with the realist tradition, that states are self-interested and accordingly will look out for their own interests and balance against aggressors; however, when possible, states prefer to "free ride" or "cheap ride," passing the buck to other states to bear the cost of balancing. Restraint proponents also emphasize the deterrent power of nuclear weapons, which tremendously raise the stakes of confrontations between great powers, breeding caution, rather than rewarding aggression. Restraint advocates see nationalism as a powerful force, one that makes states even more resistant to outside conquest and thus makes the international system more stable. Restraint proponents also argue, drawing on thinkers like the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz, that military force is a blunt, expensive, and unpredictable instrument, and that it accordingly should only be used rarely, for clear goals.
Restraint is distinct from isolationism: isolationists favor restricting trade and immigration and tend to believe that events in the outside world have little impact within the United States. As already noted, it is sometimes confused with non-interventionism. Restraint, however, sees economic dynamism as a key source of national power and accordingly tends to argue for a relatively open trade system. Some restrainers call for supporting this trade system via significant naval patrols; others suggest that the international economy is resilient against disruptions and, with rare exceptions, does not require a powerful state to guarantee the security of global trade.
Offshore balancing: In offshore balancing, the United States would refrain from significant involvement in security affairs overseas except to prevent a state from establishing hegemony in what offshore balancers identify as the world's three key strategic regions: Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. This strategy advocates a significantly reduced overseas presence compared to liberal hegemony, but argues that intervention is necessary in more circumstances than restraint. Offshore balancing is associated with offensive realist theories of state behavior: it believes that conquest can often enable states to gain power, and thus that a hegemon in regions with large economies, high populations, or critical resources could quickly become a global menace to U.S. national interests.
See also:
References:
Sources: Heuser, Beatrice (2010). The Evolution of Strategy. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511762895. ISBN 978-0-521-19968-1.
Kennedy, Paul M. (1991). Grand Strategies in War and Peace. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-05666-2.
Posen, Barry R. (2014). Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-7086-8.
Platias, Athanassios; Koliopoulos, Constantinos (2017). Thucydides on Strategy: Grand Strategies in the Peloponnesian War and Their Relevance Today. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-754805-9.
Further reading: Gaddis, John Lewis (2018). On Grand Strategy. United States: Penguin Press. ISBN 978-1594203510.
Art, Robert J (2004). A Grand Strategy for America. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-8957-0.
Biddle, Stephen. American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment Archived 2018-04-26 at the Wayback Machine. April 2005
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War
Liddell Hart, B. H. Strategy. London:Faber, 1967 (2nd rev. ed.)
Luttwak, E. The Grand strategy of the Roman Empire
Papasotiriou, Harry. Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire
Borgwardt, Elizabeth; Nichols, Christopher Mcknight; Preston, Andrew, eds. (2021). Rethinking American Grand Strategy. doi:10.1093/oso/9780190695668.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-069566-8. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Green-water navy | Definitions: The elements of maritime geography are loosely defined and their meanings have changed throughout history. The US's 2010 Naval Operations Concept defines blue water as "the open ocean", green water as "coastal waters, ports and harbors", and brown water as "navigable rivers and their estuaries". Robert Rubel of the US Naval War College includes bays in his definition of brown water, and in the past US military commentators have extended brown water out to 100 nautical miles (190 km) from shore.
During the Cold War, green water denoted those areas of ocean in which naval forces might encounter land-based aircraft. The development of long-range bombers with anti-ship missiles turned most of the oceans to "green" and the term all but disappeared. After the Cold War, US amphibious task forces were sometimes referred to as the green-water navy, in contrast to the blue-water carrier battle groups. This distinction disappeared as increasing threats in coastal waters forced the amphibious ships further offshore, delivering assaults by helicopter and tiltrotor from over the horizon. This prompted the development of ships designed to operate in such waters – the Zumwalt-class destroyer and the littoral combat ships; modeling has suggested that current NATO frigates are vulnerable to swarms of 4-8 small boats in green water. Rubel has proposed redefining green water as those areas of ocean which are too dangerous for high-value units, requiring offensive power to be dispersed into smaller vessels such as submarines that can use stealth and other characteristics to survive. Under his scheme, brown water would be zones in which ocean-going units could not operate at all, including rivers, minefields, straits, and other choke points.
As the preeminent blue-water navy of the early 21st century, the US Navy is able to define maritime geography in terms of offensive action in the home waters of its enemies, without being constrained by logistics. This is not true for most other navies, whose supply chains and air cover typically limit them to power projection within a few hundred kilometers of home territory. A number of countries are working on overcoming these constraints. Other authors have started to apply the term "green-water navy" to any national navy that has ocean-going ships but lacks the logistical support needed for a blue-water navy. It is often not clear what they mean, as the term is used without consistency or precision.
A green-water navy does not mean that the individual ships of the fleet are unable to function away from the coast or in open ocean: instead, it suggests that due to logistical reasons they are unable to be deployed for lengthy periods and must have aid from other countries to sustain long term deployments. Also, the term "green-water navy" is subjective as numerous countries that do not have a true green-water navy maintain naval forces that are on par with countries that are recognized as having green-water navies. For example, the German Navy has near the same capability as the Canadian Navy but is not recognized as a true green-water navy. Another example is the Portuguese Navy that, despite being usually classified as a minor navy, has several times conducted sustained operations in faraway regions typical of the green-water navies. However, the differences between blue-water navies and brown or green-water navies are usually quite noticeable, for example, the US Navy was able to quickly respond to the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 and continue operations in the region with relative ease even though the search area covered the Indian Ocean. In contrast, in 2005 the then green-water Russian Navy was unable to properly respond when its AS-28 rescue vehicle became tangled in undersea cables unable to surface, relying on the blue-water Royal Navy to respond and carry out the rescue in time.
Just as states build up naval capability, some lose it. For example, the Austro-Hungarian Navy was a modern green water navy of the time, but as the countries lost their coasts during World War I, their navies were confiscated, and their ports became parts of Italy and Yugoslavia. The Axis powers lost naval capabilities after their defeat in World War II, with most of Japan's Imperial Navy and Germany's Navy being disarmed and their troop and ship numbers capped and monitored by the Allies. The collapse of the USSR also brought with it the collapse of the second-largest naval force in the world, and the largest submarine force in the world. Although the Russian Federation made sure to inherit the most capable ships, passing most older models to successor states, as it had lost the logistical capabilities of the Soviet Navy, it was no longer able to operate away from Russian shores for extended periods of time. Moreover, budget cuts forced large cuts in the submarine force, such as the retirements of the Typhoon-class submarine. As the Soviet Navy was built largely around submarine warfare the losses in the submarine capability have adversely affected the capability of the newly formed Russian Navy as well.
Examples:
Australia: The Royal Australian Navy is well established as a green-water navy. The navy sustains a broad range of maritime operations, from the Middle East to the Pacific Ocean, often as part of international or allied coalitions. The RAN operates a modern fleet, consisting of destroyers, frigates, conventional submarines as well as an emerging amphibious and power projection capability based on the commissioning of HMAS Choules and two Canberra-class landing helicopter docks:
Carrier / Amphibious capability – 27,000 tonne HMAS Canberra and HMAS Adelaide
Amphibious capability – 16,190 tonne HMAS Choules.
Replenishment capability – 19,500 tonne HMAS Supply and HMAS Stalwart
Brazil: The Brazilian Navy has frequently been dubbed a "green-water" force by experts. The navy is primarily focused on securing the country's littorals and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), but also maintains the capacity to operate in the wider South Atlantic Ocean. Since the early 2000s, the Brazilian Navy has contributed to a number of peacekeeping and humanitarian missions:
Helicopter Carrier and amphibious capability – 21,000 tonne Atlântico.
Amphibious capability – 12,000 tonne Bahia, 8,757 tonne Newport-class tank landing ship, two 8,571 tonne Round Table-class landing ship logistics
Replenishment capability – 10,000 tone Almirante Gastão Motta.
Canada: According to the criteria as outlined in the 2001 publication, "Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020", the Royal Canadian Navy had met its description of a 3rd tier "Medium Global Force Projection Navy" – a green-water navy with the capacity to project force worldwide with the aid of more powerful maritime allies (e.g. United Kingdom, France and the United States). In this context, the Royal Canadian Navy ranked itself alongside the navies of Australia and the Netherlands:
Replenishing capability: MV Asterix, a dual civilian-military crewed replenishing oiler. This is an interim vessel which will provide at-sea replenishment until two new AORs (Protecteur-class auxiliary vessels) are completed around 2023-2025.
Japan: The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force is considered to be a green-water navy. Overseas JMSDF deployments include participation in the Combined Task Force 150, and an additional task force in the Indian Ocean from 2009 to combat piracy in Somalia. The first postwar overseas naval air facility of Japan was established next to Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport:
Helicopter carrier capability – two 19,000 tonne Hyūga-class helicopter destroyers and two 27,430 tonnes Izumo-class helicopter destroyers. – Can be modified to carry fixed wing aircraft.
Amphibious capability – three 14,000 tonne Ōsumi-class tank landing ships.
Replenishment capability – two 25,000 tonne Mashu class and three 15,000 tonne Towada class.
The Netherlands: The Royal Netherlands Navy has been officially described as a 3rd tier "Medium Global Force Projection Navy" – or a green-water navy with the capacity to project force worldwide with the aid of more powerful maritime allies (e.g. Britain, France and the United States). In this context, the Royal Netherlands Navy ranks alongside the navies of Australia and Canada, while the USN is a 1st tier global blue-water navy and Britain and France are 2nd tier blue-water navies. For many years since the end of the Cold War, the Royal Netherlands Navy has been changing its role from national defence to overseas intervention:
Amphibious capability – 12,750 tonne HNLMS Rotterdam and the 16,800 tonne HNLMS Johan de Witt.
Replenishment capability – 27,800 tonne Karel Doorman (Also has amphibious capabilities), plus combat support ship Den Helder (building; projected service entry 2024).
Spain: The Spanish Navy is a green-water navy, and participates in joint operations with NATO and European allies around the world. The fleet has 54 commissioned ships, including; one amphibious assault ship (also used as an aircraft carrier), two amphibious transport docks, 5 AEGIS destroyers (5 more under construction), 6 frigates, 7 corvettes (2 more under construction) and three conventional submarines. (4 under construction)
Amphibious/carrier capability – 26,000 tonne Juan Carlos I.
Amphibious capability – two 13,815 tonne Galicia-class landing platform docks. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Green-water navy | Replenishment capability – 27,800 tonne Karel Doorman (Also has amphibious capabilities), plus combat support ship Den Helder (building; projected service entry 2024).
Spain: The Spanish Navy is a green-water navy, and participates in joint operations with NATO and European allies around the world. The fleet has 54 commissioned ships, including; one amphibious assault ship (also used as an aircraft carrier), two amphibious transport docks, 5 AEGIS destroyers (5 more under construction), 6 frigates, 7 corvettes (2 more under construction) and three conventional submarines. (4 under construction)
Amphibious/carrier capability – 26,000 tonne Juan Carlos I.
Amphibious capability – two 13,815 tonne Galicia-class landing platform docks.
Replenishment capability – 17,045 tonne Patiño and the 19,500 tonne Cantabria replenishment ships.
South Korea: The Republic of Korea Navy is considered to be a green-water navy. In 2011, the government authorized the building of a naval base on Jeju Island to support the new Dokdo-class amphibious assault ships, the base will also be capable of supporting joint forces with the US Navy. A ski-jump for the operation of V/STOL jet fighters is being considered for the second ship of the Dokdo class. The Korean government is considering to buy surplus Harriers as a possible interim for the F-35 Lightning II if they choose to operate VTOL aircraft at all. On December 3, 2021, the National Assembly passed the budget to fund a fixed-wing aircraft carrier tentatively named CVX-class aircraft carrier capable of operating F35B, expected to enter operations possibly as early as 2033 LinkLinkLink South Korea participates in the Combined Task Force 151 with the expeditionary force Cheonghae Unit:
Helicopter carrier capability – two 18,800 tonne Dokdo-class amphibious assault ships
Amphibious capability – four 7,300 tonne Cheon Wang Bong-class LSTs, and four 4,300 tonne Go Jun Bong-class LSTs
Replenishment capability – one 23,000 tonne Soyang-class replenishment ship, and three 9,180 tonne Cheonji-class replenishment ships
Turkey: According to a report by Haifa University, Turkey's naval might has become a significant source of concern for the Middle East and the Balkans, as they have greatly modernized its maritime force in recent years. The study puts the Turkish Naval Forces as the strongest in the region (Middle East), and describes the Turkish navy as being a "green-water navy". According to Israeli Colonel Shlomo Guetta, one of the report's authors, Turkey is building a Navy that characterises a regional power and can conduct long-range operations. Guetta also highlighted the Turkish Navy's strike force and intervention capacity. A flagship project is the construction of TCG Anadolu, an amphibious assault ship that can serve as a light aircraft carrier. Quoting US military expert Richard Parley's estimates, the report argued that the new warship will offer Turkey unprecedented strike capabilities in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. The Turkish Navy, as of 2021, has a total of 156 naval assets, but Turkey plans to add a total of 24 new ships, which include four frigates, before the Republic reaches the 100th anniversary of its founding in 2023:
Amphibious/carrier capability – 24,660 tonne TCG Anadolu.
Amphibious capability – four 7,370 tonne Bayraktar-class tank landing ship, and the 3,773 tonne TCG Osman Gazi.
Replenishment capability – two 19,350 tonne Akar-class replenishment oiler.
Iran: Recently Iran has tried to expand its naval presence out of its own territorial waters by building new indigenous warships like Mowj-class frigates. Iran also participates in joint naval exercises with countries like Russia, China and India. The Iranian navy mostly operates in the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Caspian Sea, and the Mediterranean and has a fleet of 9 frigates (2 under construction), 17 corvettes and 35 conventional submarines (2 under construction).
Additionally, Iran has a second navy branch, The IRGC-N. Naval branch of IRGC mostly operates land-based cruise missiles and speedboats each carrying a variety of weapons, from anti-ship missiles to torpedoes and even rockets. This is suitable for the mission this force has, protecting local waters in Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and the Caspian Sea. Though this force expanded its arsenal by building missile corvettes and forward base ships, Like 4 Shahid Soleimani-class double hulled ships (1 under construction)to operate much further than Iranian local waters:
Amphibious capability – Four 2,581 tonne Hengam-class amphibious landing ships.
Carrier/replenishment capability – 120,000 tonne IRIS Makran, 12,000 tonne Shahid Roudaki (IRGC-N), 2,100 tonne Shahid Mahdavi (IRGC-N)
Drone carrier capability – 36,000 tonne Shahid Bagheri (IRGC-N)
Replenishment capability- two Bandar Abbas-class and four Kangan-class replenishment ships.
See also: Blue-water navy
Brown-water navy
Maritime geography
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Grey-zone (international relations) | Definition: Use of the term grey-zone is widespread in national security circles, but there is no universal agreement on the definition of grey-zone, or even whether it is a useful term, with views about the term ranging from "faddish" or "vague", to "useful" or "brilliant".
The grey-zone is defined as "competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality." by the United States Special Operations Command. A key element of operations within the grey-zone is that they remain below the threshold of an attack which could have a legitimate conventional military response (jus ad bellum). One paper defined it as "coercive statecraft actions short of war", and a "mainly non-military domain of human activity in which states use national resources to deliberately coerce other states". The Center for Strategic and International Studies defines the grey-zone as "the contested arena somewhere between routine statecraft and open warfare." British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace called the grey-zone "that limbo land between peace and war."
Grey zone warfare generally means a middle, unclear space that exists between direct conflict and peace in international relations.
According to Vincent Cable, examples of grey-zone activities include undermining industrial value chains or oil and gas supplies, money laundering, and the use of espionage and sabotage. According to Lee Hsi-ming "gray zone conflict is characterized by using the threat of force to create fear and intimidation." US Navy admiral Samuel Paparo has termed gray zone activities "illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive" (ICAP) following the preferred term of Romeo Brawner Jr.
History: The term grey-zone was coined by the United States Special Operations Command and published in a 2015 white paper. The concept of the grey-zone is built on existing military strategies; however, information technology has created radical new spaces which have expanded what is possible. Modern hybrid warfare and political warfare operations primarily occur in the grey-zone.
In the late 2010s, China escalated to grey-zone warfare with Taiwan in an attempt to force unification with the smaller country. Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration has had to expand rapidly to meet the rising grey-zone challenge. China's grey-zone operations against Taiwan in the maritime domain are meant to establish presence while maintaining plausible deniability.
Concerns: It is generally believed that non-democratic states can operate more effectively in the grey-zone as they are much less limited by domestic law and regulation. It can also be very hard for democratic states to respond to grey-zone threats because their legal and military systems are geared towards seeing conflicts through the sense of war and peace with little preparation or consideration for anything in between. This can lead democratic states to either dramatically overreact or under-react when faced with a grey-zone challenge.
Relation with hybrid warfare: The concept of grey-zone conflicts or warfare is distinct from the concept of hybrid warfare, although the two are intimately linked as in the modern era states most often apply unconventional tools and hybrid techniques in the grey-zone. However many of the unconventional tools used by states in the grey-zone such as propaganda campaigns, economic pressure and the use of non-state entities do not cross over the threshold into formalized state-level aggression.
See also: Gunboat diplomacy
Proxy war
Chinese salami slicing strategy
Unrestricted Warfare
References:
Further reading: Layton, Peter (2021). China's Enduring Grey-Zone Challenge (PDF) (Online PDF). Air and Space Power Centre. ISBN 9781925062502. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Guerrilla | Etymology: The Spanish word guerrilla is the diminutive form of guerra ("war"); hence, "little war". The term became popular during the early-19th century Peninsular War, when, after the defeat of their regular armies, the Spanish and Portuguese people successfully rose against the Napoleonic troops and defeated a highly superior army using the guerrilla strategy in combination with a scorched earth policy and people's war (see also attrition warfare against Napoleon). In correct Spanish usage, a person who is a member of a guerrilla unit is a guerrillero ([geriˈʎeɾo]) if male, or a guerrillera ([geriˈʎeɾa]) if female. Arthur Wellesley adopted the term "guerrilla" into English from Spanish usage in 1809, to refer to the individual fighters (e.g., "I have recommended to set the Guerrillas to work"), and also (as in Spanish) to denote a group or band of such fighters. However, in most languages guerrilla still denotes a specific style of warfare. The use of the diminutive evokes the differences in number, scale, and scope between the guerrilla army and the formal, professional army of the state.
History: Prehistoric tribal warriors presumably employed guerrilla-style tactics against enemy tribes:
Primitive (and guerrilla) warfare consists of war stripped to its essentials: the murder of enemies; the theft or destruction of their sustenance, wealth, and essential resources; and the inducement in them of insecurity and terror. It conducts the basic business of war without recourse to ponderous formations or equipment, complicated maneuvers, strict chains of command, calculated strategies, timetables, or other civilized embellishments.
Evidence of conventional warfare, on the other hand, did not emerge until 3100 BC in Egypt and Mesopotamia. The Chinese general and strategist Sun Tzu, in his The Art of War (6th century BC), became one of the earliest to propose the use of guerrilla warfare. This inspired developments in modern guerrilla warfare.
In the 3rd century BC, Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, used elements of guerrilla warfare, such as the evasion of battle, the attempt to wear down the enemy, to attack small detachments in an ambush and devised the Fabian strategy, which the Roman Republic used to great effect against Hannibal's army, see also His Excellency : George Washington: the Fabian choice. The Roman general Quintus Sertorius is also noted for his skillful use of guerrilla warfare during his revolt against the Roman Senate.
In the medieval Roman Empire, guerrilla warfare was frequently practiced between the eighth through tenth centuries along the eastern frontier with the Umayyad and then Abbasid caliphates. Tactics involved a heavy emphasis on reconnaissance and intelligence, shadowing the enemy, evacuating threatened population centres, and attacking when the enemy dispersed to raid. In the later tenth century this form of warfare was codified in a military manual known by its later Latin name as De velitatione bellica ('On Skirmishing') so it would not be forgotten in the future.
The Normans often made many forays into Wales, where the Welsh used the mountainous region, which the Normans were unfamiliar with, to spring surprise attacks upon them.
Since the Enlightenment, ideologies such as nationalism, liberalism, socialism, and religious fundamentalism have played an important role in shaping insurgencies and guerrilla warfare.
In the 17th century, Chatrapati Shivaji Maharaj, founder of the Maratha Kingdom, pioneered the Shiva sutra or Ganimi Kava (Guerrilla Tactics) to defeat the many times larger and more powerful armies of the Mughal Empire.
Kerala Varma (Pazhassi Raja) (1753–1805) used guerrilla techniques chiefly centred in mountain forests in the Cotiote War against the British East India Company in India between 1793 and 1806. Arthur Wellesley (in India 1797–1805) had commanded forces assigned to defeat Pazhassi's techniques but failed. It was the longest war waged by East India Company during their military campaigns on the Indian subcontinent. It was one of the bloodiest and hardest wars waged by East India Company in India with Presidency army regiments that suffered losses as high as eighty percent in 10 years of warfare.
The Dominican Restoration War was a guerrilla war between 1863 and 1865 in the Dominican Republic between nationalists and Spain, the latter of which had recolonized the country 17 years after its independence. The war resulted in the withdrawal of Spanish forces and the establishment of a second republic in the Dominican Republic.
The Moroccan military leader Abd el-Krim (c. 1883 – 1963) and his father unified the Moroccan tribes under their control and took up arms against the Spanish and French occupiers during the Rif War in 1920. For the first time in history, tunnel warfare was used alongside modern guerrilla tactics, which caused considerable damage to both the colonial armies in Morocco.
In the early 20th century Michael Collins and Tom Barry both developed many tactical features of guerrilla warfare during the guerrilla phase of the 1919–1921 Irish War of Independence. Collins developed mainly urban guerrilla warfare tactics in Dublin City (the Irish capital). Operations in which small Irish Republican Army (IRA) units (3 to 6 guerrillas) quickly attacked a target and then disappeared into civilian crowds frustrated the British enemy. The best example of this occurred on Bloody Sunday (21 November 1920), when Collins's assassination unit, known as "The Squad", wiped out a group of British intelligence agents ("the Cairo Gang") early in the morning (14 were killed, six were wounded) – some regular officers were also killed in the purge. That afternoon, the Royal Irish Constabulary force consisting of both regular RIC personnel and the Auxiliary Division took revenge, shooting into a crowd at a football match in Croke Park, killing fourteen civilians and injuring 60 others.
In West County Cork, Tom Barry was the commander of the IRA West Cork brigade. Fighting in west Cork was rural, and the IRA fought in much larger units than their fellows in urban areas. These units, called "flying columns", engaged British forces in large battles, usually for between 10 – 30 minutes. The Kilmichael Ambush in November 1920 and the Crossbarry Ambush in March 1921 are the most famous examples of Barry's flying columns causing large casualties to enemy forces.
The Algerian Revolution of 1954 started with a handful of Algerian guerrillas. Primitively armed, the guerrillas fought the French for over eight years. This remains a prototype for modern insurgency and counterinsurgency, terrorism, torture, and asymmetric warfare prevalent throughout the world today. In South Africa, African National Congress (ANC) members studied the Algerian War, prior to the release and apotheosis of Nelson Mandela; in their intifada against Israel, Palestinian fighters have sought to emulate it. Additionally, the tactics of Al-Qaeda closely resemble those of the Algerians.
The Mukti Bahini (Bengali: মুক্তিবাহিনী, translates as "freedom fighters", or liberation army), also known as the Bangladesh Forces, was the guerrilla resistance movement consisting of the Bangladeshi military, paramilitary and civilians during the Bangladesh Liberation War that transformed East Pakistan into Bangladesh in 1971. An earlier name Mukti Fauj was also used.
Theoretical works: The growth of guerrilla warfare was inspired in part by theoretical works on guerrilla warfare, starting with the Manual de Guerra de Guerrillas by Matías Ramón Mella written in the 19th century:...our troops should...fight while protected by the terrain...using small, mobile guerrilla units to exhaust the enemy...denying them rest so that they only control the terrain under their feet.
More recently, Mao Zedong's On Guerrilla Warfare, Che Guevara's Guerrilla Warfare, and Lenin's Guerrilla warfare, were all written after the successful revolutions carried out by them in China, Cuba and Russia, respectively. Those texts characterized the tactic of guerrilla warfare as, according to Che Guevara's text, being "used by the side which is supported by a majority but which possesses a much smaller number of arms for use in defense against oppression".
Foco theory: Why does the guerrilla fighter fight? We must come to the inevitable conclusion that the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer, that he takes up arms responding to the angry protest of the people against their oppressors, and that he fights in order to change the social system that keeps all his unarmed brothers in ignominy and misery.
In the 1960s, the Marxist revolutionary Che Guevara developed the foco (Spanish: foquismo) theory of revolution in his book Guerrilla Warfare, based on his experiences during the 1959 Cuban Revolution. This theory was later formalized as "focal-ism" by Régis Debray. Its central principle is that vanguardism by cadres of small, fast-moving paramilitary groups can provide a focus for popular discontent against a sitting regime, and thereby lead a general insurrection. Although the original approach was to mobilize and launch attacks from rural areas, many foco ideas were adapted into urban guerrilla warfare movements.
Strategy, tactics and methods:
Strategy: Guerrilla warfare is a type of asymmetric warfare: competition between opponents of unequal strength. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Guerrilla | In the 1960s, the Marxist revolutionary Che Guevara developed the foco (Spanish: foquismo) theory of revolution in his book Guerrilla Warfare, based on his experiences during the 1959 Cuban Revolution. This theory was later formalized as "focal-ism" by Régis Debray. Its central principle is that vanguardism by cadres of small, fast-moving paramilitary groups can provide a focus for popular discontent against a sitting regime, and thereby lead a general insurrection. Although the original approach was to mobilize and launch attacks from rural areas, many foco ideas were adapted into urban guerrilla warfare movements.
Strategy, tactics and methods:
Strategy: Guerrilla warfare is a type of asymmetric warfare: competition between opponents of unequal strength. It is also a type of irregular warfare: that is, it aims not simply to defeat an invading enemy, but to win popular support and political influence, to the enemy's cost. Accordingly, guerrilla strategy aims to magnify the impact of a small, mobile force on a larger, more cumbersome one. If successful, guerrillas weaken their enemy by attrition, eventually forcing them to withdraw.
Tactics: Tactically, guerrillas usually avoid confrontation with large units and formations of enemy troops but seek and attack small groups of enemy personnel and resources to gradually deplete the opposing force while minimizing their own losses. The guerrilla prizes mobility, secrecy, and surprise, organizing in small units and taking advantage of terrain that is difficult for larger units to use. For example, Mao Zedong summarized basic guerrilla tactics at the beginning of the Chinese Civil War as:"The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." At least one author credits the ancient Chinese work The Art of War with inspiring Mao's tactics. In the 20th century, other communist leaders, including North Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh, often used and developed guerrilla warfare tactics, which provided a model for their use elsewhere, leading to the Cuban "foco" theory and the anti-Soviet Mujahadeen in Afghanistan.
Unconventional methods: Guerrilla groups may use improvised explosive devices and logistical support by the local population. The opposing army may come at last to suspect all civilians as potential guerrilla backers. The guerrillas might get political support from foreign backers and many guerrilla groups are adept at public persuasion through propaganda and use of force. Some guerrilla movements today also rely heavily on children as combatants, scouts, porters, spies, informants, and in other roles. Many governments and states also recruit children within their armed forces.
Comparison of guerrilla warfare and terrorism: No commonly accepted definition of "terrorism" has attained clear consensus. The term "terrorism" is often used as political propaganda by belligerents (most often by governments in power) to denounce opponents whose status as terrorists is disputed.
While the primary concern of guerrillas is the enemy's active military units, actual terrorists largely are concerned with non-military agents and target mostly civilians.
See also:
Notes:
References: Asprey, Robert Brown (2023). "guerrilla warfare". Entry within britannica.
Boeke, Sergei (2019). "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb". International Relations. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/obo/9780199743292-0267. ISBN 978-0-19-974329-2. Retrieved 17 July 2021.
Boot, Max (2013). Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present. Liveright. pp. 10–11, 55. ISBN 978-0-87140-424-4.
Chamberlin, Paul Thomas (2015). The global offensive : the United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the making of the post-cold war order. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-021782-2. OCLC 907783262.
Child Soldiers International (2012). "Louder than words: An agenda for action to end state use of child soldiers". Archived from the original on 8 March 2019. Retrieved 19 January 2018.
Child Soldiers International (2016). "A law unto themselves? Confronting the recruitment of children by armed groups". Archived from the original on 8 March 2019. Retrieved 19 January 2018.
Creveld, Martin van (2000). "Technology and War II:Postmodern War?". In Charles Townshend (ed.). The Oxford History of Modern War. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 356–358. ISBN 978-0-19-285373-8.
Dennis, George (1985). Three Byzantine Military Treatises. Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks. p. 147.
Detsch, J (2017). "Pentagon braces for Islamic State insurgency after Mosul". Al-Monitor. Archived from the original on 12 July 2017. Retrieved 24 January 2018.
Drew, Allison (2015). "Visions of liberation: the Algerian war of independence and its South African reverberations". Review of African Political Economy. 42 (143): 22–43. doi:10.1080/03056244.2014.1000288. hdl:10.1080/03056244.2014.1000288. ISSN 0305-6244. S2CID 144545186.
Duff, James Grant (2014). The History Of The Mahrattas. Pickle Partners Publishing. p. 376. ISBN 9781782892335.
Ellis, Joseph J. (2005). His Excellency : George Washington. New York: Vintage Books. pp. 92–109. ISBN 9781400032532 – via Internet Archive.
Emmerson, B (2016). "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism" (PDF). www.un.org. Retrieved 24 January 2018.
etymonline (2023). "guerrilla". Origin and meaning of guerrilla by Online Etymology Dictionary. Retrieved 14 July 2023.
Ferriter, Diarmaid (2020). "Diarmaid Ferriter: Bloody Sunday 1920 changed British attitudes to Ireland". The Irish Times.
Guevara, Ernesto Che (2006). Guerrilla Warfare – via Internet Archive.
Halibozek, Edward P.; Jones, Andy; Kovacich, Gerald L. (2008). The corporate security professional's handbook on terrorism (illustrated ed.). Elsevier (Butterworth-Heinemann). pp. 4–5. ISBN 978-0-7506-8257-2. Retrieved 17 December 2016.
Hanhimäki, Jussi M.; Blumenau, Bernhard; Rapaport, David (2013). "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism" (PDF). An International History of Terrorism: Western and Non-Western Experiences. Routledge. pp. 46–73. ISBN 9780415635417. Archived from the original (PDF) on 21 February 2014.
historyireland (2003). "Bloody Sunday 1920: new evidence".
Hooper, Nicholas; Bennett, Matthew (1996). Cambridge illustrated atlas, warfare : the Middle Ages, 768-1487. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-44049-3 – via Internet Archive.
Horne, Alistair (2022). "A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962. Rev. ed". The SHAFR Guide Online. doi:10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim220070002. Retrieved 17 July 2023.
islamicus (2023). "ABD EL-KRIM". Islamicus. Archived from the original on 14 June 2023.
Keeley, Lawrence H. (1997). War Before Civilization. Oxford University Press.
Kruijt, Dirk; Tristán, Eduardo Rey; Álvarez, Alberto Martín (2019). Latin American Guerrilla Movements: Origins, Evolution, Outcomes. Routledge. ISBN 9780429534270.
Laqueur, Walter (1977). Guerrilla : a historical and critical study. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. ISBN 9780297771845 – via Internet archive.
Lenin, V. I. (1906). "Guerrilla Warfare". Archived from the original on 11 May 2023 – via Internet archive.
Leonard, Thomas M. (1989). Encyclopedia of the developing world.
Mao, Zedong (1965). Selected Works: A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire. Vol. I. Foreign Languages Press – via Internet Archive. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Guerrilla | War Before Civilization. Oxford University Press.
Kruijt, Dirk; Tristán, Eduardo Rey; Álvarez, Alberto Martín (2019). Latin American Guerrilla Movements: Origins, Evolution, Outcomes. Routledge. ISBN 9780429534270.
Laqueur, Walter (1977). Guerrilla : a historical and critical study. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. ISBN 9780297771845 – via Internet archive.
Lenin, V. I. (1906). "Guerrilla Warfare". Archived from the original on 11 May 2023 – via Internet archive.
Leonard, Thomas M. (1989). Encyclopedia of the developing world.
Mao, Zedong (1965). Selected Works: A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire. Vol. I. Foreign Languages Press – via Internet Archive.
Mao, Zedong (1989). On Guerrilla Warfare. Washington: U.S. Marine Corps – via Internet Archive.
McMahon, Lucas (2016). "De Velitatione Bellica and Byzantine Guerrilla Warfare" (PDF). The Annual of Medieval Studies at CEU. 22: 22–33. Archived (PDF) from the original on 7 August 2021.
McNeilly, Mark (2003). Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare. p. 204.
OED (2023). "guerrilla". Oxford English Dictionary.
Pons, Frank Moya (1998). The Dominican Republic: a national history. Markus Wiener Publishers. ISBN 978-1-55876-192-6. Retrieved 15 August 2011.
Rowe, P (2002). "Freedom fighters and rebels: the rules of civil war". J R Soc Med. 95 (1): 3–4. doi:10.1177/014107680209500102. PMC 1279138. PMID 11773342.
Snyder, Craig (1999). Contemporary security and strategy.
Sinclair, Samuel Justin; Antonius, Daniel (2012). The Psychology of Terrorism Fears. Oxford University Press, USA. ISBN 978-0-19-538811-4.
Tamer, Dr. Cenk (25 September 2017). "The Differences Between the Guerrilla Warfare and Terrorism".
Tomes, Robert (2004). "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare" (PDF). Parameters. Archived from the original (PDF) on 7 June 2010.
United Nations Secretary-General (2017). "Report of the Secretary-General: Children and armed conflict, 2017". www.un.org. Retrieved 24 January 2018.
Williamson, Myra (2009). Terrorism, war and international law: the legality of the use of force against Afghanistan in 2001. Ashgate Publishing. ISBN 978-0-7546-7403-0.
Wilson, William John (1883). History of Madras Army. Printed by E. Keys at the Govt. Press – via Internet Archive.
Attribution:
This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Flying column". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 10 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 585.
Further reading: Asprey, Robert. War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History
Beckett, I. F. W. (15 September 2009). Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare (Hardcover). Santa Barbara, California: Abc-Clio Inc. ISBN 978-0874369298. ISBN 9780874369298
Derradji Abder-Rahmane, The Algerian Guerrilla Campaign Strategy & Tactics, Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997.
Hinckle, Warren (with Steven Chain and David Goldstein): Guerrilla-Krieg in USA (Guerrilla war in the USA), Stuttgart (Deutsche Verlagsanstalt) 1971. ISBN 3-421-01592-9
Keats, John (1990). They Fought Alone. Time Life. ISBN 0-8094-8555-9
Kreiman, Guillermo (2024). "Revolutionary days: Introducing the Latin American Guerrillas Dataset". Journal of Peace Research.
MacDonald, Peter. Giap: The Victor in Vietnam
The Heretic: the life and times of Josip Broz-Tito. 1957.
Oller, John. The Swamp Fox: How Francis Marion Saved the American Revolution. Boston: Da Capo Press, 2016. ISBN 978-0-306-82457-9.
Peers, William R.; Brelis, Dean. Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America's Most Successful Guerrilla Force. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1963.
Polack, Peter. Guerrilla Warfare; Kings of Revolution Casemate,ISBN 9781612006758.
Thomas Powers, "The War without End" (review of Steve Coll, Directorate S: The CIA and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Penguin, 2018, 757 pp.), The New York Review of Books, vol. LXV, no. 7 (19 April 2018), pp. 42–43. "Forty-plus years after our failure in Vietnam, the United States is again fighting an endless war in a faraway place against a culture and a people we don't understand for political reasons that make sense in Washington, but nowhere else." (p. 43.)
Schmidt, LS. 1982. "American Involvement in the Filipino Resistance on Mindanao During the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945" Archived 5 October 2015 at the Wayback Machine. M.S. Thesis. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. 274 pp.
Sutherland, Daniel E. "Sideshow No Longer: A Historiographical Review of the Guerrilla War." Civil War History 46.1 (2000): 5–23; American Civil War, 1861–65
Sutherland, Daniel E. A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American Civil War (U of North Carolina Press, 2009). online Archived 24 June 2018 at the Wayback Machine
Weber, Olivier, Afghan Eternity, 2002
External links:
abcNEWS: The Secret War on YouTube – Pakistani militants conduct raids in Iran
abcNEWS Exclusive: The Secret War – Deadly guerrilla raids in Iran
Insurgency Research Group – Multi-expert blog dedicated to the study of insurgency and the development of counter-insurgency policy.
Guerrilla warfare on Spartacus Educational
Encyclopædia Britannica, Guerrilla warfare
Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare
Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare United States Army Special Operations Command
Counter Insurgency Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS)India |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Guerrilla warfare | Etymology: The Spanish word guerrilla is the diminutive form of guerra ("war"); hence, "little war". The term became popular during the early-19th century Peninsular War, when, after the defeat of their regular armies, the Spanish and Portuguese people successfully rose against the Napoleonic troops and defeated a highly superior army using the guerrilla strategy in combination with a scorched earth policy and people's war (see also attrition warfare against Napoleon). In correct Spanish usage, a person who is a member of a guerrilla unit is a guerrillero ([geriˈʎeɾo]) if male, or a guerrillera ([geriˈʎeɾa]) if female. Arthur Wellesley adopted the term "guerrilla" into English from Spanish usage in 1809, to refer to the individual fighters (e.g., "I have recommended to set the Guerrillas to work"), and also (as in Spanish) to denote a group or band of such fighters. However, in most languages guerrilla still denotes a specific style of warfare. The use of the diminutive evokes the differences in number, scale, and scope between the guerrilla army and the formal, professional army of the state.
History: Prehistoric tribal warriors presumably employed guerrilla-style tactics against enemy tribes:
Primitive (and guerrilla) warfare consists of war stripped to its essentials: the murder of enemies; the theft or destruction of their sustenance, wealth, and essential resources; and the inducement in them of insecurity and terror. It conducts the basic business of war without recourse to ponderous formations or equipment, complicated maneuvers, strict chains of command, calculated strategies, timetables, or other civilized embellishments.
Evidence of conventional warfare, on the other hand, did not emerge until 3100 BC in Egypt and Mesopotamia. The Chinese general and strategist Sun Tzu, in his The Art of War (6th century BC), became one of the earliest to propose the use of guerrilla warfare. This inspired developments in modern guerrilla warfare.
In the 3rd century BC, Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, used elements of guerrilla warfare, such as the evasion of battle, the attempt to wear down the enemy, to attack small detachments in an ambush and devised the Fabian strategy, which the Roman Republic used to great effect against Hannibal's army, see also His Excellency : George Washington: the Fabian choice. The Roman general Quintus Sertorius is also noted for his skillful use of guerrilla warfare during his revolt against the Roman Senate.
In the medieval Roman Empire, guerrilla warfare was frequently practiced between the eighth through tenth centuries along the eastern frontier with the Umayyad and then Abbasid caliphates. Tactics involved a heavy emphasis on reconnaissance and intelligence, shadowing the enemy, evacuating threatened population centres, and attacking when the enemy dispersed to raid. In the later tenth century this form of warfare was codified in a military manual known by its later Latin name as De velitatione bellica ('On Skirmishing') so it would not be forgotten in the future.
The Normans often made many forays into Wales, where the Welsh used the mountainous region, which the Normans were unfamiliar with, to spring surprise attacks upon them.
Since the Enlightenment, ideologies such as nationalism, liberalism, socialism, and religious fundamentalism have played an important role in shaping insurgencies and guerrilla warfare.
In the 17th century, Chatrapati Shivaji Maharaj, founder of the Maratha Kingdom, pioneered the Shiva sutra or Ganimi Kava (Guerrilla Tactics) to defeat the many times larger and more powerful armies of the Mughal Empire.
Kerala Varma (Pazhassi Raja) (1753–1805) used guerrilla techniques chiefly centred in mountain forests in the Cotiote War against the British East India Company in India between 1793 and 1806. Arthur Wellesley (in India 1797–1805) had commanded forces assigned to defeat Pazhassi's techniques but failed. It was the longest war waged by East India Company during their military campaigns on the Indian subcontinent. It was one of the bloodiest and hardest wars waged by East India Company in India with Presidency army regiments that suffered losses as high as eighty percent in 10 years of warfare.
The Dominican Restoration War was a guerrilla war between 1863 and 1865 in the Dominican Republic between nationalists and Spain, the latter of which had recolonized the country 17 years after its independence. The war resulted in the withdrawal of Spanish forces and the establishment of a second republic in the Dominican Republic.
The Moroccan military leader Abd el-Krim (c. 1883 – 1963) and his father unified the Moroccan tribes under their control and took up arms against the Spanish and French occupiers during the Rif War in 1920. For the first time in history, tunnel warfare was used alongside modern guerrilla tactics, which caused considerable damage to both the colonial armies in Morocco.
In the early 20th century Michael Collins and Tom Barry both developed many tactical features of guerrilla warfare during the guerrilla phase of the 1919–1921 Irish War of Independence. Collins developed mainly urban guerrilla warfare tactics in Dublin City (the Irish capital). Operations in which small Irish Republican Army (IRA) units (3 to 6 guerrillas) quickly attacked a target and then disappeared into civilian crowds frustrated the British enemy. The best example of this occurred on Bloody Sunday (21 November 1920), when Collins's assassination unit, known as "The Squad", wiped out a group of British intelligence agents ("the Cairo Gang") early in the morning (14 were killed, six were wounded) – some regular officers were also killed in the purge. That afternoon, the Royal Irish Constabulary force consisting of both regular RIC personnel and the Auxiliary Division took revenge, shooting into a crowd at a football match in Croke Park, killing fourteen civilians and injuring 60 others.
In West County Cork, Tom Barry was the commander of the IRA West Cork brigade. Fighting in west Cork was rural, and the IRA fought in much larger units than their fellows in urban areas. These units, called "flying columns", engaged British forces in large battles, usually for between 10 – 30 minutes. The Kilmichael Ambush in November 1920 and the Crossbarry Ambush in March 1921 are the most famous examples of Barry's flying columns causing large casualties to enemy forces.
The Algerian Revolution of 1954 started with a handful of Algerian guerrillas. Primitively armed, the guerrillas fought the French for over eight years. This remains a prototype for modern insurgency and counterinsurgency, terrorism, torture, and asymmetric warfare prevalent throughout the world today. In South Africa, African National Congress (ANC) members studied the Algerian War, prior to the release and apotheosis of Nelson Mandela; in their intifada against Israel, Palestinian fighters have sought to emulate it. Additionally, the tactics of Al-Qaeda closely resemble those of the Algerians.
The Mukti Bahini (Bengali: মুক্তিবাহিনী, translates as "freedom fighters", or liberation army), also known as the Bangladesh Forces, was the guerrilla resistance movement consisting of the Bangladeshi military, paramilitary and civilians during the Bangladesh Liberation War that transformed East Pakistan into Bangladesh in 1971. An earlier name Mukti Fauj was also used.
Theoretical works: The growth of guerrilla warfare was inspired in part by theoretical works on guerrilla warfare, starting with the Manual de Guerra de Guerrillas by Matías Ramón Mella written in the 19th century:...our troops should...fight while protected by the terrain...using small, mobile guerrilla units to exhaust the enemy...denying them rest so that they only control the terrain under their feet.
More recently, Mao Zedong's On Guerrilla Warfare, Che Guevara's Guerrilla Warfare, and Lenin's Guerrilla warfare, were all written after the successful revolutions carried out by them in China, Cuba and Russia, respectively. Those texts characterized the tactic of guerrilla warfare as, according to Che Guevara's text, being "used by the side which is supported by a majority but which possesses a much smaller number of arms for use in defense against oppression".
Foco theory: Why does the guerrilla fighter fight? We must come to the inevitable conclusion that the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer, that he takes up arms responding to the angry protest of the people against their oppressors, and that he fights in order to change the social system that keeps all his unarmed brothers in ignominy and misery.
In the 1960s, the Marxist revolutionary Che Guevara developed the foco (Spanish: foquismo) theory of revolution in his book Guerrilla Warfare, based on his experiences during the 1959 Cuban Revolution. This theory was later formalized as "focal-ism" by Régis Debray. Its central principle is that vanguardism by cadres of small, fast-moving paramilitary groups can provide a focus for popular discontent against a sitting regime, and thereby lead a general insurrection. Although the original approach was to mobilize and launch attacks from rural areas, many foco ideas were adapted into urban guerrilla warfare movements.
Strategy, tactics and methods:
Strategy: Guerrilla warfare is a type of asymmetric warfare: competition between opponents of unequal strength. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Guerrilla warfare | In the 1960s, the Marxist revolutionary Che Guevara developed the foco (Spanish: foquismo) theory of revolution in his book Guerrilla Warfare, based on his experiences during the 1959 Cuban Revolution. This theory was later formalized as "focal-ism" by Régis Debray. Its central principle is that vanguardism by cadres of small, fast-moving paramilitary groups can provide a focus for popular discontent against a sitting regime, and thereby lead a general insurrection. Although the original approach was to mobilize and launch attacks from rural areas, many foco ideas were adapted into urban guerrilla warfare movements.
Strategy, tactics and methods:
Strategy: Guerrilla warfare is a type of asymmetric warfare: competition between opponents of unequal strength. It is also a type of irregular warfare: that is, it aims not simply to defeat an invading enemy, but to win popular support and political influence, to the enemy's cost. Accordingly, guerrilla strategy aims to magnify the impact of a small, mobile force on a larger, more cumbersome one. If successful, guerrillas weaken their enemy by attrition, eventually forcing them to withdraw.
Tactics: Tactically, guerrillas usually avoid confrontation with large units and formations of enemy troops but seek and attack small groups of enemy personnel and resources to gradually deplete the opposing force while minimizing their own losses. The guerrilla prizes mobility, secrecy, and surprise, organizing in small units and taking advantage of terrain that is difficult for larger units to use. For example, Mao Zedong summarized basic guerrilla tactics at the beginning of the Chinese Civil War as:"The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." At least one author credits the ancient Chinese work The Art of War with inspiring Mao's tactics. In the 20th century, other communist leaders, including North Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh, often used and developed guerrilla warfare tactics, which provided a model for their use elsewhere, leading to the Cuban "foco" theory and the anti-Soviet Mujahadeen in Afghanistan.
Unconventional methods: Guerrilla groups may use improvised explosive devices and logistical support by the local population. The opposing army may come at last to suspect all civilians as potential guerrilla backers. The guerrillas might get political support from foreign backers and many guerrilla groups are adept at public persuasion through propaganda and use of force. Some guerrilla movements today also rely heavily on children as combatants, scouts, porters, spies, informants, and in other roles. Many governments and states also recruit children within their armed forces.
Comparison of guerrilla warfare and terrorism: No commonly accepted definition of "terrorism" has attained clear consensus. The term "terrorism" is often used as political propaganda by belligerents (most often by governments in power) to denounce opponents whose status as terrorists is disputed.
While the primary concern of guerrillas is the enemy's active military units, actual terrorists largely are concerned with non-military agents and target mostly civilians.
See also:
Notes:
References: Asprey, Robert Brown (2023). "guerrilla warfare". Entry within britannica.
Boeke, Sergei (2019). "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb". International Relations. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/obo/9780199743292-0267. ISBN 978-0-19-974329-2. Retrieved 17 July 2021.
Boot, Max (2013). Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present. Liveright. pp. 10–11, 55. ISBN 978-0-87140-424-4.
Chamberlin, Paul Thomas (2015). The global offensive : the United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the making of the post-cold war order. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-021782-2. OCLC 907783262.
Child Soldiers International (2012). "Louder than words: An agenda for action to end state use of child soldiers". Archived from the original on 8 March 2019. Retrieved 19 January 2018.
Child Soldiers International (2016). "A law unto themselves? Confronting the recruitment of children by armed groups". Archived from the original on 8 March 2019. Retrieved 19 January 2018.
Creveld, Martin van (2000). "Technology and War II:Postmodern War?". In Charles Townshend (ed.). The Oxford History of Modern War. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 356–358. ISBN 978-0-19-285373-8.
Dennis, George (1985). Three Byzantine Military Treatises. Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks. p. 147.
Detsch, J (2017). "Pentagon braces for Islamic State insurgency after Mosul". Al-Monitor. Archived from the original on 12 July 2017. Retrieved 24 January 2018.
Drew, Allison (2015). "Visions of liberation: the Algerian war of independence and its South African reverberations". Review of African Political Economy. 42 (143): 22–43. doi:10.1080/03056244.2014.1000288. hdl:10.1080/03056244.2014.1000288. ISSN 0305-6244. S2CID 144545186.
Duff, James Grant (2014). The History Of The Mahrattas. Pickle Partners Publishing. p. 376. ISBN 9781782892335.
Ellis, Joseph J. (2005). His Excellency : George Washington. New York: Vintage Books. pp. 92–109. ISBN 9781400032532 – via Internet Archive.
Emmerson, B (2016). "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism" (PDF). www.un.org. Retrieved 24 January 2018.
etymonline (2023). "guerrilla". Origin and meaning of guerrilla by Online Etymology Dictionary. Retrieved 14 July 2023.
Ferriter, Diarmaid (2020). "Diarmaid Ferriter: Bloody Sunday 1920 changed British attitudes to Ireland". The Irish Times.
Guevara, Ernesto Che (2006). Guerrilla Warfare – via Internet Archive.
Halibozek, Edward P.; Jones, Andy; Kovacich, Gerald L. (2008). The corporate security professional's handbook on terrorism (illustrated ed.). Elsevier (Butterworth-Heinemann). pp. 4–5. ISBN 978-0-7506-8257-2. Retrieved 17 December 2016.
Hanhimäki, Jussi M.; Blumenau, Bernhard; Rapaport, David (2013). "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism" (PDF). An International History of Terrorism: Western and Non-Western Experiences. Routledge. pp. 46–73. ISBN 9780415635417. Archived from the original (PDF) on 21 February 2014.
historyireland (2003). "Bloody Sunday 1920: new evidence".
Hooper, Nicholas; Bennett, Matthew (1996). Cambridge illustrated atlas, warfare : the Middle Ages, 768-1487. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-44049-3 – via Internet Archive.
Horne, Alistair (2022). "A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962. Rev. ed". The SHAFR Guide Online. doi:10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim220070002. Retrieved 17 July 2023.
islamicus (2023). "ABD EL-KRIM". Islamicus. Archived from the original on 14 June 2023.
Keeley, Lawrence H. (1997). War Before Civilization. Oxford University Press.
Kruijt, Dirk; Tristán, Eduardo Rey; Álvarez, Alberto Martín (2019). Latin American Guerrilla Movements: Origins, Evolution, Outcomes. Routledge. ISBN 9780429534270.
Laqueur, Walter (1977). Guerrilla : a historical and critical study. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. ISBN 9780297771845 – via Internet archive.
Lenin, V. I. (1906). "Guerrilla Warfare". Archived from the original on 11 May 2023 – via Internet archive.
Leonard, Thomas M. (1989). Encyclopedia of the developing world.
Mao, Zedong (1965). Selected Works: A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire. Vol. I. Foreign Languages Press – via Internet Archive. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Guerrilla warfare | War Before Civilization. Oxford University Press.
Kruijt, Dirk; Tristán, Eduardo Rey; Álvarez, Alberto Martín (2019). Latin American Guerrilla Movements: Origins, Evolution, Outcomes. Routledge. ISBN 9780429534270.
Laqueur, Walter (1977). Guerrilla : a historical and critical study. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. ISBN 9780297771845 – via Internet archive.
Lenin, V. I. (1906). "Guerrilla Warfare". Archived from the original on 11 May 2023 – via Internet archive.
Leonard, Thomas M. (1989). Encyclopedia of the developing world.
Mao, Zedong (1965). Selected Works: A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire. Vol. I. Foreign Languages Press – via Internet Archive.
Mao, Zedong (1989). On Guerrilla Warfare. Washington: U.S. Marine Corps – via Internet Archive.
McMahon, Lucas (2016). "De Velitatione Bellica and Byzantine Guerrilla Warfare" (PDF). The Annual of Medieval Studies at CEU. 22: 22–33. Archived (PDF) from the original on 7 August 2021.
McNeilly, Mark (2003). Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare. p. 204.
OED (2023). "guerrilla". Oxford English Dictionary.
Pons, Frank Moya (1998). The Dominican Republic: a national history. Markus Wiener Publishers. ISBN 978-1-55876-192-6. Retrieved 15 August 2011.
Rowe, P (2002). "Freedom fighters and rebels: the rules of civil war". J R Soc Med. 95 (1): 3–4. doi:10.1177/014107680209500102. PMC 1279138. PMID 11773342.
Snyder, Craig (1999). Contemporary security and strategy.
Sinclair, Samuel Justin; Antonius, Daniel (2012). The Psychology of Terrorism Fears. Oxford University Press, USA. ISBN 978-0-19-538811-4.
Tamer, Dr. Cenk (25 September 2017). "The Differences Between the Guerrilla Warfare and Terrorism".
Tomes, Robert (2004). "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare" (PDF). Parameters. Archived from the original (PDF) on 7 June 2010.
United Nations Secretary-General (2017). "Report of the Secretary-General: Children and armed conflict, 2017". www.un.org. Retrieved 24 January 2018.
Williamson, Myra (2009). Terrorism, war and international law: the legality of the use of force against Afghanistan in 2001. Ashgate Publishing. ISBN 978-0-7546-7403-0.
Wilson, William John (1883). History of Madras Army. Printed by E. Keys at the Govt. Press – via Internet Archive.
Attribution:
This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Flying column". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 10 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 585.
Further reading: Asprey, Robert. War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History
Beckett, I. F. W. (15 September 2009). Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare (Hardcover). Santa Barbara, California: Abc-Clio Inc. ISBN 978-0874369298. ISBN 9780874369298
Derradji Abder-Rahmane, The Algerian Guerrilla Campaign Strategy & Tactics, Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997.
Hinckle, Warren (with Steven Chain and David Goldstein): Guerrilla-Krieg in USA (Guerrilla war in the USA), Stuttgart (Deutsche Verlagsanstalt) 1971. ISBN 3-421-01592-9
Keats, John (1990). They Fought Alone. Time Life. ISBN 0-8094-8555-9
Kreiman, Guillermo (2024). "Revolutionary days: Introducing the Latin American Guerrillas Dataset". Journal of Peace Research.
MacDonald, Peter. Giap: The Victor in Vietnam
The Heretic: the life and times of Josip Broz-Tito. 1957.
Oller, John. The Swamp Fox: How Francis Marion Saved the American Revolution. Boston: Da Capo Press, 2016. ISBN 978-0-306-82457-9.
Peers, William R.; Brelis, Dean. Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America's Most Successful Guerrilla Force. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1963.
Polack, Peter. Guerrilla Warfare; Kings of Revolution Casemate,ISBN 9781612006758.
Thomas Powers, "The War without End" (review of Steve Coll, Directorate S: The CIA and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Penguin, 2018, 757 pp.), The New York Review of Books, vol. LXV, no. 7 (19 April 2018), pp. 42–43. "Forty-plus years after our failure in Vietnam, the United States is again fighting an endless war in a faraway place against a culture and a people we don't understand for political reasons that make sense in Washington, but nowhere else." (p. 43.)
Schmidt, LS. 1982. "American Involvement in the Filipino Resistance on Mindanao During the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945" Archived 5 October 2015 at the Wayback Machine. M.S. Thesis. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. 274 pp.
Sutherland, Daniel E. "Sideshow No Longer: A Historiographical Review of the Guerrilla War." Civil War History 46.1 (2000): 5–23; American Civil War, 1861–65
Sutherland, Daniel E. A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American Civil War (U of North Carolina Press, 2009). online Archived 24 June 2018 at the Wayback Machine
Weber, Olivier, Afghan Eternity, 2002
External links:
abcNEWS: The Secret War on YouTube – Pakistani militants conduct raids in Iran
abcNEWS Exclusive: The Secret War – Deadly guerrilla raids in Iran
Insurgency Research Group – Multi-expert blog dedicated to the study of insurgency and the development of counter-insurgency policy.
Guerrilla warfare on Spartacus Educational
Encyclopædia Britannica, Guerrilla warfare
Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare
Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare United States Army Special Operations Command
Counter Insurgency Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS)India |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Gun data computer | Variations: M1: This was used by seacoast artillery for major-caliber seacoast guns. It computed continuous firing data for a battery of two guns that were separated by not more than 1,000 feet (300 m). It utilised the same type of input data furnished by a range section with the then-current (1940) types of position-finding and fire-control equipment.
M3: This was used in conjunction with the M9 and M10 directors to compute all required firing data, i.e. azimuth, elevation and fuze time. The computations were made continuously, so that the gun was at all times correctly pointed and the fuze correctly timed for firing at any instant. The computer was mounted in the M13 or M14 director trailer.
M4: This was identical to the M3 except for some mechanisms and parts which were altered to allow for different ammunition being used.
M8: This was an electronic computer (using vacuum tube technology) built by Bell Labs and used by coast artillery with medium-caliber guns (up to 8 inches or 200 millimetres). It made the following corrections: wind, drift, Earth's rotation, muzzle velocity, air density, height of site and spot corrections.
M9: This was identical to the M8 except for some mechanisms and parts which were altered to accommodate anti-aircraft ammunition and guns.
M10: A ballistics computer, part of the M38 fire control system, for Skysweeper anti-aircraft guns.
M13: A ballistics computer for M48 tanks.
M14: A ballistics computer for M103 heavy tanks.
M15: A part of the M35 field artillery fire-control system, which included the M1 gunnery officer console and M27 power supply.
M16: A ballistics computer for M60A1 tanks.
M18: FADAC (field artillery digital automatic computer), an all-transistorized general-purpose digital computer manufactured by Amelco (Teledyne Systems, Inc.,) and North American—Autonetics. FADAC was first fielded during 1960, and was the first semiconductor-based digital electronics field-artillery computer.
M19: A ballistics computer for M60A2 tanks.
M21: A ballistics computer for M60A3 tanks.
M23: A mortar ballistics computer.
M26: A fire-control computer for AH-1 Cobra helicopters, (AH-1F).
M31: A mortar ballistics computer.
M32: A mortar ballistics computer, (handheld).
M1: A ballistics computer for M1 Abrams main battle tanks.
Systems: The Battery Computer System (BCS) AN/GYK-29 was a computer used by the United States Army for computing artillery fire mission data. It replaced the FADAC and was small enough to fit into the HMMWV combat vehicle.
The AN/GSG-10 TACFIRE (Tactical Fire) direction system automated field artillery command and control functions. It was composed of computers and remote devices such as the Variable Format Message Entry Device (VFMED), the AN/PSG-2 Digital Message Device (DMD) and the AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder field artillery target acquisition radar system linked by digital communications using existing radio and wire communications equipment. Later it also linked with the BCS which had more advanced targeting algorithms.
The last TACFIRE fielding was completed during 1987. Replacement of TACFIRE equipment began during 1994.
TACFIRE used the AN/GYK-12, a second-generation mainframe computer developed primarily by Litton Industries for Army divisional field artillery (DIVARTY) units. It had two configurations (division and battalion level) housed in mobile command shelters. Field artillery brigades also use the division configuration.
Components of the system were identified using acronyms:
CPU – Central Processing Unit
IOU – Input/Output Unit
MCMU – Mass Core Memory Unit
DDT – Digital Data Terminal
MTU – Magnetic Tape Unit
PCG – Power Converter Group
ELP – Electronic Line Printer
DPM – Digital Plotter Map
ACC – Artillery Control Console
RCMU – Remote Control Monitoring Unit
The successor to the TACFIRE system is the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). The AFATDS is the "Fires XXI" computer system for both tactical and technical fire control. It replaced both BCS (for technical fire solutions) and IFSAS/L-TACFIRE (for tactical fire control) systems in U.S. Field Artillery organizations, as well as in maneuver fire support elements at the battalion level and higher. As of 2009, the U.S. Army was transitioning from a version based on a Sun Microsystems SPARC computer running the Linux kernel to a version based on laptop computers running the Microsoft Windows operating system.
Surviving examples: One reason for a lack of surviving examples of early units was the use of radium on the dials. As a result they were classified as hazardous waste and were disposed of by the United States Department of Energy. Currently there is one surviving example of FADAC at the Fort Sill artillery museum.
See also: Director (military)
Fire-control system
Kerrison Predictor
List of military electronics of the United States
Mark I Fire Control Computer - US Navy system for 5-inch guns
Numerical control
Project Manager Battle Command
Rangekeeper
References: TM 9-2300 Standard Artillery and Fire Control Materiel dated 1944
TM 9-2300 Artillery Materiel and Associated Equipment. dated May 1949
ST 9-159 Handbook of Ordnance materiel dated 1968
Gun Data Computers, Coast Artillery Journal March–April 1946, pp. 45–47
External links: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1988/MJR.htm
http://ed-thelen.org/comp-hist/BRL61.html#TOC
modern system Archived 2011-06-17 at the Wayback Machine
https://web.archive.org/web/20110617062042/http://sill-www.army.mil/famag/1960/sep_1960/SEP_1960_PAGES_8_15.pdf
Article title
https://web.archive.org/web/20040511174351/http://combatindex.com/mil_docs/pdf/hdbk/0700/MIL-HDBK-799.pdf
https://web.archive.org/web/20110720002347/https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/12288-1/FM/3-22.91/chap1.htm
https://web.archive.org/web/20110617062233/http://sill-www.army.mil/famag/1958/FEB_1958/FEB_1958_PAGES_32_35.pdf
Bell labs patent
http://web.mit.edu/STS.035/www/PDFs/Newell.pdf
tacfire Archived at [1]
BCS components |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Gunboat diplomacy | Etymology: The term "gunboat diplomacy" comes from the nineteenth-century period of imperialism, when Western powers – from Europe and the United States – would intimidate other, less powerful entities into granting concessions through a demonstration of Western superior military capabilities, usually represented by their naval assets. A coastal country negotiating with a Western power would notice that a warship or fleet of ships had appeared off its coast. The mere sight of such power almost always had a considerable effect, and it was rarely necessary for such boats to use other measures, such as demonstrations of firepower.
A notable example of gunboat diplomacy, the Don Pacifico affair in 1850, saw the British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston dispatch a squadron of the Royal Navy to blockade the Greek port of Piraeus in retaliation for the assault of a British subject, David Pacifico, in Athens, and the subsequent failure of the government of King Otto to compensate the Gibraltar-born (and therefore British) Pacifico.
The effectiveness of such simple demonstrations of a nation's projection of force capabilities meant that nations with naval power and command of the sea could establish military bases (for example, Diego Garcia, 1940s onwards)
and arrange economically advantageous relationships around the world. Aside from military conquest, gunboat diplomacy was the dominant way to establish new trade relationships, colonial outposts, and expansion of empire.
Peoples lacking the resources or technological innovations available to Western empires found that their own peaceable relationships were readily dismantled in the face of such pressures, and some therefore came to depend on the imperialist nations for access to raw materials or overseas markets.
Theory: Diplomat and naval thinker James Cable spelled out the nature of gunboat diplomacy in a series of works published between 1971 and 1993. In these, he defined the phenomenon as "the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state." He further broke down the concept into four key areas:
Definitive Force: the use of gunboat diplomacy to create or remove a fait accompli.
Purposeful Force: application of naval force to change the policy or character of the target government or group.
Catalytic Force: a mechanism designed to buy a breathing space or present policy makers with an increased range of options.
Expressive Force: use of navies to send a political message. This aspect of gunboat diplomacy is undervalued and almost dismissed by Cable.
The term "gunboat" may imply naval power-projection - land-based equivalents may include military mobilisation (as in Europe in the northern-hemisphere summer of 1914), the massing of threatening bodies of troops near international borders (as practised by the German Reich in central Europe in the 1940s), or appropriately timed and situated military manoeuvres ("exercises").
Distinctions: Gunboat diplomacy contrasts with views held prior to the 18th century and influenced by Hugo Grotius, who in De jure belli ac pacis (1625) circumscribed the right to resort to force with what he described as "temperamenta".
Gunboat diplomacy is distinct from "defence diplomacy", which is understood to be the peaceful application of resources from across the spectrum of defence to achieve positive outcomes in the development of bilateral and multilateral relationships. "Military diplomacy" is a sub-set of this, tending to refer only to the role of military attachés and their associated activity. Defence diplomacy does not include military operations, but subsumes such other defence activity as international personnel exchanges, ship and aircraft visits, high-level engagement (e.g., ministers and senior defence personnel), training and exercises, security-sector reform, and bilateral military talks.
Modern contexts: Gunboat diplomacy is considered a form of hegemony. As the United States became a military power in the first decade of the 20th century, the Rooseveltian version of gunboat diplomacy, Big Stick Diplomacy, was partially superseded by dollar diplomacy: replacing the big stick with the "juicy carrot" of American private investment. However, during Woodrow Wilson's presidency, conventional gunboat diplomacy did occur, most notably in the case of the U.S. Army's occupation of Veracruz in 1914, during the Mexican Revolution.
Gunboat diplomacy in the post-Cold War world is still largely based on naval forces, owing to the U.S. Navy's overwhelming sea power. U.S. administrations have frequently changed the disposition of their major naval fleets to influence opinion in foreign capitals. More urgent diplomatic points were made by the Clinton administration in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s (in alliance with the Blair administration) and elsewhere, using sea-launched Tomahawk missiles, and E-3 AWACS airborne surveillance aircraft in a more passive display of military presence. Henry Kissinger, during his tenure as United States Secretary of State, summed up the concept as thus: "An aircraft carrier is 100,000 tons of diplomacy."
Notable examples:
18th century: Anson's visit to Canton in 1741
19th century: Second Barbary War (1815)
Haiti indemnity controversy (1825)
Pastry War (1838–39)
Opium Wars (1840, 1856)
Paulet Affair (1843)
Don Pacifico Incident (1850)
Second Anglo-Burmese War (1852)
Opening of Japan by United States Navy Commodore Matthew C. Perry and his Black Ships (1853–54)
Paraguay expedition (1858–9)
Shimonoseki Campaign (1863–1864)
Christie Affair (1861–1865)
Shinmiyangyo in Korea (1871)
Ganghwa Island incident (1875)
Tonkin Flotilla (1883)
German East Africa (1885)
Samoan crisis (1887-1889)
Môle Saint-Nicolas affair (1889–1891)
1890 British Ultimatum
Baltimore crisis (1891)
Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii (1893)
Franco-Siamese crisis of 1893
Anglo-Zanzibar War (1896)
Luders Affair (1897)
Yangtze River Patrol (1850s–1930s)
20th century: Venezuelan crisis of 1902–1903
Panama separation from Colombia
Dogger Bank Incident (1904)
Great White Fleet (1907)
Agadir Crisis (1911)
Occupation of Veracruz (1914)
Danzig crisis (1932)
First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–55)
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (1958)
Operation Vantage (1961)
Operation Brother Sam (1964)
Liberation of East Pakistan (1971)
Lebanese Civil War (1983-1984)
Third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995–96)
21st century: Spratly Islands dispute
See also: Compellence
Fleet in being
Deterrence theory
Peace through strength
Intervention (international law)
Interventionism (politics)
Police action
References:
Further reading: Arnold, Bruce Makoto (2005). Diplomacy Far Removed: A Reinterpretation of the U.S. Decision to Open Diplomatic Relations with Japan (Thesis). University of Arizona. [5]
Cable, James: Gunboat diplomacy. Political Applications of Limited Naval Forces, London 1971 (re-edited 1981 and 1994)
Graham-Yooll, Andrew. Imperial skirmishes: war and gunboat diplomacy in Latin America (2002).
Healy, D. Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era. The U.S. Navy in Haiti 1915–1916, Madison WIS 1976.
Hagan, K. J. American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy 1877–1889, Westport/London 1973.
Preston, A. and J. Major. Send a Gunboat! A study of the Gunboat and its role in British policy, 1854–1904, London 1967.
Articles
Long, D. F.: "Martial Thunder": The First Official American Armed Intervention in Asia, in: Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 42, 1973, pp. 143–162.
Willock, R.: Gunboat Diplomacy: Operations of the (British) North America and West Indies Squadron, 1875–1915, Part 2, in: American Neptune, Vol. XXVIII, 1968, pp. 85–112.
Bauer, K. J.: The "Sancala" Affair: Captain Voorhees Seizes an Argentine Squadron, in: American Neptune, Vol. XXIV, 1969, pp. 174–186
In German: Krüger, Henning: Zwischen Küstenverteidigung und Weltpolitik. Die politische Geschichte der preußischen Marine 1848 bis 1867 (Between coastal defence and world policy. The political history of the prussian navy 1848 to 1867), Bochum 2008.
Wiechmann, Gerhard: Die preußisch-deutsche Marine in Lateinamerika 1866–1914. Eine Studie deutscher Kanonenbootpolitik (The Prussian-German Navy in Latin America 1866–1914. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Gunboat diplomacy | XXVIII, 1968, pp. 85–112.
Bauer, K. J.: The "Sancala" Affair: Captain Voorhees Seizes an Argentine Squadron, in: American Neptune, Vol. XXIV, 1969, pp. 174–186
In German: Krüger, Henning: Zwischen Küstenverteidigung und Weltpolitik. Die politische Geschichte der preußischen Marine 1848 bis 1867 (Between coastal defence and world policy. The political history of the prussian navy 1848 to 1867), Bochum 2008.
Wiechmann, Gerhard: Die preußisch-deutsche Marine in Lateinamerika 1866–1914. Eine Studie deutscher Kanonenbootpolitik (The Prussian-German Navy in Latin America 1866–1914. A study of German Gunboat diplomacy), Bremen 2002.
Wiechmann, Gerhard: Die Königlich Preußische Marine in Lateinamerika 1851 bis 1867. Ein Versuch deutscher Kanonenbootpolitik (The royal Prussian navy in Latin America 1851 to 1867. An attempt of German gunboat diplomacy), in: Sandra Carreras/Günther Maihold (ed.): Preußen und Lateinamerika. Im Spannungsfeld von Kommerz, Macht und Kultur, p. 105–144, Münster 2004.
Eberspächer, Cord: Die deutsche Yangtse-Patrouille. Deutsche Kanonenbootpolitik in China im Zeitalter des Imperialismus (The German Yangtse patrol. German Gunboat diplomacy in China in the age of imperialism), Bochum 2004.
N.N.: Die Vernichtung des haitianischen Rebellenkreuzers "Crete à Pierrot" durch S.M.Kbt. "Panther" (The destruction of the Haitian rebel cruiser "Crete à Pierrot" through His Majesty´s gunboat "Panther"), in: Marine-Rundschau, 13. Jahrgang, 1902, pp. 1189–1197.
Rheder: Die militärische Unternehmung S.M.S.S. "Charlotte" und "Stein" gegen Haiti im Dezember 1897 (The military enterprise of His Majesty´s schoolships "Charlotte" and "Stein" against Haiti in December 1897), in: Marine-Rundschau, 41. Jahrgang, 1937, pp. 761–765. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Hammer and anvil | Antiquity:
Battle of Issus: The tactic was used in Antiquity, as the maneuver's origins used light cavalry, ubiquitous in the ancient world. The tactic also worked with the heavy cataphracts of the Eastern world. It appeared in a number of battles fought by the ancient Greeks and Romans. In addition to being used in many of Alexander the Great's battles, it was also used during the Second Punic War during the Battle of Cannae and the Battle of Zama.
Battle of Pharsalus: In 48 BC, Pompey the Great attempted to use it against Julius Caesar at the Battle of Pharsalus, in what was to be the decisive battle of the Great Roman Civil War. Caesar countered this by ambushing Pompey's "hammer" element with a hidden fourth line of infantry; Pompey's infantry was to be the anvil while his cavalry 'hammer' encircled Caesar's left flank. There was significant distance between the two armies, according to Caesar.
As the infantry of Caesar advanced, Pompey ordered his men not to charge, but to wait until Caesar's legions came into close quarters; Pompey's adviser Gaius Triarius believed that Caesar's infantry would be fatigued and fall into disorder if they were forced to cover twice the expected distance of a battle march. Also, stationary troops were expected to be able to defend better against pila throws. Seeing that Pompey's army was not advancing, Caesar's infantry under Mark Antony and Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus started the advance. As Caesar's men neared throwing distance, without orders, they stopped to rest and regroup before continuing the charge; Pompey's right and centre line held as the two armies collided. Caesar countered this by positioning the reserves of his 4th line to intercept the attacking cavalry.
As Pompey's infantry fought, Labienus ordered the Pompeian cavalry on his left flank to attack Caesar's cavalry; as expected they successfully pushed back Caesar's cavalry. Caesar then revealed his hidden fourth line of infantry and surprised Pompey's cavalry charge; Caesar's men were ordered to leap up and use their pila to thrust at Pompey's cavalry instead of throwing them. Pompey's cavalry panicked and suffered hundreds of casualties, as Caesar's cavalry came about and charged after them. After failing to reform, the rest of the Pompey's cavalry retreated to the hills, leaving the left wing of Pompey's legions exposed to the hidden troops as Caesar's cavalry wheeled around their flank. Caesar then ordered in his third line, containing his most battle-hardened veterans, to attack. This broke Pompey's left wing troops, who fled the battlefield.
After routing Pompey's cavalry, Caesar threw in his last line of reserves. Pompey lost the will to fight as he watched both cavalry and legions under his command break formation and flee from battle, and he retreated to his camp, leaving the rest of his troops at the centre and right flank to their own devices. He ordered the garrisoned auxiliaries to defend the camp as he escaped. As the rest of Pompey's army were left confused, Caesar urged his men to end the day by routing the rest of Pompey's troops and capturing the Pompeian camp. They complied with his wishes; after finishing off the remains of Pompey's men, they furiously attacked the camp walls. The Thracians and the other auxiliaries who were left in the Pompeian camp, in total seven cohorts, defended bravely, but were not able to fend off the assault.
Early modern era to World War I:
The Ashanti versus the British – 1874: The colonial wars of the 1800s saw some African armies deploy hammer and anvil tactics. In 1874, a strong British force under Sir Garnet Wolseley, armed with modern rifles and artillery, invaded the territory of the Ashanti Empire. The Ashanti military did not confront the British immediately, and made no major effort to interdict their long, vulnerable lines of communication through the jungle terrain. Their plan appeared to be to draw the British deep into their territory, against a strong defensive anvil centred at the town of Amoaful. Here the British would be tied down, while manoeuvring wing elements circled to the rear, trapping and cutting them off. Some historians, such as Byron Farwell, note that this was approach was a traditional Ashanti battle strategy, and was common in some African armies as well. At the village of Amoaful, the Ashantis succeeded in luring their opponents forward, but could not make any headway against the modern firepower of the British forces, which laid down a barrage of fire to accompany an advance of infantry in squares. This artillery fire took a heavy toll on the Ashanti, but they left a central blocking force in place around the village, while unleashing a large flanking attack on the left, that almost enveloped the British line and successfully broke into some of the infantry squares. Ashanti weaponry however, was poor compared to the modern weapons deployed by the British, and such superior arms served the British well in repulsing the dangerous Ashanti encirclements. As one participant noted:
The Ashantees stood admirably, and kept up one of the heaviest fires I ever was under. While opposing our attack with immediately superior numbers, they kept enveloping our left with a constant series of well-directed flank attacks.
Wolesey had studied and anticipated the Ashanti "horseshoe" formations, and had strengthened the British flanks with the best units and reinforced firepower. He was able to shift this firepower to threatened sectors to stymie enemy maneuvers, defeating their hammer and anvil elements and forcing his opponents to retreat. One British combat post-mortem pays tribute to the slain Ashanti commander for his tactical leadership and use of terrain:
The great Chief Amanquatia was among the killed. Admirable skill was shown in the position selected by Amanquatia, and the determination and generalship he displayed in the defence fully bore out his great reputation as an able tactician and gallant soldier.
World War II:
Battle of Caen: When the Allies landed at Normandy, the strategy used by the commander of the D-Day land forces, General Bernard Montgomery, was to confront the feared German panzers with constantly attacking British armies on the eastern flank of the beachhead. The role of the British forces would be to act as a great shield for the Allied landing, constantly sucking the German armour on to a great "anvil" on the left (east), and constantly grinding it down with punishing blows from artillery, tanks and Allied aircraft. As the anvil held the bulk of the German armor fast, this would open the way for the Americans to wield a great "hammer" in the west, on the right of the Allied line, breaking through the German defenses, where the Americans led by such commanders as "Lightning" Joe Collins, could run free. The British role would thus not be a glamorous one, but a tough battle in a punishing cauldron of attrition, in and around the key city of Caen.
The Germans had initially counterattacked the Normandy beachhead with powerful panzer and mobile forces hoping to drive to the sea by creating a wedge between the US and British armies. Failing this, they were then faced with a large, menacing British advance towards the strategic city of Caen, that threatened to collapse a great portion of their front, presenting a credible and very dangerous breakthrough threat. The British and Canadian divisions were not a secondary, defensively-oriented holding or diversionary force, but aggressively sought to penetrate and destroy the German front. The Germans were thus forced to commit their strongest echelons in the theatre, the mobile panzer and SS units to avoid this peril. These were pulled deeper and deeper against the attritional anvil on the eastern flank, slowly corroding German strength and capability. The bitter confrontation tied down and weakened the Wehrmacht, thus eventually paving the way for a crushing American breakthrough in the west.
As General Montgomery signaled on June 25, 1944:
When the American attack went in west of St Lo at 1100 hours on 25 July, the main enemy armoured strength of six panzer and SS divisions was deployed on the eastern flank facing the British Army. This is a good dividend. The Americans are going well and I think things will now begin to move towards the plan outlined in M512.
Supreme Allied Commander Dwight Eisenhower affirmed Montgomery's overall strategy in a message of 10 July, urging stronger efforts:
I am familiar with your plan for generally holding firmly with your left, attracting thereto all of the enemy armour, while your right pushes down the Peninsula and threatens the rear and flank of the forces facing the Second British Army.. It appears to me that we must use all possible energy in a determined effort to prevent a stalemate or facing the necessity of fighting a major defensive battle with the slight depth we now have in the bridgehead... please be assured that I will produce everything that is humanly possible to assist you in any plan that promises to get us the elbow room we need. The air and everything else will be available."
Montgomery's overall "hammer and anvil" conception of the battle eventually resulted in success, but it took two months of bitter fighting in and around the city of Caen. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Hammer and anvil | Supreme Allied Commander Dwight Eisenhower affirmed Montgomery's overall strategy in a message of 10 July, urging stronger efforts:
I am familiar with your plan for generally holding firmly with your left, attracting thereto all of the enemy armour, while your right pushes down the Peninsula and threatens the rear and flank of the forces facing the Second British Army.. It appears to me that we must use all possible energy in a determined effort to prevent a stalemate or facing the necessity of fighting a major defensive battle with the slight depth we now have in the bridgehead... please be assured that I will produce everything that is humanly possible to assist you in any plan that promises to get us the elbow room we need. The air and everything else will be available."
Montgomery's overall "hammer and anvil" conception of the battle eventually resulted in success, but it took two months of bitter fighting in and around the city of Caen.
Post World War II:
Communist Insurgency in South Korea: In early 1950, prior to the North Korean People's Army's southward advance across the 38th parallel, the North frequently launched small offensives at the border and inserted thousands of guerillas infiltrators into the South as far as Jeju Island in hopes of achieving the overthrow of President Syngman Rhee and the imposition of a communist government. After a number of Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) counterinsurgency successes, the North Koreans waged a final attempt at inciting revolution by sending two battalion-sized units of guerillas under the commands of Kim Sang-ho and Ki Moo-hyon. The first unit was, over the course of several engagements with the ROKA 6th Division, destroyed with only one survivor. The second was also annihilated by a two-battalion hammer-and-anvil maneuver by units of the ROKA 6th Division. The KPA guerillas lost 584 (480 killed, 104 captured) and the ROKA troops reported 69 killed and 184 wounded. It would prove to be the last major effort of the communist north to annex the south until the invasion on 25 June 1950.
Soviet sweep operations in Afghanistan:
See also: Encirclement
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Hedgehog defence | Description: In warfare, it is a military tactic to defend against a mobile armoured attack, or blitzkrieg. The defenders deploy in depth in heavily fortified positions suitable for all-around defence. The attackers can penetrate between the "hedgehogs", but each position continues to fight on when it is surrounded. That keeps large numbers of attacking troops tied up, attacking the well-defended strongpoints, and it allows the defenders to counterattack against the units that bypass the strongpoints with their own armored reserves, by cutting them off from their supporting elements.
World War II: In the interwar period Rommel had mentioned the hedgehog as a protective tactic used during rest periods, at platoon and company level, in World War I. Use of a pattern of hedgehogs, comprising larger units and forming a defence in depth, was proposed by General Maxime Weygand in 1940 during the Battle of France. However, Allied forces were unable to apply the tactic before they sustained heavy losses; the remaining French forces applied it but were successfully bypassed, and France signed an armistice with victorious Germany a few weeks later.
On the Eastern Front, the German army used the tactic successfully during the Soviet winter advances, notably in the Battle of Moscow in 1941, in the Second Rzhev-Sychevka Offensive in November 1942, and in the battle around Orel during Operation Saturn in February 1943. The Germans adopted the additional feature commonly associated with hedgehog defence, resupply of the strongpoints by air.
Particularly in the winter of 1941–42, the advanced "hedgehogs" effectively surrounded by the Soviets, such as the Demyansk pocket, were supplied mainly by air. Although casualties were heavy, the strongpoints held up large numbers of attacking Soviet troops and prevented them from being deployed elsewhere; the successful defence of the Demyansk pocket, for example, helped stem the Soviet counteroffensive following the Battle of Moscow. Although aerial resupply reduced reliance on vulnerable ground transport, it inflicted an enormous strain on the Luftwaffe. The successful holding of forward positions in the battles led Adolf Hitler to insist, for the remainder of the war, for static positions to be held to the last man. However, the increasing weakness of the Luftwaffe and the improved combat capabilities of the Soviet Air Force made resupply of isolated strongpoints by air difficult. In particular, Hitler had hoped that the surrounded Stalingrad could be turned into a giant hedgehog, tying up vast numbers of Soviet troops.
After the Battle of Kursk in 1943, the German Army lacked the essential components of the tactic, the mobile armoured reserve and an air combat capability necessary to secure local air superiority for keeping open aerial supply corridors, thus losing the war.
The British Army used "brigade boxes" during the Western Desert Campaign, the boxes consisted of reinforced brigade-sized forces of all arms, protected by barbed wire and with the space between boxes covered by mine fields, defence of the boxes was centered around mutually supporting field artillery and anti-tank guns, which covered the mine fields and the approaches to neighbouring boxes. In the jungles of Burma during the Burma Campaign, the British and Indian armies formed forward defensive positions called "battalion boxes", which consisted of battalion sized forces that would be supplied from the air if surrounded.
Post-World War II: Following the end of World War II, the tactic was successfully used in Southeast Asia by the French against the Việt Minh in the Battle of Nà Sản. The French suffered a disaster in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, when General Võ Nguyên Giáp deployed unexpectedly-heavy concentrations of anti-aircraft artillery around the French garrison and successfully disrupted aerial resupply. Later, hedgehog defence was central in the US Marines' successful defence of Khe Sanh against the PAVN.
A notable example of modern hedgehog defence is the Battle of Vukovar during the Croatian War of independence. A small, ill-armed but determined Croatian resistance kept a larger, heavily equipped but less-motivated Yugoslav Army at bay, buying precious time for the fledgling Republic of Croatia to organize its own armed forces.
Another, ultimately less successful, application was the Iraqi military strategy during the first Gulf War to fortify Kuwait and create an extensive "hedgehog" defensive position. The forward defensive positions were staffed by its elite Republican Guard. The dug-in forces complemented in-depth defence features, such as minefields, tank traps, fire trenches, and other elements of trench and bunker warfare.
See also: 150th Infantry Brigade (United Kingdom)
Chaco War
Fire support base
References:
"Chapter 2 The Defensive". Military Improvisations during the Russian Campaign. United States Army Center of Military History. 1986 [1951]. CMH Pub 104-1. Archived from the original on 2010-09-12. Retrieved 2010-08-12. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Help:Maintenance template removal | Overview: Maintenance templates (or "tags") are not removed automatically. Even if you fix the issue(s) described in a maintenance template, the tag will remain in the article until you or someone else manually removes it. The mechanics of removal are usually as simple as clicking "Edit" at the top of the page or in the section involved (if you're not already in edit mode), removing the code that produces the display of the template, leaving an edit summary, and saving the page.
It is not okay to remove maintenance templates until the issue flagged by the template is remedied first—that is, until the maintenance tag is no longer valid—unless it truly did not belong in the first place.
Wikipedia works because of the efforts of volunteers just like you, making bold edits to help build this encyclopedia. Fixing problems and then removing maintenance templates when you are done is important in that effort.
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Many common templates address problems with article citations and references, or their lack – because reliable sourcing is the lifeblood of Wikipedia articles and at the core of all of Wikipedia's content policies and guidelines, such as notability, verifiability, neutral point of view, and no original research. But a host of other issues may be flagged, including tone and style of writing, structure, and formatting, lack of links to or from other articles, compliance with Wikipedia's manual of style and the lack of a lead section.
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A case in point is the {{Unreferenced}} template example used above. It is placed on pages with no references. Thus, adding just one suitable reference renders that maintenance template inapplicable. However, that change does not take care of the overarching issue of poor sourcing. In this example, a change to a different template may be appropriate, depending on the type, quality, depth, and manner of sourcing added to fix the issue, such as {{refimprove}}, {{No footnotes}}, {{Primary sources}}, or one of the many others listed at Wikipedia:Template messages/Sources of articles.
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Click "show" at the right to display the instructions.
Researching the tagged issue: As noted previously, most templates contain links to guidance pages. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Help:Maintenance template removal | When a flagged issue has been addressed in parts of an article but remains in discrete sections, clarity may be served by replacing the template with a section variant, or by use of inline cleanup tags, if such versions of the template exist.
In some cases, it may be helpful to request a review of a maintenance template's removal or proposed removal with the editor who initially added it to the article at issue.
Specific template guidance: This section guides you on how to address some of the more common specific templates that may have brought you to this help page. More detailed information about the templates can be found by following the links to the templates themselves.
Click "show" at the right to display the instructions.
Researching the tagged issue: As noted previously, most templates contain links to guidance pages. Additionally, many templates have documentation that provides more information about the template's flagged issue, which is displayed when you visit the template page itself.
To access the template and thereby see its documentation, type into the search field Template:, followed by the name of the template, seen when you view its placement in the Edit interface (typically found in the first lines of the article). The first "parameter" is the name of the template.
For example, if you found this in the Edit interface, {{Unreferenced|date=September 2024}}, then you would visit the template itself by searching for Template:Unreferenced. The accompanying documentation for all maintenance templates, if it exists, can be located in this way.
Still need help?: If you've read through this page and are still confused about what needs to be done to fix an issue on a page and remove a maintenance template, try asking at the Teahouse, a page designed for new users to ask questions. Alternatively, you could try the more general Help desk, or seek live assistance at the IRC channel: #wikipedia-en-help.
See also: Wikipedia:Template messages
Help:Template
Wikipedia:Tagging pages for problems (WP:TAGGING)
Wikipedia:Template messages/Disputes
{{Bare URL inline}} – produces an inline tag (rather than banner) for individual bare URLs |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Help:Referencing for beginners | Inline citations: Inline citations are usually small, numbered footnotes like this. They are generally added either directly following the fact that they support, or at the end of the sentence that they support, following any punctuation. When clicked, they take the reader to a citation in a reference section near the bottom of the article.
While editing a page that uses the most common footnote style, you will see inline citations displayed between <ref>...</ref> tags.
If you are creating a new page, or adding references to a page that didn't previously have any, remember to add a References section like the one below near the end of the article:
==References==
{{reflist}}
Note: This is by far the most popular system for inline citations, but sometimes you will find other styles being used in an article. This is acceptable, and you shouldn't change it or mix styles. To add a new reference, just copy and modify an existing one.
RefToolbar: Manually adding references can be a slow and tricky process. Fortunately, there is a tool called "RefToolbar" built into the Wikipedia edit window, which makes it much easier.
To use it, click on Cite at the top of the edit window, having already positioned your cursor after the sentence or fact you wish to reference. Then select one of the 'Templates' from the dropdown menu that best suits the type of source. These are:
{{cite web}} for references to general websites
{{cite news}} for newspapers and news websites
{{cite book}} for references to books
{{cite journal}} for magazines, academic journals, and papers
A template window then pops up, where you fill in as much information as possible about the source, and give a unique name for it in the "Ref name" field. Click the "Insert" button, which will add the required wikitext in the edit window. If you wish, you can also "Preview" how your reference will look first.
Some fields (such as a web address, also known as a URL) will have a icon next to them. After filling in this field, you can click it to handily autofill the remaining fields. It doesn't always work properly, though, so be sure to double check it.
Often, you will want to use the same source more than once in an article to support multiple facts. In this case, you can click Named references in the toolbar, and select a previously added source to re-use.
Using the 2017 wikitext editor: As an alternative to the RefToolbar, it is possible to insert citations in the source editor using a similar automated tool as the one used in the visual editor. For this, you need to enable the 2017 wikitext editor in your preferences. You will then be able to edit the source of pages while inserting citations using the automated tool of the visual editor.
Reliable sources: Wikipedia articles require reliable, published sources that directly support the information presented in the article. Now you know how to add sources to an article, but which sources should you use?
The word "source" in Wikipedia has three meanings: the work itself (for example, a document, article, paper, or book), the creator of the work (for example, the writer), and the publisher of the work (for example, Cambridge University Press). All three can affect reliability.
Reliable sources are those with a reputation for fact-checking and accuracy. They tend to have an editorial process with multiple people scrutinizing work before it is published. Academic and peer-reviewed publications are usually the most reliable sources. Other reliable sources include university textbooks, books published by respected publishing houses, magazines, journals, and news coverage (not opinions) from mainstream newspapers.
Self-published media, where the author and publisher are the same, are usually not acceptable as sources. These can include newsletters, personal websites, press releases, patents, open wikis, personal or group blogs, and tweets. However, if an author is an established expert with a previous record of third-party publications on a topic, their self-published work may be considered reliable for that particular topic.
Whether a source is usable also depends on context. Sources that are reliable for some material are not reliable for other material. For instance, otherwise unreliable self-published sources are usually acceptable to support uncontroversial information about the source's author. You should always try to use the best possible source, particularly when writing about living people.
These are general guidelines, but the topic of reliable sources is a complicated one, and is impossible to fully cover here. You can find more information at Wikipedia:Verifiability and at Wikipedia:Reliable sources. There is also a list of commonly used sources with information on their reliability.
Try it! Take a quiz on reliable sources
See also:
Wikipedia:VisualEditor/User guide § Adding a new reference
Wikipedia:VisualEditor/User guide § Editing references
Help:Referencing for beginners without using templates
Help:Referencing for beginners with citation templates
Help:Citations quick reference
Help:References and page numbers
Wikipedia:References dos and don'ts
Wikipedia:Identifying reliable sources
Wikipedia:Citation templates
User:Nick Moyes/Easier Referencing for Beginners |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | High ground | History: In Sun Tzu's The Art of War, military leaders are advised to take high ground and let the enemy try to attack from a lower position. Fighting from an elevated position is said to be easier for a number of tactical reasons. Holding the high ground offers an elevated vantage point with a wide field of view, enabling surveillance of the surrounding landscape, in contrast to valleys which offer a limited field of view.
General Ji Ling of the late Eastern Han dynasty used this principle to his advantage by sending lookouts to positions of higher-ground to scout for and provide early warning about enemy troops. Additionally, soldiers fighting uphill are assumed to tire more quickly and will move more slowly, when compared to soldiers fighting downhill, who do not have to struggle against the forces of gravity alongside natural obstacles in the terrain. Furthermore, soldiers who are elevated above their enemies can get greater range out of low-speed projectiles (such as rocks, javelins/spears, arrows, grenades, etc.), whereas low-speed projectiles have a shorter range when thrown uphill.
Very steep and/or rocky terrain, like mountain sides, can be an obstacle to tanks and armored personnel carriers, or in the past to cavalry and war elephants. For example, in the Soviet–Afghan War, mujahideen guerrillas based themselves in the mountains of Afghanistan, thereby protecting themselves from the Soviet motorized divisions. This forced the Soviets to rely heavily on helicopters to conduct the war, but the United States gave the mujahideen FIM-92 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, which, arguably, combined with the defense of the mountains, was able to win the war for the mujahideen. High ground was also employed in the 1423 Battle of Horic in Bohemia, where Taborite soldiers took to high ground, forcing the Utraquist cavalry to dismount to attack them, and also rendering their cannons ineffective. Taborite soldiers were eventually able to make a downhill charge and wipe out the remaining Utraquists. Here again, high ground played a crucial role in the outcome of the battle.
However, getting the high ground is not always advantageous. In the Battle of Jieting of the Three Kingdoms period of China, Shu Han forces occupied a hilltop, which Cao Wei forces soon surrounded and isolated the Shu forces from water supplies and reinforcements. The Shu forces suffered a humiliating defeat, and the Shu northern expedition had to be aborted.
See also: Mountain warfare
Inclined plane
Battle of Kamdesh
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | History of military logistics | Antiquity: The most basic requirements of an army are food and water. Neolithic armies were equipped with weapons used for hunting — spears, knives, axes and bows and arrows. By 1150 BCE the Olmecs of Mesoamerica were producing obsidian weapons that were neither hunting weapons nor agricultural tools. Early armies were small due to the practical difficulty of supplying large numbers of people, and their radius of action was likewise limited to 80 to 90 kilometres or so. A ruler or warlord might use an army to extract tax or tribute, but it required a formidable logistical exercise to employ it.
By 700 BCE, Assyria had developed a standing army, with iron replacing bronze in weapons and armour, and cavalry replacing chariots. The Assyrian army may have been able to field as many as 50,000 men, which alone would have required a high degree of logistical acumen, but could operate up to 500 kilometres from its bases. The defences and fortifications of cities had improved to the point where siege warfare had become a complicated technological task, involving scaling ladders, battering rams, siege towers and tunnelling, and could take months. Supply of a besieging force therefore required the transport or construction of special equipment as well as the provision of food and water.
Alexander the Great's father, Philip II of Macedon banned the use of carts on the grounds that they restricted the army's speed and mobility. Alexander continued this practice, with his army relying on horses and mules. He also used camels, many of which were captured along with Darius III's baggage train after the Battle of Issus. Although a cart drawn by a pair of oxen could carry up to 540 kilograms (1,200 lb), compared with about 110 kilograms (250 lb) for pack horses, mules and camels, they could only travel at 3.2 kilometres per hour (2 mph) and be worked for 5 hours per day, whereas pack horses could travel at 6.4 kilometres per hour (4 mph) and be worked for 8 hours per day. Carts were also liable to break down, especially in rough country. Some were necessary, however, for the carriage of heavy siege machinery.
In the imperial Roman army, each eight-man contuberium (squad) had a mule to carry the leather or goatskin tent large enough to accommodate the squad and a handmill to grind grain – as that part of the ration was issued unground – tools and cooking implements. Together with five days' rations, this weighed about 200 kilograms (440 lb), which was easily within the carrying capacity of eight men and a mule. Adding a second mule would allow the contuberium to carry an additional 11 to 13 days' rations. The Roman army ration included bread or biscuit, beef and veal, pork and sucking-pig, mutton and lamb, poutry, lentils, cheese, olive oil, wine or vinegar, and salt. This gave them about 3,400 calories (14,000 kJ) per day, which was similar to that of Alexander's men. An army of 60,000 required 95,000 litres (21,000 imp gal) of water for the men and 720,000 litres (158,000 imp gal) for the animals each day. Each contuberium had their own fire to cook their meals, so firewood had to be collected; Julius Caesar regarded a shortage of firewood to be as dangerous as one of water or fodder. The Olmecs used camales to prepare tortillas that could be retoasted and consumed en route, whereas the Maya lacked a good, transportable food, which made long-distance forays difficult.
The Romans constructed a network of roads to permit the rapid movement of wheeled vehicles. A road network was in existence in Italy as early as the third century BCE, and by the time of Diocletian the Roman Empire had 90,000 kilometres (56,000 mi) of roads. The Roman army had no specialised engineering units, and roads were normally built by local communities, but the army could and did construct roads, especially near the frontiers. Roads were not necessary for the movement of troops, since the soldiers and their pack animals could travel along unimproved dirt tracks, but roads were used by supply trains and a military mail system. The Chinese also built a road network, as did the Maurya Empire in India, the Persians in Asia Minor, and the Moche in South America.
However, it was less expensive to ship a tonne of grain from Egypt to Rome by sea than to move it 80 kilometres (50 mi) by road. The Romans preferred to use sea travel when they could, but it was risky as ships could be lost in storms. In his treatise on The Art of Commanding Armies, Polybius recommended that a commander have a thorough knowledge of how far ships could travel by day and night, and the optimal time and seasons for sea travel. Most ships were small. Six months' supply of grain for an army of 40,000 would have weighed 6,320 tonnes, and could have been carried in 200 ships.
Middle Ages: One of the most significant changes in military organisation in Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire in the fifth century was the shift from a centrally organised army to a combination of military forces made up of local troops who often worked within the household during peace time and were provided food and drink from the high officials in the house. The magnates drew upon their own resources for their men, and during Charlemagne's reign and the reign of the Ottonian dynasty in Germany, some heads of house built permanent storages and dwellings to house men or supplies. Feudalism, under which a warrior nobility owed military obligations to their overlords, was a form of distributed military logistics system made necessary by poor communications and inadequate monetisation. In Anglo-Saxon England, King Ine of Wessex established a form of tax in kind known as the feorm, which allowed troops to be supported without cash purchases.
While on campaign, soldiers in the medieval period (the fifth to fifteenth centuries) in Europe were often responsible for supplying themselves, either through foraging, looting (more common during sieges), or purchases from markets along the campaign route. Even so, military commanders often provided their troops with food and supplies. This might be in lieu of wages if they worked within the king's household, but soldiers would be expected to pay for it from their wages if they did not, at cost or even with a profit.
Some early governments, such as the Carolingians in eighth century, required soldiers to supply their own food for three months, but would feed soldiers thereafter for free if the campaign or siege was ongoing. Later, during the Saxon revolt of 1077–1088, Saxon soldiers were required to bring supplies enough for the entire campaign. Some individual feats of logistics were formidable; after a seven-week campaign English archers shot up to half a million arrows during the battle of Crécy in 1346.
Soldiers were often required to come equipped for campaign with their own armour, shields and weapons. They could often obtain the needed supplies from local craftsmen: smiths, carpenters, and leather workers often supplied the local militia troops with cooking utensils, bows and arrows, and horseshoes and saddles. Archaeologists have found evidence of goods production in excavations of royal houses, suggesting that the Roman infrastructure of central arms and equipment factories was inherited, even if such factories were more decentralised. Estates during Charlemagne's reign were required to have carpenters staffed to produce weapons and armour.
The Vikings focused on seizing sites like monasteries that had large stores of supplies such as grain, cheese, livestock, beer and wine. They were also often located in the heart of agricultural areas with large surpluses stored in warehouses and granaries. This simplified pillaging and foraging. They were also filled with valuable objects, and housed wealthy persons who could be ransomed for substantial sums. However, they still had to take some supplies with them, and their longships were not suited to this, so they also brought merchant ships (knerrir) to carry supplies with them (and to take plunder back). They established bases where supplies could be stored, which allowed them to occasionally field substantial forces and carry out large-scale operations, such as in the Siege of Paris in 885–886.
The Mongols drank horses' blood and milk, and took with them other livestock such as sheep, goats, cattle and sometimes camels. Sheep were the most important of the herd animals, and butter and cheese was produced from their milk, although horse meat was a particular favourite. Livestock could be spared for slaughter only occasionally, but when it was, all parts of the animal were eaten, and the bones were saved to make broth. They supplemented their diet with wild game, and collected various wild vegetables, fruits, berries, fungi and edible seeds. They had collapsible tents that could be quickly erected and struck. They were capable of operating in winter, but depended on their horses, so they needed grasslands where the horses could graze.
Beasts of burden were used as vehicular transport for the food and supplies, either by carrying the supplies directly on their backs—the average medieval horse and mule could carry roughly 100 kilograms—or by pulling carts or wagons, depending on the weather conditions. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | History of military logistics | Sheep were the most important of the herd animals, and butter and cheese was produced from their milk, although horse meat was a particular favourite. Livestock could be spared for slaughter only occasionally, but when it was, all parts of the animal were eaten, and the bones were saved to make broth. They supplemented their diet with wild game, and collected various wild vegetables, fruits, berries, fungi and edible seeds. They had collapsible tents that could be quickly erected and struck. They were capable of operating in winter, but depended on their horses, so they needed grasslands where the horses could graze.
Beasts of burden were used as vehicular transport for the food and supplies, either by carrying the supplies directly on their backs—the average medieval horse and mule could carry roughly 100 kilograms—or by pulling carts or wagons, depending on the weather conditions. A force with 1,000 pack and draft animals required roughly 9,000 kilograms of food for the animals, of which 4,000 kilograms was grain. Other animals had similar needs; donkeys each required about five kilograms of food each day, of which one kilogram had to be grain, while camels required approximately twelve kilograms of food each day, of which five kilograms needed to be grain. Horses were not usually used as draft animals in China or India. In India, oxen were used to carry supplies purchased from the banjaras, mobile merchants who often accompanied armies. Oxen required no grain, but need 20 kilograms of fodder per day, which could be found by grazing, should time and conditions permit. In the Middle East and Central Asia, camels were often used, and in South and South East Asia elephants were used where roads and navigable rivers were uncommon, but there was plentiful water and foliage. This was more difficult in sub-Saharan Africa, where the elephants were less amenable. A herd of 1,000 cattle could feed 14,000 or so men for roughly ten days.
Commanders also made use of water transport throughout the medieval period as it was more efficient than ground transport. Ships made transporting supplies, and often soldiers, easier and more reliable, but the ability to use water transport was limited by location, weather, and the availability of ships. Cargo ships were also used, and were most commonly of the Nordic-type, the Utrecht-type, or the proto-cog craft. River boats resembling simple log-boats were also used. In Sub-Saharan Africa, where there were many lakes, canoes were used. Supply by sea was more economical, but not necessarily simpler than supply by land, due to complicating factors like loading and unloading, stowage, and moving supplies to an army that may not be on the coast.
In Mesoamerica, there were no wheeled vehicles or draft animals that could be used as beasts of burden. The army of the Aztec Empire consisted of units of 8,000 men called xiquipilli. The army was accompanied by porters who carried about 23 kilograms each. It moved slowly, at about 2.4 kilometres per hour or 19 kilometres per day. Since the Aztecs did not build roads outside the major cities, the army moved along tracks used for local trade. Due to the limitations of the tracks, each xiquipilli departed on a different day, and used a different route if possible. Since the army could carry food for no more than eight days, this gave it a combat radius of about 58 kilometres (36 mi) in hostile territory; moving through its own territory the army drew on supplies from tributary towns along the way.
Early modern:
Sixteenth century: Between 1530 and 1710, the size of the armed forces deployed by European states increased by an order of magnitude, to 100,000 or more in some cases, resulting in a corresponding increase in the numbers involved in major battles. There were technical and tactical components to this, like the shift from expensive armoured knights to cheaper pikemen, who could be mobilised in vast numbers, but the major factor was the growth of the European state. Increases in population and wealth generated more revenue through taxation, which could be utilised more effectively due to a series of administrative reforms in the sixteenth century. States now had the means to fund the upkeep and development of roads, which aided the logistical support of forces.
This increase in size came not just in the number of actual soldiers but also camp followers, or tross, — anywhere from half to one and a half times the size of the army itself — and the size of the baggage train — averaging one wagon for every fifteen men. However, little state support was provided to these massive armies, the vast majority of which consisted of mercenaries. Beyond being paid for their service by the state (an act which bankrupted even the Spanish Empire on several occasions), these soldiers and their commanders were forced to provide everything for themselves. If permanently assigned to a town or city with a working marketplace, or travelling along a well-established military route, supplies could be bought locally with intendants overseeing the exchanges. In other cases an army travelling in friendly territory could expect to be followed by sutlers, whose stocks were small and subject to price gouging, or a commissioner could be sent ahead to a town to make arrangements, including billetting if necessary.
Many armies were further restricted to following waterways as supplies they were forced to carry could be more easily transported by water. The Russians made use of the Volga River to support the conquest of Kazan in the Russo-Kazan Wars. Artillery in particular was reliant on this method of transport, since even a modest number of cannons of the period required hundreds of horses to move them and their ammunition, and they travelled at half the speed of the rest of the army. Troops moving down the Spanish Road between 1567 and 1620 were able to travel from Milan and Brussels, a distance of about 1,100 kilometres (700 mi), in five to seven weeks. If an army marched at a leisurely pace of 10 to 13 kilometres (6 to 8 mi) per day, the heavy guns could keep up with little difficulty. Improvements in metal casting techniques and the use of copper-based alloys like bronze and brass made cannons lighter and more durable, and therefore more mobile, but their production and maintenance required skilled craftsmen.
The Ottoman Empire developed a formidable logistical system. The network of Roman and Byzantine roads radiating from Constantinople provided good lines of communication, as did the Danube River, via the Black Sea and the port of Varna. Ottoman troops could march 970 kilometres (600 mi) from Constantinople to Buda via Adrianople and Belgrade in six weeks, drawing provision en route from forty depots. They were fed biscuit, which did not require grinding like grain, and was less likely to spoil in wet weather than flour. This was supplemented by regular issues of mutton. During the siege of Vienna in 1529, heavy rains caused flooding and rendered the roads impassable to the Turks' heavy cannons, and in the Long Turkish War of 1593 to 1606 the Turkish forces in Transylvania were hampered by attacks on their supply ships on the Danube and Tisza Rivers.
Seventeenth century: By the mid-seventeenth century, the French under Secretary of State for War Michel Le Tellier began a series of military reforms to address some of the issues which had plagued armies. Besides ensuring that soldiers were more regularly paid and combating the corruption and inefficiencies of private contractors, he devised formulae to calculate the supplies required for a given campaign, created standardised contracts for dealing with commercial suppliers, and formed a permanent vehicle-park manned by specialists whose role was to carry a few days' supplies while accompanying the army during campaigns. With these arrangements there was a gradual increase in the use of magazines, which provided a more regular flow of supply via convoys. While the concepts of magazines and convoys was not new, prior to the increase in army sizes there had rarely been cause to implement them.
Le Tellier's son, Louvois, continued the reforms after assuming his position. The most important of these reforms was to guarantee free daily rations for the soldiers, amounting to two pounds of bread or hardtack a day. These rations were supplemented as circumstances allowed by a source of protein such as meat or beans; soldiers were still responsible for purchasing these items out-of-pocket but they were often available at below-market prices or even free at the expense of the state. Louvois also made permanent a system of magazines that were overseen by local governors to ensure they were fully stocked. Some of these magazines were dedicated to providing frontier towns and fortresses several months' worth of supplies in the event of a siege, while the rest were supported French armies operating in the field.
When operating in enemy territory an army was forced to plunder the local countryside for supplies, a historical tradition meant to allow war to be conducted at the enemy's expense. However, with the increase in army sizes this reliance on plunder became a major problem, as decisions regarding where and when an army could move or fight were made based not on strategic objectives but whether a given area was capable of supporting the soldiers' needs. Sieges in particular were affected by this, both for an army attempting to lay siege to a location and for one coming to its relief. Unless a commander was able to implement some sort of regular resupply, a fortress or town with a devastated countryside could be effectively immune to either operation. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | History of military logistics | Some of these magazines were dedicated to providing frontier towns and fortresses several months' worth of supplies in the event of a siege, while the rest were supported French armies operating in the field.
When operating in enemy territory an army was forced to plunder the local countryside for supplies, a historical tradition meant to allow war to be conducted at the enemy's expense. However, with the increase in army sizes this reliance on plunder became a major problem, as decisions regarding where and when an army could move or fight were made based not on strategic objectives but whether a given area was capable of supporting the soldiers' needs. Sieges in particular were affected by this, both for an army attempting to lay siege to a location and for one coming to its relief. Unless a commander was able to implement some sort of regular resupply, a fortress or town with a devastated countryside could be effectively immune to either operation. Mons could not be besieged in 1684 because of a lack of forage in the area. For the later French siege of Mons in the Spanish Netherlands in 1691, during the Nine Years' War, Louvois purchased 900,000 rations of fodder the year before.
Although living off the land theoretically granted armies freedom of movement, it required careful planning, and the need for plunder precluded any sort of sustained, purposeful advance. Bread was a particular problem, as providing it locally was limited by the availability of mills, ovens and bakers. An army of 60,000 might require 90,000 rations once camp followers were included, and at 0.68 kilograms (1.5 lb) of bread per ration that would require 61 tonnes (135,000 lb) of bread per day. Armies normally marched for three days and rested on the fourth. A supply of bread for 60,000 men for four days required at least sixty ovens operated by 240 bakers. To build an oven required 500 two-kilogram bricks, so sixty ovens required sixty cartloads of bricks. In addition, a month's supply of fuel for the sixty ovens needed 1,400 cartloads. Local mills were targets for enemy action, so handmills were often necessary.
Recourse therefore had to be made to bringing up supplies from the bases. Fortresses not only guarded lines of communication they served as supply bases. In 1675, a French army 80,000 strong was supported for two months by the grain stored at Maastricht and Liège. The indecisiveness of campaigns of the period was largely the result of the difficulty involved in supplying large armies. The larger armies of the seventeenth century also saw the advent of military uniforms, which were introduced in Britain with the New Model Army in the English Civil War. Clothing contracts became centralised but funds were disbursed through regiments, which developed distinctive dress. Government payments were often in arrears, sometimes by years, and stripping the dead for their clothing became a common practice.
Eighteenth century: In 1704, the Duke of Marlborough marched his army from the Netherlands to the Danube, following the Rhine and Neckar rivers. He was able to do so because he was moving through rich country and his Quartermaster General, Colonel William Cadogan, paid for supplies in gold at fair prices, so that the local population were willing to sell, and brought supplies to collection points. This was arranged through a contract let to Sir Solomon de Medina to purchase supplies through local agents. The 400-kilometre (250 mi) march wore out boots but these too were provided. The result was that the army arrived in good condition and ready to fight the Battle of Blenheim.
In contrast, Marlborough's opponent, Marshal Tallard, was placed at a logistical disadvantage, having to advance without prepositioned supplies. Usually a population regarded the presence of an army, whether friendly or not, as a disaster and hoped that it would go away as soon as possible. Europe lacked a network of good roads, and rains or snow melt could turn unmade roads into quagmires. Bridges were infrequent, and wooden bridges were easy to destroy. Most were crossed only by ferry. Rivers could become unnavigable if the water level rose or fell too much.
The Chinese likewise were able to tap into the rich agricultural resources of eastern China to support campaigns against far-flung adversaries. The Kangxi Emperor drove the Russians from the Amur river region, and besieged the Russian fortress at Albazin. The Treaty of Nerchinsk allocated the region to China. In the Dzungar–Qing Wars, the emperor was able to mount an expedition across the Gobi Desert to defeat the Dzungar in the Battle of Jao Modo, but subsequent expeditions to Tibet in 1717 and 1718 were frustrated by logistical difficulties and ran out of food before a more successful expedition in 1720.
In the American Revolutionary War, the Americans had a young population with large numbers of potential soldiers, and an agricultural economy with surplus foodstuffs and no vital centres. Clothing and footwear could be supplied by domestic production, there was widespread ownership of firearms, and a shipping industry experienced in smuggling that could supply other needs. What they lacked was land transportation infrastructure — roads, waterways, wagons, animals and skilled personnel — needed for the distribution of supplies. This hampered the creation and maintenance of forces sufficiently large to drive out the British.
After the war the British created the infrastructure and gained the experience needed to manage an empire. They reorganised the management of the supply of military food and transport, which was completed in 1793–1794 when the naval Victualling and Transport Boards undertook those responsibilities. It built upon experience learned from the supply of the very-long-distance Falkland Islands garrison from 1767 to 1772 to systematise needed shipments to distant places such as Australia, Nova Scotia, and Sierra Leone.
This new infrastructure allowed Britain to launch large expeditions to the continent during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and to develop a global network of garrisons in the colonies. They were not always successful; British setbacks in the Kandyan Wars in Sri Lanka were partly attributable to logistical difficulties, although disease and terrain were also factors, and the British were defeated by the Ashanti Empire in the Battle of Nsamankow in 1824 when they ran out of ammunition.
Nineteenth century:
Napoleonic wars: Napoleon made logistical operations a major part of French strategy. He dispersed his corps along a broad front to maximise the area from which supplies could be drawn. Each day forage parties brought in supplies. This differed from earlier operations living off the land in the size of the forces involved, and because the primary motivation was the emperor's desire for mobility. Crucially, the army did not degenerate into an armed mob. Ammunition could not as a rule be obtained locally, so Napoleon allotted 2,500 of his 4,500 wagons to carrying artillery ammunition, with the rest hauling rations. Each man carried 60 to 80 rounds in his pack, and each division carried 97,000 rounds in reserve. Thus, like earlier armies, the Grande Armée took with it sufficient ammunition for the whole campaign. Support troops accompanied each unit. A British Royal Horse Artillery troop in 1813 was authorised to have a farrier, a carriage smith, two shoeing smiths, two collar makers and a wheelwright.
During the Ulm Campaign in 1805, the French army of 200,000 men had no need for time-consuming efforts to scour the countryside for supplies and live off the land, as it was well provided for by France's German allies. France's ally, the Electorate of Bavaria, turned the city of Augsburg into a gigantic supply centre, allowing the Grande Armée, generously replenished with food, shoes and ammunition, to quickly invade Austria after the decisive French victory at Ulm.
Napoleon left nothing to chance, requesting the Bavarians to prepare in advance a specified amount of food at certain cities such as Würzburg and Ulm, for which the French reimbursed them. When French demands proved excessive for the German principalities, the French army used a system of vouchers to requisition supplies and keep the rapid advance going. The agreements with allies permitted the French to obtain huge quantities of supplies within a few days' notice. Napoleon built up a major supply magazine at Passau, with barges transporting supplies down the Danube to Vienna to maintain the French army prior to the Battle of Austerlitz in combat readiness.
The French system fared poorly in the Peninsular War in the face of Spanish guerrilla warfare that targeted their supply lines and the British blockade of French-occupied ports on the Iberian Peninsula. The need to supply a besieged Barcelona made it impossible to control the province and ended French plans to incorporate Catalonia into Napoleon's Empire. Wellington blocked the French advance into Portugal with a series of fortifications, the Lines of Torres Vedras, and devastated the area north of the lines to make it difficult for the French to mass forces there to assault or besiege the fortifications.
A more spectacular logistical failure occurred in the Russian campaign in 1812. Carl von Clausewitz noted:The second crisis most commonly occurs at the end of a victorious campaign when the lines of communication have begun to be overstretched. This is especially true when the war is conducted in an impoverished, thinly populated and possibly hostile country. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | History of military logistics | The French system fared poorly in the Peninsular War in the face of Spanish guerrilla warfare that targeted their supply lines and the British blockade of French-occupied ports on the Iberian Peninsula. The need to supply a besieged Barcelona made it impossible to control the province and ended French plans to incorporate Catalonia into Napoleon's Empire. Wellington blocked the French advance into Portugal with a series of fortifications, the Lines of Torres Vedras, and devastated the area north of the lines to make it difficult for the French to mass forces there to assault or besiege the fortifications.
A more spectacular logistical failure occurred in the Russian campaign in 1812. Carl von Clausewitz noted:The second crisis most commonly occurs at the end of a victorious campaign when the lines of communication have begun to be overstretched. This is especially true when the war is conducted in an impoverished, thinly populated and possibly hostile country. How vast a difference there is between a supply line stretching from Vilna to Moscow, where every wagon has to be procured by force, and a line from Cologne to Paris, via Liége, Louvain, Brussels, Mons, Valenciennes and Cambrai, where a commercial transaction, a bill of exchange, is enough to produce millions of rations!
Medical logistics: Disease had been the greatest enemy of the soldier. Invading armies sometimes introduced diseases. Wars often created conditions for diseases to flourish through crowding, social disruption and damage to infrastructure. Crowded army camps were always susceptible to diseases. In the eighteenth century, physicians like George Cleghorn, Richard Brocklesby and René-Nicolas Dufriche Desgenettes called for improvements in military hygiene, as did John Pringle, who wrote a treatise on military medicine in 1752, Observations on the Diseases of the Army in Camp and Garrison, in which he argued that disease was caused by bad air and overcrowding.
James Lind published a Treatise of the Scurvy in 1753 in which he advocated the consumption of fresh fruit and lemon juice to treat scurvy, a common illness among sailors on long voyages. Of the 175,990 sailors recruited by the Royal Navy between 1774 and 1780, 18,545 died of disease, mainly scurvy, and 1,243 were killed. Between 1794 and 1813, with the adoption of a lemon juice ration, the navy's sick rate fell from 1 in 4 to 1 in 10.75 and the death rate from 1 in 86 to 1 in 143. Lind also advocated the consumption of the bark of cinchona trees to prevent malaria, something that had previously been recommended by Thomas Sydenham in 1676. The active ingredient was extracted and isolated in 1820 by Pierre-Joseph Pelletier and Joseph Bienaimé Caventou, who named it "quinine".
The British Walcheren Campaign of 1809 was particularly notable in that less than 800 men died in battle, but forty percent of the force of 40,000 contracted diseases, probably malaria, typhoid or typhus; 60 officers and 3,900 men died, and some 11,000 men were still ill six months later. It is estimated that of the 240,000 British soldiers and sailors who died in all theatres in the Napoleonic wars, less than 30,000 died from wounds.
Later nineteenth century: The nineteenth century saw technological developments that facilitated immense improvements to the storage, handling and transportation of supplies. Salting, drying and smoking had long been used to delay food spoilage, but in 1809 Nicolas Appert invented a process of heat sterilisation and airtight bottling for food preservation on an industrial scale. Why it worked would not be explained until Louis Pasteur's ground breaking research in 1864, but the process was swiftly and widely adopted. Appert used glass because the quality of French tinplate was poor, but good quality tinplate was widely available in the UK. Philippe de Girard in France suggested its use to Peter Durand in England, who took out a patent on the process in 1810, which he sold to industrialist Bryan Donkin in 1812 for £1,000 (equivalent to £84,000 in 2023). The British Admiralty placed substantial orders for meat preserved in tin cans in 1814. Canning remained a manual process for many years until Max Ams invented the double seam for cans in 1896, making it possible to use an automated process to fill and close them. The use of cans simplified storage and distribution of foods, and reduced waste and the incidence of food-related illness.
A practical mechanical refrigeration process was developed in Australia by James Harrison and patented in the UK by him in 1856, and by the 1880s reefer ships were plying the oceans. Richard Trevithick developed the first high-pressure steam engine in 1801 and the first working railway steam locomotive in 1804. Steam power had great advantages for vessels that plied rivers, where twists and turns meant changes of course but the narrow confines of the river made it difficult to tack. Wood and coal could be obtained along the river, whereas ocean-going vessels had no such opportunity, and therefore continued to carry sails even when they had engines.
By reducing the dependence on the wind, the steam engine made shipping faster and more reliable. To allow their warships to operate around the world, the British built a global network of coaling stations. To reduce its dependence on British colliers, the United States Navy began to move to oil in 1913. For the British, this was a more painful process, as it produced coal but not oil domestically.
The first to realise the potential of rail were the Russians, who moved a force of 14,500 men from Uherské Hradiště to Kraków by rail in 1846. During the American Civil War, railways were used extensively for the transport of personnel, supplies, horses and mules, and artillery pieces. While railways were a more economic form of transport than animal-drawn carts and wagons, they were limited to tracks, and therefore could not support an advancing army unless its advance was along existing railway lines. The large armies of the American Civil also made great use of riverboats and coastal shipping, which were not so easy to damage or interdict.
During the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, railways enabled the swift mobilisation of the Prussian Army, but the problem of moving supplies from the end of rail lines to units at the front resulted in nearly 18,000 tons trapped on trains unable to be unloaded to ground transport. During the Crimean War, the British built the first military railway, one specifically for supporting armies in the field, to support the siege of Sevastopol. The Prussian use of railways during the Franco-Prussian War is often cited as an example of logistic modernisations, but the advantages of manoeuvre were often gained by abandoning supply lines that became hopelessly congested with rear-area traffic. The Canadian government moved 4,000 troops and their supplies over the Canadian Pacific Railway to suppress the North-West Rebellion in 1885, and the Russians moved 370,000 troops along the incomplete Trans-Siberian Railway for the Russo-Japanese War in 1904.
Twentieth and twenty-first centuries:
First World War: Between 1870 and 1914, the population of Europe grew from 293 million to 490 million. The expansion of armies and navies was even more rapid. With the spread of military conscription and reserve systems in the decades leading up to the 20th century, the potential size of armies increased substantially. France mobilised 570,000 troops for the Franco-Prussian War and over three million on the outbreak of the First World War. The advent of industrial warfare in the form of bolt-action rifles, machine guns and quick-firing artillery sent ammunition consumption soaring. In the Franco-Prussian War, each German gun fired 199 shells on average but in 1914 the German stock of 1,000 rounds per gun were exhausted in the first month and a half of fighting.
In earlier wars, most artillery pieces lasted for the duration of the campaign, but now counter-battery fire was capable of destroying them. Strenuous efforts were made to step up production but constant firing led to wear and tear on the guns. The factories prioritised production of new guns over spare parts, which became scarce. Quality suffered in the haste to produce more and there were serious problems with guns and ammunition. In 1915, as many as 25 per cent of the rounds in a batch might be defective. The shortage of ammunition created a political crisis in the UK, the Shell Crisis of 1915, which led to the formation of a new coalition government.
As munitions production increased, transport became the major bottleneck. Military logistical systems continued to rely on nineteenth-century technology. The British shipped 5,337,841 tonnes (5,253,538 long tons) of ammunition to France and 5,525,875 tonnes (5,438,602 long tons) of hay and oats to feed the animals. When the war began, the rail and horse-drawn supply were stretched to their limits. Where the stalemate of trench warfare took hold, narrow gauge trench railways were built to extend the rail network to the front lines. The great size of the German Army proved too much for its railways to support except while immobile. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | History of military logistics | In 1915, as many as 25 per cent of the rounds in a batch might be defective. The shortage of ammunition created a political crisis in the UK, the Shell Crisis of 1915, which led to the formation of a new coalition government.
As munitions production increased, transport became the major bottleneck. Military logistical systems continued to rely on nineteenth-century technology. The British shipped 5,337,841 tonnes (5,253,538 long tons) of ammunition to France and 5,525,875 tonnes (5,438,602 long tons) of hay and oats to feed the animals. When the war began, the rail and horse-drawn supply were stretched to their limits. Where the stalemate of trench warfare took hold, narrow gauge trench railways were built to extend the rail network to the front lines. The great size of the German Army proved too much for its railways to support except while immobile. From the beginning of the Battle of the Somme on 24 June to 23 July 1916, 150,000 tonnes (148,000 long tons) of ammunition had been fired but only 103,404 tonnes (101,771 long tons) were landed, the difference being made up by depleting stockpiles. The capacity of the six channel ports that handled 96 per cent of the British Expeditionary Force’s requirements was increased and additional locomotives and rolling stock were imported. Between 1914 and 1918, the French laid between 5,000 and 6,000 kilometres of new track.
On the Western Front, supplies moved from the ports by rail or barge to regulating points where they were sorted before being forwarded. The supply system might be described as "semiautomatic". Certain supplies for which demand was invariant, such as fodder and rations, were sent daily without requisition in division-sized "packs" consisting of two wagons of bread, two of groceries, one of meat, four of hay, five of oats and one of petrol, a total of 15 wagons. Each pack was earmarked for a particular division and would be delivered to its own railhead. Supplies for which there was variable demand, such as reinforcements, remounts, ammunition and engineering stores, had to be indented, and were sent by the railway carload. A typical train would consist of forty wagons, two packs and ten other wagons. Each division drew its supplies from one railhead, although it might share it with other divisions.
The advent of motor vehicles powered by internal combustion engines offered an alternative to animal transport for moving supplies forward of the railhead. Though they generally require better roads and bridges, they were much faster and more efficient than animal transport. Compared with railways they had limited cargo capacity, and created logistical problems of their own with their need for fuel and spare parts. At one point the French used 11,200 trucks to move 100,000 men over 100 miles (160 km) at short notice. By 1918, the French had 90,000 motor vehicles, while the Germans had 40,000.
The movement of supplies posed greater problems on the Eastern Front, where the transportation system was less developed than in the west. The Russian economy was less developed and less efficient than that of Germany, and food and ammunition shortages developed in 1915. In turn, Russia was more developed industrially than Turkey, which nonetheless managed to last longer than Russia. This was partly because after the Gallipoli campaign the forces the British brought to bear in the Sinai and Palestine campaign and Mesopotamian campaign were in relatively remote areas of the Turkish Empire where the well-resourced British forces had to overcome supply and transportation problems to bring their power to bear. The British were able to use motor vehicles in the invasion of Darfur but in sub-Saharan Africa they were heavily reliant on human porters.
The British blockade of Germany kept a stranglehold on raw materials, goods, and food needed to support the Germany war effort, and is considered one of the key elements in the eventual Allied victory in the war. This form of economic warfare also involved pressure on neutral countries not to export or re-export to Germany and a program of pre-emptive purchasing. The Germans attempted to exploit occupied countries like Romania and Ukraine for oil, grain and other resources. Although the Allies controlled most of the world's shipping, Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare showed the vulnerability of merchant shipping despite Allied naval superiority. The United Kingdom was particularly vulnerable to economic blockade, as it did not produce enough food to feed itself, importing nearly two-thirds of its food. Coal and food had to be rationed.
In 1912, the biochemist, Casimir Funk, theorised that beriberi, scurvy and rickets were all diseases caused by nutrient deficiencies, naming the missing nutrient chemicals "vitamines" and over the following decades, biochemists were able to isolate them. During the First World War, the troops in the Gallipoli campaign suffered from beriberi and scurvy because the British Army's ration was deficient in these vitamins. Unlike their counterparts on the Western Front, the troops were unable to supplement their diet with local produce. A type of scurvy in the form of septic sores known as "Barcoo rot" appeared among the Australian Light Horse in the Sinai campaign, for the same reason.
Second World War: The mechanisation of warfare that started in the First World War, added the maintenance needs of military aircraft, tanks and other combat vehicles to the burden on military logistics. Many nations, including Germany, continued to rely on horse-drawn transport. Trucks were expensive to produce and their production put additional strain on scarce resources such as rubber, steel and petroleum. Petroleum was a particular problem, as the world's major sources were under the control of the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States and the Soviet Union. Efforts were made to step up the production of synthetic fuels and rubber, but the supply of these posed difficulties throughout the war, and they came under Allied air attack. Germany's motor vehicle industry was not well developed either. It therefore made sense to continue to rely on horse-drawn transport. In 1939 a German infantry division had 942 motor vehicles and 1,200 horse-drawn carts. Even this was hard to meet, and large numbers of civilian and captured British and French vehicles were employed. The multiplicity of types created problems with spare parts.
The forces of the United States and United Kingdom were fully mechanised, although the British and Americans used mules in North Africa, Italy and Burma. The British and Japanese also used elephants in Burma. In the South West Pacific, human porters were used. There was little civilian demand for four-wheel drive vehicles, which were more expensive than regular vehicles, so commercial firms saw little benefit in producing them. All armies entered the war with large numbers of two-wheel drive vehicles. The need for four-wheel drive soon became apparent, especially in the less developed parts of the world, and considerable manpower and materiel had to be devoted to road making and maintenance. Similarly, the American automotive industry had scant interest in heavy trucks for long-distance hauls; the US Interstate Highway System had not yet been built, and interstate commerce was the province of rail and water transport. The US Army gave a low priority to such vehicles until the need became acute.
The increased technological and administrative complexity was reflected in the proliferation of staff and paperwork. In the United States, the Army Service Forces inventoried 200,000 paper forms and eliminated 125,000 of them. Professional analysis and simplification of common procedures was undertaken using industrial engineering techniques developed by industry.
The German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 faced logistical failure when the Soviet Union did not collapse after the initial frontier battles. The summer invasion meant that fodder was available for the 625,000 horses amassed for the operation, but stocks of food were low, and their seizure alienated the local population. An invasion later in the year would have avoided this, but left less time for operations before the winter set in. The distances involved, the speed of the advance, and the poor road network all contributed to the logistical difficulties, and shortages of spare parts developed for motor vehicles, which were in short supply in the first place. The bridges over the Dnieper were demolished by the retreating Soviets, and use of the railway system was hampered by the different track gauge used in the Soviet Union. Transportation difficulties made it difficult to distribute stores like winter clothing. In 1942 the German forces in the Soviet Union began to integrate the materiel and manpower resources of the occupied regions into the German war effort.
Motor vehicles ran on tyres, but the supply of rubber to the Allies of World War II was curtailed when the Japanese overran the major sources of natural rubber. Imports to the United States dropped from 910,000 tonnes (900,000 long tons) in 1941 to 11,000 tonnes (11,000 long tons) in 1942. Fuel rationing and recycling measures were introduced to conserve tyres. The synthetic rubber industry in the United States grew from producing 8,400 tonnes (8,300 long tons) in 1939 to 810,000 tonnes (800,000 long tons) in 1944. Germany produced synthetic rubber and oil, much of it with slave labour at the IG Farben plant at Auschwitz .
The Japanese also captured the major sources of quinine. Malaria was a major medical and military problem in many theatres of war. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | History of military logistics | Motor vehicles ran on tyres, but the supply of rubber to the Allies of World War II was curtailed when the Japanese overran the major sources of natural rubber. Imports to the United States dropped from 910,000 tonnes (900,000 long tons) in 1941 to 11,000 tonnes (11,000 long tons) in 1942. Fuel rationing and recycling measures were introduced to conserve tyres. The synthetic rubber industry in the United States grew from producing 8,400 tonnes (8,300 long tons) in 1939 to 810,000 tonnes (800,000 long tons) in 1944. Germany produced synthetic rubber and oil, much of it with slave labour at the IG Farben plant at Auschwitz .
The Japanese also captured the major sources of quinine. Malaria was a major medical and military problem in many theatres of war. The US Marines in the Guadalcanal campaign had 5,000 hospital admissions for malaria among a force of 16,000 after two months on Guadalcanal, while the Australian force at Milne Bay reported over 5,000 cases of malaria among the force of 12,000 in November 1942. Neil Hamilton Fairley persuaded the UK and US authorities to produce atebrin and plasmoquine, antimalarial drugs that had been developed in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. The development of penicillin by Howard Florey and his team was a significant advance in the treatment of wounds with antibiotics. During the campaign in Western Europe in 1944–1945, penicillin was widely used both to treat infected wounds and as a prophylactic to prevent wounds from becoming infected. Gas gangrene had killed 150 out of every 1,000 casualties in the First World War, but the instance of this disease now disappeared almost completely. Open fractures now had a recovery rate of better than 94 per cent, and recovery from burns of one-fifth of the body or less was 100 per cent.
In the North African campaign, the Italians struggled to supply their forces through the inadequate ports in Libya, while the British had access to the Suez. In the Siege of Tobruk, destroyers were used to resupply the garrison, as freighters were too vulnerable to air attack. At the same time, retention of the port stretched the German and Italian supply lines, making offensive action into Egypt more difficult. Resupplying the garrison of Malta was even more hazardous, requiring major operations, as were the Arctic convoys that brought aid to the Soviet Union, so much so that they had to be suspended in July and August 1942. Safer routes were developed through Iran and Siberia, and the Black Sea after it was reopened in 1945.
The North African campaign saw the widespread adoption of the 20 litre jerry can, a German invention that was copied by the British and Americans. The jerry can had convenient carrying handles and could be stacked. It did not shift or roll in storage, and floated in water when filled with petrol. The British version was an exact copy of the German model; the American version, called an Ameri-can by the British, was slightly smaller, with a screw cap onto which a nozzle could be fitted. It weighed 4.5 kilograms (10 lb) empty, and 18 kilograms (40 lb) when filled with petrol, so 56 filled cans weighed 1.0 tonne (1 long ton). Some 11.5 million jerry cans were provided for Operation Overlord. Of these, 10.5 million were manufactured in the UK and supplied to the US Army under Reverse Lend-Lease, while the rest came from the US.
To facilitate amphibious operations in Europe and the Pacific, the Allies developed an assortment of special vessels. There were attack transports (APA) and amphibious cargo ships (AKA), and ocean-going landing ships, most notably the landing craft, infantry (LCI), landing ship, tank (LST) that could carry tanks and trucks and land them on a beach, and the landing ship, dock (LSD), a floating dry dock that could transport landing craft and amphibious vehicles. These came in many forms, from the small landing craft, vehicle, personnel (LCVP), to the larger landing craft, mechanised (LCM) and landing craft, tank (LCT). Amphibious vehicles included the DUKW, an amphibious truck, and the Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT).
The development of amphibious craft allowed the Allies to land in Normandy without having to quickly seize a heavily defended port. After their victory in the Battle of Normandy, the advance came to a halt in September 1944. This was not a result of inadequate supplies or port capacity – there were still some 600,000 long tons (610,000 t) of supplies stockpiled in the Normandy lodgment area in November – nor solely by a shortage of fuel. Rather, the problem was the inability to deliver fuel and supplies to the armies. Railways could not be repaired and pipelines could not be constructed quickly enough. Motor transport was used as a stopgap, but insufficient numbers of heavy trucks compelled the Army to use the smaller general purpose 2½-ton 6×6 trucks for long hauls, for which they were unsuited. The Red Ball Express was a success, but at a cost: overloading, careless driving, lack of proper vehicle maintenance, and wear and tear took their toll on the truck fleet. In the long run it was the railways that carried most of the tonnage.
Between September and November 1944, the American forces in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) were beset by severe difficulties with port discharge capacity and inland transportation infrastructure that only eased with the opening of the port of Antwerp in November. The Germans strongly defended the ports and destroyed their facilities. The shipping crisis in Europe escalated into a global one. The Allied merchant fleet was still growing at a rate of 510,000 deadweight tonnes (500,000 deadweight tons) per month, but the number of ships available for loading at US ports was shrinking due to the retention of vessels by the theatres. This represented 7,100,000 deadweight tonnes (7,000,000 deadweight tons) of shipping, which was about 30 percent of the total Allied-controlled tonnage. When ships failed to return from overseas on time, supplies piled up at the ports, depots and railway sidings in the United States.
Another wartime development was air transport, which provided an alternative to land and sea transport, but with limited tonnage and at high cost. The Germans used air transport to reinforce Tunisia after the Allies landed in North West Africa. Soon after the Germans attempted to supply the surrounded Sixth Army during the Battle of Stalingrad, but failed due to insufficient aircraft to fulfil the mission. The Allies were more successful; in the Burma Campaign, aircraft supplied the Chindits and the cut off Allied units in the Battle of Imphal. An airlift over "the Hump" was used to resupply the Chinese war effort. After the war the 1948 Berlin Air Lift was successful in supplying the whole non-Soviet half of the city.
Long distances dominated the Pacific War. For the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese used oilers to refuel the attacking fleet at sea en route. The ability of the Japanese navy to conduct refuelling and replenishment at sea allowed it to conduct wide-ranging operations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans in the first months of 1942. In 1944, the United States Navy created service squadrons of support ships to enable the Pacific Fleet to remain at sea longer and support fast-paced operations against a succession of Japanese-held islands.
In November 1943, the Pacific Ocean Areas instituted a form of automatic supply, whereby troops and supplies were sent according to a pre-arranged schedule in a series of echelons. Shipping was held at control points to avoid congestion in forward areas, which also minimised the time when ships were most exposed to enemy attack. While wasteful in some respects, the procedure allowed for mounting of operations from widely scattered ports, avoided shipping congestion and long turnaround times, and eliminated the duplication of Army and Navy supplies. The South West Pacific Area adopted one of its key features, the block loading of ships for a particular destination.
As in Europe, there was a shipping crisis in the South West Pacific in late 1944, and for the same reason: a lack of port capacity. To ease the strain on shipping resources, the American forces made use of local procurement. While American Lend Lease aid to Australia was only 3.3% of aid to all countries, Australian Reverse Lend Lease represented 13.0% of aid to the United States. Bypassed Japanese forces in the South West Pacific Area were expected to "wither on the vine" and starve, but this did not occur; they cultivated gardens using local labour seeds and equipment imported by aircraft and submarines, which also brought in ordnance and medical supplies. They remained strong, well-organised and capable of offensive action. Australian forces conducted a series of offensives against them, which were targeted at their gardens and supplies.
Post-Second World War: Helicopters were used by the United States in the Korean War to deliver supplies. Although much slower than fixed-wing aircraft, they could move supplies rapidly over terrain that could deliver supplies in minutes to a forward area that could take hours to reach overland. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | History of military logistics | While American Lend Lease aid to Australia was only 3.3% of aid to all countries, Australian Reverse Lend Lease represented 13.0% of aid to the United States. Bypassed Japanese forces in the South West Pacific Area were expected to "wither on the vine" and starve, but this did not occur; they cultivated gardens using local labour seeds and equipment imported by aircraft and submarines, which also brought in ordnance and medical supplies. They remained strong, well-organised and capable of offensive action. Australian forces conducted a series of offensives against them, which were targeted at their gardens and supplies.
Post-Second World War: Helicopters were used by the United States in the Korean War to deliver supplies. Although much slower than fixed-wing aircraft, they could move supplies rapidly over terrain that could deliver supplies in minutes to a forward area that could take hours to reach overland. While still affected by the weather, they could fly when other aircraft were grounded. They also became important for the rapid evacuation of casualties. They were used by the French in the First Indochina War, and the Algerian War, where they handled most of the tactical troop movement and casualty evacuation, and much of the logistical support.
In the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army operated a fleet of large Boeing CH-47 Chinook and Sikorsky CH-54 Tarhe helicopters. Using a technique whereby supplies in a cargo net were slung under a helicopter, a CH-47 could move a hundred tonnes of supplies within a 16-kilometre (10 mi) radius in a single day. These helicopters were also used to recover 10,000 crashed aircraft. Notably, in these conflicts victory did not always go to the side with the best logistics.
The war in Vietnam also saw the large-scale employment of containerisation. A standard steel container was designed called the Conex box that was capable of holding 4,100 kilograms (9,000 lb) and suitable for loading onto a semi-trailer or railway flat car. Eventually 150,000 of them were sent to Vietnam. The use of containers reduced port congestion and handling time, and saved money on packaging. There was less damage to cargo in transit and reduced loss through pilferage. The containers could be used in lieu of covered storage. The drawback of using containers was that they required special equipment to handle them. This became less of a problem as containerisation spread through the world, but in 1999 the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) found that East Timor had no facilities for handling containers, and special container handling cranes had to be designed and manufactured in New Zealand.
The development of large cargo-carrying aircraft enhanced the ability of airlift to move personnel and supplies over long distances. It remains uneconomical compared with sealift, so sealift is still the preferred means of transport for cargo, particularly heavy and bulky items. Nonetheless, during the Yom Kippur War, as part of Operation Nickel Grass, American Lockheed C-141 Starlifter and Lockheed C-5 Galaxy aircraft delivered 22,683 tonnes (22,325 long tons) of supplies for Israeli forces including 29 tanks, although only four arrived before the ceasefire on 22 October 1973; just 39 per cent of the Nickel Grass materiel was delivered by then. Another 22,683 tonnes (22,325 long tons) was sent by sea, none of which arrived before the ceasefire.
During the initial stage of the Gulf War from 7 August to 8 November 1991, some 187,000 U.S. troops were deployed to Saudi Arabia, 99.22 per cent of them by air. Airlift also accounted for 15.3 per cent of the cargo, some 161,804 tonnes (178,358 short tons). The second phase of deployment, from 8 November 1991 to 16 January 1992, involved the movement of 391,604 troops by air, the majority of whom travelled on commercial flights, and 326,223 tonnes (359,599 short tons) of cargo, representing 14.5 per cent of the total. The seaports of Saudi Arabia were world class, much better than their counterparts in the United States, with 60 piers, of which the U.S. forces used 15. Sealift carried 85.5 per cent of the dry cargo and 1,869,990 tonnes (2,061,310 short tons) of petroleum products in this phase.
As the twentieth century drew to a close, the increasing complexity of new weapons systems became a concern. While new technologies were intended to make armies more lethal and less reliant on manpower, they did not always live up to their promise. In the 1982 Falklands War, the logistical implications of the Rapier missile launchers were not initially appreciated. Generally located on hilltops where there were no roads or tracks, they had to be sited by helicopter. If they had to be moved, whether yards or miles, another helicopter sortie was called for. They required fuel to keep their generators running, and their isolated sites required the full-time service of a Westland Sea King helicopter, itself a voracious consumer of fuel, to keep them going.
The increasing complexity of weapons and equipment saw the proportion of personnel devoted to logistics in the US Army rise from 39 per cent in the American Expeditionary Forces in the First World War to 45 per cent in the ETO in the Second World War, but declined to 42 per cent in the Korean War, and 35 per cent in the Vietnam War. Concerns about the low tooth-to-tail ratio saw a mandated ratio put in place, but the widespread use of civilian contractors saw the proportion of people devoted to logistical functions rise to 55 per cent in 2005 during the Iraq War.
Complex systems like the M1 Abrams tank require more knowledge and more skilled personnel to operate, maintain and repair, and resist easy modification. The M1 required three times the fuel of the older M60 tank, and 20 per cent more spare parts. When committed to action in the Gulf War, many Abrams tank crews exhausted their stock of spare parts, which could have become a serious problem had the fighting lasted more than 100 hours. On the other hand, 300,000 rounds of artillery, antiaircraft and tank ammunition were shipped only to be returned, largely owing to the greater lethality of modern weapons lowering ammunition consumption rates. The high fuel usage led to reconsideration of proposals to use a diesel engine instead.
The diversity of equipment and consequent large number of spare parts stocked by the NATO saw attempts at standardisation. By the 21st century, there were over 1,000 NATO standardization agreements, covering everything from ammunition calibres to rail gauges and the terminology that troops use to communicate with each other. The adoption of standardisation as policy promised benefits through reducing inventories, allowing alliance partners to draw on each other's stockpiles and repair services, reducing support overheads, and lower costs through consolidation of research and development and the economies of scale of larger production runs. Most countries had no choice, as they lacked the industry and technology to manufacture complex modern weapons systems. However the adoption of foreign weapons also meant the adoption of foreign tactics, and giving up the advantages of bespoke systems tailored to the nation's own, often unique, strategic environment.
The management of spare parts became a major concern. When items were produced, it was not known how many of each spare part would be needed. Failure to estimate correctly meant inventories of spare parts that were never needed and shortages of others. Keeping old equipment rather than buying new seemed a sensible option, and sometimes the only one, for many armies, but the cost of keeping old vehicles and equipment running could also become uneconomical if not prohibitive.
In the late 20th century, the number of natural disasters increased from 50 a year in 1960 to 350 a year in 2010. While not their primary role in most countries, national and international military forces were increasingly engaged in such activities since they possessed the manpower, equipment and organization to deal with them. Up to 80 per cent of the total spent on disaster relief activities involved logistics operations, of which more than 40 per cent was wasted through duplication, lack of time to carry out adequate planning, and other factors.
Although military logistics was an older discipline than its business counterpart, in the twenty-first century the adoption of new tools, techniques and technologies saw the latter overtake the former. Techniques were imported to military logistics that had been developed in the business world, such as just-in-time manufacturing. This greatly reduced the costs involved in storage and handling of items, but in the combat environment of the Iraq War, the drawbacks became all too clear when suppliers and transport resources could not respond to rapidly changing patterns of demand. Shortages developed, and units responded by reverting to traditional just-in-case logistics, stockpiling items that they thought they might need.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 encountered severe logistical difficulties due to poor planning, notably a failure to anticipate the degree of resistance that was actually encountered. The logistical resources required were not on hand even though the capability existed. As equipment broke down through use and battle damage, a shortage of spare parts developed, which was compounded by inadequate numbers of trained maintenance personnel. Although Russia was the world's second largest producer of armaments, its industrial base still struggled to replace materiel losses incurred in high-intensity combat. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | History of military logistics | This greatly reduced the costs involved in storage and handling of items, but in the combat environment of the Iraq War, the drawbacks became all too clear when suppliers and transport resources could not respond to rapidly changing patterns of demand. Shortages developed, and units responded by reverting to traditional just-in-case logistics, stockpiling items that they thought they might need.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 encountered severe logistical difficulties due to poor planning, notably a failure to anticipate the degree of resistance that was actually encountered. The logistical resources required were not on hand even though the capability existed. As equipment broke down through use and battle damage, a shortage of spare parts developed, which was compounded by inadequate numbers of trained maintenance personnel. Although Russia was the world's second largest producer of armaments, its industrial base still struggled to replace materiel losses incurred in high-intensity combat. Even routine sustainment became difficult, with ground transport subject to interdiction by standoff missiles. Strategic failure then followed from logistical failure.
Notes:
References:
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External links: Media related to Military logistics at Wikimedia Commons
Military Logistics: A Brief History
Defence Logistics in Military History – An Analysis:
Part One · Part Two · Part Three · Part Four |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Holding attack | Definition: Many standard military activities can be considered deceptive, but not deception. For example, a unit may move into an assembly area to complete organizing and rehearsing prior to a mission. It is a standard deceptive tactic to camouflage the vehicles, equipment and personnel in the assembly area with the intent of confusing the enemy. Military deception is more complex than simple deceptive activities, with a unit deliberately planning and carrying out an elaborate effort that will cause a targeted adversary decision maker to take an action that is detrimental to the adversary and beneficial to the side employing deception.
Types: Deception can be accomplished through either increasing or decreasing an adversary's understanding of the operating environment. Ambiguity increasing deception is intended to sow confusion in the mind of the enemy decision maker by presenting multiple possible friendly courses of action. Because the adversary does not know which is true, his reactions are delayed or paralyzed, which gives the friendly side an advantage. With ambiguity decreasing deception, the friendly side intends to make the adversary certain of the friendly course of action — certain, but wrong. As a result, the adversary will misallocate time, personnel, or resources, which enables the friendly side to obtain an advantage.
The Operation Bodyguard deception in World War II can be viewed as an ambiguity increasing deception that over time became ambiguity decreasing. Initially, the aim was to increase confusion among German planners and leaders by presenting the possibilities of Allied invasions at the Pas-de-Calais and Normandy in France, as well as the Balkans, southern France, and Norway. Eventually, the deception increased certainty on the German side by causing them to conclude that Calais was the real invasion site. When the Allies attacked at Normandy, they did so with the advantage of surprise.
Tactics: Military deception may take place at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare. The five basic tactics include:
Diversion
Use of feints, demonstrations, displays, or ruses to draw the enemy's attention away from a friendly main effort and induce the enemy to concentrate resources at a time and place that is to the enemy's disadvantage.
Example: On the night of 17–18 August 1943, the Royal Air Force carried out Operation Hydra, the bombing of a World War II rocket research center at Peenemünde, a German town on the Baltic Sea. Over a period of time, the British had conditioned the Germans to expect and respond to attacks on Berlin by sending de Havilland Mosquito bombers along the same route towards the city. When the British executed Operation Hydra, the Germans believed eight Mosquitoes flying towards Berlin were the vanguard of yet another attack on the same target. As a result of this diversion, the Germans deployed the majority of their fighter aircraft over Berlin, which gave the British an advantage over Peenemünde.
Feint
An offensive action involving force-on-force contact with the adversary which deceives the adversary as to the location and/or time of the friendly side's main effort. A feint will cause the enemy to concentrate resources at an incorrect time and location. A series of feints will condition the enemy to friendly activities in the same location, causing the enemy to lower their guard or respond ineffectively to the friendly main effort.
Example: In May 1940, Nazi Germany's Army Group B attacked the Netherlands and Belgium. At the same time, Army Group A invaded France by attacking through the Ardennes towards the city of Sedan. Army Group B's attack was a feint intended to disguise Germany's main effort from British and French military leaders.
Demonstration
A demonstration presents a show of force similar to a feint, but avoids actual force-on-force contact with the adversary. The intent of a demonstration is for the adversary to incorrectly determine the time and location of the friendly main effort, which gives the friendly side an advantage by causing the adversary to incorrectly allocate resources, move to the wrong location, or fail to move.
Example: During the Peninsula campaign of the American Civil War, Union commander George B. McClellan believed he faced a stronger Confederate force commanded by John B. Magruder than he actually did. Magruder reinforced McClellan's perception with numerous demonstrations, including parading his soldiers where they could be viewed by Union observers, concealing them as they moved back to the start point, then parading them again within sight of McClellan's observers. McClellan concluded that he was outnumbered and decided to retreat.
Ruse
The deliberate exposure to the enemy of false information that causes the enemy to reach an incorrect conclusion about friendly intentions and capabilities. A ruse is a trick of warfare that relies on guile to contribute to a larger deception plan.
Example: The creation of the fictional Major William Martin ("The Man Who Never Was") as a British officer carrying important World War II battle plans. As part of the Operation Mincemeat deception that concealed the location of the planned Allied invasion of Sicily, the Allies intended for the Nazis to acquire the false documents, which indicated a planned Allied invasion of Greece and the Balkans, and then incorrectly allocate troops and materiel.
Display
The static portrayal of activity, troops, or equipment. A display is intended to deceive the adversary's visual observation capability, causing him to believe the friendly force is in a location other than where it is, that it has a capacity or capability it does not possess, or that it does not have a capacity or capability that it does possess.
Example: The Allied use of "sunshields" in Operation Bertram and inflatable decoys in Operation Bodyguard during World War II to deceive the enemy as to the size, location and objectives of Allied forces.
These basic deception tactics are often used in combination with each other as part of a larger deception plan.
Legality: Adherents to Protocol I (1977) of the Geneva Conventions agree not to engage in acts of perfidy during the conduct of warfare. Perfidious conduct is a deceitful action in which one side promises to act in good faith with the intention of breaking that promise to gain an advantage. Examples include one side raising a flag of truce to entice an enemy to come into the open and take them as prisoners of war, then opening fire on the uncovered adversary. Additional examples include misusing protected signs and symbols, such as the red cross, crescent, and crystal, to conceal weapons and ammunition by making them appear to be a medical facility.
Axioms, maxims, and principles: The development of modern military deception doctrine has led to the codification of several rules and maxims. In U.S. doctrine, three of the most important are expressed as Magruder's Principle, the Jones' Dilemma, and Care in the Placement of Deceptive Material (Avoid Windfalls).
Magruder's Principle: Named for Confederate general John B. Magruder, the principle asserts that it is easier to convince a target into holding on to a pre-existing belief than it is to convince a target of something it does not believe. Examples include the Allies of World War II making use in the Operation Mincemeat deception of the pre-existing German belief that Greece and the Balkans would be their next invasion target after North Africa, when the Allies actually intended to invade Sicily.
Jones' Dilemma: Named for British scientist Reginald Victor Jones, who played an important role in the Allied effort during World War II, the Jones dilemma indicates that the greater the number of intelligence and information gathering and transmitting resources available to the deception target, the more difficult it is to deceive the target. Conversely, the more of the target's intelligence and information systems that are manipulated in a deception plan or denied to the target, the more likely the target is to believe the deception. One reason the World War II Operation Bodyguard deception was accepted as true on the German side is that Germany's ability to acquire information about activities in England was limited, enabling the Allies to manipulate the few German intelligence gathering resources that were available.
Avoid Windfalls: If a deception target obtains deceptive information too easily ("too good to be true"), the target is unlikely to act on it and the deception will fail. This requires deception planners to take care in placing deceptive information so that it will appear to have been acquired in a seemingly natural manner. The deception target is then able to assemble details from multiple sources into a coherent, believable, but untrue story. The best deception plans co-opt the enemy's skepticism through requiring enemy participation, either by expending time and resources in obtaining the deceptive information, or by devoting significant effort to interpreting it. In an example of valid information being dismissed as a windfall, early in World War II a plane carrying German officers to Cologne became lost in bad weather and landed in Belgium. Before being arrested by Belgian authorities, the Germans attempted to burn the papers they were carrying, which included copies of the actual invasion plans for Belgium and the Netherlands. Belgian authorities discounted this true information as false because of the ease with which they obtained it.
Multiple Forms of Surprise: Friendly events about which an adversary can be deceived are described in the mnemonic SALUTE-IS, which stands for Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, Equipment, Intent, and Style. The maxim indicates that the more of these categories the friendly side can deceive the adversary about, the more likely the adversary is to believe the deception. Conversely, if there are plans and activities about which the adversary is already aware, attempting to deceive him about them is unlikely to succeed. In Operation Bodyguard, the Germans knew there would be an invasion on the coast of France, that it would happen in 1944, and that it would be based in England. They did not know the exact date and the exact location. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Holding attack | Belgian authorities discounted this true information as false because of the ease with which they obtained it.
Multiple Forms of Surprise: Friendly events about which an adversary can be deceived are described in the mnemonic SALUTE-IS, which stands for Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, Equipment, Intent, and Style. The maxim indicates that the more of these categories the friendly side can deceive the adversary about, the more likely the adversary is to believe the deception. Conversely, if there are plans and activities about which the adversary is already aware, attempting to deceive him about them is unlikely to succeed. In Operation Bodyguard, the Germans knew there would be an invasion on the coast of France, that it would happen in 1944, and that it would be based in England. They did not know the exact date and the exact location. The Allies concentrated their deception on the SALUTE-IS details the Germans did not know about, and did not attempt to deceive them about what they already knew.
Planning process: The doctrine for planning deception has been codified over time. In the U.S. military, this doctrine begins with understanding the deception target's cognitive process. Expressed as "See-Think-Do", this understanding of the adversary considers what information has to be conveyed to the target through what medium for the target to develop the perception of the situation that will cause the enemy to take an action beneficial to the friendly side. In the planning process, "See-Think-Do" is considered in reverse order—what does the friendly side want the enemy to do as a result of the deception, what perceptions will the target have to form to take the action, and what information needs to be transmitted to the target through which medium so that the target will develop the desired perception.
As an example, the intent for Operation Bodyguard was for Germany to allocate forces away from Normandy ("Do"). The perception the Allies wanted to create in the mind of the deception target (Hitler) was that the Allies were planning to invade at Calais ("Think"). The information the Allies conveyed to the target to create the perception included the false radio traffic, dummy equipment displays, and deceptive command messages of the fictional First United States Army Group ("See").
History:
Ancient Egypt: According to a story from an ancient Egyptian papyrus, in about 1450 BC, an Egyptian army under Pharaoh Thutmose III and his general Djehuty besieged the Caananite city of Yapu (later Joppa and now Jaffa). Unable to gain entry, they resorted to deception. Djehuty hid several soldiers in baskets and had the baskets delivered to the town with the message that the Egyptians were admitting defeat and sending tribute. The people of Yapu accepted the gift and celebrated the end of the siege. Once inside the city, the hidden soldiers emerged from the baskets, opened the city gates, and admitted the main Egyptian force. The Egyptians then conquered the city.
Ancient Greece: The Iliad and The Odyssey, epic poems composed between the 9th and 6th centuries BC, are credited to the Ancient Greek author Homer. These poems contain details of the Trojan War, presumed by the Greeks to have been fought in approximately the 13th century BC. The Odyssey provides the details of the Trojan Horse, a successfully executed deception. After several years of stalemate, a Greek leader, Odysseus, devised a deception. Over three days, the Greeks constructed a hollow wooden horse, which they inscribed as an offering to the goddess Athena in prayer for safe return to their homes. The Greeks then pretended to depart the area around Troy, giving the impression that they had sailed for Greece. Rather than risk offending Athena, the Trojans brought the horse into the city. That night, Greek soldiers concealed inside the horse came out of their hiding place and opened the city gates. The main force of Greek soldiers who had actually remained nearby then entered the city and killed the inhabitants.
Ancient Macedon: In 326 BC, the army of Macedon, which was led by Alexander the Great, had advanced through the Middle East to Asia, conquering numerous kingdoms along the way. Alexander planned for battle against the forces of Porus, the king of the region of Pakistan and India that is now Punjab. To confront Porus, Alexander needed to cross the Hydaspes River. Porus used the terrain to his advantage and arranged his forces to prevent Alexander from crossing the river at the most likely fording point. Leading up to the battle, Alexander scouted several alternative fords, but Porus moved each time to counter him.
Alexander eventually located a suitable crossing point approximately 17 miles north of his base. He then led a portion of his army to the crossing site, while his subordinate Craterus kept the entire army's campfires burning within sight of Porus and feigned several river crossings that Porus was able to observe. With Porus distracted, Alexander successfully led his detachment across the river, then marched south to engage in battle. In the Battle of the Hydaspes, Alexander's army had the element of surprise and quickly defeated Porus' troops, while sustaining relatively few casualties on the Macedonian side. Having conquered Porus' kingdom, Alexander then allowed Porus to rule it as one of Alexander's satraps.
Ancient China: In 341 BC, troops under the general Sun Bin of the state of Qi faced battle with the forces of the state of Wei. Knowing that Wei regarded the army of Qi as inferior and cowardly, Sun Bin decided to use Wei's perception to his advantage. When Qi's forces invaded Wei, Sun Bin ordered them to light 100,000 camp fires on the first night. On the second night, they lit 50,000. On the third, 30,000. Sun Bin's deception caused the Wei forces led by general Pang Juan to believe Qi faced mass desertions. Rushing to attack what they believed to be an inferior army, the Wei forces assaulted Qi's troops at a narrow gorge, not knowing Sun Bin's soldiers had prepared it as an ambush site. When Pang Juan's troops reached the gorge they observed that a sign had been posted. Lighting a torch to see the message, the Wei commander read "Pang Juan dies beneath this tree". The lighting of the torch was the signal for Qi to initiate the ambush. Sun Bin's army quickly routed Pang Juan's and Pang Juan committed suicide.
Another well-known deceptive measure from ancient China has come to be known as the Empty Fort Strategy. Employed several times in numerous conflicts, the best-known example is a fictional one contained in a historical novel from the 1320s AD, Romance of the Three Kingdoms. This work, which contains embellished tales of actual Chinese history from 169 to 280 AD, includes the story of general Zhuge Liang of Shu Han employing the Empty Fort Strategy. As recounted in the novel's description of Zhuge Liang's Northern Expeditions, an actual historical event, the forces of general Sima Yi of Cao Wei arrived at Zhuge Liang's location, the city of Xicheng, while the bulk of Zhuge Liang's army was deployed elsewhere. Zhuge Liang instructed the few troops he had on hand to pretend to be townspeople and told them to perform tasks which would make them visible to Sima Yi, including sweeping the town's streets. Zhuge Liang ordered Xichneg's gates to be opened, then took up a visible position on a viewing platform, playing his Guqin while flanked by only two pages. Because Zhuge Liang's reputation as a military leader was so great, Sima Yi assumed Zhuge Liang had prepared an ambush, so he declined to enter Xicheng. Zhuge Liang's deception saved the town and prevented the few soldiers he had with him from being massacred or taken prisoner.
Ancient Carthage: During the Second Punic War, the Carthaginian general Hannibal employed deception during the Battle of Cannae in 216 BC. In preparing to face a Roman force led by Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro, Hannibal had 40,000 soldiers, as compared to the over 80,000 that had been amassed by Rome. To overcome the Roman advantage in numbers, Hannibal placed his less experienced and disciplined Gauls in the center of his formation, arranged to bulge out towards the Romans. On either side of his line, Hannibal positioned his experienced and disciplined Libyan and Gaetuli infantry. Hannibal intended for the Gauls to give way to the advancing Romans, with the center of his line bending but not breaking. Seeing the Gauls appear to retreat, the Romans would advance into the bowl shape or sack created by the bending of Hannibal's line. Once inside the sack, the African infantry positioned on the left and right would wheel inwards and attack the Roman flanks. In combination with the Carthaginian cavalry, the infantry on the flanks would continue moving until they encircled the Romans and could attack their rear. The battle unfolded as Hannibal had envisioned. Only 10,000 Romans escaped, with the rest either killed or captured. The battle came to be seen as evidence of Hannibal's genius for tactical generalship, while it was among the worst defeats suffered by Ancient Rome.
Ancient Rome: During the Gallic Wars, in 52 BC Roman commander Julius Caesar attempted to engage the forces of tribal leader Vercingetorix in open battle in what is now central France. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Holding attack | Seeing the Gauls appear to retreat, the Romans would advance into the bowl shape or sack created by the bending of Hannibal's line. Once inside the sack, the African infantry positioned on the left and right would wheel inwards and attack the Roman flanks. In combination with the Carthaginian cavalry, the infantry on the flanks would continue moving until they encircled the Romans and could attack their rear. The battle unfolded as Hannibal had envisioned. Only 10,000 Romans escaped, with the rest either killed or captured. The battle came to be seen as evidence of Hannibal's genius for tactical generalship, while it was among the worst defeats suffered by Ancient Rome.
Ancient Rome: During the Gallic Wars, in 52 BC Roman commander Julius Caesar attempted to engage the forces of tribal leader Vercingetorix in open battle in what is now central France. Vercingetorix kept the River Elave (now Allier) between Caesar's forces and his own. His troops destroyed or removed the bridges and mirrored the movements of Caesar's troops, preventing Caesar from crossing the river. Caesar responded by hiding forty of his sixty cohorts and arranging the remaining twenty to give the appearance of sixty as viewed from the opposite riverbank. The twenty cohorts continued to march along the river, and Vercingetorix's troops continued to mirror their movements. Caesar then led the forty hidden cohorts back to a repairable bridge, had it fixed, led his troops across, and sent for the other twenty cohorts to rejoin him. Now on the same side of the river as Vercingetorix, Caesar was able to engage the Gallic tribes in battle as he intended.
Mongol Empire: The Mongol Empire frequently used deception to aid its military success. A favored tactic was to exaggerate the size of their army, which would cause their enemies to surrender or flee. When he fought the Naimans in 1204, Chinggis Khan ordered his soldiers to light five campfires each, giving the impression of a more numerous army. In 1258 Möngke Khan invaded Sichuan with 40,000 soldiers, and spread rumors of 100,000 in an effort to intimidate his enemy.
When confronting numerically superior forces, the Mongols often sent troops behind their own lines to raise dust with branches tied to their horses' tails, which created the impression that reinforcements were en route. Mongol soldiers had more than one horse each, and to exaggerate the size of their army, they would compel prisoners or civilians to ride their spare horses within sight of the enemy, or mount dummies on their spare horses. To make their forces appear smaller, the Mongols would ride in single file, minimizing dust and making the hoofprints of their horses more difficult to count. Mongol armies also used the feigned retreat. A typical tactic was to deploy the mangudai, a vanguard unit that would charge the enemy, break up its formation, and then fall back in an attempt to draw the enemy into a position more favorable to the Mongols.
Middle Ages: Examples of deception occurred during the Crusades. In 1271, Sultan Baybars captured the formidable Krak des Chevaliers by handing the besieged knights a letter, supposedly from their commander, ordering them to surrender. The letter was fake, but the knights believed it was genuine and capitulated.
In 1401, during the Glyndŵr Rising, the Tudors of Wales were seeking a revocation of the price that Henry Percy had placed on their heads. After deciding to capture Percy's Conwy Castle, one member of the Tudor faction posed as a carpenter, gained access, and then admitted his compatriots. The successful deception was in part responsible for the creation of England's Tudor dynasty.
Renaissance: In an event from the early 1480s that was recounted in Washington Irving's Conquest of Granada, during the Granada War, the Alhama de Granada was besieged by Moors. During the siege, a portion of the fortress' outer wall was destroyed after the earth beneath it was washed away in a violent storm. To conceal the breach, the Conde de Tendilla, leader of the Spanish defenders, directed the erection of a cloth screen. The screen deceived the Moors because it was painted to resemble stone, and no Moorish besiegers ventured close enough to spot the fakery. The wall was repaired over the next several days, and the Moors did not learn of the gap in the Alhama's defenses.
Henry VIII of England led troops on the European mainland during the War of the League of Cambrai. On 4 September 1513, Henry's forces began to besiege the city of Tournai in what is now Belgium. The site of a thriving tapestry industry and home to many well-known painters, Tournai prolonged the siege by using painted canvas that resembled trenchworks to exaggerate the strength of its defenses. As a result of this deception, the city held out for several days longer than expected and obtained favorable terms when it surrendered.
Colonial Africa: In 1659, the kingdom of Denmark–Norway constructed Fort Christiansborg near what is now Accra in Ghana. Used to control commerce in slaves, as well as raw materials including gold and ivory, the site changed hands several times between Denmark–Norway, Portugal, and Sweden, sometimes by force, sometimes by purchase. In 1692, Nana Asamani, the king of the Akwamu people, planned to capture the fort from Denmark–Norway. Disguising himself as a cook and interpreter, he obtained work at the fort, where over the next year he became proficient in the Danish language and conducted reconnaissance to learn about the activities of the facility's occupants and the people with whom they traded.
After gaining familiarity with Fort Christiansborg's occupants and operations, in 1693 Asamani informed the Danish traders who occupied it about a group of Akwamu who desired to purchase weapons and ammunition, and suggested they were so anxious to buy that the Danes should inflate their prices. Lured by the prospect of large profits, the Danes bartered with the 80 Akwamu that Asamani had brought to the fort. When the Danes allowed the Akwamu to inspect rifles and prepare to test-fire them, the Akwamu instead used the guns to commence an attack on the Danes. Caught by surprise, the Danes were quickly overpowered and ejected from Fort Christiansborg. The Akwamu occupied the post for a year before Asamani agreed to sell it back to Denmark–Norway. Asamani kept the keys as a trophy, and they are still in the possession of the Akwamu.
French and Indian War: During the Seven Years' War in North America (known in the United States as the French and Indian War), British commander James Wolfe attempted throughout the summer of 1759 to force French commander Louis-Joseph de Montcalm to come out of his well-defended position in Quebec City. When artillery fire that destroyed most of the city did not produce the desired effect, Wolfe employed a deception strategy called "uproar east, attack west" Wolfe ordered Admiral Charles Saunders to move the British fleet on the Saint Lawrence River to a position opposite one of Montcalm's main camps east of Quebec City. This demonstration gave the appearance of preparations for an upcoming attack. Montcalm was deceived, and moved troops to guard against a British assault from that location.
Wolfe's soldiers at Quebec City capitalized on the favorable balance of forces created by the deception. First, they opened a road from the riverbank to the city heights. Next, they deployed into battle formation on a farmer's field near the city walls. Caught by surprise, Montcalm knew he would not be able to withstand a siege and had no choice but to fight. On 13 September 1759, the French were decisively beaten in the Battle of the Plains of Abraham. The loss of Quebec led to defeat in the war and France was forced to cede Canada to the British.
American Revolution:
Siege of Boston: As head of the Continental Army, George Washington successfully used deception to equalize the odds in the fight against the larger, better-equipped, and better-trained British army and its mercenary allies. During the Siege of Boston from April 1775 to March 1776, the newly organized Continental Army suffered from numerous equipment and supply shortages. Among the most critical was a lack of gunpowder, which was so acute that in a battle, Washington's troops would be able to fire no more than nine bullets per man. To conceal the lack of gunpowder from the British, Washington's quartermaster soldiers filled gunpowder casks with sand and shipped them from Providence, Rhode Island to the Continental Army's depots. The deception fooled British spies, and British commanders decided not to risk an attack during the siege.
Battle of Long Island: After the Patriot defeat at the Battle of Long Island in late August 1776, Washington's forces retreated to Brooklyn Heights, with a superior British force surrounding them on three sides and their backs to the East River. The British expected Washington would find his position untenable and surrender. Washington instead arranged for a flotilla of small boats to ferry his 9,000 troops across the river to the relative safety of Manhattan Island. Moving under cover of darkness, Washington's troops withdrew unit by unit to avoid the appearance that a general retreat was taking place. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Holding attack | To conceal the lack of gunpowder from the British, Washington's quartermaster soldiers filled gunpowder casks with sand and shipped them from Providence, Rhode Island to the Continental Army's depots. The deception fooled British spies, and British commanders decided not to risk an attack during the siege.
Battle of Long Island: After the Patriot defeat at the Battle of Long Island in late August 1776, Washington's forces retreated to Brooklyn Heights, with a superior British force surrounding them on three sides and their backs to the East River. The British expected Washington would find his position untenable and surrender. Washington instead arranged for a flotilla of small boats to ferry his 9,000 troops across the river to the relative safety of Manhattan Island. Moving under cover of darkness, Washington's troops withdrew unit by unit to avoid the appearance that a general retreat was taking place. The wheels of supply wagons and gun carriages were wrapped in rags to muffle their noise, and troops ordered to remain silent to avoid alerting the nearby British. Rear guard units kept campfires blazing through the night. These measures fooled British scouts into thinking the Patriot army was still on Brooklyn Heights. A morning fog obscured visibility, which helped the Continentals complete their retreat, and all 9,000 were safely ferried across the river. When the British advanced, they were surprised to find the American positions completely empty.
Battle of Trenton: Prior to the Battle of Trenton on Christmas Day 1776, Washington used a spy, John Honeyman to gain information about the positions of Britain's Hessian mercenaries. Posing as a Loyalist butcher and weaver, Honeyman traded with British and Hessian troops and acquired useful intelligence. At the same time, he aided Washington's plan by spreading disinformation that convinced the British and Hessians that Continental Army morale was low and an end-of-year attack against British positions unlikely. Honeyman's deceptive information enabled Washington to gain the element of surprise, and his troops routed the stunned Hessians.
Battle of Princeton: After the Battle of Trenton, the British dispatched a large army under General Charles Cornwallis to chase down Washington's smaller force. At the 2 January 1777 Battle of the Assunpink Creek, the Continental troops under Washington successfully repulsed three British attacks on their positions. Darkness ended the British attacks and they planned to resume the following morning. That night, Washington again resorted to the same deceptive tactics he had used in Brooklyn, including muffling the wheels of wagons and gun carriages to reduce noise, and leaving a rear guard to keep campfires burning. The British were again fooled, and Washington was able to move his army into a position from which he defeated the British at the Battle of Princeton on 3 January.
Siege of Fort Stanwix: In August 1777, the first Patriot attempt to relieve the Siege of Fort Stanwix, New York was blocked by the British as the result of the Battle of Oriskany. A second attempt, led by Benedict Arnold succeeded in part because of a successful effort to deceive the British besiegers. Arnold dispatched a messenger, Hon Yost Schuyler to the British lines. Schuyler was a Loyalist and regarded by the British army's Mohawk allies as a prophet because of his strange dress and conduct. To ensure his good conduct, Arnold held Schuyler's brother as a hostage. Upon reaching the British positions outside Fort Stanwix, Schuyler informed the Mohawk that Arnold's relief column was nearer than it was, and that it was much larger than it actually was. The Mohawk initially disbelieved Schuyler, but assumed he was telling the truth after other American Indian messengers sent by Arnold began to arrive with the same information. The Mohawk decided to leave, forcing British commander Barry St. Leger to order a retreat. The end of the siege also ended British attempts to control the Mohawk Valley.
Battle of Cowpens: In the fall of 1780, Continental Army general Nathanael Greene, commander of the Southern Department, carried out a harassment campaign against the British in North and South Carolina. One of Greene's subordinates, Daniel Morgan, commanded a force of approximately 600, and was tasked with harassing the enemy in the backcountry of South Carolina. In January 1781, as a British force commanded by Banastre Tarleton closed in on Morgan near Cowpens, South Carolina on the Broad River, he opted to fight rather than risk being attacked while attempting to cross the water.
Knowing the British regarded Patriot militia as inferior, Morgan used this perception to his advantage by arranging his troops in three lines. The first was sharpshooters, who provided harassing fire and attempted to pick off British officers. The sharpshooters would then fall back to the second line, which would consist of militiamen. The militia would fire two volleys, then feign a rout and pretend to flee. If the British believed they had caused a panic in the militiamen, they would charge forward. But instead of catching up to the fleeing militia, they would run into the third line—Continental Army soldiers commanded by John Eager Howard. As a reserve, Morgan had a small Continental cavalry force commanded by William Washington.
Morgan's deception proved decisive. At the Battle of Cowpens on 17 January 1781, the British under Tarleton launched a frontal assault. The militia feigned retreat, and Tarleton's troops charged forward. As planned, they were met by Howard's troops, then surprised by Washington's cavalry charging into their flanks. The British lost over 100 killed, over 200 wounded, and over 500 captured. Morgan's command sustained only 12 killed and 60 wounded.
French Revolutionary Wars: Napoleon Bonaparte made significant use of deception during his campaigns. At the 1796 Battle of Lodi, he used deception to achieve a successful crossing of the River Po. As a diversion, Napoleon mounted a token crossing attempt against a strong Austrian force under Johann Peter Beaulieu. Meanwhile, the bulk of his force moved upriver and obtained an uncontested bridgehead at Piacenza. Once it had crossed the river, Napoleon's force attacked the enemy's rear guard in a tactic he referred to as manoeuvre sur les derrières ("maneuvering behind").
War of the First Coalition: During the War of the First Coalition, France attempted an invasion of Britain. During the February 1797 Battle of Fishguard, Colonel William Tate an Irish-American commanding French and Irish troops, landed near Fishguard in Wales. English and Welsh militia and civilians under the command of John Campbell, 1st Baron Cawdor hastily assembled to defend the town. When discipline began to break down among Tate's troops and their attempted invasion slowed down, Tate asked for surrender terms that would permit his command to leave. Instead of offering terms, Cawdor demanded unconditional surrender. As Tate and his subordinates considered Cawdor's demands overnight, Cawdor backed up his bluff with several deceptive measures. According to local lore, these included having women in Traditional Welsh costumes and Welsh hats line the cliffs near the French camp. from a distance, the women appeared to be British soldiers in red coats and Shakos. Convinced that he was outnumbered, Tate surrendered and his troops were taken prisoner.
First Barbary War: In October, 1803 the frigate USS Philadelphia ran aground off the North African port of Tripoli during the First Barbary War and was captured by the Tripolitan forces. In February 1804, a U.S. military detachment under the command of Stephen Decatur Jr., was assigned to retrieve the ship or destroy it to keep Tripoli from putting it into service. The raiding party deceived the Tripolitan authorities by sailing into Tripoli harbor aboard USS Intrepid, a captured Tripolitan ketch which they disguised as a Maltese merchant ship. The ship's Sicilian harbor pilot spoke to the Tripolitan authorities in Arabic, claimed the ship had lost its anchors in a storm, and sought permission to tie up next to the captured Philadelphia. Permission was granted and Decatur and his crew overwhelmed the small force guarding Philadelphia, using only swords and pikes to avoid gunshots that would alert authorities on shore of their presence. Unable to sail Philadelphia away, Decatur and his crew burned it, then safely escaped.
War of 1812:
First American Invasion of Canada: In July 1812, General William Hull was at Fort Detroit as the British fortified a defensive position across the Detroit River in Windsor, Ontario. Hull decided to move the British to Fort Malden, further away from Detroit, so that he could seize the defenses in Windsor. To implement his plan, Hull resorted to deception, which began when his troops collected all the boats and canoes they could find. On 11 July 1812, Hull sent some boats down the river to Springwells, south of Detroit, in full view of the British. At the same time, the American regiment commanded by Duncan McArthur marched from Detroit to Springwells, also observed by the British.
With the British now anticipating an American crossing south of Detroit, a second American force moved north in the dark until they reached Bloody Run, a crossing point a mile and a half north of Fort Detroit and opposite the Ontario town of Sandwich. Finding no activity at Springwells, the British believed the Americans had already crossed the river and marched on Fort Malden. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Holding attack | Hull decided to move the British to Fort Malden, further away from Detroit, so that he could seize the defenses in Windsor. To implement his plan, Hull resorted to deception, which began when his troops collected all the boats and canoes they could find. On 11 July 1812, Hull sent some boats down the river to Springwells, south of Detroit, in full view of the British. At the same time, the American regiment commanded by Duncan McArthur marched from Detroit to Springwells, also observed by the British.
With the British now anticipating an American crossing south of Detroit, a second American force moved north in the dark until they reached Bloody Run, a crossing point a mile and a half north of Fort Detroit and opposite the Ontario town of Sandwich. Finding no activity at Springwells, the British believed the Americans had already crossed the river and marched on Fort Malden. Assuming Fort Malden was vulnerable, the British troops in Sandwich marched south, and in the morning the Americans at Bloody Run crossed to Sandwich unopposed. After landing in Sandwich, the Americans then marched from Sandwich to Windsor and seized the British defensive works.
Retaking the brig Nerina: In July 1812, the British warship HMS Belvidera captured the American brig Nerina, which had sailed for New York City from Newry, Ireland without knowing that war had been declared in June. Nerina's crew was transferred to a British ship, except for the captain, James Stewart, who remained on board with a British prize crew which intended to sail Nerina to Halifax, Nova Scotia so a prize court could adjudicate the British claim. When the British ship was out of sight, Stewart suggested to the prize master the propriety of opening the hatches to air out Nerina's hold. The master gave the order, and the fifty American passengers Stewart had hidden belowdecks before Nerina was boarded rushed out and retook the ship. Stewart's successful deception enabled him to resume command and sail Nerina to New London, Connecticut, which he reached on 4 August.
Siege of Detroit: In a notable deception that occurred during the War of 1812's Siege of Detroit, British Major General Isaac Brock and Native American chief Tecumseh used a variety of tricks, including letters they allowed to be intercepted which exaggerated the size of their forces, disguising Brock's militia contingent as more fearsome regular army soldiers, and repeatedly marching the same body of Native Americans past U.S. observers to make it appear they were more numerous than they were. Though he had superior troop strength, the U.S. commander, Brigadier General William Hull, believed he faced overwhelming numbers of British regular troops and hordes of uncontrollable Indians. Fearing a massacre, in August 1812 Hull surrendered the town and the attached fort. Most of his militia were allowed to return home, while his regular army soldiers were held as prisoners of war.
Capture of brigs Catharine and Rose: American Lieutenant John Downes was in command of Georgiana as part of Captain David Porter's naval force, which raided British shipping in the Galapagos chain. On 28 May 1813, lookouts on Georgiana spotted two British ships, Catharine and Rose, off James Island. Resorting to deception, Downes raised the British flag, which tricked the British whalers into thinking they were not under threat. When the Americans were within range they lowered a few boats filled with men, which rowed to Catharine and Rose and captured them without resistance. The British captains revealed to Downes that they had no idea of the attack until the Americans were already on deck.
Capture of HMS Eagle: In 1813, the British Royal Navy continued to blockade America's major ports. The British flagship HMS Poictiers, commanded by Commodore J.B. Beresford maintained station just outside Sandy Hook on Lower New York Bay, supported by the schooner HMS Eagle. Eagle had a notorious reputation among local fishermen for seizing both fishing boat crews and the boats' valuable cargoes. John Percival of the United States Navy volunteered to end the threat, and acquired a fishing boat named Yankee. On the morning of 4 July 1813, he concealed 34 armed volunteers in the hold, while he and two volunteers stayed on deck dressed as fishermen. Percival then sailed Yankee as though it was departing on a fishing voyage. Eagle's commander spotted Yankee and sailed in close so he could order it to transfer the livestock it carried on deck to the nearby Poictiers. Percival pretended to comply, and when Eagle was less than ten feet away, he signaled his volunteers to launch a surprise attack by shouting "Lawrence!" in honor of slain U.S. Navy Captain James Lawrence. Percival's volunteers poured out on deck and began firing. Eagle's crew were taken by surprise and fled below deck. One of Eagle's crew struck her colors, thus surrendering to Yankee. Two British sailors were killed and another received mortal wounds, but there were no American casualties. Percival brought the captured Eagle into port and delivered his prisoners to New York City's Whitehall Street docks as thousands of Americans were celebrating Independence Day.
Ambush at Black Swamp Road: In July 1813, Benjamin Forsyth, one of the company commanders in the American Regiment of Riflemen wanted to enlist the aid of Seneca warriors during planned military operations against the British near Newark, Ontario (now Niagara-on-the-Lake). Forsyth and the Seneca leaders agreed to work together to ambush the Mohawks who were allied with the British. American riflemen and Seneca warriors hid on both sides of the Black Swamp Road. A few Seneca horse riders rode out to gain the Mohawks' attention, then conducted a feigned retreat. After the Seneca horsemen passed the hidden American riflemen and Senecas, Forsyth blew his bugle as a signal. The concealed Americans and Senecas rose from their hiding places and fired into the pursuing Mohawks. Fifteen Mohawks were killed and thirteen surrendered, including a British interpreter. A few Mohawks escaped, while the Americans and their Seneca allies marched their prisoners back to American lines.
Battle of Fort Stephenson: In August 1813, American Major George Croghan was in charge of 160 soldiers at Fort Stephenson, a base on the Sandusky River in what is now Sandusky County, Ohio which guarded a nearby supply depot. British commander Henry Procter arrived with a superior force that included at least 500 British regulars, 800 American Indians under Major Robert Dickson, and at least 2,000 more under Tecumseh. Procter met Croghan under a flag of truce and urged him to surrender, but Croghan refused. The British then bombarded the fort by artillery and gunboat, to little effect. Croghan returned fire with his single cannon, "Old Betsy" while frequently changing its position in the hopes that the British would believe he had more than one artillery piece. When Croghan's supply of ammunition ran low, he ordered his men to cease fire.
Croghan deduced that the British were going to strike in full force at the northwestern angle of the fort, so he ordered his men to conceal "Old Betsy" in a blockhouse at that location. The next morning, the British feinted twice at the southern angle, then approached the northwest one. American gunners surprised them by uncovering "Old Betsy" and firing at point blank range, which destroyed the British column. Procter withdrew and sailed away. Procter reported British casualties as 23 killed, 35 wounded, and 28 missing. American casualties were only one killed and seven wounded. Croghan was celebrated as a national hero and promoted to lieutenant colonel.
Ambush at Odelltown: On 28 June 1814, Benjamin Forsyth, commander of the American Regiment of Riflemen, advanced from Chazy, New York to Odelltown, Lower Canada intending to draw a British force of Canadians and American Indian allies into an ambush. Upon arriving at the British positions, Forsyth sent a few men forward as decoys to make contact. When the British responded, the American decoys conducted a feigned retreat, which successfully lured 150 Canadians and American Indian allies into the ambush site.
During the ensuing fight, Forsyth needlessly exposed himself by stepping on a log to watch the attack and was shot and killed. Forsyth's riflemen, still hidden and now enraged over the death of their commander, rose from their covered positions and fired a devastating volley. The British were surprised by the ambush and retreated in confusion, leaving seventeen dead on the field. Forsyth was the only American casualty. Even though Forsyth was killed, his feigned retreat and ambush succeeded at inflicting heavy casualties on the British force.
Battle of Lundy's Lane: In the July 1814 Battle of Lundy's Lane, American forces used deception at several critical points. When troops under Winfield Scott returned from attacks on British formations they were twice mistaken in the dark for a British unit and allowed to pass. In one incident, a British leader asked who was approaching by shouting "The 89th?" The Americans recognized the opportunity to pass unmolested and called back "The 89th!"
In another event, American Captain Ambrose Spencer saw a unit approaching in the dark. He rode up and called out "What regiment is that?" "The Royal Scots, Sir!" a Scottish officer replied. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Holding attack | The British were surprised by the ambush and retreated in confusion, leaving seventeen dead on the field. Forsyth was the only American casualty. Even though Forsyth was killed, his feigned retreat and ambush succeeded at inflicting heavy casualties on the British force.
Battle of Lundy's Lane: In the July 1814 Battle of Lundy's Lane, American forces used deception at several critical points. When troops under Winfield Scott returned from attacks on British formations they were twice mistaken in the dark for a British unit and allowed to pass. In one incident, a British leader asked who was approaching by shouting "The 89th?" The Americans recognized the opportunity to pass unmolested and called back "The 89th!"
In another event, American Captain Ambrose Spencer saw a unit approaching in the dark. He rode up and called out "What regiment is that?" "The Royal Scots, Sir!" a Scottish officer replied. Spencer called out "Halt, Royal Scots!" and then rode off. Believing a superior officer had given them a command, the regiment stopped, then remained in place until a real British officer found them and gave them new orders.
In a third incident, British soldier Shadrach Byfield reported that an individual in a company of hidden Americans impersonated a British officer and told the British troops opposing them to form up and stand tall in preparation for inspection. The British troops believed a superior officer was addressing them and stood, enabling the Americans to fire a volley, after which they escaped retaliation by scattering in the dark.
Battle of Conjocta Creek: In August 1814, American Major Lodowick Morgan of the Regiment of Riflemen, who was based in Buffalo, New York, correctly deduced that the British were going to attack Buffalo from Canada by crossing the bridge at Conjocta Creek (also called Scajaquada). Morgan and 240 riflemen marched to the point where the road from Black Rock crossed the Conjocta. They sabotaged the bridge by pulling up a number of planks, then built breastworks at the south side. Afterwards, they continued on to Black Rock. Once at Black Rock, Morgan's troops marched back the way they came while playing music and making as much noise as possible to gain the attention of the British and make them believe the Americans were headed to Buffalo.
Once out of sight, Morgan and his men marched secretly through the woods to occupy the breastworks they had constructed on the south bank of the creek. The unsuspecting British arrived at the bridge and discovered the sabotage. While they halted to consider their options, Morgan began the Battle of Conjocta Creek by blowing a whistle to signal his soldiers, who fired a devastating volley. The British sought cover on the north bank and fired back, but the American troops remained protected behind their breastworks. The British attempted an assault on the breastworks, which the Americans repulsed. The British then attempted a flanking maneuver, which the Americans also repulsed. Unable to proceed past the Conjocta, the British retreated back to Canada. The Americans lost two killed and eight wounded, while the British sustained twelve killed and twenty-one wounded.
American Civil War:
Peninsula campaign: In the American Civil War's Peninsula campaign, Union commander George B. McClellan was the victim of a deception executed by the forces under Confederate commander John B. Magruder during the 1862 Siege of Yorktown. Magruder, who had acted in and produced plays, used his knowledge of visual and audio effects to deceive McClellan into believing Magruder's force was larger than it was. These included placing straw dummy crewmen alongside Quaker guns—logs painted black to resemble cannons—in his defensive works. Magruder interspersed his Quaker guns with the few real cannons he possessed, making his artillery seem more numerous than it was. In addition, he used shouted orders and bugle calls to march his relatively small force of about 10,000 in front of Union positions until they were out of sight, then had them loop around unseen and march through the same area again, making his troop strength seem greater than it was. Magruder's elaborate charade convinced McClellan, who outnumbered Magruder by ten to one, that he faced a more formidable opponent than was actually the case, which caused him to delay attacking. McClellan's delay allowed Confederate reinforcements to arrive, causing him to retreat back to Washington, D.C.
Vicksburg campaign: In early 1863, Union naval commander David Dixon Porter lost a new ironclad, USS Indianola after it ran aground on the Mississippi River near Vicksburg, Mississippi and was captured by Confederate forces. As the Confederates attempted to repair and refloat the damaged ship so they could use it against Porter's fleet, Porter executed a deception to thwart their effort. His men constructed a giant dummy ironclad from barges, barrels, and other materials that were on hand. Made to resemble a new, real ironclad, USS Lafayette (1848), the dummy was painted black to give it a sinister appearance and flew the Jolly Roger pirate flag. Porter's sailors floated the dummy, christened Black Terror, downstream at night, and it appeared impervious to Confederate shore battery fire. Exaggerated rumors about the seemingly indestructible super ship quickly spread to Vicksburg and reached salvage crews working on Indianola. In a panic, they halted their efforts, blew up Indianola, and abandoned the wreckage. When Black Terror ran aground and was inspected by Confederates, local newspapers roundly criticized military and naval commanders for being unable to tell the difference between a real warship and a fake.
Second Boer War: During the Second Boer War, British commander Robert Baden-Powell made extensive use of deception during his October 1899 to May 1900 defense of Mafeking. After he occupied the town with a force of 1,500, Baden-Powell faced 8,000 Boers who intended to begin a siege. As the Boers advanced, Baden-Powell wrote a letter to a friend in Transvaal whom he knew had died, which contained news of the imminent approach of more British troops. Baden-Powell intended for the letter to be intercepted and when it fell into Boer hands, they believed it was real. As a result, they diverted 1,200 troops to guard the approaches against Baden-Powell's fictional reinforcements. Baden-Powell's troops also set up fake defensive works at a distance from the town itself, including one marked as his command post, which further diverted Boer attention. In addition, he had local residents execute deceptive tactics, including carrying boxes of sand labeled "mines" in places where they could be observed. Word of these supposed mines reached the Boers, and when they soon afterwards observed supposed minefields appear around the edge of the town, they assumed the danger was real. These deceptive measures held off a Boer attack, which allowed Baden-Powell time to improve Mafeking's defences. As a result of his effort, the British were able to hold out until reinforcements arrived and lifted the siege.
World War I:
Gallipoli campaign: During World War I, deception shifted from the tactical level to the strategic as modernized warfare and advances in technology increased the size and complexity of battlefield organizations. Several methods of deception were used by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (Anzac) during its withdrawal from Gallipoli in Turkey, which was completed on 20 December 1915. As early as mid-November, artillery and sniper activity went silent for periods of time, giving the impression that the Anzacs were preparing to remain in the defense with limited resupply of ammunition during the upcoming winter. To cover the removal of the last troops, "drip rifles" were prepared to fire about 20 minutes after they were set, with a water can leaking into a second can that was tied to a rifle trigger. When the second can was full, the weight caused the unmanned rifle to fire. The sporadic firing created by this ruse convinced the Turks that the Anzac troops were still manning their defenses. In addition, Anzac troops used dummy artillery and mannequins to further enhance the impression that soldiers remained in their positions. As a result of these deceptive measures, both the main body of Anzac troops and the rear guard retreated unmolested. Given the failure of the Gallipoli effort from the Anzac perspective, the evacuation was considered the most successful part of the entire campaign.
Western front: In March 1917, leaders of the German Army on the Western Front decided to withdraw from their positions in France to the Hindenburg Line, a 90-mile long defensive position that ran from Arras to Laffaux. With Germany unable to conduct an offensive because of personnel losses earlier in the war, commanders intended for unrestricted submarine warfare and strategic bombing to weaken the British and French, giving the German army time to recuperate. In addition, the move to the Hindenburg Line supported the plan of commanders Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff to shift the German focus to Russia and the Eastern Front. The withdrawal to the new defensive line would shorten Germany's front by 25 miles, enabling 13 divisions to be employed against the Russians.
Under the plan code named Operation Alberich, the Germans abandoned their old positions in a staged series that began in late February. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Holding attack | Western front: In March 1917, leaders of the German Army on the Western Front decided to withdraw from their positions in France to the Hindenburg Line, a 90-mile long defensive position that ran from Arras to Laffaux. With Germany unable to conduct an offensive because of personnel losses earlier in the war, commanders intended for unrestricted submarine warfare and strategic bombing to weaken the British and French, giving the German army time to recuperate. In addition, the move to the Hindenburg Line supported the plan of commanders Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff to shift the German focus to Russia and the Eastern Front. The withdrawal to the new defensive line would shorten Germany's front by 25 miles, enabling 13 divisions to be employed against the Russians.
Under the plan code named Operation Alberich, the Germans abandoned their old positions in a staged series that began in late February. The majority of their movement occurred between 16 and 21 March, and the full German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line was completed on 5 April. The German withdrawal included numerous efforts to deceive the Allies, among them night movements and skeleton crews who remained behind to provide screening fire from machine guns, rifles, and mortars. The deception activities proved generally successful, and Germany completed its withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line largely unmolested.
In August 1918, the Allies intended to launch two offensives, one led by British Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-chief (C-in-C) of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), near Amiens, and the other by American General John J. Pershing, C-in-C of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), near Saint-Mihiel. Prior to the Battle of Amiens, Haig's subordinate, General Henry Rawlinson, commander of the British Fourth Army, employed several deceptive tactics, including periods of radio silence by units involved in the coming attack and false radio traffic from other parts of the British lines. In addition, Rawlinson delayed troop movement for as long as possible prior to the start of the attack to prevent German observers from obtaining data on his disposition of forces, and moved troops and materiel almost entirely at night. The British offensive was immediately successful because they had maintained the element of surprise. British troops and tanks advanced eight miles, captured 400 artillery pieces, and inflicted 27,000 casualties, including 12,000 prisoners.
In an effort to gain an advantage near Saint-Mihiel, U.S. planners including Arthur L. Conger attempted to deceive the Germans into believing the American attack would come at Belfort, 180 miles to the south. False orders left where spies or informants could find them and staff officer reconnaissance activity created the appearance that the U.S. intended to conduct operations in and around Belfort. Pershing gained surprise at Saint-Mihiel and his offensive was successful. In 1926, Conger discovered from a former German officer that while the Belfort Ruse had not been completely successful, it had aided Pershing. Concerned that an Allied attack in the Belfort area was at least a possibility, many German units that could have reinforced German lines in the Saint-Mihiel area delayed movement from their rear area positions near Saint-Mihiel until it was too late. As a result of the success of Pershing's offensive, they did not have time to execute their withdrawal plans, and either abandoned their weapons and fled or were taken as prisoners.
Eastern front: At a war council held with senior commanders and the czar in April 1916, Russian General Aleksei Brusilov presented a plan to the Stavka (the Russian high command), proposing a massive offensive by his Southwestern Front against the Austro-Hungarian forces in Galicia. Brusilov's plan aimed to take some of the pressure off French and British armies in France and the Italian Army along the Isonzo Front and if possible to knock Austria-Hungary out of the war. As the Austrian army was heavily engaged in Italy, the Russian army enjoyed a significant numerical advantage in the Galician sector.
Brusilov's plan was approved, and he massed 40 infantry divisions and 15 cavalry divisions in preparation for the Brusilov Offensive. Deception efforts included false radio traffic, false orders sent by messengers who were intended to be captured, and equipment displays including dummy artillery to mislead Austria-Hungary as to the location of his units. Beginning in June 1916, Brusilov's surprise offensive caused Germany to halt its Western front attack on Verdun and transfer considerable forces to the Eastern front. It also severely reduced the fighting effectiveness of Austria-Hungary's forces, effectively depriving Germany of its most important ally.
Palestine: In October 1917, Edmund Allenby, commander of Britain's Egyptian Expeditionary Force, planned to attack the Ottomans in southern Palestine. Rather than repeat previous frontal assaults at Gaza, which had been unsuccessful, he planned a flanking attack at Beersheba. As part of the larger deception effort to convince the Ottomans that Gaza was his objective, an officer under Allenby's command executed a deceptive tactic now known as the Haversack Ruse. In this effort, usually attributed to Richard Meinertzhagen, the officer intentionally dropped a knapsack which contained false plans for an attack on Gaza, which the Ottomans recovered. As a result of the Haversack Ruse and other deceptive measures, the British surprised the Ottomans and achieved victory at the 31 October 1917 Battle of Beersheba.
Allenby again resorted to deception as he prepared to attack the Ottomans again at Tel Megiddo in September 1918. In preparation for the battle, British forces concealed the movement of three cavalry and several infantry divisions from the eastern end of the front line, the Jordan Valley, to the western end on the Mediterranean Sea. The single mounted division that remained in the east, reinforced with infantry, maintained the illusion that the Jordan Valley remained fully garrisoned. Deceptive measures included marching infantry into the valley during the day when they could be observed by the Ottomans, transporting them out by truck at night, then marching them back the next day. The tents of the departed units were left standing, and dummy horses, mules, and soldiers made from canvas and straw were displayed throughout the encampment. In addition, mules dragged branches up and down the valley to generate thick clouds of dust, giving the impression of more animals and men on hand than there actually were. Though the deceptions did not induce Otto Liman von Sanders, the commander of the Ottoman Army, to concentrate his forces on the eastern flank, as Allenby hoped, the Ottomans could not be certain of his intentions, so they could not mass their forces. With the Ottomans spread throughout their line, Allenby's forces had a numerical advantage at the 19 to 25 September Battle of Megiddo (1918), and attained victory over the Ottomans.
At sea: Britain's Royal Navy made extensive use of Q-ships to combat German submarines. Camouflaged to look like a civilian sailing vessel or decrepit tramp steamer, the Q-ships were decoys that carried concealed heavy guns. The function of the Q-ships was to appear to be an undefended target. If successful, German submarines would be lured to the surface to sink or destroy the ship by using deck guns, enabling the submarine to conserve its limited supply of torpedoes for use against warships. If a German U-boat surfaced, the Q-ship would immediately display the Royal Navy's White Ensign flag in compliance with international law, then deploy its guns against the submarine. In 150 engagements, British Q-ships destroyed 14 U-boats and damaged 60. 27 of the 200 Q-ships the British employed were lost to German attacks.
World War II:
Eastern Front: Before Operation Barbarossa in June 1941, the German High Command explained away the creation of a massive force arrayed to invade the Soviet Union by informing Soviet leaders including Joseph Stalin that it was training in preparation for an invasion of the United Kingdom. The deception worked, and Stalin continued to ignore German preparations until after the invasion of the Soviet Union had actually commenced.
When the Allies on the Western Front planned the Normandy invasion for June 1944, the Soviet Union simultaneously planned for a major Eastern front offensive against German forces. Called Operation Bagration, this Soviet attack was designed to catch the Germans unprepared in Belorussia, at the center of their lines. To gain and maintain the element of surprise for Bagration, the Soviets executed a successful deception effort. The overall intent was to make German commanders believe the Soviets would only defend in the center of the front (Belorussia), while launching a major offensive to the south in Ukraine and Crimea and a feint to the north in Finland. Soviet military leaders successfully masked preparations for action in Belorussia and limited German reconnaissance in the center of the front while drawing German attention to deceptive activities in the north and south. Germany was caught off-guard at the start of the Bagration offensive on 23 June, and the Soviets quickly pushed retreating German forces from the Soviet Union all the way to Poland.
Western Front:
Africa: From early 1941, Dudley Clarke commanded the 'A' Force, based in Cairo, Egypt, which developed much of the war's Allied deception strategy. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Holding attack | To gain and maintain the element of surprise for Bagration, the Soviets executed a successful deception effort. The overall intent was to make German commanders believe the Soviets would only defend in the center of the front (Belorussia), while launching a major offensive to the south in Ukraine and Crimea and a feint to the north in Finland. Soviet military leaders successfully masked preparations for action in Belorussia and limited German reconnaissance in the center of the front while drawing German attention to deceptive activities in the north and south. Germany was caught off-guard at the start of the Bagration offensive on 23 June, and the Soviets quickly pushed retreating German forces from the Soviet Union all the way to Poland.
Western Front:
Africa: From early 1941, Dudley Clarke commanded the 'A' Force, based in Cairo, Egypt, which developed much of the war's Allied deception strategy. In an initial deception failure from which Clarke derived an important lesson he put to use in the future, the British intended to retake British Somaliland by an advance from Sudan into Eritrea. Operation Camilla was intended to deceive the Italians occupying British Somaliland into thinking the British intended to retake British Somaliland by an amphibious assault from Aden. Instead of moving their troops to meet the potential amphibious landing, or retreating to Italian-occupied Somalia, the Italians withdrew into Eritrea. As a result, they possessed greater strength at the British objective when the genuine British attack occurred. Clarke's lesson was to focus deception not on what the enemy should think is happening but what the deception planner wants the enemy to do as a result.
North Africa: Deception played an important part in the war in North Africa. In 1941, a British Army unit led by magician and illusionist Jasper Maskelyne prevented the destruction of Alexandria, Egypt by using lights to recreate the nighttime image of the city, while blacking out the actual city lights. Coupled with explosives that simulated German bombs landing on the city, Maskelyne's illusion caused German planes to release their ordnance on the empty coastal site he had prepared rather than on the city.
Maskelyne was subsequently tasked with preventing the Germans from attacking the Suez Canal, a key asset in the Allied supply chain. He responded by creating a system of swirling searchlights which cast a spray of strobe light over more than 100 miles of the sky above Egypt. German pilots were unable to see the canal, and so were unable to destroy it.
As part of the deception surrounding Operation Crusader during the Siege of Tobruk, camouflage artist Steven Sykes built a dummy railhead near Misheifa in Egypt. The intent, which succeeded, was to divert German aerial attacks from the real railhead and deceive the Germans into believing that the British attack would not begin until the dummy was completed. Before the Second Battle of El Alamein, camouflage unit commander Geoffrey Barkas led Operation Sentinel and Operation Bertram, which used dummy equipment and other deceptive measures to deceive German commander Erwin Rommel about Allied strength and the timing and location of the Allied attack.
In Operation Sly Bob, Maskalyne's unit attempted to create a dummy submarine that would draw the attention of German reconnaissance aircraft along the German and Italian Italy-to-Tripoli supply line, enabling British ships to gain the element of surprise when attacking Axis shipping. By using old railroad sleeper cars, a wooden frame, nailed and welded beams, and metal tubing, Maskalyne's unit succeeded in creating a prototype that British ship commanders unaware of the deception plan nearly sank when they observed it near the Suez Canal. The difficulty in creating a viable dummy rendered the project impractical, and Sly Bob was abandoned before it was fully implemented.
Based on the experience with Sly Bob, the British attempted to portray an aging cruiser as a battleship that would pose a threat to German shipping. When the effort proved unsuccessful because the dummy equipment and fixtures added to the cruiser were unrealistic, Maskalyne's team used the partially-dummied cruiser as "sucker bait". With sucker bait, a magician uses an audience's powers of observation against it by allowing members to falsely believe they see through a trick. By appearing to attempt to camouflage the cruiser-turned-dummy battleship, which Maskalyne christened HMS Houdin after magician Jean-Eugène Robert-Houdin, but allowing German observers to see through the camouflage, Maskalyne's team enabled the Germans to conclude on their own that the British were attempting to hide a battleship. Allowing the Germans to believe they had penetrated the camouflage and detected the battleship created in the minds of German military leadership the same risk to German shipping a real battleship would have posed.
Normandy: Before the June 1944 D-Day invasion of Normandy, the Allies launched a deception codenamed Operation Bodyguard. As part of Bodyguard, the Operation Quicksilver deception portrayed First United States Army Group (FUSAG), a skeleton headquarters commanded by Omar Bradley, as an army group commanded by George Patton. In Operation Fortitude South, another component of Bodyguard, the Germans were persuaded that FUSAG would invade France at Pas-de-Calais in the fall of 1944. British and American troops used dummy equipment, false radio traffic and double agents (see Double-Cross System) to deceive German intelligence on the location and timing of the invasion. The Germans awaited the Calais landing for many weeks after the real landings in Normandy, leaving in place near Calais several divisions that could have helped delay or defeat the Normandy attack. By the time the Germans realized the Normandy landings were the actual offensive, Allied units were so well established in Normandy that they could not be dislodged.
Pacific theater: Japan continued diplomatic engagement with the U.S. on several issues of concern throughout late November and into early December 1941 even though attacking ships had sailed from their base in the remote Kuril Islands. The surprise 7 December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor took place several hours before Japan presented a formal declaration of hostilities and officially broke diplomatic ties. Japan also made extensive use of decoys and other deceptive displays throughout the war, which took on increased importance as the tide of the war went against it in 1944 and 1945.
Prior to the October 1944 Battle off Samar, the Japanese incorporated deception into their plan of attack by luring Admiral William Halsey Jr. into leading his powerful Third Fleet to chase a decoy fleet, a target so inviting Halsey took with him every ship he commanded.
With Halsey's force out of the way, the Japanese intended to attack the Allied landings on Leyte. The U.S. responded with their few remaining forces, the three escort carrier groups of the Seventh Fleet. Escort carriers and destroyer escorts had been built to protect slow convoys from submarine attack, and were later adapted to attack ground targets, but they had few torpedoes, as they normally relied on Halsey's fleet to protect them from armored warships. These ships, organized as Task Unit 77.4.3 ("Taffy 3"), and commanded by Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague, possessed neither the firepower nor the armor to oppose the 23 ships of the Japanese force, which included Yamato's 18-inch guns, but took the initiative and attacked. In addition to ships firing on the Japanese from point-blank range, aircraft including FM-2 Wildcats, F6F Hellcats and TBM Avengers, strafed, bombed, torpedoed, rocketed, and depth-charged the Japanese force until they ran out of ammunition. They then resorted to deception, including numerous "dry runs" at the Japanese ships. Concerned that he faced a larger force than he actually did, Japanese commander Admiral Takeo Kurita decided to withdraw.
During the Battle of Iwo Jima in February and March 1945, Japanese deception included dummy tanks sculpted out of the island's soft volcanic rock. At the Japanese-held airfield in Tianhe District, China, the Japanese painted on the ground the image of a B-29 Bomber that appeared to be on fire. Their intent was for the painted image to appear real to high-flying aircraft, which would lower their altitude to investigate, thus making them targets for Japanese anti-aircraft fire. In addition, the Japanese made extensive use of bamboo-framed dummy aircraft to project airpower and protect their remaining aircraft, straw dummy soldiers and wood weapons that made defensive works appear to be manned, and wood dummy tanks to make infantry soldiers appear to have more combat power than they actually possessed.
The Allies planned an invasion of Japan to take place after the end of fighting in Europe. This plan, codenamed Operation Downfall, had several components, including the Operation Olympic invasion of the southern Japanese island of Kyushu. The deception created to enable Olympic to succeed, Operation Pastel, would have included false attacks against Japanese held-ports in China, as well as Japanese positions on the island of Formosa. The end of the war following the U.S. atomic bomb attacks on Japan ended the need for a ground invasion or a deception plan, so Pastel was never implemented.
At sea: As a liaison to the British Navy early in the war, actor and U.S. Navy officer Douglas Fairbanks Jr. observed and participated in several raiding parties and diversions on the French coast. Upon returning to the United States, Fairbanks proposed to Ernest King, the Chief of Naval Operations the creation of a unit that would plan and execute diversionary and deception missions. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Holding attack | This plan, codenamed Operation Downfall, had several components, including the Operation Olympic invasion of the southern Japanese island of Kyushu. The deception created to enable Olympic to succeed, Operation Pastel, would have included false attacks against Japanese held-ports in China, as well as Japanese positions on the island of Formosa. The end of the war following the U.S. atomic bomb attacks on Japan ended the need for a ground invasion or a deception plan, so Pastel was never implemented.
At sea: As a liaison to the British Navy early in the war, actor and U.S. Navy officer Douglas Fairbanks Jr. observed and participated in several raiding parties and diversions on the French coast. Upon returning to the United States, Fairbanks proposed to Ernest King, the Chief of Naval Operations the creation of a unit that would plan and execute diversionary and deception missions. King authorized Fairbanks to recruit 180 officers and 300 enlisted men for the program, which was named Beach Jumpers. There are several stories about how the unit was named; during an interview late in life, Fairbanks said British admiral Louis Mountbatten coined it with the intention of creating a designation that provided cover for the unit's activities by being partly descriptive and partly in code.
On 16 March 1943 Beach Jumper Unit ONE (BJU-1) was commissioned with the mission "To assist and support the operating forces in the conduct of Tactical Cover and Deception in Naval Warfare." Eleven BJUs deployed during the war, and were used in all theaters. The Beach Jumpers raided false landing zones and shore defenses during amphibious attacks, sowing confusion with the enemy about actual landing sites and causing the enemy to defend in the wrong place. To carry out these deceptions, their boats were equipped with two .50 caliber machine guns, 10 window (chaff) rockets, smoke generators, and floating time-delay explosive packs. They were also outfitted with naval balloons and communications and psychological operations equipment, including recorders, speakers, generators, and radio jammers. The balloons included radar reflective strips that when towed would cause Beach Jumper units to appear to enemy radar operators as a larger force than they actually were.
Beach Jumper units created diversionary landings during several battles, including Operation Husky and Operation Dragoon. The Beach Jumpers were inactivated after World War II, but were reconstituted for service during the Korean War and Vietnam War. With the U.S. military creating and fielding an Information Operations capability beginning in the early 1990s, the modern Beach Jumpers exist as part of U.S. Naval Information Forces.
Korean War: In the summer of 1950, the Korean People's Army (KPA) of North Korea attacked South Korea. 140,000 South Korean and allied soldiers were nearly defeated. In August and September 1950, South Korea and its allies waged the Battle of Pusan Perimeter against the KPA and succeeded in establishing a defensive line that prevented the KPA from destroying them.
To enable the counterattack that started with an amphibious landing at Inchon (codenamed Operation Chromite), United Nations (U.N.) forces staged an elaborate deception that made it appear the landing would take place at Gunsan, 105 miles away from the actual landing site at Inchon and closer to the Pusan Perimeter. On 5 September, the U.S. Air Force began attacks on roads and bridges to isolate Gunsan. This was followed by a naval bombardment, which was followed by heavy bombing of military installations in and near the town. These tactics were typical pre-invasion steps, and were intended to cause North Korea to believe Gunsan was the planned U.N. invasion site.
In addition to the aerial and naval bombardment, United States Marine Corps officers briefed their units on the supposed Gunsan landing within earshot of many Koreans, assuming that the information would make its way to KPA leaders through rumors or spies. On the night of 12–13 September, the British Royal Navy landed U.S. Army special operations troops and Royal Marines commandos at Gunsan, making sure that enemy forces noticed their supposed reconnaissance of the area. U.N. forces also conducted rehearsals on the coast of South Korea at several sites with conditions were similar to Inchon. These drills enabled U.N. forces to perfect the timing and actions of the planned Inchon landing while simultaneously confusing the North Koreans as to the actual landing site.
On 15 September, United Nations forces under Douglas MacArthur surprised the KPA with the Inchon landing. In the ensuing Battle of Inchon, the U.N. ended a string of victories by North Korea. The KPA collapsed within a month, and 135,000 KPA troops were taken prisoner.
Cuban Missile Crisis: During the period leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, Cuba and the Soviet Union employed several deceptive measures to hide their activities. These included the codename for the plan to deploy missiles in Cuba; Anadyr, a Russian town, is associated with the sparsely-populated and inaccessible area of Northeastern Russia and did not suggest an operation in the Caribbean. Soviet soldiers constructed false superstructures to hide the defenses of the ships transporting missiles and launching equipment to Cuba, and placed agricultural equipment and other non-military machinery on deck where it could be seen. Upon arrival, the ships unloaded at eleven different Cuban ports to deceive American surveillance efforts. At the same time, Soviet and Cuban news media reported on the supposedly massive agricultural assistance the Soviets were providing Cuba, which provided a plausible explanation for the activity and equipment that could be observed. The Soviet deception proved highly effective and the missiles were discovered only after they were already operational.
Vietnam War: Both North Vietnam and the forces of South Vietnam and the United States made use of deception during the Vietnam War.
Operation El Paso: As part of Operation El Paso, which took place from May to July 1966, the U.S. 1st Infantry Division deliberately exposed information about a planned resupply and engineer equipment convoy from Minh Than north to An Lộc. Division planners anticipated the enemy response would be an ambush at one of a number of possible locations. As a result, the supposedly lightly armed convoy actually consisted of armored cavalry and infantry. Additionally, 1st ID planners prepared for air assault operations at the most likely ambush sites. Events unfolded as the planners had foreseen, and the Viet Cong ambushed the convoy. The ambush sprang the 1st Infantry Division's trap, and the subsequent Battle of Minh Thanh Road resulted in 50 percent of the Viet Cong regiment becoming casualties.
Operation Bolo: In 1967's Operation Bolo, a United States Air Force unit led by Robin Olds successfully countered the threat posed by Soviet MiG-21 fighter planes operating in North Vietnam.
During bombing missions, unescorted U.S. Republic F-105 Thunderchief fighter-bombers would often be attacked by MiG-21s. Heavily laden with ordnance, the F-105s were no match for the faster MiGs. On occasions when the F-105s were escorted by F-4 Phantom II fighter planes, the MiGs would refuse to engage. In addition, the rules of engagement on the U.S. side prevented attacking the MiGs when they were on the ground. This measure was intended to keep the Soviet Union from becoming further engaged in the conflict by preventing casualties to the Soviet mechanics and technical advisors who were assisting North Vietnam.
To counter the MiG threat, Olds' 8th Fighter Wing prepared its F-4s to display the electronic and radar signatures of F-105s. To create this effect, the 8th Fighter Wing outfitted F-4s with QRC-160 jamming pods, a device used only by F-105s. When they flew the mission, Olds and his fellow pilots assumed the route, elevation, speed, and formation of an F-105 flight. They also staggered the takeoff and arrival times of the F-4s, enabling later-arriving F-4s to prevent the MiGs from landing.
The Bolo deception was executed successfully. The North Vietnamese believed they faced an F-105 flight and dispatched their MiGs. The later-arriving F4s prevented the MiGs from returning to their base. The 8th Fighter Wing destroyed seven MiGs in a matter of minutes, while Olds' fighters sustained no losses. The destruction of half their MiGs and uncertainty about whether future flights observed on radar and electronic sensors were unescorted F-105s or F-4s pretending to be F-105s caused North Vietnam to ground its MiGs. The MiGs failed in their mission of preventing U.S. Operation Rolling Thunder bombing runs over North Vietnam.
Tet Offensive: In 1967, the government and military of North Vietnam began planning for an offensive that would begin in early 1968. The intent within the war's area of operations was to spark an uprising by the Viet Cong and others in South Vietnam who were sympathetic to the government in the north. In a wider sense, North Vietnam hoped the offensive would cause a withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam by undermining U.S. public confidence in the war.
North Vietnam implemented several deceptive measures to mask preparations for the offensive. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Holding attack | The destruction of half their MiGs and uncertainty about whether future flights observed on radar and electronic sensors were unescorted F-105s or F-4s pretending to be F-105s caused North Vietnam to ground its MiGs. The MiGs failed in their mission of preventing U.S. Operation Rolling Thunder bombing runs over North Vietnam.
Tet Offensive: In 1967, the government and military of North Vietnam began planning for an offensive that would begin in early 1968. The intent within the war's area of operations was to spark an uprising by the Viet Cong and others in South Vietnam who were sympathetic to the government in the north. In a wider sense, North Vietnam hoped the offensive would cause a withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam by undermining U.S. public confidence in the war.
North Vietnam implemented several deceptive measures to mask preparations for the offensive. In October, the North Vietnamese government announced that it would observe a seven-day holiday truce from 27 January to 3 February 1968, several days longer than previous Tet truces had lasted. The U.S. and South Vietnam presumed that the coming offensive, of which they had received some intelligence, would take place before or after the truce. When the attacks had not commenced before the holiday, South Vietnamese and U.S. leaders assumed it would come after the holiday. As a result, they allowed many soldiers to take holiday leave and relaxed the usual security measures.
As an additional deceptive measure, while intending to attack South Vietnam's major cities and military installations, the North Vietnamese continued attacks along the border between the two countries during late 1967. These diversionary assaults served to draw U.S. attention to the border and U.S. forces away from the actual objectives—the heavily populated South Vietnamese coastal lowlands and cities.
When the offensive commenced, South Vietnam and the U.S. were surprised by the coordinated attacks. However, the U.S. and South Vietnam regrouped and over several days repulsed the North Vietnamese assaults. North Vietnam failed to attain the immediate objective of creating an uprising in South Vietnam. In the longer term, the offensive aided in swaying U.S. public opinion against the war, which led to a decreased U.S. presence in Vietnam and eventual withdrawal.
Cherbourg Project: In 1969, France abruptly declared an arms embargo against countries in the Middle East, chiefly aimed at Israel, and cancelled a contract to build patrol boats for Israel's navy. France also refused to release the last five boats built under the contract even though Israel had already paid for them. In response, the Israel Defense Forces mounted an elaborate scheme involving the purchase of the boats by a civilian company for non-military purposes. When they became concerned that the dummy transaction would be exposed, Israel decided to secretly take possession of the boats. The Israeli navy dispatched crews disguised as civilians, who gradually arrived at the French Atlantic seaport of Cherbourg. Once the crews assembled, they secretly sailed the five boats out of the harbor on the night of Christmas Eve 1969. Though they encountered a winter storm, the boats reached the Mediterranean Sea and safely completed the voyage to Israel. The plan to take possession of the boats, which the Israelis called "Operation Noa" but came to be known as the Cherbourg Project, was assisted by sympathetic Cherbourg shipyard and boat building company employees, but the French government was kept totally unaware until the boats had left port.
Yom Kippur War: In the period before the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and the joint forces of Egypt and Syria, Egypt executed annual maneuvers near the Sinai Peninsula, Tahrir 41, which conditioned Israel to Egyptian troop activity in the area. In addition, several months before the start of the war, Egypt created the false impression of an imminent attack, which caused Israel to announce an emergency military reserve call up. When the war started, Israel believed the initial Egyptian troop movements were another iteration of the exercises the Egyptians had previously undertaken. In addition, because an emergency call up was costly and disruptive, the Israeli government was reluctant to conduct another one until it was sure an attack was underway. As a result of the deception, Egypt had surprise on its side when it attacked.
Operation Entebbe Rescue Mission: After the hijacking of an Air France plane in late June 1976, the perpetrators had the aircraft diverted to Entebbe Airport in Uganda, where they threatened to kill all the Jewish and Israeli passengers if their demands were not met. The Israeli government pursued diplomatic efforts to free the hostages while the Israeli Defense Forces planned a rescue mission in secrecy. When the raid was launched, IDF commandos secretly landed at an old unused area of the airport, where they offloaded decoy vehicles resembling Ugandan president Idi Amin's motorcade. By making themselves appear to be Amin and his security detail, the Israelis intended to gain the element of surprise on Ugandan guards at the terminal where the hostages were held. The ruse was only partly successful because Amin had recently changed limousines, and his new one was white, while the one the Israelis were using was black. The Ugandan guards realized the trick, which led to a gunfight that cost the Israeli commandos the element of surprise, but the raid ended with the successful rescue of the hostages.
Falklands War: The Falklands War took place between April and June 1982. During the period prior to the war, Argentina's military leaders, who were subordinate to general and president Leopoldo Galtieri, used the December 1981 change of command ceremony for Argentina's new chief of naval operations as cover to begin secretly planning for an invasion of the Falkland Islands. In April 1982, the forces of Argentina carried out the Invasion of South Georgia, an island possession of the United Kingdom. In mid-March, Argentina had used deception to successfully position an advance guard on South Georgia. An Argentinian company received a contract to dismantle a British whaling station for scrap. When the contractor's ship arrived, it contained members of an Argentinian Navy special forces unit who were disguised as scientists.
When the British prepared to conduct a Falklands landing in response to Argentina's invasion, Argentina anticipated an assault at Port Stanley, the capital and site of the largest airport on the islands. The British gained the element of surprise by launching a feint at Stanley while conducting their main assault at San Carlos, on the opposite side of East Falkland. The British then marched overland to Port Stanley, where they launched a land-based attack on the Argentine defenses surrounding the city. The Argentinians were caught off-guard and were soon compelled to surrender.
Operation Just Cause: When the leader of Panama, Manuel Noriega realized he was being surveilled by the U.S. military prior to the United States invasion of Panama in December 1989, Noriega resorted to several deceptive measures to mask his movements and locations. These included look-alike doubles, decoy vehicles and aircraft, false convoys, frequent changes of clothes, recordings of his voice played at locations where he was not present, and frequent changes of his actual location.
On the U.S. side, deception included troop movements in and around U.S. bases in Panama made to look like routine training missions, a logistics buildup disguised as routine activity, and large-scale exercises in the United States that desensitized Panamanian leaders as to U.S. capabilities and intent. While Noriega and his subordinates knew the United States had the capacity to act, they were misled by their perceptions of U.S. activity and misreading of U.S. intent into believing that the U.S. would not attack. As a result, when the attack occurred, the U.S. had the element of surprise, which helped it gain a quick victory.
Operation Desert Storm: During the period prior to the 1990–1991 Gulf War, Iraqi president Saddam Hussein positioned 100,000 troops near Iraq's border with Kuwait. To mask his true intention of invading Kuwait, during the summer of 1990, Saddam told ambassadors to Iraq, the leaders of other countries, and members of the international news media that his troops were on a training mission or were near the border merely as a tactic to extract concessions from Kuwait during diplomatic negotiations. On 2 August, Iraq's invasion commenced; the small Kuwaiti military was quickly overwhelmed, and Iraq occupied Kuwait.
After invading Kuwait, the creation of an anti-Iraq coalition and its movement of troops and materiel into Saudi Arabia caused Saddam to anticipate a Coalition ground assault from Saudi Arabia north into Kuwait and an amphibious landing on Kuwait's Persian Gulf coast. Prior to the start of the Coalition offensive in February 1991, its ground forces successfully moved multiple divisions west to the largely undefended border between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. When the attack commenced, the Coalition conducted a feint directly into Kuwait while the main effort—the "Left Hook" enabled by concealing the move of units to the west—attacked into Iraq and cut off Iraqi forces in Kuwait. After advancing into Iraq, Coalition forces turned right and attacked Iraqi forces in Kuwait from the rear. Facing overwhelming Coalition combat power in Kuwait and unable to retreat to Iraq, the Iraqi military in Kuwait quickly surrendered.
Kosovo War: During the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia as part of the 1998–1999 Kosovo War, the Serbian Army made extensive use of deception, which caused NATO forces to expend time, effort, and resources attacking false targets. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Holding attack | Prior to the start of the Coalition offensive in February 1991, its ground forces successfully moved multiple divisions west to the largely undefended border between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. When the attack commenced, the Coalition conducted a feint directly into Kuwait while the main effort—the "Left Hook" enabled by concealing the move of units to the west—attacked into Iraq and cut off Iraqi forces in Kuwait. After advancing into Iraq, Coalition forces turned right and attacked Iraqi forces in Kuwait from the rear. Facing overwhelming Coalition combat power in Kuwait and unable to retreat to Iraq, the Iraqi military in Kuwait quickly surrendered.
Kosovo War: During the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia as part of the 1998–1999 Kosovo War, the Serbian Army made extensive use of deception, which caused NATO forces to expend time, effort, and resources attacking false targets. According to post-war assessments, NATO often attacked crude decoy tanks, artillery, and wheeled vehicles made of easy to obtain material including sticks and plastic. Many of these decoys included easily produced heat sources, such as burning cans of oil, which deceived the thermal imaging systems of NATO aircraft. As a result, NATO believed it inflicted far more damage on the Serbian Army than it actually had, and Serbia gained a propaganda victory by showing how easily NATO had been deceived.
2006 Lebanon War: Prior to the 2006 Lebanon War, the Hezbollah terrorist group employed deceptive measures intended to degrade Israel's military reputation both internationally and within Israel. Deceptive measures included the construction of false bunkers and command posts which Hezbollah allowed Israel to observe while the work was in progress, while simultaneously concealing the construction of actual facilities. When Israel attacked Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in July, the dummy sites were destroyed while the actual ones were left intact.
Russo-Ukrainian War: In 2014, Russia and Ukraine went to war after Russia contested control of Ukraine's Crimea and Donbas. Russia employed disinformation and denial to facilitate its military activities, in addition to engaging in several deceptive activities. As an example, in August, Russian television news carried stories about a Russian truck convoy transporting water and baby food to Crimea. The international news media reported heavily on this convoy, presuming it was carrying Russian military supplies or materiel, and that they would be able to prove Russia was lying about the cargo. While attention was focused on this diversion, Russia's military was moving soldiers, combat equipment, and vehicles into Donbas.
Sino-Indian border dispute: During the 2020–2021 China–India skirmishes, China employed military deception to gain an advantage. Intending to increase its troop presence in disputed areas of Ladakh, China's military conducted training maneuvers near the areas that were the source of tension with India. This activity conditioned India to the presence of Chinese troops in the vicinity. In addition, China began construction of a nearby airbase. In early May, China began marching troops into several of the contested locations. In mid-to-late May, the Chinese military diverted trucks from the airbase construction project and used them to rapidly transport soldiers into portions of the disputed territory. The rapid troop movements came without warning and took India by surprise. As a result, China gained numerical superiority in several of Ladakh's contested areas.
2023 Israel–Hamas war: During the 2023 Israel–Hamas war, Hamas employed deception to gain the element of surprise when it attacked Israel. These deceptive measures included a sustained effort to convince Israeli leadership that Hamas was focused on economic improvement in Gaza, not armed conflict. Hamas also trained and rehearsed its attacks in plain sight, allowing the Israelis to assume that these activities were merely posturing on the part of Hamas fighters. In addition, Hamas ramped down conflict in the Gaza strip while increasing tensions in the West Bank; Israel moved forces from one location to the other, giving Hamas a more favorable force ratio in Gaza. Additional deceptive activities included acquiring and pre-positioning non-military vehicles intended for military use, including bulldozers, paragliders, motorcycles, and small boats. When the attack commenced, Hamas had the advantage of catching Israel off guard, which enabled Hamas's initial success.
In fiction: Fictional examples of military deception include the 1966 Star Trek episode "The Corbomite Maneuver". When Enterprise is held by the tractor beam of an alien ship, its commander announces his intention to destroy Enterprise. Captain James T. Kirk informs the alien commander, Balok, that Enterprise is on a peaceful mission. Balok does not accept Kirk's explanation, so Kirk responds with a deceptive bluff, claiming Enterprise is outfitted with a secret doomsday device made of "Corbomite". Destruction of Enterprise will trigger the Corbomite device, resulting in destruction of the alien ship. Balok uses a smaller ship to tow Enterprise to a remote area where it can be safely destroyed. Enterprise breaks free from the smaller ship's tractor beam, but damages the smaller ship in the process. Kirk then leads a boarding party to assist the aliens. Kirk's party meets Balok, who is alone and says he was testing Enterprise to discern whether Kirk's claims of peaceful intentions were true. Satisfied by their willingness to render aid to a perceived enemy, Balok expresses a desire to learn more about humans and their culture.
A scene from the 2000 film The Patriot depicts Patriot militia leader Benjamin Martin employing deceptive decoys when negotiating for the release of several members of his command who have been taken prisoner. Martin offers to exchange eighteen British officers, whom he claims are held on a hillside near the British headquarters. The British commander, General Cornwallis views the hill with a spyglass, observes figures in British uniforms who appear to be prisoners, and agrees to the exchange. After Martin and his men leave, the officer dispatched by Cornwallis to recover the British prisoners discovers they are scarecrows in captured British uniforms.
In the 2003 film Master and Commander: The Far Side of the World, Captain Jack Aubrey of HMS Surprise is pursued by the French privateer Acheron. When Acheron appears likely to catch Surprise, Aubrey orders construction of a raft with sails, which contains lanterns arranged in the same pattern as those visible on the stern of Surprise. After night falls, a member of Aubrey's crew lights the raft's lanterns while another crewman douses the lanterns on Surprise. After recovering the crewman from the raft, Aubrey has it cut loose. The darkened Surprise then escapes on a new course while Acheron pursues the decoy.
In the 2018 video game We Happy Few, "Arthur's Story" depicts an alternate version of World War II that includes the German military threatening the village of Wellington Wells with dummy tanks made of papier-mâché. The populace does not resist because it believes the threat is real.
Opinions: Opinions vary among military strategists and authors as to the value of military deception. For example, the two books on warfare usually considered the most famous classics, Sun Tzu's The Art of War and Clausewitz's On War have diametrically opposed views. Sun Tzu emphasizes military deception and considers it the key to victory. Clausewitz argues that the fog of war prevents a commander from having a clear understanding of the operating environment, so creating some sort of false appearance, particularly on a large scale, is unlikely to be meaningful. Because of the cost and effort, Clausewitz argues that from a cost-benefit analysis, a large deception is an acceptable part of a course of action only under special circumstances.
See also:
Notes:
References:
Bibliography:
External links: Media related to Military deception at Wikimedia Commons
Sworn to Secrecy: Secrets of War; Season 1, Episode 9, Tools of Deception. New York: History Channel. 1998. Archived from the original on 21 December 2021. Retrieved 29 May 2021 – via YouTube.
Sworn to Secrecy: Secrets of War; Season 4, Episode 2, Battlefield Deceptions. New York: History Channel. 2001. Archived from the original on 21 December 2021. Retrieved 29 May 2021 – via YouTube. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Horses in warfare | Types of horse used in warfare: A fundamental principle of equine conformation is "form to function". Therefore, the type of horse used for various forms of warfare depended on the work performed, the weight a horse needed to carry or pull, and distance travelled. Weight affects speed and endurance, creating a trade-off: armour added protection, but added weight reduced maximum speed. Therefore, various cultures had different military needs. In some situations, one primary type of horse was favoured over all others. In other places, multiple types were needed; warriors would travel to battle riding a lighter horse of greater speed and endurance, and then switch to a heavier horse, with greater weight-carrying capacity, when wearing heavy armour in actual combat.
The average horse can carry up to approximately 30% of its body weight. While all horses can pull more weight than they can carry, the maximum weight that horses can pull varies widely, depending on the build of the horse, the type of vehicle, road conditions, and other factors. Horses harnessed to a wheeled vehicle on a paved road can pull as much as eight times their weight, but far less if pulling wheelless loads over unpaved terrain. Thus, horses that were driven varied in size and had to make a trade-off between speed and weight, just as did riding animals. Light horses could pull a small war chariot at speed. Heavy supply wagons, artillery, and support vehicles were pulled by heavier horses or a larger number of horses. The method by which a horse was hitched to a vehicle also mattered: horses could pull greater weight with a horse collar than they could with a breast collar, and even less with an ox yoke.
Light-weight: Light, oriental horses such as the ancestors of the modern Arabian, Barb, and Akhal-Teke were used for warfare that required speed, endurance, and agility. Such horses ranged from about 12 hands (48 inches, 122 cm) to just under 15 hands (60 inches, 152 cm), weighing approximately 360 to 450 kilograms (800 to 1,000 lb). To move quickly, riders had to use lightweight tack and carry relatively light weapons such as bows, light spears, javelins, or later rifles. This was the original horse used for early chariot warfare, raiding, and light cavalry.
Relatively light horses were used by many cultures, including the Ancient Egyptians, the Mongols, the Arabs, and the Native Americans. Throughout the Ancient Near East, small, light animals were used to pull chariots designed to carry no more than two passengers, a driver and a warrior. In the European Middle Ages, a lightweight war horse became known as the rouncey.
Medium-weight: Medium-weight horses developed as early as the Iron Age with the needs of various civilizations to pull heavier loads, such as chariots capable of holding more than two people, and, as light cavalry evolved into heavy cavalry, to carry heavily armoured riders. The Scythians were among the earliest cultures to produce taller, heavier horses. Larger horses were also needed to pull supply wagons and, later on, artillery pieces. In Europe, horses were also used to a limited extent to maneuver cannons on the battlefield as part of dedicated horse artillery units. Medium-weight horses had the greatest range in size, from about 14.2 hands (58 inches, 147 cm) but stocky, to as much as 16 hands (64 inches, 163 cm), weighing approximately 450 to 540 kilograms (1,000 to 1,200 lb). They generally were quite agile in combat, though they did not have the raw speed or endurance of a lighter horse. By the Middle Ages, larger horses in this class were sometimes called destriers. They may have resembled modern Baroque or heavy warmblood breeds. Later, horses similar to the modern warmblood often carried European cavalry.
Heavy-weight: Large, heavy horses, weighing from 680 to 910 kilograms (1,500 to 2,000 lb), the ancestors of today's draught horses, were used, particularly in Europe, from the Middle Ages onward. They pulled heavy loads like supply wagons and were disposed to remain calm in battle. Some historians believe they may have carried the heaviest-armoured knights of the Late Medieval Period, though others dispute this claim, indicating that the destrier, or knight's battle horse, was a medium-weight animal. It is also disputed whether the destrier class included draught animals or not. Breeds at the smaller end of the heavyweight category may have included the ancestors of the Percheron, agile for their size and physically able to maneuver in battle.
Ponies: The British Army's 2nd Dragoons in 1813 had 340 ponies of 14.2 hands (58 inches, 147 cm) and 55 ponies of 14 hands (56 inches, 142 cm); the Lovat Scouts, formed in 1899, were mounted on Highland ponies; the British Army recruited 200 Dales ponies in World War II for use as pack and artillery animals; and the British Territorial Army experimented with the use of Dartmoor ponies as pack animals in 1935, finding them to be better than mules for the job.
Other equids: Horses were not the only equids used to support human warfare. Donkeys have been used as pack animals from antiquity to the present. Mules were also commonly used, especially as pack animals and to pull wagons, but also occasionally for riding. Because mules are often both calmer and hardier than horses, they were particularly useful for strenuous support tasks, such as hauling supplies over difficult terrain. However, under gunfire, they were less cooperative than horses, so were generally not used to haul artillery on battlefields. The size of a mule and work to which it was put depended largely on the breeding of the mare that produced the mule. Mules could be lightweight, medium weight, or even, when produced from draught horse mares, of moderate heavy weight.
Training and deployment: The oldest known manual on training horses for chariot warfare was written c. 1350 BC by the Hittite horsemaster, Kikkuli. An ancient manual on the subject of training riding horses, particularly for the Ancient Greek cavalry is Hippike (On Horsemanship) written about 360 BC by the Greek cavalry officer Xenophon. and another early text was that of Kautilya, written about 323 BC.
Whether horses were trained to pull chariots, to be ridden as light or heavy cavalry, or to carry the armoured knight, much training was required to overcome the horse's natural instinct to flee from noise, the smell of blood, and the confusion of combat. They also learned to accept any sudden or unusual movements of humans while using a weapon or avoiding one. Horses used in close combat may have been taught, or at least permitted, to kick, strike, and even bite, thus becoming weapons themselves for the warriors they carried.
In most cultures, a war horse used as a riding animal was trained to be controlled with limited use of reins, responding primarily to the rider's legs and weight. The horse became accustomed to any necessary tack and protective armour placed upon it, and learned to balance under a rider who would also be laden with weapons and armour. Developing the balance and agility of the horse was crucial. The origins of the discipline of dressage came from the need to train horses to be both obedient and manoeuvrable. The Haute ecole or "High School" movements of classical dressage taught today at the Spanish Riding School have their roots in manoeuvres designed for the battlefield. However, the airs above the ground were unlikely to have been used in actual combat, as most would have exposed the unprotected underbelly of the horse to the weapons of foot soldiers.
Horses used for chariot warfare were not only trained for combat conditions, but because many chariots were pulled by a team of two to four horses, they also had to learn to work together with other animals in close quarters under chaotic conditions.
Technological innovations: Horses were probably ridden in prehistory before they were driven. However, evidence is scant, mostly simple images of human figures on horse-like animals drawn on rock or clay. The earliest tools used to control horses were bridles of various sorts, which were invented nearly as soon as the horse was domesticated. Evidence of bit wear appears on the teeth of horses excavated at the archaeology sites of the Botai culture in northern Kazakhstan, dated 3500–3000 BC.
Harness and vehicles: The invention of the wheel was a major technological innovation that gave rise to chariot warfare. At first, equines, both horses and onagers, were hitched to wheeled carts by means of a yoke around their necks in a manner similar to that of oxen. However, such a design is incompatible with equine anatomy, limiting both the strength and mobility of the animal. By the time of the Hyksos invasions of Egypt, c. 1600 BC, horses were pulling chariots with an improved harness design that made use of a breastcollar and breeching, which allowed a horse to move faster and pull more weight.
Even after the chariot had become obsolete as a tool of war, there still was a need for technological innovations in pulling technologies; horses were needed to pull heavy loads of supplies and weapons. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Horses in warfare | Harness and vehicles: The invention of the wheel was a major technological innovation that gave rise to chariot warfare. At first, equines, both horses and onagers, were hitched to wheeled carts by means of a yoke around their necks in a manner similar to that of oxen. However, such a design is incompatible with equine anatomy, limiting both the strength and mobility of the animal. By the time of the Hyksos invasions of Egypt, c. 1600 BC, horses were pulling chariots with an improved harness design that made use of a breastcollar and breeching, which allowed a horse to move faster and pull more weight.
Even after the chariot had become obsolete as a tool of war, there still was a need for technological innovations in pulling technologies; horses were needed to pull heavy loads of supplies and weapons. The invention of the horse collar in China during the 5th century AD (Northern and Southern dynasties) allowed horses to pull greater weight than they could when hitched to a vehicle with the ox yokes or breast collars used in earlier times. The horse collar arrived in Europe during the 9th century, and became widespread by the 12th century.
Riding equipment: Two major innovations that revolutionised the effectiveness of mounted warriors in battle were the saddle and the stirrup. Riders quickly learned to pad their horse's backs to protect themselves from the horse's spine and withers, and fought on horseback for centuries with little more than a blanket or pad on the horse's back and a rudimentary bridle. To help distribute the rider's weight and protect the horse's back, some cultures created stuffed padding that resembles the panels of today's English saddle. Both the Scythians and Assyrians used pads with added felt attached with a surcingle or girth around the horse's barrel for increased security and comfort. Xenophon mentioned the use of a padded cloth on cavalry mounts as early as the 4th century BC.
The saddle with a solid framework, or "tree", provided a bearing surface to protect the horse from the weight of the rider, but was not widespread until the 2nd century AD. However, it made a critical difference, as horses could carry more weight when distributed across a solid saddle tree. A solid tree, the predecessor of today's Western saddle, also allowed a more built-up seat to give the rider greater security in the saddle. The Romans are credited with the invention of the solid-treed saddle.
An invention that made cavalry particularly effective was the stirrup. A toe loop that held the big toe was used in India possibly as early as 500 BC, and later a single stirrup was used as a mounting aid. The first set of paired stirrups appeared in China about 322 AD during the Jin dynasty. Following the invention of paired stirrups, which allowed a rider greater leverage with weapons, as well as both increased stability and mobility while mounted, nomadic groups such as the Mongols adopted this technology and developed a decisive military advantage. By the 7th century, due primarily to invaders from Central Asia, stirrup technology spread from Asia to Europe. The Avar invaders are viewed as primarily responsible for spreading the use of the stirrup into central Europe. However, while stirrups were known in Europe in the 8th century, pictorial and literary references to their use date only from the 9th century. Widespread use in Northern Europe, including England, is credited to the Vikings, who spread the stirrup in the 9th and 10th centuries to those areas.
Tactics: The first archaeological evidence of horses used in warfare dates from between 4000 and 3000 BC in the steppes of Eurasia, in what today is Ukraine, Hungary, and Romania. Not long after domestication of the horse, people in these locations began to live together in large fortified towns for protection from the threat of horseback-riding raiders, who could attack and escape faster than people of more sedentary cultures could follow. Horse-mounted nomads of the steppe and current day Eastern Europe spread Indo-European Languages as they conquered other tribes and groups.
The use of horses in organised warfare was documented early in recorded history. One of the first depictions is the "war panel" of the Standard of Ur, in Sumer, dated c. 2500 BC, showing horses (or possibly onagers or mules) pulling a four-wheeled wagon.
Chariot warfare: Among the earliest evidence of chariot use are the burials of horse and chariot remains by the Andronovo (Sintashta-Petrovka) culture in modern Russia and Kazakhstan, dated to approximately 2000 BC. The oldest documentary evidence of what was probably chariot warfare in the Ancient Near East is the Old Hittite Anitta text, of the 18th century BC, which mentioned 40 teams of horses at the siege of Salatiwara. The Hittites became well known throughout the ancient world for their prowess with the chariot. Widespread use of the chariot in warfare across most of Eurasia coincides approximately with the development of the composite bow, known from c. 1600 BC. Further improvements in wheels and axles, as well as innovations in weaponry, soon resulted in chariots being driven in battle by Bronze Age societies from China to Egypt.
The Hyksos invaders brought the chariot to Ancient Egypt in the 16th century BC and the Egyptians adopted its use from that time forward. The oldest preserved text related to the handling of war horses in the ancient world is the Hittite manual of Kikkuli, which dates to about 1350 BC, and describes the conditioning of chariot horses.
Chariots existed in the Minoan civilization, as they were inventoried on storage lists from Knossos in Crete, dating to around 1450 BC. Chariots were also used in China as far back as the Shang dynasty (c. 1600–1050 BC), where they appear in burials. The high point of chariot use in China was in the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BC), although they continued in use up until the 2nd century BC.
Descriptions of the tactical role of chariots in Ancient Greece and Rome are rare. The Iliad, possibly referring to Mycenaen practices used c. 1250 BC, describes the use of chariots for transporting warriors to and from battle, rather than for actual fighting. Later, Julius Caesar, invading Britain in 55 and 54 BC, noted British charioteers throwing javelins, then leaving their chariots to fight on foot.
Cavalry: Some of the earliest examples of horses being ridden in warfare were horse-mounted archers or javelin-throwers, dating to the reigns of the Assyrian rulers Ashurnasirpal II and Shalmaneser III. However, these riders sat far back on their horses, a precarious position for moving quickly, and the horses were held by a handler on the ground, keeping the archer free to use the bow. Thus, these archers were more a type of mounted infantry than true cavalry. The Assyrians developed cavalry in response to invasions by nomadic people from the north, such as the Cimmerians, who entered Asia Minor in the 8th century BC and took over parts of Urartu during the reign of Sargon II, approximately 721 BC. Mounted warriors such as the Scythians also had an influence on the region in the 7th century BC. By the reign of Ashurbanipal in 669 BC, the Assyrians had learned to sit forward on their horses in the classic riding position still seen today and could be said to be true light cavalry. The ancient Greeks used both light horse scouts and heavy cavalry, although not extensively, possibly due to the cost of keeping horses.
Heavy cavalry was believed to have been developed by the Ancient Persians, although others argue for the Sarmatians. By the time of Darius (558–486 BC), Persian military tactics required horses and riders that were completely armoured, and selectively bred a heavier, more muscled horse to carry the additional weight. The cataphract was a type of heavily armoured cavalry with distinct tactics, armour, and weaponry used from the time of the Persians up until the Middle Ages.
In Ancient Greece, Phillip of Macedon is credited with developing tactics allowing massed cavalry charges. The most famous Greek heavy cavalry units were the companion cavalry of Alexander the Great. The Chinese of the 4th century BC during the Warring States period (403–221 BC) began to use cavalry against rival states. To fight nomadic raiders from the north and west, the Chinese of the Han dynasty (202 BC – 220 AD) developed effective mounted units. Cavalry was not used extensively by the Romans during the Roman Republic period, but by the time of the Roman Empire, they made use of heavy cavalry. However, the backbone of the Roman army was the infantry.
Horse artillery: Once gunpowder was invented, another major use of horses was as draught animals for heavy artillery, or cannon. In addition to field artillery, where horse-drawn guns were attended by gunners on foot, many armies had artillery batteries where each gunner was provided with a mount. Horse artillery units generally used lighter pieces, pulled by six horses. "9-pounders" were pulled by eight horses, and heavier artillery pieces needed a team of twelve. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Horses in warfare | To fight nomadic raiders from the north and west, the Chinese of the Han dynasty (202 BC – 220 AD) developed effective mounted units. Cavalry was not used extensively by the Romans during the Roman Republic period, but by the time of the Roman Empire, they made use of heavy cavalry. However, the backbone of the Roman army was the infantry.
Horse artillery: Once gunpowder was invented, another major use of horses was as draught animals for heavy artillery, or cannon. In addition to field artillery, where horse-drawn guns were attended by gunners on foot, many armies had artillery batteries where each gunner was provided with a mount. Horse artillery units generally used lighter pieces, pulled by six horses. "9-pounders" were pulled by eight horses, and heavier artillery pieces needed a team of twelve. With the individual riding horses required for officers, surgeons and other support staff, as well as those pulling the artillery guns and supply wagons, an artillery battery of six guns could require 160 to 200 horses. Horse artillery usually came under the command of cavalry divisions, but in some battles, such as Waterloo, the horse artillery were used as a rapid response force, repulsing attacks and assisting the infantry. Agility was important; the ideal artillery horse was 1.5 to 1.6 metres (15 to 16 hands) high, strongly built, but able to move quickly.
Asia:
Central Asia: Relations between steppe nomads and the settled people in and around Central Asia were often marked by conflict. The nomadic lifestyle was well suited to warfare, and steppe cavalry became some of the most militarily potent forces in the world, only limited by nomads' frequent lack of internal unity. Periodically, strong leaders would organise several tribes into one force, creating an almost unstoppable power. These unified groups included the Huns, who invaded Europe, and under Attila, conducted campaigns in both eastern France and northern Italy, over 500 miles apart, within two successive campaign seasons. Other unified nomadic forces included the Wu Hu rebellions in China, and the Mongol conquest of much of Eurasia.
South Asia: The literature of ancient India describes numerous horse nomads. Some of the earliest references to the use of horses in South Asian warfare are Puranic texts, which refer to an attempted invasion of India by the joint cavalry forces of the Sakas, Kambojas, Yavanas, Pahlavas, and Paradas, called the "five hordes" (pañca.ganah) or "Kśatriya" hordes (Kśatriya ganah). About 1600 BC, they captured the throne of Ayodhya by dethroning the Vedic king, Bahu. Later texts, such as the Mahābhārata, c. 950 BC, appear to recognise efforts taken to breed war horses and develop trained mounted warriors, stating that the horses of the Sindhu and Kamboja regions were of the finest quality, and the Kambojas, Gandharas, and Yavanas were expert in fighting from horses.
In technological innovation, the early toe loop stirrup is credited to the cultures of India, and may have been in use as early as 500 BC. Not long after, the cultures of Mesopotamia and Ancient Greece clashed with those of central Asia and India. Herodotus (484–425 BC) wrote that Gandarian mercenaries of the Achaemenid Empire were recruited into the army of emperor Xerxes I of Persia (486–465 BC), which he led against the Greeks. A century later, the "Men of the Mountain Land," from north of Kabul River, served in the army of Darius III of Persia when he fought against Alexander the Great at Arbela in 331 BC. In battle against Alexander at Massaga in 326 BC, the Assakenoi forces included 20,000 cavalry. The Mudra-Rakshasa recounted how cavalry of the Shakas, Yavanas, Kambojas, Kiratas, Parasikas, and Bahlikas helped Chandragupta Maurya (c. 320–298 BC) defeat the ruler of Magadha and take the throne, thus laying the foundations of Mauryan dynasty in Northern India.
Mughal cavalry used gunpowder weapons, but were slow to replace the traditional composite bow. Under the impact of European military successes in India, some Indian rulers adopted the European system of massed cavalry charges, although others did not. By the 18th century, Indian armies continued to field cavalry, but mainly of the heavy variety.
East Asia: The Chinese used chariots for horse-based warfare until light cavalry forces became common during the Warring States era (402–221 BC). A major proponent of the change to riding horses from chariots was Wu Ling, c. 320 BC. However, conservative forces in China often opposed change, as cavalry did not benefit from the additional cachet attached to being the military branch dominated by the nobility as in medieval Europe. Nevertheless, during the reign of Emperor Wu of Han (r. 141–87 BC), it is recorded that 300,000 government-owned horses were insufficient for the cavalry and baggage trains of the Han military in the campaigns to expel the Xiongnu nomads from the Ordos Desert, Qilian Mountains, Khangai Mountains and Gobi Desert, spurring new policies that encouraged households to hand over privately-bred horses in exchange for military and corvee labor exemptions.
The Japanese samurai fought as cavalry for many centuries. They were particularly skilled in the art of using archery from horseback. The archery skills of mounted samurai were developed by training such as Yabusame, which originated in 530 AD and reached its peak under Minamoto no Yoritomo (1147–1199 AD) in the Kamakura period. They switched from an emphasis on mounted bowmen to mounted spearmen during the Sengoku period (1467–1615 AD).
Middle East: During the period when various Islamic empires controlled much of the Middle East as well as parts of West Africa and the Iberian peninsula, Muslim armies consisted mostly of cavalry, made up of fighters from various local groups, mercenaries and Turkoman tribesmen. The latter were considered particularly skilled as both lancers and archers from horseback. In the 9th century the use of Mamluks, slaves raised to be soldiers for various Muslim rulers, became increasingly common. Mobile tactics, advanced breeding of horses, and detailed training manuals made Mamluk cavalry a highly efficient fighting force. The use of armies consisting mostly of cavalry continued among the Turkish people who founded the Ottoman Empire. Their need for large mounted forces led to an establishment of the sipahi, cavalry soldiers who were granted lands in exchange for providing military service in times of war.
Mounted Muslim warriors conquered North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula during the 7th and 8th centuries AD following the Hijrah, of Muhammad in 622 AD. By 630 AD, their influence expanded across the Middle East and into western North Africa. By 711 AD, the light cavalry of Muslim warriors had reached Spain, and controlled most of the Iberian peninsula by 720. Their mounts were of various oriental types, including the North African Barb. A few Arabian horses may have come with the Ummayads who settled in the Guadalquivir valley. Another strain of horse that came with Islamic invaders was the Turkoman horse. Muslim invaders travelled north from present-day Spain into France, where they were defeated by the Frankish ruler Charles Martel at the Battle of Tours in 732 AD.
Europe:
Antiquity:
Middle Ages: During the European Middle Ages, there were three primary types of war horses: the destrier, the courser, and the rouncey, which differed in size and usage. A generic word used to describe medieval war horses was charger, which appears interchangeable with the other terms. The medieval war horse was of moderate size, rarely exceeding 15.2 hands (62 inches, 157 cm). Heavy horses were logistically difficult to maintain and less adaptable to varied terrains. The destrier of the early Middle Ages was moderately larger than the courser or rouncey, in part to accommodate heavier armoured knights. However, destriers were not as large as draught horses, averaging between 14.2 hands (58 inches, 147 cm) and 15 hands (60 inches, 152 cm). On the European continent, the need to carry more armour against mounted enemies such as the Lombards and Frisians led to the Franks developing heavier, bigger horses. As the amount of armour and equipment increased in the later Middle Ages, the height of the horses increased; some late medieval horse skeletons were of horses over 1.5 metres (15 hands).
Stallions were often used as destriers due to their natural aggression. However, there may have been some use of mares by European warriors, and mares, who were quieter and less likely to call out and betray their position to the enemy, were the preferred war horse of the Moors, who invaded various parts of Southern Europe from 700 AD through the 15th century. Geldings were used in war by the Teutonic Knights, and known as "monk horses" (German: Mönchpferde or Mönchhengste). |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Horses in warfare | On the European continent, the need to carry more armour against mounted enemies such as the Lombards and Frisians led to the Franks developing heavier, bigger horses. As the amount of armour and equipment increased in the later Middle Ages, the height of the horses increased; some late medieval horse skeletons were of horses over 1.5 metres (15 hands).
Stallions were often used as destriers due to their natural aggression. However, there may have been some use of mares by European warriors, and mares, who were quieter and less likely to call out and betray their position to the enemy, were the preferred war horse of the Moors, who invaded various parts of Southern Europe from 700 AD through the 15th century. Geldings were used in war by the Teutonic Knights, and known as "monk horses" (German: Mönchpferde or Mönchhengste). One advantage was if captured by the enemy, they could not be used to improve local bloodstock, thus maintaining the Knights' superiority in horseflesh.
Uses: The heavy cavalry charge, while it could be effective, was not a common occurrence. Battles were rarely fought on land suitable for heavy cavalry. While mounted riders remained effective for initial attacks, by the end of the 14th century, it was common for knights to dismount to fight, while their horses were sent to the rear, kept ready for pursuit. Pitched battles were avoided if possible, with most offensive warfare in the early Middle Ages taking the form of sieges, and in the later Middle Ages as mounted raids called chevauchées, with lightly armed warriors on swift horses.
The war horse was also seen in hastiludes – martial war games such as the joust, which began in the 11th century both as sport and to provide training for battle. Specialised destriers were bred for the purpose, although the expense of keeping, training, and outfitting them kept the majority of the population from owning one. While some historians suggest that the tournament had become a theatrical event by the 15th and 16th centuries, others argue that jousting continued to help cavalry train for battle until the Thirty Years' War.
Transition: The decline of the armoured knight was probably linked to changing structures of armies and various economic factors, and not obsolescence due to new technologies. However, some historians attribute the demise of the knight to the invention of gunpowder, or to the English longbow. Some link the decline to both technologies. Others argue these technologies actually contributed to the development of knights: plate armour was first developed to resist early medieval crossbow bolts, and the full harness worn by the early 15th century developed to resist longbow arrows. From the 14th century onwards, most plate was made from hardened steel, which resisted early musket ammunition. In addition, stronger designs did not make plate heavier; a full harness of musket-proof plate from the 17th century weighed 70 pounds (32 kg), significantly less than 16th century tournament armour.
The move to predominately infantry-based battles from 1300 to 1550 was linked to both improved infantry tactics and changes in weaponry. By the 16th century, the concept of a combined-arms professional army had spread throughout Europe. Professional armies emphasized training, and were paid via contracts, a change from the ransom and pillaging which reimbursed knights in the past. When coupled with the rising costs involved in outfitting and maintaining armour and horses, the traditional knightly classes began to abandon their profession. Light horses, or prickers, were still used for scouting and reconnaissance; they also provided a defensive screen for marching armies. Large teams of draught horses or oxen pulled the heavy early cannon. Other horses pulled wagons and carried supplies for the armies.
Early modern period: During the early modern period the shift continued from heavy cavalry and the armoured knight to unarmoured light cavalry, including Hussars and Chasseurs à cheval. Light cavalry facilitated better communication, using fast, agile horses to move quickly across battlefields. The ratio of footmen to horsemen also increased over the period as infantry weapons improved and footmen became more mobile and versatile, particularly once the musket bayonet replaced the more cumbersome pike. During the Elizabethan era, mounted units included cuirassiers, heavily armoured and equipped with lances; light cavalry, who wore mail and bore light lances and pistols; and "petronels", who carried an early carbine. As heavy cavalry use declined armour was increasingly abandoned and dragoons, whose horses were rarely used in combat, became more common: mounted infantry provided reconnaissance, escort and security. However, many generals still used the heavy mounted charge, from the late 17th century and early 18th century, where sword-wielding wedge-formation shock troops penetrated enemy lines, to the early 19th century, where armoured heavy cuirassiers were employed.
Light cavalry continued to play a major role, particularly after the Seven Years' War when Hussars started to play a larger part in battles. Though some leaders preferred tall horses for their mounted troops this was as much for prestige as for increased shock ability and many troops used more typical horses, averaging 15 hands. Cavalry tactics altered with fewer mounted charges, more reliance on drilled maneuvers at the trot, and use of firearms once within range. Ever-more elaborate movements, such as wheeling and caracole, were developed to facilitate the use of firearms from horseback. These tactics were not greatly successful in battle since pikemen protected by musketeers could deny cavalry room to manoeuvre. However the advanced equestrianism required survives into the modern world as dressage. While restricted, cavalry was not rendered obsolete. As infantry formations developed in tactics and skills, artillery became essential to break formations; in turn, cavalry was required to both combat enemy artillery, which was susceptible to cavalry while deploying, and to charge enemy infantry formations broken by artillery fire. Thus, successful warfare depended in a balance of the three arms: cavalry, artillery and infantry.
As regimental structures developed many units selected horses of uniform type and some, such as the Royal Scots Greys, even specified colour. Trumpeters often rode distinctive horses so they stood out. Regional armies developed type preferences, such as British hunters, Hanoverians in central Europe, and steppe ponies of the Cossacks, but once in the field, the lack of supplies typical of wartime meant that horses of all types were used. Since horses were such a vital component of most armies in early modern Europe, many instituted state stud farms to breed horses for the military. However, in wartime, supply rarely matched the demand, resulting in some cavalry troops fighting on foot.
19th century: In the 19th century distinctions between heavy and light cavalry became less significant; by the end of the Peninsular War, heavy cavalry were performing the scouting and outpost duties previously undertaken by light cavalry, and by the end of the 19th century the roles had effectively merged. Most armies at the time preferred cavalry horses to stand 15.2 hands (62 inches, 157 cm) and weigh 990 to 1,100 pounds (450 to 500 kg), although cuirassiers frequently had heavier horses. Lighter horses were used for scouting and raiding. Cavalry horses were generally obtained at 5 years of age and were in service from 10 to 12 years, barring loss. However losses of 30–40% were common during a campaign due to conditions of the march as well as enemy action. Mares and geldings were preferred over less-easily managed stallions.
During the French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars the cavalry's main offensive role was as shock troops. In defence cavalry were used to attack and harass the enemy's infantry flanks as they advanced. Cavalry were frequently used prior to an infantry assault, to force an infantry line to break and reform into formations vulnerable to infantry or artillery. Infantry frequently followed behind in order to secure any ground won or the cavalry could be used to break up enemy lines following a successful infantry action.
Mounted charges were carefully managed. A charge's maximum speed was 20 km/h; moving faster resulted in a break in formation and fatigued horses. Charges occurred across clear rising ground, and were effective against infantry both on the march and when deployed in a line or column. A foot battalion formed in line was vulnerable to cavalry, and could be broken or destroyed by a well-formed charge. Traditional cavalry functions altered by the end of the 19th century. Many cavalry units transferred in title and role to "mounted rifles": troops trained to fight on foot, but retaining mounts for rapid deployment, as well as for patrols, scouting, communications, and defensive screening. These troops differed from mounted infantry, who used horses for transport but did not perform the old cavalry roles of reconnaissance and support.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Horses were used for warfare in the central Sudan since the 9th century, where they were considered "the most precious commodity following the slave." The first conclusive evidence of horses playing a major role in the warfare of West Africa dates to the 11th century when the region was controlled by the Almoravids, a Muslim Berber dynasty. During the 13th and 14th centuries, cavalry became an important factor in the area. This coincided with the introduction of larger breeds of horse and the widespread adoption of saddles and stirrups. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Horses in warfare | Many cavalry units transferred in title and role to "mounted rifles": troops trained to fight on foot, but retaining mounts for rapid deployment, as well as for patrols, scouting, communications, and defensive screening. These troops differed from mounted infantry, who used horses for transport but did not perform the old cavalry roles of reconnaissance and support.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Horses were used for warfare in the central Sudan since the 9th century, where they were considered "the most precious commodity following the slave." The first conclusive evidence of horses playing a major role in the warfare of West Africa dates to the 11th century when the region was controlled by the Almoravids, a Muslim Berber dynasty. During the 13th and 14th centuries, cavalry became an important factor in the area. This coincided with the introduction of larger breeds of horse and the widespread adoption of saddles and stirrups. Increased mobility played a part in the formation of new power centers, such as the Oyo Empire in what today is Nigeria. The authority of many African Islamic states such as the Bornu Empire also rested in large part on their ability to subject neighboring peoples with cavalry. Despite harsh climate conditions, endemic diseases such as trypanosomiasis, the African horse sickness, and unsuitable terrain that limited the effectiveness of horses in many parts of Africa, horses were continuously imported and were, in some areas, a vital instrument of war. The introduction of horses also intensified existing conflicts, such as those between the Herero and Nama people in Namibia during the 19th century.
The African slave trade was closely tied to the imports of war horses, and as the prevalence of slaving decreased, fewer horses were needed for raiding. This significantly decreased the amount of mounted warfare seen in West Africa. By the time of the Scramble for Africa and the introduction of modern firearms in the 1880s, the use of horses in African warfare had lost most of its effectiveness. Nonetheless, in South Africa during the Second Boer War (1899–1902), cavalry and other mounted troops were the major combat force for the British, since the horse-mounted Boers moved too quickly for infantry to engage. The Boers presented a mobile and innovative approach to warfare, drawing on strategies that had first appeared in the American Civil War. The terrain was not well-suited to the British horses, resulting in the loss of over 300,000 animals. As the campaign wore on, losses were replaced by more durable African Basuto ponies, and Waler horses from Australia.
The Americas: The horse had been extinct in the Western Hemisphere for approximately 10,000 years prior to the arrival of Spanish Conquistadors in the early 16th century. Consequently, the Indigenous peoples of the Americas had no warfare technologies that could overcome the considerable advantage provided by European horses and gunpowder weapons. In particular this resulted in the conquest of the Aztec and Inca empires. The speed and increased impact of cavalry contributed to a number of early victories by European fighters in open terrain, though their success was limited in more mountainous regions. The Incas' well-maintained roads in the Andes enabled quick mounted raids, such as those undertaken by the Spanish while resisting the siege of Cuzco in 1536–37.
Indigenous populations of South America soon learned to use horses. In Chile, the Mapuche began using cavalry in the Arauco War in 1586. They drove the Spanish out of Araucanía at the beginning of the 17th century. Later, the Mapuche conducted mounted raids known as Malónes, first on Spanish, then on Chilean and Argentine settlements until well into the 19th century. In North America, Native Americans also quickly learned to use horses. In particular, the people of the Great Plains, such as the Comanche and the Cheyenne, became renowned horseback fighters. By the 19th century, they presented a formidable force against the United States Army.
During the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783), the Continental Army made relatively little use of cavalry, primarily relying on infantry and a few dragoon regiments. The United States Congress eventually authorized regiments specifically designated as cavalry in 1855. The newly formed American cavalry adopted tactics based on experiences fighting over vast distances during the Mexican War (1846–1848) and against indigenous peoples on the western frontier, abandoning some European traditions.
During the American Civil War (1861–1865), cavalry held the most important and respected role it would ever hold in the American military. Field artillery in the American Civil War was also highly mobile. Both horses and mules pulled the guns, though only horses were used on the battlefield. At the beginning of the war, most of the experienced cavalry officers were from the South and thus joined the Confederacy, leading to the Confederate Army's initial battlefield superiority. The tide turned at the 1863 Battle of Brandy Station, part of the Gettysburg campaign, where the Union cavalry, in the largest cavalry battle ever fought on the American continent, ended the dominance of the South. By 1865, Union cavalry were decisive in achieving victory. So important were horses to individual soldiers that the surrender terms at Appomattox allowed every Confederate cavalryman to take his horse home with him. This was because, unlike their Union counterparts, Confederate cavalrymen provided their own horses for service instead of drawing them from the government.
20th century: Although cavalry was used extensively throughout the world during the 19th century, horses became less important in warfare at the beginning of the 20th century. Light cavalry was still seen on the battlefield, but formal mounted cavalry began to be phased out for combat during and immediately after World War I, although units that included horses still had military uses well into World War II.
World War I: World War I saw great changes in the use of cavalry. The mode of warfare changed, and the use of trench warfare, barbed wire and machine guns rendered traditional cavalry almost obsolete. Tanks, introduced in 1917, began to take over the role of shock combat.
Early in the War, cavalry skirmishes were common, and horse-mounted troops widely used for reconnaissance. On the Western Front cavalry were an effective flanking force during the "Race to the Sea" in 1914, but were less useful once trench warfare was established. There a few examples of successful shock combat, and cavalry divisions also provided important mobile firepower. Cavalry played a greater role on the Eastern Front, where trench warfare was less common. On the Eastern Front, and also against the Ottomans, the "cavalry was literally indispensable." British Empire cavalry proved adaptable, since they were trained to fight both on foot and while mounted, while other European cavalry relied primarily on shock action.
On both fronts, the horse was also used as a pack animal. Because railway lines could not withstand artillery bombardments, horses carried ammunition and supplies between the railheads and the rear trenches, though the horses generally were not used in the actual trench zone. This role of horses was critical, and thus horse fodder was the single largest commodity shipped to the front by some countries. Following the war, many cavalry regiments were converted to mechanised, armoured divisions, with light tanks developed to perform many of the cavalry's original roles.
World War II: Several nations used horse units during World War II. The Polish army used mounted infantry to defend against the armies of Nazi Germany during the 1939 invasion. Both the Germans and the Soviet Union maintained cavalry units throughout the war, particularly on the Eastern Front. The British Army used horses early in the war, and the final British cavalry charge was on March 21, 1942, when the Burma Frontier Force encountered Japanese infantry in central Burma. The only American cavalry unit during World War II was the 26th Cavalry. They challenged the Japanese invaders of Luzon, holding off armoured and infantry regiments during the invasion of the Philippines, repelled a unit of tanks in Binalonan, and successfully held ground for the Allied armies' retreat to Bataan.
Throughout the war, horses and mules were an essential form of transport, especially by the British in the rough terrain of Southern Europe and the Middle East. The United States Army utilised a few cavalry and supply units during the war, but there were concerns that the Americans did not use horses often enough. In the campaigns in North Africa, generals such as George S. Patton lamented their lack, saying, "had we possessed an American cavalry division with pack artillery in Tunisia and in Sicily, not a German would have escaped."
The German and the Soviet armies used horses until the end of the war for transportation of troops and supplies. The German Army, strapped for motorised transport because its factories were needed to produce tanks and aircraft, used around 2.75 million horses – more than it had used in World War I. One German infantry division in Normandy in 1944 had 5,000 horses. The Soviets used 3.5 million horses.
Recognition: While many statues and memorials have been erected to human heroes of war, often shown with horses, a few have also been created specifically to honor horses or animals in general. One example is the Horse Memorial in Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape province of South Africa. Both horses and mules are honored in the Animals in War Memorial in London's Hyde Park.
Horses have also at times received medals for extraordinary deeds. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Horses in warfare | The German and the Soviet armies used horses until the end of the war for transportation of troops and supplies. The German Army, strapped for motorised transport because its factories were needed to produce tanks and aircraft, used around 2.75 million horses – more than it had used in World War I. One German infantry division in Normandy in 1944 had 5,000 horses. The Soviets used 3.5 million horses.
Recognition: While many statues and memorials have been erected to human heroes of war, often shown with horses, a few have also been created specifically to honor horses or animals in general. One example is the Horse Memorial in Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape province of South Africa. Both horses and mules are honored in the Animals in War Memorial in London's Hyde Park.
Horses have also at times received medals for extraordinary deeds. After the Charge of the Light Brigade during the Crimean War, a surviving horse named Drummer Boy, ridden by an officer of the 8th Hussars, was given an unofficial campaign medal by his rider that was identical to those awarded to British troops who served in the Crimea, engraved with the horse's name and an inscription of his service. A more formal award was the PDSA Dickin Medal, an animals' equivalent of the Victoria Cross, awarded by the People's Dispensary for Sick Animals charity in the United Kingdom to three horses that served in World War II.
Modern uses: Today, many of the historical military uses of the horse have evolved into peacetime applications, including exhibitions, historical reenactments, work of peace officers, and competitive events. Formal combat units of mounted cavalry are mostly a thing of the past, with horseback units within the modern military used for reconnaissance, ceremonial, or crowd control purposes. With the rise of mechanised technology, horses in formal national militias were displaced by tanks and armored fighting vehicles, often still referred to as "cavalry".
Active military: Organised armed fighters on horseback are occasionally seen. The best-known current examples are the Janjaweed, militia groups seen in the Darfur region of Sudan, who became notorious for their attacks upon unarmed civilian populations in the Darfur conflict. Many nations still maintain small numbers of mounted military units for certain types of patrol and reconnaissance duties in extremely rugged terrain, including the conflict in Afghanistan.
At the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, Operational Detachment Alpha 595 teams were covertly inserted into Afghanistan on October 19, 2001. Horses were the only suitable method of transport in the difficult mountainous terrain of Northern Afghanistan. They were the first U.S. soldiers to ride horses into battle since January 16, 1942, when the U.S. Army’s 26th Cavalry Regiment charged an advanced guard of the 14th Japanese Army as it advanced from Manila.
The only remaining operationally ready, fully horse-mounted regular regiment in the world is the Indian Army's 61st Cavalry.
Law enforcement and public safety: Mounted police have been used since the 18th century, and still are used worldwide to control traffic and crowds, patrol public parks, keep order in processionals and during ceremonies and perform general street patrol duties. Today, many cities still have mounted police units. In rural areas, horses are used by law enforcement for mounted patrols over rugged terrain, crowd control at religious shrines, and border patrol.
In rural areas, law enforcement that operates outside of incorporated cities may also have mounted units. These include specially deputised, paid or volunteer mounted search and rescue units sent into roadless areas on horseback to locate missing people. Law enforcement in protected areas may use horses in places where mechanised transport is difficult or prohibited. Horses can be an essential part of an overall team effort as they can move faster on the ground than a human on foot, can transport heavy equipment, and provide a more rested rescue worker when a subject is found.
Ceremonial and educational uses: Many countries throughout the world maintain traditionally trained and historically uniformed cavalry units for ceremonial, exhibition, or educational purposes. One example is the Horse Cavalry Detachment of the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division. This unit of active duty soldiers approximates the weapons, tools, equipment and techniques used by the United States Cavalry in the 1880s. It is seen at change of command ceremonies and other public appearances. A similar detachment is the Governor General's Horse Guards, Canada's Household Cavalry regiment, the last remaining mounted cavalry unit in the Canadian Forces. Nepal's King's Household Cavalry is a ceremonial unit with over 100 horses and is the remainder of the Nepalese cavalry that existed since the 19th century. An important ceremonial use is in military funerals, which often have a caparisoned horse as part of the procession, "to symbolize that the warrior will never ride again".
Horses are also used in many historical reenactments. Reenactors try to recreate the conditions of the battle or tournament with equipment that is as authentic as possible.
Equestrian sport: Modern-day Olympic equestrian events are rooted in cavalry skills and classical horsemanship. The first equestrian events at the Olympics were introduced in 1912, and through 1948, competition was restricted to active-duty officers on military horses. Only after 1952, as mechanisation of warfare reduced the number of military riders, were civilian riders allowed to compete. Dressage traces its origins to Xenophon and his works on cavalry training methods, developing further during the Renaissance in response to a need for different tactics in battles where firearms were used. The three-phase competition known as Eventing developed out of cavalry officers' needs for versatile, well-schooled horses. Though show jumping developed largely from fox hunting, the cavalry considered jumping to be good training for their horses, and leaders in the development of modern riding techniques over fences, such as Federico Caprilli, came from military ranks. Beyond the Olympic disciplines are other events with military roots. Competitions with weapons, such as mounted shooting and tent pegging, test the combat skills of mounted riders.
See also: Equestrianism
Great Stirrup Controversy
List of historical military horses
Notes:
References:
Sources:
Further reading: Barton, P. G. (2019), "The Medieval Powys Warhorse", Montgomeryshire Collections, 107
Hacker, Barton C. (August 1997). "Military Technology and World History: A Reconnaissance". The History Teacher. 30 (4): 461–487. doi:10.2307/494141. JSTOR 494141.
Harrison, Sunny (2022). "How to make a warhorse: violence and behavioural control in late medieval hippiatric treatises". Journal of Medieval History.
External links: The Institute for Ancient Equestrian Studies (IAES)
The Society of the Military Horse
Historic films showing horses in World War I at europeanfilmgateway.eu
Warhorse: the archaeology of a medieval revolution?, AHRC funded research project by the University of Exeter and the University of East Anglia |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Hull-down | Ships: When a ship moves away, due to the curvature of the Earth, the ship's hull will disappear under the sightline at a much smaller distance than its upper rigging. The geodetic visibility depends on the altitude of the observation site and the altitude of the object being viewed. For example, in clear air a lookout at the top of a mast 130 feet (40 m) above the water will be able to see the top of another 130 ft mast from over 24 nautical miles (44 km) away, but will be able to see the hull above the waterline of the other ship from only 12 nautical miles (22 km) away. The discovery of the hull-down phenomenon in sailing was essential to disproving the Flat Earth theory.
With a clear horizon, whether a vessel is hull down or hull up gives some idea of its distance from the observer, using the line-of-sight formula.
Tactical considerations: In naval warfare, while the upper rigging (of a sailing vessel) or radio mast and stacks (of a steam ship) may give some idea of its type, it is impossible to tell the true nature of a ship when it is hull down and its armament and size are not visible. Especially during the age of sail, a naval vessel that chose to pursue a possible enemy vessel spotted hull down ran the risk of unknowingly closing on a more powerful opponent — depending on the wind and other conditions, it might not be possible to flee once the other vessel was clearly visible hull up.
Hull down was also used to describe a commercial sailing vessel being under sail and loaded sailing briskly to windward.
Armoured warfare: In modern armoured warfare, 'hull down' is a position taken up by an armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) such that its hull (the main part of the vehicle) is behind a crest or other raised ground, but its turret (or a superstructure or roof-mounted weapon) is exposed. This allows it to observe and fire upon the ground ahead, while the hull is protected from enemy fire behind hard cover. A hull-down AFV is said to be in defilade. Taking advantage of hull-down positions is an element of tactical movement.
Turret down is the position in which the vehicle's crew can observe forward from roof hatches, but the vehicle is completely hidden (usually a few metres further back from a hull-down position). This can also apply to vehicles without turrets.
In flat or gently rolling terrain, a hull-down position is difficult to find. The actual protecting rise of ground may be hundreds of metres long. In steep or abrupt terrain cover is plentiful, but it may be difficult to find covered positions from which the vehicle's main gun can fire upon terrain ahead (see tank design, below).
In preparing defensive works, a hull-down position can be created or improved by digging shallow "tank scrapes". Tank units usually have one or two tanks with 'dozer' blades attached for this purpose, and some tank models have a built-in blade. Combat engineering vehicles often accompany armoured vehicles as they manoeuvre to dig tank scrapes, as they can accomplish the task more quickly.
Tactical movement: Crossing a crest or ridgeline is a dangerous manoeuvre for AFVs, as they are particularly exposed to enemy fire while silhouetted against the sky (skylined). While cresting a steep slope, the thin armour on the front bottom of a tank's hull (below the thick glacis plate) can be exposed to fire. After cresting, the thin top armour may be exposed while it moves down the forward slope. If an antitank gunner has spotted the AFV, they may train their sights on it and wait for an easy shot while it moves forward.
After observing from a hull-down or turret-down position, an armoured vehicle will try to advance while minimizing these risks. If possible, it may reverse away from a crest, and try to find a route forward through the relative safety of hidden low ground (dead ground).
If crossing a long crest is unavoidable, the vehicle can back down and jockey at least 50 metres across the covered back of the slope, before advancing over the crest at high speed. An enemy gunner will have little time to locate the target, train his sights on it, and take the shot. If the terrain is hilly enough, the AFV can quickly enter low ground, then advance through it to another hull-down position.
Mutual support: Small armoured units (companies or platoons) make use of these tactics in co-ordinated fashion, when contact with the enemy is expected. Since firing while moving was until recently impossible or ineffective, elements of a unit (platoons, patrols, or individual vehicles) take turns moving and supporting each other from the halt (see overwatch). This is called mutual support, or fire and movement, related to the infantry tactic of leap-frogging, or, somewhat more loosely, the air combat tactic of flying with a wingman. Co-ordination is accomplished by hand signals or radio messages.
Lightly armed reconnaissance elements make much use of covered movement and stealth, while offensive units such as tanks move much more aggressively. When speed is paramount, modern tanks (which can fire effectively while moving) may dispense with fire and movement, and move all at once.
Tank design: Tanks and other fighting vehicles must be able to depress their gun to be able to take advantage of many hull-down positions, since a vehicle's hull is usually tilted upwards when it is behind a crest. A vehicle with a relatively small range of gun depression may have to drive up onto an exposed crest or forward slope to be able to fire on lower ground to the front. Notably, Soviet and Russian tanks after World War II have very low profiles, but pay for this advantage by having a poor range of gun depression. Their low turret roof stops the rising gun breech when the muzzle is depressed. Thus, Soviet tank crews would have a hard time finding a hull-down position from which they could cover much of the terrain by fire. The typical Soviet tank had a range of elevation of -5 to +15 degrees, about two thirds that of Western tanks with a range of about -10 to +20 degrees.
This disadvantage was deemed acceptable, as Soviet tanks were designed to be used as an offensive weapon, fighting over flat terrain. Soviet tactics didn't neglect the defence, however. Newer Soviet tank models were equipped with an integral dozer blade, so given time, they could improve a hull-down position. Soviet tactics also emphasize the use of tanks on the defence in the counterattack role, rather than engaging an enemy advance from prepared positions.
The Swedish Stridsvagn 103, while resembling a tank destroyer, was actually a main battle tank. The turretless design was chosen to give it a low profile and thus increase protection, including in a hull-down position. It was however intended to be used in the offensive role, as the armoured brigades it served in were assault brigades intended for counter-offensive operations against enemy beachheads and airborne landings.
See also: Radar horizon
Spherical Earth
References:
External links:
Chapter 4: "Defensive Operations"—from US army manual FM 17-15 Tank Platoon
How Boats "Vanish" Over The Horizon |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Humanitarian aid | Types:
Food aid: Food aid is a type of aid whereby food that is given to countries in urgent need of food supplies, especially if they have just experienced a natural disaster. Food aid can be provided by importing food from the donor, buying food locally, or providing cash.
The welfare impacts of any food aid-induced changes in food prices are decidedly mixed, underscoring the reality that it is impossible to generate only positive intended effects from an international aid program.
Changed consumption patterns: Food aid that is relatively inappropriate to local uses can distort consumption patterns. Food aid is usually exported from temperate climate zones and is often different than the staple crops grown in recipient countries, which usually have a tropical climate. The logic of food export inherently entails some effort to change consumers' preferences, to introduce recipients to new foods and thereby stimulate demand for foods with which recipients were previously unfamiliar or which otherwise represent only a small portion of their diet.
Massive shipments of wheat and rice into the West African Sahel during the food crises of the mid-1970s and mid-1980s were widely believed to stimulate a shift in consumer demand from indigenous coarse grains – millet and sorghum – to western crops such as wheat. During the 2000 drought in northern Kenya, the price of changaa (a locally distilled alcohol) fell significantly and consumption seems to have increased as a result. This was a result of grain food aid inflows increasing the availability of low-cost inputs to the informal distilling industry.
Natural resource overexploitation: Recent research suggests that patterns of food aid distribution may inadvertently affect the natural environment, by changing consumption patterns and by inducing locational change in grazing and other activities. A pair of studies in Northern Kenya found that food aid distribution seems to induce greater spatial concentration of livestock around distribution points, causing localized rangeland degradation, and that food aid provided as whole grain requires more cooking, and thus more fuelwood, stimulating local deforestation.
Medical humanitarian aid: There are different kinds of medical humanitarian aid, including: providing medical supplies and equipment; sending professionals to an affected region; and, long-term training for local medical staff. Such aid emerged when international organizations stepped in to respond to the need of national governments for global support and partnership to address natural disasters, wars, and other crises that impact people's health. Often, a humanitarian aid organization would clash with a government's approach to the unfolding domestic conflict. In such cases, humanitarian aid organizations have sought out autonomy to extend help regardless of political or ethnic affiliation.
Limitations: Humanitarian medical aid as a sector possesses several limitations. First, multiple organizations often exist to solve the same problem. Rather than collaborating to address a given situation, organizations frequently interact as competitors, which creates bottlenecks of treatment and supplies. A second limitation is how humanitarian organizations are focused on a specific disaster or epidemic, without a plan for whatever might come next; international organizations frequently enter a region, provide short term aid, and then exit without ensuring local capacity to maintain or sustain this medical care. Finally, humanitarian medical aid assumes a biomedical approach which does not always account for the alternative beliefs and practices about health and well-being in the affected regions. This problem is rarely explored as most studies conducted are done from the lens of the donor or Westernized humanitarian organization rather than the recipient country's perspective. Discovering ways of encouraging locals to embrace bio-medicine approaches while simultaneously respecting a given people's culture and beliefs remains a major challenge for humanitarian aid organizations; in particular as organizations constantly enter new regions as crises occur. However, understanding how to provide aid cohesively with existing regional approaches is necessary in securing the local peoples' acceptance of the humanitarian aid's work.
Funding sources: Aid is funded by donations from individuals, corporations, governments and other organizations. The funding and delivery of humanitarian aid is increasingly international, making it much faster, more responsive, and more effective in coping to major emergencies affecting large numbers of people (e.g. see Central Emergency Response Fund). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordinates the international humanitarian response to a crisis or emergency pursuant to Resolution 46/182 of the United Nations General Assembly. The need for aid is ever-increasing and has long outstripped the financial resources available.
The Central Emergency Response Fund was created at the 2005 Central Emergency Response Fund at the United Nations General Assembly.
Delivery of humanitarian aid:
Methods of delivery: Humanitarian aid spans a wide range of activities, including providing food aid, shelter, education, healthcare or protection. The majority of aid is provided in the form of in-kind goods or assistance, with cash and vouchers constituting only 6% of total humanitarian spending. However, evidence has shown how cash transfers can be better for recipients as it gives them choice and control, they can be more cost-efficient and better for local markets and economies.
It is important to note that humanitarian aid is not only delivered through aid workers sent by bilateral, multilateral or intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations. Actors like the affected people themselves, civil society, local informal first-responders, civil society, the diaspora, businesses, local governments, military, local and international non-governmental organizations all play a crucial role in a timely delivery of humanitarian aid.
How aid is delivered can affect the quality and quantity of aid. Often in disaster situations, international aid agencies work in hand with local agencies. There can be different arrangements on the role these agencies play, and such arrangement affects that quality of hard and soft aid delivered.
Humanitarian access: Securing access to humanitarian aid in post-disasters, conflicts, and complex emergencies is a major concern for humanitarian actors. To win assent for interventions, aid agencies often espouse the principles of humanitarian impartiality and neutrality. However, gaining secure access often involves negotiation and the practice of humanitarian diplomacy. In the arena of negotiations, humanitarian diplomacy is ostensibly used by humanitarian actors to try to persuade decision makers and leaders to act, at all times and in all circumstances, in the interest of vulnerable people and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles. However, humanitarian diplomacy is also used by state actors as part of their foreign policy.
United Nations' response: The UN implements a multifaceted approach to assist migrants and refugees throughout their relocation process. This includes children's integration into the local education system, food security, and access to health services. The approach also encompasses humanitarian transportation, the goal of which is to ensure migrants and refugees retain access to basic goods and services and the labour market. Basic needs, including access to shelter, clean water, and child protection, are supplemented by the UN's efforts to facilitate social integration and legal regularization for displaced individuals.
Use of technology and data: Since the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, the institutional and operational focus of humanitarian aid has been on leveraging technology to enhance humanitarian action, ensuring that more formal relationships are established, and improving the interaction between formal humanitarian organizations such as the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and informal volunteer and technological communities known as digital humanitarians.
The recent rise in Big Data, high-resolution satellite imagery and new platforms powered by advanced computing have already prompted the development of crisis mapping to help humanitarian organizations make sense of the vast volume and velocity of information generated during disasters. For example, crowdsourcing maps (such as OpenStreetMap) and social media messages in Twitter were used during the 2010 Haiti Earthquake and Hurricane Sandy to trace leads of missing people, infrastructure damages and rise new alerts for emergencies.
Gender and humanitarian aid: Even prior to a humanitarian crisis, gender differences exist. Women have limited access to paid work, are at risk of child marriage, and are more exposed to Gender based violence, such as rape and domestic abuse. Conflict and natural disasters exacerbate women's vulnerabilities. When delivering humanitarian aid, it is thus important for humanitarian actors, such as the United Nations, to include challenges specific to women in their humanitarian response. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee provides guidelines for humanitarian actors on how be inclusive of gender when delivering humanitarian aid. It recommends agencies to collect data disaggregated by sex and age to better understand which group of the population is in need of what type of aid. In recent years, the United Nations have been using sex and age disaggregated data more and more, consulting with gender specialists. In the assessment phase, several UN agencies meet to compile data and work on a humanitarian response plan. Throughout the plans. women specific challenges are listed and sex and age disaggregated data are used so when they deliver aid to a country facing a humanitarian crisis, girls and women can have access to the aid they need.
Problematic aspects:
Economic distortions due to food aid: Some of the unintended effects of food aid include labor and production disincentives, changes in recipients' food consumption patterns and natural resources use patterns, distortion of social safety nets, distortion of NGO operational activities, price changes, and trade displacement. These issues arise from targeting inefficacy and poor timing of aid programs. Food aid can harm producers by driving down prices of local products, whereas the producers are not themselves beneficiaries of food aid. Unintentional harm occurs when food aid arrives or is purchased at the wrong time, when food aid distribution is not well-targeted to food-insecure households, and when the local market is relatively poorly integrated with broader national, regional and global markets.
Food aid can drive down local or national food prices in at least three ways.
First, monetization of food aid can flood the market, increasing supply. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Humanitarian aid | Problematic aspects:
Economic distortions due to food aid: Some of the unintended effects of food aid include labor and production disincentives, changes in recipients' food consumption patterns and natural resources use patterns, distortion of social safety nets, distortion of NGO operational activities, price changes, and trade displacement. These issues arise from targeting inefficacy and poor timing of aid programs. Food aid can harm producers by driving down prices of local products, whereas the producers are not themselves beneficiaries of food aid. Unintentional harm occurs when food aid arrives or is purchased at the wrong time, when food aid distribution is not well-targeted to food-insecure households, and when the local market is relatively poorly integrated with broader national, regional and global markets.
Food aid can drive down local or national food prices in at least three ways.
First, monetization of food aid can flood the market, increasing supply. In order to be granted the right to monetize, operational agencies must demonstrate that the recipient country has adequate storage facilities and that the monetized commodity will not result in a substantial disincentive in either domestic agriculture or domestic marketing.
Second, households receiving aid may decrease demand for the commodity received or for locally produced substitutes or, if they produce substitutes or the commodity received, they may sell more of it. This can be most easily understood by dividing a population in a food aid recipient area into subpopulations based on two criteria: whether or not they receive food aid (recipients vs. non-recipients) and whether they are net sellers or net buyers of food. Because the price they receive for their output is lower, however, net sellers are unambiguously worse off if they do not receive food aid or some other form of compensatory transfer.
Finally, recipients may sell food aid to purchase other necessities or complements, driving down prices of the food aid commodity and its substitutes, but also increasing demand for complements. Most recipient economies are not robust and food aid inflows can cause large price decreases, decreasing producer profits, limiting producers' abilities to pay off debts and thereby diminishing both capacity and incentives to invest in improving agricultural productivity. However, food aid distributed directly or through FFW programs to households in northern Kenya during the lean season can foster increased purchase of agricultural inputs such as improved seeds, fertilizer and hired labor, thereby increasing agricultural productivity.Labor distortion can arise when Food-For-Work (FFW) Programs are more attractive than work on recipients' own farms/businesses, either because the FFW pays immediately, or because the household considers the payoffs to the FFW project to be higher than the returns to labor on its own plots. Food aid programs hence take productive inputs away from local private production, creating a distortion due to substitution effects, rather than income effects.
Beyond labor disincentive effects, food aid can have the unintended consequence of discouraging household-level production. Poor timing of aid and FFW wages that are above market rates cause negative dependency by diverting labor from local private uses, particularly if FFW obligations decrease labor on a household's own enterprises during a critical part of the production cycle. This type of disincentive impacts not only food aid recipients but also producers who sell to areas receiving food aid flows.
FFW programs are often used to counter a perceived dependency syndrome associated with freely distributed food. However, poorly designed FFW programs may cause more risk of harming local production than the benefits of free food distribution. In structurally weak economies, FFW program design is not as simple as determining the appropriate wage rate. Empirical evidence from rural Ethiopia shows that higher-income households had excess labor and thus lower (not higher as expected) value of time, and therefore allocated this labor to FFW schemes in which poorer households could not afford to participate due to labor scarcity. Similarly, FFW programs in Cambodia have shown to be an additional, not alternative, source of employment and that the very poor rarely participate due to labor constraints.
Increasing existing conflicts: In addition to post-conflict settings, a large portion of aid is often directed at countries currently undergoing conflicts. However, the effectiveness of humanitarian aid, particularly food aid, in conflict-prone regions has been criticized in recent years. There have been accounts of humanitarian aid being not only inefficacious but actually fuelling conflicts in the recipient countries. Aid stealing is one of the prime ways in which conflict is promoted by humanitarian aid. Aid can be seized by armed groups, and even if it does reach the intended recipients, "it is difficult to exclude local members of a local militia group from being direct recipients if they are also malnourished and qualify to receive aid."
Furthermore, analyzing the relationship between conflict and food aid, recent research shows that the United States food aid promoted civil conflict in recipient countries on average. An increase in United States' wheat aid increased the duration of armed civil conflicts in recipient countries, and ethnic polarization heightened this effect. However, since academic research on aid and conflict focuses on the role of aid in post-conflict settings, the aforementioned finding is difficult to contextualize. Nevertheless, research on Iraq shows that "small-scale [projects], local aid spending ... reduces conflict by creating incentives for average citizens to support the government in subtle ways." Similarly, another study also shows that aid flows can "reduce conflict because increasing aid revenues can relax government budget constraints, which can [in return] increase military spending and deter opposing groups from engaging in conflict." Thus, the impact of humanitarian aid on conflict may vary depending upon the type and mode in which aid is received, and, inter alia, the local socio-economic, cultural, historical, geographical and political conditions in the recipient countries.
Increasing conflict duration: International aid organizations identify theft by armed forces on the ground as a primary unintended consequence through which food aid and other types of humanitarian aid promote conflict. Food aid usually has to be transported across large geographic territories and during the transportation it becomes a target for armed forces, especially in countries where the ruling government has limited control outside of the capital. Accounts from Somalia in the early 1990s indicate that between 20 and 80 percent of all food aid was stolen, looted, or confiscated. In the former Yugoslavia, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) lost up to 30 percent of the total value of aid to Serbian armed forces. On top of that 30 percent, bribes were given to Croatian forces to pass their roadblocks in order to reach Bosnia.
The value of the stolen or lost provisions can exceed the value of the food aid alone since convoy vehicles and telecommunication equipment are also stolen. MSF Holland, international aid organization operating in Chad and Darfur, underscored the strategic importance of these goods, stating that these "vehicles and communications equipment have a value beyond their monetary worth for armed actors, increasing their capacity to wage war"
A famous instance of humanitarian aid unintentionally helping rebel groups occurred during the Nigeria-Biafra civil war in the late 1960s, where the rebel leader Odumegwu Ojukwu only allowed aid to enter the region of Biafra if it was shipped on his planes. These shipments of humanitarian aid helped the rebel leader to circumvent the siege on Biafra placed by the Nigerian government. These stolen shipments of humanitarian aid caused the Biafran civil war to last years longer than it would have without the aid, claim experts.
The most well-known instances of aid being seized by local warlords in recent years come from Somalia, where food aid is funneled to the Shabab, a Somali militant group that controls much of Southern Somalia. Moreover, reports reveal that Somali contractors for aid agencies have formed a cartel and act as important power brokers, arming opposition groups with the profits made from the stolen aid"
Rwandan government appropriation of food aid in the early 1990s was so problematic that aid shipments were canceled multiple times. In Zimbabwe in 2003, Human Rights Watch documented examples of residents being forced to display ZANU-PF Party membership cards before being given government food aid. In eastern Zaire, leaders of the Hema ethnic group allowed the arrival of international aid organizations only upon agreement not give aid to the Lendu (opposition of Hema). Humanitarian aid workers have acknowledged the threat of stolen aid and have developed strategies for minimizing the amount of theft en route. However, aid can fuel conflict even if successfully delivered to the intended population as the recipient populations often include members of rebel groups or militia groups, or aid is "taxed" by such groups.
Academic research emphatically demonstrates that on average food aid promotes civil conflict. Namely, increase in US food aid leads to an increase in the incidence of armed civil conflict in the recipient country. Another correlation demonstrated is food aid prolonging existing conflicts, specifically among countries with a recent history of civil conflict. However, this does not find an effect on conflict in countries without a recent history of civil conflict. Moreover, different types of international aid other than food which is easily stolen during its delivery, namely technical assistance and cash transfers, can have different effects on civil conflict.
Community-driven development (CDD) programs have become one of the most popular tools for delivering development aid. In 2012, the World Bank supported 400 CDD programs in 94 countries, valued at US$30 billion. Academic research scrutinizes the effect of community-driven development programs on civil conflict. The Philippines' flagship development program KALAHI-CIDSS is concluded to have led to an increase in violent conflict in the country. After the program's start, some municipalities experienced and statistically significant and large increase in casualties, as compared to other municipalities who were not part of the CDD. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Humanitarian aid | However, this does not find an effect on conflict in countries without a recent history of civil conflict. Moreover, different types of international aid other than food which is easily stolen during its delivery, namely technical assistance and cash transfers, can have different effects on civil conflict.
Community-driven development (CDD) programs have become one of the most popular tools for delivering development aid. In 2012, the World Bank supported 400 CDD programs in 94 countries, valued at US$30 billion. Academic research scrutinizes the effect of community-driven development programs on civil conflict. The Philippines' flagship development program KALAHI-CIDSS is concluded to have led to an increase in violent conflict in the country. After the program's start, some municipalities experienced and statistically significant and large increase in casualties, as compared to other municipalities who were not part of the CDD. Casualties suffered by government forces as a result of insurgent-initiated attacks increased significantly.
These results are consistent with other examples of humanitarian aid exacerbating civil conflict. One explanation is that insurgents attempt to sabotage CDD programs for political reasons – successful implementation of a government-supported project could weaken the insurgents' position. Related findings of Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov further demonstrate that a successful community-driven development program increased support for the government in Afghanistan by exacerbating conflict in the short term, revealing an unintended consequence of the aid.
Waste and corruption in humanitarian aid: Waste and corruption are hard to quantify, in part because they are often taboo subjects, but they appear to be significant in humanitarian aid. For example, it has been estimated that over $8.75 billion was lost to waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement in the Hurricane Katrina relief effort. Non-governmental organizations have in recent years made great efforts to increase participation, accountability and transparency in dealing with aid, yet humanitarian assistance remains a poorly understood process to those meant to be receiving it—much greater investment needs to be made into researching and investing in relevant and effective accountability systems.
However, there is no clear consensus on the trade-offs between speed and control, especially in emergency situations when the humanitarian imperative of saving lives and alleviating suffering may conflict with the time and resources required to minimise corruption risks. Researchers at the Overseas Development Institute have highlighted the need to tackle corruption with, but not limited to, the following methods:
Resist the pressure to spend aid rapidly.
Continue to invest in audit capacity, beyond simple paper trails;
Establish and verify the effectiveness of complaints mechanisms, paying close attention to local power structures, security and cultural factors hindering complaints;
Clearly explain the processes during the targeting and registration stages, highlighting points such as the fact that people should not make payments to be included, photocopy and read aloud any lists prepared by leaders or committees.
Abuse of power by aid workers: Reports of sexual exploitation and abuse in humanitarian response have been reported following humanitarian interventions in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone in 2002, in Central African Republic and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
2021 reporting on a Racial Equity Index report indicated that just under two-thirds of aid workers have experienced racism and 98% of survey respondents witnessed racism.
Contrary practice: Countries or war parties that prevent humanitarian relief are generally under unanimous criticism. Such was the case for the Derg regime, preventing relief to the population of Tigray in the 1980s, and the prevention of relief aid in the Tigray War of 2020–2021 by the Abiy Ahmed Ali regime of Ethiopia was again widely condemned.
Humanitarian aid in conflict zones:
Aid workers: Aid workers are people who are distributed internationally to do humanitarian aid work.
Composition: The total number of humanitarian aid workers around the world has been calculated by ALNAP, a network of agencies working in the Humanitarian System, as 210,800 in 2008. This is made up of roughly 50% from NGOs, 25% from the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 25% from the UN system. In 2010, it was reported that the humanitarian fieldworker population increased by approximately 6% per year over the previous 10 years.
Psychological issues: Aid workers are exposed to tough conditions and have to be flexible, resilient, and responsible in an environment that humans are not psychologically supposed to deal with, in such severe conditions that trauma is common. In recent years, a number of concerns have been raised about the mental health of aid workers.
The most prevalent issue faced by humanitarian aid workers is post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Adjustment to normal life again can be a problem, with feelings such as guilt being caused by the simple knowledge that international aid workers can leave a crisis zone, whilst nationals cannot.
A 2015 survey conducted by The Guardian, with aid workers of the Global Development Professionals Network, revealed that 79 percent experienced mental health issues.
Attacks:
Standards: The humanitarian community has initiated a number of interagency initiatives to improve accountability, quality and performance in humanitarian action. Four of the most widely known initiatives are, ALNAP, the CHS Alliance, the Sphere Project and the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS). Representatives of these initiatives began meeting together on a regular basis in 2003 in order to share common issues and harmonise activities where possible.
Sphere Project: The Sphere Project handbook, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, which was produced by a coalition of leading non-governmental humanitarian agencies, lists the following principles of humanitarian action:
The right to life with dignity
The distinction between combatant and non-combatants
The principle of non-refoulement
Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability: Another humanitarian standard used is the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS). It was approved by the CHS Technical Advisory Group in 2014, and has since been endorsed by many humanitarian actors such as "the Boards of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), People in Aid and the Sphere Project". It comprises nine core standards, which are complemented by detailed guidelines and indicators.
While some critics were questioning whether the sector will truly benefit from the implementation of yet another humanitarian standard, others have praised it for its simplicity. Most notably, it has replaced the core standards of the Sphere Handbook and it is regularly referred to and supported by officials from the United Nations, the EU, various NGOs and institutes.
History:
Origins: The beginnings of organized international humanitarian aid can be traced to the late 19th century. Early campaigns include British aid to distressed populations on the continent and in Sweden during the Napoleonic Wars, and the international relief campaigns during the Great Irish Famine in the 1840s.
In 1854, when the Crimean War began Florence Nightingale and her team of 38 nurses arrived to Barracks Hospital of Scutari where there were thousands of sick and wounded soldiers. Nightingale and her team watched as the understaffed military hospitals struggled to maintain hygienic conditions and meet the needs of patients. Ten times more soldiers were dying of disease than from battle wounds. Typhus, typhoid, cholera and dysentery were common in the army hospitals. Nightingale and her team established a kitchen, laundry and increased hygiene. More nurses arrived to aid in the efforts and the General Hospital at Scutari was able to care for 6,000 patients.
Nightingale's contributions still influence humanitarian aid efforts. This is especially true in regard to Nightingale's use of statistics and measures of mortality and morbidity. Nightingale used principles of new science and statistics to measure progress and plan for her hospital. She kept records of the number and cause of deaths in order to continuously improve the conditions in hospitals. Her findings were that in every 1,000 soldiers, 600 were dying of communicable and infectious diseases. She worked to improve hygiene, nutrition and clean water and decreased the mortality rate from 60% to 42% to 2.2%. All of these improvements are pillars of modern humanitarian intervention. Once she returned to Great Britain she campaigned for the founding of the Royal Commission on the Health of the Army. She advocated for the use of statistics and coxcombs to portray the needs of those in conflict settings.
The most well-known origin story of formalized humanitarian aid is that of Henri Dunant, a Swiss businessman and social activist, who upon seeing the sheer destruction and inhumane abandonment of wounded soldiers from the Battle of Solferino in June 1859, canceled his plans and began a relief response. Despite little to no experience as a medical physician, Dunant worked alongside local volunteers to assist the wounded soldiers from all warring parties, including Austrian, Italian and French casualties, in any way he could including the provision of food, water, and medical supplies. His graphic account of the immense suffering he witnessed, written in his book A Memory of Solferino, became a foundational text to modern humanitarianism.
A Memory of Solferino changed the world in a way that no one, let alone Dunant, could have foreseen nor truly appreciated at the time. To start, Dunant was able to profoundly stir the emotions of his readers by bringing the battle and suffering into their homes, equipping them to understand the current barbaric state of war and treatment of soldiers after they were injured or killed; in of themselves these accounts altered the course of history. Beyond this, in his two-week experience attending to the wounded soldiers of all nationalities, Dunant inadvertently established the vital conceptual pillars of what would later become the International Committee of the Red Cross and International Humanitarian Law: impartiality and neutrality. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Humanitarian aid | His graphic account of the immense suffering he witnessed, written in his book A Memory of Solferino, became a foundational text to modern humanitarianism.
A Memory of Solferino changed the world in a way that no one, let alone Dunant, could have foreseen nor truly appreciated at the time. To start, Dunant was able to profoundly stir the emotions of his readers by bringing the battle and suffering into their homes, equipping them to understand the current barbaric state of war and treatment of soldiers after they were injured or killed; in of themselves these accounts altered the course of history. Beyond this, in his two-week experience attending to the wounded soldiers of all nationalities, Dunant inadvertently established the vital conceptual pillars of what would later become the International Committee of the Red Cross and International Humanitarian Law: impartiality and neutrality. Dunant took these ideas and came up with two more ingenious concepts that would profoundly alter the practice of war; first Dunant envisioned a creation of permanent volunteer relief societies, much like the ad hoc relief group he coordinated in Solferino, to assist wounded soldiers; next Dunant began an effort to call for the adoption of a treaty which would guarantee the protection of wounded soldiers and any who attempted to come to their aid.
After publishing his foundational text in 1862, progress came quickly for Dunant and his efforts to create a permanent relief society and International Humanitarian Law. The embryonic formation of the International Committee of the Red Cross had begun to take shape in 1863 when the private Geneva Society of Public Welfare created a permanent sub-committee called "The International Committee for Aid to Wounded in Situations of War". Composed of five Geneva citizens, this committee endorsed Dunant's vision to legally neutralize medical personnel responding to wounded soldiers. The constitutive conference of this committee in October 1863 created the statutory foundation of the International Committee of the Red Cross in their resolutions regarding national societies, caring for the wounded, their symbol, and most importantly the indispensable neutrality of ambulances, hospitals, medical personnel and the wounded themselves. Beyond this, in order to solidify humanitarian practice, the Geneva Society of Public Welfare hosted a convention between 8 and 22 August 1864 at the Geneva Town Hall with 16 diverse States present, including many governments of Europe, the Ottoman Empire, the United States of America (USA), Brazil and Mexico. This diplomatic conference was exceptional, not due to the number or status of its attendees but rather because of its very raison d'être. Unlike many diplomatic conferences before it, this conference's purpose was not to reach a settlement after a conflict nor to mediate between opposing interests; indeed this conference was to lay down rules for the future of conflict with aims to protect medical services and those wounded in battle.
The first of the renowned Geneva Conventions was signed on 22 August 1864; never before in history has a treaty so greatly impacted how warring parties engage with one another. The basic tenents of the convention outlined the neutrality of medical services, including hospitals, ambulances, and related personnel, the requirement to care for and protect the sick and wounded during the conflict and something of particular symbolic importance to the International Committee of the Red Cross: the Red Cross emblem. For the first time in contemporary history, it was acknowledged by a representative selection of states that war had limits. The significance only grew with time in the revision and adaptation of the Geneva Convention in 1906, 1929 and 1949; additionally, supplementary treaties granted protection to hospital ships, prisoners of war and most importantly to civilians in wartime.
The International Committee of the Red Cross exists to this day as the guardian of International Humanitarian Law and as one of the largest providers of humanitarian aid in the world.
Late 19th century: Internationally organized humanitarian aid efforts continued to be launched for the rest of the century, often with ever-greater logistical acumen and experience. In 1876, after a drought led to cascading crop failures across Northern China, a famine broke out that lasted several years—during its course as many as 10 million people may have died from hunger and disease. British missionary Timothy Richard first called international attention to the famine in Shandong in the summer of 1876 and appealed to the foreign community in Shanghai for money to help the victims. The Shandong Famine Relief Committee was soon established, with those participating including diplomats, businessmen, as well as Christian missionaries, Catholic and Protestant alike. An international network was set up to solicit donations, ultimately bringing in 204,000 silver taels, the equivalent of $7–10 million if valued at 2012 silver prices.
Simultaneously in India, another campaign was launched in response to the Great Famine of 1876–78. Retrospectively, authorities from across the administrative and colonial structures of the British Raj and princely states have been to various degrees blamed for the shocking severity of the famine, with critiques revolving around their laissez-faire attitude and the resulting lack of any adequate policy to address the mass death and suffering across the subcontinent, though meaningful relief measures began to be introduced towards the famine's end. Privately, a famine relief fund was set up in the United Kingdom, raising £426,000 within its first few months of operation.
Early 20th century: Intertwined with and informed efforts related to the profound destruction and disruption caused by World War I, including that of the Red Cross and Red Crescent organization, the Russian famine of 1921–1922, taking place in a country already immensely burdened with systemic agriculture and logistical struggles—then ravaged by successive periods of industrial war, blockade, bad harvests, the Russian Revolution, its resulting political restructuring and social upheaval, and then the insurgency and war communism of the Russian Civil War that followed. In the nascent Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, Vladimir Lenin allowed his personal friend and acclaimed thinker Maxim Gorky to pen an open letter to the international community asking for relief for the Russian people. Despite the ongoing ideological, material, and military conflicts levied by both the new socialist state and the capitalist international community towards one another, efforts to aid the starving population of Soviet Russia were intensive, deliberate, and effective. American efforts, led in large part future president Herbert Hoover, as well as those by the International Committee for Russian Relief joined extant humanitarian organizations in delivering food and medicine to Russia over the course of 1921 and 1922, at some points feeding over 10 millions Russians every day. With the United States left relatively untouched by World War I, its intensive private and public efforts in Russia constituted a clear expression of its new paramount soft power on the international stage, with power projection from European states having been either totally destroyed or severely limited in scope in the years following the conflict.
1980s: Early attempts were in private hands and were limited in their financial and organizational capabilities. It was only in the 1980s, that global news coverage and celebrity endorsement were mobilized to galvanize large-scale government-led famine (and other forms of) relief in response to disasters around the world. The 1983–85 famine in Ethiopia caused upwards of 1 million deaths and was documented by a BBC news crew, with Michael Buerk describing "a biblical famine in the 20th Century" and "the closest thing to hell on Earth".
Live Aid, a 1985 fund-raising effort headed by Bob Geldof induced millions of people in the West to donate money and to urge their governments to participate in the relief effort in Ethiopia. Some of the proceeds also went to the famine hit areas of Eritrea.
2000s: A 2004 reform initiative by Jan Egeland, resulted in the creation of the Humanitarian Cluster System, designed to improve coordination between humanitarian agencies working on the same issues.
2010s:
World Humanitarian Summit: The first global summit on humanitarian diplomacy was held in 2016 in Istanbul, Turkey. An initiative of United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the World Humanitarian Summit included participants from governments, civil society organizations, private organizations, and groups affected by humanitarian need. Issues that were discussed included: preventing and ending conflict, managing crises, and aid financing.
Attendees at the summit agreed a series of reforms on aid spending called the Grand Bargain, including a commitment to spend 25% of aid funds directly through local and national humanitarian aid organizations.
COVID-19 Pandemic
Following the outburst of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019, approximately 216 million individuals required humanitarian aid across 69 countries. Many efforts and reforms of humanitarian assistance were made following the pandemic to the Covid-19 pandemic.
2020s: In 2020, there was an exponential increase in humanitarian needs, with 235 million people, or 1 in 33 individuals globally, requiring humanitarian assistance and protection by the year's end. A report documented an 85% increase in humanitarian air during 2020 then the year before.
See also: Church asylum
Emergency management
Humanitarian corridor
Humanitarian protection
Humanitarian Response Index
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
World Humanitarian Day
References:
Further reading: Götz, Norbert; Brewis, Georgina; Werther, Steffen (2020). Humanitarianism in the Modern World: The Moral Economy of Famine Relief. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108655903. ISBN 978-1-108-65590-3.
James, Eric (2008). Managing Humanitarian Relief: An Operational Guide for NGOs. Rugby: Practical Action. Practical Action/Intermediate Technology. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Humanitarian aid | A report documented an 85% increase in humanitarian air during 2020 then the year before.
See also: Church asylum
Emergency management
Humanitarian corridor
Humanitarian protection
Humanitarian Response Index
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
World Humanitarian Day
References:
Further reading: Götz, Norbert; Brewis, Georgina; Werther, Steffen (2020). Humanitarianism in the Modern World: The Moral Economy of Famine Relief. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108655903. ISBN 978-1-108-65590-3.
James, Eric (2008). Managing Humanitarian Relief: An Operational Guide for NGOs. Rugby: Practical Action. Practical Action/Intermediate Technology. ISBN 978-1-853-39669-4.
Minear, Larry (2002). The Humanitarian Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press. ISBN 1-56549-149-1.
Waters, Tony (2001). Bureaucratizing the Good Samaritan: The Limitations of Humanitarian Relief Operations. Boulder: Westview Press. ISBN 978-0-813-36790-3.
External links: The Humanitarian Organisations Dataset (HOD): 2,505 organizations active in the humanitarian sector
"Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance". alnap.org.
"APCN (Africa Partner Country Network)". apan.org.
"CE-DAT: The Complex Emergency Database". cedat.org.
"Centre for Safety and Development". centreforsafety.org.
"The Code of Conduct: humanitarian principles in practice". International Committee of the Red Cross. 20 September 2004.
"Doctors of the World". medecinsdumonde.org.
"EM-DAT: The International Disaster Database". emdat.be.
"The New Humanitarian". thenewhumanitarian.org.
"Protection work during armed conflict and other situations of violence: professional standards". International Committee of the Red Cross. December 2009.
"The Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine". CDHAM.org.
"The ODI Humanitarian Policy Group". odi.org.uk. Archived from the original on 8 February 2006. Retrieved 7 March 2006.
"UN ReliefWeb". reliefweb.int.
Critiques of humanitarian aid: Rieff, David; Myers, Joanne J. "A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis". Archived from the original on 30 March 2007. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | ISBN (identifier) | History: The Standard Book Number (SBN) is a commercial system using nine-digit code numbers to identify books. In 1965, British bookseller and stationers WHSmith announced plans to implement a standard numbering system for its books. They hired consultants to work on their behalf, and the system was devised by Gordon Foster, emeritus professor of statistics at Trinity College Dublin. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Technical Committee on Documentation sought to adapt the British SBN for international use. The ISBN identification format was conceived in 1967 in the United Kingdom by David Whitaker (regarded as the "Father of the ISBN") and in 1968 in the United States by Emery Koltay (who later became director of the U.S. ISBN agency R. R. Bowker).
The 10-digit ISBN format was developed by the ISO and was published in 1970 as international standard ISO 2108. The United Kingdom continued to use the nine-digit SBN code until 1974. ISO has appointed the International ISBN Agency as the registration authority for ISBN worldwide and the ISBN Standard is developed under the control of ISO Technical Committee 46/Subcommittee 9 TC 46/SC 9. The ISO on-line facility only refers back to 1978.
An SBN may be converted to an ISBN by prefixing the digit "0". For example, the second edition of Mr. J. G. Reeder Returns, published by Hodder in 1965, has "SBN 340 01381 8", where "340" indicates the publisher, "01381" is the serial number assigned by the publisher, and "8" is the check digit. By prefixing a zero, this can be converted to ISBN 0-340-01381-8; the check digit does not need to be re-calculated. Some publishers, such as Ballantine Books, would sometimes use 12-digit SBNs where the last three digits indicated the price of the book; for example, Woodstock Handmade Houses had a 12-digit Standard Book Number of 345-24223-8-595 (valid SBN: 345-24223-8, ISBN: 0-345-24223-8), and it cost US$5.95.
Since 1 January 2007, ISBNs have contained thirteen digits, a format that is compatible with "Bookland" European Article Numbers, which have 13 digits.
The United States, with 3.9 million registered ISBNs in 2020, was by far the biggest user of the ISBN identifier in 2020, followed by the Republic of Korea (329,582), Germany (284,000), China (263,066), the UK (188,553) and Indonesia (144,793). Lifetime ISBNs registered in the United States are over 39 million as of 2020.
Overview: A separate ISBN is assigned to each edition and variation (except reprintings) of a publication. For example, an ebook, audiobook, paperback, and hardcover edition of the same book must each have a different ISBN assigned to it.: 12 The ISBN is thirteen digits long if assigned on or after 1 January 2007, and ten digits long if assigned before 2007. An International Standard Book Number consists of four parts (if it is a 10-digit ISBN) or five parts (for a 13-digit ISBN).
Section 5 of the International ISBN Agency's official user manual: 11 describes the structure of the 13-digit ISBN, as follows:
for a 13-digit ISBN, a prefix element – a GS1 prefix: so far 978 or 979 have been made available by GS1,
the registration group element (language-sharing country group, individual country or territory),
the registrant element,
the publication element, and
a checksum character or check digit.
A 13-digit ISBN can be separated into its parts (prefix element, registration group, registrant, publication and check digit), and when this is done it is customary to separate the parts with hyphens or spaces. Separating the parts (registration group, registrant, publication and check digit) of a 10-digit ISBN is also done with either hyphens or spaces. Figuring out how to correctly separate a given ISBN is complicated, because most of the parts do not use a fixed number of digits.
Issuing process: ISBN issuance is country-specific, in that ISBNs are issued by the ISBN registration agency that is responsible for that country or territory regardless of the publication language. The ranges of ISBNs assigned to any particular country are based on the publishing profile of the country concerned, and so the ranges will vary depending on the number of books and the number, type, and size of publishers that are active. Some ISBN registration agencies are based in national libraries or within ministries of culture and thus may receive direct funding from the government to support their services. In other cases, the ISBN registration service is provided by organisations such as bibliographic data providers that are not government funded.
A full directory of ISBN agencies is available on the International ISBN Agency website. A list for a few countries is given below:
Australia – Thorpe-Bowker
Brazil – The National Library of Brazil; (Up to 28 February 2020)
Brazil – Câmara Brasileira do Livro (From 1 March 2020)
Canada – English Library and Archives Canada, a government agency; French Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec;
Colombia – Cámara Colombiana del Libro, an NGO
Hong Kong – Books Registration Office (BRO), under the Hong Kong Public Libraries
Iceland – Landsbókasafn (National and University Library of Iceland)
India – The Raja Rammohun Roy National Agency for ISBN (Book Promotion and Copyright Division), under Department of Higher Education, a constituent of the Ministry of Human Resource Development
Israel – The Israel Center for Libraries
Italy – EDISER srl, owned by Associazione Italiana Editori (Italian Publishers Association)
Kenya – National Library of Kenya
Latvia - Latvian ISBN Agency
Lebanon – Lebanese ISBN Agency
Maldives – The National Bureau of Classification (NBC)
Malta – The National Book Council (Maltese: Il-Kunsill Nazzjonali tal-Ktieb)
Morocco – The National Library of Morocco
New Zealand – The National Library of New Zealand
Nigeria – National Library of Nigeria
Pakistan – National Library of Pakistan
Philippines – National Library of the Philippines
South Africa – National Library of South Africa
Spain – Spanish ISBN Agency – Agencia del ISBN
Turkey – General Directorate of Libraries and Publications, a branch of the Ministry of Culture
United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland – Nielsen Book Services Ltd, part of NIQ
United States – R. R. Bowker
Registration group element: The ISBN registration group element is a 1-to-5-digit number that is valid within a single prefix element (i.e. one of 978 or 979),: 11 and can be separated between hyphens, such as "978-1-...". Registration groups have primarily been allocated within the 978 prefix element. The single-digit registration groups within the 978-prefix element are: 0 or 1 for English-speaking countries; 2 for French-speaking countries; 3 for German-speaking countries; 4 for Japan; 5 for Russian-speaking countries; and 7 for People's Republic of China. Example 5-digit registration groups are 99936 and 99980, for Bhutan. The allocated registration groups are: 0–5, 600–631, 65, 7, 80–94, 950–989, 9910–9989, and 99901–99993. Books published in rare languages typically have longer group elements.
Within the 979 prefix element, the registration group 0 is reserved for compatibility with International Standard Music Numbers (ISMNs), but such material is not actually assigned an ISBN. The registration groups within prefix element 979 that have been assigned are 8 for the United States of America, 10 for France, 11 for the Republic of Korea, and 12 for Italy.
The original 9-digit standard book number (SBN) had no registration group identifier, but prefixing a zero to a 9-digit SBN creates a valid 10-digit ISBN.
Registrant element: The national ISBN agency assigns the registrant element (cf. Category:ISBN agencies) and an accompanying series of ISBNs within that registrant element to the publisher; the publisher then allocates one of the ISBNs to each of its books. In most countries, a book publisher is not legally required to assign an ISBN, although most large bookstores only handle publications that have ISBNs assigned to them.
The International ISBN Agency maintains the details of over one million ISBN prefixes and publishers in the Global Register of Publishers. This database is freely searchable over the internet.
Publishers receive blocks of ISBNs, with larger blocks allotted to publishers expecting to need them; a small publisher may receive ISBNs of one or more digits for the registration group identifier, several digits for the registrant, and a single digit for the publication element. Once that block of ISBNs is used, the publisher may receive another block of ISBNs, with a different registrant element. Consequently, a publisher may have different allotted registrant elements. There also may be more than one registration group identifier used in a country. This might occur once all the registrant elements from a particular registration group have been allocated to publishers. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | ISBN (identifier) | In most countries, a book publisher is not legally required to assign an ISBN, although most large bookstores only handle publications that have ISBNs assigned to them.
The International ISBN Agency maintains the details of over one million ISBN prefixes and publishers in the Global Register of Publishers. This database is freely searchable over the internet.
Publishers receive blocks of ISBNs, with larger blocks allotted to publishers expecting to need them; a small publisher may receive ISBNs of one or more digits for the registration group identifier, several digits for the registrant, and a single digit for the publication element. Once that block of ISBNs is used, the publisher may receive another block of ISBNs, with a different registrant element. Consequently, a publisher may have different allotted registrant elements. There also may be more than one registration group identifier used in a country. This might occur once all the registrant elements from a particular registration group have been allocated to publishers.
By using variable block lengths, registration agencies are able to customise the allocations of ISBNs that they make to publishers. For example, a large publisher may be given a block of ISBNs where fewer digits are allocated for the registrant element and many digits are allocated for the publication element; likewise, countries publishing many titles have few allocated digits for the registration group identifier and many for the registrant and publication elements. Here are some sample ISBN-10 codes, illustrating block length variations.
English-language pattern: English-language registration group elements are 0 and 1 (2 of more than 220 registration group elements). These two registration group elements are divided into registrant elements in a systematic pattern, which allows their length to be determined, as follows:
Check digits: A check digit is a form of redundancy check used for error detection, the decimal equivalent of a binary check bit. It consists of a single digit computed from the other digits in the number. The method for the 10-digit ISBN is an extension of that for SBNs, so the two systems are compatible; an SBN prefixed with a zero (the 10-digit ISBN) will give the same check digit as the SBN without the zero. The check digit is base eleven, and can be an integer between 0 and 9, or an 'X'. The system for 13-digit ISBNs is not compatible with SBNs and will, in general, give a different check digit from the corresponding 10-digit ISBN, so does not provide the same protection against transposition. This is because the 13-digit code was required to be compatible with the EAN format, and hence could not contain the letter 'X'.
ISBN-10 check digits: According to the 2001 edition of the International ISBN Agency's official user manual, the ISBN-10 check digit (which is the last digit of the 10-digit ISBN) must range from 0 to 10 (the symbol 'X' is used for 10), and must be such that the sum of the ten digits, each multiplied by its (integer) weight, descending from 10 to 1, is a multiple of 11. That is, if xi is the ith digit, then x10 must be chosen such that:
For example, for an ISBN-10 of 0-306-40615-2:
Formally, using modular arithmetic, this is rendered
It is also true for ISBN-10s that the sum of all ten digits, each multiplied by its weight in ascending order from 1 to 10, is a multiple of 11. For this example:
Formally, this is rendered
The two most common errors in handling an ISBN (e.g. when typing it or writing it down) are a single altered digit or the transposition of adjacent digits. It can be proven mathematically that all pairs of valid ISBN-10s differ in at least two digits. It can also be proven that there are no pairs of valid ISBN-10s with eight identical digits and two transposed digits (these proofs are true because the ISBN is less than eleven digits long and because 11 is a prime number). The ISBN check digit method therefore ensures that it will always be possible to detect these two most common types of error, i.e., if either of these types of error has occurred, the result will never be a valid ISBN—the sum of the digits multiplied by their weights will never be a multiple of 11. However, if the error were to occur in the publishing house and remain undetected, the book would be issued with an invalid ISBN.
In contrast, it is possible for other types of error, such as two altered non-transposed digits, or three altered digits, to result in a valid ISBN (although it is still unlikely).
ISBN-10 check digit calculation: Each of the first nine digits of the 10-digit ISBN—excluding the check digit itself—is multiplied by its (integer) weight, descending from 10 to 2, and the sum of these nine products found. The value of the check digit is simply the one number between 0 and 10 which, when added to this sum, means the total is a multiple of 11.
For example, the check digit for an ISBN-10 of 0-306-40615-? is calculated as follows:
Adding 2 to 130 gives a multiple of 11 (because 132 = 12×11)—this is the only number between 0 and 10 which does so. Therefore, the check digit has to be 2, and the complete sequence is ISBN 0-306-40615-2. If the value of
x
10
{\displaystyle x_{10}}
required to satisfy this condition is 10, then an 'X' should be used.
Alternatively, modular arithmetic is convenient for calculating the check digit using modulus 11. The remainder of this sum when it is divided by 11 (i.e. its value modulo 11), is computed. This remainder plus the check digit must equal either 0 or 11. Therefore, the check digit is (11 minus the remainder of the sum of the products modulo 11) modulo 11. Taking the remainder modulo 11 a second time accounts for the possibility that the first remainder is 0. Without the second modulo operation, the calculation could result in a check digit value of 11 − 0 = 11, which is invalid. (Strictly speaking, the first "modulo 11" is not needed, but it may be considered to simplify the calculation.)
For example, the check digit for the ISBN of 0-306-40615-? is calculated as follows:
Thus the check digit is 2.
It is possible to avoid the multiplications in a software implementation by using two accumulators. Repeatedly adding t into s computes the necessary multiples:
The modular reduction can be done once at the end, as shown above (in which case s could hold a value as large as 496, for the invalid ISBN 99999-999-9-X), or s and t could be reduced by a conditional subtract after each addition.
ISBN-13 check digit calculation: Appendix 1 of the International ISBN Agency's official user manual: 33 describes how the 13-digit ISBN check digit is calculated. The ISBN-13 check digit, which is the last digit of the ISBN, must range from 0 to 9 and must be such that the sum of all the thirteen digits, each multiplied by its (integer) weight, alternating between 1 and 3, is a multiple of 10. As ISBN-13 is a subset of EAN-13, the algorithm for calculating the check digit is exactly the same for both.
Formally, using modular arithmetic, this is rendered:
The calculation of an ISBN-13 check digit begins with the first twelve digits of the 13-digit ISBN (thus excluding the check digit itself). Each digit, from left to right, is alternately multiplied by 1 or 3, then those products are summed modulo 10 to give a value ranging from 0 to 9. Subtracted from 10, that leaves a result from 1 to 10. A zero replaces a ten, so, in all cases, a single check digit results.
For example, the ISBN-13 check digit of 978-0-306-40615-? is calculated as follows:
s = 9×1 + 7×3 + 8×1 + 0×3 + 3×1 + 0×3 + 6×1 + 4×3 + 0×1 + 6×3 + 1×1 + 5×3
= 9 + 21 + 8 + 0 + 3 + 0 + 6 + 12 + 0 + 18 + 1 + 15
= 93
93 / 10 = 9 remainder 3
10 – 3 = 7
Thus, the check digit is 7, and the complete sequence is ISBN 978-0-306-40615-7.
In general, the ISBN check digit is calculated as follows.
Let
Then
This check system—similar to the UPC check digit formula—does not catch all errors of adjacent digit transposition. Specifically, if the difference between two adjacent digits is 5, the check digit will not catch their transposition. For instance, the above example allows this situation with the 6 followed by a 1. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | ISBN (identifier) | In general, the ISBN check digit is calculated as follows.
Let
Then
This check system—similar to the UPC check digit formula—does not catch all errors of adjacent digit transposition. Specifically, if the difference between two adjacent digits is 5, the check digit will not catch their transposition. For instance, the above example allows this situation with the 6 followed by a 1. The correct order contributes 3 × 6 + 1 × 1 = 19 to the sum; while, if the digits are transposed (1 followed by a 6), the contribution of those two digits will be 3 × 1 + 1 × 6 = 9. However, 19 and 9 are congruent modulo 10, and so produce the same, final result: both ISBNs will have a check digit of 7. The ISBN-10 formula uses the prime modulus 11 which avoids this blind spot, but requires more than the digits 0–9 to express the check digit.
Additionally, if the sum of the 2nd, 4th, 6th, 8th, 10th, and 12th digits is tripled then added to the remaining digits (1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th, 11th, and 13th), the total will always be divisible by 10 (i.e., end in 0).
ISBN-10 to ISBN-13 conversion: A 10-digit ISBN is converted to a 13-digit ISBN by prepending "978" to the ISBN-10 and recalculating the final checksum digit using the ISBN-13 algorithm. The reverse process can also be performed, but not for numbers commencing with a prefix other than 978, which have no 10-digit equivalent.
Errors in usage: Publishers and libraries have varied policies about the use of the ISBN check digit. Publishers sometimes fail to check the correspondence of a book title and its ISBN before publishing it; that failure causes book identification problems for libraries, booksellers, and readers. For example, ISBN 0-590-76484-5 is shared by two books—Ninja gaiden: a novel based on the best-selling game by Tecmo (1990) and Wacky laws (1997), both published by Scholastic.
Most libraries and booksellers display the book record for an invalid ISBN issued by the publisher. The Library of Congress catalogue contains books published with invalid ISBNs, which it usually tags with the phrase "Cancelled ISBN". The International Union Library Catalog (a.k.a., WorldCat OCLC—Online Computer Library Center system) often indexes by invalid ISBNs, if the book is indexed in that way by a member library.
eISBN: Only the term "ISBN" should be used; the terms "eISBN" and "e-ISBN" have historically been sources of confusion and should be avoided. If a book exists in one or more digital (e-book) formats, each of those formats must have its own ISBN. In other words, each of the three separate EPUB, Amazon Kindle, and PDF formats of a particular book will have its own specific ISBN. They should not share the ISBN of the paper version, and there is no generic "eISBN" which encompasses all the e-book formats for a title.
EAN format used in barcodes, and upgrading: The barcodes on a book's back cover (or inside a mass-market paperback book's front cover) are EAN-13; they may have a separate barcode encoding five digits called an EAN-5 for the currency and the recommended retail price. For 10-digit ISBNs, the number "978", the Bookland "country code", is prefixed to the ISBN in the barcode data, and the check digit is recalculated according to the EAN-13 formula (modulo 10, 1× and 3× weighting on alternating digits).
Partly because of an expected shortage in certain ISBN categories, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) decided to migrate to a 13-digit ISBN (ISBN-13). The process began on 1 January 2005 and was planned to conclude on 1 January 2007. As of 2011, all the 13-digit ISBNs began with 978. As the 978 ISBN supply is exhausted, the 979 prefix was introduced. Part of the 979 prefix is reserved for use with the Musicland code for musical scores with an ISMN. The 10-digit ISMN codes differed visually as they began with an "M" letter; the bar code represents the "M" as a zero, and for checksum purposes it counted as a 3. All ISMNs are now thirteen digits commencing 979-0; 979-1 to 979-9 will be used by ISBN.
Publisher identification code numbers are unlikely to be the same in the 978 and 979 ISBNs, likewise, there is no guarantee that language area code numbers will be the same. Moreover, the 10-digit ISBN check digit generally is not the same as the 13-digit ISBN check digit. Because the GTIN-13 is part of the Global Trade Item Number (GTIN) system (that includes the GTIN-14, the GTIN-12, and the GTIN-8), the 13-digit ISBN falls within the 14-digit data field range.
Barcode format compatibility is maintained, because (aside from the group breaks) the ISBN-13 barcode format is identical to the EAN barcode format of existing 10-digit ISBNs. So, migration to an EAN-based system allows booksellers the use of a single numbering system for both books and non-book products that is compatible with existing ISBN based data, with only minimal changes to information technology systems. Hence, many booksellers (e.g., Barnes & Noble) migrated to EAN barcodes as early as March 2005. Although many American and Canadian booksellers were able to read EAN-13 barcodes before 2005, most general retailers could not read them. The upgrading of the UPC barcode system to full EAN-13, in 2005, eased migration to the ISBN in North America.
See also: ASIN (Amazon Standard Identification Number)
BICI (Book Item and Component Identifier)
Book sources search – a Wikipedia resource that allows search by ISBNs
CODEN (serial publication identifier currently used by libraries; replaced by the ISSN for new works)
DOI (Digital Object Identifier)
ESTC (English Short Title Catalogue)
ISAN (International Standard Audiovisual Number)
ISRC (International Standard Recording Code)
ISTC (International Standard Text Code)
ISWC (International Standard Musical Work Code)
ISSN (International Standard Serial Number)
ISWN (International Standard Wine Number)
LCCN (Library of Congress Control Number)
License number (East German books) (Book identification system used between 1951 and 1990 in the former GDR)
List of group-0 ISBN publisher codes
List of group-1 ISBN publisher codes
List of ISBN registration groups
SICI (Serial Item and Contribution Identifier)
VD 16 (Verzeichnis der im deutschen Sprachbereich erschienenen Drucke des 16. Jahrhunderts, "Bibliography of Books Printed in the German Speaking Countries of the Sixteenth Century")
VD 17 (Verzeichnis der im deutschen Sprachraum erschienenen Drucke des 17. Jahrhunderts, "Bibliography of Books Printed in the German Speaking Countries of the Seventeenth Century")
Explanatory notes:
References:
External links:
ISO 2108:2017 – International Standard Book Number (ISBN)
International ISBN Agency – coordinates and supervises the worldwide use of the ISBN system
Numerical List of Group Identifiers – List of language/region prefixes
Free conversion tool: ISBN-10 to ISBN-13 & ISBN-13 to ISBN-10 from the ISBN agency. Also shows correct hyphenation & verifies if ISBNs are valid or not.
"Guidelines for the Implementation of 13-Digit ISBNs" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 12 September 2004.
RFC 3187 – Using International Standard Book Numbers as Uniform Resource Names (URN)
Worldwide Auto-Converter at Library of Congress |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Individual movement techniques | See also: Tactic (method)
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Industrial warfare | Total war: One of the main features of industrial warfare is the concept of "total war". The term was coined during World War I by Erich Ludendorff (and again in his 1935 book Total War), which called for the complete mobilization and subordination of all resources, including policy and social systems, to the German war effort. It has also come to mean waging warfare with absolute ruthlessness, and its most identifiable legacy today has been the reintroduction of civilians and civilian infrastructure as targets in destroying the enemy's ability to engage in war.
There are several reasons for the rise of total warfare in the 19th century. The main one is industrialization. As countries' capital and natural resources grew, it became clear that some forms of warfare demanded more resources than others. Consequently, the greater cost of warfare became evident. An industrialized nation could distinguish and then choose the intensity of warfare that it wished to engage in.
Additionally, warfare was becoming more mechanized and required greater infrastructure. Combatants could no longer live off the land, but required an extensive support network of people behind the lines to keep them fed and armed. This required the mobilization of the home front. Modern concepts like propaganda were first used to boost production and maintain morale, while rationing took place to provide more war material.
The earliest modern example of total war was the American Civil War. Union generals Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman were convinced that, if the North was to be victorious, the Confederacy's strategic, economic, and psychological ability to wage war had to be definitively crushed. They believed that to break the backbone of the South, the North had to employ scorched earth tactics, or as Sherman called it, "Hard War". Sherman's advance through Georgia and the Carolinas was characterized by the widespread destruction of civilian supplies and infrastructure. In contrast to later conflicts, the damage done by Sherman was almost entirely limited to property destruction. In Georgia alone, Sherman claimed he and his men had caused $100,000,000 in damages.
Conscription: Conscription is the compulsory enrollment of civilians into military service. Conscription allowed the French Republic to form La Grande Armée, what Napoleon Bonaparte called "the nation in arms", which successfully battled smaller, professional European armies.
Conscription, particularly when the conscripts are being sent to foreign wars that do not directly affect the security of the nation, has historically been highly politically contentious in democracies. For instance, during World War I, bitter political disputes broke out in Canada (see Conscription Crisis of 1917), Newfoundland, Australia and New Zealand (see Compulsory Military Training) over conscription. Canada also had a political dispute over conscription during World War II (see Conscription Crisis of 1944). Both South Africa and Australia put limits on where conscripts could fight in WWII. Similarly, mass protests against conscription to fight the Vietnam War occurred in several countries in the late 1960s.
In developed nations, the increasing emphasis on technological firepower and better-trained fighting forces, the sheer unlikelihood of a conventional military assault on most developed nations, as well as memories of widespread controversies over the Vietnam War, make mass conscription less likely, but still possible, in the future.
Russia, as well as many smaller nations such as Switzerland, retain mainly conscript armies.
Transportation:
Land: Prior to the invention of the motorized transport, combatants were transported by wagons, horses and by marching. With the advent of locomotives, large groups of combatants, supplies, and equipment were able to be transported faster and in larger numbers. To counter this, an opposing force would destroy rail lines to hinder their enemies' movements. General Sherman's men during the American Civil War, would destroy tracks, heat the rails, and wrap them around trees.
The mass transportation of combatants was further revolutionized with the advent of the internal combustion engine and the automobile. Combined with the widespread use of the machine gun, the horse, after millennia of use, was finally supplanted in its war time role. During both WWI and WWII, trucks were used to carry combatants and materiel, while cars and jeeps were used to scout enemy positions.
The mechanization of infantry occurred during WWII. The tank, a product of World War I independently invented by the British and French to break through trenches while withstanding machine gun fire, while discounted by many, came into its own. Tanks evolved from thin-skinned, lumbering vehicles into fast, powerful war machines of various types that dominated the battlefield and allowed the Germans to conquer most of Europe. As a result of the tank's evolution, a number of armored transport vehicles appeared, such as armoured personnel carriers and amphibious vehicles.
After the war ended, armored transports continued to evolve. The armored car and train declined in use, largely becoming relegated to military and civilian use as transportation for VIPs. Infantry fighting vehicles rose to prominence with the creation of the Soviet BMP-1. IFVs are a more combat capable version of the APC, with heavier armaments (such as autocannons), while still retaining the ability to transport combatants into and out of battles.
Sea: Sealift is a military logistics term referring to the use of cargo ships for the deployment of military assets, such as weaponry, military personnel, and materiel supplies. It complements other means of transport, such as strategic airlifters, in order to enhance a state's ability to project power. A state's sealift capabilities may include civilian-operated ships that normally operate by contract, but which can be chartered or commandeered during times of military necessity to supplement government-owned naval fleets.
During WWI, the United States bought, borrowed or commandeered vessels of various types, ranging from pleasure craft to ocean liners to transport the American Expeditionary Force to Europe. Many of these ships were scrapped, sold or returned to their owners after the war.
Air: There are two different kinds of airlifts in warfare, a strategic airlift and a tactical airlift. A strategic airlift is the use transporting of weapons, supplies and personnel over long distances (from a base in one country to a base in another country for example) using large cargo aircraft. This contrasts with tactical airlifts, which involves transporting the same above items within a theater of operations. This usually involves cargo planes with shorter ranges and slower speeds, but higher maneuverability.
Communications: Cryptography
Homing pigeon/War pigeon
Joint Army/Navy Phonetic Alphabet
Message precedence
Semaphore (communication)
Signal Corps
Smoke signal
Telegraphy
Equipment: Aldis lamp
International maritime signal flags
Land warfare: Land warfare, as the name implies, takes place on land. The most common type of warfare, it can encompass several modes and locales, including urban, arctic, and mountain warfare.
The early part of the 19th century from 1815 to 1848 saw a long period of peace in Europe, accompanied by extraordinary industrial expansion. The industrial age brought about various technological advancements, each with their own implication. Land warfare moved from visual-range and semi person-to-person combat of the previous era, to indiscriminate and impersonal, "beyond visual range" warfare. The Crimean War (1853–1856) saw the introduction of trench warfare, long-range artillery, railroads, the telegraph, and the rifle. The mechanized mass-destruction of enemy combatants grew ever more deadly. In WWI (1914–1918) machine-guns, barbed wire, chemical weapons, and land-mines entered the battlefield. The deadly stalemated trench-warfare stage was finally passed with the advent of the modern armored tank late in WWI.
One major trend involved the transition away massed infantry fire and human waves to more refined tactics. This became possible with the superseding of earlier weapons like the highly inaccurate musket.
Technological advances: Rifling refers to the act of adding spiral grooves to the inside of the barrel of a firearm. The grooves would cause a projectile to spin as it traveled down the barrel, improving range and accuracy. Once rifling became easier and practical, a new type of firearm was introduced, the rifle. It gave combatants the ability to specifically target an enemy combatant, rather than have large numbers of combatants fire in a general direction. It effectively broke up groups of combatants into smaller more maneuverable units.
Artillery are large guns designed to fire large projectiles a great distance. Early artillery pieces were large and cumbersome with slow rates of fire. This reduced their use to sieges, by both defenders and attackers. With the advent of the industrial age and various technological advancements, lighter, yet powerful and accurate artillery pieces were produced. This gave rise to field artillery which were used on a tactical level to support troops.
Machine guns are fully automatic guns. In this era of warfare they only existed as mounted support weapons, as automatic firearms were not yet developed. Early machine guns as invented by Richard Gatling, were hand cranked but evolved into truly automatic machine guns by Maxim at the end of the era. Machine guns were valued for their ability to smash infantry formations, especially attacking enemy formations when they were dense. This, along with effective field artillery, changed tactics drastically.
Static defense: Static defenses evolved from the use of permanent fortifications that were direct descendants of medieval castles. As artillery improved in destructive power and penetrative ability, more modern fortifications were developed, using first thicker layers of stone, then concrete and steel. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Industrial warfare | With the advent of the industrial age and various technological advancements, lighter, yet powerful and accurate artillery pieces were produced. This gave rise to field artillery which were used on a tactical level to support troops.
Machine guns are fully automatic guns. In this era of warfare they only existed as mounted support weapons, as automatic firearms were not yet developed. Early machine guns as invented by Richard Gatling, were hand cranked but evolved into truly automatic machine guns by Maxim at the end of the era. Machine guns were valued for their ability to smash infantry formations, especially attacking enemy formations when they were dense. This, along with effective field artillery, changed tactics drastically.
Static defense: Static defenses evolved from the use of permanent fortifications that were direct descendants of medieval castles. As artillery improved in destructive power and penetrative ability, more modern fortifications were developed, using first thicker layers of stone, then concrete and steel. After naval artillery developed the turret – a moving cannon platform – land fortifications started to use this method as well. Between the World Wars, France built an "impregnable" underground steel and concrete fortification that ran the length of the German-French border. This Maginot Line failed to stop German tanks in 1940: they bypassed the fortifications by invading through neighboring Belgium.
Temporary fortifications: As artillery and rifles allowed the killing of enemy personnel at a longer effective range, soldiers started to dig into temporary fortifications. These included massive trenches as used in WWI, and individual soldier-sized "fox holes" which became more common in WWII.
Maneuver warfare: Maneuver had existed throughout military history – from soldiers marching on the field to using horses in cavalry formations. It was not until the advent of mechanized transport over unprepared terrain, such as fields and deserts, using tanks and armored vehicles, that "maneuver warfare" became feasible. First used by the German army in Poland and France in WWII, Blitzkrieg or "lightning war" saw whole armies moved rapidly on tracked and armored fighting vehicles. During the war airborne movement was used, with soldiers dropped to the battlefield by parachute by both the Germans and the Allies. After WWII, developments in helicopters brought a more practical way to transport troops by air.
Armoured warfare
Blitzkrieg
Deep operations
Naval warfare:
Ironclads and Dreadnoughts: The period after the Napoleonic Wars was one of intensive experimentation with new technology; steam power for ships appeared in the 1810s, improved metallurgy and machining technique produced larger and deadlier guns, and the development of explosive shells, capable of demolishing a wooden ship at a single blow, in turn required the addition of iron armor, which led to ironclads.
The famous battle of the CSS Virginia and USS Monitor in the American Civil War was the duel of ironclads that symbolized the changing times. Although the battle was inconclusive, nations around the world subsequently raced to convert their fleets to iron, as ironclads had shown themselves to be clearly superior to wooden ships in their ability to withstand enemy fire.
In the late 19th century, naval warfare was revolutionized by Alfred Thayer Mahan's book The Influence of Sea Power upon History. Mahan argued that in the Anglo-French wars of the 18th and 19th centuries, domination of the sea was the deciding factor in the outcome, and therefore control of seaborne commerce was critical to military victory. Mahan argued that the best way to achieve naval domination was through large fleets of concentrated capital ships, as opposed to commerce raiders. His books were closely studied in all the Great Powers, influencing their naval arms race in the years prior to WWI.
As the century came to a close, the familiar modern battleship began to emerge; a steel-armored ship, entirely dependent on steam turbines, and sporting a number of large shell guns mounted in turrets arranged along the centerline of the main deck. The ultimate design was reached in 1906 with HMS Dreadnought, which entirely dispensed with smaller guns, her main guns being sufficient to sink any existing ship of the time.
The Russo-Japanese War and particularly the Battle of Tsushima in 1905 was the first test of the new concepts, resulting in a stunning Japanese victory and the destruction of dozens of Russian ships. World War I pitted the old Royal Navy against the new navy of Imperial Germany, culminating in the 1916 Battle of Jutland. Following the war, many nations agreed to limit the size of their fleets in the Washington Naval Treaty and scrapped many of their battleships and cruisers.
Growing tensions of the 1930s restarted the building programs, with even larger ships than before: the Japanese battleship Yamato, launched in 1941, displaced 72,000 tons and mounted 18-inch (46 cm) guns. This marked the climax of "big gun" warfare, as aircraft would gradually play a larger role in warfare. By the 1960s, battleships had all-but vanished from the fleets of the world.
Aircraft carriers: Between the world wars, the first aircraft carriers appeared, initially as a way to circumvent the tonnage limits of the Washington Naval Treaty (many of the first carriers were converted battlecruisers). Though several ships had previously been designed to launch aircraft, the first true "flat-top" carrier was HMS Argus, launched in December 1917.
By the start of WWII, aircraft carriers typically carried three types of aircraft: torpedo bombers, which could also be used for conventional horizontal bombing and reconnaissance; dive bombers, also used for reconnaissance; and fighters for fleet defence and bomber escort duties. Because of the restricted space on aircraft carriers, these aircraft were almost always small, single-engined warplanes. The first true demonstration of naval air power was the victory of the Royal Navy at the Battle of Taranto in 1940, which set the stage for Japan's much larger and more famous attack on Pearl Harbor the following year.
Two days after Pearl Harbor, the sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, marked the beginning of the end for the battleship era. Following WWII, aircraft carriers continued to remain key to navies throughout the latter 20th century, moving in the 1950s to jets launched from Supercarriers, behemoths which could displace as much as 100,000 tons.
Submarines: Just as important was the development of submarines to travel underneath the sea, at first for short dives, then later to be able to spend weeks or months underwater powered by a nuclear reactor. The first successful submarine attack in wartime was in 1864 by the Confederate submarine H.L. Hunley which sank the frigate USS Housatonic.
In both World Wars, submarines primarily exerted their power by sinking merchant ships using torpedoes, in addition to attacks on warships. All nations practiced unrestricted submarine warfare in which submarines sank merchant ships without warning, but the only successful campaign during this period was America's submarine war against Japan during the Pacific War. In the 1950s the Cold War inspired the development of ballistic missile submarines, each one loaded with dozens of nuclear-armed missiles and with orders to launch them from sea should the other nation attack.
Aerial warfare: The first use of airplanes in war was the Italo-Turkish War of 1911, when the Italians carried out several reconnaissance and bombing missions. During WWI both sides made use of balloons and airplanes for reconnaissance and directing artillery fire. To prevent enemy reconnaissance, some airplane pilots began attacking other airplanes and balloons, first with small arms carried in the cockpit, and later with machine guns mounted on the aircraft. Both sides also made use of aircraft for bombing, strafing and dropping of propaganda leaflets.
The German air force carried out the first terror bombing raids, using Zeppelins to drop bombs on Britain. By the end of the war airplanes had become specialised into bombers, fighters, and surveillance aircraft. Most of these airplanes were biplanes with wooden frames, canvas skins, wire rigging and air-cooled engines.
Between 1918 and 1939, aircraft technology developed very rapidly. By 1939 military biplanes were in the process of being replaced with metal framed monoplanes, often with stressed skins and liquid cooled engines. Top speeds had tripled; altitudes doubled (and oxygen masks become commonplace); ranges and payloads of bombers increased enormously.
Some theorists, most famously Hugh Trenchard and Giulio Douhet, believed that aircraft would become the dominant military arm in the future, and argued that future wars would be won entirely by the destruction of the enemy's military and industrial capability from the air. This concept was called strategic bombing. Douhet also argued in The Command of the Air (1921) that future military leaders could avoid falling into bloody World War I-style trench stalemates by using aviation to strike past the enemy's forces directly at their vulnerable civilian population, which Douhet believed would cause these populations to rise up in revolt to stop the bombing.
Others, such as Billy Mitchell, saw the potential of air power to neutralize the striking power of naval surface fleets. Mitchell himself proved the vulnerability of capital ships to aircraft was finally in 1921 when he commanded a squadron of bombers that sank the ex-German battleship SMS Ostfriesland with aerial bombs. (See Industrial warfare#Naval warfare)
During WWII, there was a debate between strategic bombing and tactical bombing. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Industrial warfare | This concept was called strategic bombing. Douhet also argued in The Command of the Air (1921) that future military leaders could avoid falling into bloody World War I-style trench stalemates by using aviation to strike past the enemy's forces directly at their vulnerable civilian population, which Douhet believed would cause these populations to rise up in revolt to stop the bombing.
Others, such as Billy Mitchell, saw the potential of air power to neutralize the striking power of naval surface fleets. Mitchell himself proved the vulnerability of capital ships to aircraft was finally in 1921 when he commanded a squadron of bombers that sank the ex-German battleship SMS Ostfriesland with aerial bombs. (See Industrial warfare#Naval warfare)
During WWII, there was a debate between strategic bombing and tactical bombing. Strategic bombing focused on targets such as factories, railroads, oil refineries, and heavily populated areas such as cities and towns, and required heavy four-engine bombers carrying large payloads of ordnance or a single heavy four-engine bomber carrying a nuclear weapon flying deep into enemy territory. Tactical bombing focused on concentration of combatants, command and control centers, airfields, and ammunition dumps, and required attack aircraft, dive bombers, and fighter bombers that could fly low over the battlefield.
In the early years of WWII, the German Luftwaffe focused on tactical bombing, using large numbers of Ju 87 Stukas as "flying artillery" for land offensives. Artillery was slow and required time to set up a firing position, whereas aircraft were better able keep up with the fast advances of the German panzer columns. Close air support greatly assisted in the successes of the German Army in the Battle of France. It was also important in amphibious warfare, where aircraft carriers could provide support for soldiers landing on the beaches.
Strategic bombing, by contrast, was unlike anything the world has seen before or since. In 1940, the Germans attempted to force Britain to surrender through attacks on its airfields and factories, and then on its cities in The Blitz in what became the Battle of Britain, the first major battle whose outcome was determined primarily in the air. The campaigns conducted in Europe and Asia could involve thousands of aircraft dropping tens of thousands of tons of munitions over a single city.
Military aviation in the post-war years was dominated by the needs of the Cold War. The postwar years saw a rapid conversion to jet power, which resulted in enormous increases in speeds and altitudes of aircraft. Until the advent of the intercontinental ballistic missile, major powers relied on high-altitude bombers to deliver their newly developed nuclear deterrent. Each country strove to develop the technology of bombers and the high-altitude fighters that could intercept them. The concept of air superiority began to play a heavy role in aircraft designs for both the United States and the Soviet Union.
Post-World War II: With the invention of nuclear weapons, the concept of full-scale war carries the prospect of global annihilation, and as such conflicts since WWII have been "low intensity" conflicts, typically in the form of proxy wars fought within local regional confines, using what are now referred to as "conventional weapons", typically combined with the use of asymmetric warfare tactics and applied use of intelligence.
Nuclear warfare: The use of nuclear weapons first came into being during the last months of WWII, with the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This was the only use of nuclear weapons in combat. For a decade after World War II, the United States and later the Soviet Union (and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom and France) developed and maintained a strategic force of bombers that would be able to attack any potential aggressor from bases inside their countries.
Before the development of a capable strategic missile force in the Soviet Union, much of the war-fighting doctrine held by western nations revolved around the use of a large number of smaller nuclear weapons used in a tactical role. It is arguable if such use could be considered "limited" however, because it was believed that the US would use their own strategic weapons (mainly bombers at the time) should the USSR deploy any kind of nuclear weapon against civilian targets.
A revolution in thinking occurred with the introduction of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which the Soviet Union first successfully tested in the late 1950s. To deliver a warhead to a target, a missile was far less expensive than a bomber that could do the same job. Moreover, at the time it was impossible to intercept ICBMs due to their high altitude and speed.
In the 1960s, another major shift in nuclear doctrine occurred with the development of the submarine-based nuclear missile (SLBM). It was hailed by military theorists as a weapon that would assure a surprise attack would not destroy the capability to retaliate, and therefore would make nuclear war less likely.
Cold War: Since the end of WWII, no industrial nations have fought such a large, decisive war, due to the availability of weapons that are so destructive that their use would offset the advantages of victory. The fighting of a total war where nuclear weapons are used is something that instead of taking years and the full mobilisation of a country's resources such as in WWII, would take tens of minutes. Such weapons are developed and maintained with relatively modest peace time defence budgets.
By the end of the 1950s, the ideological stand-off of the Cold War between the Western World and the Soviet Union involved thousands of nuclear weapons being aimed at each side by the other. Strategically, the equal balance of destructive power possessed by each side situation came to be known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the idea that a nuclear attack by one superpower would result in nuclear counter-strike by the other. This would result in hundreds of millions of deaths in a world where, in words widely attributed to Nikita Khrushchev, "The living will envy the dead".
During the Cold War, the superpowers sought to avoid open conflict between their respective forces, as both sides recognized that such a clash could very easily escalate, and quickly involve nuclear weapons. Instead, the superpowers fought each other through their involvement in proxy wars, military buildups, and diplomatic standoffs.
In the case of proxy wars, each superpower supported its respective allies in conflicts with forces aligned with the other superpower, such as in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
21st century: The Royal United Services Institute stated that the Russo-Ukrainian War has proven that the age of industrial warfare is still here and that massive consumption of equipment, vehicles and ammunition requires a large industrial base for resupply.
Milestones:
See also: Mobilization
Trench warfare
Unconditional surrender
World war
Material aspects:
Arms race
Economic warfare
Home front
Mass production
Total war
War economy
War effort
Specific:
Cold War
Curtis LeMay
Technology during World War I
Technology during World War II
Technological escalation during World War II
Unrestricted Warfare (China)
References:
External links: Modern Tendencies in Strategy and Tactics as shown in Campaigns in the Far East (1906) by Lieutenant Colonel Yoda, Imperial Japanese Army. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Infantry | Etymology and terminology: In English, use of the term infantry began about the 1570s, describing soldiers who march and fight on foot. The word derives from Middle French infanterie, from older Italian (also Spanish) infanteria (foot soldiers too inexperienced for cavalry), from Latin īnfāns (without speech, newborn, foolish), from which English also gets infant. The individual-soldier term infantryman was not coined until 1837. In modern usage, foot soldiers of any era are now considered infantry and infantrymen.
From the mid-18th century until 1881, the British Army named its infantry as numbered regiments "of Foot" to distinguish them from cavalry and dragoon regiments (see List of Regiments of Foot).
Infantry equipped with special weapons were often named after that weapon, such as grenadiers for their grenades, or fusiliers for their fusils. These names can persist long after the weapon speciality; examples of infantry units that retained such names are the Royal Irish Fusiliers and the Grenadier Guards.
Dragoons were created as mounted infantry, with horses for travel between battles; they were still considered infantry since they dismounted before combat. However, if light cavalry was lacking in an army, any available dragoons might be assigned their duties; this practice increased over time, and dragoons eventually received all the weapons and training as both infantry and cavalry, and could be classified as both. Conversely, starting about the mid-19th century, regular cavalry have been forced to spend more of their time dismounted in combat due to the ever-increasing effectiveness of enemy infantry firearms. Thus most cavalry transitioned to mounted infantry. As with grenadiers, the dragoon and cavalry designations can be retained long after their horses, such as in the Royal Dragoon Guards, Royal Lancers, and King's Royal Hussars.
Similarly, motorised infantry have trucks and other unarmed vehicles for non-combat movement, but are still infantry since they leave their vehicles for any combat. Most modern infantry have vehicle transport, to the point where infantry being motorised is generally assumed, and the few exceptions might be identified as modern light infantry. Mechanised infantry go beyond motorised, having transport vehicles with combat abilities, armoured personnel carriers (APCs), providing at least some options for combat without leaving their vehicles. In modern infantry, some APCs have evolved to be infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), which are transport vehicles with more substantial combat abilities, approaching those of light tanks. Some well-equipped mechanised infantry can be designated as armoured infantry. Given that infantry forces typically also have some tanks, and given that most armoured forces have more mechanised infantry units than tank units in their organisation, the distinction between mechanised infantry and armour forces has blurred.
History: The first military forces in history were infantry. In antiquity, infantry were armed with early melee weapons such as a spear, axe, or sword, or an early ranged weapon like a javelin, sling, or bow, with a few infantry men being expected to use both a melee and a ranged weapon. With the development of gunpowder, infantry began converting to primarily firearms. By the time of Napoleonic warfare, infantry, cavalry and artillery formed a basic triad of ground forces, though infantry usually remained the most numerous. With armoured warfare, armoured fighting vehicles have replaced the horses of cavalry, and airpower has added a new dimension to ground combat, but infantry remains pivotal to all modern combined arms operations.
The first warriors, adopting hunting weapons or improvised melee weapons, before the existence of any organised military, likely started essentially as loose groups without any organisation or formation. But this changed sometime before recorded history; the first ancient empires (2500–1500 BC) are shown to have some soldiers with standardised military equipment, and the training and discipline required for battlefield formations and manoeuvres: regular infantry. Though the main force of the army, these forces were usually kept small due to their cost of training and upkeep, and might be supplemented by local short-term mass-conscript forces using the older irregular infantry weapons and tactics; this remained a common practice almost up to modern times.
Before the adoption of the chariot to create the first mobile fighting forces c. 2000 BC, all armies were pure infantry. Even after, with a few exceptions like the Mongol Empire, infantry has been the largest component of most armies in history.
In the Western world, from Classical Antiquity through the Middle Ages (c. 8th century BC to 15th century AD), infantry are categorised as either heavy infantry or light infantry. Heavy infantry, such as Greek hoplites, Macedonian phalangites, and Roman legionaries, specialised in dense, solid formations driving into the main enemy lines, using weight of numbers to achieve a decisive victory, and were usually equipped with heavier weapons and armour to fit their role. Light infantry, such as Greek peltasts, Balearic slingers, and Roman velites, using open formations and greater manoeuvrability, took on most other combat roles: scouting, screening the army on the march, skirmishing to delay, disrupt, or weaken the enemy to prepare for the main forces' battlefield attack, protecting them from flanking manoeuvers, and then afterwards either pursuing the fleeing enemy or covering their army's retreat.
After the fall of Rome, the quality of heavy infantry declined, and warfare was dominated by heavy cavalry, such as knights, forming small elite units for decisive shock combat, supported by peasant infantry militias and assorted light infantry from the lower classes. Towards the end of Middle Ages, this began to change, where more professional and better trained light infantry could be effective against knights, such as the English longbowmen in the Hundred Years' War. By the start of the Renaissance, the infantry began to return to a larger role, with Swiss pikemen and German Landsknechts filling the role of heavy infantry again, using dense formations of pikes to drive off any cavalry.
Dense formations are vulnerable to ranged weapons. Technological developments allowed the raising of large numbers of light infantry units armed with ranged weapons, without the years of training expected for traditional high-skilled archers and slingers. This started slowly, first with crossbowmen, then hand cannoneers and arquebusiers, each with increasing effectiveness, marking the beginning of early modern warfare, when firearms rendered the use of heavy infantry obsolete. The introduction of musketeers using bayonets in the mid 17th century began replacement of the pike with the infantry square replacing the pike square.
To maximise their firepower, musketeer infantry were trained to fight in wide lines facing the enemy, creating line infantry. These fulfilled the central battlefield role of earlier heavy infantry, using ranged weapons instead of melee weapons. To support these lines, smaller infantry formations using dispersed skirmish lines were created, called light infantry, fulfilling the same multiple roles as earlier light infantry. Their arms were no lighter than line infantry; they were distinguished by their skirmish formation and flexible tactics.
The modern rifleman infantry became the primary force for taking and holding ground on battlefields as an element of combined arms. As firepower continued to increase, use of infantry lines diminished, until all infantry became light infantry in practice. Modern classifications of infantry have since expanded to reflect modern equipment and tactics, such as motorised infantry, mechanised or armoured infantry, mountain infantry, marine infantry, and airborne infantry.
Equipment: Beyond main arms and armour, an infantryman's "military kit" generally includes combat boots, battledress or combat uniform, camping gear, heavy weather gear, survival gear, secondary weapons and ammunition, weapon service and repair kits, health and hygiene items, mess kit, rations, filled water canteen, and all other consumables each infantryman needs for the expected duration of time operating away from their unit's base, plus any special mission-specific equipment. One of the most valuable pieces of gear is the entrenching tool—basically a folding spade—which can be employed not only to dig important defences, but also in a variety of other daily tasks, and even sometimes as a weapon. Infantry typically have shared equipment on top of this, like tents or heavy weapons, where the carrying burden is spread across several infantrymen. In all, this can reach 25–45 kg (60–100 lb) for each soldier on the march. Such heavy infantry burdens have changed little over centuries of warfare; in the late Roman Republic, legionaries were nicknamed "Marius' mules" as their main activity seemed to be carrying the weight of their legion around on their backs, a practice that predates the eponymous Gaius Marius.
When combat is expected, infantry typically switch to "packing light", meaning reducing their equipment to weapons, ammunition, and other basic essentials, and leaving other items deemed unnecessary with their transport or baggage train, at camp or rally point, in temporary hidden caches, or even (in emergencies) simply discarding the items. Additional specialised equipment may be required, depending on the mission or to the particular terrain or environment, including satchel charges, demolition tools, mines, or barbed wire, carried by the infantry or attached specialists.
Historically, infantry have suffered high casualty rates from disease, exposure, exhaustion and privation — often in excess of the casualties suffered from enemy attacks. Better infantry equipment to support their health, energy, and protect from environmental factors greatly reduces these rates of loss, and increase their level of effective action. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Infantry | When combat is expected, infantry typically switch to "packing light", meaning reducing their equipment to weapons, ammunition, and other basic essentials, and leaving other items deemed unnecessary with their transport or baggage train, at camp or rally point, in temporary hidden caches, or even (in emergencies) simply discarding the items. Additional specialised equipment may be required, depending on the mission or to the particular terrain or environment, including satchel charges, demolition tools, mines, or barbed wire, carried by the infantry or attached specialists.
Historically, infantry have suffered high casualty rates from disease, exposure, exhaustion and privation — often in excess of the casualties suffered from enemy attacks. Better infantry equipment to support their health, energy, and protect from environmental factors greatly reduces these rates of loss, and increase their level of effective action. Health, energy, and morale are greatly influenced by how the soldier is fed, so militaries issue standardised field rations that provide palatable meals and enough calories to keep a soldier well-fed and combat-ready.
Communications gear has become a necessity, as it allows effective command of infantry units over greater distances, and communication with artillery and other support units. Modern infantry can have GPS, encrypted individual communications equipment, surveillance and night vision equipment, advanced intelligence and other high-tech mission-unique aids.
Armies have sought to improve and standardise infantry gear to reduce fatigue for extended carrying, increase freedom of movement, accessibility, and compatibility with other carried gear, such as the American All-purpose Lightweight Individual Carrying Equipment (ALICE).
Weapons: Infantrymen are defined by their primary arms – the personal weapons and body armour for their own individual use. The available technology, resources, history, and society can produce quite different weapons for each military and era, but common infantry weapons can be distinguished in a few basic categories.
Ranged combat weapons: javelins, slings, blowguns, bows, crossbows, hand cannons, arquebuses, muskets, grenades, flamethrowers.
Melee combat weapons: bludgeoning weapons like clubs, flails and maces; bladed weapons like swords, daggers, and axes; pole weapons like spears, halberds, naginata, and pikes.
Both ranged and close weapons: the bayonet fixed to a firearm allows infantrymen to use the same weapon for both ranged combat and close combat. This started with muskets and its use still continues with modern assault rifles. Use of the bayonet has declined with the introduction of automatic firearms, but are still generally kept as a weapon of last resort.
Infantrymen often carry secondary or back-up weapons, sometimes called a sidearm or ancillary weapons. Infantry with ranged or pole weapons often carried a sword or dagger for possible hand-to-hand combat. The pilum was a javelin the Roman legionaries threw just before drawing their primary weapon, the gladius (short sword), and closing with the enemy line.
Modern infantrymen now treat the bayonet as a backup weapon, but may also have handguns as sidearms. They may also deploy anti-personnel mines, booby traps, incendiary, or explosive devices defensively before combat.
Protection: Infantry have employed many different methods of protection from enemy attacks, including various kinds of armour and other gear, and tactical procedures.
The most basic is personal armour. This includes shields, helmets and many types of armour – padded linen, leather, lamellar, mail, plate, and kevlar. Initially, armour was used to defend both from ranged and close combat; even a fairly light shield could help defend against most slings and javelins, though high-strength bows and crossbows might penetrate common armour at very close range. Infantry armour had to compromise between protection and coverage, as a full suit of attack-proof armour would be too heavy to wear in combat.
As firearms improved, armour for ranged defence had to be made thicker and heavier, which hindered mobility. With the introduction of the heavy arquebus designed to pierce standard steel armour, it was proven easier to make heavier firearms than heavier armour; armour transitioned to be only for close combat purposes. Pikemen armour tended to be just steel helmets and breastplates, and gunners had very little or no armour at all. By the time of the musket, the dominance of firepower shifted militaries away from any close combat, and use of armour decreased, until infantry typically went without wearing any armour.
Helmets were added back during World War I as artillery began to dominate the battlefield, to protect against their fragmentation and other blast effects beyond a direct hit. Modern developments in bullet-proof composite materials like kevlar have started a return to body armour for infantry, though the extra weight is a notable burden.
In modern times, infantrymen must also often carry protective measures against chemical and biological attack, including military gas masks, counter-agents, and protective suits. All of these protective measures add to the weight an infantryman must carry, and may decrease combat efficiency.
Infantry-served weapons: Early crew-served weapons were siege weapons, like the ballista, trebuchet, and battering ram. Modern versions include machine guns, anti-tank missiles, and infantry mortars.
Formations: Beginning with the development the first regular military forces, close-combat regular infantry fought less as unorganised groups of individuals and more in coordinated units, maintaining a defined tactical formation during combat, for increased battlefield effectiveness; such infantry formations and the arms they used developed together, starting with the spear and the shield.
A spear has decent attack abilities with the additional advantage keeping opponents at distance; this advantage can be increased by using longer spears, but this could allow the opponent to side-step the point of the spear and close for hand-to-hand combat where the longer spear is near useless. This can be avoided when each spearman stays side by side with the others in close formation, each covering the ones next to him, presenting a solid wall of spears to the enemy that they cannot get around.
Similarly, a shield has decent defence abilities, but is literally hit-or-miss; an attack from an unexpected angle can bypass it completely. Larger shields can cover more, but are also heavier and less manoeuvrable, making unexpected attacks even more of a problem. This can be avoided by having shield-armed soldiers stand close together, side-by-side, each protecting both themselves and their immediate comrades, presenting a solid shield wall to the enemy.
The opponents for these first formations, the close-combat infantry of more tribal societies, or any military without regular infantry (so called "barbarians") used arms that focused on the individual – weapons using personal strength and force, such as larger swinging swords, axes, and clubs. These take more room and individual freedom to swing and wield, necessitating a more loose organisation. While this may allow for a fierce running attack (an initial shock advantage) the tighter formation of the heavy spear and shield infantry gave them a local manpower advantage where several might be able to fight each opponent.
Thus tight formations heightened advantages of heavy arms, and gave greater local numbers in melee. To also increase their staying power, multiple rows of heavy infantrymen were added. This also increased their shock combat effect; individual opponents saw themselves literally lined-up against several heavy infantryman each, with seemingly no chance of defeating all of them. Heavy infantry developed into huge solid block formations, up to a hundred meters wide and a dozen rows deep.
Maintaining the advantages of heavy infantry meant maintaining formation; this became even more important when two forces with heavy infantry met in battle; the solidity of the formation became the deciding factor. Intense discipline and training became paramount. Empires formed around their military.
Organization: The organization of military forces into regular military units is first noted in Egyptian records of the Battle of Kadesh (c. 1274 BC). Soldiers were grouped into units of 50, which were in turn grouped into larger units of 250, then 1,000, and finally into units of up to 5,000 – the largest independent command. Several of these Egyptian "divisions" made up an army, but operated independently, both on the march and tactically, demonstrating sufficient military command and control organisation for basic battlefield manoeuvres. Similar hierarchical organizations have been noted in other ancient armies, typically with approximately 10 to 100 to 1,000 ratios (even where base 10 was not common), similar to modern sections (squads), companies, and regiments.
Training: The training of the infantry has differed drastically over time and from place to place. The cost of maintaining an army in fighting order and the seasonal nature of warfare precluded large permanent armies.
The antiquity saw everything from the well-trained and motivated citizen armies of Greece and Rome, the tribal host assembled from farmers and hunters with only passing acquaintance with warfare and masses of lightly armed and ill-trained militia put up as a last ditch effort. Kushite king Taharqa enjoyed military success in the Near East as a result of his efforts to strengthen the army through daily training in long-distance running.
In medieval times the foot soldiers varied from peasant levies to semi-permanent companies of mercenaries, foremost among them the Swiss, English, Aragonese and German, to men-at-arms who went into battle as well-armoured as knights, the latter of which at times also fought on foot.
The creation of standing armies—permanently assembled for war or defence—saw increase in training and experience. The increased use of firearms and the need for drill to handle them efficiently. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Infantry | The antiquity saw everything from the well-trained and motivated citizen armies of Greece and Rome, the tribal host assembled from farmers and hunters with only passing acquaintance with warfare and masses of lightly armed and ill-trained militia put up as a last ditch effort. Kushite king Taharqa enjoyed military success in the Near East as a result of his efforts to strengthen the army through daily training in long-distance running.
In medieval times the foot soldiers varied from peasant levies to semi-permanent companies of mercenaries, foremost among them the Swiss, English, Aragonese and German, to men-at-arms who went into battle as well-armoured as knights, the latter of which at times also fought on foot.
The creation of standing armies—permanently assembled for war or defence—saw increase in training and experience. The increased use of firearms and the need for drill to handle them efficiently.
The introduction of national and mass armies saw an establishment of minimum requirements and the introduction of special troops (first of them the engineers going back to medieval times, but also different kinds of infantry adopted to specific terrain, bicycle, motorcycle, motorised and mechanised troops) culminating with the introduction of highly trained special forces during the first and second World War.
Air force and naval infantry: Naval infantry, commonly known as marines, are primarily a category of infantry that form part of the naval forces of states and perform roles on land and at sea, including amphibious operations, as well as other, naval roles. They also perform other tasks, including land warfare, separate from naval operations.
Air force infantry and base defense forces, such as the United States Air Force Security Forces, Royal Air Force Regiment, Royal Australian Air Force Airfield Defence Guards, and Indonesian Air Force Paskhas Corps are used primarily for ground-based defense of air bases and other air force facilities. They also have a number of other, specialist roles. These include, among others, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence and training other airmen in basic ground defense tactics.
See also:
Notes:
References:
Citations: Infentory
Sources:
External links:
Historic films and photos showing Infantries in World War I at europeanfilmgateway.eu
In Praise of Infantry, by Field-Marshal Earl Wavell; First published in "The Times", Thursday, 19 April 1945.
The Lagunari "Serenissima" Regiment KFOR: KFOR Chronicle.
Web Version of U.S. Army Field Manual 3–21.8 – The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad.
"Infantry" . Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 14 (11th ed.). 1911. pp. 517–533. — includes several drawings |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Infantry Minor Tactics | See also: Tactic (method)
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Infiltration tactics | Development during World War I: These tactics emerged gradually during World War I. Several nations modified their existing tactics in ways that supported ideas that were later called infiltration tactics, with the German developments having the most impact, both during the war and afterwards.
Germany: As far back as the 18th century, Prussian military doctrine stressed maneuver and force concentration to achieve a decisive battle (Vernichtungsgedanke). The German military searched for ways to apply this in the face of trench warfare. Captain Willy Rohr fought in the long Battle of Hartmannswillerkopf (1914–1915), starting with two Pionier (combat engineer) companies. Such engineers were often employed in assaulting fortifications, using non-standard weapons and tactics compared to the regular infantry. Rohr's initial efforts to use these as special advanced strike teams, to break French trench lines for following troops to exploit, achieved only limited success, with heavy losses. Rohr, working with his superiors, saw equipment improved, including the new Stahlhelme (steel helmets), ample supplies of hand grenades, flamethrowers, light mortars and light machine guns. Rohr's analysis was that much more training was needed to incorporate the new weapons and to coordinate separate attacks as needed to achieve the overall operational goals. His analysis got the attention of the Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL, German army high command). In December 1915, Rohr was given the task of training the army in "modern close combat", and soon promoted to major. During the next two years, special Stoßtruppen (stormtrooper) detachments were created in divisions throughout the army; select men were sent to Rohr for training, who became trainers when they returned to their units. These tactics were expanded and refined by many in the German military command, extending the Prussian military doctrine down to the smallest units – specially trained troops maneuvered and organised to strike selected positions, wherever opportunities were found.
German infiltration tactics are sometimes called Hutier tactics, after German General Oskar von Hutier, even though his role in developing the tactics was limited. Hutier, along with his artillery commander Colonel Georg Bruchmüller, improved the use of artillery in ways that suited infiltration tactics. Conventional mass-wave tactics were typically preceded by days of constant bombardment of all defender positions, attempting to gain advantage by attrition. Hutier favoured brief but intense hurricane bombardments that allow the opponent little time to react and reinforce their line. The bombardment targeted the opponents' rear areas to destroy or disrupt roads, artillery, and command centres. This was done to suppress and confuse the defenders and reduce their capability to counterattack from their rearward defence lines. For maximum effect, the exact points of attack remained concealed until the last possible moment, and the infantry attacked immediately following the short bombardment.: 158–160
The German stormtrooper methods involve men rushing forward in small but mutually supporting groups, using whatever cover is available, and then laying down covering fire for the other groups as they moved. The tactics aim to avoid attacking any strongpoints directly, by first breaching the weakest points of the defender's line, and using those to gain positional advantages on other points. Additionally, they acknowledge the futility of managing a grand detailed plan of operations from afar, opting instead for junior officers on the spot to exercise initiative, expanding the earlier Prussian doctrine of Auftragstaktik (mission-based tactics).
Due to the extensive training needed, stormtroopers remained small elite forces. Regular infantry with heavy weapons would follow up, using more standard tactics, reducing isolated and weakened opposing strongpoints with flank attacks, as the stormtroopers continued the advance beyond them. Reserve troops following these had to consolidate gains against counterattacks.: 157
The Germans employed and improved infiltration tactics with increasing success, at first defensively in counterattacks as part of Germany's defence in depth and then offensively, leading up to the Battle of Caporetto against the Italians in 1917 and finally the massive German spring offensive in 1918 against the British and French.: 489 Initial German successes were stunning; of these, Hutier's 18th Army gained more than 50 km (30 mi) in less than a week – the farthest advance in the Western Front since the Race to the Sea had ended the war of movement in 1914. This advance would hereafter associate Hutier's name with infiltration tactics in Western Europe. The German armies began to stall after outrunning their supply, artillery and reinforcements, which could not catch up over the shell-torn ground left ruined by Allied attacks in the Battle of the Somme in 1916; the offensives failed to achieve a war-winning breakthrough dividing the French and British armies.: 137 The exhausted German forces lost the initiative and were soon pushed back in the Allied Hundred Days Offensive, ending in the German surrender.
Though far more successful tactically than traditional attacks, infiltration tactics did not address supporting any resulting advances operationally, so they tended to bog-down over time and allow the defender time to regroup. German artillery, critical during the initial assault, lagged far behind afterwards. The elite stormtroopers took notable casualties on the initial attacks, which could not be readily replaced. German forces lacked mobile forces such as cavalry to exploit and secure deep advances. Most importantly, German logistical capabilities, designed for a static front, failed to sustain troops advancing far into devastated enemy territory.
The German military did not use the term infiltration tactics as a distinct new manner of warfare but more as a continuous improvement to their wide array of military tactics. When the "new" German tactics made headlines in Allied nations in 1918, the French published articles on the "Hutier tactics" as they saw it; this focused more on the operational surprise of the start of the attack and the effective hurricane bombardment, rather than the low-level tactics. In post-war years, although information on "Hutier tactics" was widely distributed in France, the US and Britain, most generals were skeptical about these new tactics, given the German defeat. In Germany, infiltration tactics were integrated into the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht. Felix Steiner, former officer of the Reichswehr, introduced the principle of stormtroopers into the formation of the Waffen-SS, in order to shape it into a new type of army using this tactic. When combined with armoured fighting vehicles and aircraft to extend the tactics' operational capabilities, this contributed to what would be called Blitzkrieg in the Second World War.
France: New French tactics that included an initial step for infiltration were published by the Grand Quartier Général (GQG, French General Headquarters) on 16 April 1915, in But et conditions d’une action offensive d’ensemble (Goal and Conditions for a General Offensive Action), its widely circulated version being Note 5779. It states that the first waves of infantry should penetrate as far as possible and leave enemy strongpoints to be dealt with by follow-up nettoyeurs de tranchée (trench cleaner) waves. The note covers weapons and close-combat tactics for the trench cleaners, but the tactics and weapons of preceding waves are unchanged, and there is little mention of any additional support for the now-detached advanced waves. The note contains annexes covering different subjects, including artillery, infantry defense, and infantry attacks. For attacks, Note 5779 continued to promote the pre-war French doctrine of la percée (the breakthrough), where an offensive is driven by a grand, single plan with continuous waves of reserves targeting the operation's distant and static objectives. It does not cover methods of adapting to local success or setbacks, nor the small-unit initiative, coordination and additional training this would require. The tactics were employed with some success on the opening day of the Second Battle of Artois, 9 May 1915, by the French XXXIII Corps; they advanced 4.5 kilometres (2.8 mi) in the first hour and a half of the attack but were unable to reinforce and consolidate to hold onto all these gains against German counterattacks. The battle was costly and inconclusive, taking a heavy toll in French troops and matériel. Later French infantry tactics moved away from the costly la percée towards a more practical grignotage (literally nibbling, taking in small bits) doctrine, which employed a series of smaller and more methodical operations with limited objectives; each of these were still planned at headquarters, rather than from immediate local initiative. Note 5779 also describes an early form of rolling barrage in its artillery annex; this was employed with success and continued to be developed by the French as well as by most other nations throughout the war.
In August 1915, a young French infantry officer, Captain André Laffargue, put forward additional ideas in a pamphlet titled Étude sur l’attaque dans la période actuelle de la guerre (Study of the Attack in the Current Period of the War). Laffargue based his proposals in particular on his experiences in the initially successful but ultimately disappointing results of employing the tactics of Note 5779 at the Second Battle of Artois; he commanded a company of the 153rd Infantry Regiment, attacking immediately south of Neuville-Saint-Vaast on 9 May 1915. Laffargue was left wounded on the German front line but his regiment advanced another 1.5 kilometres (0.93 mi), only to be held up by two German machine guns. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Infiltration tactics | In August 1915, a young French infantry officer, Captain André Laffargue, put forward additional ideas in a pamphlet titled Étude sur l’attaque dans la période actuelle de la guerre (Study of the Attack in the Current Period of the War). Laffargue based his proposals in particular on his experiences in the initially successful but ultimately disappointing results of employing the tactics of Note 5779 at the Second Battle of Artois; he commanded a company of the 153rd Infantry Regiment, attacking immediately south of Neuville-Saint-Vaast on 9 May 1915. Laffargue was left wounded on the German front line but his regiment advanced another 1.5 kilometres (0.93 mi), only to be held up by two German machine guns. Laffargue's pamphlet focused primarily on the small-unit perspective, calling for mobile firepower to deal with local resistance such as machine guns, advocating that the first waves of an attack advance through the intervals or gaps between centres of resistance, which should be temporarily neutralised on the edges by fire or heavy smoke. The points of resistance would then be encircled and dealt with by successive waves. This promotes coordinating local forces to deal with local resistance as it is encountered, an important second step in infiltration tactics. Laffargue suggests that had these methods been followed the attack could have resulted in a complete breakthrough of the German defences and the capture of Vimy Ridge.
The French Army published Laffargue's pamphlet in 1915 and the following year a commercial edition found wide circulation, but as informational rather than being officially adopted by the French military. The British translated and published Laffargue's pamphlet in December 1915 and, like others, continued to make frequent use of wave attacks. The US Infantry Journal published a translation in 1916.
In contrast to the infiltration tactics then under development in the German army, the tactics of Note 5779 and as expanded by Laffargue remained firmly wedded to the use of the attack by waves, despite the high casualties which could ensue. Laffargue maintained that the psychological support of the attack in line was necessary to enable men to advance against heavy fire.
In 1916, captured copies of Laffargue's pamphlet were translated and distributed by the German army. How much this may have influenced German infiltration tactics is not known; such influence has been dismissed by Gudmundsson. The Germans had started developing their own infiltration tactics in the spring of 1915, months before Laffargue's pamphlet was even published.
Russia: The vast Eastern Front of World War I, much less confined than the Western Front, was much less affected by trench warfare, but trench lines still tended to take hold whenever the front became static. Still, about a third of all Russian divisions remained cavalry, including Cossack divisions.
General Aleksei Brusilov, commanding the Russian Southwestern Front, promoted large-scale simultaneous attacks along a wide front in order to limit defenders' ability to respond to any one point, thus allowing the collapse of the entire defending line and returning to maneuver warfare. For the Brusilov Offensive of 1916, he meticulously prepared a massive surprise attack on a very wide 400 km (250 mi) front stretching from the Pripet Marshes to the Carpathian Mountains, with the objective of Lemburg, Galicia (now Lviv, Ukraine), 100 km (60 mi) behind the well-fortified Austro-Hungarian line. The Austro-German military command was confident that these deep and extensive entrenchments, equal to those of the Germans on Western Front, could not be broken without significant Russian reinforcements.: 33–36
After a thorough reconnaissance, Brusilov directed preparations for several months. Forward trenches were dug as bridgeheads for the attack, which approached the Austro-Hungarian trench lines as closely as 70 m (230 ft). Select forces were trained and tasked with breaking through the defending lines, creating gaps to be widened by 8 total successive waves of infantry, allowing deep penetration. Brusilov committed all his reserves into the initial assault.: 51
Although Brusilov favoured shorter bombardments, the bombardment preparation for this offensive was more than two days long, from 3am on June 4 (May 22 old style) to 9am on June 6 (May 24). This bombardment disrupted the first defense zone and partially neutralized the defending artillery. The first infantry attacks made breakthroughs at 13 points, which were soon increased in width and depth. Austro-Hungarian response to the unexpected offensive was slow and limited, believing that their existing forces and defenses would prove sufficient; instead, reserve units sent forward to counterattack often found their routes already overrun by the Russians.: 40 The Russian 8th Army, commanded by Brusilov himself just a few months before his promotion to command the Southwestern Front, achieved the greatest success, advancing 48 km (30 mi) in less than a week. The 7th and 9th Army achieved lesser gains, though the remaining 11th Army in the center made no initial breakthroughs. The performance of individual Austro-Hungarian units during the campaign, each raised from separate diverse societies within the Empire, was highly variable, with some units long standing firm despite the odds, like the Polish Legions at the Battle of Kostiuchnówka, whereas others readily retreated in panic or surrendered, as at the Battle of Lutsk.: 78–79 : 42–44
Though the campaign was devastating to the Austro-Hungarian Army, Russian losses were very high. German forces were sent to reinforce, and the initial Russian advantages waned. Though Russian attacks continued for months, their cost in Russian men and materiel increased while gains diminished. In the end, much like the bold French tactics of la percée at the Second Battle of Artois, these tactics were too costly to maintain. The Imperial Russian Army never fully recovered, and the monumental losses of so many Russian soldiers helped fuel the Russian Revolution of 1917, leading to disbanding the Imperial Russian Army.: 53
Though the Brusilov Campaign impressed the German Army High Command, how this may have influenced their further development of infiltration tactics is not known. Elements of Brusilov's tactics were eventually used by the Red Army in developing their Deep Battle doctrine for World War II.
Britain: The British Army pursued a doctrine of integrating new technologies and updating old ones to find advantages in trench warfare.
At the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, March 1915, a well-planned British attack on German trenches, coordinated with short but effective artillery bombardment, achieved a local breakthrough. Though ammunition shortages and command and control issues prevented exploiting the gains, this demonstrated the importance of a combined infantry-artillery doctrine.
Initial experiences in trench warfare, shared between British and French, led both to increase pre-bombardment (requiring dramatically increased artillery munitions production), and also to supply infantry with more firepower, such as light mortars, light machine guns, and rifle grenades. While the British hoped that this new combination of arms, once improved and properly executed, could achieve decisive breakthroughs, the French moved from their pre-war grand la percée doctrine to more limited and practical tactical objectives. At this same time, the Germans were learning the value of deep trenches, defense in depth, defensive artillery, and quick counter-attacks.
This came to a head with the British Somme Offensive on 1 July 1916. Douglas Haig, commanding the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), planned on an ambitious large-scale quick breakthrough, with an extensive artillery bombardment targeting the German front-line defenses, followed by a creeping barrage leading a mass infantry assault.: 106–10 : 117–21 Despite planning, execution was flawed, perhaps resulting from the rapid expansion of the British Army. The British losses on the first days were horrific. British operations improved over the next several months of the campaign, however.: 113–6 : 183–282 Learning the limits of battle planning and bombardment, they abandoned single grand objectives, and adopted a "bite and hold" doctrine (equivalent to the French grignotage) of limited, local objectives to what could be supported by available artillery in close cooperation.: 345–84 Combining this with new arms was still promoted; Britain's new secret weapon, the tank, made its first appearance midway through the Somme operations. Though not yet effective, their promise of breakthroughs in the future was held out.
The British Third Army employed tactics giving platoons more independence at the Battle of Arras in April 1917 (most notably the capture of Vimy Ridge by the Canadian Corps), following the reorganisation of British infantry platoons according to the new Manual SS 143. This still advocated wave attacks, taking strongpoints and consolidating before advancing, part of "bite-and-hold" tactics, but this did allow for more local flexibility, and set groundwork for low-level unit initiative, an important aspect of infiltration tactics.
Hurricane bombardment: A new method of artillery use evolved during World War I, colloquially called hurricane bombardment. This is a very quick but intense artillery bombardment, in contrast to the prevailing artillery tactic of long bombardments. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Infiltration tactics | Though not yet effective, their promise of breakthroughs in the future was held out.
The British Third Army employed tactics giving platoons more independence at the Battle of Arras in April 1917 (most notably the capture of Vimy Ridge by the Canadian Corps), following the reorganisation of British infantry platoons according to the new Manual SS 143. This still advocated wave attacks, taking strongpoints and consolidating before advancing, part of "bite-and-hold" tactics, but this did allow for more local flexibility, and set groundwork for low-level unit initiative, an important aspect of infiltration tactics.
Hurricane bombardment: A new method of artillery use evolved during World War I, colloquially called hurricane bombardment. This is a very quick but intense artillery bombardment, in contrast to the prevailing artillery tactic of long bombardments. Various forms of quick bombardments were employed at several times and places during the war, but the most successful use of hurricane bombardment was when it was combined with German infiltration tactics in which local forces take immediate advantage of any enemy weak points they find.
After the start of trench warfare in World War I, and artillery moved from direct fire to indirect fire, the standard use of artillery preceding any friendly infantry attack became a very long artillery bombardment, often lasting several days, to destroy the opponent's defences and kill the defenders. But trenches were very soon extended to avoid this; they were dug deeper and connected by deep or even underground passages to bunkers far behind the lines, where defenders could safely wait out bombardments. When the bombardment stopped, this signalled the start of the attack to the defenders, and they quickly moved back to their forward positions.: 13–14 This practice of very long bombardments expanded over the course of the war, in the hopes of at least causing a few casualties, damaging surface defences like barbed wire lines and machine gun nests, and exhausting and demoralizing the defenders by the stress of being forced underground for so long, the noise and the vibrations.
The Allies, led by the British, developed alternative artillery tactics using shorter bombardments; these sought to achieve success by surprise. (This was also to use limited ammunition supplies more efficiently.) The effectiveness of short bombardments was dependent on local conditions: the targets had to be identified and located beforehand, many artillery pieces were needed, each with ample ammunition, and the preparations had to be kept hidden from the defenders.
To further increase the chance of success, these short bombardments were sometimes followed by barrages. Many variations were devised, including moving barrages, block barrages, creeping barrages, standing and box barrages. The goal of an artillery barrage was to target a line of impact points repeatedly so as to impede infantry movement; these lines could be held in position or slowly moved to inhibit movement by the opponent or even force them into poor positions. The barrage plans were often quite complicated and could be very effective.
The Germans also experimented with short bombardments and barrages. German Colonel Georg Bruchmüller tailored these significantly to integrate well with infiltration tactics. He began to perfect this while serving as a senior artillery officer on the Eastern Front in 1916. Hurricane bombardments avoided giving the defender several days' warning of an impending attack – vital for infiltration tactics. Barrages had to be carefully limited for use with infiltration tactics, as both the barrage movement and infantry advance must keep to a timetable, necessarily very methodical and slow to avoid casualties from friendly artillery; this takes away almost all initiative from the advancing infantry. Barrages with infiltration tactics had to be more intense and precise, and quickly moved to deeper targets. Bruchmüller enforced having artillery aim from the map, avoiding the typical practise of firing several registering shells before a bombardment to adjust the aim of each gun by trial-and-error, alerting the defenders before the full bombardment. Precise aiming without registering shells requires expertise in ballistics with angles and elevation calculated from accurate maps expressly designed for artillery use, knowledge of the effects of altitude and local weather conditions, and also reliable and consistent manufacturing of guns and ammunition to eliminate uncontrolled variation.: 12–13
Bruchmüller devised intricate, centrally-controlled firing plans for intense bombardments with minimal delays. These plans typically had several bombardment phases. The first phase might be bombardment against enemy communications, telegraph lines, and headquarters, roads and bridges, to isolate and confuse the defenders and delay their reinforcements. The second phase might be against the defenders' artillery batteries and the third against their front-line trenches to drive them back just before the infantry assault on those positions. The last phase was typically a creeping barrage that moved forward of the advancing infantry to quickly bombard positions just before they are attacked. The phases were usually much more complicated, quickly switching between targets to catch defenders off guard; each bombardment plan was carefully tailored to local conditions. The type of shells depended on the target, such as shrapnel, high explosive, smoke, illumination, short-term or lingering gas shells. The total bombardment time was usually from a couple hours down to just minutes.: 74–76
The creeping barrage phase is often held out as a key part of infiltration tactics, but its use in infiltration attacks is limited by the fact that the rate of infantry advance cannot be predicted. The quickness, intensity, accuracy, and careful selection of targets for maximum effect is more important.
Allied and German styles of bombardments could use tricks of irregular pauses and switching suddenly between targets for short periods of time to avoid being predictable to the defenders.
Bruchmüller's hurricane bombardment tactics in close cooperation with infiltration tactics matured by the time of the German victory at Riga on 3 September 1917, where he served under General Hutier. These bombardment tactics were disseminated throughout the German Army. Hutier and Bruchmüller were transferred together to the Western Front to take part in the Spring Offensive of 1918, where Bruchmüller's artillery tactics had great effect on quickly breaking the British lines for Hutier's 18th Army. Following that initial attack, the artillery had less effect, as infantry forces advanced faster than artillery and munitions could keep up.
After World War I, use of radios to quickly redirect artillery fire as needed removed any exclusive reliance on time-table driven artillery bombardment.
Dien Bien Phu: At the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954), Major Marcel Bigeard, commander of the French 6th Colonial Parachute Battalion (6th BPC), used infiltration tactics to defend the besieged garrison against Viet Minh trench warfare tactics. Bigeard's parachute assault companies were supported by concentrated artillery and air support and received help from tanks, allowing two companies (the 1st under Lieutenant René Le Page and the 2nd under Lieutenant Hervé Trapp) numbering no more than 180 men to recapture the important hilltop position of Eliane 1 from a full Viet Minh battalion, on the early morning of 10 April 1954. Other parachute battalion and company commanders also used similar tactics during the battle.
See also: Military deception
List of military tactics
Raid (military)
Extraction (military)
Frogman
Notes:
References: Davidson, Phillip B. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. ISBN 0-19-506792-4, ISBN 0-89141-306-5.
Gudmundsson, Bruce I. Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918. New York: Praeger, 1989. ISBN 0-275-93328-8.
Simon Jones, Infiltration by Close Order: André Laffargue and the Attack of 9 May 1915.
Kraus, Jonathan. Early Trench Tactics in the French Army: The Second Battle of Artois May–June 1915. Farnham: Ashgate, 2013. ISBN 978-1-4094-5500-4.
Kraus, Jonathan. Podcast: The Second Battle of Artois, May 1915: the new turning-point.
Laffargue, André. The Attack in Trench Warfare Impressions and Reflections of a Company Commander by Capt. André Laffargue 153rd Infantry, French Army, Translated for the Infantry Journal by an Officer of Infantry. Washington, D.C.: The United States Infantry Association, 1916.
Samuels, Martin. Doctrine and Dogma: German and British Infantry Tactics in the First World War. New York: Greenwood Press, 1992. ISBN 0-313-27959-4.
Samuels, Martin. Command or Control?: Command, Training, and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888–1918. London; Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1995. ISBN 0-7146-4570-2, ISBN 0-7146-4214-2.
Further reading: David Goldovt-Ryzhenkov (Translator from German) 2018: Examples of Reconnaissance and Security Operations in Defense, 1942/1944. German Manuals
House, Jonathan M. Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization. U.S. Army Command General Staff College, 1984. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Infiltration tactics | Samuels, Martin. Doctrine and Dogma: German and British Infantry Tactics in the First World War. New York: Greenwood Press, 1992. ISBN 0-313-27959-4.
Samuels, Martin. Command or Control?: Command, Training, and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888–1918. London; Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1995. ISBN 0-7146-4570-2, ISBN 0-7146-4214-2.
Further reading: David Goldovt-Ryzhenkov (Translator from German) 2018: Examples of Reconnaissance and Security Operations in Defense, 1942/1944. German Manuals
House, Jonathan M. Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization. U.S. Army Command General Staff College, 1984. Available online (8 September 2016) or through University Press of the Pacific (Honolulu, Hawaii, 2002). ISBN 1-4102-0159-7.
Pope, Stephen, Elizabeth-Anne Wheal, and Keith Robbins, eds. The Macmillan Dictionary of the First World War. London: Macmillan Reference Books, 1995. ISBN 0-333-61822-X. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Information warfare | Overview: Information warfare has been described as "the use of information to achieve our national objectives." According to NATO, "Information war is an operation conducted in order to gain an information advantage over the opponent."
Information warfare can take many forms:
Television, internet and radio transmission(s) can be jammed to disrupt communications, or hijacked for a disinformation campaign.
Logistics networks can be disabled.
Enemy communications networks can be disabled or spoofed, especially online social communities in modern days.
Stock exchange transactions can be sabotaged, either with electronic intervention, by leaking sensitive information or by placing disinformation.
The use of drones and other surveillance robots or webcams.
Communication management
Synthetic media
The organized use of social media and other online content-generation platforms can be used to influence public perceptions.
The United States Air Force has had Information Warfare Squadrons since the 1980s. In fact, the official mission of the U.S. Air Force is now "To fly, fight and win... in air, space and cyberspace", with the latter referring to its information warfare role.
As the U.S. Air Force often risks aircraft and aircrews to attack strategic enemy communications targets, remotely disabling such targets using software and other means can provide a safer alternative. In addition, disabling such networks electronically (instead of explosively) also allows them to be quickly re-enabled after the enemy territory is occupied. Similarly, counter-information warfare units are employed to deny such capability to the enemy. The first application of these techniques was used against Iraqi communications networks in the Gulf War.
Also during the Gulf War, Dutch hackers allegedly stole information about U.S. troop movements from U.S. Defense Department computers and tried to sell it to the Iraqis, who thought it was a hoax and turned it down. In January 1999, U.S. Air Intelligence computers were hit by a coordinated attack (Moonlight Maze), part of which came from a Russian mainframe. This could not be confirmed as a Russian cyber attack due to non-attribution – the principle that online identity may not serve as proof of real-world identity.
New battlefield: Within the realm of cyberspace, there are two primary weapons: network-centric warfare and C4ISR, which denotes integrated Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Furthermore, cyberspace attacks initiated by one nation against another nation have an underlying goal of gaining information superiority over the attacked party, which includes disrupting or denying the victimized party's ability to gather and distribute information. A real-world occurrence that illustrated the dangerous potential of cyberattacks transpired in 2007, when a strike from Israeli forces demolished an alleged nuclear reactor in Syria that was being constructed via a collaborative effort between Syria and North Korea. Accompanied by the strike was a cyberattack on Syria's air defenses, which left them blind to the attack on the nuclear reactor and, ultimately allowed for the attack to occur (New York Times 2014). An example of a more basic attack on a nation within cyberspace is a distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack, which is utilized to hinder networks or websites until they lose their primary functionality. As implied, cyberattacks do not just affect the military party being attacked, but rather the whole population of the victimized nation. Since more aspects of daily life are being integrated into networks in cyberspace, civilian populations can potentially be negatively affected during wartime. For example, if a nation chose to attack another nation's power grid servers in a specific area to disrupt communications, civilians and businesses in that area would also have to deal with power outages, which could potentially lead to economic disruptions as well.
Moreover, physical ICTs have also been implemented into the latest revolution in military affairs by deploying new, more autonomous robots (i.e. – unmanned drones) into the battlefield to carry out duties such as patrolling borders and attacking ground targets. Humans from remote locations pilot many of the unmanned drones, however, some of the more advanced robots, such as the Northrop Grumman X-47B, are capable of autonomous decisions. Despite piloting drones from remote locations, a proportion of drone pilots still suffer from stress factors of more traditional warfare. According to NPR, a study performed by the Pentagon in 2011 found that 29% of drone pilots are "burned out" and undergo high levels of stress. Furthermore, approximately 17% of the drone pilots surveyed as the study were labeled "clinically distressed" with some of those pilots also showing signs of post-traumatic stress disorder.
Modern ICTs have also brought advancements to communications management among military forces. Communication is a vital aspect of war for any involved party and, through the implementation of new ICTs such as data-enabled devices, military forces are now able to disseminate information faster than ever before. For example, some militaries are now employing the use of iPhones to upload data and information gathered by drones in the same area.
Notable examples:
Chinese information warfare:
Russo-Ukrainian War: In 2022, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have taken advantage of deficiencies in Russian communications by allowing them to piggyback on Ukrainian networks, connect, and communicate. Ukrainian forces then eavesdrop, and cut off Russian communications at a crucial part of the conversation.
To build support before it invaded Ukraine, Russia perpetuated a narrative that claimed the Ukrainian government was committing violence against its own Russian speaking population. By publishing large amounts of disinformation on the internet, the alternate narrative was picked up in search results, such as Google News.
Russian interference in foreign elections: Russian interference in foreign elections, most notably the Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections, has been described as information warfare. Russia has also begun to interfere in the 2024 US presidential elections according to Microsoft. According to NBC, Russia is conducting disinformation campaigns in the 2024 US elections against US president, Joe Biden.
Russia vs West: Research suggests that Russia and the West are also engaged in an information war. For instance, Russia believes that the West is undermining its leader through the encouragement of overthrowing authoritarian regimes and liberal values. In response, Russia promotes the anti-liberal sentiments, including racism, antisemitism, homophobia, and misogyny. Russia has sought to promote the idea that the American democratic state is failing.
Russia, China and Pro Palestinian protests: The Telegraph reported in 2024 that China and Russia were promoting Pro Palestinian influencers in order to manipulate British public opinion in favour of Russian and Chinese interests. NBC reported that Russia was using different tools to cause division within the US, by delegitimizing US police operations against Pro Palestinian protests and by pivoting public conversation from the Russian invasion in Ukraine to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Russian media activity increased by 400% in the weeks after Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel.
United States COVID-19 disinformation campaign: According to a report by Reuters, the United States ran a propaganda campaign to spread disinformation about the Sinovac Chinese COVID-19 vaccine, including using fake social media accounts to spread the disinformation that the Sinovac vaccine contained pork-derived ingredients and was therefore haram under Islamic law. The campaign was described as "payback" for COVID-19 disinformation by China directed against the U.S. The campaign primarily targeted people in the Philippines and used a social media hashtag for "China is the virus" in Tagalog. The campaign ran from 2020 to mid-2021. The primary contractor for the U.S. military on the project was General Dynamics IT, which received $493 million for its role.
Legal and ethical concerns: While information warfare has yielded many advances in the types of attack that a government can make, it has also raised concerns about the moral and legal ambiguities surrounding this particularly new form of war. Traditionally, wars have been analyzed by moral scholars according to just war theory. However, with Information Warfare, Just War Theory fails because the theory is based on the traditional conception of war. Information Warfare has three main issues surrounding it compared to traditional warfare:
The risk for the party or nation initiating the cyberattack is substantially lower than the risk for a party or nation initiating a traditional attack. This makes it easier for governments, as well as potential terrorist or criminal organizations, to make these attacks more frequently than they could with traditional war.
Information communication technologies (ICT) are so immersed in the modern world that a very wide range of technologies are at risk of a cyberattack. Specifically, civilian technologies can be targeted for cyberattacks and attacks can even potentially be launched through civilian computers or websites. As such, it is harder to enforce control of civilian infrastructures than a physical space. Attempting to do so would also raise many ethical concerns about the right to privacy, making defending against such attacks even tougher.
The mass-integration of ICT into our system of war makes it much harder to assess accountability for situations that may arise when using robotic and/or cyber attacks. For robotic weapons and automated systems, it's becoming increasingly hard to determine who is responsible for any particular event that happens. This issue is exacerbated in the case of cyberattacks, as sometimes it is virtually impossible to trace who initiated the attack in the first place.
Recently, legal concerns have arisen centered on these issues, specifically the issue of the right to privacy in the United States of America. Lt. General Keith B. Alexander, who served as the head of Cyber Command under President Barack Obama, noted that there was a "mismatch between our technical capabilities to conduct operations and the governing laws and policies" when writing to the Senate Armed Services Committee. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Information warfare | Attempting to do so would also raise many ethical concerns about the right to privacy, making defending against such attacks even tougher.
The mass-integration of ICT into our system of war makes it much harder to assess accountability for situations that may arise when using robotic and/or cyber attacks. For robotic weapons and automated systems, it's becoming increasingly hard to determine who is responsible for any particular event that happens. This issue is exacerbated in the case of cyberattacks, as sometimes it is virtually impossible to trace who initiated the attack in the first place.
Recently, legal concerns have arisen centered on these issues, specifically the issue of the right to privacy in the United States of America. Lt. General Keith B. Alexander, who served as the head of Cyber Command under President Barack Obama, noted that there was a "mismatch between our technical capabilities to conduct operations and the governing laws and policies" when writing to the Senate Armed Services Committee. A key point of concern was the targeting of civilian institutions for cyberattacks, to which the general promised to try to maintain a mindset similar to that of traditional war, in which they will seek to limit the impact on civilians.
See also: Group specific:
US specific:
Notes:
References:
Bibliography:
Books: Jerome Clayton Glenn, "Future Mind" Chapter 9. Defense p. 195-201. Acropolis Books LTD, Washington, DC (1989)
Winn Schwartau, "Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway" Thunder's Mouth Press (1993)
Winn Schwartau, ed, Information Warfare: Cyberterrorism: Protecting your personal security in the electronic age, Thunder's Mouth Press, 2nd ed, (1996) (ISBN 1560251328).
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, In Athena's Camp, RAND (1997).
Dorothy Denning, Information Warfare and Security, Addison-Wesley (1998) (ISBN 0201433036).
James Adams, The Next World War: Computers are the Weapons and the Front line is Everywhere, Simon and Schuster (1998) (ISBN 0684834529).
Edward Waltz, Information Warfare Principles and Operations, Artech House, 1998, ISBN 0-89006-511-X
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, RAND (2001) (ISBN 0833030302).
Ishmael Jones, The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture, Encounter Books, New York (2010) (ISBN 978-1594032233). Information/intelligence warfare.
Gregory J. Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace, MIT Press (2001) (ISBN 0262182092).
Anthony H. Cordesman, Cyber-threats, Information Warfare, and Critical Infrastructure Protection: DEFENDING THE US HOMELAND (2002) (ISBN 0275974235).
Leigh Armistead, Information Operations: The Hard Reality of Soft Power, Joint Forces Staff College and the National Security Agency (2004) (ISBN 1574886991).
Thomas Rid, War and Media Operations: The US Military and the Press from Vietnam to Iraq, Routledge (2007) (ISBN 0415416590).
Other: Science at War: Information Warfare, The History Channel (1998).
External links:
Resources: Hacktivism and Politically Motivated Computer Crime (PDF)
Cyberspace and Information Operations Study Center Archived 2007-10-31 at the Wayback Machine, Air University, U.S. Air Force.
IWS - The Information Warfare Site
Information Warfare Monitor - Tracking Cyberpower (University of Toronto, Canada/Munk Centre)
Twitter: InfowarMonitor
Information Warfare, I-War, IW, C4I, Cyberwar
Federation of American Scientists - IW Resources Archived 2007-10-14 at the Wayback Machine
Association of Old Crows http://www.crows.org The Electronic Warfare and Information Operations Association.
C4I.org - Computer Security & Intelligence
Information Warfare, Information Operations and Electronic Attack Capabilities Air Power Australia.
Committee on Policy Consequences and Legal/Ethical Implications of Offensive Information Warfare Archived 2017-06-11 at the Wayback Machine, The National Academies.
Program on Information and Warfare, Global Information Society Project, World Policy Institute.
Information Warriors Archived 2020-10-27 at the Wayback Machine Information Warriors is web forum dedicated to the discussion of Navy Information Warfare.
Mastermind Corporation Information Warfare Tactics Analysis (PDF)
Information Warfare in Biology Nature's Exploitation of Information to Win Survival Contests, Monash University, Computer Science.
Course syllabi: COSC 511 Information Warfare: Terrorism, Crime, and National Security @ Department of Computer Science, Georgetown University (1997–2002) (Dorothy Denning).
CSE468 Information Conflict (Honours) @ School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, Monash University (2006) (Carlo Kopp).
Information Warfare, Cyberterrorism, and Hacktivism from Cybercrime, Cyberterrorism and Digital Law Enforcement, New York Law School.
Papers: research and theory: Col Andrew Borden, USAF (Ret.), What is Information Warfare? Aerospace Power Chronicles (1999).
Dr Carlo Kopp, A Fundamental Paradigm of Infowar (February 2000).
Research & Theory Links Archived 2007-10-30 at the Wayback Machine, Cyberspace and Information Operations Study Center, Air War College, Air University, U.S. Air Force.
Lachlan Brumley et al., Cutting Through the Tangled Web: An Information-Theoretic Perspective on Information Warfare (October 2012).
Galeotti, Mark (5 March 2018). "I'm Sorry for Creating the 'Gerasimov Doctrine'". Foreign Policy. Slate Group. Retrieved 19 March 2022.
Galeotti, Mark (2018). "The mythical 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and the language of threat". Critical Studies on Security. 7 (2). Informa UK Limited: 157–161. doi:10.1080/21624887.2018.1441623. ISSN 2162-4887. OCLC 8319522816. S2CID 159811828.
Michael MacDonald (2012) "Black Logos: Rhetoric and Information Warfare", pages 189–220 in Literature, Rhetoric and Values: Selected Proceedings of a Conference held at University of Waterloo, 3–5 June 2011, editors Shelley Hulan, Murray McArthur and Randy Allen Harris, Cambridge Scholars Publishing ISBN 978-1-4438-4175-7 .
Taddeo, Mariarosaria (2012). Information Warfare: A Philosophical Perspective. Philosophy and Technology 25 (1):105-120.
Papers: Other: An essay on Information Operations by Zachary P. Hubbard (Also Here (Doc file) from this page - working link added 31 May 2024)
News articles: Army, Air Force seek to go on offensive in cyber war, GovExec.com (June 13, 2007).
NATO says urgent need to tackle cyber attack, Reuters (June 14, 2007).
America prepares for 'cyber war' with China, Telegraph.uk.co (June 15, 2007).
NATO, US gear up for cyberpunk warfare, The Register (June 15, 2007).
United States Department of Defense IO Doctrine: Information Operations Roadmap (DOD 2003)
Information Operations (JP 3-13 2006)
Operations Security (JP 3-13.3) (PDF)
Military Deception (JP 3-13.4) (PDF)
Joint Doctrine for PSYOP (JP 3-53 2003)
Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs (JP 3-61 2005)
Destabilizing Terrorist Networks: Disrupting and Manipulating Information Flows in the Global War on Terrorism, Yale Information Society Project Conference Paper (2005).
Seeking Symmetry in Fourth Generation Warfare: Information Operations in the War of Ideas, Presentation (PDF slides) to the Bantle - Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT) Symposium, Syracuse University (2006).
K. A. Taipale, Seeking Symmetry on the Information Front: Confronting Global Jihad on the Internet, 16 National Strategy F. Rev. 14 (Summer 2007). |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Interdiction | Military: In the military, interdiction is the act of delaying, disrupting, or destroying enemy forces or supplies en route to the battle area. A distinction is often made between strategic and tactical interdiction. The former refers to operations whose effects are broad and long-term; tactical operations are designed to affect events rapidly and in a localized area.
Types: In different theaters of conflict:
Air: Air interdiction or Interdiction bombing
Ground: No-drive zone
Sea: Maritime interdiction or Blockade
Law enforcement: The term interdiction is also used in criminology and law enforcement, such as in the U.S. War on Drugs and in immigration.
Espionage:
United States: The term interdiction is also used by the NSA when an electronics shipment is secretly intercepted by an intelligence agency (domestic or foreign) for the purpose of implanting bugs before they reach their destination. According to Der Spiegel, the NSA's TAO group is able to divert shipping deliveries to its own "secret workshops" in a method called interdiction, where agents load malware onto the electronics or install malicious hardware that can give US intelligence agencies remote access. The report also indicates that the NSA, in collaboration with the CIA and FBI, routinely and secretly intercepts shipping deliveries for laptops or other computer accessories, such as a computer monitor or keyboard cables with hidden wireless transmitters bugs built-in for eavesdropping on video and keylogging.
China: In July 2014 it was reported that handheld shipping image scanners manufactured in China were found with pre-installed, weaponized malware which was capable of exfiltrating CRM data and financial data. These scanners are of the type used by many United States retailers and warehouses, as well as delivery services such as United Parcel Service and FedEx. The scanned data was copied and sent out to an established comprehensive command and control connection (CnC) to a Chinese botnet that was terminated at the Shandong Lanxiang Vocational School located in China.
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Investment (military) | Antiquity: Thucydides notes the role circumvallation played in the Sicilian Expedition and in the Spartan siege of Plataea during the initial stages of the Peloponnesian War in 429 BC.
Julius Caesar in his Commentaries on the Gallic War describes his textbook use of the circumvallation to defeat the Gauls under their chieftain, Vercingetorix, at the Siege of Alesia in September 52 BC.
During the Siege of Jerusalem, Titus and his Roman legions built a circumvallation, cutting down all trees within fifteen kilometres (9 miles).
Middle Ages: Another example from the pre-modern period is the Siege of Constantinople (717–718).
The caliph of the Umayyad Empire took advantage of the violent anarchy in the Byzantine Empire to prepare a huge host, comprising more than 100,000 troops and 1,800 ships, to take them to the Byzantine capital, Constantinople. Upon arriving outside the city's Theodosian walls, the Arab army had some knowledge that Emperor Leo III the Isaurian had allied with Bulgaria under Khan Tervel, and so, in preparation for the Bulgarian army, built a set of stone walls against the city and against the countryside, with the Arab camp in between.
King Pepin the Short of Francia built a number of fortified camps during his Siege of Bourbon (761) to surround the town completely. He built a complete set of lines of circumvallation and contravallation during the Siege of Bourges (762).
Modern era: The basic objectives and tactics of a military investment have remained the same in the modern era. During the Second World War, there were many sieges and many investments. One of the best-known sieges of the war, which demonstrated the tactical use of investment, was the
Siege of Stalingrad. During the first half of the siege, the Germans were unable to fully encircle the city and so the Soviets got men and supplies in across the Volga River. During the second half of the battle, the complete investment of Stalingrad by the Soviets, including airspace, which prevented the construction by the Germans of an adequately large airbridge, eventually forced the starving Germans in the city to surrender.
In modern times, investments and sieges of cities are often combined with intensive shelling, air strikes and extensive use of land and/or sea mines.
See also: Encirclement
List of established military terms
References:
Sources: Petersen, Leif Inge Ree (2013). Siege Warfare and Military Organization in the Successor States (400–800 AD): Byzantium, the West and Islam. Leiden: Brill. ISBN 978-90-04-25199-1. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Irregular military | Regular vs. irregular: The words "regular" and "irregular" have been used to describe combat forces for hundreds of years, usually with little ambiguity. The requirements of a government's chain of command cause the regular army to be very well defined, and anybody fighting outside it, other than official paramilitary forces, are irregular. In case the legitimacy of the army or its opponents is questioned, some legal definitions have been created.
In international humanitarian law, the term "irregular forces" refers to a category of combatants that consists of individuals forming part of the armed forces of a party to an armed conflict, international or domestic, but not belonging to that party's regular forces and operating inside or outside of their own territory, even if the territory is under occupation.
The Third Geneva Convention of 1949 uses "regular armed forces" as a critical distinction. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is a non-governmental organization primarily responsible for and most closely associated with the drafting and successful completion of the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War ("GPW"). The ICRC provided commentary saying that "regular armed forces" satisfy four Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) (Hague IV) conditions. In other words, "regular forces" must satisfy the following criteria:
being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates to a party of conflict
having a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance
carrying arms openly
conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war
By extension, combat forces that do not satisfy these criteria are termed "irregular forces".
Types: The term "irregular military" describes the "how" and "what", but it is more common to focus on the "why" as just about all irregular units were created to provide a tactical advantage to an existing military, whether it was privateer forces harassing shipping lanes against assorted New World colonies on behalf of their European contractors, or Auxiliaries, levies, civilian and other standing irregular troops that are used as more expendable supplements to assist costly trained soldiers. Bypassing the legitimate military and taking up arms is an extreme measure. The motivation for doing so is often used as the basis of the primary label for any irregular military. Different terms come into and out of fashion, based on political and emotional associations that develop. Here is a list of such terms, which is organized more or less from oldest to latest:
Auxiliaries – foreign or allied troops supplementing the regular army, organized from provincial or tribal regions. In the Imperial Roman army, it became common to maintain a number of auxiliaries about equal to the legionaries.
Levies – feudal peasants and freemen liable to be called up for short-term military duty.
Privateer – a "for-profit" private person or ship authorized and sponsored by a government by letters of marque to attack foreign vessels during wartime and to destroy or disrupt logistics of the enemy during "peacetime", often on the open sea by attacking its merchant shipping, rather than engaging its combatants or enforcing a blockade against them.
Revolutionary – someone part of a revolution, whether military or not.
Guerrilla – someone who uses unconventional military tactics. The term tends to refer to groups engaged in open conflict, rather than underground resistance. It was coined during the Peninsula War in Spain against France.
Montoneras – they were a type of irregular forces that were formed in the 19th century in Latin America.
Franc-tireur – French irregular forces during the Franco-Prussian War. The term is also used in international legal cases as a synonym for unprivileged combatant (for example the Hostages Trial [1947–1948]).
Militia – military force composed of ordinary citizens.
Ordenanças – The Portuguese territorial militia system from the 16th century to the 19th century. From the 17th century, it became the third line of the Army, serving both as local defense force and as the mobilization system that provided conscripts for the first (Regular) and second (Militia) lines of the Army.
Partisan – In the 20th century, someone part of a resistance movement. In the 18th and 19th century, a local conventional military force using irregular tactics. Often used to refer to resistance movements against the Axis Powers during the Second World War.
Freedom fighter – A type of irregular military in which the main cause, in their or their supporters' view, is freedom for themselves or others.
Paramilitary – An organization whose structure, tactics, training, subculture, and (often) function are similar to those of a professional military, but which is not part of a country's official or legitimate armed forces.
Terrorist – An irregular military that targets civilians and other non-combatants to gain political leverage. The term is almost always used pejoratively. Although reasonably well defined, its application is frequently controversial.
False flag or pseudo-operations – Troops of one side dressing like troops of another side to eliminate or discredit the latter and its support, such as members of the Panzer Brigade 150, commanded by Waffen-SS commando Otto Skorzeny in Operation Greif during the Battle of the Bulge in World War II and Selous Scouts of the Rhodesian Bush War.
Insurgent – An alternate term for a member of an irregular military that tends to refer to members of underground groups such as the Iraqi Insurgency, rather than larger rebel organizations like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.
Fifth column - A group that carries out sabotage, disinformation, espionage, and/or terrorism within a group that responds to external enemies
Bandit - It is generally treated as an organized crime, but it has the character of a resistance movement depending on the political and social situation.
Private army - Combatants who owe their allegiance to a private person, group, or organization.
Mercenary or "soldier of fortune" – Someone who is generally not a national in a standing army or not otherwise an inherently-invested party to an armed conflict who becomes involved in an armed conflict for monetary motives or for private gain. Mercenaries are often explicitly hired to fight or provide manpower or expertise in exchange for money; material wealth or, less commonly, political power. Mercenaries are often experienced combatants or former regular soldiers who decided to sell their combat experience, skill or manpower to interested parties or to the highest bidder in an armed conflict. Famous historic examples of "professional" or organized (often "career") mercenaries include the Italian condottieri, or "contractors", leaders of "free agent" mercenary armies that provided their armies to the various Italian city-states and the Papal states during the Late Middle Ages and Renaissance Italy in exchange for profit, land or power. However, not all soldiers deemed to be "mercenaries" are "professional" or "career" mercenaries, and many mercenaries may be simply opportunists or persons with no prior combat experience. Whether a combatant is truly a "mercenary" may be a matter of controversy or degree, as financial and national interests often overlap, and most standing regular armies also provide their soldiers with some form of payment. Furthermore, as reflected in the Geneva Convention, mercenaries are generally provided less protection under the rules of war than non-mercenaries, and many countries have criminalized "mercenary activity".
Intense debates can build up over which term is to be used to refer to a specific group. Using one term over another can strongly imply strong support or opposition for the cause.
It is possible for a military to cross the line between regular and irregular. Isolated regular army units that are forced to operate without regular support for long periods of time can degrade into irregulars. As an irregular military becomes more successful, it may transition away from irregular, even to the point of becoming the new regular army if it wins.
Regular military units that use irregular military tactics: Most conventional military officers and militaries are wary of using irregular military forces and see them as unreliable, of doubtful military usefulness, and prone to committing atrocities leading to retaliation in kind. Usually, such forces are raised outside the regular military like the British SOE during World War II and, more recently, the CIA's Special Activities Center. However at times, such as out of desperation, conventional militaries will resort to guerilla tactics, usually to buy breathing space and time for themselves by tying up enemy forces to threaten their line of communications and rear areas, such as the 43rd Battalion Virginia Cavalry and the Chindits.
Although they are part of a regular army, United States Special Forces are trained in missions such as implementing irregular military tactics. However, outside the United States, the term special forces does not generally imply a force that is trained to fight as guerillas and insurgents. Originally, the United States Special Forces were created to serve as a cadre around which stay-behind resistance forces could be built in the event of a communist victory in Europe or elsewhere. The United States Special Forces and the CIA's Special Activities Center can trace their lineage to the OSS operators of World War II, which were tasked with inspiring, training, arming and leading resistance movements in German-occupied Europe and Japanese occupied Asia.
In Finland, well-trained light infantry Sissi troops use irregular tactics such as reconnaissance, sabotage and guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines.
The founder of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong actively advocated for the use of irregular military tactics by regular military units. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Irregular military | Although they are part of a regular army, United States Special Forces are trained in missions such as implementing irregular military tactics. However, outside the United States, the term special forces does not generally imply a force that is trained to fight as guerillas and insurgents. Originally, the United States Special Forces were created to serve as a cadre around which stay-behind resistance forces could be built in the event of a communist victory in Europe or elsewhere. The United States Special Forces and the CIA's Special Activities Center can trace their lineage to the OSS operators of World War II, which were tasked with inspiring, training, arming and leading resistance movements in German-occupied Europe and Japanese occupied Asia.
In Finland, well-trained light infantry Sissi troops use irregular tactics such as reconnaissance, sabotage and guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines.
The founder of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong actively advocated for the use of irregular military tactics by regular military units. In his book On Guerrilla Warfare, Mao described seven types of Guerilla units, and argues that "regular army units temporarily detailed for the purpose (of guerilla warfare)," "regular army units permanently detailed (for the purpose of guerilla warfare)," and bands of guerillas created "through a combination of a regular army unit and a unit recruited from the people" were all examples of ways in which regular military units could be involved in irregular warfare. Mao argues that regular army units temporarily detailed for irregular warfare are essential because "First, in mobile-warfare situations, the coordination of guerilla activities with regular operations is necessary. Second, until guerilla hostilities can be developed on a grand scale, there is no one to carry out guerilla missions but regulars." He also emphasizes the importance for the use of regular units permanently attached to guerilla warfare activities, stating that they can play key roles in severing enemy supply routes.
Effectiveness: While the morale, training and equipment of the individual irregular soldier can vary from very poor to excellent, irregulars are usually lacking the higher-level organizational training and equipment that is part of regular army. This usually makes irregulars ineffective in direct, main-line combat, the typical focus of more standard armed forces. Other things being equal, major battles between regulars and irregulars heavily favor the regulars.
However, irregulars can excel at many other combat duties besides main-line combat, such as scouting, skirmishing, harassing, pursuing, rear-guard actions, cutting supply, sabotage, raids, ambushes and underground resistance. Experienced irregulars often surpass the regular army in these functions. By avoiding formal battles, irregulars have sometimes harassed high quality armies to destruction.
The total effect of irregulars is often underestimated. Since the military actions of irregulars are often small and unofficial, they are underreported or even overlooked. Even when engaged by regular armies, some military histories exclude all irregulars when counting friendly troops, but include irregulars in the count of enemy troops, making the odds seem much worse than they were. This may be accidental; counts of friendly troops often came from official regular army rolls that exclude unofficial forces, while enemy strength often came from visual estimates, where the distinction between regular and irregular were lost. If irregular forces overwhelm regulars, records of the defeat are often lost in the resulting chaos.
History: By definition, "irregular" is understood in contrast to "regular armies", which grew slowly from personal bodyguards or elite militia. In Ancient warfare, most civilized nations relied heavily on irregulars to augment their small regular army. Even in advanced civilizations, the irregulars commonly outnumbered the regular army.
Sometimes entire tribal armies of irregulars were brought in from internal native or neighboring cultures, especially ones that still had an active hunting tradition to provide the basic training of irregulars. The regulars would only provide the core military in the major battles; irregulars would provide all other combat duties.
Notable examples of regulars relying on irregulars include Bashi-bazouk units in the Ottoman Empire, auxiliary cohorts of Germanic peoples in the Roman Empire, Cossacks in the Russian Empire, and Native American forces in the American frontier of the Confederate States of America.
One could attribute the disastrous defeat of the Romans at the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest to the lack of supporting irregular forces; only a few squadrons of irregular light cavalry accompanied the invasion of Germany when normally the number of foederati and auxiliaries would equal the regular legions. During this campaign the majority of locally recruited irregulars defected to the Germanic tribesmen led by the former auxiliary officer Arminius.
During the decline of the Roman Empire, irregulars made up an ever-increasing proportion of the Roman military. At the end of the Western Empire, there was little difference between the Roman military and the barbarians across the borders.
Following Napoleon's modernisation of warfare with the invention of conscription, the Peninsular War led by Spaniards against the French invaders in 1808 provided the first modern example of guerrilla warfare. Indeed, the term of guerrilla itself was coined during this time.
As the Industrial Revolution dried up the traditional source of irregulars, nations were forced take over the duties of the irregulars using specially trained regular army units. Examples are the light infantry in the British Army.
Irregular regiments in British India: Prior to 1857 Britain's East India Company maintained large numbers of cavalry and infantry regiments officially designated as "irregulars", although they were permanently established units. The end of Muslim rule saw a large number of unemployed Indian Muslim horsemen, who were employed in the army of the EIC. British officers such as Skinner, Gardner and Hearsay had become leaders of irregular cavalry that preserved the traditions of Mughal cavalry, which had a political purpose because it absorbed pockets of cavalrymen who might otherwise become disaffected plunderers. These were less formally drilled and had fewer British officers (sometimes only three or four per regiment) than the "regular" sepoys in British service. This system enabled the Indian officers to achieve greater responsibility than their counterparts in regular regiments. Promotion for both Indian and British officers was for efficiency and energy, rather than by seniority as elsewhere in the EIC's armies. In irregular cavalry the Indian troopers provided their horses under the silladar system. The result was a loose collection of regiments which in general were more effective in the field than their regular counterparts. These irregular units were also cheaper to raise and maintain and as a result many survived into the new Indian Army that was organized following the great Indian Rebellion of 1857.
Irregular military in Canada before 1867: Before 1867, military units in Canada consisted of British units of volunteers.
During French rule, small local volunteer militia units or colonial militias were used to provide defence needs. During British control of various local militias, the Provincial Marine were used to support British regular forces in Canada.
Other instances of irregulars: Use of large irregular forces featured heavily in wars such as the Three Kingdoms period, the American Revolution, the Irish War of Independence and Irish Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War, the Russian Civil War, the Second Boer War, Liberation war of Bangladesh, Vietnam War, the Syrian Civil War and especially the Eastern Front of World War II where hundreds of thousands of partisans fought on both sides.
The Chinese People's Liberation Army began as a peasant guerilla force which in time transformed itself into a large regular force. This transformation was foreseen in the doctrine of "people's war", in which irregular forces were seen as being able to engage the enemy and to win the support of the populace but as being incapable of taking and holding ground against regular military forces.
Examples: Arbegnoch - Guerrilla force in occupied Ethiopia 1936-44.
Armatoloi - Ottoman Greek irregulars
Armenian fedayi – Armenian irregular units of the 1880s–1920s
Atholl Highlanders – The only legal and still existing private army in Europe under the command of the Duke of Atholl in Scotland, United Kingdom, (1777–1783 and since 1839)
Bands - (Italian Army colonial and foreign irregulars)
Bargi - Maratha horsemen 1741-51.
Bashi-bazouk – Irregular mounted mercenary in the Ottoman Empire
Border ruffian / Jayhawker
Bushwhackers – Irregular partisans who fought for the South during the American Civil War.
Cacos - Haitian insurgent groups 19th and 20th centuries.
Camisards – Huguenot insurgency in the beginning of the 18th century in the Cévennes
Cateran - Scottish clan warriors and marauders pre-18th century.
Çetes - Muslim irregulars Asia Minor 1910s-1920s
Cheta - armed bands resisting Ottoman rule in Macedonia, early 20th century.
Chetniks - nationalist movement and guerrilla force in occupied Yugoslavia 1941-44.
Croats (military unit) - 17th century frontier light cavalry in Habsburgh service.
Dubat - indigenous auxiliaries in Italian Somaliand.
Fano - Ethiopian guerrilla force
Fedayeen - Arabic term for fighters willing to sacrifice themselves
Fellagha - nationalist militants in Algeria and Tunisia opposing French colonial rule 1950s.
Filibuster (military) - participants in foreign military interventions without official backing. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Irregular military | Camisards – Huguenot insurgency in the beginning of the 18th century in the Cévennes
Cateran - Scottish clan warriors and marauders pre-18th century.
Çetes - Muslim irregulars Asia Minor 1910s-1920s
Cheta - armed bands resisting Ottoman rule in Macedonia, early 20th century.
Chetniks - nationalist movement and guerrilla force in occupied Yugoslavia 1941-44.
Croats (military unit) - 17th century frontier light cavalry in Habsburgh service.
Dubat - indigenous auxiliaries in Italian Somaliand.
Fano - Ethiopian guerrilla force
Fedayeen - Arabic term for fighters willing to sacrifice themselves
Fellagha - nationalist militants in Algeria and Tunisia opposing French colonial rule 1950s.
Filibuster (military) - participants in foreign military interventions without official backing.
Free Corps (Freikorps) – volunteer units in German-speaking countries, that existed from the 18th to the early 20th centuries as private armies
Free Swarm (Freischar) – volunteers, that participated in a conflict without the formal authorisation of one of the belligerents, but on the instigation of a political party or an individual
Goumiers – originally tribal allies supporting France in Algeria during the 19th century. From 1912 to 1956 Moroccan auxiliaries serving with the French Army.
Hajduks— bandits and irregulars in and against the Ottoman Empire, but found amongst military ranks in Hungary and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth
Harkis – Algerian Muslim irregulars who served with the French Army during the Algerian War of 1954–62.
Haydamak - pro-Cossack paramilitary (18th century)
Honghuzi – Manchurian bandits who served as irregulars during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905.
Jagunço – armed hand in Northern Brazil.
Kachaks - Albanian bandits and rebels (1880s–1930)
Klephts – Greek guerrilla fighters in Ottoman Greece
Komitadji – rebel bands operating in the Balkans during the final period of the Ottoman Empire.
Kuruc - Hungarian insurgent groups 17th-18th centuries.
Kuva-yi Milliye - Ottoman/Turkish militia 1918-1921
Land Storm (troops) (Landsturm) – created by a 21 April 1813 edict of Frederick William III of Prussia, lowest level of reserve troops in Prussia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands
Legion of Frontiersmen – An irregular quasi-military organization that proliferated throughout the British Empire prior to World War I
Macheteros de Jara - Paraguayan cavalry regiment of the Chaco War
Republiquetas
Requeté
Makhnovshchina – Ukrainian anarchist army that fought both the White Armies and the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War.
Minutemen – American irregular troops during the American Revolution
Morlachs - Dalmatian auxiliaries in Venetian service during the 17th century.
People's Liberation Armed Forces of South Vietnam- Viet Cong's army
Pindari – 18th century irregular horsemen in India
Rapparee - Irish guerillas (1690s)
Righteous Army— militias organised at several dates in Korean history
Rough Riders – in the Spanish–American War
Ruga-Ruga - East African auxiliaries to German and British colonial armies.
Selbstschutz
Shifta – local militia in the Horn of Africa,
Trenck's Pandurs – Habsburg monarchy 17th and 18th century skirmisher, later evolving in the regular Grenz infantry.
Zapatistas - militant political movement active in southern Mexico from 1994.
Zeybeks - Ottoman irregulars (17th to 20th centuries)
Irregulars in today's warfare: Modern conflicts in post-invasion Iraq, the renewed Taliban insurgency in the 2001 war in Afghanistan, the Darfur conflict, the rebellion in the North of Uganda by the Lord's Resistance Army, and the Second Chechen War are fought almost entirely by irregular forces on one or both sides.
The CIA's Special Activities Center (SAC) is the premiere American paramilitary clandestine unit for creating or combating irregular military forces. SAD paramilitary officers created and led successful units from the Hmong tribe during the Laotian Civil War in the 1960s and 1970s. They also organized and led the Mujaheddin as an irregular force against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, as well as the Northern Alliance as an irregular insurgency force against the Taliban with US Army Special Forces during the war in Afghanistan in 2001 and organized and led the Kurdish Peshmerga with US Army Special Forces as an irregular counter-insurgency force against the Kurdish Sunni Islamist group Ansar al-Islam at the Iraq-Iran border and as an irregular force against Saddam Hussein during the war in Iraq in 2003.
Irregular civilian volunteers also played a large role in the Battle of Kyiv during the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine.
See also: Asymmetric warfare – Military theory that also includes regulars vs. irregulars
Fourth generation warfare
"Yank" Levy, teacher of the Home Guard and coauthor of the first practical book on Guerrilla Warfare
Low intensity conflict
Military volunteer
Unconventional warfare
Violent non-state actors
Sissi (Finnish light infantry)
Legal aspects, categories: Definition of terrorism
Enemy combatant, US term used during the "War on Terror"
Law of war
Martens Clause, stating that customary law applies where specific law is lacking in detail
Unlawful combatant
References:
Bibliography:
References:
Further reading: Beckett, I. F. W. (15 September 2009). Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare (Hardcover). Santa Barbara, California: Abc-Clio Inc. ISBN 978-0874369298. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Irregular warfare | Terminology:
Early usage: One of the earliest known uses of the term irregular warfare is in the 1986 English edition of "Modern Irregular Warfare in Defense Policy and as a Military Phenomenon" by former Nazi officer Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte. The original 1972 German edition of the book is titled "Der Moderne Kleinkrieg als Wehrpolitisches und Militarisches Phänomen". The German word "Kleinkrieg" is literally translated as "Small War." The word "Irregular," used in the title of the English translation of the book, seems to be a reference to non "regular armed forces" as per the Third Geneva Convention.
Another early use of the term is in a 1996 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) document by Jeffrey B. White. Major military doctrine developments related to IW were done between 2004 and 2007 as a result of the September 11 attacks on the United States. A key proponent of IW within US Department of Defense (DoD) is Michael G. Vickers, a former paramilitary officer in the CIA. The CIA's Special Activities Center (SAC) is the premiere American paramilitary clandestine unit for creating and for combating irregular warfare units. For example, SAC paramilitary officers created and led successful irregular units from the Hmong tribe during the war in Laos in the 1960s, from the Northern Alliance against the Taliban during the war in Afghanistan in 2001, and from the Kurdish Peshmerga against Ansar al-Islam and the forces of Saddam Hussein during the war in Iraq in 2003.
Other definitions: IW is a form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority. IW favors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric approaches in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.
IW is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)
IW involves conflicts in which enemy combatants are not regular military forces of nation-states.
IW is "war among the people" as opposed to "industrial war" (i.e., regular war).
Examples: Nearly all modern wars include at least some element of irregular warfare. Since the time of Napoleon, approximately 80% of conflict has been irregular in nature.
However, the following conflicts may be considered to have exemplified by irregular warfare:
Afghan Civil War
Algerian War
American Indian Wars
American Revolutionary War
Arab Revolt
Chinese Civil War
Cuban Revolution
First Chechen War
First Sudanese Civil War
Iraq War
Kosovo War
Lebanese Civil War
Portuguese Colonial War
Rwanda Civil War
Second Boer War
Second Chechen War
Second Sudanese Civil War
Somali Civil War
Philippine-American War
The Troubles
Vietnam War
Libyan Civil War (2011)
Syrian Civil War
Iraqi Civil War (2014–2017)
Second Libyan Civil War
Yemeni Civil War (2015–present)
Activities: Activities and types of conflict included in IW are:
Asymmetric warfare
Civil-military operations (CMO)
Colonial war
Foreign internal defense (FID)
Guerrilla warfare (GW)
Insurgency/Counter-insurgency (COIN)
Law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries
Military Intelligence and counter-intelligence activities
Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO)
Terrorism/Counter-terrorism
Transnational criminal activities that support or sustain IW:
narco-trafficking
Illicit arms trafficking
illegal financial transactions
Unconventional warfare (UW)
According to the DoD, there are five core activities of IW:
Counter-insurgency (COIN)
Counter-terrorism (CT)
Unconventional warfare (UW)
Foreign internal defense (FID)
Stabilization Operations (SO)
Modeling and simulation: As a result of DoD Directive 3000.07, United States armed forces are studying irregular warfare concepts using modeling and simulation.
Wargames and exercises: There have been several military wargames and military exercises associated with IW, including:
Unified Action,
Unified Quest,
January 2010 Tri-Service Maritime Workshop,
Joint Irregular Warrior Series war games,
Expeditionary Warrior war game series, and
a December 2011 Naval War College Maritime Stability Operations Game focused specifically on stability operations in the maritime domain conducted by the Naval Service.
See also: Individuals:
Che Guevara
François Géré
John R. M. Taylor
T. E. Lawrence
Robert Rogers' 28 "Rules of Ranging"
Notes:
References:
External links:
Military Art and Science Major - Irregular Warfare Specialty Track [11] Archived 2016-03-03 at the Wayback Machine
Pincus, Walter, "Irregular Warfare, Both Future and Present," The Washington Post, 7 April 2008 [12]
Phillips, Joan T., Fairchild, Muir S.,"Irregular Warfare", Maxwell Air Force Base, March 2007 [13] Archived 2017-05-01 at the Wayback Machine
Gustafson, Michael, "Modern Irregular Warfare & Counterinsurgency", Swedish National Defence College, 2009 [14] Archived 2010-08-23 at the Wayback Machine
Coons, Kenneth C. Jr., Harned, Glenn M., "Irregular Warfare is Warfare", Joint Force Quarterly, National Defense University, 2009 [15] Archived 2009-01-09 at the Wayback Machine
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (CTIW) [16]
United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Irregular Warfare Center (JIWC) [17] Archived 2011-07-25 at the Wayback Machine
Armed Groups and Irregular Warfare; Adapting Professional Military Education, Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Roy Godson, and Querine Hanlon (Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 2009). [18]
Tomkins, Paul, Irregular Warfare: Annotated Bibliography. Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2011. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Islamic military jurisprudence | Development of rulings: The first military rulings were formulated during the first century after Muhammad established an Islamic state in Medina. These rulings evolved in accordance with the interpretations of the Qur'an (the Islamic Holy scriptures) and Hadith (the recorded traditions, actions (behaviors), sayings and consents of Muhammad). The key themes in these rulings were the justness of war (Harb), and the injunction to jihad. The rulings do not cover feuds and armed conflicts in general.
Jihad (Arabic for "struggle") was given a military dimension after the oppressive practices of the Meccan Quraish against Muslims. It was interpreted as the struggle in God's cause to be conducted by the Muslim community. Injunctions relating to jihad have been characterized as individual as well as collective duties of the Muslim community. Hence, the nature of attack is important in the interpretation—if the Muslim community as a whole is attacked jihad becomes incumbent on all Muslims. Jihad is differentiated further in respect to the requirements within Muslim-governed lands (Dar al-Islam) and non-Muslim lands, both friendly and hostile.
According to Shaheen Sardar Ali and Javaid Rehman, both professors of law, the Islamic military jurisprudence are in line with rules of modern international law. They point to the dual commitment of Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) member states (representing most of the Muslim world) to Islamic law and the United Nations Charter, as evidence of compatibility of both legal systems.
Ethics of warfare: Fighting is justified for legitimate self-defense, to aid other Muslims and after a violation in the terms of a treaty, but should be stopped if these circumstances cease to exist. War should be conducted in a disciplined way, to avoid injuring non-combatants, with the minimum necessary force, without anger and with humane treatment towards prisoners of war.
During his life, Muhammad gave various injunctions to his forces and adopted practices toward the conduct of war. The most important of these were summarized by Muhammad's companion and first Caliph, Abu Bakr, in the form of ten rules for the Muslim army:
O people! I charge you with ten rules; learn them well! Stop, O people, that I may give you ten rules for your guidance in the battlefield. Do not commit treachery or deviate from the right path. You must not mutilate dead bodies. Neither kill a child, nor a woman, nor an aged man. Bring no harm to the trees, nor burn them with fire, especially those which are fruitful. Slay not any of the enemy's flock, save for your food. You are likely to pass by people who have devoted their lives to monastic services; leave them alone.
According to Tabari, the ten bits of "advice" that Abu Bakr gave was during the Expedition of Usama bin Zayd. During the Battle of Siffin, the Caliph Ali stated that Islam does not permit Muslims to stop the supply of water to their enemy. In addition to the Rashidun Caliphs, hadiths attributed to Muhammad himself suggest that he stated the following regarding the Muslim conquest of Egypt that eventually took place after his death:
You are going to enter Egypt a land where qirat (money unit) is used. Be extremely good to them as they have with us close ties and marriage relationships. When you enter Egypt after my death, recruit many soldiers from among the Egyptians because they are the best soldiers on earth, as they and their wives are permanently on duty until the Day of Resurrection. Be good to the Copts of Egypt; you shall take them over, but they shall be your instrument and help. Be Righteous to God about the Copts.
These principles were upheld by 'Amr ibn al-'As during his conquest of Egypt. A Christian contemporary in the 7th century, John of Nikiû, stated the following regarding the conquest of Alexandria by 'Amr:
On the twentieth of Maskaram, Theodore and all his troops and officers set out and proceeded to the island of Cyprus, and abandoned the city of Alexandria. And thereupon 'Amr the chief of the Moslem made his entry without effort into the city of Alexandria. And the inhabitants received him with respect; for they were in great tribulation and affliction. And Abba Benjamin, the patriarch of the Egyptians, returned to the city of Alexandria in the thirteenth year after his flight from the Romans, and he went to the Churches, and inspected all of them. And every one said: 'This expulsion (of the Romans) and victory of the Moslem is due to the wickedness of the emperor Heraclius and his persecution of the Orthodox through the patriarch Cyrus. This was the cause of the ruin of the Romans and the subjugation of Egypt by the Moslem. And 'Amr became stronger every day in every field of his activity. And he exacted the taxes which had been determined upon, but he took none of the property of the Churches, and he committed no act of spoliation or plunder, and he preserved them throughout all his days.
The principles established by the early Caliphs were also honoured during the Crusades, as exemplified by Sultans such as Saladin and Al-Kamil. For example, after Al-Kamil defeated the Franks during the Crusades, Oliverus Scholasticus praised the Islamic laws of war, commenting on how Al-Kamil supplied the defeated Frankish army with food:
Who could doubt that such goodness, friendship and charity come from God? Men whose parents, sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, had died in agony at our hands, whose lands we took, whom we drove naked from their homes, revived us with their own food when we were dying of hunger and showered us with kindness even when we were in their power.
The early Islamic treatises on international law from the 9th century onwards covered the application of Islamic ethics, Islamic economic jurisprudence and Islamic military jurisprudence to international law, and were concerned with a number of modern international law topics, including the law of treaties; the treatment of diplomats, hostages, refugees and prisoners of war; the right of asylum; conduct on the battlefield; protection of women, children and non-combatant civilians; contracts across the lines of battle; the use of poisonous weapons; and devastation of enemy territory.
Criteria for soldiering: Muslim jurists agree that Muslim armed forces must consist of debt-free adults who possess a sound mind and body. In addition, the combatants must not be conscripted, but rather enlist of their free will, and with the permission of their family.
Legitimacy of war: Muslims have struggled to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate wars. Fighting in self-defense is not only legitimate but considered obligatory upon Muslims, according to the Qur'an. The Qur'an, however, says that should the enemy's hostile behavior cease, then the reason for engaging the enemy also lapses.
Defensive conflict: According to the majority of jurists, the Qur'anic casus belli (justification of war) are restricted to aggression against Muslims and fitna—persecution of Muslims because of their religious belief. They hold that unbelief in itself is not the justification for war. These jurists therefore maintain that only combatants are to be fought; noncombatants such as women, children, clergy, the aged, the insane, farmers, serfs, the blind, and so on are not to be killed in war. Thus, the Hanafī Ibn Najīm states: "the reason for jihād in our [the Hanafīs] view is kawnuhum harbā ‛alaynā [literally, their being at war against us]." The Hanafī jurists al-Shaybānī and al-Sarakhsī state that "although kufr [unbelief in God] is one of the greatest sins, it is between the individual and his God the Almighty and the punishment for this sin is to be postponed to the dār al-jazā’, (the abode of reckoning, the Hereafter)." War, according to the Hanafis, can't simply be made on the account of a nation's religion. Abdulaziz Sachedina argues that the original jihad according to his version of Shi'ism was permission to fight back against those who broke their pledges. Thus the Qur'an justified defensive jihad by allowing Muslims to fight back against hostile and dangerous forces.
Offensive conflict: Muhammad ibn Idris ash-Shafi`i (d. 820), founder of the Shafi'i school of thought, was the first to permit offensive jihad, limiting this warfare against pagan Arabs only, not permitting it against non-Arab non-Muslims. This view of al-Shafi'i is mitigated by the fact that an opposite view, in agreement with the majority, is also attributed to al-Shafi'i.
According to Abdulaziz Sachedina, offensive jihad raises questions about whether jihad is justifiable on moral grounds. He states that the Qur'an requires Muslims to establish just public order, increasing the influence of Islam, allowing public Islamic worship, through offensive measures. To this end, the Qur'anic verses revealed required Muslims to wage jihad against unbelievers who persecuted them. This has been complicated by the early Muslim conquests, which he argues were although considered jihad by Sunni scholars, but under close scrutiny can be determined to be political. Moreover, the offensive jihad points more to the complex relationship with the "People of the book". |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Islamic military jurisprudence | This view of al-Shafi'i is mitigated by the fact that an opposite view, in agreement with the majority, is also attributed to al-Shafi'i.
According to Abdulaziz Sachedina, offensive jihad raises questions about whether jihad is justifiable on moral grounds. He states that the Qur'an requires Muslims to establish just public order, increasing the influence of Islam, allowing public Islamic worship, through offensive measures. To this end, the Qur'anic verses revealed required Muslims to wage jihad against unbelievers who persecuted them. This has been complicated by the early Muslim conquests, which he argues were although considered jihad by Sunni scholars, but under close scrutiny can be determined to be political. Moreover, the offensive jihad points more to the complex relationship with the "People of the book".
Some major modern scholars who have rejected the idea of "offensive jihad" include the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), the Al-Azhar scholar Muhammad Abu Zahra (1898–1974) who thought that "military jihad is permitted only to remove aggression ('udwân) and religious persecution (fitnah) against Muslims", as well as Syrian scholars Mohamed Said Ramadan Al-Bouti (1929–2013) and Wahbah al-Zuhayli (1932-2015), the latter saying that "peace is the underlying principle of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. al-Zuhayli maintains that this view is supported by 8:61, as well as 2:208 and 4:94 that establish the principle of international peace. For him, Muslims should be committed to peace and security (on the basis of 4:90 and 60:8)."
International conflict: International conflicts are armed strifes conducted by one state against another, and are distinguished from civil wars or armed strife within a state. Some classical Islamic scholars, like the Shafi'i, classified territories into broad categories: dar al-islam ("abode of Islam"), dar al-harb ("abode of war), dar al-ahd ("abode of treaty"), and dar al-sulh ("abode of reconciliation"). Such categorizations of states, according to Asma Afsaruddin, are not mentioned in the Qur'an and Islamic tradition.
Declaration of war: The Qur'an commands Muslims to make a proper declaration of war prior to the commencement of military operations. Thus, surprise attacks prior to such a declaration are illegal under the Islamic jurisprudence. The Qur'an had similarly commanded Muhammad to give his enemies, who had violated the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, a time period of four months to reconsider their position and negotiate. This rule, however, is not binding if the adversary has already started the war. Forcible prevention of religious practice is considered an act of war.
Conduct of armed forces: During battle the Qur'an commands Muslims to fight against the enemy. However, there are restrictions to such combat. Burning or drowning the enemy is allowed only if it is impossible to achieve victory by other means. The mutilation of dead bodies is prohibited. The Qur'an also discourages Muslim combatants from displaying pomp and unnecessary boasting when setting out for battle.
According to professor Sayyid Dāmād, no explicit injunctions against use of chemical or biological warfare were developed by medieval Islamic jurists as these threats were not existent then. However, Khalil al-Maliki's Book on jihad states that combatants are forbidden to employ weapons that cause unnecessary injury to the enemy, except under dire circumstances. The book, as an example, forbids the use of poisonous spears, since it inflicts unnecessary pain.
Civilian areas: According to all madhhabs, it is not permissible to kill women or children unless they are fighting against the Muslims. The Hanafi, Hanbali and Maliki schools forbid killing of those who are not able to fight, including monks, farmers, and serfs, as well as mentally and physically disabled.
Harming civilian areas and pillaging residential areas is also forbidden, as is the destruction of trees, crops, livestock and farmlands. The Muslim forces may not loot travelers, as doing so is contrary to the spirit of jihad. Nor do they have the right to use the local facilities of the native people without their consent. If such a consent is obtained, the Muslim army is still under the obligation to compensate the people financially for the use of such facilities. However, Islamic law allows the confiscation of military equipment and supplies captured from the camps and military headquarters of the combatant armies.
However, 14th century Fiqih Ibn Hudayl of Granada says:
It is permissible to set fire to the lands of the enemy, his stores of grain, his beasts of burden—if it is not possible for the Muslims to take possession of them—as well as to cut down his trees, to raze his cities, in a word, to do everything that might ruin and discourage him, provided that the imam deems these measures appropriate, suited to hastening the Islamization of that enemy or to weakening him. Indeed, all this contributes to a military triumph over him or to forcing him to capitulate.
Negotiations: Commentators of the Qur'an agree that Muslims should always be willing and ready to negotiate peace with the other party without any hesitation. According to Maududi, Islam does not permit Muslims to reject peace and continue bloodshed.
Islamic jurisprudence calls for third party interventions as another means of ending conflicts. Such interventions are to establish mediation between the two parties to achieve a just resolution of the dispute.
Ceasefire: In the context of seventh century Arabia, the Qur'an ordained Muslims must restrain themselves from fighting in the months when fighting was prohibited by Arab pagans. The Qur'an also required the respect of this cease-fire, prohibiting its violation.
If, however, non-Muslims commit acts of aggression, Muslims are free to retaliate, though in a manner that is equal to the original transgression. The "sword verse", which has attracted attention, is directed against a particular group who violate the terms of peace and commit aggression (but excepts those who observe the treaty). Patricia Crone states that this verse seems to be based on the same above-mentioned rules. Here also it is stressed that one must stop when they do. Ibn Kathir states that the verse implies a hasty mission of besieging and gathering intelligence about the enemy, resulting in either death or repentance by the enemy. It is read as a continuation of previous verses, it would be concerned with the same oath-breaking of "polytheists".
Prisoners of war: Men, women, and children may all be taken as prisoners of war under traditional interpretations of Islamic law. Generally, a prisoner of war could be, at the discretion of the military leader, executed, freed, ransomed, exchanged for Muslim prisoners, or kept as slaves. In earlier times, the ransom sometimes took an educational dimension, where a literate prisoner of war could secure his or her freedom by teaching ten Muslims to read and write. Some Muslim scholars hold that a prisoner may not be ransomed for gold or silver, but may be exchanged for Muslim prisoners. Women and children prisoners of war cannot be killed under any circumstances, regardless of their religious convictions, but they may be freed or ransomed. Women who are neither freed nor ransomed by their people were to be kept in bondage - also referred to as malakah.
Kitab al-Umm of Al-Shafi'i also recorded how Zubayr ibn al-Awwam and Anas ibn Malik convinced Umar to pardon Hormuzan, despite Umar earlier intent to execute the Persian general for the death of his two precious soldiers, Mujaz'ah ibn Thawr as-Sadusi and al-Bara' ibn Malik. Umar in the end agreed with Zubayr and Anas to spare Hormuzan as prisoner of war, and this historical rulings of Zubayr, Anas, and caliph Umar became the guideline for Shafiite scholars that prisoner of war in normal condition are not allowed to be harmed.
Permission to interrogate & torture: However, there are special condition regarding the allowance the conduct of using torture as method of interrogation,
Ibn Taymiyyah, Hanbalite scholar who has been praised as Mujaddid, has issued Fatwa that using torture on certain case for exceptionally dangerous criminal or enemy of the state were allowed, which based on the conduct of Zubayr ibn al-Awwam, when he tortured the Jewish chieftain Kenana ibn al-Rabi in the aftermath of the conquest of Khaybar fortresses, as Kenana was hiding the war spoils in Khaibar and refused to tell it. Abd al-Aziz Bin Baz, late 19th AD Grand Mufti of Saudi also supported Ibn Taymiyyah fatwa and issued his own fatwa with similar ruling on the basis Zubayr conduct of interrogating Kenana. Ibn Baz highlighted Zubayr conduct were acknowledged and permitted by Muhammad, as Kenana was one of Jewish conspirator in Khaybar. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Islamic military jurisprudence | Abd al-Aziz Bin Baz, late 19th AD Grand Mufti of Saudi also supported Ibn Taymiyyah fatwa and issued his own fatwa with similar ruling on the basis Zubayr conduct of interrogating Kenana. Ibn Baz highlighted Zubayr conduct were acknowledged and permitted by Muhammad, as Kenana was one of Jewish conspirator in Khaybar. This criminal interrogation procedure exacted by Zubayr towards Kinana were also highlighted by other prominent scholars, such as Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Thalabi in his work, Tafsir al-Tha'labi
Shafiʽi school madhhab highlighted another case that were used in Ijma (consensus among scholars) to permit the interrogations towards enemy of the state were including the case when Ali ibn Abi Talib and Zubayr once threaten a polytheist informant spy who are being caught by the 2 Sahabah during the spy journey to inform Mecca about Muslims secret military operation.
This ruling of torturing testified and accepted by Islamic researcher as particular affirmative proposition in certain case against war criminal, which modern time Islamic jurisprudence law theorists agreed on by viewing the measure as the necessity of law upholding, rather than degradation of the rights of the prisoner as human.
Internal conflict: Internal conflicts include "civil wars", launched against rebels, and "wars for welfare" launched against bandits.
During their first civil war, Muslims fought at the Battle of Bassorah. In this engagement, Ali (the caliph), set the precedent for war against other Muslims, which most later Muslims have accepted. According to Ali's rules, wounded or captured enemies should not be killed, those throwing away their arms should not be fought, and those fleeing from the battleground should not be pursued. Only captured weapons and animals (horses and camels which have been used in the war) are to be considered war booty. No war prisoners, women or children are to be enslaved and the property of the slain enemies are to go to their legal Muslim heirs.
Different views regarding armed rebellion have prevailed in the Muslim world at different times. During the first three centuries of Muslim history, jurists held that a political rebel may not be executed nor his/her property confiscated.
Classical jurists, however, laid down severe penalties for rebels who use "stealth attacks" and "spread terror". In this category, Muslim jurists included abductions, poisoning of water wells, arson, attacks against wayfarers and travellers, assaults under the cover of night and rape. The punishment for such crimes were severe, including death, regardless of the political convictions and religion of the perpetrator.
Some modern commentators have argued that the classical precedent of harsh punishments for rebels engaging in attacks that harmed civilian populations can be taken as evidence that the religious justifications used by Islamist groups such as al Qaeda and ISIL are in fact, not grounded in the Islamic tradition.
See also: Islam and war
Geneva Conventions
Hague conventions
Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project (RULAC)
Itmaam-i-hujjat
Laws of war
Opinion of Islamic scholars on Jihad
Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition
Notes:
References: Aboul-Enein, H. Yousuf; Zuhur, Sherifa, "Islamic Rulings on Warfare", Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Diane Publishing Co., Darby PA, ISBN 1-4289-1039-5
Abu-Nimer, Mohammed (2000–2001). "A Framework for Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam". Journal of Law and Religion 15 (1/2). Retrieved on 2007-08-05.
Ali, Abdullah Yusuf (1991). The Holy Quran. Medina: King Fahd Holy Qur-an Printing Complex.
Charles, Robert H. (2007) [1916]. The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu: Translated from Zotenberg's Ethiopic Text. Merchantville, NJ: Evolution Publishing. ISBN 9781889758879.
Dāmād, Sayyid Mustafa Muhaqqiq et al. (2003). Islamic views on Human Rights. Tehran: Center for Cultural-International Studies.
Crone, Patricia (2004). God's Rule: Government and Islam. New York: Columbia University Press.
Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, Mizan (2001). The Islamic Law of Jihad, Dar ul-Ishraq. OCLC 52901690
Nicola Melis, Trattato sulla guerra. Il Kitāb al-ğihād di Molla Hüsrev, Aipsa, Cagliari 2002.
Madelung, Wilferd (1997). The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-64696-0.
Maududi, Sayyid Abul Ala (1967). The Meaning of the Quran. Lahore: Islamic publications.
Maududi, Sayyid Abul Ala (1998). Human Rights in Islam. Islamabad: Da'wah Academy.
M. Mukarram Ahmed, Muzaffar Husain Syed, ed. (2005). "Encyclopaedia of Islam: Introduction to Islam". Encyclopaedia of Islam. Anmol Publications PVT. LTD. ISBN 81-261-2339-7.
Further reading: Khadduri, Majid (1955). War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Johns Hopkins Press. ISBN 1-58477-695-1.
Hashmi, Sohail H., ed. (2002). Islamic Political Ethics: Civil Society, Pluralism, and Conflict. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-11310-6.
Malik, S. K. (1986). The Quranic Concept of War (PDF). Himalayan Books. ISBN 81-7002-020-4.
External links:
Jihad and the Islamic Law of War - RISSC |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Jewish laws on war | Characteristics: A mandatory war is to be distinguished from a "voluntary war" (מלחמת רשות; milḥemet reshūt), that is to say, a battle waged of free choice, which requires the approbation of the Sanhedrin, presumably in order to impose a religious and moral check on reckless warfare. It is also to be distinguished from a "religious war" (מלחמת מצוה; milḥemet mitzvah), which is restricted to those nations mentioned in the Hebrew Bible, such as Amalek and the nations of Canaan. The biblical command, in the case of the Canaanite inhabitants, was to exterminate them and to annex their territory, whereas others who made peace with Israel could be enslaved and forced to pay tribute.
For all practical purposes, a mandatory war can be described as a defensive war.
General overview: Specifically relating to the halachic laws governing the Jewish nation, Spanish Jewish rabbi and scholar, Menahem Meiri, has described the conditions needed for there to be a "mandatory war", saying that all wars, excepting those made for the conquest of the Land of Israel (such as at the time of Joshua), are to be deemed as "voluntary wars". A ruler cannot compel the Jewish people to fight in such "voluntary wars" (so-named because the ruler of that nation is either angry at his enemy, or simply wishes to show his prowess, or to extend his territorial domain), unless it be by the authorization of the greater Sanhedrin, composed of seventy-one judges. However, if there were a case whereby the nation of Israel had been attacked by an enemy for any reason, that would be tantamount to a battle waged in a religious cause ("religious war"), in which case it is the bounden duty of all in Israel to fight and resist the enemy, hence: a mandatory war (or battle waged in duty bound).
Maimonides further explains that whenever Israel finds itself fighting a battle in a religious cause, such as when an oppressor has come upon them in war to destroy them, the people of Israel need not obtain prior permission from the Rabbinic court to fight, but may go forth to the battle, and compel others to do the same.
Wars fought to redeem captives, such as those wars waged by Abraham to free Lot, and by David to free Jewish women and children in Ziklag (1 Sam. 30), are generally categorized as defensive wars.
The Hebrew expressions, Milḥemet mitzvah (religious war) and Milḥemet ḥovah (mandatory war), are sometimes used interchangeably, since they include the reactive defensive wars when Jewish habitations were attacked. Rabbi Yehuda, however, distinguishes between these two expressions.
Rabbinic discussions: [When you go out to war against your enemies, and see horses and chariots and an army larger than your own, you shall not be afraid of them, for the Lord your God is with you, who brought you up out of the land of Egypt, etc. (Deut. 20:1–ff.)] What does the saying here advanced pertain to? Said Rabbi Yehuda: 'The matter concerns a religious war (milḥemet mitzvah). However, in a mandatory war (milḥemet ḥovah), all go forth [into battle], even a bridegroom from his room and a bride from her bridal-chamber.' Our Mishnah [in Soṭah speaks of] when you go out to war against your enemies. The writing [in Mishnah Soṭah] speaks about the voluntary war (milḥemet ha-reshūt) [fought at Israel's own discretion].
One of the fine points arising from the rabbinic discussions on the subject is that, whenever Israel voluntarily wages a battle of free choice against another nation, unto Israel would apply all the conditions mentioned in the Hebrew Bible (Deuteronomy 20:1–ff.) and in Mishnah Soṭah (chapter 8). Although certain persons were permitted by Deuteronomy, chapter 20, to leave the field before a battle began, this was allowed, according to rabbinical opinion, only in case of a voluntary war. Wherefore, a man who has betrothed a wife and has yet to consummate that marriage, or who has planted a vineyard and has yet to partake of its fruit, or who has built a new house and who has not yet lived in that house for a year's time, etc. is exempt from participating in that war. However, if Israel were faced with an existential threat, the conditions of Deuteronomy (chapter 20) and of Mishnah Soṭah (chapter 8) would not apply, as not even a bridegroom is exempt from that war, but must rally behind Israel, and go forth to fight in Israel's defense. A mandatory war is, therefore, tantamount to a "religious war" and, as such, the general principle applies to everyone: "He that is currently engaged in performing one biblical commandment (i.e. defending Israel), he is exempt from doing another biblical commandment (i.e. cohabiting with his bride, etc.)" (העוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה).
Jewish soldiers conscripted in foreign armies: Although the laws governing a Mandatory war pertain to wars conducted in the Land of Israel, because of an existential threat to the Jewish people, it is still permissible for Jewish soldiers serving in foreign armies to set-out and rescue other Jewish and Gentile soldiers who had been taken captive by enemy forces, since the saving of Jewish life is tantamount to a Religious war, and may be waged without obtaining permission from the Court.
Warfare and the Sabbath-day: In Tractate Eruvin [45a] it was explained that the nations of the world who lay siege to the cities of Israel on the Sabbath-day, the people of Israel are not permitted to go out against them on the Sabbath-day with their armaments, but rather they (the besieged) are to shut themselves up before them and try to observe the laws of Sabbath as much as possible. What does the saying here advanced pertain to? This pertains to a case where it is certain that they have come to take away only money, or objects of money-value. However, if they had come to take away lives, even if it were only a doubtful case, the people of Israel are permitted to go out to battle against them and they desecrate the Sabbath on their account, in order to rescue them. If there was a Jewish city situated along the frontier of the Land of Israel where non-Jewish forces had laid siege to the city, even in such cases where they only came to take away bales of hay and straw, it is permitted for the Jewish nation to go out in battle against the invading army and to desecrate the Sabbath-day in order to save the city.
Elsewhere [ibid.], it was explained that even in the remaining cities and towns of Israel, it is one's bounden duty to go out to battle on their behalf, in order to assist them, and when they have eventually rescued their fellow countrymen, they are allowed to return to their place [on the Sabbath-day] with their own armaments in hand, seeing that if they were not allowed to do so they would refrain from assisting their brethren in future conflicts.
Ethical question: An ethical question was raised in the early 20th-century about whether or not one is permitted to give-up his own life in order to avert danger to the Jewish people as a whole, both in war and non-war situations, in which the answer posited by Abraham Isaac Kook (1865–1935) and by Shlomo Zalman Pines (1874–1954) was an unequivocal yes, although each man gave different reasons for this allowance. According to Rabbi Kook, "we expose ourselves to the dangers of killing and being killed in accordance with the nature of the world."
See also: Armed conflict
Declaration of war
Judaism and warfare
Jus ad bellum
Just war theory
Law of war
Laws of armed conflict
References:
Notes:
Further reading: Grunblatt, Joseph (1968). "Violence and Some Aspects of the Judaic Tradition". Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Jewish Thought. 10 (2). Rabbinical Council of America (RCA): 42–47. JSTOR 23256251.
Kimelman, Reuven (2023). "Judaism and the Ethics of War". The Cambridge Companion to Religion and War. pp. 215–240. doi:10.1017/9781108884075.013. ISBN 978-1-108-88407-5.
== Bibliography == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Jungle warfare | History:
Pre-modern: Throughout world history, forests have played significant roles in many of the most historic battles. For example, in the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest between the Romans and the Germanic tribes in 9 CE, the Germans used the forest to ambush the Romans. In ancient China, the Chinese Empire planted forests on its strategic borderland to thwart nomadic attacks. For example, the Northern Song Dynasty (960-1127) constructed and maintained an extensive defensive forest in present-day Hebei.
In the Amazon rainforest, there were fighting and wars between the neighboring tribes of the Jivaro. Several tribes of the Jivaroan group, including the Shuar, practised headhunting for trophies and headshrinking.
Nicaragua guerillas:
World War II:
Conventional jungle warfare: At the start of Pacific War in the Far East, the Japanese Imperial Forces were able to advance on all fronts. In the Malayan Campaign, time and again they infiltrated through the jungle to bypass static British positions based on road blocks so that they could cut the British supply line and attack their defences from all sides.
In early 1942, the fighting in Burma at the start of the Burma Campaign took on a similar aspect and resulted in one of the longest retreats in British military history. Most members of the British Indian Army left Burma with the belief that the Japanese were unstoppable in the jungle.
The Chindits were a special force of 3,500 that in February 1942 launched a deep penetration raid, code-named Operation Longcloth, into Japanese occupied Burma. They went in on foot and used mules to carry supplies. The operation was not a military success but was a propaganda boost for the Allies because it showed that Allied forces could successfully move and fight in jungle terrain well away from roads. On the back of the propaganda success, Orde Wingate, the eccentric commander of the Chindits, was given the resources to increase his command to divisional size and the USAAF supplied the 1st Air Commando Group to support his operations. The availability of air transport revolutionized Wingate's operational choices. In February 1944, Operation Thursday was launched, and air transport support supplied 1st Air to allow the Chindits to set up air supplied bases deep behind enemy lines from which aggressive combat patrols could be sent out to interdict Japanese supply lines and disrupt rear echelon forces. That in turn forced the Japanese 18th Division to pull frontline troops from the battle against X Force, which was advancing through Northern Burma, to protect the men building the Ledo Road. When the Japanese closed on a base and got within artillery range, the base could be abandoned and then set up in another remote location. The ability to sustain the bases that relied totally on air power in the coming decades would prove a template for many similar operations.
After the first Chindits expedition, thanks to the training the regular forces were receiving and the example of the Chindits and new divisional tactics, the regular units of the Fourteenth Army started to get the measure of both the jungle and the enemy. When the Japanese launched their late 1943 Arakan offensive they infiltrated Allied lines to attack the 7th Indian Infantry Division from the rear, overrunning the divisional HQ. Unlike previous occasions on which this had happened, the Allied forces stood firm against the attack and supplies were dropped to them by parachute. In the Battle of the Admin Box from 5 February to 23 February, the Japanese were unable to break through the heavily-defended perimeter of the box. The Japanese switched their attack to the central front, but again, the British fell back into defensive box of Imphal and the Kohima redoubt. In falling back to the defensive positions around Imphal, the leading British formations found their retreat cut by Japanese forces, but unlike previously, they took that attitude that the Japanese who were behind them were just as cut off as the British. The situation maps of the fighting along the roads leading to Imphal resembled a slice of marble cake, as both sides used the jungle to outflank each other. Another major change by the British was that use of air support both as an offensive weapon to replace artillery and as a logistical tool to transport men and equipment. For example, the 5th Indian Infantry Division was airlifted straight from the now-quieter Arakan front up to the central front and were in action within days of arriving. By the end of the campaigning season, both Kohima and Imphal had been relieved, and the Japanese were in full retreat.
The lessons learnt in Burma on how to fight in the jungle and how to use air transport to move troops around would lay the foundations of how to conduct large-scale jungle campaigns in future wars.
Unconventional jungle warfare: Immediately after the fall of Malaya and Singapore in 1942, a few British officers, such as Freddie Spencer Chapman, eluded capture and escaped into the central Malaysian jungle, where they helped to organize and train bands of lightly-armed local ethnic Chinese communists into a capable guerrilla force against the Japanese occupiers. What began as desperate initiatives by several determined British officers probably inspired the subsequent formation of the above-mentioned early jungle-warfare forces.
The British and the Australians contributed to the development of jungle warfare as the unconventional, low-intensity, guerrilla-style type of warfare understood today. V Force and Force 136 were composed of small bodies of soldiers and irregulars, equipped with no more than small arms and explosives but were rigorously trained in guerrilla warfare-style tactics, particularly in close-quarters combat, and fought behind enemy lines. They were joined in Burma by American led Kachin guerrillas were armed and coordinated by the American liaison organisation, OSS Detachment 101, which led, armed, and co-ordinated them.
Another small force operating in the Far East was the Australian-led Z Special Unit, which carried out a total of 81 covert operations in the South West Pacific theatre, some of which involved jungle warfare.
Cold War:
British experience during Malayan Emergency: After the war, early skills in jungle warfare were further honed in the Malayan Emergency, when in 1948 guerrilla fighters of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) turned against the Commonwealth. In addition to jungle discipline, field craft, and survival skills, special tactics such as combat tracking (first using native trackers), close-quarter fighting (tactics were developed by troopers who were protected only with fencing masks and stalked and shot each other in the jungle training ground with air rifles), small team operations (which led to the typical four-man special operations teams) and tree jumping (parachuting into the jungle and through the rain forest canopy) were developed from Borneo's native Iban people to actively take the war to the Communist guerrillas, instead of reacting to incidents that were initiated by them.
Of greater importance was the integration of the tactical jungle warfare with the strategic "winning hearts and minds" psychological, economic, and political warfare as a complete counter-insurgency package. The Malayan Emergency was declared over in 1960, as the surviving Communist guerrillas were driven to the jungle near the Thai border, where they remained until they gave up their armed struggle in 1989.
Cuban Revolution:
Brazilian military government guerrilla:
Portuguese Colonial War: In the 1960s and early 1970s, Portugal was engaged in jungle warfare operations in Africa against the independentist guerrillas of Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique. The operations were part of what is collectively known as the "Portuguese Colonial War". In fact, there were three different wars: the Angolan Independence War, the Guinea-Bissau War of Independence and the Mozambican War of Independence. The situation was unique in that small armed forces, those of Portugal, conducted three large-scale counterinsurgency wars at the same time, each in a different theatre of operations and separated by thousands of kilometres from the others. For those operations, Portugal developed its own counterinsurgency and jungle warfare doctrines. In the counterinsurgency operations, the Portuguese organized their forces into two main types, the grid (quadrilha) units and the intervention units. The grid units were each in charge of a given area of responsibility in which they were responsible to protect and keep the local populations from influence from the guerrillas. The intervention forces, mostly composed of special units (paratroopers, marines, commandos etc.) were highly-mobile units that were used to conduct strategic offensive operations against the guerrillas or to temporary reinforcing grid units under heavy attack.
Vietnam War: The British experience in counterinsurgency was passed onto the Americans during their involvement in the Vietnam War, where the battlegrounds were again the jungle. Much British strategic thinking on counterinsurgency tactics in a jungle environment was passed on through BRIAM (British Advisory Mission) to South Vietnam headed by Sir Robert Thompson, a former Chindit and the Permanent Secretary of Defense for Malaya during the Emergency.
The Americans further refined jungle warfare by the creation of such dedicated counterinsurgency special operations troops as the Special Forces (Green Berets), Rangers, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP), and Combat Tracker Teams (CTT).
During the decade of active U.S. combat involvement in the Vietnam War (1962–1972), jungle warfare became closely associated with counter insurgency and special operations troops.
However, although the American forces managed to have mastered jungle warfare at a tactical level in Vietnam, they were unable to install a successful strategic program in winning a jungle-based guerrilla war. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Jungle warfare | Much British strategic thinking on counterinsurgency tactics in a jungle environment was passed on through BRIAM (British Advisory Mission) to South Vietnam headed by Sir Robert Thompson, a former Chindit and the Permanent Secretary of Defense for Malaya during the Emergency.
The Americans further refined jungle warfare by the creation of such dedicated counterinsurgency special operations troops as the Special Forces (Green Berets), Rangers, Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP), and Combat Tracker Teams (CTT).
During the decade of active U.S. combat involvement in the Vietnam War (1962–1972), jungle warfare became closely associated with counter insurgency and special operations troops.
However, although the American forces managed to have mastered jungle warfare at a tactical level in Vietnam, they were unable to install a successful strategic program in winning a jungle-based guerrilla war. Hence, the American military lost the political war in Vietnam for failing to destroy the logistics bases of the Viet Cong and the Vietnamese People's Army along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
With the end of the Vietnam War, jungle warfare fell into disfavor among the major armies in the world, namely, those of the U.S.-led NATO and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, which focused their attention to conventional warfare with a nuclear flavor that was to be fought on the jungleless European battlefields.
American special operations troops that were created for the purpose of fighting in the jungle environment, such as LRRP and CTT, were disbanded, and other jungle-warfare-proficient troops, such as the Special Forces and Rangers, went through a temporary period of decline until they found their role in counterterrorism operations in the 1980s.
Central American Crisis:
Post-Cold War: The end of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s marked the beginning of the end of a number of proxy wars that had been fought between the superpowers in the jungles of Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia. In the euphoria at the end of the Cold War, many Western nations were quick to claim the peace dividend and reinvested resources to other priorities.
Jungle warfare was reduced in scope and priority in the regular training curriculum of most conventional Western armies. The nature of major military operations in the Middle East and Central Asia saw the need to put an emphasis upon desert warfare and urban warfare training in both the conventional and the unconventional warfare models.
Conflicts in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru:
Chittagong Hill Tracts:
Jungle units and training schools: The following military and police forces have specialized units that are trained and equipped to conduct jungle warfare:
Argentina: the Argentine Army has four companies of Cazadores de Monte (Jungle Hunters).
Brazil: the Brazilian Army has six Jungle Infantry Brigades: 1st, 2nd, 16th, 17th, 22nd and 23rd Jungle Infantry Brigades and others units, and the Jungle Warfare Training Center (CIGS). Brazilian Special Forces, Commandos, Parachute Infantry and Marine Corps are trained in jungle warfare too. The SOF of some State Military Police Forces, like the Military Police of São Paulo's Comandos e Operações Especiais, the Military Police of Minas Gerais's Batalhão de Operações Especiais (BOPE)/COMAF, the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro's Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (which has an agreement with the CIGS) and the Military Police of Maranhão's Companhia de Operações de Sobrevivência em Área Rural (COSAR) has training or are specialized in jungle operations. Jungle artillery is made by the 1st and the 10th Jungle Field Artillery Group.
Brunei:
Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF)
Royal Brunei Land Force (RBLF)
Gurkha Reserve Unit (GRU)
Royal Brunei Land Force Regiment (RBLFR)
Royal Brunei Navy (RBN)
Naval Surface Action Group (NSAG)
Royal Brunei Air Force (RBAF)
No. 236 Squadron
Parachute Airborne Tactical Delivery Unit (PATDU)
Royal Brunei Police Force (RBPF)
Special Operations Squad (PGK)
Cambodia:
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF)
Royal Cambodian Army
911th Special Forces Regiment
B-70
All infantry divisions and mechanized infantry brigade can fight in the jungle.
Royal Cambodian Navy
Naval Infantry Company
Royal Gendarmerie
Infantry Battalion
Colombia: Brigada de Fuerzas Especiales, Batallones de Selva.
Ecuador: the Ecuadorian Army maintains three units composed of jungle troops: the 17th, 19th and 21st Jungle Infantry Brigades (Brigadas de Infantería de Selva). In addition, it has an independent jungle battalion with personnel recruited from the native population of the jungle: the 23rd Special Operations Training Battalion (Batallón Escuela de Operaciones Especiales 23, or BEOES 23). It has also a training school for jungle operations, the Escuela de Selva "Cap. Giovanny Calles".
Indonesia:
Indonesian Army
Combat Reconnaissance Platoon (Tontaipur) are Kostrad's special unit which expertise in Reconnaissance operations, it is trained in jungle warfare in accordance with the terrain of the tropical country.
India:
The Indian Army maintains an elite Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School which is used to train domestic and foreign units in methods for countering irregular warfare.
Malaysia
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Sustainability (MPRT)
Forestry Department of Peninsular Malaysia
Forest Ranger
Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF)
Malaysian Army
10th Parachute Brigade (10 PARA BDE)
21st Special Service Group (GGK)
Border Regiment
Royal Armoured Corps (KAD)
Royal Malay Regiment
Royal Ranger Regiment (RRD)
Territorial Army Regiment
Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN)
PASKAL
Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF)
Royal Malaysian Air Force Regiment (RMAFR)
HANDAU
Infantry Security Group
PASKAU
Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA)
Special Task and Rescue (STAR)
Royal Malaysia Police (RMP)
General Operations Force
Special Operations Command (PGK)
Special Actions Unit (UTK)
VAT 69 Commando (VAT 69)
UNGERIN
Myanmar:
Tatmadaw
Myanmar Army
Airborne Infantry Division (AID)
Armoured Infantry Battalions (AIB)
Border Guard Forces (BGF)
Light Infantry Divisions (LID)
Special Forces Brigade (SFB)
Myanmar Navy
Myanmar Navy SEALs
Naval Infantry Battalion (NIB)
Myanmar Police Force
Border Guard Police (BGP)
Combat Police Battalions (SWAT)
Forestry Security Police Force
Philippines
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
Philippine Army (PA)
All infantry divisions, armor division and combined arms brigade can fight in the jungle.
Light Reaction Regiment (LRR)
Scout Ranger
Special Forces Regiment (Airborne)
Philippine Navy (PN)
Naval Special Operations Command (NAVSOCOM)
Philippine Marine Corps (PMC)
Force Reconnaissance Group (FRG)
Marine Brigades
Marine Rifle Battalions (MRB)
Marine Security and Escort Group (MSEG)
Marine Scout Snipers (MSS)
Philippine Air Force (PAF)
710th Special Operations Wing (710th SPOW)
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Park Ranger
Philippine National Police (PNP)
Regional Mobile Force Battalion (RMFB)
Special Action Force (SAF)
Thailand
Ministry of Interior (MOI)
Department of Provincial Administration (DOPA)
Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC)
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE)
Royal Forest Department (RFD)
Forest Ranger
Park Ranger
Small Ranger Unit (SRU)
Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF)
Royal Thai Army (RTA)
31st Infantry Regiment, King Bhumibol's Guard
All infantry, cavalry, and mechanized infantry divisions can fight in the jungle.
Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols Company (LRRP)
Royal Thai Army Special Warfare Command (RTASWC)
Thahan Phran
Royal Thai Navy (RTN)
Mekong Riverine Unit (MRU)
Royal Thai Marine Corps (RTMC)
Marine Division
1st Marine Regiment
2nd Marine Regiment
3rd Marine Regiment
Marine Task Forces (MTF)
Marine 61st Special Operations Center
Marines Task Unit 411
Paramilitary Marine Regiment
RECON
Royal Thai Navy SEALs
Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF)
RTAF Security Force Command
Special Operations Regiment (SOR)
Royal Thai Police (RTP)
Border Patrol Police (BPP)
Aerial Reinforcement Division (ARD) aka Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PARU)
Naresuan 261
Special Forces Company (SFC)
All Border Patrol Police Regional Divisions can fight in the jungle.
Special unit Border Patrol Police Regional Divisions
4th Border Patrol Police Regional Divisions
43th Border Patrol Police Sub-Division
SINGA Special Operations Team
44th Border Patrol Police Sub-Division
Long Range Surveillance Unit (LRSU)
United States: The U.S. Army 25th Infantry Division is the primary jungle warfare unit in its size. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Jungle warfare | Special unit Border Patrol Police Regional Divisions
4th Border Patrol Police Regional Divisions
43th Border Patrol Police Sub-Division
SINGA Special Operations Team
44th Border Patrol Police Sub-Division
Long Range Surveillance Unit (LRSU)
United States: The U.S. Army 25th Infantry Division is the primary jungle warfare unit in its size. The 25th Infantry Division conducts military operations primarily in the Asia-Pacific region; it also operates the Jungle Operations Training Course, Jungle Environment Working Group, and the Lightning Academy Jungle School.
Jungle warfare training:
India: The Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) located in Vairengte, Mizoram, India, is the primary jungle warfare training center for Indian forces.
Brazil: The Jungle Warfare Training Center (CIGS) in Brazil is the primary jungle warfare training center for Brazilian forces. They seek to copy the capacities of units of homologous commands.
United States: The Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC) located at Schofield Barracks in Oahu, Hawaii is the primary jungle warfare training center for American forces. Opened in its present rendition in 2013, JOTC is operated by the 25th Infantry Division and primarily trains personnel of the 25th Infantry Division, special forces, and foreign partners. Hawaii was chosen as the location for JOTC due to its climate, geography, capacity, and operational history in jungle training within the Pacific.
Jungle warfare training is not new to this organization in Hawaii or the United States. During World War II the JOTC, also known as the Pacific Combat Training Center, was established in Hawaii to teach soldiers survival and fighting skills in tropical environments. Over 300,000 U.S. military personnel were trained in jungle fighting prior to deploying throughout the Pacific. Between 1956 and 1965, this same installation in Hawaii was home to the Jungle and Guerilla Warfare Training Center followed by the Recondo School from 1971 to 1979. The U.S. Asia-Pacific Rebalance Strategy necessitated jungle warfare training for the U.S. military be increased in priority. JOTC's revival at its original location in Hawaii is in part due to closure of the Fort Sherman, Panama JOTC location in 1999.
Another jungle warfare training center, Camp Gonsalves, is operated by the United States Marine Corps on northern Okinawa Island, Japan.
Notes:
References: Cowley, Robert; Parker, Geoffrey (2001). The Reader's Companion to Military History (illustrated ed.). Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. p. 511. ISBN 0-618-12742-9.
Further reading: Newsinger, John (2015). British Counterinsurgency 2nd edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Baudrier, Michael (2005). Love & Terror in Malaya. Trafford Publishing. ISBN 1-4120-5171-1.
Chapman, Spencer (2003) [1949]. The Jungle is Neutral. Guilford, CT: Lyons Press.
Forty, George (1999). Japanese Army handbook 1939-1945. Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing.
Marchall, Brig. Gen. S. L. A.; Hackworth., Lt. Col. David H (5 February 2005) [1966?]. Vietnamprimer: Lessons Learned." Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army. Internet Archive: Wayback Machine. Archived from the original on 5 February 2005.
Taber, Robert (1965). War of the Flea: Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare. London: Granada Publishing Ltd.
External links:
Jungle Warfare, The Game*
https://web.archive.org/web/20100127142024/http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/remember.nsf/pages/NT00002F06 Jungle, Japanese and the Australian Army: learning the lessons of New Guinea]
Combat Tracker Teams: Dodging an Elusive Enemy
Jungle Survival tips
U.S. WWII Newsmap featuring Jungle Warfare, hosted by the UNT Libraries Digital Collections
Counter Insurgency Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS)India
A 1989 U.S. Army news archive about the 7th Infantry Division (Light) participating in Jungle Warfare training.
Praaq Special Forces |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Just war theory | Origins:
Ancient Egypt: A 2017 study found that the just war tradition can be traced as far back as to Ancient Egypt. Egyptian ethics of war usually centered on three main ideas, these including the cosmological role of Egypt, the pharaoh as a divine office and executor of the will of the gods, and the superiority of the Egyptian state and population over all other states and peoples. Egyptian political theology held that the pharaoh had the exclusive legitimacy in justly initiating a war, usually claimed to carry out the will of the gods. Senusret I, in the Twelfth Dynasty, claimed, "I was nursed to be a conqueror...his [Atum's] son and his protector, he gave me to conquer what he conquered." Later pharaohs also considered their sonship of the god Amun-Re as granting them absolute ability to declare war on the deity's behalf. Pharaohs often visited temples prior to initiating campaigns, where the pharaoh was believed to receive their commands of war from the deities. For example, Kamose claimed that "I went north because I was strong (enough) to attack the Asiatics through the command of Amon, the just of counsels." A stele erected by Thutmose III at the Temple of Amun at Karnak "provides an unequivocal statement of the pharaoh's divine mandate to wage war on his enemies." As the period of the New Kingdom progressed and Egypt heightened its territorial ambition, so did the invocation of just war aid the justification of these efforts. The universal principle of Maat, signifying order and justice, was central to the Egyptian notion of just war and its ability to guarantee Egypt virtually no limits on what it could take, do, or use to guarantee the ambitions of the state.
India: The Indian Hindu epic, the Mahabharata, offers the first written discussions of a "just war" (dharma-yuddha or "righteous war"). In it, one of five ruling brothers (Pandavas) asks if the suffering caused by war can ever be justified. A long discussion then ensues between the siblings, establishing criteria like proportionality (chariots cannot attack cavalry, only other chariots; no attacking people in distress), just means (no poisoned or barbed arrows), just cause (no attacking out of rage), and fair treatment of captives and the wounded.
In Sikhism, the term dharamyudh describes a war that is fought for just, righteous or religious reasons, especially in defence of one's own beliefs. Though some core tenets in the Sikh religion are understood to emphasise peace and nonviolence, especially before the 1606 execution of Guru Arjan by Mughal Emperor Jahangir, military force may be justified if all peaceful means to settle a conflict have been exhausted, thus resulting in a dharamyudh.
East Asian: Chinese philosophy produced a massive body of work on warfare, much of it during the Zhou dynasty, especially the Warring States era. War was justified only as a last resort and only by the rightful sovereign; however, questioning the decision of the emperor concerning the necessity of a military action was not permissible. The success of a military campaign was sufficient proof that the campaign had been righteous.
Japan did not develop its own doctrine of just war but between the 5th and the 7th centuries drew heavily from Chinese philosophy, and especially Confucian views. As part of the Japanese campaign to take the northeastern island Honshu, Japanese military action was portrayed as an effort to "pacify" the Emishi people, who were likened to "bandits" and "wild-hearted wolf cubs" and accused of invading Japan's frontier lands.
Ancient Greece and Rome: The notion of just war in Europe originates and is developed first in ancient Greece and then in the Roman Empire.
It was Aristotle who first introduced the concept and terminology to the Hellenic world that called war a last resort requiring conduct that would allow the restoration of peace. Aristotle argues that the cultivation of a military is necessary and good for the purpose of self-defense, not for conquering: "The proper object of practising military training is not in order that men may enslave those who do not deserve slavery, but in order that first they may themselves avoid becoming enslaved to others" (Politics, Book 7).
In ancient Rome, a "just cause" for war might include the necessity of repelling an invasion, or retaliation for pillaging or a breach of treaty. War was always potentially nefas ("wrong, forbidden"), and risked religious pollution and divine disfavor. A "just war" (bellum iustum) thus required a ritualized declaration by the fetial priests. More broadly, conventions of war and treaty-making were part of the ius gentium, the "law of nations", the customary moral obligations regarded as innate and universal to human beings.
Christian views: Christian theory of the Just War begins around the time of Augustine of Hippo The Just War theory, with some amendments, is still used by
Christians today as a guide to whether or not a war can be justified.
War may be necessary and right, even though it may not be good. In the case of a country that has been invaded by an occupying force, war may be the only way to restore justice.
Saint Augustine: Saint Augustine held that individuals should not resort immediately to violence, but God has given the sword to government for a good reason (based upon Romans 13:4). In Contra Faustum Manichaeum book 22 sections 69–76, Augustine argues that Christians, as part of a government, need not be ashamed of protecting peace and punishing wickedness when they are forced to do so by a government. Augustine asserted that was a personal and philosophical stance: "What is here required is not a bodily action, but an inward disposition. The sacred seat of virtue is the heart."
Nonetheless, he asserted, peacefulness in the face of a grave wrong that could be stopped by only violence would be a sin. Defense of one's self or others could be a necessity, especially when it is authorized by a legitimate authority:They who have waged war in obedience to the divine command, or in conformity with His laws, have represented in their persons the public justice or the wisdom of government, and in this capacity have put to death wicked men; such persons have by no means violated the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill."While not breaking down the conditions necessary for war to be just, Augustine nonetheless originated the very phrase itself in his work The City of God:
But, say they, the wise man will wage Just Wars. As if he would not all the rather lament the necessity of just wars, if he remembers that he is a man; for if they were not just he would not wage them, and would therefore be delivered from all wars.
Augustine further taught:
No war is undertaken by a good state except on behalf of good faith or for safety.
J. Mark Mattox writes,In terms of the traditional notion of jus ad bellum (justice of war, that is, the circumstances in which wars can be justly fought), war is a coping mechanism for righteous sovereigns who would ensure that their violent international encounters are minimal, a reflection of the Divine Will to the greatest extent possible, and always justified. In terms of the traditional notion of jus in bello (justice in war, or the moral considerations which ought to constrain the use of violence in war), war is a coping mechanism for righteous combatants who, by divine edict, have no choice but to subject themselves to their political masters and seek to ensure that they execute their war-fighting duty as justly as possible.
Isidore of Seville: Isidore of Seville writes:
Those wars are unjust which are undertaken without cause. For aside from vengeance or to fight off enemies no just war can be waged.
Peace and Truce of God: The medieval Peace of God (Latin: pax dei) was a 10th century mass movement in Western Europe instigated by the clergy that granted immunity from violence for non-combatants.
Starting in the 11th Century, the Truce of God (Latin: treuga dei) involved Church rules that successfully limited when and where fighting could occur: Catholic forces (e.g. of warring barons) could not fight each other on Sundays, Thursdays, holidays, the entirety of Lent and Advent and other times, severely disrupting the conduct of wars. The 1179 Third Council of the Lateran adopted a version of it for the whole church.
Saint Thomas Aquinas: The just war theory by Thomas Aquinas has had a lasting impact on later generations of thinkers and was part of an emerging consensus in Medieval Europe on just war. In the 13th century Aquinas reflected in detail on peace and war. Aquinas was a Dominican friar and contemplated the teachings of the Bible on peace and war in combination with ideas from Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, Saint Augustine and other philosophers whose writings are part of the Western canon. Aquinas' views on war drew heavily on the Decretum Gratiani, a book the Italian monk Gratian had compiled with passages from the Bible. After its publication in the 12th century, the Decretum Gratiani had been republished with commentary from Pope Innocent IV and the Dominican friar Raymond of Penafort. Other significant influences on Aquinas just war theory were Alexander of Hales and Henry of Segusio.
In Summa Theologica Aquinas asserted that it is not always a sin to wage war, and he set out criteria for a just war. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Just war theory | In the 13th century Aquinas reflected in detail on peace and war. Aquinas was a Dominican friar and contemplated the teachings of the Bible on peace and war in combination with ideas from Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, Saint Augustine and other philosophers whose writings are part of the Western canon. Aquinas' views on war drew heavily on the Decretum Gratiani, a book the Italian monk Gratian had compiled with passages from the Bible. After its publication in the 12th century, the Decretum Gratiani had been republished with commentary from Pope Innocent IV and the Dominican friar Raymond of Penafort. Other significant influences on Aquinas just war theory were Alexander of Hales and Henry of Segusio.
In Summa Theologica Aquinas asserted that it is not always a sin to wage war, and he set out criteria for a just war. According to Aquinas, three requirements must be met. Firstly, the war must be waged upon the command of a rightful sovereign. Secondly, the war needs to be waged for just cause, on account of some wrong the attacked have committed. Thirdly, warriors must have the right intent, namely to promote good and to avoid evil. Aquinas came to the conclusion that a just war could be offensive and that injustice should not be tolerated so as to avoid war. Nevertheless, Aquinas argued that violence must only be used as a last resort. On the battlefield, violence was only justified to the extent it was necessary. Soldiers needed to avoid cruelty and a just war was limited by the conduct of just combatants. Aquinas argued that it was only in the pursuit of justice, that the good intention of a moral act could justify negative consequences, including the killing of the innocent during a war.
Renaissance and Christian Humanists: Various Renaissance humanists promoted Pacificist views.
John Colet famously preached a Lenten sermon before Henry VIII, who was preparing for a war, quoting Cicero "Better an unjust peace rather than the justest war."
Erasmus of Rotterdam wrote numerous works on peace which criticized Just War theory as a smokescreen and added extra limitations, notably The Complaint of Peace and the Treatise on War (Dulce bellum inexpertis).
A leading humanist writer after the Reformation was legal theorist Hugo Grotius, whose De jura belli ac pacis re-considered Just War and fighting wars justly.
First World War: At the beginning of the First World War, a group of theologians in Germany published a manifesto that sought to justify the actions of the German government. At the British government's request, Randall Davidson, Archbishop of Canterbury, took the lead in collaborating with a large number of other religious leaders, including some with whom he had differed in the past, to write a rebuttal of the Germans' contentions. Both German and British theologians based themselves on the just war theory, each group seeking to prove that it applied to the war waged by its own side.
Contemporary Catholic doctrine: The just war doctrine of the Catholic Church found in the 1992 Catechism of the Catholic Church, in paragraph 2309, lists four strict conditions for "legitimate defense by military force:"
The damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave and certain.
All other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective.
There must be serious prospects of success.
The use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated.
The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church elaborates on the just war doctrine in paragraphs 500 to 501, while citing the Charter of the United Nations:
If this responsibility justifies the possession of sufficient means to exercise this right to defense, States still have the obligation to do everything possible "to ensure that the conditions of peace exist, not only within their own territory but throughout the world". It is important to remember that "it is one thing to wage a war of self-defense; it is quite another to seek to impose domination on another nation. The possession of war potential does not justify the use of force for political or military objectives. Nor does the mere fact that war has unfortunately broken out mean that all is fair between the warring parties".
The Charter of the United Nations ... is based on a generalized prohibition of a recourse to force to resolve disputes between States, with the exception of two cases: legitimate defence and measures taken by the Security Council within the area of its responsibilities for maintaining peace. In every case, exercising the right to self-defence must respect "the traditional limits of necessity and proportionality".
Therefore, engaging in a preventive war without clear proof that an attack is imminent cannot fail to raise serious moral and juridical questions. International legitimacy for the use of armed force, on the basis of rigorous assessment and with well-founded motivations, can only be given by the decision of a competent body that identifies specific situations as threats to peace and authorizes an intrusion into the sphere of autonomy usually reserved to a State.
Pope John Paul II in an address to a group of soldiers said the following: Peace, as taught by Sacred Scripture and the experience of men itself, is more than just the absence of war. And the Christian is aware that on earth a human society that is completely and always peaceful is, unfortunately, an utopia and that the ideologies which present it as easily attainable only nourish vain hopes. The cause of peace will not go forward by denying the possibility and the obligation to defend it.
Russian Orthodox Church: The War and Peace section in the Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church is crucial for understanding the Russian Orthodox Church's attitude towards war. The document offers criteria of distinguishing between an aggressive war, which is unacceptable, and a justified war, attributing the highest moral and sacred value of military acts of bravery to a true believer who participates in a justified war. Additionally, the document considers the just war criteria as developed in Western Christianity to be eligible for Russian Orthodoxy; therefore, the justified war theory in Western theology is also applicable to the Russian Orthodox Church.
In the same document, it is stated that wars have accompanied human history since the fall of man, and according to the gospel, they will continue to accompany it. While recognizing war as evil, the Russian Orthodox Church does not prohibit its members from participating in hostilities if there is the security of their neighbours and the restoration of trampled justice at stake. War is considered to be necessary but undesirable. It is also stated that the Russian Orthodox Church has had profound respect for soldiers who gave their lives to protect the life and security of their neighbours.
Just war tradition: The just war theory, propounded by the medieval Christian philosopher Thomas Aquinas, was developed further by legal scholars in the context of international law. Cardinal Cajetan, the jurist Francisco de Vitoria, the two Jesuit priests Luis de Molina and Francisco Suárez, as well as the humanist Hugo Grotius and the lawyer Luigi Taparelli were most influential in the formation of a just war tradition. The just war tradition, which was well established by the 19th century, found its practical application in the Hague Peace Conferences (1899 and 1907) and in the founding of the League of Nations in 1920. After the United States Congress declared war on Germany in 1917, Cardinal James Gibbons issued a letter that all Catholics were to support the war because "Our Lord Jesus Christ does not stand for peace at any price... If by Pacifism is meant the teaching that the use of force is never justifiable, then, however well meant, it is mistaken, and it is hurtful to the life of our country."
Armed conflicts such as the Spanish Civil War, World War II and the Cold War were, as a matter of course, judged according to the norms (as established in Aquinas' just war theory) by philosophers such as Jacques Maritain, Elizabeth Anscombe and John Finnis. Other scholars such as Robert L. Holmes cited a presumptive moral imperative prohibiting violence against all innocent people as the prima facie basis for questioning whether the norms of just war theories could adequately serve as a rational moral justification for military conflict within the nuclear age.
The first work dedicated specifically to just war was the 15th-century sermon De bellis justis of Stanisław of Skarbimierz (1360–1431), who justified war by the Kingdom of Poland against the Teutonic Knights. Francisco de Vitoria criticized the conquest of America by the Spanish conquistadors on the basis of just-war theory. With Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius, just war theory was replaced by international law theory, codified as a set of rules, which today still encompass the points commonly debated, with some modifications.
Just-war theorists combine a moral abhorrence towards war with a readiness to accept that war may sometimes be necessary. The criteria of the just-war tradition act as an aid in determining whether resorting to arms is morally permissible. Just-war theories aim "to distinguish between justifiable and unjustifiable uses of organized armed forces"; they attempt "to conceive of how the use of arms might be restrained, made more humane, and ultimately directed towards the aim of establishing lasting peace and justice".
The just war tradition addresses the morality of the use of force in two parts: when it is right to resort to armed force (the concern of jus ad bellum) and what is acceptable in using such force (the concern of jus in bello).
In 1869 the Russian military theorist Genrikh Antonovich Leer theorized on the advantages and potential benefits of war. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Just war theory | Just-war theorists combine a moral abhorrence towards war with a readiness to accept that war may sometimes be necessary. The criteria of the just-war tradition act as an aid in determining whether resorting to arms is morally permissible. Just-war theories aim "to distinguish between justifiable and unjustifiable uses of organized armed forces"; they attempt "to conceive of how the use of arms might be restrained, made more humane, and ultimately directed towards the aim of establishing lasting peace and justice".
The just war tradition addresses the morality of the use of force in two parts: when it is right to resort to armed force (the concern of jus ad bellum) and what is acceptable in using such force (the concern of jus in bello).
In 1869 the Russian military theorist Genrikh Antonovich Leer theorized on the advantages and potential benefits of war.
The Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin defined only three types of just war.
But picture to yourselves a slave-owner who owned 100 slaves warring against a slave-owner who owned 200 slaves for a more "just" distribution of slaves. Clearly, the application of the term "defensive" war, or war "for the defense of the fatherland" in such a case would be historically false, and in practice would be sheer deception of the common people, of philistines, of ignorant people, by the astute slaveowners. Precisely in this way are the present-day imperialist bourgeoisie deceiving the peoples by means of "national ideology" and the term "defense of the fatherland" in the present war between slave-owners for fortifying and strengthening slavery.
The anarcho-capitalist scholar Murray Rothbard (1926-1995) stated that "a just war exists when a people tries to ward off the threat of coercive domination by another people, or to overthrow an already-existing domination. A war is unjust, on the other hand, when a people try to impose domination on another people or try to retain an already-existing coercive rule over them."
Jonathan Riley-Smith writes:
The consensus among Christians on the use of violence has changed radically since the crusades were fought. The just war theory prevailing for most of the last two centuries—that violence is an evil that can, in certain situations, be condoned as the lesser of evils—is relatively young. Although it has inherited some elements (the criteria of legitimate authority, just cause, right intention) from the older war theory that first evolved around AD 400, it has rejected two premises that underpinned all medieval just wars, including crusades: first, that violence could be employed on behalf of Christ's intentions for mankind and could even be directly authorized by him; and second, that it was a morally neutral force that drew whatever ethical coloring it had from the intentions of the perpetrators.
Criteria: The just war theory has two sets of criteria, the first establishing jus ad bellum (the right to go to war), and the second establishing jus in bello (right conduct within war).
Jus ad bellum: Competent authority
Only duly constituted public authorities may wage war. "A just war must be initiated by a political authority within a political system that allows distinctions of justice. Dictatorships (e.g. Hitler's regime) or deceptive military actions (e.g. the 1968 US bombing of Cambodia) are typically considered as violations of this criterion. The importance of this condition is key. Plainly, we cannot have a genuine process of judging a just war within a system that represses the process of genuine justice. A just war must be initiated by a political authority within a political system that allows distinctions of justice".
Probability of success
According to this principle, there must be good grounds for concluding that aims of the just war are achievable. This principle emphasizes that mass violence must not be undertaken if it is unlikely to secure the just cause. This criterion is to avoid invasion for invasion's sake and links to the proportionality criteria. One cannot invade if there is no chance of actually winning. However, wars are fought with imperfect knowledge, so one must simply be able to make a logical case that one can win; there is no way to know this in advance. These criteria move the conversation from moral and theoretical grounds to practical grounds. Essentially, this is meant to gather coalition building and win approval of other state actors.
Last resort
The principle of last resort stipulates that all non-violent options must first be exhausted before the use of force can be justified. Diplomatic options, sanctions, and other non-military methods must be attempted or validly ruled out before the engagement of hostilities. Further, in regard to the amount of harm—proportionally—the principle of last resort would support using small intervention forces first and then escalating rather than starting a war with massive force such as carpet bombing or nuclear warfare.
Just cause
The reason for going to war needs to be just and cannot, therefore, be solely for recapturing things taken or punishing people who have done wrong; innocent life must be in imminent danger and intervention must be to protect life. A contemporary view of just cause was expressed in 1993 when the US Catholic Conference said: "Force may be used only to correct a grave, public evil, i.e., aggression or massive violation of the basic human rights of whole populations."
Jus in bello: Once war has begun, just war theory (jus in bello) also directs how combatants are to act or should act:
Distinction
Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of distinction. The acts of war should be directed towards enemy combatants, and not towards non-combatants caught in circumstances that they did not create. The prohibited acts include bombing civilian residential areas that include no legitimate military targets, committing acts of terrorism or reprisal against civilians or prisoners of war (POWs), and attacking neutral targets. Moreover, combatants are not permitted to attack enemy combatants who have surrendered, or who have been captured, or who are injured and not presenting an immediate lethal threat, or who are parachuting from disabled aircraft and are not airborne forces, or who are shipwrecked.
Proportionality
Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of proportionality. Combatants must make sure that the harm caused to civilians or civilian property is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by an attack on a legitimate military objective. This principle is meant to discern the correct balance between the restriction imposed by a corrective measure and the severity of the nature of the prohibited act.
Military necessity
Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of military necessity. An attack or action must be intended to help in the defeat of the enemy; it must be an attack on a legitimate military objective, and the harm caused to civilians or civilian property must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. This principle is meant to limit excessive and unnecessary death and destruction.
Fair treatment of prisoners of war
Enemy combatants who surrendered or who are captured no longer pose a threat. It is therefore wrong to torture them or otherwise mistreat them.
No means malum in se
Combatants may not use weapons or other methods of warfare that are considered evil, such as mass rape, forcing enemy combatants to fight against their own side or using weapons whose effects cannot be controlled (e.g., nuclear/biological weapons).
Ending a war: Jus post bellum: In recent years, some theorists, such as Gary Bass, Louis Iasiello and Brian Orend, have proposed a third category within the just war theory. Jus post bellum concerns justice after a war, including peace treaties, reconstruction, environmental remediation, war crimes trials, and war reparations. Jus post bellum has been added to deal with the fact that some hostile actions may take place outside a traditional battlefield. Jus post bellum governs the justice of war termination and peace agreements, as well as the prosecution of war criminals, and publicly labelled terrorists. The idea has largely been added to help decide what to do if there are prisoners that have been taken during battle. It is, through government labelling and public opinion, that people use jus post bellum to justify the pursuit of labelled terrorist for the safety of the government's state in a modern context. The actual fault lies with the aggressor and so by being the aggressor, they forfeit their rights for honourable treatment by their actions. That theory is used to justify the actions taken by anyone fighting in a war to treat prisoners outside of war.
See also: Appeasement
Christian pacifism
Democratic peace theory
Deterrence theory
Peace and conflict studies
Right of conquest
Moral equality of combatants
References:
Further reading: Benson, Richard. "The Just War Theory: A Traditional Catholic Moral View", The Tidings (2006). Showing the Catholic view in three points, including John Paul II's position concerning war.
Blattberg, Charles. Taking War Seriously. A critique of just war theory.
Brough, Michael W., John W. Lango, Harry van der Linden, eds., Rethinking the Just War Tradition (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2007). Discusses the contemporary relevance of just war theory. Offers an annotated bibliography of current writings on just war theory.
Brunsletter, D., & D. O'Driscoll, Just war thinkers from Cicero to the 21st century (Routledge, 2017).
Butler, Paul (2002–2003). "By Any Means Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion to Change Unjust Law". UCLA Law Review. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Just war theory | "The Just War Theory: A Traditional Catholic Moral View", The Tidings (2006). Showing the Catholic view in three points, including John Paul II's position concerning war.
Blattberg, Charles. Taking War Seriously. A critique of just war theory.
Brough, Michael W., John W. Lango, Harry van der Linden, eds., Rethinking the Just War Tradition (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2007). Discusses the contemporary relevance of just war theory. Offers an annotated bibliography of current writings on just war theory.
Brunsletter, D., & D. O'Driscoll, Just war thinkers from Cicero to the 21st century (Routledge, 2017).
Butler, Paul (2002–2003). "By Any Means Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion to Change Unjust Law". UCLA Law Review. 50: 721 – via HeinOnline.
Churchman, David. Why we fight: the origins, nature, and management of human conflict (University Press of America, 2013) online.
Crawford, Neta. "Just War Theory and the US Countertenor War", Perspectives on Politics 1(1), 2003. online
Elshtain, Jean Bethke, ed. Just war theory (NYU Press, 1992) online.
Evans, Mark (editor) Just War Theory: A Reappraisal (Edinburgh University Press, 2005)
Fotion, Nicholas. War and Ethics (London, New York: Continuum, 2007). ISBN 0-8264-9260-6. A defence of an updated form of just war theory.
Heindel, Max. The Rosicrucian Philosophy in Questions and Answers – Volume II (The Philosophy of War, World War I reference, ed. 1918), ISBN 0-911274-90-1 (Describing a philosophy of war and just war concepts from the point of view of his Rosicrucian Fellowship)
Gutbrod, Hans. Russia's Recent Invasion of Ukraine and Just War Theory ("Global Policy Journal", March 2022); applies the concept to Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Holmes, Robert L. On War and Morality (Princeton University Press, 1989.
Khawaja, Irfan. Review of Larry May, War Crimes and Just War, in Democratiya 10, ([1]), an extended critique of just war theory.
Kwon, David. Justice after War: Jus Post Bellum in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C., Catholic University of America Press, 2023). ISBN 978-0-813236-51-3
MacDonald, David Roberts. Padre E. C. Crosse and 'the Devonshire Epitaph': The Astonishing Story of One Man at the Battle of the Somme (with Antecedents to Today's 'Just War' Dialogue), 2007 Cloverdale Books, South Bend. ISBN 978-1-929569-45-8
McMahan, Jeff. "Just Cause for War," Ethics and International Affairs, 2005.
Nájera, Luna. "Myth and Prophecy in Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda's Crusading "Exhortación" Archived 11 March 2011 at the Wayback Machine, in Bulletin for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies, 35:1 (2011). Discusses Sepúlveda's theories of war in relation to the war against the Ottoman Turks.
Nardin, Terry, ed. The ethics of war and peace: Religious and secular perspectives (Princeton University Press, 1998) online
O'Donovan, Oliver. The Just War Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Steinhoff, Uwe. On the Ethics of War and Terrorism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). Covers the basics and some of the most controversial current debates.
Walzer, Michael. Arguing about War, (Yale University Press, 2004). ISBN 978-0-300-10978-8
External links: "Just war theory". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Catholic Teaching Concerning Just War at Catholicism.org
"Just War" In Our Time, BBC Radio 4 discussion with John Keane and Niall Ferguson (3 June 1999) |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Khalid ibn al-Walid | Ancestry and early life: Khalid's father was al-Walid ibn al-Mughira, an arbitrator of local disputes in Mecca in the Hejaz (western Arabia). Al-Walid is identified by the historians Ibn Hisham (d. 833), Ibn Durayd (d. 837) and Ibn Habib (d. 859) as the "derider" of the Islamic prophet Muhammad mentioned in the Meccan suras (chapters) of the Qur'an. He belonged to the Banu Makhzum, a leading clan of the Quraysh tribe and Mecca's pre-Islamic aristocracy. The Makhzum are credited for introducing Meccan commerce to foreign markets, particularly Yemen and Abyssinia (Ethiopia), and developed a reputation among the Quraysh for their intellect, nobility and wealth. Their prominence was owed to the leadership of Khalid's paternal grandfather al-Mughira ibn Abd Allah. Khalid's paternal uncle Hisham was known as the 'lord of Mecca' and the date of his death was used by the Quraysh as the start of their calendar. The historian Muhammad Abdulhayy Shaban describes Khalid as "a man of considerable standing" within his clan and Mecca in general.
Khalid's mother was al-Asma bint al-Harith ibn Hazn, commonly known as Lubaba al-Sughra ('Lubaba the Younger', to distinguish her from her elder half-sister Lubaba al-Kubra) of the nomadic Banu Hilal tribe. Lubaba al-Sughra converted to Islam about c. 622 and her paternal half-sister Maymuna became a wife of Muhammad. Through his maternal relations Khalid became highly familiarized with the Bedouin (nomadic Arab) lifestyle.
Early military career:
Opposition to Muhammad: The Makhzum were strongly opposed to Muhammad, and the clan's preeminent leader Amr ibn Hisham (Abu Jahl), Khalid's first cousin, organized the boycott of Muhammad's clan, the Banu Hashim of Quraysh, in c. 616–618. After Muhammad emigrated from Mecca to Medina in 622, the Makhzum under Abu Jahl commanded the war against him until they were routed at the Battle of Badr in 624. About twenty-five of Khalid's paternal cousins, including Abu Jahl, and numerous other kinsmen were slain in that engagement.
The following year Khalid commanded the right flank of the cavalry in the Meccan army which confronted Muhammad at the Battle of Uhud north of Medina. According to the historian Donald Routledge Hill, rather than launching a frontal assault against the Muslim lines on the slopes of Mount Uhud, "Khalid adopted the sound tactics" of going around the mountain and bypassing the Muslim flank. He advanced through the Wadi Qanat valley west of Uhud until being checked by Muslim archers south of the valley at Mount Ruma. The Muslims gained the early advantage in the fight, but after most of the Muslim archers abandoned their positions to join the raiding of the Meccans' camp, Khalid charged against the resulting break in the Muslims' rear defensive lines. In the ensuing rout, several dozen Muslims were killed. The narratives of the battle describe Khalid riding through the field, slaying the Muslims with his lance. Shaban credits Khalid's "military genius" for the Quraysh's victory at Uhud, the only engagement in which the tribe defeated Muhammad.
In 628 Muhammad and his followers headed for Mecca to perform the umra (lesser pilgrimage to Mecca) and the Quraysh dispatched 200 cavalry to intercept him upon hearing of his departure. Khalid was at the head of the cavalry and Muhammad avoided confronting him by taking an unconventional and difficult alternate route, ultimately reaching Hudaybiyya at the edge of Mecca. Upon realizing Muhammad's change of course, Khalid withdrew to Mecca. A truce between the Muslims and the Quraysh was reached in the Treaty of Hudaybiyya in March.
Conversion to Islam and service under Muhammad: In the year 6 AH (c. 627) or 8 AH (c. 629) Khalid embraced Islam in Muhammad's presence alongside the Qurayshite Amr ibn al-As; the modern historian Michael Lecker comments that the accounts holding that Khalid and Amr converted in 8 AH are "perhaps more trustworthy". The historian Akram Diya Umari holds that Khalid and Amr embraced Islam and relocated to Medina following the Treaty of Hudaybiyya, apparently after the Quraysh dropped demands for the extradition of newer Muslim converts to Mecca. Following his conversion, Khalid "began to devote all his considerable military talents to the support of the new Muslim state", according to the historian Hugh N. Kennedy.
Khalid participated in the expedition to Mu'ta in modern-day Jordan ordered by Muhammad in September 629. The purpose of the raid may have been to acquire booty in the wake of the Sasanian Persian army's retreat from Syria following its defeat by the Byzantine Empire in July. The Muslim detachment was routed by a Byzantine force consisting mostly of Arab tribesmen led by the Byzantine commander Theodore and several high-ranking Muslim commanders were slain. Khalid took command of the army following the deaths of the appointed commanders and, with considerable difficulty, oversaw a safe withdrawal of the Muslims. Muhammad rewarded Khalid by bestowing on him the honorary title Sayf Allah ('the Sword of God').
In December 629 or January 630, Khalid took part in Muhammad's capture of Mecca, after which most of the Quraysh converted to Islam. In that engagement Khalid led a nomadic contingent called muhajirat al-arab ('the Bedouin emigrants'). He led one of the two main pushes into the city and in the subsequent fighting with the Quraysh, three of his men were killed while twelve Qurayshites were slain, according to Ibn Ishaq, the 8th-century biographer of Muhammad. Khalid commanded the Bedouin Banu Sulaym in the Muslims' vanguard at the Battle of Hunayn later that year. In that confrontation, the Muslims, boosted by the influx of Qurayshite converts, defeated the Thaqif—the Ta'if-based traditional rivals of the Quraysh—and their nomadic Hawazin allies. Khalid was then appointed to destroy the idol of al-Uzza, one of the goddesses worshiped in pre-Islamic Arabian religion, in the Nakhla area between Mecca and Ta'if.
Khalid was afterward dispatched to invite to Islam the Banu Jadhima in Yalamlam, about 80 kilometers (50 mi) south of Mecca, but the Islamic traditional sources hold that he attacked the tribe illicitly. In the version of Ibn Ishaq, Khalid had persuaded the Jadhima tribesmen to disarm and embrace Islam, which he followed up by executing a number of the tribesmen in revenge for the Jadhima's slaying of his uncle Fakih ibn al-Mughira dating to before Khalid's conversion to Islam. In the narrative of Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani (d. 1449), Khalid misunderstood the tribesmen's acceptance of the faith as a rejection or denigration of Islam due to his unfamiliarity with the Jadhima's accent and consequently attacked them. In both versions Muhammad declared himself innocent of Khalid's action but did not discharge or punish him. According to the historian W. Montgomery Watt, the traditional account about the Jadhima incident "is hardly more than a circumstantial denigration of Khālid, and yields little solid historical fact".
Later in 630, while Muhammad was at Tabuk, he dispatched Khalid to capture the oasis market town of Dumat al-Jandal. Khalid gained its surrender and imposed a heavy penalty on the inhabitants of the town, one of whose chiefs, the Kindite Ukaydir ibn Abd al-Malik al-Sakuni, was ordered by Khalid to sign the capitulation treaty with Muhammad in Medina. In June 631 Khalid was sent by Muhammad at the head of 480 men to invite the mixed Christian and polytheistic Balharith tribe of Najran to embrace Islam. The tribe converted and Khalid instructed them in the Qur'an and Islamic laws before returning to Muhammad in Medina with a Balharith delegation.
Commander in the Ridda wars: After Muhammad's death in June 632, one of his early and close companions, Abu Bakr, became caliph (leader of the Muslim community). The issue of succession had caused discord among the Muslims. The Ansar (lit. 'Helpers'), the natives of Medina who hosted Muhammad after his emigration from Mecca, attempted to elect their own leader. Opinion was split among the Muhajirun (lit. 'Emigrants'), the mostly Qurayshite natives of Mecca who emigrated with Muhammad to Medina. One group advocated for a companion closer in kinship to Muhammad, namely his cousin Ali, while another group, backed by new converts among the Qurayshite aristocracy, rallied behind Abu Bakr. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Khalid ibn al-Walid | The tribe converted and Khalid instructed them in the Qur'an and Islamic laws before returning to Muhammad in Medina with a Balharith delegation.
Commander in the Ridda wars: After Muhammad's death in June 632, one of his early and close companions, Abu Bakr, became caliph (leader of the Muslim community). The issue of succession had caused discord among the Muslims. The Ansar (lit. 'Helpers'), the natives of Medina who hosted Muhammad after his emigration from Mecca, attempted to elect their own leader. Opinion was split among the Muhajirun (lit. 'Emigrants'), the mostly Qurayshite natives of Mecca who emigrated with Muhammad to Medina. One group advocated for a companion closer in kinship to Muhammad, namely his cousin Ali, while another group, backed by new converts among the Qurayshite aristocracy, rallied behind Abu Bakr. The latter, with the key intervention of the prominent Muhajirun, Umar ibn al-Khattab and Abu Ubayda ibn al-Jarrah, overrode the Ansar and acceded. Khalid was a staunch supporter of Abu Bakr's succession. A report preserved in a work by the 13th-century scholar Ibn Abi'l-Hadid claims that Khalid was a partisan of Abu Bakr, opposed Ali's candidacy, and declared that Abu Bakr was "not a man about whom one needs [to] enquire, and his character needs not be sounded out".
Most tribes in Arabia, except those inhabiting the environs of Mecca, Medina and Ta'if discontinued their allegiance to the nascent Muslim state after Muhammad's death or had never established formal relations with Medina. Islamic historiography describes Abu Bakr's efforts to establish or reestablish Islamic rule over the tribes as the Ridda wars (wars against the 'apostates'). Views of the wars by modern historians vary considerably. Watt agrees with the Islamic characterization of the tribal opposition as anti-Islamic in nature, while Julius Wellhausen and C. H. Becker hold the tribes were opposed to the tax obligations to Medina rather than Islam as a religion. In the view of Leone Caetani and Bernard Lewis, the opposing tribes who had established ties with Medina regarded their religious and fiscal obligations as being a personal contract with Muhammad; their attempts to negotiate different terms after his death were rejected by Abu Bakr, who proceeded to launch the campaigns against them.
Of the six main conflict zones in Arabia during the Ridda wars, two were centered in Najd (the central Arabian plateau): the rebellion of the Asad, Tayy and Ghatafan tribes under Tulayha and the rebellion of the Tamim tribe led by Sajah; both leaders claimed to be prophets. After Abu Bakr quashed the threat to Medina by the Ghatafan at the Battle of Dhu al-Qassa, he dispatched Khalid against the rebel tribes in Najd. Khalid was Abu Bakr's third nominee to lead the campaign after his first two choices, Zayd ibn al-Khattab and Abu Hudhayfa ibn Utba, refused the assignment. His forces were drawn from the Muhajirun and the Ansar. Throughout the campaign, Khalid demonstrated considerable operational independence and did not stringently abide by the caliph's directives. In the words of Shaban, "he simply defeated whoever was there to be defeated".
Battle of Buzakha: Khalid's initial focus was the suppression of Tulayha's following. In late 632, he confronted Tulayha's forces at the Battle of Buzakha, which took place at the eponymous well in Asad territory where the tribes were encamped. The Tayy defected to the Muslims before Khalid's troops arrived to Buzakha, the result of mediation between the two sides by the Tayy chief Adi ibn Hatim. The latter had been assigned by Medina as its tax collector over his tribe and its traditional Asad rivals.
Khalid bested the Asad–Ghatafan forces in battle. When Tulayha appeared close to defeat, the Fazara section of the Ghatafan under their chief Uyayna ibn Hisn deserted the field, compelling Tulayha to flee for Syria. His tribe, the Asad, subsequently submitted to Khalid, followed by the hitherto neutral Banu Amir, which had awaited the results of the conflict before giving its allegiance to either side. Uyayna was captured and brought to Medina. As a result of the victory at Buzakha, the Muslims gained control over most of Najd.
Execution of Malik ibn Nuwayra: After Buzakha, Khalid proceeded against the rebel Tamimite chieftain Malik ibn Nuwayra headquartered in al-Butah, in the present-day Qassim region. Malik had been appointed by Muhammad as the collector of the sadaqa ('alms tax') over his clan of the Tamim, the Yarbu, but stopped forwarding this tax to Medina after Muhammad's death. Abu Bakr consequently resolved to have him executed by Khalid. The latter faced divisions within his army regarding this campaign, with the Ansar initially staying behind, citing instructions by Abu Bakr not to campaign further until receiving a direct order by the caliph. Khalid claimed such an order was his prerogative as the commander appointed by the caliph, but he did not force the Ansar to participate and continued his march with troops from the Muhajirun and the Bedouin defectors from Buzakha and its aftermath; the Ansar ultimately rejoined Khalid after internal deliberations.
According to the most common account in the Muslim traditional sources, Khalid's army encountered Malik and eleven of his clansmen from the Yarbu in 632. The Yarbu did not resist, proclaimed their Muslim faith and were escorted to Khalid's camp. Khalid had them all executed over the objection of an Ansarite, who had been among the captors of the tribesmen and argued for the captives' inviolability due to their testaments as Muslims. Afterward, Khalid married Malik's widow Umm Tamim bint al-Minhal. When news of Khalid's actions reached Medina, Umar, who had become Abu Bakr's chief aide, pressed for Khalid to be punished or relieved of command, but Abu Bakr pardoned him.
According to the account of the 8th-century historian Sayf ibn Umar, Malik had also been cooperating with the prophetess Sajah, his kinswoman from the Yarbu, but after they were defeated by rival clans from the Tamim, left her cause and retreated to his camp at al-Butah. There, he was encountered with his small party by the Muslims. The modern historian Wilferd Madelung discounts Sayf's version, asserting that Umar and other Muslims would not have protested Khalid's execution of Malik if the latter had left Islam, while Watt considers accounts about the Tamim during the Ridda in general to be "obscure ... partly because the enemies of Khālid b. al-Walīd have twisted the stories to blacken him". In the view of the modern historian Ella Landau-Tasseron, "the truth behind Malik's career and death will remain buried under a heap of conflicting traditions".
Elimination of Musaylima and conquest of the Yamama: Following a series of setbacks in her conflict with rival Tamim factions, Sajah joined the strongest opponent of the Muslims: Musaylima, the leader of the sedentary Banu Hanifa tribe in the Yamama, the agricultural eastern borderlands of Najd. Musaylima had laid claims to prophet-hood before Muhammad's emigration from Mecca, and his entreaties for Muhammad to mutually recognize his divine revelation were rejected by Muhammad. After Muhammad died, support for Musaylima surged in the Yamama, whose strategic value lay not only with its abundance of wheat fields and date palms, but also its location connecting Medina to the regions of Bahrayn and Oman in eastern Arabia. Abu Bakr had dispatched Shurahbil ibn Hasana and Khalid's cousin Ikrima with an army to reinforce the Muslim governor in the Yamama, Musaylima's tribal kinsman Thumama ibn Uthal. According to the modern historian Meir Jacob Kister, it was likely the threat posed by this army which compelled Musaylima to forge an alliance with Sajah. Ikrima was repelled by Musaylima's forces and thereafter instructed by Abu Bakr to quell rebellions in Oman and Mahra (central southern Arabia) while Shurahbil was to remain in the Yamama in expectation of Khalid's large army.
After his victories against the Bedouin of Najd, Khalid headed to the Yamama with warnings of the Hanifa's military prowess and instructions by Abu Bakr to act severely toward the tribe should he be victorious. The 12th-century historian Ibn Hubaysh al-Asadi holds that the armies of Khalid and Musaylima respectively stood at 4,500 and 4,000. Kister dismisses the much larger figures cited by most of the early Muslim sources as exaggerations. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Khalid ibn al-Walid | According to the modern historian Meir Jacob Kister, it was likely the threat posed by this army which compelled Musaylima to forge an alliance with Sajah. Ikrima was repelled by Musaylima's forces and thereafter instructed by Abu Bakr to quell rebellions in Oman and Mahra (central southern Arabia) while Shurahbil was to remain in the Yamama in expectation of Khalid's large army.
After his victories against the Bedouin of Najd, Khalid headed to the Yamama with warnings of the Hanifa's military prowess and instructions by Abu Bakr to act severely toward the tribe should he be victorious. The 12th-century historian Ibn Hubaysh al-Asadi holds that the armies of Khalid and Musaylima respectively stood at 4,500 and 4,000. Kister dismisses the much larger figures cited by most of the early Muslim sources as exaggerations. Khalid's first three assaults against Musaylima at the plain of Aqraba were beaten back. The strength of Musaylima's warriors, the superiority of their swords and the fickleness of the Bedouin contingents in Khalid's ranks were all reasons cited by the Muslims for their initial failures. Khalid heeded the counsel of the Ansarite Thabit ibn Qays to exclude the Bedouins from the next fight.
In the fourth assault against the Hanifa, the Muhajirun under Khalid and the Ansar under Thabit killed a lieutenant of Musaylima, who subsequently fled with part of his army. The Muslims pursued the Hanifa to a large enclosed garden which Musaylima used to stage a last stand against the Muslims. The enclosure was stormed by the Muslims, Musaylima was slain and most of the Hanifites were killed or wounded. The enclosure became known as the 'garden of death' for the high casualties suffered by both sides.
Khalid assigned a Hanifite taken captive early in the campaign, Mujja'a ibn al-Murara, to assess the strength, morale and intentions of the Hanifa in their Yamama fortresses in the aftermath of Musaylima's slaying. Mujja'a had the women and children of the tribe dress and pose as men at the openings of the forts in a ruse to boost their leverage with Khalid; he relayed to Khalid that the Hanifa still counted numerous warriors determined to continue the fight against the Muslims. This assessment, along with the exhaustion of his own troops, compelled Khalid to accept Mujja'a's counsel for a ceasefire with the Hanifa, despite Abu Bakr's directives to pursue retreating Hanifites and execute Hanifite prisoners of war.
Khalid's terms with the Hanifa entailed the tribe's conversion to Islam and the surrender of their arms and armor and stockpiles of gold and silver. Abu Bakr ratified the treaty, though he remained opposed to Khalid's concessions and warned that the Hanifa would remain eternally faithful to Musaylima. The treaty was further consecrated by Khalid's marriage to Mujja'a's daughter. According to Lecker, Mujja'a's ruse may have been invented by the Islamic tradition "in order to protect Khalid's policy because the negotiated treaty ... caused the Muslims great losses". Khalid was allotted an orchard and a field in each village included in the treaty with the Hanifa, while the villages excluded from the treaty were subject to punitive measures. Among these villages were Musaylima's hometown al-Haddar and Mar'at, whose inhabitants were expelled or enslaved and the villages resettled with tribesmen from clans of the Tamim.
Conclusion of the Ridda wars: The traditional sources place the final suppression of the Arab tribes of the Ridda wars before March 633, though Caetani insists the campaigns must have continued into 634. The tribes in Bahrayn may have resisted the Muslims until the middle of 634. A number of the early Islamic sources ascribe a role for Khalid on the Bahrayn front after his victory over the Hanifa. Shoufani deems this improbable, while allowing the possibility that Khalid had earlier sent detachments from his army to reinforce the main Muslim commander in Bahrayn, al-Ala al-Hadhrami.
The Muslim war efforts, in which Khalid played a vital part, secured Medina's dominance over the strong tribes of Arabia, which sought to diminish Islamic authority in the peninsula, and restored the nascent Muslim state's prestige. According to Lecker, Khalid and the other Qurayshite generals "gained precious experience [during the Ridda wars] in mobilizing large multi-tribal armies over long distances" and "benefited from the close acquaintance of the Kuraysh [sic] with tribal politics throughout Arabia".
Campaigns in Iraq: With the Yamama pacified, Khalid marched northward toward Sasanian territory in Iraq (lower Mesopotamia). He reorganized his army, possibly because the bulk of the Muhajirun may have withdrawn to Medina. According to the historian Khalil Athamina, the remnants of Khalid's army consisted of nomadic Arabs from Medina's environs whose chiefs were appointed to replace the vacant command posts left by the sahaba ('companions' of Muhammad). The historian Fred Donner holds that the Muhajirun and the Ansar still formed the core of his army, along with a large proportion of nomadic Arabs likely from the Muzayna, Tayy, Tamim, Asad and Ghatafan tribes. The commanders of the tribal contingents appointed by Khalid were Adi ibn Hatim of the Tayy and Asim ibn Amr of the Tamim. He arrived at the southern Iraqi frontier with about 1,000 warriors in the late spring or early summer of 633.
The focus of Khalid's offensive was the western banks of the Euphrates river and the nomadic Arabs who dwelt there. The details of the campaign's itinerary are inconsistent in the early Muslim sources, though Donner asserts that "the general course of Khalid's progress in the first part of his campaigning in Iraq can be quite clearly traced". The 9th-century histories of al-Baladhuri and Khalifa ibn Khayyat hold Khalid's first major battle in Iraq was his victory over the Sasanian garrison at Ubulla (the ancient Apologos, near modern Basra) and the nearby village of Khurayba, though al-Tabari (d. 923) considers attribution of the victory to Khalid as erroneous and that Ubulla was conquered later by Utba ibn Ghazwan al-Mazini. Donner accepts the town's conquest by Utba "somewhat later than 634" is the more likely scenario, though the historian Khalid Yahya Blankinship argues "Khālid at least may have led a raid there although [Utbah] actually reduced the area".
From Ubulla's vicinity, Khalid marched up the western bank of the Euphrates where he clashed with the small Sasanian garrisons who guarded the Iraqi frontier from nomadic incursions. The clashes occurred at Dhat al-Salasil, Nahr al-Mar'a (a canal connecting the Euphrates with the Tigris immediately north of Ubulla), Madhar (a town several days north of Ubulla), Ullays (likely the ancient trade center of Vologesias) and Walaja. The last two places were in the vicinity of al-Hira, a predominantly Arab market town and the Sasanian administrative center for the middle Euphrates valley.
Al-Hira's capture was the most significant gain of Khalid's campaign. After besting the city's Persian cavalry under the commander Azadhbih in minor clashes, Khalid and part of his army entered the unwalled city. Al-Hira's Arab tribal nobles, many of whom were Nestorian Christians with blood ties to the nomadic tribes on the city's western desert fringes, barricaded in their scattered fortified palaces. In the meantime, the other part of Khalid's army harried the villages in al-Hira's orbit, many of which were captured or capitulated on tributary terms with the Muslims. The Arab nobility of al-Hira surrendered in an agreement with Khalid whereby the city paid a tribute in return for assurances that al-Hira's churches and palaces would not be disturbed. The annual sum to be paid by al-Hira amounted to 60,000 or 90,000 silver dirhams, which Khalid forwarded to Medina, marking the first tribute the Caliphate received from Iraq.
During the engagements in and around al-Hira, Khalid received key assistance from al-Muthanna ibn Haritha and his Shayban tribe, who had been raiding this frontier for a considerable period before Khalid's arrival, though it is not clear if al-Muthanna's earlier activities were linked to the nascent Muslim state. After Khalid departed, he left al-Muthanna in practical control of al-Hira and its vicinity. He received similar assistance from the Sadus clan of the Dhuhl tribe under Qutba ibn Qatada and the Ijl tribe under al-Madh'ur ibn Adi during the engagements at Ubulla and Walaja. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Khalid ibn al-Walid | The annual sum to be paid by al-Hira amounted to 60,000 or 90,000 silver dirhams, which Khalid forwarded to Medina, marking the first tribute the Caliphate received from Iraq.
During the engagements in and around al-Hira, Khalid received key assistance from al-Muthanna ibn Haritha and his Shayban tribe, who had been raiding this frontier for a considerable period before Khalid's arrival, though it is not clear if al-Muthanna's earlier activities were linked to the nascent Muslim state. After Khalid departed, he left al-Muthanna in practical control of al-Hira and its vicinity. He received similar assistance from the Sadus clan of the Dhuhl tribe under Qutba ibn Qatada and the Ijl tribe under al-Madh'ur ibn Adi during the engagements at Ubulla and Walaja. None of these tribes, all of which were branches of the Banu Bakr confederation, joined Khalid when he operated outside of their tribal areas.
Khalid continued northward along the Euphrates valley, attacking Anbar on the east bank of the river, where he secured capitulation terms from its Sasanian commander. Afterward, he plundered the surrounding market villages frequented by tribesmen from the Bakr and Quda'a confederations, before moving against Ayn al-Tamr, an oasis town west of the Euphrates and about 90 kilometers (56 mi) south of Anbar. Khalid encountered stiff resistance there by the tribesmen of the Namir, compelling him to besiege the town's fortress. The Namir were led by Hilal ibn Aqqa, a Christian chieftain allied with the Sasanians, who Khalid had crucified after defeating him. Ayn al-Tamr capitulated and Khalid captured the town of Sandawda to the north. By this stage, Khalid had subjugated the western areas of the lower Euphrates and the nomadic tribes, including the Namir, Taghlib, Iyad, Taymallat and most of the Ijl, as well as the settled Arab tribesmen, which resided there.
Modern assessments: Athamina doubts the Islamic traditional narrative that Abu Bakr directed Khalid to launch a campaign in Iraq, citing Abu Bakr's disinterest in Iraq at a time when the Muslim state's energies were focused principally on the conquest of Syria. Unlike Syria, Iraq had not been the focus of Muhammad's or the early Muslims' ambitions, nor did the Quraysh maintain trading interests in the region dating to the pre-Islamic period as they had in Syria. According to Shaban, it is unclear if Khalid requested or received Abu Bakr's sanction to raid Iraq or ignored objections by the caliph. Athamina notes hints in the traditional sources that Khalid initiated the campaign unilaterally, implying that the return of the Muhajirun in Khalid's ranks to Medina following Musaylima's defeat likely represented their protest of Khalid's ambitions in Iraq. Shaban holds that the tribesmen who remained in Khalid's army were motivated by the prospect of war booty, particularly amid an economic crisis in Arabia which had arisen in the aftermath of the Ridda campaigns.
According to Fred Donner, the subjugation of Arab tribes may have been Khalid's primary goal in Iraq and clashes with Persian troops were the inevitable, if incidental, result of the tribes' alignment with the Sasanian Empire. In Kennedy's view, Khalid's push toward the desert frontier of Iraq was "a natural continuation of his work" subduing the tribes of northeastern Arabia and in line with Medina's policy to bring all nomadic Arab tribes under its authority. Madelung asserts Abu Bakr relied on the Qurayshite aristocracy during the Ridda wars and early Muslim conquests and speculates that the caliph dispatched Khalid to Iraq to allot the Makhzum an interest in that region.
The extent of Khalid's role in the conquest of Iraq is disputed by modern historians. Patricia Crone argues it is unlikely Khalid played any role on the Iraqi front, citing seeming contradictions by contemporary, non-Arabic sources, namely the Armenian chronicle of Sebeos (c. 661) and the Khuzistan Chronicle (c. 680). The former only records Arab armies being sent to conquer Iraq as the Muslim conquest of Syria was already underway—as opposed to before as held by the traditional Islamic sources—while the latter mentions Khalid as the conqueror of Syria only. Crone views the traditional reports as part of a general theme in the largely Iraq-based, Abbasid-era (post-750) sources to diminish the early Muslims' focus on Syria in favor of Iraq. Crone's assessment is considered a "radical critique of the [traditional] sources" by R. Stephen Humphreys, while Khalid Yahya Blankinship calls it "too one-sided ... The fact that Khālid is a major hero in the historical traditions of Iraq certainly suggests ties there that can have come only from his early participation in its conquest".
March to Syria: All early Islamic accounts agree that Khalid was ordered by Abu Bakr to leave Iraq for Syria to support Muslim forces already present there. Most of these accounts hold that the caliph's order was prompted by requests for reinforcements by the Muslim commanders in Syria. Khalid likely began his march to Syria in early April 634. He left small Muslim garrisons in the conquered cities of Iraq under the overall military command of al-Muthanna ibn Haritha.
The chronological sequence of events after Khalid's operations in Ayn al-Tamr is inconsistent and confused. According to Donner, Khalid undertook two further principal operations before embarking on his march to Syria, which have often been conflated by the sources with events that occurred during the march. One of the operations was against Dumat al-Jandal and the other against the Namir and Taghlib tribes present along the western banks of the upper Euphrates valley as far as the Balikh tributary and the Jabal al-Bishri mountains northeast of Palmyra. It is unclear which engagement occurred first, though both were Muslim efforts to bring the mostly nomadic Arab tribes of north Arabia and the Syrian steppe under Medina's control.
In the Dumat al-Jandal campaign, Khalid was instructed by Abu Bakr or requested by one of the commanders of the campaign, al-Walid ibn Uqba, to reinforce the lead commander Iyad ibn Ghanm's faltering siege of the oasis town. Its defenders were backed by their nomadic allies from the Byzantine-confederate tribes, the Ghassanids, Tanukhids, Salihids, Bahra and Banu Kalb. Khalid left Ayn al-Tamr for Dumat al-Jandal where the combined Muslim forces bested the defenders in a pitched battle. Afterward, Khalid executed the town's Kindite leader Ukaydir, who had defected from Medina following Muhammad's death, while the Kalbite chief Wadi'a was spared after the intercession of his Tamimite allies in the Muslims' camp.
The historians Michael Jan de Goeje and Caetani dismiss altogether that Khalid led an expedition to Dumat al-Jandal following his Iraqi campaign and that the city mentioned in the traditional sources was likely the town by the same name near al-Hira. The historian Laura Veccia Vaglieri calls their assessment "logical" and writes that "it seems impossible that Khālid could have made such a detour which would have taken him so far out of his way while delaying the accomplishment of his mission [to join the Muslim armies in Syria]". Vaglieri surmises that the oasis was conquered by Iyad ibn Ghanm or possibly Amr ibn al-As as the latter had been previously tasked during the Ridda wars with suppressing Wadi'a, who had barricaded himself in Dumat al-Jandal. Crone, dismissing Khalid's role in Iraq entirely, asserts that Khalid had definitively captured Dumat al-Jandal in the 631 campaign and from there crossed the desert to engage in the Syrian conquest.
Itineraries and the desert march: The starting point of Khalid's general march to Syria was al-Hira, according to most of the traditional accounts, with the exception of al-Baladhuri, who places it at Ayn al-Tamr. The segment of the general march called the 'desert march' by the sources occurred at an unclear stage after the al-Hira departure. This phase entailed Khalid and his men—numbering between 500 and 800 strong—marching from a well called Quraqir across a vast stretch of waterless desert for six days and five nights until reaching a source of water at a place called Suwa. As his men did not possess sufficient waterskins to traverse this distance with their horses and camels, Khalid had some twenty of his camels increase their typical water intake and sealed their mouths to prevent the camels from eating and consequently spoiling the water in their stomachs; each day of the march, he had a number of the camels slaughtered so his men could drink the water stored in the camels' stomachs. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Khalid ibn al-Walid | The segment of the general march called the 'desert march' by the sources occurred at an unclear stage after the al-Hira departure. This phase entailed Khalid and his men—numbering between 500 and 800 strong—marching from a well called Quraqir across a vast stretch of waterless desert for six days and five nights until reaching a source of water at a place called Suwa. As his men did not possess sufficient waterskins to traverse this distance with their horses and camels, Khalid had some twenty of his camels increase their typical water intake and sealed their mouths to prevent the camels from eating and consequently spoiling the water in their stomachs; each day of the march, he had a number of the camels slaughtered so his men could drink the water stored in the camels' stomachs. The utilization of the camels as water storage and the locating of the water source at Suwa were the result of advice given to Khalid by his guide, Rafi ibn Amr of the Tayy.
Excluding the above-mentioned operations in Dumat al-Jandal and the upper Euphrates valley, the traditional accounts agree on only two events of Khalid's route to Syria after the departure from al-Hira: the desert march between Quraqir and Suwa, and a subsequent raid against the Bahra tribe at or near Suwa and operations which resulted in the submission of Palmyra; otherwise, they diverge in tracing Khalid's itinerary. Based on these accounts, Donner summarizes three possible routes taken by Khalid to the vicinity of Damascus: two via Palmyra from the north and the one via Dumat al-Jandal from the south. Kennedy notes the sources are "equally certain" in their advocacy of their respective itineraries and there is "simply no knowing which version is correct".
In the first Palmyra–Damascus itinerary, Khalid marches upwards along the Euphrates—passing through places he had previously reduced—to Jabal al-Bishri and from there successively moves southwestwards through Palmyra, al-Qaryatayn and Huwwarin before reaching the Damascus area. In this route the only span where a desert march could have occurred is between Jabal al-Bishri and Palmyra, though the area between the two places is considerably less than a six-day march and contains a number of water sources. The second Palmyra–Damascus itinerary is a relatively direct route between al-Hira and Palmyra via Ayn al-Tamr. The stretch of desert between Ayn al-Tamr and Palmyra is long enough to corroborate a six-day march and contains scarce watering points, though there are no placenames that can be interpreted as Quraqir or Suwa. In the Dumat al-Jandal–Damascus route, such placenames exist, namely the sites of Qulban Qurajir, associated with 'Quraqir', along the eastern edge of Wadi Sirhan, and Sab Biyar, which is identified with Suwa 150 kilometers (93 mi) east of Damascus. The span between the two sites is arid and corresponds with the six-day march narrative.
The desert march is the most celebrated episode of Khalid's expedition and medieval Futuh ('Islamic conquests') literature in general. Kennedy writes that the desert march "has been enshrined in history and legend. Arab sources marvelled at his [Khalid's] endurance; modern scholars have seen him as a master of strategy." He asserts it is "certain" Khalid embarked on the march, "a memorable feat of military endurance", and "his arrival in Syria was an important ingredient of the success of Muslim arms there". The historian Moshe Gil calls the march "a feat which has no parallel" and a testament to "Khalid's qualities as an outstanding commander".
The historian Ryan J. Lynch deems Khalid's desert march to be a literary construct by the authors of the Islamic tradition to form a narrative linking the Muslim conquests of Iraq and Syria and presenting the conquests as "a well-calculated, singular affair" in line with the authors' alleged polemical motives. Lynch holds that the story of the march, which "would have excited and entertained" Muslim audiences, was created out of "fragments of social memory" by inhabitants who attributed the conquests of their towns or areas to Khalid as a means "to earn a certain degree of prestige through association" with the "famous general".
Conquest of Syria: Most traditional accounts have the first Muslim armies deploy to Syria from Medina at the beginning of 13 AH (early spring 634). The commanders of the Muslim armies were Amr ibn al-As, Yazid ibn Abi Sufyan, Shurahbil ibn Hasana and Abu Ubayda ibn al-Jarrah, though the last may have not deployed to Syria until after Umar's succession to the caliphate in the summer of 634, following Abu Bakr's death. According to Donner, the traditional sources' dating of the first Muslim armies' deployment to Syria was behind by several months. It most likely occurred in the autumn of 633, which better conforms with the anonymous Syriac Chronicle of 724, which dates the first clash between the Muslim armies and the Byzantines to February 634. By the time Khalid had left Iraq, the Muslim armies in Syria had already fought a number of skirmishes with local Byzantine garrisons and dominated the southern Syrian countryside, but did not control any urban centers.
Khalid was appointed supreme commander of the Muslim armies in Syria. Accounts cited by al-Baladhuri, al-Tabari, Ibn A'tham, al-Fasawi (d. 987) and Ibn Hubaysh al-Asadi hold that Abu Bakr appointed Khalid supreme commander as part of his reassignment from Iraq to Syria, citing the general's military talents and record. A single account in al-Baladhuri instead attributes Khalid's appointment to a consensus among the commanders already in Syria, though Athamina asserts "it is inconceivable that a man like [Amr ibn al-As] would agree" to such a decision voluntarily. Upon his accession, Umar may have confirmed Khalid as supreme commander.
Khalid reached the meadow of Marj Rahit north of Damascus after his army's trek across the desert. He arrived on Easter day of that year, i.e. 24 April 634, a rare precise date cited by most traditional sources, which Donner deems to be likely correct. There, Khalid attacked a group of Ghassanids celebrating Easter before he or his subordinate commanders raided the Ghouta agricultural belt around Damascus. Afterward, Khalid and the commanders of the earlier Muslim armies, except for Amr, assembled at Bosra southeast of Damascus. The trading center of Bosra, along with the Hauran region in which it lies, had historically supplied the nomadic tribes of Arabia with wheat, oil and wine and had been visited by Muhammad during his youth. The Byzantines may not have reestablished an imperial garrison in the city in the aftermath of the Sasanian withdrawal in 628 and the Muslim armies encountered token resistance during their siege. Bosra capitulated in late May 634, making it the first major city in Syria to fall to the Muslims.
Khalid and the Muslim commanders headed west to Palestine to join Amr as the latter's subordinates in the Battle of Ajnadayn, the first major confrontation with the Byzantines, in July. The battle ended in a decisive victory for the Muslims and the Byzantines retreated toward Pella ('Fahl' in Arabic), a major city east of the Jordan River. The Muslims pursued them and scored another major victory at the Battle of Fahl, though it is unclear if Amr or Khalid held overall command in the engagement.
Siege of Damascus: The remnants of the Byzantine forces from Ajnadayn and Fahl retreated north to Damascus, where the Byzantine commanders called for imperial reinforcements. Khalid advanced, possibly besting a Byzantine unit at the Marj al-Suffar plain before besieging the city. Each of the five Muslim commanders were charged with blocking one of the city gates; Khalid was stationed at Bab Sharqi (the East Gate). A sixth contingent positioned at Barzeh immediately north of Damascus repulsed relief troops dispatched by the Byzantine emperor Heraclius (r. 575–641).
Several traditions relate the Muslims' capture of Damascus. The most popular narrative is preserved by the Damascus-based Ibn Asakir (d. 1175), according to whom Khalid and his men breached the Bab Sharqi gate. Khalid and his men scaled the city's eastern walls and killed the guards and other defenders at Bab Sharqi. As his forces entered from the east, Muslim forces led by Abu Ubayda had entered peacefully from the western Bab al-Jabiya gate after negotiations with Damascene notables led by Mansur ibn Sarjun, a high-ranking city official. The Muslim armies met up in the city center where capitulation terms were agreed. On the other hand, al-Baladhuri holds that Khalid entered peacefully from Bab Sharqi while Abu Ubayda entered from the west by force. Modern research questions Abu Ubayda's arrival in Syria by the time of the siege. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Khalid ibn al-Walid | Several traditions relate the Muslims' capture of Damascus. The most popular narrative is preserved by the Damascus-based Ibn Asakir (d. 1175), according to whom Khalid and his men breached the Bab Sharqi gate. Khalid and his men scaled the city's eastern walls and killed the guards and other defenders at Bab Sharqi. As his forces entered from the east, Muslim forces led by Abu Ubayda had entered peacefully from the western Bab al-Jabiya gate after negotiations with Damascene notables led by Mansur ibn Sarjun, a high-ranking city official. The Muslim armies met up in the city center where capitulation terms were agreed. On the other hand, al-Baladhuri holds that Khalid entered peacefully from Bab Sharqi while Abu Ubayda entered from the west by force. Modern research questions Abu Ubayda's arrival in Syria by the time of the siege. Caetani cast doubt about the aforementioned traditions, while the orientalist Henri Lammens substituted Abu Ubayda with Yazid ibn Abi Sufyan.
In the versions of the Syriac author Dionysius of Tel Mahre (d. 845) and the Melkite patriarch Eutychius of Alexandria (d. 940), the Damascenes led by Mansur, having become weary of the siege and convinced of the besiegers' determination, approached Khalid at Bab Sharqi with an offer to open the gate in return for assurances of safety. Khalid accepted and ordered the drafting of a capitulation agreement. Although several versions of Khalid's treaty were recorded in the early Muslim and Christian sources, they generally concur that the inhabitants' lives, properties and churches were to be safeguarded, in return for their payment of the jizya (poll tax). Imperial properties were confiscated by the Muslims. The treaty probably served as the model for the capitulation agreements made throughout Syria, as well Iraq and Egypt, during the early Muslim conquests.
Although the accounts cited by al-Waqidi (d. 823) and Ibn Ishaq agree that Damascus surrendered in August/September 635, they provide varying timelines of the siege ranging from four to fourteen months.
Battle of Yarmouk: In the spring of 636, Khalid withdrew his forces from Damascus to the old Ghassanid capital at Jabiya in the Golan. He was prompted by the approach of a large Byzantine army dispatched by Heraclius, consisting of imperial troops led by Vahan and Theodore Trithyrius and frontier troops, including Christian Arab light cavalry led by the Ghassanid phylarch Jabala ibn al-Ayham and Armenian auxiliaries led by a certain Georgius (called Jaraja by the Arabs). The sizes of the forces are disputed by modern historians; Donner holds the Byzantines outnumbered the Muslims four to one, Walter E. Kaegi writes the Byzantines "probably enjoyed numerical superiority" with 15,000–20,000 or more troops, and John Walter Jandora holds there was likely "near parity in numbers" between the two sides with the Muslims at 36,000 men (including 10,000 from Khalid's army) and the Byzantines at about 40,000.
The Byzantine army set up camp at the Ruqqad tributary west of the Muslims' positions at Jabiya. Khalid consequently withdrew, taking up position north of the Yarmouk River, close to where the Ruqqad meets the Yarmouk. The area spanned high hilltops, water sources, critical routes connecting Damascus to the Galilee and historic pastures of the Ghassanids. For over a month, the Muslims held the strategic high ground between Adhri'at (modern Daraa) and their camp near Dayr Ayyub and bested the Byzantines in a skirmish outside Jabiya on 23 July 636. Jandora asserts that the Byzantines' Christian Arab and Armenian auxiliaries deserted or defected, but that the Byzantine force remained "formidable", consisting of a vanguard of heavy cavalry and a rear guard of infantrymen when they approached the Muslim defensive lines.
Khalid split his cavalry into two main groups, each positioned behind the Muslims' right and left infantry wings to protect his forces from a potential envelopment by the Byzantine heavy cavalry. He stationed an elite squadron of 200–300 horsemen to support the center of his defensive line and left archers posted in the Muslims' camp near Dayr Ayyub, where they could be most effective against an incoming Byzantine force. The Byzantines' initial assaults against the Muslims' right and left flanks successively failed, but they kept up the momentum until the entire Muslim line fell back or, as contemporary Christian sources maintain, feigned retreat.
The Byzantines pursued the Muslims into their camp, where the Muslims had their camel herds hobbled to form a series of defensive perimeters from which the infantry could fight and which Byzantine cavalries could not easily penetrate. As a result, the Byzantines were left vulnerable to attack by Muslim archers, their momentum was halted and their left flank exposed. Khalid and his cavalries used the opportunity to pierce the Byzantines' left flank, taking advantage of the gap between the Byzantine infantry and cavalry. Khalid enveloped the opposing heavy cavalry on either side, but intentionally left an opening from which the Byzantines could only escape northward, far from their infantry. According to the 9th-century Byzantine historian Theophanes, the Byzantine infantry mutinied under Vahan, possibly in light of Theodore's failure to counter the attack on the cavalry. The infantry was subsequently routed.
The Byzantine cavalry, meanwhile, had withdrawn north to the area between the Ruqqad and Allan tributaries. Khalid sent a force to pursue and prevent them from regrouping. He followed up with a nighttime operation in which he seized the Ruqqad bridge, the only viable withdrawal route for the Byzantines. The Muslims then assaulted the Byzantines' camps on 20 August and massacred most of the Byzantine troops, or induced panic in Byzantine ranks, causing thousands to die in the Yarmouk's ravines in an attempt to make a westward retreat.
Jandora credits the Muslim victory at Yarmouk to the cohesion and "superior leadership" of the Muslim army, particularly the "ingenuity" of Khalid, in comparison to the widespread discord in the Byzantine army's ranks and the conventional tactics of Theodorus, which Khalid "correctly anticipated". In Gil's view, Khalid's withdrawal before the army of Heraclius, the evacuation of Damascus and the counter-movement on the Yarmouk tributaries "are evidence of his excellent organising ability and his skill at manoeuvring on the battlefield". The Byzantine rout marked the destruction of their last effective army in Syria, immediately securing earlier Muslim gains in Palestine and Transjordan and paving the way for the recapture of Damascus in December, this time by Abu Ubayda, and the conquest of the Beqaa Valley and ultimately the rest of Syria to the north. In Jandora's assessment, Yarmouk was one of "the most important battles of World History", ultimately leading to Muslim victories which expanded the Caliphate between the Pyrenees mountains and Central Asia.
Demotion: Khalid was retained as supreme commander of the Muslim forces in Syria between six months and two years from the start of Umar's caliphate, depending on the source. Modern historians mostly agree that Umar's dismissal of Khalid probably occurred in the aftermath of Yarmouk. The caliph appointed Abu Ubayda to Khalid's place, reassigned his troops to the remaining Muslim commanders and subordinated Khalid under the command of one of Abu Ubayda's lieutenants; a later order deployed the bulk of Khalid's former troops to Iraq. Varied causes for Khalid's dismissal from the supreme command are cited by the early Islamic sources. Among them were his independent decision-making and minimal coordination with the leadership in Medina; older allegations of moral misconduct, including his execution of Malik ibn Nuwayra and subsequent marriage to Malik's widow; accusations of generous distribution of booty to members of the tribal nobility to the detriment of eligible early Muslim converts; personal animosity between Khalid and Umar; and Umar's uneasiness over Khalid's heroic reputation among the Muslims, which he feared could develop into a personality cult.
The modern historians De Goeje, William Muir and Andreas Stratos viewed Umar's enmity with Khalid as a contributing cause of Khalid's dismissal. Shaban acknowledges the enmity but asserts it had no bearing on the caliph's decision. De Goeje dismisses Khalid's extravagant grants to the tribal nobility, a common practice among the early Muslim leaders including Muhammad, as a cause for his sacking. Muir, Becker, Stratos and Philip K. Hitti have proposed that Khalid was ultimately dismissed because the Muslim gains in Syria in the aftermath of Yarmouk required the replacement of a military commander at the helm with a capable administrator such as Abu Ubayda.
Athamina doubts all the aforementioned reasons, arguing the cause "must have been vital" at a time when large parts of Syria remained under Byzantine control and Heraclius had not abandoned the province. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Khalid ibn al-Walid | The modern historians De Goeje, William Muir and Andreas Stratos viewed Umar's enmity with Khalid as a contributing cause of Khalid's dismissal. Shaban acknowledges the enmity but asserts it had no bearing on the caliph's decision. De Goeje dismisses Khalid's extravagant grants to the tribal nobility, a common practice among the early Muslim leaders including Muhammad, as a cause for his sacking. Muir, Becker, Stratos and Philip K. Hitti have proposed that Khalid was ultimately dismissed because the Muslim gains in Syria in the aftermath of Yarmouk required the replacement of a military commander at the helm with a capable administrator such as Abu Ubayda.
Athamina doubts all the aforementioned reasons, arguing the cause "must have been vital" at a time when large parts of Syria remained under Byzantine control and Heraclius had not abandoned the province. Athamina holds that "with all his military limitations", Abu Ubayda would not have been considered "a worthy replacement for Khālid's incomparable talents". Medina's lack of a regular standing army, the need to redeploy fighters to other fronts, and the Byzantine threat to Muslim gains in Syria all required the establishment of a defense structure based on the older-established Arab tribes in Syria, which had served as confederates of Byzantium. After Medina's entreaties to the leading confederates, the Ghassanids, were rebuffed, relations were established with the Kalb, Judham and Lakhm. These tribes likely considered the large numbers of outside Arab tribesmen in Khalid's army as a threat to their political and economic power. Khalid's initial force of 500–800 men had swelled to as high as 10,000 as a result of tribesmen joining his army's ranks from the Iraqi front or Arabia and as high as 30,000–40,000 factoring in their families. Athamina concludes Umar dismissed Khalid and recalled his troops from Syria as an overture to the Kalb and their allies.
Operations in northern Syria: Abu Ubayda and Khalid proceeded from Damascus northward to Homs (called Emesa by the Byzantines) and besieged the city probably in the winter of 636–637. The siege held amid a number of sorties by the Byzantine defenders and the city capitulated in the spring. Per the surrender terms, taxes were imposed on the inhabitants in return for guarantees of protection for their property, churches, water mills and the city walls. A quarter of the church of St. John was reserved for Muslim use, and abandoned houses and gardens were confiscated and distributed by Abu Ubayda or Khalid among the Muslim troops and their families. Owing to its proximity to the desert steppe, Homs was viewed as a favorable place of settlement for Arab tribesmen and became the first city in Syria to acquire a large Muslim population.
Information about the subsequent conquests in northern Syria is scant and partly contradictory. Khalid was dispatched by Abu Ubayda to conquer Qinnasrin (called Chalcis by the Byzantines) and nearby Aleppo. Khalid routed a Byzantine force led by a certain Minas in the outskirts of Qinnasrin. There, Khalid spared the inhabitants following their appeal and claim that they were Arabs forcibly conscripted by the Byzantines. He followed up by besieging the walled town of Qinnasrin, which capitulated in August/September 638. He and Iyad ibn Ghanm then launched the first Muslim raid into Byzantine Anatolia. Khalid made Qinnasrin his headquarters, settling there with his wife. Khalid was appointed Abu Ubayda's deputy governor in Qinnasrin in 638. The campaigns against Homs and Qinnasrin resulted in the conquest of northwestern Syria and prompted Heraclius to abandon his headquarters at Edessa for Samosata in Anatolia and ultimately to the imperial capital of Constantinople.
Khalid may have participated in the siege of Jerusalem, which capitulated in 637 or 638. According to al-Tabari, he was one of the witnesses of a letter of assurance by Umar to Patriarch Sophronius of Jerusalem guaranteeing the safety of the city's people and property.
Dismissal and death: According to Sayf ibn Umar, later in 638 Khalid was rumored to have lavishly distributed war spoils from his northern Syrian campaigns, including a sum to the Kindite nobleman al-Ash'ath ibn Qays. Umar consequently ordered that Abu Ubayda publicly interrogate and relieve Khalid from his post regardless of the interrogation's outcome, as well as to put Qinnasrin under Abu Ubayda's direct administration. Following his interrogation in Homs, Khalid issued successive farewell speeches to the troops in Qinnasrin and Homs before being summoned by Umar to Medina. Sayf's account notes that Umar sent notice to the Muslim garrisons in Syria and Iraq that Khalid was dismissed not as a result of improprieties but because the troops had become "captivated by illusions on account of him [Khalid]" and he feared they would disproportionately place their trust in him rather than God.
Khalid's sacking did not elicit public backlash, possibly due to existing awareness in the Muslim polity of Umar's enmity toward Khalid, which prepared the public for his dismissal, or because of existing hostility toward the Makhzum in general as a result of their earlier opposition to Muhammad and the early Muslims. In the account of Ibn Asakir, Umar declared at a council of the Muslim army at Jabiya in 638 that Khalid was dismissed for lavishing war spoils on war heroes, tribal nobles and poets instead of reserving the sums for needy Muslims. No attending commanders voiced opposition, except for a Makhzumite who accused Umar of violating the military mandate given to Khalid by Muhammad. According to the Muslim jurist al-Zuhri (d. 742), before his death in 639, Abu Ubayda appointed Khalid and Iyad ibn Ghanm as his successors, but Umar confirmed only Iyad as governor of the Homs–Qinnasrin–Jazira district and appointed Yazid ibn Abi Sufyan governor over the rest of Syria, namely the districts of Damascus, Jordan and Palestine.
Khalid died in Medina or Homs in 21 AH (c. 642 CE). Purported hadiths related about Khalid include Muhammad's urgings to Muslims not to harm Khalid and prophecies that Khalid would be dealt injustices despite his tremendous contributions to Islam. In Islamic literary narratives, Umar expresses remorse over dismissing Khalid and the women of Medina mourn his death en masse. Athamina considers these all to be "no more than latter-day expressions of sympathy on the part of subsequent generations for the heroic character of Khalid as portrayed by Islamic tradition".
Legacy: Khalid is credited by the early sources for being the most effective commander of the conquests, including after his dismissal from the supreme command. He is considered "one of the tactical geniuses of the early Islamic period" by Donner. The historian Carole Hillenbrand calls him "the most famous of all Arab Muslim generals", and Humphreys describes him as "perhaps the most famous and brilliant Arab general of the Riddah wars and the early conquests". In Kennedy's assessment, Khalid was "a brilliant, ruthless military commander, but one with whom the more pious Muslims could never feel entirely comfortable". While recognizing his military achievements, the early Islamic sources present a mixed assessment of Khalid due to his early confrontation with Muhammad at Uhud, his reputation for brutal or disproportionate actions against Arab tribesmen during the Ridda wars and his military fame which disturbed the pious early converts.
According to the historian Richard Blackburn, despite attempts in the early sources to discredit Khalid, his reputation has developed as "Islam's most formidable warrior" during the eras of Muhammad, Abu Bakr and the conquest of Syria. Kennedy notes that "his reputation as a great general has lasted through the generations and streets are named after him all over the Arab world". Khalid is considered a war hero by Sunni Muslims, while many Shia Muslims view him as a war criminal for his execution of Malik ibn Nuwayra and immediate marriage of his widow, in contravention of the traditional Islamic bereavement period.
Family and claimants of descent: Khalid's eldest son was named Sulayman, hence his kunya ('paedonymic') Abu Sulayman ('father of Sulayman'). Khalid was married to Asma, a daughter of Anas ibn Mudrik, a prominent chieftain and poet of the Khath'am tribe. Their son Abd al-Rahman became a reputable commander in the Arab–Byzantine wars and a close aide of Mu'awiya ibn Abi Sufyan, the governor of Syria and later founder and first caliph of the Umayyad Caliphate, serving as the latter's deputy governor of the Homs–Qinnasrin–Jazira district. Another son of Khalid, Muhajir, was a supporter of Ali, who reigned as caliph in 656–661, and died fighting Mu'awiya's army at the Battle of Siffin in 657 during the First Muslim Civil War. |