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mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Deterrence theory | History: By November 1945 general Curtis LeMay, who led American air raids on Japan during World War II, was thinking about how the next war would be fought. He said in a speech that month to the Ohio Society of New York that since "No air attack, once it is launched, can be completely stopped", his country needed an air force that could immediately retaliate: "If we are prepared it may never come. It is not immediately conceivable that any nation will dare to attack us if we are prepared".
Most of the innovative work on deterrence theory occurred from the late 1940s to mid-1960s. Historically, scholarship on deterrence has tended to focus on nuclear deterrence. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an extension of deterrence scholarship to areas that are not specifically about nuclear weapons.
NATO was founded 1949 with a role including deterring aggression.
A distinction is sometimes made between nuclear deterrence and "conventional deterrence."
The two most prominent deterrent strategies are "denial" (denying the attacker the benefits of attack) and "punishment" (inflicting costs on the attacker).
Lesson of Munich, where appeasement failed, contributes to deterrence theory. In the words of scholars Frederik Logevall and Kenneth Osgood, "Munich and appeasement have become among the dirtiest words in American politics, synonymous with naivete and weakness, and signifying a craven willingness to barter away the nation's vital interests for empty promises." They claimed that the success of US foreign policy often depends upon a president withstanding "the inevitable charges of appeasement that accompany any decision to negotiate with hostile powers.
Concept: The use of military threats as a means to deter international crises and war has been a central topic of international security research for at least 2000 years.
The concept of deterrence can be defined as the use of threats in limited force by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action. In Arms and Influence (1966), Schelling offers a broader definition of deterrence, as he defines it as "to prevent from action by fear of consequences." Glenn Snyder also offers a broad definition of deterrence, as he argues that deterrence involves both the threat of sanction and the promise of reward.
A threat serves as a deterrent to the extent that it convinces its target not to carry out the intended action because of the costs and losses that target would incur. In international security, a policy of deterrence generally refers to threats of military retaliation directed by the leaders of one state to the leaders of another in an attempt to prevent the other state from resorting to the use of military force in pursuit of its foreign policy goals.
As outlined by Huth, a policy of deterrence can fit into two broad categories: preventing an armed attack against a state's own territory (known as direct deterrence) or preventing an armed attack against another state (known as extended deterrence). Situations of direct deterrence often occur if there is a territorial dispute between neighboring states in which major powers like the United States do not directly intervene. On the other hand, situations of extended deterrence often occur when a great power becomes involved. The latter case has generated most interest in academic literature. Building on the two broad categories, Huth goes on to outline that deterrence policies may be implemented in response to a pressing short-term threat (known as immediate deterrence) or as strategy to prevent a military conflict or short-term threat from arising (known as general deterrence).
A successful deterrence policy must be considered in military terms but also political terms: International relations, foreign policy and diplomacy. In military terms, deterrence success refers to preventing state leaders from issuing military threats and actions that escalate peacetime diplomatic and military co-operation into a crisis or militarized confrontation that threatens armed conflict and possibly war. The prevention of crises of wars, however, is not the only aim of deterrence. In addition, defending states must be able to resist the political and the military demands of a potential attacking nation. If armed conflict is avoided at the price of diplomatic concessions to the maximum demands of the potential attacking nation under the threat of war, it cannot be claimed that deterrence has succeeded.
Furthermore, as Jentleson et al. argue, two key sets of factors for successful deterrence are important: a defending state strategy that balances credible coercion and deft diplomacy consistent with the three criteria of proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility and minimizes international and domestic constraints and the extent of an attacking state's vulnerability as shaped by its domestic political and economic conditions. In broad terms, a state wishing to implement a strategy of deterrence is most likely to succeed if the costs of noncompliance that it can impose on and the benefits of compliance it can offer to another state are greater than the benefits of noncompliance and the costs of compliance.
Deterrence theory holds that nuclear weapons are intended to deter other states from attacking with their nuclear weapons, through the promise of retaliation and possibly mutually assured destruction. Nuclear deterrence can also be applied to an attack by conventional forces. For example, the doctrine of massive retaliation threatened to launch US nuclear weapons in response to Soviet attacks.
A successful nuclear deterrent requires a country to preserve its ability to retaliate by responding before its own weapons are destroyed or ensuring a second-strike capability. A nuclear deterrent is sometimes composed of a nuclear triad, as in the case of the nuclear weapons owned by the United States, Russia, the China and India. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, have only sea-based and air-based nuclear weapons.
Proportionality: Jentleson et al. provides further detail in relation to those factors. Proportionality refers to the relationship between the defending state's scope and nature of the objectives being pursued and the instruments available for use to pursue them. The more the defending state demands of another state, the higher that state's costs of compliance and the greater need for the defending state's strategy to increase the costs of noncompliance and the benefits of compliance. That is a challenge, as deterrence is by definition a strategy of limited means. George (1991) goes on to explain that deterrence sometimes goes beyond threats to the actual use of military force, but if force is actually used, it must be limited and fall short of full-scale use to succeed.
The main source of disproportionality is an objective that goes beyond policy change to regime change, which has been seen in Libya, Iraq, and North Korea. There, defending states have sought to change the leadership of a state and to policy changes relating primarily to their nuclear weapons programs.
Reciprocity: Secondly, Jentleson et al. outlines that reciprocity involves an explicit understanding of linkage between the defending state's carrots and the attacking state's concessions. The balance lies in not offering too little, too late or for too much in return and not offering too much, too soon, or for too little return.
Coercive credibility: Finally, coercive credibility requires that in addition to calculations about costs and benefits of co-operation, the defending state convincingly conveys to the attacking state that failure to co-operate has consequences. Threats, uses of force, and other coercive instruments such as economic sanctions must be sufficiently credible to raise the attacking state's perceived costs of noncompliance. A defending state having a superior military capability or economic strength in itself is not enough to ensure credibility. Indeed, all three elements of a balanced deterrence strategy are more likely to be achieved if other major international actors like the UN or NATO are supportive, and opposition within the defending state's domestic politics is limited.
The other important considerations outlined by Jentleson et al. that must be taken into consideration is the domestic political and economic conditions in the attacking state affecting its vulnerability to deterrence policies and the attacking state's ability to compensate unfavourable power balances. The first factor is whether internal political support and regime security are better served by defiance, or there are domestic political gains to be made from improving relations with the defending state. The second factor is an economic calculation of the costs that military force, sanctions, and other coercive instruments can impose and the benefits that trade and other economic incentives may carry. That is partly a function of the strength and flexibility of the attacking state's domestic economy and its capacity to absorb or counter the costs being imposed. The third factor is the role of elites and other key domestic political figures within the attacking state. To the extent that such actors' interests are threatened with the defending state's demands, they act to prevent or block the defending state's demands.
Rational deterrence theory: One approach to theorizing about deterrence has entailed the use of rational choice and game-theoretic models of decision making (see game theory). Rational deterrence theory entails:
Rationality: actors are rational
Unitary actor assumption: actors are understood as unitary
Dyads: interactions tend to be between dyads (or triads) of states
Strategic interactions: actors consider the choices of other actors
Cost-benefit calculations: outcomes reflect actors' cost-benefit calculations
Deterrence theorists have consistently argued that deterrence success is more likely if a defending state's deterrent threat is credible to an attacking state. Huth outlines that a threat is considered credible if the defending state possesses both the military capabilities to inflict substantial costs on an attacking state in an armed conflict, and the attacking state believes that the defending state is resolved to use its available military forces. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Deterrence theory | Rational deterrence theory: One approach to theorizing about deterrence has entailed the use of rational choice and game-theoretic models of decision making (see game theory). Rational deterrence theory entails:
Rationality: actors are rational
Unitary actor assumption: actors are understood as unitary
Dyads: interactions tend to be between dyads (or triads) of states
Strategic interactions: actors consider the choices of other actors
Cost-benefit calculations: outcomes reflect actors' cost-benefit calculations
Deterrence theorists have consistently argued that deterrence success is more likely if a defending state's deterrent threat is credible to an attacking state. Huth outlines that a threat is considered credible if the defending state possesses both the military capabilities to inflict substantial costs on an attacking state in an armed conflict, and the attacking state believes that the defending state is resolved to use its available military forces. Huth goes on to explain the four key factors for consideration under rational deterrence theory: the military balance, signaling and bargaining power, reputations for resolve, interests at stake.
The American economist Thomas Schelling brought his background in game theory to the subject of studying international deterrence. Schelling's (1966) classic work on deterrence presents the concept that military strategy can no longer be defined as the science of military victory. Instead, it is argued that military strategy was now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, intimidation and deterrence. Schelling says the capacity to harm another state is now used as a motivating factor for other states to avoid it and influence another state's behavior. To be coercive or deter another state, violence must be anticipated and avoidable by accommodation. It can therefore be summarized that the use of the power to hurt as bargaining power is the foundation of deterrence theory and is most successful when it is held in reserve.
In an article celebrating Schelling's Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics, Michael Kinsley, Washington Post op‑ed columnist and one of Schelling's former students, anecdotally summarizes Schelling's reorientation of game theory thus: "[Y]ou're standing at the edge of a cliff, chained by the ankle to someone else. You'll be released, and one of you will get a large prize, as soon as the other gives in. How do you persuade the other guy to give in, when the only method at your disposal—threatening to push him off the cliff—would doom you both? Answer: You start dancing, closer and closer to the edge. That way, you don't have to convince him that you would do something totally irrational: plunge him and yourself off the cliff. You just have to convince him that you are prepared to take a higher risk than he is of accidentally falling off the cliff. If you can do that, you win."
Military balance: Deterrence is often directed against state leaders who have specific territorial goals that they seek to attain either by seizing disputed territory in a limited military attack or by occupying disputed territory after the decisive defeat of the adversary's armed forces. In either case, the strategic orientation of potential attacking states generally is for the short term and is driven by concerns about military cost and effectiveness. For successful deterrence, defending states need the military capacity to respond quickly and strongly to a range of contingencies. Deterrence often fails if either a defending state or an attacking state underestimates or overestimates the other's ability to undertake a particular course of action.
Signaling and bargaining power: The central problem for a state that seeks to communicate a credible deterrent threat by diplomatic or military actions is that all defending states have an incentive to act as if they are determined to resist an attack in the hope that the attacking state will back away from military conflict with a seemingly resolved adversary. If all defending states have such incentives, potential attacking states may discount statements made by defending states along with any movement of military forces as merely bluffs. In that regard, rational deterrence theorists have argued that costly signals are required to communicate the credibility of a defending state's resolve. Those are actions and statements that clearly increase the risk of a military conflict and also increase the costs of backing down from a deterrent threat. States that bluff are unwilling to cross a certain threshold of threat and military action for fear of committing themselves to an armed conflict.
Reputations for resolve: There are three different arguments that have been developed in relation to the role of reputations in influencing deterrence outcomes. The first argument focuses on a defending state's past behavior in international disputes and crises, which creates strong beliefs in a potential attacking state about the defending state's expected behaviour in future conflicts. The credibilities of a defending state's policies are arguably linked over time, and reputations for resolve have a powerful causal impact on an attacking state's decision whether to challenge either general or immediate deterrence. The second approach argues that reputations have a limited impact on deterrence outcomes because the credibility of deterrence is heavily determined by the specific configuration of military capabilities, interests at stake, and political constraints faced by a defending state in a given situation of attempted deterrence. The argument of that school of thought is that potential attacking states are not likely to draw strong inferences about a defending states resolve from prior conflicts because potential attacking states do not believe that a defending state's past behaviour is a reliable predictor of future behavior. The third approach is a middle ground between the first two approaches and argues that potential attacking states are likely to draw reputational inferences about resolve from the past behaviour of defending states only under certain conditions. The insight is the expectation that decisionmakers use only certain types of information when drawing inferences about reputations, and an attacking state updates and revises its beliefs when a defending state's unanticipated behavior cannot be explained by case-specific variables.
An example shows that the problem extends to the perception of the third parties as well as main adversaries and underlies the way in which attempts at deterrence can fail and even backfire if the assumptions about the others' perceptions are incorrect.
Interests at stake: Although costly signaling and bargaining power are more well established arguments in rational deterrence theory, the interests of defending states are not as well known. Attacking states may look beyond the short-term bargaining tactics of a defending state and seek to determine what interests are at stake for the defending state that would justify the risks of a military conflict. The argument is that defending states that have greater interests at stake in a dispute are more resolved to use force and more willing to endure military losses to secure those interests. Even less well-established arguments are the specific interests that are more salient to state leaders such as military interests and economic interests.
Furthermore, Huth argues that both supporters and critics of rational deterrence theory agree that an unfavorable assessment of the domestic and international status quo by state leaders can undermine or severely test the success of deterrence. In a rational choice approach, if the expected utility of not using force is reduced by a declining status quo position, deterrence failure is more likely since the alternative option of using force becomes relatively more attractive.
Tripwires: International relations scholars Dan Reiter and Paul Poast have argued that so-called "tripwires" do not deter aggression. Tripwires entail that small forces are deployed abroad with the assumption that an attack on them will trigger a greater deployment of forces. Dan Altman has argued that tripwires do work to deter aggression, citing the Western deployment of forces to Berlin in 1948–1949 to deter Soviet aggression as a successful example.
A 2022 study by Brian Blankenship and Erik Lin-Greenberg found that high-resolve, low-capability signals (such as tripwires) were not viewed as more reassuring to allies than low-resolve, high-capability alternatives (such as forces stationed offshore). Their study cast doubt on the reassuring value of tripwires.
Nuclear deterrence theory: In 1966, Schelling is prescriptive in outlining the impact of the development of nuclear weapons in the analysis of military power and deterrence. In his analysis, before the widespread use of assured second strike capability, or immediate reprisal, in the form of SSBN submarines, Schelling argues that nuclear weapons give nations the potential to destroy their enemies but also the rest of humanity without drawing immediate reprisal because of the lack of a conceivable defense system and the speed with which nuclear weapons can be deployed. A nation's credible threat of such severe damage empowers their deterrence policies and fuels political coercion and military deadlock, which can produce proxy warfare.
According to Kenneth Waltz, there are three requirements for successful nuclear deterrence:
Part of a state's nuclear arsenal must appear to be able to survive an attack by the adversary and be used for a retaliatory second strike
The state must not respond to false alarms of a strike by the adversary
The state must maintain command and control
The stability–instability paradox is a key concept in rational deterrence theory. It states that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases. This occurs because rational actors want to avoid nuclear wars, and thus they neither start major conflicts nor allow minor conflicts to escalate into major conflicts—thus making it safe to engage in minor conflicts. For instance, during the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union never engaged each other in warfare, but fought proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, Angola, the Middle East, Nicaragua and Afghanistan and spent substantial amounts of money and manpower on gaining relative influence over the third world.
Bernard Brodie wrote in 1959 that a credible nuclear deterrent must be always ready but never used. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Deterrence theory | It states that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases. This occurs because rational actors want to avoid nuclear wars, and thus they neither start major conflicts nor allow minor conflicts to escalate into major conflicts—thus making it safe to engage in minor conflicts. For instance, during the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union never engaged each other in warfare, but fought proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, Angola, the Middle East, Nicaragua and Afghanistan and spent substantial amounts of money and manpower on gaining relative influence over the third world.
Bernard Brodie wrote in 1959 that a credible nuclear deterrent must be always ready but never used.
Scholars have debated whether having a superior nuclear arsenal provides a deterrent against other nuclear-armed states with smaller arsenals. Matthew Kroenig has argued that states with nuclear superiority are more likely to win nuclear crises, whereas Todd Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann and David C. Logan have challenged this assertion. A 2023 study found that a state with nuclear weapons is less likely to be targeted by non-nuclear states, but that a state with nuclear weapons is not less likely to target other nuclear states in low-level conflict. A 2022 study by Kyungwon Suh suggests that nuclear superiority may not reduce the likelihood that nuclear opponents will initiate nuclear crises.
Proponents of nuclear deterrence theory argue that newly nuclear-armed states may pose a short- or medium-term risk, but that "nuclear learning" occurs over time as states learn to live with new nuclear-armed states. Mark S. Bell and Nicholas L. Miller have however argued that there is a weak theoretical and empirical basis for notions of "nuclear learning."
Stages of US policy of deterrence: The US policy of deterrence during the Cold War underwent significant variations.
Containment: The early stages of the Cold War were generally characterized by the containment of communism, an aggressive stance on behalf of the US especially on developing nations under its sphere of influence. The period was characterized by numerous proxy wars throughout most of the globe, particularly Africa, Asia, Central America, and South America. One notable conflict was the Korean War. George F. Kennan, who is taken to be the founder of this policy in his Long Telegram, asserted that he never advocated military intervention, merely economic support, and that his ideas were misinterpreted as espoused by the general public.
Détente: With the US drawdown from Vietnam, the normalization of US relations with China, and the Sino-Soviet Split, the policy of containment was abandoned and a new policy of détente was established, with peaceful co-existence was sought between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although all of those factors contributed to this shift, the most important factor was probably the rough parity achieved in stockpiling nuclear weapons with the clear capability of mutual assured destruction (MAD). Therefore, the period of détente was characterized by a general reduction in the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States and a thawing of the Cold War, which lasted from the late 1960s until the start of the 1980s. The doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence then characterized relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and relations with Russia until the onset of the New Cold War in the early 2010s. Since then, relations have been less clear.
Reagan era: A third shift occurred with US President Ronald Reagan's arms build-up during the 1980s. Reagan attempted to justify the policy by concerns of growing Soviet influence in Latin America and the post-1979 revolutionary government of Iran. Similar to the old policy of containment, the US funded several proxy wars, including support for Saddam Hussein of Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War, support for the mujahideen in Afghanistan, who were fighting for independence from the Soviet Union, and several anticommunist movements in Latin America such as the overthrow of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The funding of the Contras in Nicaragua led to the Iran-Contra Affair, while overt support led to a ruling from the International Court of Justice against the United States in Nicaragua v. United States.
The final expression of the full impact of deterrence during the cold war can be seen in the agreement between Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985. They "agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the U.S. could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.".
While the army was dealing with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the spread of nuclear technology to other nations beyond the United States and Russia, the concept of deterrence took on a broader multinational dimension. The US policy on deterrence after the Cold War was outlined in 1995 in the document called "Essentials of Post–Cold War Deterrence". It explains that while relations with Russia continue to follow the traditional characteristics of MAD, but the US policy of deterrence towards nations with minor nuclear capabilities should ensure by threats of immense retaliation (or even pre-emptive action) not to threaten the United States, its interests, or allies. The document explains that such threats must also be used to ensure that nations without nuclear technology refrain from developing nuclear weapons and that a universal ban precludes any nation from maintaining chemical or biological weapons. The current tensions with Iran and North Korea over their nuclear programs are caused partly by the continuation of the policy of deterrence.
Post-Cold War period: By the beginning of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, many western hawks expressed the view that deterrence worked in that war but only in one way – in favor of Russia. Former US security advisor, John Bolton, said: Deterrence is working in the Ukraine crisis, just not for the right side. The United States and its allies failed to deter Russia from invading. The purpose of deterrence strategy is to prevent the conflict entirely, and there Washington failed badly. On the other hand, Russian deterrence is enjoying spectacular success. Russia has convinced the West that even a whisper of NATO military action in Ukraine would bring disastrous consequences. Putin threatens, blusters, uses the word “nuclear,” and the West wilts.
When Elon Musk prevented Ukraine from carrying drone attacks on the Russian Black Sea fleet by denying to enable needed Starlink communications in Crimea, Anne Applebaum argued Musk had been deterred by Russia after the country's ambassador warned him an attack on Crimea would be met with a nuclear response. Later Ukrainian attacks on the same fleet using a different communications system also caused deterrence, this time to the Russian Navy.
Timo S. Koster who served at NATO as Director of Defence Policy & Capabilities similarly argued: A massacre is taking place in Europe and the strongest military alliance in the world is staying out of it. We are deterred and Russia is not. Philip Breedlove, a retired four-star U.S. Air Force general and a former SACEUR, said that Western fears about nuclear weapons and World War III have left it "fully deterred" and Putin "completely undeterred." The West have "ceded the initiative to the enemy." No attempt was made by NATO to deter Moscow with the threat of military force, wondered another expert. To the contrary, it was Russia’s deterrence that proved to be successful.
Cyber deterrence: Since the early 2000s, there has been an increased focus on cyber deterrence. Cyber deterrence has two meanings:
The use of cyber actions to deter other states
The deterrence of an adversary's cyber operations
Scholars have debated how cyber capabilities alter traditional understandings of deterrence, given that it may be harder to attribute responsibility for cyber attacks, the barriers to entry may be lower, the risks and costs may be lower for actors who conduct cyber attacks, it may be harder to signal and interpret intentions, the advantage of offense over defense, and weak actors and non-state actors can develop considerable cyber capabilities. Scholars have also debated the feasibility of launching highly damaging cyber attacks and engaging in destructive cyber warfare, with most scholars expressing skepticism that cyber capabilities have enhanced the ability of states to launch highly destructive attacks. The most prominent cyber attack to date is the Stuxnet attack on Iran's nuclear program. By 2019, the only publicly acknowledged case of a cyber attack causing a power outage was the 2015 Ukraine power grid hack.
There are various ways to engage in cyber deterrence:
Denial: preventing adversaries from achieving military objectives by defending against them
Punishment: the imposition of costs on the adversary
Norms: the establishment and maintenance of norms that establish appropriate standards of behavior
Escalation: raising the probability that costs will be imposed on the adversary
Entanglement and interdependence: interdependence between actors can have a deterrent effect
There is a risk of unintended escalation in cyberspace due to difficulties in discerning the intent of attackers, and complexities in state-hacker relationships. According to political scientists Joseph Brown and Tanisha Fazal, states frequently neither confirm nor deny responsibility for cyber operations so that they can avoid the escalatory risks (that come with public credit) while also signaling that they have cyber capabilities and resolve (which can be achieved if intelligence agencies and governments believe they were responsible).
According to Lennart Maschmeyer, cyber weapons have limited coercive effectiveness due to a trilemma "whereby speed, intensity, and control are negatively correlated. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Deterrence theory | According to political scientists Joseph Brown and Tanisha Fazal, states frequently neither confirm nor deny responsibility for cyber operations so that they can avoid the escalatory risks (that come with public credit) while also signaling that they have cyber capabilities and resolve (which can be achieved if intelligence agencies and governments believe they were responsible).
According to Lennart Maschmeyer, cyber weapons have limited coercive effectiveness due to a trilemma "whereby speed, intensity, and control are negatively correlated. These constraints pose a trilemma for actors because a gain in one variable tends to produce losses across the other two variables."
Intrawar deterrence: Intrawar deterrence is deterrence within a war context. It means that war has broken out but actors still seek to deter certain forms of behavior. In the words of Caitlin Talmadge, "intra-war deterrence failures... can be thought of as causing wars to get worse in some way." Examples of intrawar deterrence include deterring adversaries from resorting to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons attacks or attacking civilian populations indiscriminately. Broadly, it involves any prevention of escalation.
Criticism:
Deterrence failures: Deterrence theory has been criticized by numerous scholars for various reasons, the most basic being skepticism that decision makers are rational. A prominent strain of criticism argues that rational deterrence theory is contradicted by frequent deterrence failures, which may be attributed to misperceptions. Here it's argued that misestimations of perceived costs and benefits by analysts contribute to deterrence failures, as exemplified in case of Russian invasion of Ukraine. Frozen conflicts can be seen as rewarding aggression.
Misprediction of behavior: Scholars have also argued that leaders do not behave in ways that are consistent with the predictions of nuclear deterrence theory. Scholars have also argued that rational deterrence theory does not grapple sufficiently with emotions and psychological biases that make accidents, loss of self-control, and loss of control over others likely. Frank C. Zagare has argued that deterrence theory is logically inconsistent and empirically inaccurate. In place of classical deterrence, rational choice scholars have argued for perfect deterrence, which assumes that states may vary in their internal characteristics and especially in the credibility of their threats of retaliation.
Suicide attacks: Advocates for nuclear disarmament, such as Global Zero, have criticized nuclear deterrence theory. Sam Nunn, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and George Shultz have all called upon governments to embrace the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and created the Nuclear Security Project to advance that agenda. In 2010, the four were featured in a documentary film entitled Nuclear Tipping Point where proposed steps to achieve nuclear disarmament. Kissinger has argued, "The classical notion of deterrence was that there was some consequences before which aggressors and evildoers would recoil. In a world of suicide bombers, that calculation doesn't operate in any comparable way." Shultz said, "If you think of the people who are doing suicide attacks, and people like that get a nuclear weapon, they are almost by definition not deterrable."
Stronger deterrent: Paul Nitze argued in 1994 that nuclear weapons were obsolete in the "new world disorder" after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and he advocated reliance on precision guided munitions to secure a permanent military advantage over future adversaries.
Minimum deterrence: As opposed to the extreme mutually assured destruction form of deterrence, the concept of minimum deterrence in which a state possesses no more nuclear weapons than is necessary to deter an adversary from attacking is presently the most common form of deterrence practiced by nuclear weapon states, such as China, India, Pakistan, Britain, and France. Pursuing minimal deterrence during arms negotiations between the United States and Russia allows each state to make nuclear stockpile reductions without the state becoming vulnerable, but it has been noted that there comes a point that further reductions may be undesirable, once minimal deterrence is reached, as further reductions beyond that point increase a state's vulnerability and provide an incentive for an adversary to expand its nuclear arsenal secretly.
France has developed and maintained its own nuclear deterrent under the belief that the United States will refuse to risk its own cities by assisting Western Europe in a nuclear war.
Ethical objections: In the post cold war era, philosophical objections to the reliance upon deterrence theories in general have also been raised on purely ethical grounds. Scholars such as Robert L. Holmes have noted that the implementation of such theories is inconsistent with a fundamental deontological presumption which prohibits the killing of innocent life. Consequently, such theories are prima facie immoral in nature. In addition, he observes that deterrence theories serve to perpetuate a state of mutual assured destruction between nations over time. Holmes further argues that it is therefore both irrational and immoral to utilize a methodology for perpetuating international peace which relies exclusively upon the continuous development of new iterations of the very weapons which it is designed to prohibit.
See also:
Notes:
References:
Further reading: Schultz, George P. and Goodby, James E. The War that Must Never be Fought, Hoover Press, ISBN 978-0-8179-1845-3, 2015.
Freedman, Lawrence. 2004. Deterrence. New York: Polity Press.
Jervis, Robert, Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein. 1985. Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 270 pp.
Morgan, Patrick. 2003. Deterrence Now. Cambridge University Press.
T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, James J. Wirtz, Complex Deterrence: Strategy In the Global Age (University of Chicago Press, 2009) ISBN 978-0-226-65002-9.
Waltz, Kenneth N. "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities". The American Political Science Review. Vol. 84, No. 3 (Sep, 1990), pp. 731–746.
== External links == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Direct fire | Description: Examples of direct-fire weapons include most ancient and modern weapons such as slings, blowguns, bows, crossbows, firearms, and recoilless rifles. The term is most often used in the context of artillery, such as howitzers and mortars.
Direct fire remained the dominant method of operating artillery throughout most of human history, with indirect fire used for sieges and involving specific siege guns. Technological developments born of the Industrial Revolution and the development of technical practices in the late 19th century led to an appreciation of indirect fire, although it was not until World War I that indirect fire supplanted direct fire as the primary method by which artillery supported the other combat arms. During World War II direct fire remained secondary to indirect fire, although it was used profusely in situations where indirect fire was less effective, and new direct-fire artillery such as anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft guns were developed.
After World War II new technology continued to diminish the role of direct fire; however, in several situations it remains a necessary function on the modern battlefield. One of these is the defense of fixed fortified areas – for example fire support bases – for which specific firing techniques and munitions such as Killer Junior and Beehive anti-personnel rounds were developed. Another is when artillery is forced to defend itself, such as in a surprise attack. This could be the result of rapid maneuvering by ground forces, an attack by airborne troops, or from the lack of defined front lines as found in counterinsurgency operations. Direct-fire artillery can also be massed to counter a penetration by enemy tanks. In particular self-propelled artillery are ideally suited for this role on account of their mobility, armor protection, and faster rate of fire compared to other weapons. A final situation is in urban warfare, where locating the enemy can be difficult, the physical structures give the defenders better protection, and the risk of collateral damage is high. In these cases direct-fire artillery can unleash tremendous firepower to precisely destroy enemy fortified positions. For example, during the Siege of Marawi, the Armed Forces of the Philippines used 105mm M101 howitzers in close-range to combat Abu Sayyaf and Maute Group terrorists who fortified themselves in several buildings.
See also: Director (military) – Computer that calculates aiming for weapons
Fire-control radar – Narrowly focused radar beam whose reflected signal is used to obtain a missile lock-on
Gun laying – Process of aiming an artillery piece or turret
Line-of-sight (missile) – straight line between a missile and its targetPages displaying wikidata descriptions as a fallback
Telescopic sight – Optical sighting device for firearms
field gun
References:
Footnotes:
Bibliography: Bailey, J B A (2004). Field Artillery and Firepower. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-029-0. OCLC 51931033. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Director (military) | Naval warships: For warships of the 20th century, the director is part of the fire control system; it passes information to the computer that calculates range and elevation for the guns. Typically, positions on the ship measured range and bearing of the target; these instantaneous measurements are used to calculate rate of change values, and the computer ("fire control table" in Royal Navy terms) then predicts the correct firing solution, taking into account other parameters, such as wind direction, air temperature, and ballistic factors for the guns. The British Royal Navy widely deployed the Pollen and Dreyer Fire Control Tables during the First World War, while in World War II a widely used computer in the US Navy was the electro-mechanical Mark I Fire Control Computer.
On ships the director control towers for the main battery are placed high on the superstructure, where they have the best view. Due to their large size and weight, in the World War II era the computers were located in plotting rooms deep in the ship, below the armored deck on armored ships.
Field artillery: Directors were introduced into field artillery in the early 20th century to orient the guns of an artillery battery in their zero line (or 'centre of arc'). Directors were an essential element in the introduction of indirect artillery fire. In US service these directors were called 'aiming circles'. Directors could also be used instead of theodolites for artillery survey over shorter distances. The first directors used an open sight rotating on an angular scale (e.g. degrees & minutes, grads or mils of one sort or another), but by World War I most directors were optical instruments. Introduction of digital artillery sights in the 1990s removed the need for directors.
Directors were mounted on a field tripod and oriented in relation to grid north of the map. If time was short this orientation usually used an integral compass, but was updated by calculation (azimuth by hour angle or azimuth by Polaris) or 'carried' by survey techniques from a survey control point. In the 1960s gyroscopic orientation was introduced.
Anti-aircraft: For anti-aircraft use, directors are usually used in conjunction with other fire control equipment, such as height finders or fire control radars. In some armies these 'directors' were called 'predictors'. The Mark 51 director was used by the US Navy for 40 mm guns and later for 3"/50 caliber guns. The Kerrison Predictor was also designed to be used with the Bofors 40 mm gun.
Example: The Bofors 40 mm gun (called a fire unit) used in its anti-aircraft role has the M5 director for its fire-control system. The director is operated by a member of the range section who reports to the chief of section, who in turn reports to the platoon commander. The range section's leader is also called a range setter; he guides the preparation of the director and generator for firing, verifies the orientation and synchronisation of the gun and the director, and supervises fire control using the M5 director (or by the carriage when the M7 Weissight is used). The range section that uses the M5 director consists of the range setter, elevation tracker, azimuth tracker, power plant operator and telephone operator.
The M5 director is used to determine or estimate the altitude or slant range of the aerial target. Two observers then track the aircraft through a pair of telescopes on opposite sides of the director. The trackers turn handwheels to keep the crosshairs of their respective telescope on the aircraft image. The rotation of the handwheels provides the director with data on the aircraft's change in elevation and change in azimuth in relation to the director. As the mechanisms inside the director respond to the rotation of the handwheels, a firing solution is mechanically calculated and continuously updated for as long as the target is tracked. Essentially, the director predicts future position based on the aircraft's present location and how it is moving.
After their introduction, directors soon incorporated correction factors that could compensate for ballistic conditions such as air density, wind velocity and wind direction. If the director was not located near the gun sections, a correction for parallax error could also be entered to produce even more accurate firing direction calculations.
Directors transmit three important calculated firing solutions to the anti-aircraft gun firing crew: the correct firing azimuth and quadrant elevation calculated to determine where exactly to aim the gun, and for guns that use ammunition with timed fuzes, the director also provides the flight time for the projectile so the fuze can be set to detonate close to the target.
Early anti-aircraft artillery batteries located the directors in the middle of the position, with the firing sections (guns) located at the corners of the position. Before the introduction of radars, searchlights were used in conjunction with directors to allow night target engagement.
U.S. Army anti-aircraft directors: T1 (wilson) director
T4 gun director used with 3-inch M1918 gun
T6 was built by Sperry Corporation in 1930 and standardized as the M2 director.
M3 was standardized from the T8 in 1934
M4 was standardized in 1939
M5 Gun Director Mechanical, a US-produced Kerrison Predictor, for use with 37mm Gun M1 and M1 40 MM
M5A1
M5A2
M7 gun director was standardized in 1941, and is similar to the M4 but added power control to the guns it is still described as a mechanical system. for use with 90 mm gun
M7A1B1
M7A1B2
T10 standardized as M9 Gun Director electrical for use with 90 mm gun produced by Bell Labs
M9B1
M10 gun director electrical for use with 120 mm M1 gun
Naval directors: Mark 1
MK 51 Fire Control System
Mark 56
Mark 57
Mark 58
Mark 59
Mark 92
Type 6 director (PRC)
Surviving examples: South African National Museum of Military History - Number 1 Mark II Predictor
Powerhouse Museum - Vickers No.1 anti-aircraft predictor, 1942
USS Texas, museum ship, Houston, Texas. Mark 51 anti-aircraft directors.
See also: Ship gun fire-control systems
Rangekeeper
Gun data computer
Fire-control system
Indirect fire
Hendrik Wade Bode, designer of US T10 director.
John Whitney (animator), Used M5 AA director for film animation.
Notes:
References: TM 9-2300 Standard Artillery and Fire Control Materiel dated 1944
Brooks, Brian L., Antiaircraft command: Preserving the history of U.S.Army antiaircraft artillery of World War II, Directors and height finders, [3]
Lone Sentry.com, German Antiaircraft Artillery, Military Intelligence Service, Special Series 10, Feb. 1943, U.S. War Department, 1943
Skylighters, A Beginner's Guide to the Skylighters, WW II Antiaircraft Artillery, Searchlights, and Radar, Skylighters.org Archived 2016-04-05 at the Wayback Machine January 10, 2004
Brown, Louis, A Radar History of World War II: Technical and Military Imperatives, CRC Press, 1999
Journal of the United States Artillery, v. 47, Artillery School (Fort Monroe, Va.), Coast Artillery Training Center (U.S.), 1917
Dow Boutwell, William, Brodinsky, Ben, Frederick, Pauline, Pratt Harris, Joseph, Nixon, Glenn, Robertson, Archibald Thomas, America Prepares for Tomorrow; the Story of Our Total Defense Effort, Harper and brothers, 1941
Evans, Nigel F., Laying and Orienting the Guns
Bennett, Stuart, A History of Control Engineering, 1930–1955, IET, 199
The Coast Artillery Journal, May/June 1935
Further reading: Mindell, David (December 1995). "Automation's Finest Hour: Bell Labs and Automatic Control in World War II" (PDF). IEEE Control Systems Magazine. 15 (6): 72–78 80. doi:10.1109/MCS.1995.476388. S2CID 10041704.
External links: Mark 51 Gun director
Director Firing Handbook index from HMS Dreadnought project
Gunnery Pocket book maritime.org
http://web.mit.edu/STS.035/www/PDFs/sperry.pdf
https://books.google.com/books?id=sExvSbe9MSsC&q=Between+Human+and+Machine
https://books.google.com/books?id=T-IDAAAAMBAJ&dq=m16+gun+data+computer&pg=PA801
Gun Fire Control System Mark 37 Operating Instructions at ibiblio.org
Director section of Mark 1 Mod 1 computer operations at NavSource.org |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Disaster response | Definition: Disaster response refers to the actions taken directly before, during or in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. The objective is to save lives, ensure health and safety and to meet the subsistence needs of the people affected.: 16
The Business Dictionary provide a more comprehensive definition for "disaster response"; Aggregate of decisions and measures to (1) contain or mitigate the effects of a disastrous event to prevent any further loss of life and/or property, (2) restore order in its immediate aftermath, and (3) re-establish normality through reconstruction and re-rehabilitation shortly thereafter. The first and immediate response is called emergency response.
The Johns Hopkins and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) state: "The word disaster implies a sudden overwhelming and unforeseen event. At the household level, a disaster could result in a major illness, death, a substantial economic or social misfortune. At the community level, it could be a flood, a fire, a collapse of buildings in an earthquake, the destruction of livelihoods, an epidemic or displacement through conflict. When occurring at district or provincial level, a large number of people can be affected."
A recent case study of a disaster response undertaken by the IFRC can be viewed here.
The level of disaster response depends on a number of factors and particular situation awareness. Studies undertaken by Son, Aziz and Peña-Mora (2007) shows that "initial work demand gradually spreads and increases based on a wide range of variables including scale of disaster, vulnerability of affected area which in turn is affected by population density, site-specific conditions (e.g. exposure to hazardous conditions) and effects of cascading disasters resulting from inter-dependence between elements of critical infrastructure".
In the British Government's Emergency Response and Recovery guidance, disaster response refers to decisions and actions taken in accordance with the strategic, tactical and operational objectives defined by emergency responders. At a high level these will be to protect life, contain and mitigate the impacts of the emergency and create the conditions for a return to normality. Response encompasses the decisions and actions taken to deal with the immediate effects of an emergency. In many scenarios it is likely to be relatively short and to last for a matter of hours or days—rapid implementation of arrangements for collaboration, co-ordination and communication are, therefore, vital. Response encompasses the effort to deal not only with the direct effects of the emergency itself (e.g. fighting fires, rescuing individuals) but also the indirect effects (e.g. disruption, media interest).
Common objectives for responders are:
saving and protecting human life;
relieving suffering;
containing the emergency – limiting its escalation or spread and mitigating its impacts;
providing the public and businesses with warnings, advice and information;
protecting the health and safety of responding personnel;
safeguarding the environment;
as far as reasonably practicable, protecting property;
maintaining or restoring critical activities;
maintaining normal services at an appropriate level;
promoting and facilitating self-help in affected communities;
facilitating investigations and inquiries (e.g. by preserving the scene and effective records management);
facilitating the recovery of the community (including the humanitarian assistance, economic, infrastructure and environmental impacts);
evaluating the response and recovery effort; and
identifying and taking action to implement lessons identified.
Disaster response planning: The United States National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 Standard (NFPA, 2010) specify elements of an emergency response, as: defined responsibilities; specific actions to be taken (which must include protective actions for life safety); and communication directives. Within the standard, NFPA recognize that disasters and day-to-day emergencies are characteristically different. Nevertheless, the prescribed response elements are the same.
In support of the NFPA standard, Statoil's (2013) practical application of emergency response is across three distinct "lines" that incorporate NFPA's elements. Line 1 is responsible for the operational management of an incident; line 2, typically housed off-site, is responsible for tactical guidance and additional resource management. Finally, in the case of major incidents, line 3 provides strategic guidance, group resource management, and government and media relations.
While it is impossible to plan for every disaster, crisis or emergency, the Statoil investigation into the terrorist attacks on In Amenas place emphasis on the importance of having a disaster response. The report concludes that a disaster response framework may be utilized in an array of disaster situations, such as that at In Amenas.
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is action taken to "[reduce] existing disaster risk and [manage] residual risk." DRR plans aim to decrease the amount of disaster response necessary by planning ahead and making communities resilient to any potential hazardous events that might occur. A number of international frameworks such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction have been enacted to increase the implementation of global mitigation plans in the event of disasters.
Organizations:
United Nations: The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); is responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies that require an international response. OCHA plays a key role in operational coordination in crisis situations. This includes assessing situations and needs; agreeing common priorities; developing common strategies to address issues such as negotiating access, mobilizing funding and other resources; clarifying consistent public messaging; and monitoring progress.
United Kingdom: The organisation in the United Kingdom for the provision of communications disaster response is RAYNET. The UK organisation for the provision of disaster response by off-road vehicles is 4x4 Response.
European Union: In addition to providing funding to humanitarian aid, the European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG-ECHO) is in charge of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism to coordinate the response to disasters in Europe and beyond and contributes to at least 75% of the transport and/or operational costs of deployments. Established in 2001, the Mechanism fosters cooperation among national civil protection authorities across Europe. Currently 34 countries are members of the Mechanism; all 27 EU Member States in addition to Iceland, Norway, Serbia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Mechanism was set up to enable coordinated assistance from the participating states to victims of natural and man-made disasters in Europe and elsewhere.
Canada: In Canada, GlobalMedic was established in 1998 as a non-sectarian humanitarian-aid NGO to provide disaster relief services to large scale catastrophes around the world. Time magazine recognized the work of GlobalMedic in its 2010 Time 100 issue. It has a roster of over 1,000 volunteers from across Canada that includes professional rescuers, police officers, firefighters and paramedics who donate their time to respond to international disasters. Their personnel are divided into Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) that operate rescue units, Water Purification Units (WPUs) designed to provide safe drinking water; and Emergency Medical Units (EMUs) that use inflatable field hospitals to provide emergency medical treatment. Since 2004, GlobalMedic teams have deployed to over 60 humanitarian disasters around the world.
India: In India, the National Disaster Management Authority is responsible for planning for mitigating effects of natural disasters and anticipating and avoiding man-made disasters. It also coordinates the capacity-building and response of government agencies in the time of crises and emergencies. The National Disaster Response Force is an inter-government disaster response agency that specializes in search, rescue and rehabilitation.
United States of America: In the US, the Federal Emergency Management Agency coordinates federal operational and logistical disaster response capability needed to save and sustain lives, minimize suffering, and protect property in a timely and effective manner in communities that become overwhelmed by disasters. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention offer information for specific types of emergencies, such as disease outbreaks, natural disasters and severe weather, as well as chemical and radiation accidents. Also, the Emergency Preparedness and Response Program of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health develops resources to address responder safety and health during responder and recovery operations.
Among volunteers, the American Red Cross is chartered by Congress in 1900 to lead and coordinate non-profit efforts. They are supported by disaster relief organizations from many religious denominations and community service agencies. Licensed amateur radio operators support most volunteer organizations, and are often affiliated with the American Radio Relay League (ARRL).
Disaster response organizations: In addition to the response by the government, a great deal of assistance in the wake of any disaster comes from charities, disaster response and non-governmental organizations. The biggest international umbrella organizations are the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and the International Council for Voluntary Agencies.
Humanitarian OSM Team works to update and provide map in areas struck by disaster.
Disaster response technologies:
Ad hoc infrastructure: A range of infrastructures could be restored ad hoc quickly after a disaster using technologies.
Communications: The Government Emergency Telecommunications Service supports federal, state, local and tribal government personnel, industry and non-governmental organizations during a crisis or emergency by providing emergency access and priority handling for local and long-distance calls over the public switched telephone network. There is a Nationwide Wireless Priority Service that allows a user to wait for cellular bandwidth to open.
Wireless mesh networks can be deployed rapidly to enable Internet connectivity, substitute failed mobile phone networks and emergency- and post-disaster communication – including for disaster response coordination and emergency calls. Mesh networks such as B.A.T.M.A.N. are often developed and deployed open-source by volunteer communities with little resources. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Disaster response | The biggest international umbrella organizations are the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and the International Council for Voluntary Agencies.
Humanitarian OSM Team works to update and provide map in areas struck by disaster.
Disaster response technologies:
Ad hoc infrastructure: A range of infrastructures could be restored ad hoc quickly after a disaster using technologies.
Communications: The Government Emergency Telecommunications Service supports federal, state, local and tribal government personnel, industry and non-governmental organizations during a crisis or emergency by providing emergency access and priority handling for local and long-distance calls over the public switched telephone network. There is a Nationwide Wireless Priority Service that allows a user to wait for cellular bandwidth to open.
Wireless mesh networks can be deployed rapidly to enable Internet connectivity, substitute failed mobile phone networks and emergency- and post-disaster communication – including for disaster response coordination and emergency calls. Mesh networks such as B.A.T.M.A.N. are often developed and deployed open-source by volunteer communities with little resources.
Electricity: Emergency power systems – such as mobile microgeneration units, mobile charging- and power supply-stations or specially designed or extended smart grids – could support important electrical systems on loss of normal power supply or restore power supply for small regions whose connections to the main power grid were cut off.
Transportation: The transportation infrastructure may have become unpassable due to a disaster, complicating logistics, evacuation and disaster response.
Technologies may allow for quick ad hoc sufficient restoration of the transportation network or substitutions of parts of it. Such include the rapid construction of stable bridges based on mobile lightweight and/or locally sourced materials or components, which militaries have been involved in.
Waste management: Disaster waste is often managed in an ad hoc manner. The waste generated by a disaster can overwhelm existing solid waste management facilities and affect other response activities. Depending on the type of disaster, its scope and recovery duration conventional waste may need to be managed in similar ways and both may be associated with the transportation network restoration.
Emergency accommodation: Emergency accommodation is sometimes considered to be an element of infrastructure. Temporary accommodation for people and animals after disasters is an issue. Sometimes existing private accommodation infrastructure and logistics are repurposed for the disaster response.
Water supply: Water supply, drainage and sewerage infrastructure, and the functioning of wastewater treatment plants may be disrupted by disasters.
Vaccination infrastructure: Long-term disaster response, as well as medical infrastructure local to disaster regions with increased health risk, may include vaccination infrastructure.
Response coordination websites: Volunteers, as well as other people involved in a disaster response such as locals and civil organizations like the Technische Hilfswerk, can be coordinated and coordinate with the help of websites and similar ICTs such as for preventing traffic jams, "disaster tourists" and other obstruction of the transportation network, for allocating different forms of help to locations in need, reporting missing persons and increasing efficiency. Such websites for specific individual affected regions have been set up after the 2021 European floods.
Emergency response systems: Smart Emergency Response System (SERS) prototype was built in the SmartAmerica Challenge 2013–2014, a United States government initiative. SERS has been created by a team of nine organizations led by MathWorks. The project was featured at the White House in June 2014 and described by Todd Park (U.S. Chief Technology Officer) as an exemplary achievement.
The SmartAmerica initiative challenges the participants to build cyber-physical systems as a glimpse of the future to save lives, create jobs, foster businesses, and improve the economy. SERS primarily saves lives. The system provides the survivors and the emergency personnel with information to locate and assist each other during a disaster. SERS allows to submit help requests to a MATLAB-based mission center connecting first responders, apps, search-and-rescue dogs, a 6-feet-tall humanoid, robots, drones, and autonomous aircraft and ground vehicles. The command and control center optimizes the available resources to serve every incoming requests and generates an action plan for the mission. The Wi-Fi network is created on the fly by the drones equipped with antennas. In addition, the autonomous rotorcrafts, planes, and ground vehicles are simulated with Simulink and visualized in a 3D environment (Google Earth) to unlock the ability to observe the operations on a mass scale.
The International Charter Space and Major Disasters provides for the charitable retasking of satellite assets, providing coverage from 15 space agencies, etc. which is wide albeit contingent. It focuses on the beginning of the disaster cycle, when timely data is of the essence.
Digital technologies are increasingly being used in humanitarian action, they have shown to improve the health and recovery of populations affected by both natural and man-made disasters. They are used in humanitarian response to facilitate and coordinate aid in various stages including preparedness, response, and recovery from emergencies. More specifically, mobile health (mHealth), which is defined as the use of communication devices such as mobile phones for the purpose of health services information. Nowadays, millions of people use mobile phones as a means of daily communication and data transference, out of which 64% live in developing countries. One of the most important characteristics of disasters are the harms caused to infrastructures, accessibility issues, and an exponential need of medical and emergency services. In such situations, the use of mobile phones for mHealth can be vital, especially when other communication infrastructures are hindered. In such conditions, the abundance of mobile technology in developing countries provide the opportunity to be harnessed for helping victims and vulnerable people.
Mobile health information technology platforms, in the acute phase of disaster response, create a common operational framework that improves disaster response by standardizing data acquisition, organizing information storage, and facilitating communication among medical staff. One of the challenges in disaster response is the need of pertinent, effective and continuous analysis of the situation and information in order to evaluate needs and resources. mHealth has been shown to provide effective disaster preparedness with real time collection of medical data as well as helping identify and create needs assessments during disasters. Using mobile technology in heath has set the stage for the dynamic organization of medical resources and promotion of patient care done through quick triage, patient tracking, and documentation storage and maintenance.
Managing an effective and influential response requires cooperation, which is also facilitated through mHealth. A retrospective study demonstrated that applying mHealth can lead to up to 15% decrease of unnecessary hospital transfers during disasters. In addition, they provide field hospital administrators with real-time census information essential for planning, resource allocation, inter-facility patient transfers, and inter-agency collaboration. mHealth technology systems can improve post-operative care and patient handoffs between volunteer providers. Data entry with mobile devices is now widely used to facilitate the registration of displaced individuals, to conduct surveys, identify those in need of assistance, and to capture data on issues such as food security, vaccination rates, and mortality.
Above all, mHealth can harness the power of information to improve patient outcomes. Efforts led by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Operational Medicine Institute during the Haiti earthquake resulted in the creation of a web-based mHealth system that created a patient log of 617 unique entries used by on-the-ground medical providers and field hospital administrators. This helped facilitate provider triage, improve provider handoffs, and track vulnerable populations such as unaccompanied minors, pregnant women, traumatic orthopedic injuries and specified infectious diseases. Also, during the Haiti earthquake, the International Red Crescent sent more than 45 million SMSs to Viole mobile phone users. This resulted in 95% of the receiver reporting they had gained useful information, and out of these 90% reported the SMS helped in their preparedness.
Problematic individual and collective responses: Previous experiences with false alarms cause some people to ignore legitimate danger signals, such as a fire alarm.
Amanda Ripley points out that (contrary to many portrayals in movies) among the general public in fires and large-scale disasters, there is a remarkable lack of panic and sometimes dangerous denial of, lack of reaction to, or rationalization of warning signs that should be obvious. She says that this is often attributed to local or national character, but appears to be universal, and is typically followed by consultations with nearby people when the signals finally get enough attention. Disaster survivors advocate training everyone to recognize warning signs and practice responding.
A study published in 2020 showed that social networks can function poorly as pathways for inconvenient truths that people would rather ignore and that the interplay between communication and action may depend on the structure of social networks. It also showed that communication networks suppress necessary "evacuations" in test-scenarios because of spontaneous and diffuse emergence of false reassurance when compared to groups of isolated individuals and that larger networks with a smaller proportion of informed subjects suffered more damage due to human-caused misinformation. Following disaster, collective processing of emotions leads to greater resilience and community engagement.
Impacts of disasters:
On men and women: In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, an affected population has a number of needs. In disaster response relief, many actors tend to focus on addressing the most immediate needs first. For example, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) emphasizes that:
response efforts will focus on the immediate provision of quality life-saving humanitarian supplies, including ready-to-eat rations and food baskets, basic relief items for the most vulnerable households, including light hygiene and dignity kits, and a series of initial – and largely mobile - emergency protection interventions. Delivery of basic services will be supported through the reinforcement of available service providers relating to sectors including health, WASH, shelter, protection and education in the areas hosting those newly displaced.
These priorities are more than just addressing basic needs, as they represent shared needs between men and women. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Disaster response | Following disaster, collective processing of emotions leads to greater resilience and community engagement.
Impacts of disasters:
On men and women: In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, an affected population has a number of needs. In disaster response relief, many actors tend to focus on addressing the most immediate needs first. For example, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) emphasizes that:
response efforts will focus on the immediate provision of quality life-saving humanitarian supplies, including ready-to-eat rations and food baskets, basic relief items for the most vulnerable households, including light hygiene and dignity kits, and a series of initial – and largely mobile - emergency protection interventions. Delivery of basic services will be supported through the reinforcement of available service providers relating to sectors including health, WASH, shelter, protection and education in the areas hosting those newly displaced.
These priorities are more than just addressing basic needs, as they represent shared needs between men and women. Consequently, addressing these needs first, helps disaster relief responses to reach as many people as possible. While meeting these gender inclusive needs are critical, men and women also have different needs which must be addressed. Specifically, there are biological differences between men and women, which create different needs. For instance, the needs of women in a post-disaster context can include; having access to menstrual products, having access to a secure toilet (as going to a non secure toilet can leave women more vulnerable to the potential for rape or sexual assault) and having critical pre or post natal services, to name a few. These areas are also immediate needs that need to be addressed in post-disaster relief responses. Beyond women's immediate needs, women can face long-term income disparities as a result of disasters.
On women: Women's income is disproportionately impacted by disasters. A study undertaken by Le Masson et al. in 2016, found that following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, "the ratio of women's to men's earnings in New Orleans declined from 81.6% prior to the disaster to 61.8% in 2006". Underlying this disproportionate impact are gendered vulnerabilities. One notable gendered vulnerability is the double burden. The double burden is the combination of paid and unpaid work. One of the key forms of unpaid labor is care labor. Care labor (also referred to as social reproduction) encompasses, "tasks of providing for dependants, for children, the sick, the elderly and all the rest of us". This double burden exacerbates the unequal impact that disasters have on women. Lafrenière, Sweetman and Thylin emphasize that "women operate as unpaid carers keeping societies and economies functioning ... Poverty and crisis make this unpaid work even more critical for survival. This makes it imperative for humanitarian responders to understand the scope and extent of this unpaid care work and to work with women carers". Another critical underlying gendered vulnerability is unequal access to economic resources. Globally, "women have less access to livelihoods assets (such as financial accounts) and opportunities than men". In times of disaster, the lack of access to sufficient financial resources can "force [women] to turn to risky behaviour such as prostitution or transactional sex as a means of survival. Crises also tend to increase the burdens of care and household responsibilities for women, making their ability to economically support themselves and their dependents more difficult".
See also: Civil protection
Emergency management
Hurricane response
References:
Bibliography:
External links: Radio Society of Great Britain website (RSGB)
4x4 Response Network
Video on Smart Emergency Response System
CDC's Information on Specific Types of Emergencies
Emergency Preparedness and Response Resources by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Disinformation | Etymology: The English word disinformation comes from the application of the Latin prefix dis- to information making the meaning "reversal or removal of information". The rarely used word had appeared with this usage in print at least as far back as 1887.
Some consider it a loan translation of the Russian дезинформация, transliterated as dezinformatsiya, apparently derived from the title of a KGB black propaganda department. Soviet planners in the 1950s defined disinformation as "dissemination (in
the press, on the radio, etc.) of false reports intended to mislead public opinion."
Disinformation first made an appearance in dictionaries in 1985, specifically, Webster's New College Dictionary and the American Heritage Dictionary. In 1986, the term disinformation was not defined in Webster's New World Thesaurus or New Encyclopædia Britannica. After the Soviet term became widely known in the 1980s, native speakers of English broadened the term as "any government communication (either overt or covert) containing intentionally false and misleading material, often combined selectively with true information, which seeks to mislead and manipulate either elites or a mass audience."
By 1990, use of the term disinformation had fully established itself in the English language within the lexicon of politics. By 2001, the term disinformation had come to be known as simply a more civil phrase for saying someone was lying. Stanley B. Cunningham wrote in his 2002 book The Idea of Propaganda that disinformation had become pervasively used as a synonym for propaganda.
Operationalization: The Shorenstein Center at Harvard University defines disinformation research as an academic field that studies “the spread and impacts of misinformation, disinformation, and media manipulation,” including “how it spreads through online and offline channels, and why people are susceptible to believing bad information, and successful strategies for mitigating its impact” According to a 2023 research article published in New Media & Society, disinformation circulates on social media through deception campaigns implemented in multiple ways including: astroturfing, conspiracy theories, clickbait, culture wars, echo chambers, hoaxes, fake news, propaganda, pseudoscience, and rumors.
In order to distinguish between similar terms, including misinformation and malinformation, scholars collectively agree on the definitions for each term as follows: (1) disinformation is the strategic dissemination of false information with the intention to cause public harm; (2) misinformation represents the unintentional spread of false information; and (3) malinformation is factual information disseminated with the intention to cause harm, these terms are abbreviated 'DMMI'.
In 2019, Camille François devised the "ABC" framework of understanding different modalities of online disinformation:
Manipulative Actors, who "engage knowingly and with clear intent in viral deception campaigns" that are "covert, designed to obfuscate the identity and intent of the actor orchestrating them." Examples include personas such as Guccifer 2.0, Internet trolls, state media, and military operatives.
Deceptive Behavior, which "encompasses the variety of techniques viral deception actors may use to enhance and exaggerate the reach, virality and impact of their campaigns." Examples include troll farms, Internet bots, astroturfing, and "paid engagement".
Harmful Content, which includes health misinformation, manipulated media such as deepfakes, online harassment, violent extremism, hate speech or terrorism.
In 2020, the Brookings Institution proposed amending this framework to include Distribution, defined by the "technical protocols that enable, constrain, and shape user behavior in a virtual space". Similarly, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace proposed adding Degree ("distribution of the content ... and the audiences it reaches") and Effect ("how much of a threat a given case poses").
Comparisons with propaganda: Whether and to what degree disinformation and propaganda overlap is subject to debate. Some (like U.S. Department of State) define propaganda as the use of non-rational arguments to either advance or undermine a political ideal, and use disinformation as an alternative name for undermining propaganda. While others consider them to be separate concepts altogether. One popular distinction holds that disinformation also describes politically motivated messaging designed explicitly to engender public cynicism, uncertainty, apathy, distrust, and paranoia, all of which disincentivize citizen engagement and mobilization for social or political change.
Practice: Disinformation is the label often given to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). Studies on disinformation are often concerned with the content of activity whereas the broader concept of FIMI is more concerned with the "behaviour of an actor" that is described through the military doctrine concept of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
Disinformation is primarily carried out by government intelligence agencies, but has also been used by non-governmental organizations and businesses. Front groups are a form of disinformation, as they mislead the public about their true objectives and who their controllers are. Most recently, disinformation has been deliberately spread through social media in the form of "fake news", disinformation masked as legitimate news articles and meant to mislead readers or viewers. Disinformation may include distribution of forged documents, manuscripts, and photographs, or spreading dangerous rumours and fabricated intelligence. Use of these tactics can lead to blowback, however, causing such unintended consequences such as defamation lawsuits or damage to the dis-informer's reputation.
Worldwide:
Soviet disinformation:
Russian disinformation:
Chinese disinformation:
American disinformation: The United States Intelligence Community appropriated use of the term disinformation in the 1950s from the Russian dezinformatsiya, and began to use similar strategies during the Cold War and in conflict with other nations. The New York Times reported in 2000 that during the CIA's effort to substitute Mohammed Reza Pahlavi for then-Prime Minister of Iran Mohammad Mossadegh, the CIA placed fictitious stories in the local newspaper. Reuters documented how, subsequent to the 1979 Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan during the Soviet–Afghan War, the CIA put false articles in newspapers of Islamic-majority countries, inaccurately stating that Soviet embassies had "invasion day celebrations". Reuters noted a former U.S. intelligence officer said they would attempt to gain the confidence of reporters and use them as secret agents, to affect a nation's politics by way of their local media.
In October 1986, the term gained increased currency in the U.S. when it was revealed that two months previously, the Reagan Administration had engaged in a disinformation campaign against then-leader of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi. White House representative Larry Speakes said reports of a planned attack on Libya as first broken by The Wall Street Journal on August 25, 1986, were "authoritative", and other newspapers including The Washington Post then wrote articles saying this was factual. U.S. State Department representative Bernard Kalb resigned from his position in protest over the disinformation campaign, and said: "Faith in the word of America is the pulse beat of our democracy."
The executive branch of the Reagan administration kept watch on disinformation campaigns through three yearly publications by the Department of State: Active Measures: A Report on the Substance and Process of Anti-U.S. Disinformation and Propaganda Campaigns (1986); Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986–87 (1987); and Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1987–88 (1989).
According to a report by Reuters, the United States ran a propaganda campaign to spread disinformation about the Sinovac Chinese COVID-19 vaccine, including using fake social media accounts to spread the disinformation that the Sinovac vaccine contained pork-derived ingredients and was therefore haram under Islamic law. Reuters said the ChinaAngVirus disinformation campaign was designed to "counter what it perceived as China’s growing influence in the Philippines" and was prompted by the "[fear] that China’s COVID diplomacy and propaganda could draw other Southeast Asian countries, such as Cambodia and Malaysia, closer to Beijing". The campaign was also described as "payback for Beijing's efforts to blame Washington for the pandemic". The campaign primarily targeted people in the Philippines and used a social media hashtag for "China is the virus" in Tagalog. The campaign ran from 2020 to mid-2021. The primary contractor for the U.S. military on the project was General Dynamics IT, which received $493 million for its role.
Response:
Responses from cultural leaders: Pope Francis condemned disinformation in a 2016 interview, after being made the subject of a fake news website during the 2016 U.S. election cycle which falsely claimed that he supported Donald Trump. He said the worst thing the news media could do was spread disinformation. He said the act was a sin, comparing those who spread disinformation to individuals who engage in coprophilia.
Ethics in warfare: In a contribution to the 2014 book Military Ethics and Emerging Technologies, writers David Danks and Joseph H. Danks discuss the ethical implications in using disinformation as a tactic during information warfare. They note there has been a significant degree of philosophical debate over the issue as related to the ethics of war and use of the technique. The writers describe a position whereby the use of disinformation is occasionally allowed, but not in all situations. Typically the ethical test to consider is whether the disinformation was performed out of a motivation of good faith and acceptable according to the rules of war. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Disinformation | election cycle which falsely claimed that he supported Donald Trump. He said the worst thing the news media could do was spread disinformation. He said the act was a sin, comparing those who spread disinformation to individuals who engage in coprophilia.
Ethics in warfare: In a contribution to the 2014 book Military Ethics and Emerging Technologies, writers David Danks and Joseph H. Danks discuss the ethical implications in using disinformation as a tactic during information warfare. They note there has been a significant degree of philosophical debate over the issue as related to the ethics of war and use of the technique. The writers describe a position whereby the use of disinformation is occasionally allowed, but not in all situations. Typically the ethical test to consider is whether the disinformation was performed out of a motivation of good faith and acceptable according to the rules of war. By this test, the tactic during World War II of putting fake inflatable tanks in visible locations on the Pacific Islands in order to falsely present the impression that there were larger military forces present would be considered as ethically permissible. Conversely, disguising a munitions plant as a healthcare facility in order to avoid attack would be outside the bounds of acceptable use of disinformation during war.
Research: Research related to disinformation studies is increasing as an applied area of inquiry. The call to formally classify disinformation as a cybersecurity threat is made by advocates due to its increase in social networking sites. Researchers working for the University of Oxford found that over a three-year period the number of governments engaging in online disinformation rose from 28 in 2017, to 40 in 2018, and 70 in 2019. Despite the proliferation of social media websites, Facebook and Twitter showed the most activity in terms of active disinformation campaigns. Techniques reported on included the use of bots to amplify hate speech, the illegal harvesting of data, and paid trolls to harass and threaten journalists.
Whereas disinformation research focuses primarily on how actors orchestrate deceptions on social media, primarily via fake news, new research investigates how people take what started as deceptions and circulate them as their personal views. As a result, research shows that disinformation can be conceptualized as a program that encourages engagement in oppositional fantasies (i.e., culture wars), through which disinformation circulates as rhetorical ammunition for never-ending arguments. As disinformation entangles with culture wars, identity-driven controversies constitute a vehicle through which disinformation disseminates on social media. This means that disinformation thrives, not despite raucous grudges but because of them. The reason is that controversies provide fertile ground for never-ending debates that solidify points of view.
Scholars have pointed out that disinformation is not only a foreign threat as domestic purveyors of disinformation are also leveraging traditional media outlets such as newspapers, radio stations, and television news media to disseminate false information. Current research suggests right-wing online political activists in the United States may be more likely to use disinformation as a strategy and tactic. Governments have responded with a wide range of policies to address concerns about the potential threats that disinformation poses to democracy, however, there is little agreement in elite policy discourse or academic literature as to what it means for disinformation to threaten democracy, and how different policies might help to counter its negative implications.
Consequences of exposure to disinformation online: There is a broad consensus amongst scholars that there is a high degree of disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda online; however, it is unclear to what extent such disinformation has on political attitudes in the public and, therefore, political outcomes. This conventional wisdom has come mostly from investigative journalists, with a particular rise during the 2016 U.S. election: some of the earliest work came from Craig Silverman at Buzzfeed News. Cass Sunstein supported this in #Republic, arguing that the internet would become rife with echo chambers and informational cascades of misinformation leading to a highly polarized and ill-informed society.
Research after the 2016 election found: (1) for 14 percent of Americans social media was their "most important" source of election news; 2) known false news stories "favoring Trump were shared a total of 30 million times on Facebook, while those favoring Clinton were shared 8 million times"; 3) the average American adult saw fake news stories, "with just over half of those who recalled seeing them believing them"; and 4) people are more likely to "believe stories that favor their preferred candidate, especially if they have ideologically segregated social media networks." Correspondingly, whilst there is wide agreement that the digital spread and uptake of disinformation during the 2016 election was massive and very likely facilitated by foreign agents, there is an ongoing debate on whether all this had any actual effect on the election. For example, a double blind randomized-control experiment by researchers from the London School of Economics (LSE), found that exposure to online fake news about either Trump or Clinton had no significant effect on intentions to vote for those candidates. Researchers who examined the influence of Russian disinformation on Twitter during the 2016 US presidential campaign found that exposure to disinformation was (1) concentrated among a tiny group of users, (2) primarily among Republicans, and (3) eclipsed by exposure to legitimate political news media and politicians. Finally, they find "no evidence of a meaningful relationship between exposure to the Russian foreign influence campaign and changes in attitudes, polarization, or voting behavior." As such, despite its mass dissemination during the 2016 Presidential Elections, online fake news or disinformation probably did not cost Hillary Clinton the votes needed to secure the presidency.
Research on this topic is continuing, and some evidence is less clear. For example, internet access and time spent on social media does not appear correlated with polarisation. Further, misinformation appears not to significantly change political knowledge of those exposed to it. There seems to be a higher level of diversity of news sources that users are exposed to on Facebook and Twitter than conventional wisdom would dictate, as well as a higher frequency of cross-spectrum discussion. Other evidence has found that disinformation campaigns rarely succeed in altering the foreign policies of the targeted states.
Research is also challenging because disinformation is meant to be difficult to detect and some social media companies have discouraged outside research efforts. For example, researchers found disinformation made "existing detection algorithms from traditional news media ineffective or not applicable...[because disinformation] is intentionally written to mislead readers...[and] users' social engagements with fake news produce data that is big, incomplete, unstructured, and noisy." Facebook, the largest social media company, has been criticized by analytical journalists and scholars for preventing outside research of disinformation.
Alternative perspectives and critiques: Researchers have criticized the framing of disinformation as being limited to technology platforms, removed from its wider political context and inaccurately implying that the media landscape was otherwise well-functioning. "The field possesses a simplistic understanding of the effects of media technologies; overemphasizes platforms and underemphasizes politics; focuses too much on the United States and Anglocentric analysis; has a shallow understanding of political culture and culture in general; lacks analysis of race, class, gender, and sexuality as well as status, inequality, social structure, and power; has a thin understanding of journalistic processes; and, has progressed more through the exigencies of grant funding than the development of theory and empirical findings."
Alternative perspectives have been proposed:
Moving beyond fact-checking and media literacy to study a pervasive phenomenon as something that involves more than news consumption.
Moving beyond technical solutions including AI-enhanced fact checking to understand the systemic basis of disinformation.
Develop a theory that goes beyond Americentrism to develop a global perspective, understand cultural imperialism and Third World dependency on Western news, and understand disinformation in the Global South.
Develop market-oriented disinformation research that examines the financial incentives and business models that nudge content creators and digital platforms to circulate disinformation online.
Include a multidisciplinary approach, involving history, political economy, ethnic studies, feminist studies, and science and technology studies.
Develop understandings of Gendered-based disinformation (GBD) defined as "the dissemination of false or misleading information attacking women (especially political leaders, journalists and public figures), basing the attack on their identity as women."
Strategies for spreading disinformation:
Disinformation attack: The research literature on how disinformation spreads is growing. Studies show that disinformation spread in social media can be classified into two broad stages: seeding and echoing. "Seeding," when malicious actors strategically insert deceptions, like fake news, into a social media ecosystem, and "echoing" is when the audience disseminates disinformation argumentatively as their own opinions often by incorporating disinformation into a confrontational fantasy. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Disinformation | Develop market-oriented disinformation research that examines the financial incentives and business models that nudge content creators and digital platforms to circulate disinformation online.
Include a multidisciplinary approach, involving history, political economy, ethnic studies, feminist studies, and science and technology studies.
Develop understandings of Gendered-based disinformation (GBD) defined as "the dissemination of false or misleading information attacking women (especially political leaders, journalists and public figures), basing the attack on their identity as women."
Strategies for spreading disinformation:
Disinformation attack: The research literature on how disinformation spreads is growing. Studies show that disinformation spread in social media can be classified into two broad stages: seeding and echoing. "Seeding," when malicious actors strategically insert deceptions, like fake news, into a social media ecosystem, and "echoing" is when the audience disseminates disinformation argumentatively as their own opinions often by incorporating disinformation into a confrontational fantasy.
Internet manipulation: Studies show four main methods of seeding disinformation online:
Selective censorship
Manipulation of search rankings
Hacking and releasing
Directly Sharing Disinformation
See also:
Notes:
References:
Further reading: Bittman, Ladislav (1985), The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider's View, Pergamon-Brassey's, ISBN 978-0-08-031572-0
Boghardt, Thomas (26 January 2010), "Operation INFEKTION – Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign" (PDF), Studies in Intelligence, 53 (4), retrieved 9 December 2016
Golitsyn, Anatoliy (1984), New Lies for Old: The Communist Strategy of Deception and Disinformation, Dodd, Mead & Company, ISBN 978-0-396-08194-4
O'Connor, Cailin, and James Owen Weatherall, "Why We Trust Lies: The most effective misinformation starts with seeds of truth", Scientific American, vol. 321, no. 3 (September 2019), pp. 54–61.
Ion Mihai Pacepa and Ronald J. Rychlak (2013), Disinformation: Former Spy Chief Reveals Secret Strategies for Undermining Freedom, Attacking Religion, and Promoting Terrorism, WND Books, ISBN 978-1-936488-60-5
Fletcher Schoen; Christopher J. Lamb (1 June 2012), "Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic. Communications: How One Interagency Group. Made a Major Difference" (PDF), Strategic Perspectives, 11, retrieved 9 December 2016
Shultz, Richard H.; Godson, Roy (1984), Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy, Pergamon-Brassey's, ISBN 978-0080315737
Taylor, Adam (26 November 2016), "Before 'fake news,' there was Soviet 'disinformation'", The Washington Post, retrieved 3 December 2016
Legg, Heidi; Kerwin, Joe (1 November 2018), The Fight Against Disinformation in the U.S.: A Landscape Analysis, Harvard Kennedy School, Shorenstein Center, retrieved 10 August 2020
External links:
Disinformation Archived 25 October 2007 at the Wayback Machine – a learning resource from the British Library including an interactive movie and activities.
MediaWell – an initiative of the nonprofit Social Science Research Council seeking to track and curate disinformation, misinformation, and fake news research. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Ditch (fortification) | Uses: In early fortifications, ditches were often used in combination with ramparts to slow down the enemy whilst defensive fire could be brought to bear from the relative protection afforded by the rampart and possibly the palisade.
In medieval fortification, a ditch was often constructed in front of a defensive wall to hinder mining and escalade activities from an attacker. When filled with water, such a defensive ditch is called a moat. However, moats may also be dry.
Later star forts designed by military engineers like Vauban, comprised elaborate networks of ditches and parapets, carefully calculated so that the soil for the raised earthworks was provided, as nearly as possible, entirely by the excavations whilst also maximising defensive firepower.
Today ditches are obsolescent as an anti-personnel obstacle, but are still often used as anti-vehicle obstacles (see also berm).
A fence concealed in a ditch is called a ha-ha.
Elements of a ditch in an artillery fortification (16th to 19th centuries): Scarp: the inner side of the ditch (closest to the fort) is called the scarp (or escarp) slope. This may be revetted with masonry or brickwork, in which case, it is called the "scarp wall".
Cordon: a course of protruding masonry along the top of a scarp wall, intended to make it harder for an enemy to stand a ladder against it.
Rampart: the actual wall of the fort which can be made of earth or masonry, is topped by a parapet for the defenders to fire over, and usually slopes away from the ditch (the "exterior slope").
Berm: a ledge between the scarp wall and the exterior slope of the rampart, designed to increase the stability of the rampart and prevent any falling debris from compromising the ditch.
Faussebraye: a secondary parapet between the rampart and the inner edge of the ditch.
Carnot wall: a loopholed wall between the rampart and the inner edge of the ditch.
Chemin de ronde: a pathway running along the berm, behind the faussebraye or Carnot wall.
Cunette: a narrow channel that runs along the floor of the ditch for drainage purposes.
Bartardeau: a type of masonry dam across a ditch that is part wet and part dry.
Counterscarp: the outer slope or wall of the ditch (furthest from the fort).
Sally port: a small door allowing the defenders to enter the ditch should it be occupied by the enemy.
Caponier: a masonry or brick structure extending into the ditch or traversing across it; it is pierced with loopholes to enable the defenders to fire along the floor of the ditch.
Counterscarp gallery: a passage constructed behind the counterscarp wall and pierced with loopholes, which enables the defenders to fire on attackers who have entered the ditch.
Glacis: an earth slope angled away from the ditch; the height and angle of the glacis was calculated to protect the rampart from direct fire but to allow the defenders to fire over it.
Covered way: a path running between the outer edge of the ditch and the glacis, allowing defending troops to move around the exterior of the fort; it was usually provided with a banquette or fire step so that defenders could shoot over the crest of the glacis.
Place-of-arms: an open area of the covered way at an angle of the ditch, where defenders could assemble for a sally or counter attack.
See also: Border barrier
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Divide and rule | Definition: The use of this technique is meant to empower the sovereign to control subjects, populations, or factions of different interests, who collectively might be able to oppose its rule. Niccolò Machiavelli identifies a similar application to military strategy, advising in Book VI of The Art of War (1521). a captain should endeavour with every act to divide the forces of the enemy. Machiavelli advises that this act should be achieved either by making him suspicious of his men in whom he trusted, or by giving him cause that he has to separate his forces, and, because of this, become weaker.
The maxim divide et impera has been attributed to Philip II of Macedon. It was utilised by the Roman ruler Julius Caesar and the French emperor Napoleon (together with the maxim divide ut regnes).
The strategy of division and rule has been attributed to sovereigns, ranging from Louis XI of France to the House of Habsburg. Edward Coke denounces it in Chapter I of the Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England, reporting that when it was demanded by the Lords and Commons what might be a principal motive for them to have good success in Parliament, it was answered: "Eritis insuperabiles, si fueritis inseparabiles. Explosum est illud diverbium: Divide, & impera, cum radix & vertex imperii in obedientium consensu rata sunt." ("You would be invincible if you were inseparable. This proverb, Divide and rule, has been rejected, since the root and the summit of authority are confirmed by the consent of the subjects.")
In a minor variation, Sir Francis Bacon wrote the phrase as separa et impera in a letter to James I of 15 February 1615. James Madison made this recommendation in a letter to Thomas Jefferson of 24 October 1787, which summarized the thesis of The Federalist#10:
Divide et impera is the third of three political maxims in Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace (1795), Appendix I, the others being Fac et excusa ("Act now, and make excuses later") and Si fecisti, nega ("If you commit a crime, deny it"): "Divide et impera, the reprobated axiom of tyranny, is under certain (some) qualifications, the only policy, by which a republic can be administered on just principles." Kant refers this tactic when describing the traits of a "political moralist."
Historical examples:
Asia: While the Mongols imported Central Asian Muslims to serve as administrators in China, the Mongols also sent Han Chinese and Khitans from China to serve as administrators over the Muslim population in Bukhara in Central Asia, using foreigners to curtail the power of the local peoples of both lands.
Some Indian historians, such as politician Shashi Tharoor, assert that the British Raj frequently used this tactic to consolidate their rule and prevent the emergence of the Indian independence movement, citing Lord Elphinstone who said that "Divide et impera was the old Roman maxim, and it should be ours." A Times Literary Supplement review by British historian Jon Wilson suggests that although this was broadly the case a more nuanced approach might be closer to the facts. On the other hand, Proponents of Hindutva, the ideology of the current and recent Indian governments over the years, stress strongly Hindu-Muslim conflict going back centuries before the arrival of the British.
The classic nationalist position was expressed by the Indian jurist and supporter of Indian reunification Markandey Katju, who wrote in the Pakistani paper The Nation in 2013:
Up to 1857, there were no communal problems in India; all communal riots and animosity began after 1857. No doubt even before 1857, there were differences between Hindus and Muslims, the Hindus going to temples and the Muslims going to mosques, but there was no animosity. In fact, the Hindus and Muslims used to help each other; Hindus used to participate in Eid celebrations, and Muslims in Holi and Diwali. The Muslim rulers like the Mughals, Nawab of Awadh and Murshidabad, Tipu Sultan, etc. were totally secular; they organised Ramlilas, participated in Holi, Diwali, etc. Ghalib's affectionate letters to his Hindu friends like Munshi Shiv Naraln Aram, Har Gopal Tofta, etc. attest to the affection between Hindus and Muslims at that time. In 1857, the ‘Great Mutiny’ broke out in which the Hindus and Muslims jointly fought against the British. This shocked the British government so much that after suppressing the Mutiny, they decided to start the policy of divide and rule (see online "History in the Service of Imperialism" by B.N. Pande). All communal riots began after 1857, artificially engineered by the British authorities. The British collector would secretly call the Hindu Pandit, pay him money, and tell him to speak against Muslims, and similarly he would secretly call the Maulvi, pay him money, and tell him to speak against Hindus. This communal poison was injected into our body politic year after year and decade after decade.
Historian John Keay takes a contrary position regarding British policy, writing:
Stock accusations of a wider Machiavellian intent to 'divide and rule' and to 'stir up Hindu-Muslim animosity' assume some premonition of a later partition. They make little sense in the contemporary context. 'Divide and rule' as a governing precept supposes the pre-existence of an integrated entity. In an India politically united only by British rule – and not yet even by the opposition which it generated – such a thing did not exist. Division was a fact of life. As Maulana Muhammad Ali would later put it, 'we divide and you rule'. Without recognising, exploring and accommodating such division, British dominion in India would have been impossible to establish, let alone sustain. Provoking sectarian conflict, on the other hand, was rarely in British interest.
General S.K. Sinha, former Vice-Chief of Army Staff, writes that contrary to what the notion of divide and rule would predict, the British Indian Army was effectively integrated:
The undivided army was a unique institution set up by the British in India... [A]ll combat units, except Gorkhas and Garhwalis, had a mixed combination of Muslims and non-Muslims. They fought wars together and lived as friendly comrades in peace, owing loyalty to their regiments. Political developments with the emergency of the Congress and the Muslim League did not affect them. The Indian Army was totally apolitical till June 3rd 1947... In fact, during the Partition holocaust and till that date, both Muslim and non-Muslim soldiers remained totally impartial in dealing with communal violence. After June 3, 1947 things started changing.
French Algeria:
Ottoman Empire: The Ottoman Empire often used a divide-and-rule strategy, pitting Armenians and Kurds against each other. This strategy no longer worked in the Republic of Turkey because the Armenians were eliminated in the Armenian genocide.
Europe: Herodotus, (Histories, 5.3) claimed that the Thracians would be the strongest nation in the world if they were united.
Athenian historian Thucydides in his book History of the Peloponnesian War claimed that Alcibiades recommended to Persian statesman Tissaphernes, to weaken both Athens and Sparta for his own Persian's benefit. Alcibiades, suggested to Tissaphernes that 'The cheapest plan was to let the Hellenes wear each other out, at a small share of the expense and without risk to himself.
Tacitus in Germania. chapter 33 writes "Long, I pray, may foreign nations persist in hating one another .... and fortune can bestow on us no better gift than discord among our foes."
The Romans invaded the Kingdom of Macedonia from the south and defeated King Perseus in the Battle of Pydna in 168 BC. Macedonia was then divided into four republics that were heavily restricted from relations with one another and other Hellenic states. A ruthless purge occurred, with allegedly anti-Roman citizens being denounced by their compatriots and forcibly deported in large numbers.
During the Gallic Wars, Caesar was able to use a divide and conquer strategy to easily defeat the Gauls, exploiting their fractious nature of their tribal society. Although the remaining Gauls were later united under Vercingetorix their resistance was not enough to stop the conquest.
In Revolutions of 1848, the governments which were being revolted against used this tactic to counter the rebels.
The Salami strategy of Hungarian Communist leader, Mátyás Rákosi.
The colonial authorities in British Cyprus often stirred up the Turkish minority in order to neutralize agitation from the Greek majority. This policy intentionally cultivated further animosity between the already divided Greek majority and the Turkish minority (which consists of 18% of the population) in the island that remains divided to this day after an invasion by Turkey to establish the state of North Cyprus (which is only diplomatically recognized by Turkey).
The partition of Ireland in 1921 has been claimed as an intentional implementation of this strategy by David Lloyd George, although the religious divisions in Ireland were notorious and of long standing. The Stanford historian Priya Satia claims that the partition of Ireland was in ways a patch-test for the partition of India in 1947. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Divide and rule | In Revolutions of 1848, the governments which were being revolted against used this tactic to counter the rebels.
The Salami strategy of Hungarian Communist leader, Mátyás Rákosi.
The colonial authorities in British Cyprus often stirred up the Turkish minority in order to neutralize agitation from the Greek majority. This policy intentionally cultivated further animosity between the already divided Greek majority and the Turkish minority (which consists of 18% of the population) in the island that remains divided to this day after an invasion by Turkey to establish the state of North Cyprus (which is only diplomatically recognized by Turkey).
The partition of Ireland in 1921 has been claimed as an intentional implementation of this strategy by David Lloyd George, although the religious divisions in Ireland were notorious and of long standing. The Stanford historian Priya Satia claims that the partition of Ireland was in ways a patch-test for the partition of India in 1947.
Colonialism: According to Richard Morrock, four tactics of divide and rule practiced by Western colonialists are:
The manufacture of differences within the targeted population;
The amplification of existing differences;
The use of these differences for the benefit of the colonial empire; and
The carry over of these differences into the post-colonial period.
Foreign policy: Divide and rule can be used by states to weaken enemy military alliances. This usually happens when propaganda or disinformation are disseminated within the enemy states in an attempt to raise doubts about the alliance. Once the alliance weakens or dissolves, a vacuum will allow the hostile state to achieve military dominance.
The divide and conquer strategy is similar to the notion of a Wedge strategy (diplomacy).
United States: Some analysts assert that the United States is practicing the strategy in the 21st-century Middle East through their supposed escalation of the Sunni–Shia conflict. British journalist Nafeez Ahmed cited a 2008 RAND Corporation study for the U.S Armed Forces which recommended "divide and rule" as a possible strategy against the Muslim world in "the Long War".
Israel: Professor Avner Cohen, a former Israeli religious affairs official, publicly acknowledged that Hamas was "Israel's creation." Similar statesments have been made by Yasser Arafat.
Assertions of Israeli support for Hamas date back to the late 1970s and early 1980s, a period marked by significant political upheaval in the Middle East. Former Israeli officials have openly acknowledged Israel's role in providing funding and assistance to Hamas as a means of undermining secular Palestinian factions such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Brigadier General Yitzhak Segev, who served as the Israeli military governor in Gaza during the early 1980s, admitted to providing financial assistance to Muslim Brotherhood, the precursor of Hamas, on the instruction of the Israeli authorities. The aim of the support was to weaken leftist and secular Palestinian organizations.
Israel contributed to the construction of parts of Islamist politician Ahmed Yassin's network of mosques, clubs, and schools in Gaza, as well as the expansion of these institutions.
Shlomo Brom, retired general and former deputy to Israel's national security adviser, believes that an empowered Hamas helps Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu avoid negotiatings over a Palestinian state, suggesting that there is no viable partner for peace talks. Bezalel Smotrich, a far-right lawmaker and finance minister under Netanyahu Government, called the Palestinian Authority a "burden" and Hamas an "asset".
Russia: Contemporary Russian affairs have characteristics of a "divide and rule" strategy, too. Applied domestically to secure Vladimir Putin's power in Russia, it is used abroad in Russian disinformation campaigns to achieve "regime security, predominance in Russia’s near abroad, and world-power status for Russia".
Mexico:
Politics: In politics, the concept refers to a strategy that breaks up existing power structures, and especially prevents smaller power groups from linking up, causing rivalries and fomenting discord among the people to prevent a rebellion against the elites or the people implementing the strategy. The goal is either to pit the lower classes against themselves to prevent a revolution, or to provide a desired solution to the growing discord that strengthens the power of the elites.
The principle "divide et impera" is cited as a common in politics by Traiano Boccalini in La bilancia politica.
Economics: In economics, the concept is also mentioned as a strategy for market segmentation to get the most out of the players in a competitive market.
Psychopathy in the workplace: Clive R. Boddy found that "divide and conquer" was a common strategy by corporate psychopaths used as a smokescreen to help consolidate and advance their grip on power in the corporate hierarchy.
See also:
Ad hominem
Agent provocateur
Apartheid
Astroturfing
Black propaganda
Critical theory
Divide and conquer algorithm
False flag
Front organization
Cracking
Hate speech
Demographic engineering
Defeat in detail
Destabilisation
Identity politics
Overton window
Pork barrel
Promoting adversaries
Psychological warfare
Red herring
Right of conquest
Salami slicing tactics
Smear campaign
Smoke screen
Social exclusion
Social undermining
Strategy of tension
Triangulation (psychology)
Wedge issue
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Drone warfare | United States: Estimates for the total people killed in U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, range from 2,000 to 3,500 militants killed and 158–965 civilians killed. 81 insurgent leaders in Pakistan have been killed. Drone strikes in Yemen are estimated to have killed 846–1,758 militants and 116–225 civilians. 57 Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leaders are confirmed to have been killed.
In August 2018, Al Jazeera reported that a Saudi Arabian-led coalition combating Houthi rebels in Yemen had secured secret deals with al-Qaeda in Yemen and recruited hundreds of that group's fighters: "... Key figures in the deal-making said the United States was aware of the arrangements and held off on drone attacks against the armed group, which was created by Osama bin Laden in 1988."
After US president Donald Trump had increased drone strikes by over 400%,his successor Joe Biden reversed course. Under Biden, drone strikes reportedly decreased. A Biden administration drone strike in Kabul, Afghanistan in August 2021 killed 10 civilians, including seven children. Later, a drone strike killed Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Effects: Scholarly opinions are mixed regarding the efficacy of drone strikes. Some studies support that decapitation strikes to kill a terrorist or insurgent group's leadership limit the capabilities of these groups in the future, while other studies refute this. Drone strikes are successful at suppressing militant behavior, though this response is in anticipation of a drone strike rather than as a result of one. Data from the US and Pakistan's joint counter-terrorism efforts show that militants cease communication and attack planning to avoid detection and targeting.
Proponents of drone strikes assert that drone strikes are largely effective in targeting specific combatants. Some scholars argue that drone strikes reduce the amount of civilian casualties and territorial damage when compared to other types of military force like large bombs. Military alternatives to drone strikes such as raids and interrogations can be extremely risky, time-consuming, and potentially ineffective. Relying on drone strikes does not come without risks as U.S. drone usage sets an international precedent on extraterritorial and extrajudicial killings.
Islamic State drone strikes: Small drones and quadcopters have been used for strikes by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. A group of twelve or more have been piloted by specially trained pilots to drop munitions onto enemy forces. They have been able to evade ground defense forces.
During the battle for Mosul, the Islamic State was able to kill or wound dozens of Iraqi soldiers by dropping light explosives or 40-millimeter grenades from numerous drones attacking at the same time. Drone strikes were also used to destroy military supplies. Drone footage released by the Islamic State showed bombs being dropped on an ammunitions facility located in Deir ez-Zor, Syria, an area of contested control between the Islamic State and the Syrian government at the time.
In 2017, FBI Director Christopher Wray stated at a Senate hearing that "We do know that terrorist organizations have an interest in using drones ... We have seen that overseas already with some frequency. I think that the expectation is that it is coming here, imminently."
Drone expert Brett Velicovich discussed the dangers of the Islamic State utilizing off the shelf drones to attack civilian targets, claiming in an interview with Fox News that it was only a matter of time before ISIS extremists use of drones to strike civilian targets would become more prevalent and sophisticated.
The overall success rate for drone strikes used by the Islamic State is unclear. The Islamic State may have used drones as a way to gather footage for propaganda purposes, rather than for their military value.
Proliferation in the 2020s: On 6 January 2018, Russian forces thwarted a drone (UAV) swarm attack on the Khmeimim Air Base, the first of this kind in the history of warfare.
In 2020, a Turkish-made UAV loaded with explosives detected and attacked Haftar's forces in Libya with artificial intelligence and without command, according to a report from the UN Security Council's Panel of Experts on Libya published in March 2021. It was considered the first attack carried out by an AI UAV.
The Economist has cited Azerbaijan's highly effective use of drones against Armenia in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and Turkey's use of drones in the Syrian Civil War as indicating the future of warfare. Noting that it had previously been assumed that drones would not play a major role in conflicts between nations due to their vulnerability to anti-aircraft fire, it suggested that while this might be true for major powers with air defences, it was less true for minor powers. It noted Azerbaijani tactics and Turkey's use of drones as indicating a "new, more affordable type of air power". It also noted that the ability of drones to record their kills enabled a highly effective Azerbaijani propaganda campaign.
On 13 October 2022, a Ukrainian MiG-29 became the first manned plane to go down to a drone during combat. The pilot is claimed to have destroyed a Shahed-136 drone with his cannon. The blast is believed to have brought the plane down and hospitalised the pilot.
Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, approximately 30 companies in Ukraine have emerged to mass-produce drones for the war effort. The Ukraine government Ministry of Digital Transformation initiated the "Army of Drones" project, and is attempting to purchase up to 200,000 drones in 2023, aiming to deploy relatively cheap drones against large advantages Russia has had in military equipment. In 2023, they have also sponsored several competitions where the "dozens of drone developers that have sprung up all over Ukraine" are invited to make simulated attacks on ground targets, or chase fixed-wing drones, or even participate in drone dogfight competitions. One new model that has been successful is the "Baba Yaga" hexacopter, which can carry "44 pounds of payload".
Commercial UCAVs: Commercial UCAVs may be equipped with such weapons as guided bombs, cluster bombs, incendiary devices, air-to-surface missiles, air-to-air missiles, anti-tank guided missiles or other types of precision-guided munitions, autocannons and machine guns. Drone attacks can be conducted by commercial UCAVs dropping bombs, firing a missile, or crashing into a target. Commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can be weaponized by being loaded with dangerous explosives and then crashed into vulnerable targets or detonated above them. They can conduct aerial bombing by dropping hand grenades, mortar shell or other improvised explosive munitions directly above targets. Payloads could include explosives, shrapnel, chemical, radiological or biological hazards. Multiple drones may attack simultaneously in a drone swarm. Drones have been used extensively by both sides for recon and artillery spotting in the Russo-Ukraine War.
Anti-UAV systems are being developed by states to counter the threat of drone strikes. This is, however, proving difficult. According to James Rogers, an academic who studies drone warfare, "There is a big debate out there at the moment about what the best way is to counter these small UAVs, whether they are used by hobbyists causing a bit of a nuisance or in a more sinister manner by a terrorist actor."
Azerbaijan drone warfare: UCAVs were used extensively by the Azerbaijani Army against the Armenian Army during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These UCAVs included Israeli IAI Harops and Turkish Bayraktar TB2s. As the Bayraktar TB2 utilizes Canadian optics and laser targeting systems, Canada suspended export of its military drone technology to Turkey in October 2020 after allegations that the technology had been used to collect intelligence and direct artillery and missile fire at military positions. After the incident, Aselsan stated that it would begin the serial production and integration of the CATS system to replace the Canadian MX15B.
Russian invasion of Ukraine: During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, both sides have utilised drones in combat and for reconnaissance, and drones have played an important role in offensives. Ukrainian forces have made extensive use of the Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drone throughout the conflict in strikes against Russian forces. Russian forces meanwhile launched waves of Iranian HESA Shahed 136 drones during the October 2022 missile strikes on Ukraine. The main roles of drones in the war, however, are in reconnaissance and artillery spotting. Russian sources claimed to have used a "Stupor anti-drone rifle" to jam the radio controls of Ukrainian drones.
On October 13, 2022, the first recorded instance of an unarmed drone-on-drone combat encounter occurred above the Donetsk region of Ukraine. A Ukrainian DJI Mavic quadcopter was recorded ramming a Russian drone of the same model, resulting in the latter crashing towards the surface below. Another instance of this aerial ramming tactic occurred on November 24, 2022, this time with the Russian DJI Mavic being recorded plummeting towards the ground after a collision with a Ukrainian drone.
On May 9, 2023, a Russian conscript surrendered to (or rather via) a Ukrainian drone.
The average HESA Shahed 136 drone is worth about $20,000. An IRIS-T missile is worth about $430,000 each in comparison. From 13 September until 17 October, open source information suggests that Ukraine has had to spend $28.14 million on defending against these drones. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Drone warfare | On October 13, 2022, the first recorded instance of an unarmed drone-on-drone combat encounter occurred above the Donetsk region of Ukraine. A Ukrainian DJI Mavic quadcopter was recorded ramming a Russian drone of the same model, resulting in the latter crashing towards the surface below. Another instance of this aerial ramming tactic occurred on November 24, 2022, this time with the Russian DJI Mavic being recorded plummeting towards the ground after a collision with a Ukrainian drone.
On May 9, 2023, a Russian conscript surrendered to (or rather via) a Ukrainian drone.
The average HESA Shahed 136 drone is worth about $20,000. An IRIS-T missile is worth about $430,000 each in comparison. From 13 September until 17 October, open source information suggests that Ukraine has had to spend $28.14 million on defending against these drones.
Since at least September 2022, Ukraine has used black naval drones, equipped with the Starlink satellite internet system, to carry attacks on the Russian Black Sea fleet at the Sevastopol Naval base. The naval drones were at first assumed to be for reconnaissance, but appear to carry munitions and act as a bomb. With experts noting that the sensors on the front of the naval drone could be used as a laser range finder to help in targeting. In late October 2022, seven of these drones were used to mount a successful drone attack on the Sevastopol Naval base.
In September 2023, Ukrainian troops were reported as using cardboard drones with GoPro cameras for aerial reconnaissance.
As of April 2024, Ukraine has started deploying manned aircraft, such as the Aeroprakt A-22 Foxbat and Yakovlev Yak-52, which uses snipers or machine guns to shot down Russian drones. Ukrainian drones have also been given a variety of improvised modifications for the express purpose of attacking and countering Russian drones; these include an instance in July 2024 where an FPV drone with a stick mounted to it was used to attack and eventually destroy a ZALA 421-16E reconnaissance drone through repeated aerial ramming.
On 31 July 2024, a Russian Mi-8 helicopter was shot down by over occupied Donetsk, by a Ukrainian FPV drones. The first time a helicopter in combat was destroyed by a drone. The Mi-8 was believed to have been attacked on the ground either during landing or take off.
2023 Gaza War: On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched an invasion of southern Israel, using commercial drones to bomb Israeli guard towers before breaching the border wall. Videos of Israeli troops and a Merkava IV tank being taken out by drones surfaced on the internet.
The largest drone attack in history: As of April 14, 2024, the world's largest drone attack in history took place in the middle of the conflict caused by the developments of the Israeli war on Gaza, with a mass and simultaneous attack of more than 185 Iranian drones in less than a few hours against targets across Israel. This Iranian attack on Israel was carried out in response to the bombing of the Iranian consular building in Damascus (which happened a few days before by the Israeli side).
See also: Anti-drone systems using: electronic jamming and hi-jacking systems, directed-energy weapons (mainly laser), kinetic projectiles, netting, trained eagles etc.
Counter unmanned air system (C-UAS)
Anti-aircraft warfare § AUDS
Electronic beam
Directed-energy weapon, planned to also be used against drones
Laser weapon: Anti-drone systems
Silent Hunter (laser weapon), Chinese anti-drone laser weapon
Electronic warfare (EW) - jamming & hi-jacking
Bukovel (counter unmanned aircraft system), Ukrainian anti-drone electronic warfare system
EDM4S (Electronic Drone Mitigation 4 - System), Lithuanian portable EW anti-drone device
Malyuk assault rifle, Riff model: Ukrainian man-portable battery-powered anti-drone weapon
R-330Zh Zhitel, Russian truck-mounted EW jamming communication station
Kinetic systems
Slinger (weapon system), Australian anti-drone system using an auto-cannon
Large systems & manufacturers
Drone Dome, Israeli anti-aircraft including anti-drone system developed by Rafael ADS
DronesVision, Taiwanese arms manufacturer, specialising in UAV and anti-UAV technologies
Indrajaal Autonomous Drone Defence Dome, Indian AI anti-drone system
ZALA Aero Group, Russian arms manufacturer, specialising in UAV and anti-UAV EW systems
Other related topics
Non-combatant Casualty Value
PlayStation mentality
Public opinion about US drone attacks
Military robot
Unmanned surface vehicle
Zanana
Civilian casualties from U.S. drone strikes
References:
External links: Media related to Drone strikes at Wikimedia Commons |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Early modern warfare | Europe:
Fortifications: The period from 1501 to 1800 saw a rapid advance in techniques of fortification in Europe. Whereas medieval castles had relied on high walls to keep out attackers, early modern fortifications had to withstand artillery bombardments. To do this, engineers developed a style of fortress known as the "Italian style" or trace Italienne. These had low, thick, sloping walls, that would either absorb or deflect cannon fire.
In addition, they were shaped like stars, with bastions protruding at sharp angles. This was to ensure that every bastion could be supported with fire from an adjacent bastion, leaving no dead ground for an attacker to take cover in. These new fortifications quickly negated the advantages cannon had offered to besiegers.
In response to the vulnerabilities of star forts, military engineers evolved a much simpler but more robust style of fortification. A polygonal fort is a fortification in the style that evolved around the middle of the 18th century, in response to the development of explosive shells. The complex and sophisticated designs of star forts that preceded them were highly effective against cannon assault, but proved much less effective against the more accurate fire of rifled guns and the destructive power of explosive shells. The polygonal style of fortification is also described as a "flankless fort". Many such forts were built in the United Kingdom and British Empire during the government of Lord Palmerston, and so they are also often referred to as Palmerston forts. Fort Tas-Silġ is an example of a British polygonal fort.
Firearms: The power of aristocracies vis à vis states diminished throughout Western Europe during this period. Aristocrats' 200- to 400-year-old ancestral castles no longer provided useful defences against artillery. The nobility's importance in warfare also eroded as medieval heavy cavalry lost its central role in battle. The heavy cavalry - made up of armoured knights - had begun to fade in importance in the Late Middle Ages. The English longbow and the Swiss pike had both proven their ability to devastate larger armed forces of mounted knights. However, the proper use of the longbow required the user to be extremely strong, making it impossible to amass very large forces of archers.
The proper use of the pike required complex operations in formation and a great deal of fortitude and cohesion by the pikemen, again making amassing large forces difficult. Starting in the early 14th century, armourers added plate-armour pieces to the traditional protective linked mail armour of knights and men-at-arms to guard against the arrows of the longbow and crossbow. By 1415, some infantrymen began deploying the first "hand cannons", and the earliest small-bore arquebuses, with burning "match locks", appeared on the battlefield in the later 15th century.
Decline of plate armour: In virtually all major European battles during a period of 250 years (1400 to 1650), many soldiers wore extensive plate armour; this includes infantrymen (usually pikemen) and almost all mounted troops. Plate armour was expected to deflect edged weapons and to stop an arquebus or pistol ball fired from a distance, and it usually did. The use of plate armour as a remedy to firearms tended to work as long as the velocity and weight of the ball remained quite low, but over time the increasing power and effectiveness of firearms overtook the development of defenses to counteract them, such that flintlock muskets (entering use after 1650) could kill an armoured man at a distance of even 100 yards (though with limited accuracy), and the armour necessary to protect against this threat would have been too heavy and unwieldy to be practical.
The flintlock musket, carried by most infantrymen other than pikemen after 1650, fired a heavier charge and ball than the matchlock arquebus. A recruit could be trained to use a musket in a matter of weeks. Operating a musket did not require the great physical strength of a pikeman or a longbowman or the fairly rare skills of a horseman. Unlike their arquebus predecessors, flintlock muskets could neutralize even the most heavily armoured cavalry forces.
Since a firearm requires little training to operate, a peasant with a gun could now undermine the order and respect maintained by mounted cavalry in Europe and their Eastern equivalents. Although well-smithed plate-armour could still prevent the penetration of gunpowder-weapons, by 1690 it had become no match for massed firearms in a frontal attack and its use ended, even among the cavalry. By the end of the 17th century, soldiers in the infantry and most cavalry units alike preferred the higher mobility of being completely unarmoured to the slight protection, but greatly lessened mobility, offered by donning the heavy plate armour of the period.
Transition to flintlock muskets: The arquebus, in use from 1410, was one of the first handheld firearms that were relatively light (it still required a stand to balance on) and a single person could operate one. One of these weapons was first recorded as being used in the Battle of Agincourt in 1415, although this was still very much a medieval battle. The term musket originally applied to a heavier form of the arquebus, which fired a shot that could pierce plate armour, though only at close range. In the 16th century it still had to be mounted on a support stick to keep it steady. The caliver was the lighter form of the arquebus. By 1600, armies phased out these firearms in favour of a new lighter matchlock musket. Throughout the 16th century and up until 1690, muskets used the matchlock design.
However, the matchlock design was superseded in the 1690s by the flintlock musket, which was less prone to misfires and had a faster reloading rate. By this time, only light-cavalry scouting units, "the eyes of the army", continued to wear front and back armour plates to protect themselves from distant or undisciplined musket-equipped troops.
While soldiers armed with firearms could inflict great damage on cavalry at a moderate distance, at close quarters the cavalry could slaughter the musket-armed infantry if they could break their formation and close to engage in melee combat. For many years infantry formations included a mix of troops armed with both firearms to provide striking power and pikes to allow for the defence of the arquebusiers or musketeers from a cavalry charge. The invention of the bayonet allowed the combining of these two weapons into one in the 1690s, which transformed the infantry into the most important branch of the early modern military—one that uniformly used flintlock muskets tipped with bayonets.
Nature of war: This period saw the size and scale of warfare greatly increase. The number of combatants involved escalated steadily from the mid 16th century and dramatically expanded after the 1660s. For example, Henry II of France, even in the dawn of religious unrest and inevitable violence, could amass an impressive 20,000 men in total for his 1550 decade of war against Habsburg Spain, but Louis XIV, Sun King with the highest population in the Kingdom of France and by extension Western Europe could deploy up to 500,000 men into the field by 1700 in the War of the Spanish Succession with more at stake. Moreover, wars and subsequent battles became increasingly deadly and pyrrhic in this period. The Battle of Fontenoy with advanced presence of Louis XV saw over 100,000 men deployed on both sides ending 20,000 lives, almost half of which were French, and despite a French victory, France herself did not keep Dutch territory gained as peace was desired for the bankrupt kingdom, a layman translation meaning almost 10,000 deaths were rendered obsolete by said king who witnessed the horrors from afar just 3 years later with very few battles left in the Austrian conflict. Cities that took months to siege could fall in mere days. European monarchs with bitter rivalries would invest many resources into intense warfare which often resulted in mass death and destruction of innocent populations, such as the Sack of Rome where the Supreme Pontiff's life was endangered, a symbolic attack against God and Christendom. The Italian Wars alone would threaten Europe's very existence. This may in part be attributed to improvements in weapons technology and in the techniques of using it (for example infantry volley fire).
However, the main reason was that armies were now much bigger, but logistical support for them was inadequate. This meant that armies tended to devastate civilian areas in an effort to feed themselves, causing famines and population displacement. This was exacerbated by the increasing length of conflicts, such as the Thirty Years' War and Eighty Years' War, when this period saw the size and scale of warfare greatly increase. The number of combatants involved escalated steadily from the mid 16th century and they fought over areas subjected to repeated devastation. For this reason, the wars of this era were among the most lethal before the modern period.
For example, the Thirty Years' War and the contemporary Wars of the Three Kingdoms, were the bloodiest conflicts in the history of Germany and Britain respectively before World War I. Another factor adding to bloodshed in war was the lack of a clear set of rules concerning the treatment of prisoners and non-combatants. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Early modern warfare | However, the main reason was that armies were now much bigger, but logistical support for them was inadequate. This meant that armies tended to devastate civilian areas in an effort to feed themselves, causing famines and population displacement. This was exacerbated by the increasing length of conflicts, such as the Thirty Years' War and Eighty Years' War, when this period saw the size and scale of warfare greatly increase. The number of combatants involved escalated steadily from the mid 16th century and they fought over areas subjected to repeated devastation. For this reason, the wars of this era were among the most lethal before the modern period.
For example, the Thirty Years' War and the contemporary Wars of the Three Kingdoms, were the bloodiest conflicts in the history of Germany and Britain respectively before World War I. Another factor adding to bloodshed in war was the lack of a clear set of rules concerning the treatment of prisoners and non-combatants. While prisoners were usually ransomed for money or other prisoners, they were sometimes slaughtered out of hand - as at the Battle of Dungans Hill in 1647.
One of the reasons for warfare's increased impact was its indecisiveness. Armies were slow moving in an era before good roads and canals. Battles were relatively rare as armies could manoeuvre for months, with no direct conflict. In addition, battles were often made irrelevant by the proliferation of advanced, bastioned fortifications. To control an area, armies had to take fortified towns, regardless of whether they defeated their enemies' field armies. As a result, by far the most common battles of the era were sieges, hugely time-consuming and expensive affairs. Storming a fortified city could result in massive casualties and cities which did not surrender before an assault were usually brutally sacked -for example Magdeburg in 1631 or Drogheda in 1649. In addition, both garrisons and besiegers often suffered heavily from disease.
The indecisive nature of conflict meant wars were long and endemic. Conflicts stretched on for decades and many states spent more years at war than they did at peace. The Spanish attempt to reconquer the Netherlands after the Dutch Revolt became bogged down in endless siege warfare. The expense caused the Spanish monarchy to declare bankruptcy several times, beginning in 1577.
The changes in warfare eventually made the mercenary forces of the Renaissance and Middle Ages obsolete. However this was a gradual change. As late as the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), most troops were mercenaries. However, after this conflict, most states invested in better disciplined and more ideologically inspired troops. For a time mercenaries became important as trainers and administrators, but soon these tasks were also taken by the state. The massive size of these armies required a large supporting force of administrators. The newly centralized states were forced to set up vast organized bureaucracies to manage these armies, which some historians argue is the basis of the modern bureaucratic state.
The combination of increased taxes and increased centralisation of government functions caused a series of revolts across Europe such as the English Civil War and the Fronde in France. In many countries, the resolution of this conflict was the rise of monarchical absolutism. Only in England and the Netherlands did representative government evolve as an alternative. From the late 17th century, states started financing wars through long term low interest loans from national banking institutions like the Bank of England. The first state to take full advantage of this process was the Dutch Republic.
This transformation in the armies of Europe had great social impact. J. F. C. Fuller famously stated that "the musket made the infantryman and the infantryman made the democrat". This argument states that the defence of the state now rested on the common man, not on the aristocrats. Revolts by the underclass, that had routinely been defeated in the Middle Ages, could now conceivably threaten the power of the state. However, aristocrats continued to monopolise the officer corps of almost all early modern armies, including their high command.
Moreover, popular revolts almost always failed unless they had the support and patronage of the noble or gentry classes. The new armies, because of their vast expense, were also dependent on taxation and the commercial classes who also began to demand a greater role in society. The great commercial powers of the Dutch and English matched much larger states in military might.
As any man could be quickly trained in the use of a musket, it became far easier to form massive armies. The inaccuracy of the weapons necessitated large groups of massed soldiers. This led to a rapid swelling of the size of armies.
For the first time huge masses of the population could enter combat, rather than just the highly skilled professionals. It has been argued that the drawing of men from across the nation into an organized corps helped breed national unity and patriotism, and during this period the modern notion of the nation state was born. However, this would only become apparent after the French Revolutionary Wars. At this time, the levée en masse and conscription would become the defining paradigm of modern warfare.
Before then, however, most national armies were in fact composed of many nationalities. For example, although the Swedish Army under Gustavus Adolphus was originally recruited by a kind of national conscription, the losses of the Thirty Years' War meant that by 1648 over 80% of its troops were foreign mercenaries. In Spain, armies were recruited from all the Spanish European territories including Spain, Italy, Wallonia and Germany. The French recruited soldiers from Germany, Switzerland and elsewhere as well as from France. Britain recruited Hessian troops until the late 18th century. Irish Catholics made careers for themselves in the armies of many European states (See the Flight of the Wild Geese).
Infantry: Column - This formation was typically used while marching, although with sufficient will and mass it was effective at breaking through line formations, albeit with heavy casualties.
Line - A simple two- or three-rank deep line formation allowed most muskets to be brought to bear and was the most commonly used battle formation. Often the first rank would kneel after firing to allow the second rank to fire.
Skirmishers - Skirmishers were not a common infantry unit until late in the 18th century. Light infantry would advance and be the first to fire to draw the enemy to attack, while also probing the flanks. In later eras, sharpshooters would not only target common soldiers, but also officers so that the men were without leadership.
Square - This formation was used against cavalry. Bayonets would be fixed, the first line would kneel with their muskets angled upward (much like a pike.) The second and third lines would fire at the cavalry when it came close. This formation was very ineffective when faced with combined cavalry and infantry, or artillery fire in the case of plain squares.
Cavalry: The rise of gunpowder reduced the importance of the once dominant heavy cavalry, but it remained effective in a new role into the 19th century. The cavalry, along with the infantry, became more professional in this period but it retained its greater social and military prestige than the infantry. Light cavalry was introduced for skirmishing and scouting because of its advantage in speed and mobility. The new types of cavalry units introduced in this period were the dragoons or mounted infantry.
Dragoons were intended to travel on horseback but fight on foot and were armed with carbines and pistols. Even orthodox cavalry carried firearms, especially the pistol, which they used in a tactic known as the caracole. Cavalry charges using swords on undisciplined infantry could still be quite decisive, but a frontal charge against well-ordered musketeers and pikemen was all but futile. Cavalry units, from the 16th century on, were more likely to charge other cavalry on the flanks of an infantry formation and try to work their way behind the enemy infantry. When they achieved this and pursued a fleeing enemy, heavy cavalry could still destroy an enemy army. Only specialised cavalry units like winged hussars armed with long lances could break pikemen lines, but this was rather an exception. After wars with Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, when he fought often against superior mounted troops, King Gustavus II Adolphus started using successfully cavalry melee charge more often instead of caracole like during Battle of Breitenfeld. The cavalry charge remained an important part of battle tactics for the rest of 17th century and until the modern area, and its shock value could be decisive when implemented properly like during Battle of Vienna (1683).
However, the power formerly wielded by a heavy cavalry-focused army was at an end. For the first time in millennia, the settled people of the agricultural regions could defeat the horse peoples of the steppe in open combat. The power of the Mongols was broken in Russia and, no longer threatened from the east, Russia began to assert itself as a major force in European affairs. Never again would nomads from the east threaten to overrun Europe or the Middle East. In the Siege of Kazan (1552), Russia had employed artillery, sappers, cavalry and infantry armed with arquebus (Streltsy), while the Khanate of Kazan had only employed cavalry. The use of sappers proved decisive.
The one exception to this was the Ottoman Empire, which had been founded by Turkish horsemen. The Ottomans were some of the first to embrace gunpowder artillery and firearms and integrated them into their already formidable fighting abilities. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Early modern warfare | However, the power formerly wielded by a heavy cavalry-focused army was at an end. For the first time in millennia, the settled people of the agricultural regions could defeat the horse peoples of the steppe in open combat. The power of the Mongols was broken in Russia and, no longer threatened from the east, Russia began to assert itself as a major force in European affairs. Never again would nomads from the east threaten to overrun Europe or the Middle East. In the Siege of Kazan (1552), Russia had employed artillery, sappers, cavalry and infantry armed with arquebus (Streltsy), while the Khanate of Kazan had only employed cavalry. The use of sappers proved decisive.
The one exception to this was the Ottoman Empire, which had been founded by Turkish horsemen. The Ottomans were some of the first to embrace gunpowder artillery and firearms and integrated them into their already formidable fighting abilities. As European infantry became better armed and disciplined, by about 1700, the Ottoman forces began to be regularly defeated by the troops of the Austria and Russia.
Naval warfare: The Age of Sail (usually dated as 1571–1862) was a period roughly corresponding to the early modern period in which international trade and naval warfare were dominated by sailing ships and gunpowder warfare, lasting from the mid-16th to the mid-19th centuries. The spread of European power around the world was closely tied to naval developments in this period. The caravel for the first time made unruly seas like the Atlantic Ocean open to exploration, trade, and military conquest. While in all previous eras, European navies had been largely confined to operations in coastal waters, and were generally used only in a support role for land-based forces, this changed with the introduction of the new vessels like the caravel, carrack, and galleon, and the increasing importance of international waterborne trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The new caravels were large enough and powerful enough to be armed with cannons with which they could bombard both shoreline defenses and other vessels.
Africa:
Somalia: The Ethiopian–Adal War was a military conflict between the Ethiopian Empire and the Adal Sultanate from 1529 until 1543. The Imam Ahmad ibn Ibrihim al-Ghazi (nicknamed Gurey in Somali and Gragn in Amharic (ግራኝ Graññ), both meaning "the left-handed") came close to extinguishing the ancient realm of Ethiopia, and converting all of its subjects to Islam; the intervention of the European Cristóvão da Gama, son of the famous navigator Vasco da Gama, helped to prevent this outcome. Many historians trace the origins of hostility between Somalia and Ethiopia to this war. Some historians also argue that this conflict proved, through their use on both sides, the value of firearms such as the matchlock musket, cannons, and the arquebus over traditional weapons. Imam Ahmed was the first African commander to use cannon warfare on the continent during the Adal's conquest of the Ethiopian Empire under Dawit II.
Asia:
China: Gunpowder was invented in China in the Tang dynasty. It started being broadly used in warfare in the Song dynasty. From the 7th through 10th century, there were widespread advances in gunpowder technology. While the Europeans were pressed on technological advancements and military developments with gunpowder, the Chinese fell back in regards to further developing military technology. This was due to the fact that the Chinese were not as heavily engaged in wars or conquests as the Europeans. Notably, when the Chinese were at war with the Portuguese, for example, they swiftly adapted to military technology, and adopted Western style guns.
The Chinese pioneered the use of gunpowder weapons, crossbows, advanced forms of arms and armor, naval and nomadic cavalry. Thus, the Chinese even adopted Western military technology. Interestingly, the Chinese had many descriptions of how they utilized their technology. For Ming China, they had experiences on the battlefield: against Chinese rebels, Shan elephants, and Mongol horsemen. Nonetheless, under the Ming dynasty, intensively practiced tactical strategies based on their firearm use. Qi Jiguang and his troops used innovative battle techniques such as counter marching, dividing the troops, as a flexible way of adapting to the battlefield. These tactics were proved effective during the Sino-Dutch War beginning in 1661. While the Chinese were undermined as the inferior empire due to lack of weaponry, their strict adherence discipline and tactical strategy led to them defeating the Dutch. This draws a parallel to the Sino-Portuguese conflict. During the first war, in 1521, the Portuguese firepower was far more effective than the Chinese. As they witnessed the power of Portuguese artillery, the Chinese better prepared for the war in 1522. They modified, adapted, innovated and improved. The Chinese were a display of rapid militarization, as they instilled Western style learnings to their knowledge of artillery and war tactical strategy.
The fire arrows (rocket arrows) were first reported to have been used by the Southern Wu in 904 during the siege of Yuzhang.
Safavid Empire: Soon after the Ottoman Empire, two other Muslim gunpowder empires appeared: the Safavid Empire in Iran and the Mughal Empire in India. They both began in the early 16th century but later collapsed in the 18th century.
The refusal of their Qizilbash forces to use firearms contributed to the Safavid rout at Chaldiran in 1514.
After this, the Persians actively sought to acquire the skills to make and use firearms. In a report given to the Council of Ten on 24 September 1572, the Venetian envoy Vincenzo di Alessandri noted how firearms had become integrated into the Persian army:
They used for arms, swords, lances, arquebuses, which all the soldiers carry and use; their arms are also superior and better tempered than those of any other nation. The barrels of the arquebuses are generally six spans long, and carry a ball little less than three ounces in weight. They use them with such facility that it does not hinder them drawing their bows nor handling their swords, keeping the latter hung at their saddle bows till occasion requires them. The arquebus is then put away behind the back so that one weapon does not impede the use of the other.
Japan: The Japanese were introduced to early firearms by Portuguese traders arriving with European style arquebuses onto the island of Tanegashima, near the island of Kyushu in September 1543. The impact of this event would revolutionize Japanese strategy throughout the Sengoku-jidai, revolving around tactics that centered on usage of firearms.
While memoirs by Fernão Mendes Pinto attribute himself and Diogo Zeimoto as the traders to initially introduce firearms to Japan, studies of said memoirs call this claim highly embellished, and therefore the validity of this claim falls into question. Daimyō of the period, searching for any sort of new tactical edge over their regional rivals, were quick to acquire and have blacksmiths under their retinue, reverse-engineer and reproduce the early European firearms. Portuguese traders visiting Japan several years later found that the Japanese had successfully reproduced hundreds of arquebuses, and by 1546, a rough estimate of over 300,000 of the early firearms were in circulation throughout Japan. Early production of said firearms were limited to the general region of Kyushu, though gunsmiths would eventually migrate throughout Japan. Different schools started to emerge from this migration. with notable examples from Sakai, Yokkaichi, and Kunitomo being the most prevalent. Moreover, production of small arms ranged from the early Tanegashima arquebus, to later production teppo, which also subdivided into arquebuses of varying caliber and length, to "hand cannons" favored by those of the Shimazu clan.
Japanese military strategy upon receiving the new weapon, began to gradually shift towards infantry based tactics, rather than those that favored horseback cavalry. This is most famously portrayed at the Battle of Nagashino in 1575, where Oda Nobunaga's 3,000 riflemen had handily dispatched the much larger Takeda clan cavalry force using the first recorded utilization of volley fire. However, certain studies have disputed the claim that Nobunaga was the first to utilize this tactic, though Japanese forces were utilizing it far earlier than other world contemporaries. Japanese battle planning soon centered around manipulating one's enemies into allied fortified positions to rapidly dispatch enemy manpower, only engaging in hand-to-hand combat when necessary.
Similarly, Japanese daimyō were introduced to artillery in 1551, when a trader claiming to be the king of Rome presented elements of the Ōtomo clan with two examples of field artillery. As with their small arms counterparts, many warlords wished to quickly adopt the weapon in order to gain an advantage over their contemporaries, but difficulties in producing suitable reproductions led to limited early usage in comparison. As with personal firearms, Oda Nobunaga was early to adopt the new weapon, and later, after his death, one of his retainers Toyotomi Hideyoshi would use cannons to destructive effect to lay siege to Kanki Castle in 1582. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Early modern warfare | Japanese battle planning soon centered around manipulating one's enemies into allied fortified positions to rapidly dispatch enemy manpower, only engaging in hand-to-hand combat when necessary.
Similarly, Japanese daimyō were introduced to artillery in 1551, when a trader claiming to be the king of Rome presented elements of the Ōtomo clan with two examples of field artillery. As with their small arms counterparts, many warlords wished to quickly adopt the weapon in order to gain an advantage over their contemporaries, but difficulties in producing suitable reproductions led to limited early usage in comparison. As with personal firearms, Oda Nobunaga was early to adopt the new weapon, and later, after his death, one of his retainers Toyotomi Hideyoshi would use cannons to destructive effect to lay siege to Kanki Castle in 1582. Moreover, Nobunaga had attempted to incorporate cannons onto warships in 1578, but their inefficacy against rival naval daimyō forces under the Mori had led to the discontinuation of any further implementations to other naval forces.
These changes and adoptions into Sengoku era Japanese warfare made themselves present during the Japanese invasions of Korea of 1592–1598 after Toyotomi Hideyoshi had unified Japan. Early success in the first incursion during May 1592 into Korea was attributed to the varied small arms and tactics of the Japanese forces, allowing them to make and defend early footholds into the Korean peninsula. However, after the Koreans had allied themselves with Ming China, they gained access to better artillery with greater range and destructive power than their Japanese equivalents. Finally, the Korean navy under the command of Yi Sun-sin had utilized the superior, cannon-armed navy of the Korean-Ming alliance against the Japanese maritime supply lines, eventually leading to a shortage of supplies and Japanese losses on the mainland. Japan was driven off their last stronghold in Seoul in May 1594, and subsequent ventures 1597 would not come close to the success of the first, as the Korean-Ming alliance had developed countermeasures and equivalent small arms to Japanese equivalents.
The Japanese version of the fire arrow (rocket arrow) was known as the bo hiya. The Japanese pirates (wokou, also known as wako or kaizoku) in the 16th century were reported to have used the bo hiya which had the appearance of a large arrow. A burning element made from incendiary waterproof rope was wrapped around the shaft and when lit the bo hiya was launched from a mortar like weapon hiya taihou or a wide bore Tanegashima matchlock arquebus. During one sea battle it was said the bo hiya were "falling like rain".
Kingdom of Mysore: The first iron rockets were developed by Tipu Sultan, a Muslim ruler of the South Indian Kingdom of Mysore. He successfully used these iron rockets against the larger forces of the British East India Company during the Anglo-Mysore Wars. The Mysore rockets of this period were much more advanced than what the British had seen, chiefly because of the use of iron tubes for holding the propellant; this enabled higher thrust and longer range for the missile (up to 2 km range). After Tipu's eventual defeat in the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War and the capture of the Mysore iron rockets, they were influential in British rocket development and were soon put into use in the Napoleonic Wars.
Mughal Empire: Babur, the founder of the Mughal Empire on the Indian subcontinent, employed firearms, gun carts and movable artillery in battle. In particular, he used them at the first Battle of Panipat (1526) to defeat the much larger forces of Ibrahim Lodhi, the last ruler of the Delhi Sultanate. Other battles he fought using gunpowder weapons include the Battle of Khanwa in 1527 against Rana Sanga, and the Battle of Ghaghra in 1529.
His descendants also employed gunpowder weapons in their expansion of the Mughal Empire, such as Akbar the Great at the second Battle of Panipat (1556) against Adil Shah Suri and Hemu of the Sur dynasty. In 1582, Fathullah Shirazi, a Persian-Indian developed a seventeen-barrelled cannon, fired with a matchlock.
Ottoman Empire: The Ottoman Empire had been one of the first Middle Eastern states to effectively use gunpowder weapons and used them to great effect conquering much of the Middle East, North Africa, and the Balkans. In the 17th century the state began to stagnate as more modern technologies and strategies were not adopted. Specifically, the Ottoman Empire was slow to adopt innovations like boring cannon (rather than casting them in a mold), making the conversion from matchlock firearms to flintlocks, and the lightening of field guns and carriages.
In part this was because the military elite had become a powerful force in the empire and change threatened their positions. David Nicolle theorizes that one contributing factor to the Ottoman reluctance to adopt the flintlock musket, despite its superiority over the matchlock ignition system, was the dusty climate of much of the Middle East which could cause problems with reliability.
Overall, the Ottoman Empire between the 15th and 18th centuries has been assessed as a military producer which copies existing technologies, but does not capture the underlying process of innovation or adaption. Other research, though, complicates that view. A Chinese military manual published in 1644 compared Ottoman and European firearms in the following manner:
Firearms have been in use since the beginning of the dynasty, and field armies in battle formation have found them convenient and useful to carry along... Since muskets have been transmitted to China, these weapons have lost their effectiveness... In battle formation, aside from various cannon such as the "three generals", the breech-loading swivel gun, and the "hundred-league thunder", nothing has more range or power than the Turkish musket. The next best is the European one.
The fact that Ottoman firearms were considered by 17th century Chinese writers to be superior to European firearms demonstrates that the Ottoman Empire was at least a second tier producer of muskets during this period. However, some claim that the 'European' firearms the Chinese researcher tested were actually Japanese arquebuses based on fifty-year-old Portuguese models. The design of the Ottoman matchlock is substantially different from that of the European variety and it in turn influenced the matchlocks produced in both Safavid Persia and Mughal India.
15th century: The Ottoman Empire by the middle of the fifteenth century had developed strategic infantry groups along with the ascension of weaponry. Early modern warfare has many important factors alongside weapons and artillery, and strategy is one of them. Developing a strong core for the sultan was key to understanding the way the Ottoman Empire could expand and take over vast territories to maintain them under their rule. One of the most important creations for their early modern warfare was a group called the Janissaries. They were considered to be an elite group of infantryman that were highly skilled and sociable. With their placement in use for the sultan, they were an unmatched military power that no European power could compete with during the fifteenth century.
The Ottoman Empire was brought up in a different way from most militaristic powers, and that was from the bottom up. They were developed in peaceful upbringings. When they conquered Constantinople in 1453, they had created a transcontinental government that would see them to continue to expand militarily and politically. They used the Janissary units to advance their stronghold on the will of the people they conquered. One of their techniques was to capture boys from the territories they had defeated and forced them to become Muslim in order to control their easily molded minds. It was a similar tactic to many growing empires, because it is understood that children are easily manipulated, and in order to maintain new territories guarded by the Janissary, they needed to have an easier population to mold. The Janissaries also had other roles outside of military conflict. They were one of the main protectors of the sultan in order to prevent coups from happening, or paramilitary units from gaining control of the empire. The problem with this is that the Ottoman Empire made the Janissaries too powerful and because of their socialization, career advancement options, and recruitment procedures, the men in the units were very cohesive and respected each other more than the sultan. This would prove to be an issue later on, but during the fifteenth century it was not an issue yet because their numbers were still growing and would continue to grow in order to boost their elite power.
A man by the name of Konstantin Mihailović was captured by the Turks in 1455 and would eventually write a memoir about his time with the Ottoman Empire's Janissary units. His account would be considered flawed because of the translations from Serbian to Czech and Polish. There is no original text from his memoir and only translations are left to work from, and those have far fetched ideas of what the Janissaries were doing during the time. He was recaptured in 1463 by Hungarian troops and eventually wrote the memoir after he became a Christian again. His memoir is an important piece of history, but scholars and historians have widely debated the authentic nature of his stories and doubt the consistency of his tales.
The Ottoman Empire was one of the first states to put gunpowder weapons into widespread use. The famous Janissary corps of the Ottoman army began using matchlock muskets as early as the 1440s. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Early modern warfare | A man by the name of Konstantin Mihailović was captured by the Turks in 1455 and would eventually write a memoir about his time with the Ottoman Empire's Janissary units. His account would be considered flawed because of the translations from Serbian to Czech and Polish. There is no original text from his memoir and only translations are left to work from, and those have far fetched ideas of what the Janissaries were doing during the time. He was recaptured in 1463 by Hungarian troops and eventually wrote the memoir after he became a Christian again. His memoir is an important piece of history, but scholars and historians have widely debated the authentic nature of his stories and doubt the consistency of his tales.
The Ottoman Empire was one of the first states to put gunpowder weapons into widespread use. The famous Janissary corps of the Ottoman army began using matchlock muskets as early as the 1440s. The army of Mehmed the Conqueror, which conquered Constantinople in 1453, included both artillery and foot soldiers armed with gunpowder weapons. The Ottomans brought to the siege sixty-nine guns in fifteen separate batteries and trained them at the walls of the city. The barrage of Ottoman cannon fire lasted forty days, and they are estimated to have fired 19,320 times.
16th century: The 16th century saw the first widespread use of the matchlock musket as a decisive weapon on the battlefield with the Turks becoming leaders in this regard. The first of these campaigns was the campaign against the Persians in 1514 under Yavuz Sultan Selim, or Selim the Grim. Armed with gunpowder weapons, his army defeated the Persians at the Battle of Chaldiran. After his victory over the Safavids, Selim turned his attention towards the Mamluk dynasty in Egypt. The decisive battle of his campaign against the Mamluks, and the battle which highlighted the importance of the musket in the Ottoman military, was the Battle of Raydaniyah, fought in 1517. There, Selim outflanked the entrenched Mamluk artillery, and attacked the Mamluk forces with his Janissaries. The Janissaries, armed with firearms, destroyed the Mamluk army, armed mostly with traditional swords and javelins.
Reference was made by João de Barros to a sea battle outside Jiddah, in 1517, between Portuguese and Ottoman vessels. The Muslim force under Salman Reis had "three or four basilisks firing balls of thirty palms in circumference". This was estimated to be a cannon of about 90 inch bore "firing cut stone balls of approximately 1,000 pounds (453 kg)".
After the death of Selim, he was succeeded by his son Suleiman the Magnificent. During his reign, gunpowder weapons continued to be used effectively. One important example is the Battle of Mohács in 1526. During this battle, Ottoman artillery, and Janissaries armed with muskets, were able to cut down charging Hungarian cavalry.
17th century: Although the cannon and musket were employed by the Ottomans long beforehand, by the 17th century they witnessed how ineffective the traditional cavalry charges were in the face of concentrated musket-fire volleys. In a report given by an Ottoman general in 1602, he confessed that the army was in a distressed position due to the emphasis in European forces for musket-wielding infantry, while the Ottomans relied heavily on cavalry. Thereafter it was suggested that the Janissaries, who were already trained and equipped with muskets, become more heavily involved in the imperial army while led by their agha.
By the middle of the 17th century, the continued reliance of the Ottomans on over-heavy ordnance had been made out by European officers as a liability. Raimondo Montecuccoli, the Habsburg commander who defeated the Ottomans at Battle of Saint Gotthard commented on Ottoman cannon:
This enormous artillery produces great damage when it hits, but it is awkward to move and it requires too much time to reload and site. Furthermore, it consumes a great amount of powder, besides cracking and breaking the wheels and the carriages and even the ramparts on which it is placed ... our artillery is more handy and more efficient and here resides our advantage over the cannon of the Turks.
Vietnam: Western matchlock arquebuses were imported into Vietnam during the early 16th century. The raging and lengthy wars between Le and Mac dynasties, and later Trinh and Nguyen clans invoked an arm race between the opposing factions. Gunnery and marksmanship rapidly spread across the country and soon Vietnamese musketeers became famous within Asia as masters of firearms.
See also: Gunpowder magazine
Kabinettskriege
Battle of Caishi
Battle of Tangdao
Technology of the Song dynasty
Early modern period
References:
Bibliography:
External links: Military Science in Western Europe in the 16th Century. Prologue: The Nature of Armies in the 16th Century (PDF).
From Gunpowder to World Domination |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Echelon formation | Military formation: Use of the formation dates back to ancient infantry and cavalry warfare, as an alternative to column, line-abreast, or phalanx (box) formations. One of its earliest uses was at the Battle of Leuctra, when the Thebans attacked the Spartan right with a column 48 men deep while their weaker center and right were repelled. The echelon formation may have been used by Hannibal at the Battle of Cannae, Alexander the Great at the Battle of Gaugamela, Frederick II of Prussia, and the Confederate army at the Battle of Gettysburg.
The tactic still persists and is regularly employed by all branches of the modern armed forces. Tactically, echelon formations are used because of the excellent range of vision offered to each participant in the formation. In particular, it is commonly employed by armored cavalry because of the large, overlapping fields of fire that it gives to each tank in the formation, and by combat aircraft, allowing them to communicate visually and maneuver as a single unit.
"Echeloning" is the name of a tactic in use by the United Kingdom's armed forces, mainly the infantry. It consists of using a company to attack a set of positions. Once the first platoon in the company has reached its limit of advance (ammunition has been expended, fatigue has become high, or casualties are mounting) another platoon "echelons through" it to continue onto the next position. The tactic is similar to leapfrogging.
Echelon formations are also commonly used by civic or riot police to move crowds either to the left or right. En echelon is also used for a type of arrangement of gun turrets on ships: see Glossary of nautical terms § E.
Derived meanings:
The name has been adopted by the birdwatching community to describe the familiar V-shaped formations of flights of geese, ducks and other migratory birds, though this more symmetric formation is more strictly defined as a V formation.
In geology, en echelon describes an arrangement where a set of short linear features overlap or are staggered in a line that runs obliquely to the strike of the individual features. Echelon faults and en echelon veins are examples.
In sheet material response to shear stress it is typical for a series of echelon cracks to form. This is commonly seen in asphalt roads subject to shear stress imposed by aseismic fault creep.
In mathematics, the term row echelon form refers to a kind of matrix where the non-zero elements are shaped in an echelon-like manner.
In road bicycle racing, an echelon formation is a diagonal line of racers, which allows cooperative drafting in crosswinds.
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Economic warfare | History:
Crusades: In his Book on the Recovery of the Holy Land, Fidentius of Padua provides prescriptions for economic warfare to be waged against the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt in furtherance of the Crusades. He envisions a fleet of 40–50 galleys to enforce a blockade on trade between Europe and Egypt. He sees this trade as helping Egypt in two ways: from Europe it obtains war materiel (iron, tin, timber, oil) and from Asia dues on goods brought in via the Red Sea for trade to Europe. If this spice trade were deflected from the Red Sea to Mongol Persia, Egypt would be deprived of customs duties and would also lose export markets because of the reduction in shipping. This may also make it unable to afford more slave soldiers imported from the Black Sea.
American Civil War: Union forces in the American Civil War had the challenge of occupying and controlling the 11 states of the Confederacy, a vast area larger than Western Europe. The Confederate economy proved surprisingly vulnerable.
Guerrilla warfare in the American Civil War was supported by a large fraction of the Confederate population that provided food, horses, and hiding places for official and unofficial Confederate units. The Union response was to ravage the local economy, as in the Burning Raid of 1864. Before the war, most passenger and freight traffic moved by water through the river system or coastal ports. Confederate railroads were already inadequate and suffered much damage. Travel became far more difficult. The Union Navy took control of much of the seacoast and the main rivers such as the Mississippi River and the Tennessee River, using the Mississippi River Squadron of powerful small gunboats. Land transportation was contested, as Confederate supporters tried to block shipments of munitions, reinforcements and supplies through West Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee to Union forces to the south. Bridges were burned, railroad tracks torn up, and telegraph lines were cut. Both sides did the same and effectively ruined the infrastructure of the Confederacy.
The Confederacy in 1861 had 297 towns and cities with a total population of 835,000 people, 162 of which were at one point occupied by Union forces with a total population of 681,000 people. In practically every case, infrastructure was damaged, and trade and economic activity was disrupted for a while. Eleven cities were severely damaged by war action, including Atlanta, Charleston, Columbia, and Richmond. The rate of damage in smaller towns was much lower, with severe damage to 45 out of a total of 830.
Farms were in disrepair, and the prewar stock of horses, mules, and cattle was much depleted; 40% of the South's livestock had been killed. The South's farms were not highly mechanized, but the value of farm implements and machinery in the 1860 census was $81 million and had been reduced by 40% by 1870. The transportation infrastructure lay in ruins, with little railroad or riverboat service available to move crops and animals to market. Railroad mileage was located mostly in rural areas and over two thirds of the South's rails, bridges, rail yards, repair shops, and rolling stock were in areas reached by Union armies, which systematically destroyed what they could. Even in untouched areas, the lack of maintenance and repair, the absence of new equipment, the heavy overuse, and the relocation of equipment by the Confederacy from remote areas to the war zone ensured the system would be ruined at war's end.
The enormous cost of the Confederate war effort took a high toll on the South's economic infrastructure. The direct costs to the Confederacy in human capital, government expenditures, and physical destruction totaled perhaps $3.3 billion. By 1865, the Confederate dollar was worthless because of high inflation, and people in the South had to resort to bartering for goods or services to use scarce Union dollars. With the emancipation of the slaves, the entire economy of the South had to be rebuilt. Having lost their enormous investment in slaves, white planters had minimal capital to pay freedmen workers to bring in crops. As a result, a system of sharecropping was developed in which landowners broke up large plantations and rented small lots to the freedmen and their families. The main feature of the Southern economy changed from an elite minority of landed gentry slaveholders to a tenant farming agriculture system. The disruption of finance, trade, services, and transportation nodes severely disrupted the prewar agricultural system and forced Southerners to turn to barter. The entire region was impoverished for generations.
World War I: The British used their greatly-superior Royal Navy to cause a tight blockade of Germany and a close monitoring of shipments to neutral countries to prevent them from being transshipped to there. Germany could not find enough food since its younger farmers were all in the army, and the desperate Germans were eating turnips by the winter of 1916–17. US shipping was sometimes seized, and Washington protested. The British paid monetary compensation so that the American protests would not escalate into serious trouble.
World War II: Clear examples of economic warfare occurred during World War II when the Allied powers followed such policies to deprive the Axis economies of critical resources. The British Royal Navy again blockaded Germany although with much more difficulty than in 1914. The US Navy, especially its submarines, cut off shipments of oil and food to Japan.
In turn, Germany attempted to damage the Allied war effort via submarine warfare: the sinking of transport ships carrying supplies, raw materials, and essential war-related items such as food and oil. As the Allied air forces grew, they mounted an Oil campaign of World War II to deprive Germany of fuel.
Neutral countries continue to trade with both sides. The Royal Navy could not stop land trade, so the allies made other effort to cut off sales to Germany of critical minerals such as tungsten, chromium, mercury and iron ore from Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Sweden and elsewhere. Germany wanted Spain to enter the war but they could not agree to terms. To keep Germany and Spain apart, Britain used a carrot-and-stick approach. Britain provided oil and closely monitored Spain's export trade. It outbid Germany for the wolfram, whose price soared, and by 1943, wolfram was Spain's biggest export-earner. Britain's cautious treatment of Spain brought conflict with the more aggressive American policy. In the Wolfram Crisis of 1944 Washington cut off oil supplies but then agreed with London's requests to resume oil shipments. Portugal feared a German-Spanish invasion, but when that became unlikely in 1944, it virtually joined the Allies.
Cold War: During the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), the British military deployed herbicides and defoliants in the Malaysian countryside (including crop fields) in order to deprive Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) insurgents of cover, potential sources of food and to flush them out of the jungle. The herbicides and defoliants deployed by the British contained Trioxone, an ingredient which was also formed part of the chemical composition of the Agent Orange herbicide used by the U.S. military during the Vietnam War. Deployment of herbicides and defoliants served the dual purpose of thinning jungle trails to prevent ambushes and destroying crop fields in regions where the MNLA was active to deprive them of potential sources of food. Herbicides and defoliants were also sprayed from Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft.
On 17 November 1953, the Greek National Intelligence Service (KYP) proposed conducting tax audits on suspected communist book publishers and cinema owners, censoring Soviet movies and promoting Soviet films of particularly low quality. In 1959, KYP launched exhibitions of Soviet products in Volos, Thessaloniki and Piraeus. The bulk of the products were cheap and defective, purposefully selected to tarnish the Soviet Union's image.
During the Vietnam War, between 1962 and 1971, the United States military sprayed nearly 20,000,000 U.S. gallons (76,000 m3) of various chemicals – the "rainbow herbicides" and defoliants – in Vietnam, eastern Laos, and parts of Cambodia as part of Operation Ranch Hand, reaching its peak from 1967 to 1969. For comparison purposes, an olympic size pool holds approximately 660,000 U.S. gal (2,500 m3). As the British did in Malaya, the goal of the U.S. was to defoliate rural/forested land, depriving guerrillas of food and concealment and clearing sensitive areas such as around base perimeters. Samuel P. Huntington argued that the program was also a part of a general policy of forced draft urbanization, which aimed to destroy the ability of peasants to support themselves in the countryside, forcing them to flee to the U.S.-dominated cities, depriving the guerrillas of their rural support base.
French Economic Warfare School: Christian Harbulot, the director of the Economic Warfare School in Paris, provides an historical reconstruction of the economic balance of power between states. In his study, he demonstrates that the strategies that states put in place to increase their economic power and their impact on the international balance of power can be interpreted only by the concept of economic warfare.
Economic sanctions: The Covenant of the League of Nations provided for military and economic sanctions against aggressor states, and the idea of economic sanctions was regarded as a great innovation. However, economic sanctions without military ones failed to dissuade Italy from conquering Abbysinia. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Economic warfare | Samuel P. Huntington argued that the program was also a part of a general policy of forced draft urbanization, which aimed to destroy the ability of peasants to support themselves in the countryside, forcing them to flee to the U.S.-dominated cities, depriving the guerrillas of their rural support base.
French Economic Warfare School: Christian Harbulot, the director of the Economic Warfare School in Paris, provides an historical reconstruction of the economic balance of power between states. In his study, he demonstrates that the strategies that states put in place to increase their economic power and their impact on the international balance of power can be interpreted only by the concept of economic warfare.
Economic sanctions: The Covenant of the League of Nations provided for military and economic sanctions against aggressor states, and the idea of economic sanctions was regarded as a great innovation. However, economic sanctions without military ones failed to dissuade Italy from conquering Abbysinia.
In 1973–1974, the oil-producing Arab states imposed an oil embargo against the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, South Africa, Japan, and other industrialized countries that supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. Results included the 1973 oil crisis and a sharp rise in prices but not an end to support for Israel.
Many United States sanctions have been imposed since the middle 20th century.
United States embargo against Cuba
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
Sanctions against North Korea
Fortress economics or a fortress economy is a phrase used in relation to the defense and sustenance of a countries' economy amidst international sanctions. (The term has been used in reference to Russia in 2022, Taiwan with relation to China-US relations, and Europe.)
See also:
References:
Further reading: Baldwin, David A. Economic Statecraft (Princeton UP, 1985).
Clark, J. Maurice et al. Readings in the Economics Of War (1918) 703pp; short excerpts from primary sources on a very wide range of economic warfare topics online free
Dobson, Alan P. U.S. Economic Statecraft for Survival 1933–1991 (2003). excerpt
Duffett, Rachel, and Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, eds. Food and War in Twentieth Century Europe (2016)
Einzig, Paul. Economic Warfare 1939-1940 (1942) online free
Esno, Tyler. "Reagan's Economic War on the Soviet Union," Diplomatic History (2018) 42#2 pp 281–304.
Christian Harbulot,La machine de guerre économique, Economica,Paris, 1992.
Christian Harbulot,La guerre économique, PUF,Paris, 2011
Christian Harbulot,Le manuel de l'intelligence économique, PUF,Paris, 2012
Christian Harbulo,Techniques offensives et guerre économique, éditions La Bourdonnaye,Paris, 2014.
Christian Harbulot,Le manuel de l'intelligence économique, comprendre la guerre économique, PUF,Paris, 2015
Christian Harbulot,L'art de la guerre economique,Editions Va Press,Versailles,2018
Jack, D. T. Studies in economic warfare (1940), covers Napoleonic wars, laws, WWI and 1939-40 online free
Jackson, Ian. The Economic Cold War: America, Britain and East-West Trade, 1948–63 (2001)
Joes, Anthony James. America and guerrilla warfare (2015); Covers nine major wars from the 1770s to the 21st century.
McDermott, John. "Total War and the Merchant State: Aspects of British Economic Warfare against Germany, 1914-16." Canadian Journal of History 21.1 (1986): 61–76.
Siney, Marion C. The Allied blockade of Germany, 1914-1916 (1957) online free
External links: Media related to Economic warfare at Wikimedia Commons |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Economy of force | Notes:
See also: Carl Von Clausewitz's Vom Krieg (On War)
J.F.C. Fuller's The Nine Principles of War.
Col. John Boyd's OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) theory.
Further reading: Handel, Michael I. (2001). Robert Cowley, Geoffrey Parker (ed.). The Reader's Companion to Military History. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. pp. 147–. ISBN 978-0-618-12742-9. Retrieved 6 September 2011. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Electromagnetic warfare | The electromagnetic environment: Military operations are executed in an information environment increasingly complicated by the electromagnetic spectrum. The electromagnetic spectrum portion of the information environment is referred to as the electromagnetic environment (EME). The recognized need for military forces to have unimpeded access to and use of the electromagnetic environment creates vulnerabilities and opportunities for electronic warfare in support of military operations.
Within the information operations construct, EW is an element of information warfare; more specifically, it is an element of offensive and defensive counterinformation.
NATO has a different and arguably more encompassing and comprehensive approach to EW. A military committee conceptual document from 2007, MCM_0142 Nov 2007 Military Committee Transformation Concept for Future NATO Electronic Warfare, recognised the EME as an operational maneuver space and warfighting environment/domain. In NATO, EW is considered to be warfare in the EME. NATO has adopted simplified language which parallels those used in other warfighting environments like maritime, land, and air/space. For example, an electronic attack (EA) is offensive use of EM energy, electronic defense (ED), and electronic surveillance (ES). The use of the traditional NATO EW terms, electronic countermeasures (ECM), electronic protective measures (EPM), and electronic support measures (ESM) has been retained as they contribute to and support electronic attack (EA), electronic defense (ED) and electronic surveillance (ES). Besides EW, other EM operations include intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR), and signals intelligence (SIGINT). Subsequently, NATO has issued EW policy and doctrine and is addressing the other NATO defense lines of development.
Primary EW activities have been developed over time to exploit the opportunities and vulnerabilities that are inherent in the physics of EM energy. Activities used in EW include electro-optical, infrared and radio frequency countermeasures; EM compatibility and deception; radio jamming, radar jamming and deception and electronic counter-countermeasures (or anti-jamming); electronic masking, probing, reconnaissance, and intelligence; electronic security; EW reprogramming; emission control; spectrum management; and wartime reserve modes.
Subdivisions: Electronic warfare consists of three major subdivisions: electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES).
Electronic attack: Electronic attack (EA), also known as electronic countermeasures (ECM), involves the offensive use of electromagnetic energy weapons, directed energy weapons, or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability including human life. In the case of electromagnetic energy, this action is most commonly referred to as "jamming" and can be performed on communications systems or radar systems. In the case of anti-radiation weapons, this often includes missiles or bombs that can home in on a specific signal (radio or radar) and follow that path directly to impact, thus destroying the system broadcasting.
In November 2021, Israel Aerospace Industries announced a new electronic warfare system named Scorpius that can disrupt radar and communications from ships, UAVs, and missiles simultaneously and at varying distances.
On 8 September 2024, Russian drones entered both Romanian and Latvian airspace. Romanian scrambled two F-16s to monitor the drone's progress, it landed "in an uninhabited area" near Periprava, according to the Romanian Ministry of Defence. The drone that entered Latvian airspace from Belarus crashed near Rezekne. This comes as the ISW noted increased success in Ukrainian Electronic Warfare against Russian drones that resulted in "several Russian Shahed drones (that) recently failed to reach their intended targets for unknown reasons." Two Kh-58s also reportedly failed to reach their targets.
Electronic protection: Electronic protection (EP), also known as an electronic protective measure (EPM) or electronic counter-countermeasure (ECCM) are a measure used to protect against an electronic enemy attack (EA) or to protect against friendly forces who unintentionally deploy the equivalent of an electronic attack on friendly forces. (sometimes called EW fratricide). The effectiveness of electronic protection (EP) level is the ability to counter an electronic attack (EA).
Flares are often used to distract infrared homing missiles into missing their target. The use of flare rejection logic in the guidance (seeker head) of an infrared homing missile to counter an adversary's use of flares is an example of EP. While defensive EA actions (jamming) and EP (defeating jamming) both protect personnel, facilities, capabilities, and equipment, EP protects from the effects of EA (friendly and/or adversary). Other examples of EP include spread spectrum technologies, the use of restricted frequency lists, emissions control (EMCON), and low observability (stealth) technology.
Electronic warfare self-protection (EWSP) is a suite of countermeasure systems fitted primarily to aircraft for the purpose of protecting the host from weapons fire and can include, among others: directional infrared countermeasures (DIRCM, flare systems and other forms of infrared countermeasures for protection against infrared missiles; chaff (protection against radar-guided missiles); and DRFM decoy systems (protection against radar-targeted anti-aircraft weapons).
An electronic warfare tactics range (EWTR) is a practice range that provides training for personnel operating in electronic warfare. There are two examples of such ranges in Europe: one at RAF Spadeadam in the northwest county of Cumbria, England, and the Multinational Aircrew Electronic Warfare Tactics Facility Polygone range on the border between Germany and France. EWTRs are equipped with ground-based equipment to simulate electronic warfare threats that aircrew might encounter on missions. Other EW training and tactics ranges are available for ground and naval forces as well.
Antifragile EW is a step beyond standard EP, occurring when a communications link being jammed actually increases in capability as a result of a jamming attack, although this is only possible under certain circumstances such as reactive forms of jamming.
Electronic warfare support: Electronic warfare support (ES) is a subdivision of EW involving actions taken by an operational commander or operator to detect, intercept, identify, locate, and/or localize sources of intended and unintended radiated electromagnetic (EM) energy. These Electronic Support Measures (ESM) aim to enable immediate threat recognition focuses on serving military service needs even in the most tactical, rugged, and extreme environments. This is often referred to as simply reconnaissance, although today, more common terms are intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) or intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR). The purpose is to provide immediate recognition, prioritization, and targeting of threats to battlefield commanders.
Signals intelligence (SIGINT), a discipline overlapping with ES, is the related process of analyzing and identifying intercepted transmissions from sources such as radio communication, mobile phones, radar, or microwave communication. SIGINT is broken into two categories: electronic intelligence (ELINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT). Analysis parameters measured in signals of these categories can include frequency, bandwidth, modulation, and polarization.
The distinction between SIGINT and ES is determined by the controller of the collection assets, the information provided, and the intended purpose of the information. Electronic warfare support is conducted by assets under the operational control of a commander to provide tactical information, specifically threat prioritization, recognition, location, targeting, and avoidance. However, the same assets and resources that are tasked with ES can simultaneously collect information that meets the collection requirements for more strategic intelligence.
History: The earliest documented use of EW was during the Second Boer War of 1899–1902. The British Army, when trying to relieve Ladysmith, under siege by the Boers, used a searchlight to "bounce" Morse code signals off the clouds. The Boers immediately spotted this and used one of their own searchlights in an attempt to jam the British signals. This was graphically described by Winston Churchill in his book London to Ladysmith via Pretoria.
During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 the Japanese auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru had located the Russian Baltic Fleet in Tsushima Strait, and was communicating the fleet's location by radio signals to the Imperial Japanese Fleet HQ. The captain of the Russian warship Ural requested permission to disrupt the Japanese communications link by attempting to transmit a stronger radio signal over the Shinano Maru's signal, hoping to distort the Japanese signal at the receiving end. Russian Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky refused the advice and denied the Ural permission to electronically jam the enemy, which in those circumstances might have proved invaluable. The intelligence the Japanese gained ultimately led to the decisive Battle of Tsushima, where the Russian Navy lost all its battleships and most of its cruisers and destroyers. These losses effectively ended the Russo-Japanese War in Japan's favor.
During World War II, the Allies and Axis Powers both extensively used EW, or what Winston Churchill referred to as the "Battle of the Beams": as navigational radars were used to guide bombers to their targets and back to their base, the first application of EW in WWII was to interfere with the navigational radars. Chaff was also introduced during WWII to confuse and defeat tracking radar systems.
As battlefield communication and radar technology improved, so did electronic warfare, which played a major role in several military operations during the Vietnam War. Aircraft on bombing runs and air-to-air missions often relied on EW to survive the battle, although many were defeated by Vietnamese ECCM. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Electromagnetic warfare | The intelligence the Japanese gained ultimately led to the decisive Battle of Tsushima, where the Russian Navy lost all its battleships and most of its cruisers and destroyers. These losses effectively ended the Russo-Japanese War in Japan's favor.
During World War II, the Allies and Axis Powers both extensively used EW, or what Winston Churchill referred to as the "Battle of the Beams": as navigational radars were used to guide bombers to their targets and back to their base, the first application of EW in WWII was to interfere with the navigational radars. Chaff was also introduced during WWII to confuse and defeat tracking radar systems.
As battlefield communication and radar technology improved, so did electronic warfare, which played a major role in several military operations during the Vietnam War. Aircraft on bombing runs and air-to-air missions often relied on EW to survive the battle, although many were defeated by Vietnamese ECCM.
In 2007, an Israeli attack on a suspected Syrian nuclear site during Operation Outside the Box (or Operation Orchard) used electronic warfare systems to disrupt Syrian air defenses while Israeli jets crossed much of Syria, bombed their targets, and returned to Israel undeterred. The target was a suspected nuclear reactor under construction near the Euphrates River, modeled after a North Korean reactor and supposedly financed with Iranian assistance. Some reports say Israeli EW systems deactivated all of Syria's air defense systems for the entire period of the raid.
In December 2010, the Russian Army deployed their first land-based multifunctional electronic warfare system known as Borisoglebsk 2, developed by Sozvezdie. Development of the system started in 2004 and evaluation testing successfully completed in December 2010. The Borisoglebsk-2 uses four different types of jamming stations on a single system. The Borisoglebsk-2 system is mounted on nine MT-LB armored vehicles and is intended to suppress mobile satellite communications and satellite-based navigation signals. This EW system is developed to conduct electronic reconnaissance and suppression of radio-frequency sources. In August 2015, the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet said its initial usage caused concern within NATO. A Russian blog described Borisoglebsk-2 thus:
The 'Borisoglebsk-2', when compared to its predecessors, has better technical characteristics: wider frequency bandwidth for conducting radar collection and jamming, faster scanning times of the frequency spectrum, and higher precision when identifying the location and source of radar emissions, and increased capacity for suppression.
During the first two days of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian EW disrupted Ukraine's air defense radars and communications, severely disrupting Ukrainian ground-based air defense systems. Russian jamming was so effective it interfered with their own communications, so efforts were scaled back. This led to Ukrainian SAMs regaining much of their effectiveness, which began inflicting significant losses on Russian aircraft by the start of March 2022. Rapid Russian advances at the start of the war prevented EW troops from properly supporting the advancing troops, but by late March and April 2022, extensive jamming infrastructure had been deployed. EW complexes were set up in Donbas in concentrations of up to 10 complexes per 13 mi (21 km) of frontage. Electronic suppression of GPS and radio signals caused heavy losses of Ukrainian UAVs, depriving them of intelligence and precise artillery fire spotting. Small quadcopters had an average life expectancy of around three flights, and larger fixed-wing UAVs like the Bayraktar TB2 had a life expectancy of about six flights. By summer 2022, only some one-third of Ukrainian UAV missions could be said to have been successful, as EW had contributed to Ukraine losing 90% of the thousands of drones it had at the beginning of the invasion.
Russian EW capacity to disrupt GPS signals is credited with the reduction in the success of Ukrainian usage of HIMARS and JDAM bombs. The failure of GPS guidance forces these weapons, in particular JDAMS, to use inertial navigation system which reduces accuracy from around 5 metres (15 ft) down to around 27 metres (90 ft).
Ukraine was losing some 10,000 drones a month due to Russian electronic warfare, according to a 19 May 2023 report by the Royal United Services Institute. This was an average of 300 drones a day. Russia has established EW posts about every 10 kilometres (6 mi) of the front, being some 6 kilometres (4 mi) back from the front line. In October 2023, The Economist reported that electronic warfare was in widespread use on front lines to impair small battlefield UAV activity, with Russia installing video feedback and control jammers on high-value equipment like tanks and artillery. By 11 March 2024, Ukraine reported it had destroyed a Russian Palantin EW system in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, which "suppress satellite radio navigation along the entire line of contact and in most parts of Ukraine, replacing the satellite radio navigation field (spoofing)". An estimated three Palantin systems have been hit (June 2022, February 2023, and March 2024). In addition to the Palantin, in Zaporizhzhia a Layer EW system was destroyed.
In popular culture: In the movie Spaceballs, an electronic attack "jams" a weapons system with a literal jar of jam. In both Top Gun: Maverick and Behind Enemy Lines, characters utilize chaff and flares from their F/A-18s to confuse/deflect guided missiles.
See also: Cyberwarfare
Electromagnetic pulse
Electromagnetic interference
Electronic harassment
L3Harris Technologies
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)
Other electronic warfare systems:
ADM-160 MALD
Krasukha (electronic warfare system)
Radar warning receiver (RWR)
Samyukta electronic warfare system
Sky Shadow (radar)
Historic:
36th Electronic Warfare Squadron
55th Wing
Battle of Latakia: the first recorded use of deception EW in a naval battle
No. 100 Group RAF
U.S. specific:
Association of Old Crows
DARPA
Electronic warfare officer
Fleet Electronic Warfare Center
Joint Functional Component Command – Network Warfare
National Electronics Museum
U.S. Marine Corps Radio Reconnaissance Platoon
USACEWP (United States Army Computer Network Operations-Electronic Warfare Proponents )
References:
Citations:
Sources:
Further reading: EW 101: A First Course in Electronic Warfare; David Adamy; 2001; ISBN 978-1580531696.
EW 102: A Second Course in Electronic Warfare; David Adamy; 2004; ISBN 978-1580536868.
Deception in War; Jon Latimer; 2001; ISBN 978-0719556050.
FM 3-36: Electronic Warfare In Operations. Safeguarding Soldiers Through Technology. Fort Leavenworth, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Archived 2011-09-28 at the Wayback Machine (CAC), 26 February 2009 – PDF, 114 p., 4,5 MB. See also: John Milburn: Army manual raises emphasis on electronic warfare. The Washington Post, 26 February 2009.
Jogiaas, Aadu. "Disturbing soviet transmissions in August 1991". Archived from the original on 14 November 2011.
Bolton, Matt; Munro, Matt (2011). "The Tallinn Cables" (PDF). Lonely Planet Magazine (December): 48–55. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2013-11-13.
Winkler, Jonathan Reed (2017). "The Forgotten Menace of Electro-Magnetic Warfare in the Early Cold War". Diplomatic History. 42 (2): 254–280. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Electronic counter-countermeasure | History: Ever since electronics have been used in battle in an attempt to gain superiority over the enemy, effort has been spent on techniques to reduce the effectiveness of those electronics. More recently, sensors and weapons are being modified to deal with this threat. One of the most common types of ECM is radar jamming or spoofing. This originated with the Royal Air Force's use of what they codenamed Window during World War II, which Americans referred to as chaff. It was first used during the Hamburg raid on July 24-25, 1943. Jamming also may have originated with the British during World War II, when they began jamming German radio communications. These efforts include the successful British disruption of German Luftwaffe navigational radio beams.
In perhaps the first example of ECCM, the Germans increased their radio transmitter power in an attempt to 'burn through' or override the British jamming, which by necessity of the jammer being airborne or further away produced weaker signals. This is still one of the primary methods of ECCM today. For example, modern airborne jammers are able to identify incoming radar signals from other aircraft and send them back with random delays and other modifications in an attempt to confuse the opponent's radar set, making the 'blip' jump around wildly and become impossible to range. More powerful airborne radars means that it is possible to 'burn through' the jamming at much greater ranges by overpowering the jamming energy with the actual radar returns. The Germans were not really able to overcome the chaff spoofing very successfully and had to work around it (by guiding the aircraft to the target area and then having them visually acquire the targets).
Today, more powerful electronics with smarter software for operation of the radar might be able to better discriminate between a moving target like an aircraft and an almost stationary target like a chaff bundle. The technology powering modern sensors and seekers allow all successful systems partly due to ECCM designed into them. Today, electronic warfare is composed of ECM, ECCM and, electronic reconnaissance/intelligent (ELINT) activities.
Examples of electronic counter-countermeasures include the American Big Crow program, which served as a Bear bomber and a standoff jammer. It was a modified Air Force NKC-135A and was built to provide capability and flexibility of conducting varied and precision electronic warfare experiments. Throughout its 20-year existence, the U.S. government developed and installed over 3,143 electronic counter-countermeasures to its array of weapons. There is also the BAMS Project, which was funded by the Belgian government since 1982. This system, together with advanced microelectronics, also provided secure voice, data, and text communications under the most severe electronic warfare conditions.
Specific ECCM techniques: The following are some examples of EPM (other than simply increasing the fidelity of sensors through techniques such as increasing power or improving discrimination):
ECM detection: Sensor logic may be programmed to be able to recognize attempts at spoofing (e.g., aircraft dropping chaff during terminal homing phase) and ignore them. Even more sophisticated applications of ECCM might be to recognize the type of ECM being used, and be able to cancel out the signal.
Pulse compression by "chirping", or linear frequency modulation: One of the effects of the pulse compression technique is boosting the apparent signal strength as perceived by the radar receiver. The outgoing radar pulses are chirped, that is, the frequency of the carrier is varied within the pulse, much like the sound of a cricket chirping. When the pulse reflects off a target and returns to the receiver, the signal is processed to add a delay as a function of the frequency. This has the effect of "stacking" the pulse so it seems stronger, but shorter in duration, to further processors. The effect can increase the received signal strength to above that of noise jamming. Similarly, jamming pulses (used in deception jamming) will not typically have the same chirp, so will not benefit from the increase in signal strength.
Frequency hopping: Frequency agility ("frequency hopping") may be used to rapidly switch the frequency of the transmitted energy, and receiving only that frequency during the receiving time window. This foils jammers which cannot detect this switch in frequency quickly enough or predict the next hop frequency, and switch their own jamming frequency accordingly during the receiving time window. The most advanced jamming techniques have a very wide and fast frequency range, and might possibly jam out an antijammer.
This method is also useful against barrage jamming in that it forces the jammer to spread its jamming power across multiple frequencies in the jammed system's frequency range, reducing its power in the actual frequency used by the equipment at any one time. The use of spread-spectrum techniques allow signals to be spread over a wide enough spectrum to make jamming of such a wideband signal difficult.
Sidelobe blanking: Radar jamming can be effective from directions other than the direction the radar antenna is currently aimed. When jamming is strong enough, the radar receiver can detect it from a relatively low gain sidelobe. The radar, however, will process signals as if they were received in the main lobe. Therefore, jamming can be seen in directions other than where the jammer is located. To combat this, an omnidirectional antenna is used for a comparison signal. By comparing the signal strength as received by both the omnidirectional and the (directional) main antenna, signals can be identified that are not from the direction of interest. These signals are then ignored.
Polarization: Polarization can be used to filter out unwanted signals, such as jamming. If a jammer and receiver do not have the same polarization, the jamming signal will incur a loss that reduces its effectiveness. The four basic polarizations are linear horizontal, linear vertical, right-hand circular, and left-hand circular. The signal loss inherent in a cross polarized (transmitter different from receiver) pair is 3 dB for dissimilar types, and 17 dB for opposites.
Aside from power loss to the jammer, radar receivers can also benefit from using two or more antennas of differing polarization and comparing the signals received on each. This effect can effectively eliminate all jamming of the wrong polarization, although enough jamming may still obscure the actual signal.
Radiation homing: Another practice of ECCM is to program sensors or seekers to detect attempts at ECM and possibly even to take advantage of them. For example, some modern fire-and-forget missiles like the Vympel R-77 and the AMRAAM are able to home in directly on sources of radar jamming if the jamming is too powerful to allow them to find and track the target normally. This mode, called "home-on-jam", actually makes the missile's job easier. Some missile seekers actually target the enemy's radiation sources, and are therefore called "anti-radiation missiles" (ARMs). The jamming in this case effectively becomes a beacon announcing the presence and location of the transmitter. This makes the use of such ECM a difficult decision – it may serve to obscure an exact location from non-ARMs, but in doing so it must put the jamming vehicle at risk of being targeted and hit by ARMs.
See also: Jamming
Electronic warfare
Electronic warfare support measures
Wartime reserve mode
References:
Raytheon ECCM-capable radio set
Camp Evans Engineers develop World War II counter-measures with the help of Allen B. DuMont. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Electronic countermeasure | History: The first example of electronic countermeasures being applied in a combat situation took place during the Russo-Japanese war. On July 13, 1904, Russian wireless telegraphy stations installed in the Port Arthur fortress and on board Russian light cruisers successfully interrupted wireless communication between a group of Japanese battleships. The spark-gap transmitters in the Russian stations generated senseless noise while the Japanese were making attempts to coordinate their efforts in the bombing of a Russian naval base. Germany and United Kingdom interfered with enemy communications along the western front during World War I while the Royal Navy tried to intercept German naval radio transmissions. There were also efforts at sending false radio signals, having shore stations send transmissions using ships' call signs, and jamming enemy radio signals. On the other hand, there were also attempts by the Ottoman side to jam Allied wireless communications during the Gallipoli campaign.
World War II ECM expanded to include dropping chaff (originally called Window), jamming and spoofing radar and navigation signals. German bomber aircraft navigated using radio signals transmitted from ground stations, which the British disrupted with spoofed signals in the Battle of the Beams. During the RAF's night attacks on Germany the extent of electronic countermeasures was much expanded, and a specialised organisation, No. 100 Group RAF, was formed to counter the increasing German night fighter force and radar defences. Cold War developments included anti-radiation missiles designed to home in on enemy radar transmitters.
In the 2007 Operation Orchard Israeli attack on a suspected Syrian nuclear weapons site, the Israel Air Force used electronic warfare to take control of Syrian airspace prior to the attack. Israeli electronic warfare (EW) systems took over Syria's air defense systems, feeding them a false sky-picture while Israel Air Force jets crossed much of Syria, bombed their targets and returned.
Radar ECM: Basic radar ECM strategies are (1) radar interference, (2) target modifications, and (3) changing the electrical properties of air. Interference techniques include jamming and deception. Jamming is accomplished by a friendly platform transmitting signals on the radar frequency to produce a noise level sufficient to hide echos. The jammer's continuous transmissions will provide a clear direction to the enemy radar, but no range information. Deception may use a transponder to mimic the radar echo with a delay to indicate incorrect range. Transponders may alternatively increase return echo strength to make a small decoy appear to be a larger target. Target modifications include radar absorbing coatings and modifications of the surface shape to either "stealth" a high-value target or enhance reflections from a decoy. Dispersal of small aluminium strips called chaff is a common method of changing the electromagnetic properties of air to provide confusing radar echos.
Communications ECM: Radio jamming or communications jamming is the deliberate transmission of radio signals that disrupt communications by decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio to the point where the target communications link is either degraded or denied service.
Aircraft ECM: ECM is practiced by nearly all modern military units—land, sea or air. Aircraft, however, are the primary weapons in the ECM battle because they can "see" a larger patch of earth than a sea or land-based unit. When employed effectively, ECM can keep aircraft from being tracked by search radars, or targeted by surface-to-air missiles or air-to-air missiles. An aircraft ECM can take the form of an attachable underwing pod or could be embedded in the airframe. Fighter planes using a conventional electronically scanned antenna mount dedicated jamming pods instead or, in the case of the US, German, and Italian air forces, may rely on electronic warfare aircraft to carry them. ECM pods vary widely in power and capability; while many fighter aircraft are capable of carrying an ECM pod, these pods are generally less powerful, capable and of shorter range than the equipment carried by dedicated ECM aircraft, thus making dedicated ECM aircraft an important part of any airforce’s inventory.
Future airborne jammers: The Next Generation Jammer is being developed to replace the current AN/ALQ-99 carried on the E/A-18G electronic warfare plane. Planned for adoption around 2020, it will use a small AESA antenna divided into quadrants for all around coverage and retain the capability of highly directional jamming.
DARPA's Precision Electronic Warfare (PREW) project aims to develop a low-cost system capable of synchronizing several simple airborne jamming pods with enough precision to replicate the directionality of an electronically scanned antenna, avoiding collateral jamming of non-targeted receivers.
An expendable active decoy that uses DRFM technology to jam RF based threats has already been developed by Selex ES (merged into Leonardo new name of Finmeccanica since 2017). The system, named BriteCloud, is self-contained within a small canister that is similar to a standard flare cartridge. The 55 mm format of the system has undergone flight trials with the Gripen aircraft and the development of a 218 variant is at an advanced stage.
Dedicated ECM aircraft: EA-3 Skywarrior
EB-66 Destroyer
EC-130H Compass Call
EA-6B Prowler equipped with ALQ-92 communications jammer, ALQ-100 multi-band track breaking system, and five ALQ-99 tactical jammer pods.
EA-18G Growler
EF-111A Raven
Tornado ECR
J-16 D
Su-24MP
Yak-28PP
Mi-8PP
Shipboard ECM: The ULQ-6 deception transmitter was one of the earlier shipboard ECM installations. The Raytheon SLQ-32 shipboard ECM package came in three versions providing warning, identification and bearing information about radar-guided cruise missiles. The SLQ-32 V3 included quick reaction electronic countermeasures for cruisers and large amphibious ships and auxiliaries in addition to the RBOC (Rapid Blooming Off-board Chaff) launchers found on most surface ships. The BLR-14 Submarine Acoustic Warfare System (or SAWS) provides an integrated receiver, processor, display, and countermeasures launch system for submarines.
Infrared and acoustic analogies: Infrared homing systems can be decoyed with flares and other infrared countermeasures. Acoustic homing and detection systems used for ships are also susceptible to countermeasures. United States warships use Masker and PRAIRIE (propeller AIR Ingestion and Emission) systems to create small air bubbles around a ship's hull and wake to reduce sound transmission. Surface ships tow noisemakers like the AN/SLQ-25 Nixie to decoy homing torpedoes. Submarines can deploy similar acoustic device countermeasures (or ADCs) from a 3-inch (75-mm) signal launching tube. United States ballistic missile submarines could deploy the Mark 70 MOSS (Mobile submarine simulator) decoy from torpedo tubes to simulate a full size submarine. Most navies additionally equip ships with decoy launchers.
See also: AN/MSR-T4
Electronic warfare
Electronic warfare support measures
Electronic counter-countermeasure
Khibiny (electronic countermeasures system)
Krasukha (electronic warfare system)
No. 100 Group RAF
Samyukta electronic warfare system
Starshel rounds
References:
=== Sources === |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Electronic countermeasures | History: The first example of electronic countermeasures being applied in a combat situation took place during the Russo-Japanese war. On July 13, 1904, Russian wireless telegraphy stations installed in the Port Arthur fortress and on board Russian light cruisers successfully interrupted wireless communication between a group of Japanese battleships. The spark-gap transmitters in the Russian stations generated senseless noise while the Japanese were making attempts to coordinate their efforts in the bombing of a Russian naval base. Germany and United Kingdom interfered with enemy communications along the western front during World War I while the Royal Navy tried to intercept German naval radio transmissions. There were also efforts at sending false radio signals, having shore stations send transmissions using ships' call signs, and jamming enemy radio signals. On the other hand, there were also attempts by the Ottoman side to jam Allied wireless communications during the Gallipoli campaign.
World War II ECM expanded to include dropping chaff (originally called Window), jamming and spoofing radar and navigation signals. German bomber aircraft navigated using radio signals transmitted from ground stations, which the British disrupted with spoofed signals in the Battle of the Beams. During the RAF's night attacks on Germany the extent of electronic countermeasures was much expanded, and a specialised organisation, No. 100 Group RAF, was formed to counter the increasing German night fighter force and radar defences. Cold War developments included anti-radiation missiles designed to home in on enemy radar transmitters.
In the 2007 Operation Orchard Israeli attack on a suspected Syrian nuclear weapons site, the Israel Air Force used electronic warfare to take control of Syrian airspace prior to the attack. Israeli electronic warfare (EW) systems took over Syria's air defense systems, feeding them a false sky-picture while Israel Air Force jets crossed much of Syria, bombed their targets and returned.
Radar ECM: Basic radar ECM strategies are (1) radar interference, (2) target modifications, and (3) changing the electrical properties of air. Interference techniques include jamming and deception. Jamming is accomplished by a friendly platform transmitting signals on the radar frequency to produce a noise level sufficient to hide echos. The jammer's continuous transmissions will provide a clear direction to the enemy radar, but no range information. Deception may use a transponder to mimic the radar echo with a delay to indicate incorrect range. Transponders may alternatively increase return echo strength to make a small decoy appear to be a larger target. Target modifications include radar absorbing coatings and modifications of the surface shape to either "stealth" a high-value target or enhance reflections from a decoy. Dispersal of small aluminium strips called chaff is a common method of changing the electromagnetic properties of air to provide confusing radar echos.
Communications ECM: Radio jamming or communications jamming is the deliberate transmission of radio signals that disrupt communications by decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio to the point where the target communications link is either degraded or denied service.
Aircraft ECM: ECM is practiced by nearly all modern military units—land, sea or air. Aircraft, however, are the primary weapons in the ECM battle because they can "see" a larger patch of earth than a sea or land-based unit. When employed effectively, ECM can keep aircraft from being tracked by search radars, or targeted by surface-to-air missiles or air-to-air missiles. An aircraft ECM can take the form of an attachable underwing pod or could be embedded in the airframe. Fighter planes using a conventional electronically scanned antenna mount dedicated jamming pods instead or, in the case of the US, German, and Italian air forces, may rely on electronic warfare aircraft to carry them. ECM pods vary widely in power and capability; while many fighter aircraft are capable of carrying an ECM pod, these pods are generally less powerful, capable and of shorter range than the equipment carried by dedicated ECM aircraft, thus making dedicated ECM aircraft an important part of any airforce’s inventory.
Future airborne jammers: The Next Generation Jammer is being developed to replace the current AN/ALQ-99 carried on the E/A-18G electronic warfare plane. Planned for adoption around 2020, it will use a small AESA antenna divided into quadrants for all around coverage and retain the capability of highly directional jamming.
DARPA's Precision Electronic Warfare (PREW) project aims to develop a low-cost system capable of synchronizing several simple airborne jamming pods with enough precision to replicate the directionality of an electronically scanned antenna, avoiding collateral jamming of non-targeted receivers.
An expendable active decoy that uses DRFM technology to jam RF based threats has already been developed by Selex ES (merged into Leonardo new name of Finmeccanica since 2017). The system, named BriteCloud, is self-contained within a small canister that is similar to a standard flare cartridge. The 55 mm format of the system has undergone flight trials with the Gripen aircraft and the development of a 218 variant is at an advanced stage.
Dedicated ECM aircraft: EA-3 Skywarrior
EB-66 Destroyer
EC-130H Compass Call
EA-6B Prowler equipped with ALQ-92 communications jammer, ALQ-100 multi-band track breaking system, and five ALQ-99 tactical jammer pods.
EA-18G Growler
EF-111A Raven
Tornado ECR
J-16 D
Su-24MP
Yak-28PP
Mi-8PP
Shipboard ECM: The ULQ-6 deception transmitter was one of the earlier shipboard ECM installations. The Raytheon SLQ-32 shipboard ECM package came in three versions providing warning, identification and bearing information about radar-guided cruise missiles. The SLQ-32 V3 included quick reaction electronic countermeasures for cruisers and large amphibious ships and auxiliaries in addition to the RBOC (Rapid Blooming Off-board Chaff) launchers found on most surface ships. The BLR-14 Submarine Acoustic Warfare System (or SAWS) provides an integrated receiver, processor, display, and countermeasures launch system for submarines.
Infrared and acoustic analogies: Infrared homing systems can be decoyed with flares and other infrared countermeasures. Acoustic homing and detection systems used for ships are also susceptible to countermeasures. United States warships use Masker and PRAIRIE (propeller AIR Ingestion and Emission) systems to create small air bubbles around a ship's hull and wake to reduce sound transmission. Surface ships tow noisemakers like the AN/SLQ-25 Nixie to decoy homing torpedoes. Submarines can deploy similar acoustic device countermeasures (or ADCs) from a 3-inch (75-mm) signal launching tube. United States ballistic missile submarines could deploy the Mark 70 MOSS (Mobile submarine simulator) decoy from torpedo tubes to simulate a full size submarine. Most navies additionally equip ships with decoy launchers.
See also: AN/MSR-T4
Electronic warfare
Electronic warfare support measures
Electronic counter-countermeasure
Khibiny (electronic countermeasures system)
Krasukha (electronic warfare system)
No. 100 Group RAF
Samyukta electronic warfare system
Starshel rounds
References:
=== Sources === |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Electronic-warfare aircraft | List of electronic-warfare aircraft: Examples of modern aircraft designed or modified for EW include:
Antonov An-12BK-PPS (Soviet Union)
Antonov An-26REP (Soviet Union)
Boeing EA-18G Growler (United States)
Denel TP1 Oryx EW (South Africa)
Chengdu J-10D (China)
Douglas C-47TP EW (South Africa)
Douglas EA-3 Skywarrior (United States)
Douglas EB-66 Destroyer (United States)
Douglas EF-10B Skyknight (United States)
Embraer R-99 (Brazil)
General Dynamics/Grumman EF-111A Raven (United States)
IAI 202B Arava (Israel)
Ilyushin Il-22PP (Soviet Union) / (Russia)
Kawasaki EC-1 (Japan)
Kawasaki RC-2 (Japan)
Lockheed EC-130H Compass Call (United States)
Mil Mi-8PP (Soviet Union)
Northrop Grumman EA-6B Prowler (United States)
Tornado ECR (Germany / Italy)
Shaanxi Y-8EW (China)
Shaanxi Y-8-GX1 (China)
Shaanxi Y-9-GX11 (China)
Shaanxi Y-9DZ (China)
Shenyang J-15D (China)
Shenyang J-16D (China)
Sukhoi Su-24MP (Soviet Union)
Tupolev Tu-16RM-2 (Soviet Union)
Yakovlev Yak-28PP (Soviet Union)
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Empty Fort Strategy | Cao Cao: According to the Sanguozhi, in 195, the Empty Fort Strategy was used by the warlord Cao Cao against his rival Lü Bu in one incident at Chengshi County (乘氏縣; southwest of present-day Juye County, Shandong). In the summer of that year, Lü Bu went to Dongmin County (東緡縣; northeast of present-day Jinxiang County, Shandong) and gathered about 10,000 troops to attack Cao Cao. At the time, Cao Cao had very few soldiers with him, but he set up an ambush and managed to defeat Lü Bu.
The Wei Shu (魏書) gave a more detailed account of the ambush. Cao Cao had sent most of his troops out to collect grain so he had less than 1,000 men available in his base, which could not be well defended with so few men. When Lü Bu showed up, Cao Cao ordered all his available soldiers to defend the base and even ordered women to stand guard on the walls. To the west of Cao Cao's base was a dyke, and to its south was a deep forest. Lü Bu suspected that there was an ambush, so he told his men, "Cao Cao is very cunning. We must not fall into his ambush." He then led his troops to 10 li (Chinese miles) south of Cao Cao's base and set up his camp there. The next day, Lü Bu came to attack Cao Cao, and by then, Cao Cao had really set up an ambush near the dyke with the soldiers that had returned from gathering the grain. Lü Bu's forces fell into the ambush and were defeated.
The "ambush" mentioned in the Sanguozhi refers to the ambush that Lü Bu's forces fell into a trap on the second day, as described in the Wei Shu. The incident is also mentioned in Sima Guang's Zizhi Tongjian. However, the Zizhi Tongjian account, which combined the Sanguozhi and Wei Shu accounts, did not mention the events on the first day – which were about Cao Cao sending all his available soldiers to defend the base and ordering women to stand guard on the walls.
Debate: Yi Zhongtian, a history professor from Xiamen University, commented on this incident in his book Pin San Guo (品三国) in response to criticism from Fudan University historian Zhou Zhenhe and an online commentator known as "Hongchayangweili" (红茶杨威利). Earlier on, Yi referred to this incident when he said in a lecture on the television programme Lecture Room that "Cao Cao's rights to the invention of the Empty Fort Strategy had been stolen from him". Zhou claimed that the Empty Fort Strategy had never been used in history before so there were no "rights" to its invention; the online commentator argued that the incident does not count as a use of the Empty Fort Strategy.
Yi defended his claim and said that the incident in 195 is valid because of the circumstances under which it was used, which were very similar to the incidents involving Zhao Yun and Wen Ping (see the sections below). Cao Cao was trying to confuse Lü Bu by making use of the geographical features (the "deep forest") and by ordering women to stand guard on the walls, so as to make Lü Bu suspect that he had set up an ambush in the "deep forest" and lure Lü Bu to attack his "weakly defended" base by deploying women as soldiers to show how "desperate" he was to set up a defence. The ploy worked because it made Lü Bu hesitate when he wanted to attack. Cao Cao had bought sufficient time to set up a real ambush, and he defeated Lü Bu when he came to attack again on the following day.
Zhao Yun: The Zhao Yun Biezhuan (趙雲別傳; Unofficial Biography of Zhao Yun) mentioned an incident about Zhao Yun, a general under the warlord Liu Bei, using the Empty Fort Strategy during the Battle of Han River in 219, fought between Liu Bei and his rival Cao Cao as part of the Hanzhong Campaign.
This incident took place after Cao Cao's general Xiahou Yuan was defeated and killed in action at the earlier Battle of Mount Dingjun. Cao Cao's forces were transporting food supplies to the north hill when Liu Bei's general Huang Zhong, heard about it and led a group of soldiers, including some of Zhao Yun's men, to seize the supplies. When Huang Zhong did not return after a long time, Zhao Yun led tens of horsemen in search of Huang. Zhao Yun's search party encountered Cao Cao's forces and engaged them in battle but were outnumbered and was forced to retreat back to camp with Cao Cao's men in pursuit. Zhao Yun's subordinate Zhang Yi wanted to close the gates of the camp to prevent the enemy from entering. However, Zhao Yun gave orders for the gates to be opened, all flags and banners to be hidden, and the war drums silenced. Cao Cao's forces thought that there was an ambush inside Zhao Yun's camp so they withdrew. Just then, Zhao Yun launched a counterattack and his men beat the war drums loudly and fired arrows at the enemy. Cao Cao's soldiers were shocked and thrown into disarray. Some of them trampled on each other while fleeing in panic, and many of them fell into the Han River in their haste to get away and drowned. When Liu Bei came to inspect the camp later, he praised Zhao Yun and held a banquet to celebrate his victory.
Wen Ping: The Weilüe mentioned an incident about the Empty Fort Strategy being used by a general Wen Ping during a battle between the forces of the states of Cao Wei and Eastern Wu in the Three Kingdoms period. It is not clear which battle this was, but it could have been the Battle of Jiangling of 223.
The Wu leader Sun Quan led thousands of troops to attack a fortress defended by the Wei general Wen Ping. At the time, there were heavy rains and many fortifications were damaged. The civilians in the fortress had retreated to the fields further back so they could not help with repairs to the fortifications, and some repairs were still uncompleted when Sun Quan arrived with his men. When Wen Ping heard that Sun Quan had arrived, he was unsure of what to do, but eventually formulated a plan to deceive him. He ordered everyone in the fortress to stay under cover while he hid behind the walls, creating an illusion of an empty fortress. As Wen Ping expected, Sun Quan became suspicious and he said to his subordinates, "The northerners regard this man (Wen Ping) as a loyal subject, which is why they entrusted him with defending this commandery. Now, as I approach, he does not make any move. It must be either that he has something up his sleeve or that his reinforcements have arrived." Sun Quan then withdrew his forces.
The historian Pei Songzhi commented that the Weilüe account did not match the original account in the Sanguozhi. The Sanguozhi mentioned: "Sun Quan led 50,000 troops to besiege Wen Ping at Shiyang (石陽). The situation was very critical but Wen Ping put up a firm defence. Sun Quan withdrew his forces after more than 20 days, and Wen Ping led his men to attack them as they were retreating and defeated them."
Zhuge Liang: One of the best known examples of the use of the Empty Fort Strategy is a fictional incident in the novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms, which romanticises historical events in the late Han dynasty and the Three Kingdoms period. This event took place during the first of a series of campaigns – known as Zhuge Liang's Northern Expeditions – led by Shu Han's chancellor Zhuge Liang to attack Shu's rival state, Cao Wei.
In the first Northern Expedition, Zhuge Liang's efforts to conquer the Wei city Chang'an were undermined by the Shu defeat at the Battle of Jieting. With the loss of Jieting (present-day Qin'an County, Gansu), Zhuge Liang's current location, Xicheng (西城; believed to be located 120 li southwest of present-day Tianshui, Gansu), became exposed and was in danger of being attacked by the Wei army. In the face of imminent danger, with the main Shu army deployed elsewhere and only a small group of soldiers in Xicheng with him, Zhuge Liang came up with a ploy to hold off the approaching enemy.
Zhuge Liang ordered all the gates to be opened and instructed soldiers disguised as civilians to sweep the roads while he sat on the viewing platform above the gates with two page boys by his side. He put on a calm and composed image by playing his guqin. When the Wei army led by Sima Yi arrived, Sima was surprised by the sight before him and he ordered a retreat after suspecting that there was an ambush inside the city. Zhuge Liang later explained that his strategy was a risky one. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Empty Fort Strategy | In the face of imminent danger, with the main Shu army deployed elsewhere and only a small group of soldiers in Xicheng with him, Zhuge Liang came up with a ploy to hold off the approaching enemy.
Zhuge Liang ordered all the gates to be opened and instructed soldiers disguised as civilians to sweep the roads while he sat on the viewing platform above the gates with two page boys by his side. He put on a calm and composed image by playing his guqin. When the Wei army led by Sima Yi arrived, Sima was surprised by the sight before him and he ordered a retreat after suspecting that there was an ambush inside the city. Zhuge Liang later explained that his strategy was a risky one. It worked because Zhuge Liang had a reputation for being a careful military tactician who hardly took risks, so Sima Yi came to the conclusion that there was certainly an ambush upon seeing Zhuge's relaxed composure.
As a topic of academic study: Christopher Cotton, an economist from the Queen's University, and Chang Liu, a graduate student, used game theory to model the bluffing strategies used in the Chinese military legends of Li Guang and his 100 horsemen (144 BC), and Zhuge Liang and the Empty City (228 AD). In the case of these military legends, the researchers found that bluffing arose naturally as the optimal strategy in each situation. The findings were published under the title 100 Horsemen and the empty city: A game theoretic examination of deception in Chinese military legend in the Journal of Peace Research in 2011.
Historicity: The basis for this story in Romance of the Three Kingdoms is an anecdote shared by one Guo Chong (郭沖) in the early Jin dynasty (266–420). In the fifth century, Pei Songzhi added the anecdote as an annotation to Zhuge Liang's biography in the third-century historical text Sanguozhi. The anecdote is as follows: Zhuge Liang garrisoned at Yangping (陽平; around present-day Hanzhong, Shaanxi) and ordered Wei Yan to lead the troops east. He left behind only 10,000 men to defend Yangping. Sima Yi led 200,000 troops to attack Zhuge Liang and he took a shortcut, bypassing Wei Yan's army and arriving at a place 60 li away from Zhuge Liang's location. Upon inspection, Sima Yi realised that Zhuge Liang's city was weakly defended. Zhuge Liang knew that Sima Yi was near, so he thought of recalling Wei Yan's army back to counter Sima Yi, but it was too late already and his men were worried and terrified. Zhuge Liang remained calm and instructed his men to hide all flags and banners and silence the war drums. He then ordered all the gates to be opened and told his men to sweep and dust the ground. Sima Yi knew that impression that Zhuge Liang was a cautious and prudent man, and he was baffled by the sight before him and suspected that there was an ambush. He then withdrew his troops. The following day, Zhuge Liang clapped his hands, laughed, and told an aide that Sima Yi thought that there was an ambush and had withdrawn. Later, his scouts returned and reported that Sima Yi had indeed retreated. Sima Yi was very upset when he later found out about the ruse.
After adding the anecdote to Zhuge Liang's biography, Pei Songzhi wrote a short commentary as follows: When Zhuge Liang garrisoned at Yangping, Sima Yi was serving as the Area Commander of Jing Province and he was stationed at Wancheng (宛城; present-day Wancheng District, Nanyang, Henan). He only came into confrontation with Zhuge Liang in Guanzhong after Cao Zhen's death (in 231). It was unlikely that the Wei government ordered Sima Yi to lead an army from Wancheng to attack Shu via Xicheng (西城; present-day Ankang, Shaanxi) because there were heavy rains at the time (which obstructed passage). There were no battles fought at Yangping before and after that period of time. Going by Guo Chong's anecdote, if Sima Yi did lead 200,000 troops to attack Zhuge Liang, knew that Zhuge Liang's position was weakly defended, and suspected that there was an ambush, he could have ordered his troops to surround Zhuge Liang's position instead of retreating. Wei Yan's biography mentioned: "Each time Wei Yan followed Zhuge Liang to battle, he would request to command a separate detachment of about 10,000 men and take a different route and rendezvous with Zhuge Liang's main force at Tong Pass. Zhuge Liang rejected the plan, and Wei Yan felt that Zhuge Liang was a coward and complained that his talent was not put to good use." As mentioned in Wei Yan's biography, Zhuge Liang never agreed to allow Wei Yan to command a separate detachment of thousands of troops. If Guo Chong's anecdote was true, how was it possible that Zhuge Liang would allow Wei Yan to lead a larger army ahead while he followed behind with a smaller army? Guo Chong's anecdote was endorsed by the Prince of Fufeng (Sima Jun, a son of Sima Yi). However, the story puts Sima Yi in a negative light, and it does not make sense for a son to approve a story which demeans his father. We can tell that this anecdote is fake after reading the sentence "the Prince of Fufeng endorsed Guo Chong's anecdote".
Evidence from historical sources indicate that Sima Yi was indeed not in Jieting at the time. The Battle of Jieting took place in 228 but Sima Yi's biography in the Book of Jin claimed that in 227, Sima Yi was stationed at Wancheng in the north of Jing Province. He led an army to suppress a rebellion by Meng Da at Xincheng (新城; in present-day northwestern Hubei), and returned to Wancheng after his victory. Later, he went to the imperial capital Luoyang to meet the Wei emperor Cao Rui, who consulted him on some affairs before ordering him to return to Wancheng. Sima Yi only engaged Zhuge Liang in battle after 230.
Yi Zhongtian, a professor from Xiamen University, commented on this incident in his book Pin San Guo (品三国). He pointed out three problems in the story:
Sima Yi did not dare to attack because he feared that there was an ambush inside the fortress. If so, he could have sent recces to scout ahead and check if there was really an ambush.
Romance of the Three Kingdoms provided this description: "(Sima Yi) saw Zhuge Liang sitting at the top of the gates, smiling and playing his guqin and being oblivious to his surroundings." Based on this description, the distance between Sima Yi and Zhuge Liang must have been very short, or else Sima would not have been able to observe Zhuge's actions so clearly. If so, Sima Yi could have ordered an archer to kill Zhuge Liang.
Both Guo Chong's anecdote and Romance of the Three Kingdoms said that Sima Yi's army was superior to Zhuge Liang's in terms of size: Guo Chong's anecdote stated that Sima Yi had 200,000 men while Zhuge Liang had 10,000 men; Romance of the Three Kingdoms mentioned that Sima Yi had 150,000 men while Zhuge Liang had only 2,500 men. If so, Sima Yi could have ordered his troops to surround Zhuge Liang's fortress first, and then wait for an opportunity to attack.
Li Yuan: According to historical sources such as the Old Book of Tang, New Book of Tang and Zizhi Tongjian, Li Yuan, the founding emperor of the Tang dynasty, used a similar strategy in 618 CE in a battle against the Göktürks before he started his rebellion against the Sui dynasty. In early 618, Li Yuan was still a general in the Sui army and was based in Jinyang (晉陽; present-day Taiyuan, Shanxi). When he heard rumours that Emperor Yang of Sui wanted to execute him, he started making preparations for a rebellion against the Sui dynasty to save himself. In May 618, the Göktürks allied with the warlord Liu Wuzhuo to attack the Sui dynasty in order to gain territory. Jinyang became one of their targets.
Around the time, Li Yuan had just arrested Wang Wei (王威) and Gao Junya (高君雅), two officials sent by Emperor Yang to spy on him. He was also still busy plotting his rebellion. Moreover, he was also not prepared for a battle against the Göktürks because of two reasons. Firstly, Göktürk cavalrymen were so powerful that Li Yuan was not confident that his troops could defeat them. Secondly, even if Li Yuan defeated them in battle, he would nonetheless suffer significant losses that would undermine his rebellion against the Sui dynasty.
Li Yuan thus ordered his soldiers to hide in Jinyang and leave the city gates wide open. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Empty Fort Strategy | In May 618, the Göktürks allied with the warlord Liu Wuzhuo to attack the Sui dynasty in order to gain territory. Jinyang became one of their targets.
Around the time, Li Yuan had just arrested Wang Wei (王威) and Gao Junya (高君雅), two officials sent by Emperor Yang to spy on him. He was also still busy plotting his rebellion. Moreover, he was also not prepared for a battle against the Göktürks because of two reasons. Firstly, Göktürk cavalrymen were so powerful that Li Yuan was not confident that his troops could defeat them. Secondly, even if Li Yuan defeated them in battle, he would nonetheless suffer significant losses that would undermine his rebellion against the Sui dynasty.
Li Yuan thus ordered his soldiers to hide in Jinyang and leave the city gates wide open. Shibi Khan, leading a force of Göktürk cavalrymen, saw that the city appeared to be deserted and feared that there might be an ambush, so he did not enter. Li Yuan then ordered his son Li Shimin and subordinate Pei Ji to make their troops beat war drums loudly in the empty camps they had set up earlier, so as to create an illusion that reinforcements had arrived in Jinyang. Shibi Khan was so frightened that he retreated after two days.
Battle of Mikatagahara: Many traditions say that in 1572, during the Sengoku Period in Japan, Tokugawa Ieyasu used the tactic during his retreat in the Battle of Mikatagahara. He commanded that the fortress gates remain open, and that braziers be lit to guide his retreating army back to safety. One officer beat a large war drum, seeking to add encouragement to the returning men of a noble, courageous retreat. When Takeda forces led by Baba Nobuharu and Yamagata Masakage heard the drums, and saw the braziers and open gates, they assumed that Tokugawa was planning a trap, and so they stopped and made camp for the night. The authenticity of this story has been disputed by some, however, as it appears to be copied straight from Zhuge Liang's story, perhaps in an attempt to embellish Tokugawa's career.
References:
Chen, Shou. Records of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguozhi).
Fang, Xuanling. Book of Jin (Jin Shu).
Liu, Xu. Old Book of Tang (Jiu Tang Shu).
Luo, Guanzhong. Romance of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguo Yanyi).
Ouyang, Xiu and Song Qi. New Book of Tang (Xin Tang Shu).
Pei, Songzhi. Annotations to Records of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguozhi zhu).
Sima, Guang. Zizhi Tongjian. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Encirclement | History: Encirclement has been used throughout the centuries by military leaders, including generals such as Spartacus, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Genghis Khan, Khalid bin Waleed, Hannibal, Sun Tzu, Yi Sun Shin, Shaka Zulu, von Wallenstein, Nader Shah, Napoleon, von Moltke, Heinz Guderian, von Rundstedt, von Manstein, Zhukov, Patton and Soleimani.
Sun Tzu and other military thinkers suggest that an army should be not completely encircled but instead given some room for escape. Otherwise, the "encircled" army's men will lift their morale and fight to the death. It is better to have them consider the possibility of a retreat. Once the enemy retreats, it can be pursued and captured or destroyed with far less risk to the pursuing forces than a fight to the death.
Types of encirclement: The main form of encircling, the "double pincer", is executed by attacks on the flanks of a battle whose mobile forces of the era, such as light infantry, cavalry, tanks, or armoured personnel carriers attempt to force a breakthrough to utilize their speed to join behind the back of the enemy force and complete the "ring" while the main enemy force is stalled by probing attacks. The encirclement of the German Sixth Army in the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942 is a typical example. During the Winter War, Finland used "pocket tactics" against the Soviet Union, called motti; in the context of war, motti describes a tactic that the Finns used to immobilise, segment, surround and destroy the Soviet troops that were many times as large as them.
If there is a natural obstacle, such as ocean or mountains on one side of the battlefield, only one pincer is needed ("single pincer"), because the function of the second arm is taken over by the natural obstacle. The German attack into the lowlands of France in 1940 is a typical example of this.
A third and rare type of encirclement can ensue from a breakthrough in an area of the enemy front, and exploiting that with mobile forces, diverging in two or more directions behind the enemy line. Full encirclement rarely follows, but the threat of it severely hampers the defender's options. This type of attack pattern is centerpiece to blitzkrieg operations. Because of the extreme difficulty of this operation, it cannot be executed unless the offensive force has a vast superiority, either in technology, organization, or sheer numbers. The Barbarossa campaign of 1941 saw some examples.
The danger to the encircling force is that it is, itself, cut off from its logistical base; if the encircled force is able to stand firm, or maintain a supply route, the encircling force can be thrown into confusion (for example, Rommel's "Dash to the Wire" in 1941 and the Demyansk Pocket in 1942) or be comprehensively destroyed (as during the Burma campaign, in 1944).
Notable encirclement battles: Some examples of battles of encirclement are listed below.
Battle of Thermopylae (480 BC)
Battle of Cannae (216 BC)
Battle of the Abas (65 BC)
Battle of Walaja (633 AD)
Battle of Mohi (1241)
Battle of Ekeren (1703)
Battle of Fraustadt (1706)
Battle of Kirkuk (1733)
Battle of Kars (1745)
Battle of Maymyo (1768)
Ulm Campaign (1805)
Battle of Ocaña (1809)
Battle of Isandlwana (1879)
Battle of Tannenberg (1914)
Battle of Magdhaba (1916)
Battle of Rafa (1916)
First Battle of Gaza (1917)
Battle of Beersheba (1917)
Battle of Megiddo (1918)
Battle of Suomussalmi (1939-1940)
Battle of Kiev (1941)
Battle of Smolensk (1941)
Battle of Białystok–Minsk (1941)
Battle for Velikiye Luki (1942)
Battle of Hong Kong (1941)
Battle of Stalingrad (1942-1943)
Battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket (1944)
Kamenets-Podolsky pocket (1944)
Operation Bagration (1944)
Battle of the Mons Pocket (1944)
Siege of Bastogne, Belgium (1944)
Battle of the Ruhr Pocket (1945)
Battle of Berlin (1945)
Six-Day War (1967)
Battle of Khorramshahr (1980)
Battle of Mogadishu (1993)
Battle of Misrata (2011)
Battle of Aleppo (2012–2016)
Battle of Ilovaisk (2014)
Second Battle of Tikrit (2015)
Battle of Afrin (2018)
Battle of the Jabara Valley (2019)
Siege of Mariupol (2022)
See also: Blockade
Encirclement Campaigns
Maneuver warfare
References:
External links:
The Great Kitilä Motti (Winter War history from a documentary film's website showing multiple encirlements.) |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Endemic warfare | Description: Ritual fighting (or ritual battle or ritual warfare) permits the display of courage, masculinity, and the expression of emotion while resulting in relatively few wounds and even fewer deaths. Thus such a practice can be viewed as a form of conflict-resolution and/or as a psycho-social exercise. Native Americans often engaged in this activity, but the frequency of warfare in most hunter-gatherer cultures is a matter of dispute.
Examples: Warfare is known to every tribal society, but some societies develop a particular emphasis of warrior culture. Examples includes the Nuer of South Sudan, the Māori of New Zealand, the Dugum Dani of Papua, the Yanomami (dubbed "the Fierce People") of the Amazon. The culture of inter-tribal warfare has long been present in New Guinea.
Communal societies are well capable of escalation to all-out wars of annihilation between tribes. Thus, in Amazonas, there was perpetual animosity between the neighboring tribes of the Jívaro. A fundamental difference between wars enacted within the same tribe and against neighboring tribes is such that "wars between different tribes are in principle wars of extermination".
The Yanomami of Amazonas traditionally practiced a system of escalation of violence in several discrete stages.
The chest-pounding duel, the side-slapping duel, the club fight, and the spear-throwing fight. Further escalation results in raiding parties with the purpose of killing at least one member of the hostile faction. Finally, the highest stage of escalation is Nomohoni or all-out massacres brought about by treachery.
Similar customs were known to the Dugum Dani and the Chimbu of New Guinea, the Nuer of Sudan and the North American Plains Indians. Among the Chimbu and the Dugum Dani, pig theft was the most common cause of conflict, even more frequent than abduction of women, while among the Yanomamö, the most frequent initial cause of warfare was accusations of sorcery. Warfare serves the function of easing intra-group tensions and has aspects of a game, or "overenthusiastic football". Especially Dugum Dani "battles" have a conspicuous element of play, with one documented instance of a battle interrupted when both sides were distracted by throwing stones at a passing cuckoo dove.
See also: Captives in American Indian Wars
Communal violence
Flower war
Irregular warfare
Mock combat
Napoleon Chagnon
Prehistoric warfare
Religion and violence
Sudanese nomadic conflicts
Ethnic violence in South Sudan
Oromo–Somali clashes
Tinku
War dance
References:
Further reading: Zimmerman, L. The Crow Creek Site Massacre: A Preliminary Report, US Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha District, 1981.
Chagnon, N. The Yanomamo, Holt, Rinehart & Winston,1983.
Keeley, Lawrence. War Before Civilization, Oxford University Press, 1996.
Pauketat, Timothy R. North American Archaeology 2005. Blackwell Publishing.
Wade, Nicholas. Before the Dawn, Penguin: New York 2006.
S. A. LeBlanc, Prehistoric Warfare in the American Southwest, University of Utah Press (1999).
Guy Halsall, 'Anthropology and the Study of Pre-Conquest Warfare and Society: The Ritual War in Anglo-Saxon England' in *Hawkes (ed.), Weapons and Warfare in Anglo-Saxon England (1989), 155–177.
Diamond, Jared. The World Until Yesterday: What Can We Learn from Traditional Societies?, Viking. New York, 2012. pp. 79–129
External links: Haida Warfare
Tribal Warfare and Blood Revenge
The Crow Creek Massacre
Tribal warfare kills nine in Indonesia's Papua |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Envelopment | See also: Platform envelopment
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Espionage | History: Espionage has been recognized as of importance in military affairs since ancient times.
The oldest known classified document was a report made by a spy disguised as a diplomatic envoy in the court of King Hammurabi, who died in around 1750 BC. The ancient Egyptians had a developed secret service, and espionage is mentioned in the Iliad, the Bible, and the Amarna letters. Espionage was also prevalent in the Greco-Roman world, when spies employed illiterate subjects in civil services.
The thesis that espionage and intelligence has a central role in war as well as peace was first advanced in The Art of War and in the Arthashastra. In the Middle Ages European states excelled at what has later been termed counter-subversion when Catholic inquisitions were staged to annihilate heresy. Inquisitions were marked by centrally organised mass interrogations and detailed record keeping. Western espionage changed fundamentally during the Renaissance when Italian city-states installed resident ambassadors in capital cities to collect intelligence. Renaissance Venice became so obsessed with espionage that the Council of Ten, which was nominally responsible for security, did not even allow the doge to consult government archives freely. In 1481 the Council of Ten barred all Venetian government officials from making contact with ambassadors or foreigners. Those revealing official secrets could face the death penalty. Venice became obsessed with espionage because successful international trade demanded that the city-state could protect its trade secrets. Under Queen Elizabeth I of England (r. 1558–1603), Francis Walsingham (c. 1532–1590) was appointed foreign secretary and intelligence chief. The novelist and journalist Daniel Defoe (died 1731) not only spied for the British government, but also developed a theory of espionage foreshadowing modern police-state methods.
During the American Revolution, Nathan Hale and Benedict Arnold achieved their fame as spies, and there was considerable use of spies on both sides during the American Civil War. Though not a spy himself, George Washington was America's first spymaster, utilizing espionage tactics against the British.
In the 20th century, at the height of World War I, all great powers except the United States had elaborate civilian espionage systems and all national military establishments had intelligence units. In order to protect the country against foreign agents, the U.S. Congress passed the Espionage Act of 1917. Mata Hari, who obtained information for Germany by seducing French officials, was the most noted espionage agent of World War I. Prior to World War II, Germany and Imperial Japan established elaborate espionage nets. In 1942 the Office of Strategic Services was founded by Gen. William J. Donovan. However, the British system was the keystone of Allied intelligence. Numerous resistance groups such as the Austrian Maier-Messner Group, the French Resistance, the Witte Brigade, Milorg and the Polish Home Army worked against Nazi Germany and provided the Allied secret services with information that was very important for the war effort.
Since the end of World War II, the activity of espionage has enlarged, much of it growing out of the Cold War between the United States and the former USSR. The Russian Empire and its successor, the Soviet Union have had a long tradition of espionage ranging from the Okhrana to the KGB (Committee for State Security), which also acted as a secret police force. In the United States, the 1947 National Security Act created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to coordinate intelligence and the National Security Agency for research into codes and electronic communication. In addition to these, the United States has 13 other intelligence gathering agencies; most of the U.S. expenditures for intelligence gathering are budgeted to various Defense Dept. agencies and their programs. Under the intelligence reorganization of 2004, the director of national intelligence is responsible for overseeing and coordinating the activities and budgets of the U.S. intelligence agencies.
In the Cold War, espionage cases included Alger Hiss, Whittaker Chambers and the Rosenberg Case. In 1952 the Communist Chinese captured two CIA agents and in 1960 Francis Gary Powers, flying a U-2 reconnaissance mission over the Soviet Union for the CIA, was shot down and captured. During the Cold War, many Soviet intelligence officials defected to the West, including Gen. Walter Krivitsky, Victor Kravchenko, Vladimir Petrov, Peter Deriabin, Pawel Monat and Oleg Penkovsky of the GRU. Among Western officials who defected to the Soviet Union are Guy Burgess and Donald D. Maclean of Great Britain in 1951, Otto John of West Germany in 1954, William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell, U.S. cryptographers, in 1960, and Harold (Kim) Philby of Great Britain in 1962. U.S. acknowledgment of its U-2 flights and the exchange of Francis Gary Powers for Rudolf Abel in 1962 implied the legitimacy of some espionage as an arm of foreign policy.
China has a very cost-effective intelligence program that is especially effective in monitoring neighboring countries such as Mongolia, Russia and India. Smaller countries can also mount effective and focused espionage efforts. For instance, the Vietnamese communists had consistently superior intelligence during the Vietnam War. Some Islamic countries, including Libya, Iran and Syria, have highly developed operations as well. SAVAK, the secret police of the Pahlavi dynasty, was particularly feared by Iranian dissidents before the 1979 Iranian Revolution.
Modern day: Today, spy agencies target the illegal drug trade and terrorists as well as state actors.
Intelligence services value certain intelligence collection techniques over others. The former Soviet Union, for example, preferred human sources over research in open sources, while the United States has tended to emphasize technological methods such as SIGINT and IMINT. In the Soviet Union, both political (KGB) and military intelligence (GRU) officers were judged by the number of agents they recruited.
Targets of espionage: Espionage agents are usually trained experts in a targeted field so they can differentiate mundane information from targets of value to their own organizational development. Correct identification of the target at its execution is the sole purpose of the espionage operation.
Broad areas of espionage targeting expertise include:
Natural resources: strategic production identification and assessment (food, energy, materials). Agents are usually found among bureaucrats who administer these resources in their own countries
Popular sentiment towards domestic and foreign policies (popular, middle class, elites). Agents often recruited from field journalistic crews, exchange postgraduate students and sociology researchers
Strategic economic strengths (production, research, manufacture, infrastructure). Agents recruited from science and technology academia, commercial enterprises, and more rarely from among military technologists
Military capability intelligence (offensive, defensive, manoeuvre, naval, air, space). Agents are trained by military espionage education facilities and posted to an area of operation with covert identities to minimize prosecution
Counterintelligence operations targeting opponent's intelligence services themselves, such as breaching the confidentiality of communications and recruiting defectors or moles
Methods and terminology: Although the news media may speak of "spy satellites" and the like, espionage is not a synonym for all intelligence-gathering disciplines. It is a specific form of human source intelligence (HUMINT). Codebreaking (cryptanalysis or COMINT), aircraft or satellite photography (IMINT), and analysis of publicly available data sources (OSINT) are all intelligence gathering disciplines, but none of them is considered espionage. Many HUMINT activities, such as prisoner interrogation, reports from military reconnaissance patrols and from diplomats, etc., are not considered espionage. Espionage is the disclosure of sensitive information (classified) to people who are not cleared for that information or access to that sensitive information.
Unlike other forms of intelligence collection disciplines, espionage usually involves accessing the place where the desired information is stored or accessing the people who know the information and will divulge it through some kind of subterfuge. There are exceptions to physical meetings, such as the Oslo Report, or the insistence of Robert Hanssen in never meeting the people who bought his information.
The US defines espionage towards itself as "the act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defence with an intent, or reason to believe, that the information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation". Black's Law Dictionary (1990) defines espionage as: "... gathering, transmitting, or losing ... information related to the national defense". Espionage is a violation of United States law, 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–798 and Article 106a of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The United States, like most nations, conducts espionage against other nations, under the control of the National Clandestine Service. Britain's espionage activities are controlled by the Secret Intelligence Service.
Technology and techniques: Source:
Organization: A spy is a person employed to seek out top secret information from a source. Within the United States Intelligence Community, "asset" is more common usage. A case officer or Special Agent, who may have diplomatic status (i.e., official cover or non-official cover), supports and directs the human collector. Cut-outs are couriers who do not know the agent or case officer but transfer messages. A safe house is a refuge for spies. Spies often seek to obtain secret information from another source.
In larger networks, the organization can be complex with many methods to avoid detection, including clandestine cell systems. Often the players have never met. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Espionage | The United States, like most nations, conducts espionage against other nations, under the control of the National Clandestine Service. Britain's espionage activities are controlled by the Secret Intelligence Service.
Technology and techniques: Source:
Organization: A spy is a person employed to seek out top secret information from a source. Within the United States Intelligence Community, "asset" is more common usage. A case officer or Special Agent, who may have diplomatic status (i.e., official cover or non-official cover), supports and directs the human collector. Cut-outs are couriers who do not know the agent or case officer but transfer messages. A safe house is a refuge for spies. Spies often seek to obtain secret information from another source.
In larger networks, the organization can be complex with many methods to avoid detection, including clandestine cell systems. Often the players have never met. Case officers are stationed in foreign countries to recruit and supervise intelligence agents, who in turn spy on targets in the countries where they are assigned. A spy need not be a citizen of the target country and hence does not automatically commit treason when operating within it. While the more common practice is to recruit a person already trusted with access to sensitive information, sometimes a person with a well-prepared synthetic identity (cover background), called a legend in tradecraft, may attempt to infiltrate a target organization.
These agents can be moles (who are recruited before they get access to secrets), defectors (who are recruited after they get access to secrets and leave their country) or defectors in place (who get access but do not leave).
A legend is also employed for an individual who is not an illegal agent, but is an ordinary citizen who is "relocated", for example, a "protected witness". Nevertheless, such a non-agent very likely will also have a case officer who will act as a controller. As in most, if not all synthetic identity schemes, for whatever purpose (illegal or legal), the assistance of a controller is required.
Spies may also be used to spread disinformation in the organization in which they are planted, such as giving false reports about their country's military movements, or about a competing company's ability to bring a product to market. Spies may be given other roles that also require infiltration, such as sabotage.
Many governments spy on their allies as well as their enemies, although they typically maintain a policy of not commenting on this. Governments also employ private companies to collect information on their behalf such as SCG International Risk, International Intelligence Limited and others.
Many organizations, both national and non-national, conduct espionage operations. It should not be assumed that espionage is always directed at the most secret operations of a target country. National and terrorist organizations and other groups are also targeted. This is because governments want to retrieve information that they can use to be proactive in protecting their nation from potential terrorist attacks.
Communications both are necessary to espionage and clandestine operations, and also a great vulnerability when the adversary has sophisticated SIGINT detection and interception capability. Spies rely on COVCOM or covert communication through technically advanced spy devices. Agents must also transfer money securely.
Industrial espionage: Reportedly Canada is losing $12 billion and German companies are estimated to be losing about €50 billion ($87 billion) and 30,000 jobs to industrial espionage every year.
Agents in espionage: In espionage jargon, an "agent" is the person who does the spying. They may be a citizen of a country recruited by that country to spy on another; a citizen of a country recruited by that country to carry out false flag assignments disrupting his own country; a citizen of one country who is recruited by a second country to spy on or work against his own country or a third country, and more.
In popular usage, this term is sometimes confused with an intelligence officer, intelligence operative, or case officer who recruits and handles agents.
Among the most common forms of agent are:
Agent provocateur: instigates trouble or provides information to gather as many people as possible into one location for an arrest.
Intelligence agent: provides access to sensitive information through the use of special privileges. If used in corporate intelligence gathering, this may include gathering information of a corporate business venture or stock portfolio. In economic intelligence, "Economic Analysts may use their specialized skills to analyze and interpret economic trends and developments, assess and track foreign financial activities, and develop new econometric and modelling methodologies." This may also include information of trade or tariff.
Agent-of-influence: provides political influence in an area of interest, possibly including publications needed to further an intelligence service agenda. The use of the media to print a story to mislead a foreign service into action, exposing their operations while under surveillance.
Double agent: engages in clandestine activity for two intelligence or security services (or more in joint operations), who provides information about one or about each to the other, and who wittingly withholds significant information from one on the instructions of the other or is unwittingly manipulated by one so that significant facts are withheld from the adversary. Peddlers, fabricators, and others who work for themselves rather than a service are not double agents because they are not agents. The fact that double agents have an agent relationship with both sides distinguishes them from penetrations, who normally are placed with the target service in a staff or officer capacity."
Redoubled agent: forced to mislead the foreign intelligence service after being caught as a double agent.
Unwitting double agent: offers or is forced to recruit as a double or redoubled agent and in the process is recruited by either a third-party intelligence service or his own government without the knowledge of the intended target intelligence service or the agent. This can be useful in capturing important information from an agent that is attempting to seek allegiance with another country. The double agent usually has knowledge of both intelligence services and can identify operational techniques of both, thus making third-party recruitment difficult or impossible. The knowledge of operational techniques can also affect the relationship between the operations officer (or case officer) and the agent if the case is transferred by an operational targeting officer] to a new operations officer, leaving the new officer vulnerable to attack. This type of transfer may occur when an officer has completed his term of service or when his cover is blown.
Sleeper agent: recruited to wake up and perform a specific set of tasks or functions while living undercover in an area of interest. This type of agent is not the same as a deep cover operative, who continually contacts a case officer to file intelligence reports. A sleeper agent is not in contact with anyone until activated.
Triple agent: works for three intelligence services.
Less common or lesser known forms of agent include:
Access agent: provides access to other potential agents by providing offender profiling information that can help lead to recruitment into an intelligence service.
Confusion agent: provides misleading information to an enemy intelligence service or attempts to discredit the operations of the target in an operation.
Facilities agent: provides access to buildings, such as garages or offices used for staging operations, resupply, etc.
Illegal agent: lives in another country under false credentials and does not report to a local station. A nonofficial cover operative can be dubbed an "illegal" when working in another country without diplomatic protection.
Principal agent: functions as a handler for an established network of agents, usually considered "blue chip".
Law: Espionage against a nation is a crime under the legal code of many nations. In the United States, it is covered by the Espionage Act of 1917. The risks of espionage vary. A spy violating the host country's laws may be deported, imprisoned, or even executed. A spy violating its own country's laws can be imprisoned for espionage or/and treason (which in the United States and some other jurisdictions can only occur if they take up arms or aids the enemy against their own country during wartime), or even executed, as the Rosenbergs were. For example, when Aldrich Ames handed a stack of dossiers of U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents in the Eastern Bloc to his KGB-officer "handler", the KGB "rolled up" several networks, and at least ten people were secretly shot. When Ames was arrested by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), he faced life in prison; his contact, who had diplomatic immunity, was declared persona non grata and taken to the airport. Ames' wife was threatened with life imprisonment if her husband did not cooperate; he did, and she was given a five-year sentence. Hugh Francis Redmond, a CIA officer in China, spent nineteen years in a Chinese prison for espionage—and died there—as he was operating without diplomatic cover and immunity.
In United States law, treason, espionage, and spying are separate crimes. Treason and espionage have graduated punishment levels.
The United States in World War I passed the Espionage Act of 1917. Over the years, many spies, such as the Soble spy ring, Robert Lee Johnson, the Rosenberg ring, Aldrich Hazen Ames, Robert Philip Hanssen, Jonathan Pollard, John Anthony Walker, James Hall III, and others have been prosecuted under this law.
History of espionage laws: From ancient times, the penalty for espionage in many countries was execution. This was true right up until the era of World War II; for example, Josef Jakobs was a Nazi spy who parachuted into Great Britain in 1941 and was executed for espionage.
In modern times, many people convicted of espionage have been given penal sentences rather than execution. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Espionage | In United States law, treason, espionage, and spying are separate crimes. Treason and espionage have graduated punishment levels.
The United States in World War I passed the Espionage Act of 1917. Over the years, many spies, such as the Soble spy ring, Robert Lee Johnson, the Rosenberg ring, Aldrich Hazen Ames, Robert Philip Hanssen, Jonathan Pollard, John Anthony Walker, James Hall III, and others have been prosecuted under this law.
History of espionage laws: From ancient times, the penalty for espionage in many countries was execution. This was true right up until the era of World War II; for example, Josef Jakobs was a Nazi spy who parachuted into Great Britain in 1941 and was executed for espionage.
In modern times, many people convicted of espionage have been given penal sentences rather than execution. For example, Aldrich Hazen Ames is an American CIA analyst, turned KGB mole, who was convicted of espionage in 1994; he is serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole in the high-security Allenwood U.S. Penitentiary. Ames was formerly a 31-year CIA counterintelligence officer and analyst who committed espionage against his country by spying for the Soviet Union and Russia. So far as it is known, Ames compromised the second-largest number of CIA agents, second only to Robert Hanssen, who also served a prison sentence until his death in 2023.
Use against non-spies: Espionage laws are also used to prosecute non-spies. In the United States, the Espionage Act of 1917 was used against socialist politician Eugene V. Debs (at that time the Act had much stricter guidelines and amongst other things banned speech against military recruiting). The law was later used to suppress publication of periodicals, for example of Father Coughlin in World War II. In the early 21st century, the act was used to prosecute whistleblowers such as Thomas Andrews Drake, John Kiriakou, and Edward Snowden, as well as officials who communicated with journalists for innocuous reasons, such as Stephen Jin-Woo Kim.
As of 2012, India and Pakistan were holding several hundred prisoners of each other's country for minor violations like trespass or visa overstay, often with accusations of espionage attached. Some of these include cases where Pakistan and India both deny citizenship to these people, leaving them stateless. The BBC reported in 2012 on one such case, that of Mohammed Idrees, who was held under Indian police control for approximately 13 years for overstaying his 15-day visa by 2–3 days after seeing his ill parents in 1999. Much of the 13 years were spent in prison waiting for a hearing, and more time was spent homeless or living with generous families. The Indian People's Union for Civil Liberties and Human Rights Law Network both decried his treatment. The BBC attributed some of the problems to tensions caused by the Kashmir conflict.
Espionage laws in the UK: Espionage is illegal in the UK under the National Security Act 2023, which repealed prior Official Secrets Acts and creates three separate offences for espionage. A person is liable to be imprisoned for life for committing an offence under Section 1 of the Act, or 14 years for an offence under Sections 2 and 3
Government intelligence laws and its distinction from espionage: Government intelligence is very much distinct from espionage, and is not illegal in the UK, providing that the organisations of individuals are registered, often with the ICO, and are acting within the restrictions of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA). 'Intelligence' is considered legally as "information of all sorts gathered by a government or organisation to guide its decisions. It includes information that may be both public and private, obtained from much different public or secret sources. It could consist entirely of information from either publicly available or secret sources, or be a combination of the two."
However, espionage and intelligence can be linked. According to the MI5 website, "foreign intelligence officers acting in the UK under diplomatic cover may enjoy immunity from prosecution. Such persons can only be tried for spying (or, indeed, any criminal offence) if diplomatic immunity is waived beforehand. Those officers operating without diplomatic cover have no such immunity from prosecution".
There are also laws surrounding government and organisational intelligence and surveillance. Generally, the body involved should be issued with some form of warrant or permission from the government and should be enacting their procedures in the interest of protecting national security or the safety of public citizens. Those carrying out intelligence missions should act within not only RIPA but also the Data Protection Act and Human Rights Act. However, there are spy equipment laws and legal requirements around intelligence methods that vary for each form of intelligence enacted.
War: In war, espionage is considered permissible as many nations recognize the inevitability of opposing sides seeking intelligence each about the dispositions of the other. To make the mission easier and successful, combatants wear disguises to conceal their true identity from the enemy while penetrating enemy lines for intelligence gathering. However, if they are caught behind enemy lines in disguises, they are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status and subject to prosecution and punishment—including execution.
The Hague Convention of 1907 addresses the status of wartime spies, specifically within "Laws and Customs of War on Land" (Hague IV); October 18, 1907: CHAPTER II Spies". Article 29 states that a person is considered a spy who, acts clandestinely or on false pretences, infiltrates enemy lines with the intention of acquiring intelligence about the enemy and communicate it to the belligerent during times of war. Soldiers who penetrate enemy lines in proper uniforms for the purpose of acquiring intelligence are not considered spies but are lawful combatants entitled to be treated as prisoners of war upon capture by the enemy. Article 30 states that a spy captured behind enemy lines may only be punished following a trial. However, Article 31 provides that if a spy successfully rejoined his own military and is then captured by the enemy as a lawful combatant, he cannot be punished for his previous acts of espionage and must be treated as a prisoner of war. This provision does not apply to citizens who committed treason against their own country or co-belligerents of that country and may be captured and prosecuted at any place or any time regardless whether he rejoined the military to which he belongs or not or during or after the war.
The ones that are excluded from being treated as spies while behind enemy lines are escaping prisoners of war and downed airmen as international law distinguishes between a disguised spy and a disguised escaper. It is permissible for these groups to wear enemy uniforms or civilian clothes in order to facilitate their escape back to friendly lines so long as they do not attack enemy forces, collect military intelligence, or engage in similar military operations while so disguised. Soldiers who are wearing enemy uniforms or civilian clothes simply for the sake of warmth along with other purposes rather than engaging in espionage or similar military operations while so attired are also excluded from being treated as unlawful combatants.
Saboteurs are treated as spies as they too wear disguises behind enemy lines for the purpose of waging destruction on an enemy's vital targets in addition to intelligence gathering. For example, during World War II, eight German agents entered the U.S. in June 1942 as part of Operation Pastorius, a sabotage mission against U.S. economic targets. Two weeks later, all were arrested in civilian clothes by the FBI thanks to two German agents betraying the mission to the U.S. Under the Hague Convention of 1907, these Germans were classified as spies and tried by a military tribunal in Washington D.C. On August 3, 1942, all eight were found guilty and sentenced to death. Five days later, six were executed by electric chair at the District of Columbia jail. Two who had given evidence against the others had their sentences reduced by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to prison terms. In 1948, they were released by President Harry S. Truman and deported to the American Zone of occupied Germany.
The U.S. codification of enemy spies is Article 106 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This provides a mandatory death sentence if a person captured in the act is proven to be "lurking as a spy or acting as a spy in or about any place, vessel, or aircraft, within the control or jurisdiction of any of the armed forces, or in or about any shipyard, any manufacturing or industrial plant, or any other place or institution engaged in work in aid of the prosecution of the war by the United States, or elsewhere".
Spy fiction: Spies have long been favorite topics for novelists and filmmakers. An early example of espionage literature is Kim by the English novelist Rudyard Kipling, with a description of the training of an intelligence agent in the Great Game between the UK and Russia in 19th century Central Asia. An even earlier work was James Fenimore Cooper's classic novel, The Spy, written in 1821, about an American spy in New York during the Revolutionary War.
During the many 20th-century spy scandals, much information became publicly known about national spy agencies and dozens of real-life secret agents. These sensational stories piqued public interest in a profession largely off-limits to human interest news reporting, a natural consequence of the secrecy inherent in their work. To fill in the blanks, the popular conception of the secret agent has been formed largely by 20th and 21st-century fiction and film. Attractive and sociable real-life agents such as Valerie Plame find little employment in serious fiction, however. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Espionage | An early example of espionage literature is Kim by the English novelist Rudyard Kipling, with a description of the training of an intelligence agent in the Great Game between the UK and Russia in 19th century Central Asia. An even earlier work was James Fenimore Cooper's classic novel, The Spy, written in 1821, about an American spy in New York during the Revolutionary War.
During the many 20th-century spy scandals, much information became publicly known about national spy agencies and dozens of real-life secret agents. These sensational stories piqued public interest in a profession largely off-limits to human interest news reporting, a natural consequence of the secrecy inherent in their work. To fill in the blanks, the popular conception of the secret agent has been formed largely by 20th and 21st-century fiction and film. Attractive and sociable real-life agents such as Valerie Plame find little employment in serious fiction, however. The fictional secret agent is more often a loner, sometimes amoral—an existential hero operating outside the everyday constraints of society. Loner spy personalities may have been a stereotype of convenience for authors who already knew how to write loner private investigator characters that sold well from the 1920s to the present.
Johnny Fedora achieved popularity as a fictional agent of early Cold War espionage, but James Bond is the most commercially successful of the many spy characters created by intelligence insiders during that struggle. Other fictional agents include Le Carré's George Smiley, and Harry Palmer as played by Michael Caine.
Jumping on the spy bandwagon, other writers also started writing about spy fiction featuring female spies as protagonists, such as The Baroness, which has more graphic action and sex, as compared to other novels featuring male protagonists.
Spy fiction has permeated the video game world as well, in games such as Perfect Dark, GoldenEye 007, No One Lives Forever, and the Metal Gear series.
Espionage has also made its way into comedy depictions. The 1960s TV series Get Smart, the 1983 Finnish film Agent 000 and the Deadly Curves, and Johnny English film trilogy portrays an inept spy, while the 1985 movie Spies Like Us depicts a pair of none-too-bright men sent to the Soviet Union to investigate a missile.
The historical novel The Emperor and the Spy highlights the adventurous life of U.S. Colonel Sidney Forrester Mashbir, who during the 1920s and 1930s attempted to prevent war with Japan, and when war did erupt, he became General MacArthur's top advisor in the Pacific Theater of World War Two.
Black Widow is also a fictional agent who was introduced as a Russian spy, an antagonist of the superhero Iron Man. She later became an agent of the fictional spy agency S.H.I.E.L.D. and a member of the superhero team the Avengers.
See also:
References:
Citations:
Works cited: Johnson, John (1997). The Evolution of British Sigint, 1653–1939. London: HMSO. OCLC 52130886.
Winkler, Jonathan Reed (July 2009). "Information Warfare in World War I". The Journal of Military History. 73 (3): 845–867. doi:10.1353/jmh.0.0324. ISSN 1543-7795. S2CID 201749182.
Further reading:
External links:
History of an espionage in Russia |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Exhausting | Definition: Fatigue in a medical context is used to cover experiences of low energy that are not caused by normal life.
A 2021 review proposed a definition for fatigue as a starting point for discussion: "A multi-dimensional phenomenon in which the biophysiological, cognitive, motivational and emotional state of the body is affected resulting in significant impairment of the individual's ability to function in their normal capacity".
Another definition is that fatigue is "a significant subjective sensation of weariness, increasing sense of effort, mismatch between effort expended and actual performance, or exhaustion independent from medications, chronic pain, physical deconditioning, anaemia, respiratory dysfunction, depression, and sleep disorders".
Terminology: The use of the term "fatigue" in medical contexts may carry inaccurate connotations from the more general usage of the same word. More accurate terminology may also be needed for variants within the umbrella term of fatigue.
Comparison with other terms:
Tiredness: Tiredness which is a normal result of work, mental stress, anxiety, overstimulation and understimulation, jet lag, active recreation, boredom, or lack of sleep is not considered medical fatigue. This is the tiredness described in MeSH Descriptor Data.
Sleepiness: Sleepiness refers to a tendency to fall asleep, whereas fatigue refers to an overwhelming sense of tiredness, lack of energy, and a feeling of exhaustion. Sleepiness and fatigue often coexist as a consequence of sleep deprivation. However sleepiness and fatigue may not correlate. Fatigue is generally considered a longer-term condition than sleepiness (somnolence).
Presentation:
Common features: Distinguishing features of medical fatigue include
unpredictability,
not linking fatigue to an obvious cause, such as a physical exertion,
variability in severity,
fatigue being relatively profound/overwhelming, and having extensive impact on daily living,
lack of improvement with rest,
where an underlying disease is present, the quantum of fatigue often does not correlate with the severity of the underlying disease.
Differentiating features: Differentiating characteristics of fatigue that may help identify the possible cause of fatigue include
Post-exertional malaise; a common feature of ME/CFS, and experienced by a significant proportion of people with Long Covid, but not a feature of other fatigues.
Increased by heat or cold; MS fatigue is in many cases affected in this way.
Remission; MS fatigue may reduce during periods of other MS symptom remission. ME/CFS may also have lower periods of activity.
Cognitive declines; sleep deprivation causes cognitive and neurobehavioral effects including unstable attention and slowing of response times. ME/CFS and MS may cause brain fog over longer timescales.
Intermittency; Fatigues often vary in how and when they occur. Some fatigues (RA, cancer fatigue) seem to often be continual (24/7) whilst others (MS, Sjögren's, lupus, brain injury) are often intermittent. A 2010 study found that Sjögren's patients reported fatigue after rising, an improvement in mid-morning, and worsening later in the day, whereas lupus (SLE) patients reported lower fatigue after rising followed by increasing fatigue through the day. ME/CFS symptoms can be continual, or can fluctuate during the day, from day to day, and over longer periods.
The pace of onset may be a related differentiating factor; MS fatigue can have abrupt onset.
Feeling of weight; some fatigues, including that caused by MS, create a sense of weight or gravity; "I feel like I have lead weights attached to my limbs ... or I am being pulled down by gravity."
Some people may have multiple causes of fatigue.
Causes:
Drug use: A 2021 study in a Korean city found that alcohol consumption was the variable with the most correlation with overall fatigue. A 2020 Norway study found that 69% of substance use disorder patients had severe fatigue symptoms, and particularly those with extensive use of benzodiazepines. Causality, as opposed to correlation, were not proven in these studies.
Unknown: In up to a third of fatigue primary care cases, no medical or psychiatric diagnosis is found.
Tiredness is a common medically unexplained symptom.
Sleep disturbance: Fatigue can often be traced to poor sleep habits. Sleep deprivation and disruption is associated with subsequent fatigue. Sleep disturbances due to disease may impact fatigue. Caffeine and alcohol can disrupt sleep, causing fatigue.
Medications: Fatigue may be a side effect of certain medications (e.g., lithium salts, ciprofloxacin); beta blockers, which can induce exercise intolerance, medicines used to treat allergies or coughs) and many cancer treatments, particularly chemotherapy and radiotherapy. Use of benzodiazepines has been found to correlate with higher fatigue.
Association with diseases and illnesses: Fatigue is often associated with diseases and conditions. Some major categories of conditions that often list fatigue as a symptom include physical diseases, substance use illness, mental illnesses, and other diseases and conditions.
Physical diseases: autoimmune diseases, such as celiac disease, lupus, multiple sclerosis, myasthenia gravis, NMOSD, Sjögren's syndrome, rheumatoid arthritis, spondyloarthropathy and UCTD; this population's primary concern is fatigue;
blood disorders, such as anemia and hemochromatosis;
brain injury;
cancer, in which case it is called cancer fatigue;
Covid-19 and long Covid;
developmental disorders such as autism spectrum disorder;
endocrine diseases or metabolic disorders: diabetes mellitus, hypothyroidism and Addison's disease;
fibromyalgia;
heart failure and heart attack;
HIV
inborn errors of metabolism such as fructose malabsorption;
infectious diseases such as infectious mononucleosis or tuberculosis;
irritable bowel syndrome;
kidney diseases, e.g., acute renal failure, chronic renal failure;
leukemia or lymphoma;
liver failure or liver diseases, e.g., hepatitis;
Lyme disease;
neurological disorders such as narcolepsy, Parkinson's disease, postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome (POTS) and post-concussion syndrome;
physical trauma and other pain-causing conditions, such as arthritis;
sleep deprivation or sleep disorders, e.g. sleep apnea;
stroke
thyroid disease such as hypothyroidism;
Mental illnesses: anxiety disorders, such as generalized anxiety disorder;
depression;
eating disorders, which can produce fatigue due to inadequate nutrition;
Other: myalgic encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS)
idiopathic chronic fatigue, a term used to describe chronic fatigue which does not have symptoms of ME/CFS. However ICF does not have a dedicated diagnostic code in the World Health Organization's ICD-11 classification.
Gulf War syndrome;
Primary vs. secondary: In some areas, it has been proposed that fatigue be separated into primary fatigue, caused directly by a disease process, and ordinary or secondary fatigue, caused by a range of causes including exertion and also secondary impacts on a person of having a disease (such as disrupted sleep). The ICD-11 MG22 definition of fatigue captures both types of fatigue; it includes fatigue that "occur[s] in the absence of... exertion... as a symptom of health conditions."
Obesity: Obesity correlates with higher fatigue levels and incidence.
Somatic symptom disorder: In somatic symptom disorder the patient is overfocused on a physical symptom, such as fatigue, that may or may not be explained by a medical condition.
Adverse life events: Adverse life events have been associated with fatigue.
Scientifically unsupported causes: The concept of adrenal fatigue is often raised in media but no scientific basis has been found for it.
Mechanisms: The mechanisms that cause fatigue are not well understood. Several mechanisms may be in operation within a patient, with the relative contribution of each mechanism differing over time.
Proposed fatigue explanations due to permanent changes in the brain may have difficulty in explaining the "unpredictability" and "variability" (i.e. appearing intermittently during the day, and not on all days) of the fatigue associated with inflammatory rheumatic diseases and autoimmune diseases (such as multiple sclerosis).
Inflammation: Inflammation distorts neural chemistry, brain function and functional connectivity across a broad range of brain networks, and has been linked to many types of fatigue. Findings implicate neuroinflammation in the etiology of fatigue in autoimmune and related disorders. Low-grade inflammation may cause an imbalance between energy availability and expenditure.
Cytokines are small protein molecules that modulate immune responses and inflammation (as well as other functions) and may have causal roles in fatigue. However a 2019 review was inconclusive as to whether cytokines play any definitive role in ME/CFS.
Reduced brain connectivity: Fatigue has been correlated with reductions in structural and functional connectivity in the brain. This has included in post-stroke, MS, NMOSD and MOG, and ME/CFS. This was also found for fatigue after brain injury, including a significant linear correlation between self-reported fatigue and brain functional connectivity.
Areas of the brain for which there is evidence of relation to fatigue are the thalamus and middle frontal cortex, fronto-parietal and cingulo-opercular, and default mode network, salience network, and thalamocortical loop areas.
A 2024 review found that structural connectivity changes may underlie fatigue in pwRRMS but that the overall results were inconclusive, possibly explained by heterogeneity and limited number of studies. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Exhausting | However a 2019 review was inconclusive as to whether cytokines play any definitive role in ME/CFS.
Reduced brain connectivity: Fatigue has been correlated with reductions in structural and functional connectivity in the brain. This has included in post-stroke, MS, NMOSD and MOG, and ME/CFS. This was also found for fatigue after brain injury, including a significant linear correlation between self-reported fatigue and brain functional connectivity.
Areas of the brain for which there is evidence of relation to fatigue are the thalamus and middle frontal cortex, fronto-parietal and cingulo-opercular, and default mode network, salience network, and thalamocortical loop areas.
A 2024 review found that structural connectivity changes may underlie fatigue in pwRRMS but that the overall results were inconclusive, possibly explained by heterogeneity and limited number of studies.
A small 2023 study found that infratentorial lesion volume (cerebellar and brainstem) was a relatively good predictor of RRMS fatigue severity.
Damage to brain white matter: Studies have found MS fatigue correlates with damage to NAWM (normal appearing white matter) (which will not show on normal MRI but will show on DTI (diffusion tensor imaging)). The correlation becomes unreliable in patients aged over 65 due to damage due to ageing.
Heat shock proteins: A small 2016 study found that primary Sjögren's syndrome patients with high fatigue, when compared with those with low fatigue, had significantly higher plasma concentrations of HSP90α, and a tendency to higher concentrations of HSP72. A small 2020 study of Crohn's disease patients found that higher fatigue visual analogue scale (fVAS) scores correlated with hgher HSP90α levels. A related small 2012 trial investigating if application of an IL-1 receptor antagonist (anakinra) would reduce fatigue in primary Sjögren's syndrome patients was inconclusive.
Diagnosis: Fatigue is currently measured by many different self-measurement surveys. Examples are the Fatigue Symptom Inventory (FSI) and the Fatigue Severity Scale. There is no consensus on best practice, and the existing surveys do not capture the intermittent nature of some forms of fatigue.
A 2023 guidance indicates the following
in the primary care setting, a medical or psychiatric diagnosis is found in at least two-thirds of patients;
the most common diagnoses are viral illness, upper respiratory infection, iron-deficiency anaemia, acute bronchitis, adverse effects of a medical agent in the proper dose, and depression or other mental disorder, such as panic disorder, and somatisation disorder;
the origin of fatigue may be central, brain-derived, or peripheral, usually of a neuromuscular origin—it may be attributed to physical illness, psychological (e.g., psychiatric disorder), social (e.g., family problems), and physiological factors (e.g., old age), occupational illness (e.g., workplace stress);
when unexplained, clinically evaluated chronic fatigue can be separated into ME/CFS and idiopathic chronic fatigue.
A 2016 German review found that
about 20% of people complaining of tiredness to a GP (general practitioner) suffered from a depressive disorder.
anaemia, malignancies and other serious somatic diseases were only very rarely found in fatigued primary care patients, with prevalence rates hardly differing from non-fatigued patients.
if fatigue occurred in primary care patients as an isolated symptom without additional abnormalities in the medical history and in the clinical examination, then extensive diagnostic testing rarely helped detect serious diseases. Such testing might also lead to false-positive tests.
A 2014 Australian review recommended that a period of watchful waiting may be appropriate if there are no major warning signs.
A 2009 study found that about 50% of people who had fatigue received a diagnosis that could explain the fatigue after a year with the condition. In those people who had a possible diagnosis, musculoskeletal (19.4%) and psychological problems (16.5%) were the most common. Definitive physical conditions were only found in 8.2% of cases.
Classification:
By type:
Uni- or multi-dimensional: Fatigue can be seen as a uni-dimensional phenomenon that influences different aspects of human life. It can be multi-faceted and broadly defined, making understanding the causes of its manifestations especially difficult in conditions with diverse pathology including autoimmune diseases.
A 2021 review considered that different "types/subsets" of fatigue may exist and that patients normally present with more than one such "type/subset". These different "types/subsets" of fatigue may be different dimensions of the same symptom, and the relative manifestations of each may depend on the relative contribution of different mechanisms. Inflammation may be the root causal mechanism in many cases.
Physical: Physical fatigue, or muscle fatigue, is the temporary physical inability of muscles to perform optimally. The onset of muscle fatigue during physical activity is gradual, and depends upon an individual's level of physical fitness – other factors include sleep deprivation and overall health. Physical fatigue can be caused by a lack of energy in the muscle, by a decrease of the efficiency of the neuromuscular junction or by a reduction of the drive originating from the central nervous system, and can be reversed by rest. The central component of fatigue is triggered by an increase of the level of serotonin in the central nervous system. During motor activity, serotonin released in synapses that contact motor neurons promotes muscle contraction. During high level of motor activity, the amount of serotonin released increases and a spillover occurs. Serotonin binds to extrasynaptic receptors located on the axonal initial segment of motor neurons with the result that nerve impulse initiation and thereby muscle contraction are inhibited.
Muscle strength testing can be used to determine the presence of a neuromuscular disease, but cannot determine its cause. Additional testing, such as electromyography, can provide diagnostic information, but information gained from muscle strength testing alone is not enough to diagnose most neuromuscular disorders.
Mental: Mental fatigue is a temporary inability to maintain optimal cognitive performance. The onset of mental fatigue during any cognitive activity is gradual, and depends upon an individual's cognitive ability, and also upon other factors, such as sleep deprivation and overall health.
Mental fatigue has also been shown to decrease physical performance. It can manifest as somnolence, lethargy, directed attention fatigue, or disengagement. Research also suggests that mental fatigue is closely linked to the concept of ego depletion, though the validity of the concept is disputed. For example, one pre-registered study of 686 participants found that after exerting mental effort, people are likely to disengage and become less interested in exerting further effort.
Decreased attention can also be described as a more or less decreased level of consciousness. In any case, this can be dangerous when performing tasks that require constant concentration, such as operating large vehicles. For instance, a person who is sufficiently somnolent may experience microsleep. However, objective cognitive testing can be used to differentiate the neurocognitive deficits of brain disease from those attributable to tiredness.
The perception of mental fatigue is believed to be modulated by the brain's reticular activating system (RAS).
Fatigue impacts a driver's reaction time, awareness of hazards around them and their attention. Drowsy drivers are three times more likely to be involved in a car crash, and being awake over 20 hours is the equivalent of driving with a blood-alcohol concentration level of 0.08%.
Neurological fatigue: People with multiple sclerosis experience a form of overwhelming tiredness that can occur at any time of the day, for any duration, and that does not necessarily recur in a recognizable pattern for any given patient, referred to as "neurological fatigue", and often as "multiple sclerosis fatigue" or "lassitude". People with autoimmune diseases including inflammatory rheumatic diseases such as rheumatoid arthritis, psoriatic arthritis and primary Sjögren's syndrome, experience similar fatigue.
Attempts have been made to isolate causes of central nervous system fatigue.
By timescale:
Acute: Acute fatigue is that which is temporary and self-limited. Acute fatigue is most often caused by an infection such as the common cold and can be cognized as one part of the sickness behavior response occurring when the immune system fights an infection. Other common causes of acute fatigue include depression and chemical causes, such as dehydration, poisoning, low blood sugar, or mineral or vitamin deficiencies.
Prolonged: Prolonged fatigue is a self-reported, persistent (constant) fatigue lasting at least one month.
Chronic: Chronic fatigue is a self-reported fatigue lasting at least 6 consecutive months. Chronic fatigue may be either persistent or relapsing. Chronic fatigue is a symptom of many chronic illnesses and of idiopathic chronic fatigue.
By effect: Fatigue can have significant negative impacts on quality of life. Profound and debilitating fatigue is the most common complaint reported among individuals with autoimmune disease, such as systemic lupus erythematosus, multiple sclerosis, type 1 diabetes, celiac disease, Myalgic Encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome, and rheumatoid arthritis. Fatigue has been described by sufferers as 'incomprehensible' due to its unpredictable occurrence, lack of relationship to physical effort and different character as compared to tiredness. Fatigue that dissociates by quantum with disease activity represents a large health economic burden and unmet need to patients and to society. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Exhausting | Chronic: Chronic fatigue is a self-reported fatigue lasting at least 6 consecutive months. Chronic fatigue may be either persistent or relapsing. Chronic fatigue is a symptom of many chronic illnesses and of idiopathic chronic fatigue.
By effect: Fatigue can have significant negative impacts on quality of life. Profound and debilitating fatigue is the most common complaint reported among individuals with autoimmune disease, such as systemic lupus erythematosus, multiple sclerosis, type 1 diabetes, celiac disease, Myalgic Encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome, and rheumatoid arthritis. Fatigue has been described by sufferers as 'incomprehensible' due to its unpredictable occurrence, lack of relationship to physical effort and different character as compared to tiredness. Fatigue that dissociates by quantum with disease activity represents a large health economic burden and unmet need to patients and to society.
WHO classification: The World Health Organization's ICD-11 classification
includes a category MG22 Fatigue (typically fatigue following exertion but sometimes may occur in the absence of such exertion as a symptom of health conditions), and many other categories where fatigue is mentioned as a secondary result of other factors. It does not include any fatigue-based psychiatric illness (unless it is accompanied by related psychiatric symptoms).
DSM-5 lists 'fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day' as one factor in diagnosing depression.
Treatment: Management may include review of factors and methods as explained below.
Cessation of medications causing fatigue: Taking of medications with side effects of contributing to fatigue may be ceased.
Medications to treat fatigue: The UK NICE recommends consideration of amantadine, modafinil and SSRIs for MS fatigue. Psychostimulants such as methylphenidate, amphetamines, and modafinil have been used in the treatment of fatigue related to depression, and medical illness such as chronic fatigue syndrome and cancer. They have also been used to counteract fatigue in sleep loss and in aviation.
Mental health tools: CBT can be useful for fatigue, including ME/CFS but is not included in NICE guidelines for ME/CFS treatment.
Other approaches:
Avoidance of body heat: Fatigue in MS often correlates with relatively high endogenous body temperature.
Improved sleep: Improving sleep has been associated with reduced fatigue but only in small studies.
Intermittent fasting: A very small 2022 study found 40% reductions in fatigue categorisations after three months of 16:8 intermittent fasting.
Vagus nerve stimulation: A very small 2023 study of Sjogren's patients showed reductions in self-reported fatigue after 56 days of vagus nerve stimulation.
Qigong and Tai Chi: Qigong and Tai chi have been postulated as helpful to reduce fatigue, but the evidence is of low quality.
Prevalence: 2023 guidance stated fatigue prevalence is between 4.3% and 21.9%. Prevalence is higher in women than men.
A 2021 German study found that fatigue was the main or secondary reason for 10–20% of all consultations with a primary care physician.
A large study based on the 2004 Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a biennial longitudinal survey of US adults aged 51 and above, with mean age 65, found that 33% of women and 29% of men self-reported fatigue.
Possible purposes of fatigue:
Body resource management purposes: Fatigue has been posited as a bio-psycho-physiological state reflecting the body's overall strategy in resource (energy) management. Fatigue may occur when the body wants to limit resource utilisation ("rationing") in order to use resources for healing (part of sickness behaviour) or conserve energy for a particular current or future anticipated need, including a threat.
Evolutionary purposes: It has been posited that fatigue had evolutionary benefits in making more of the body's resources available for healing processes, such as immune responses, and in limiting disease spread by tending to reduce social interactions.
See also:
References:
Further reading: Byung-Chul Han: Müdigkeitsgesellschaft. Matthes & Seitz, Berlin 2010, ISBN 978-3-88221-616-5. (Philosophical essay about fatigue as a sociological problem and symptom).
Danish edition: Træthedssamfundet. Møller, 2012, ISBN 978-87-994043-7-7.
Dutch edition: De vermoeide samenleving. van gennep, 2012, ISBN 978-94-6164-071-0.
Italian editions: La società della stanchezza. nottetempo, 2012, ISBN 978-88-7452-345-0.
Korean edition: 한병철 지음 | 김태환 옮김. Moonji, 2011, ISBN 978-89-320-2396-0.
Spanish edition: La sociedad del cansancio. Herder Editorial, 2012, ISBN 978-84-254-2868-5.
External links:
Fatigue – Information for Patients, U.S. National Cancer Institute |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Expeditionary warfare | In the ancient world: The earliest examples of expeditionary warfare come from the Sea Peoples, a term used for a confederation of seafaring raiders of the second millennium BC who sailed into the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, caused political unrest, and attempted to enter or control Egyptian territory during the late 19th dynasty, and especially during Year 8 of Ramesses III of the 20th dynasty.
The raiding tactics were expanded into the more complex expeditionary warfare operations by Alexander the Great who used naval vessels for both troop transporting and logistics in his campaigns against the Persian Empire.
The next exponents of expeditionary warfare in the ancient world of the Mediterranean Basin were the Carthaginians who introduced two entirely new dimensions to the use of naval forces by staging not only operations that combined naval and land troops, but also eventuated in combining strategic multi-national forces during the land phase of the operation when Hannibal in his most famous achievement at the outbreak of the Second Punic War marched an army, which included war elephants, from Iberia over the Pyrenees and the Alps into Northern Italy.
Following on the example of Carthage, the Romans used expeditionary operations extensively to expand their Empire and influence in the Mediterranean and beyond, including the Roman conquest of Britain which was not only a limited expeditionary operation, but one conceived to include long-term occupation and Roman settlement of the territories.
The Han dynasty of ancient China also famously used expeditionary warfare to deal with the nomadic Xiongnu people during the Han–Xiongnu War. Under the orders of Emperor Wu of Han, the Han launched numerous long-distance raids deep into Xiongnu territory. The exploits of famed Han generals Wei Qing and Huo Qubing were of particular note, with both recording multiple successful expeditions between the years 127 and 119 BC, eventually annexing the Hexi Corridor and expelling the Xiongnu from the Qilian Mountains. The expeditionary Han forces were primarily made up of cavalry and were typically arrayed in columns. They also frequently crossed vast distances–Huo Qubing is said to have travelled 2,000 li, roughly 620 miles, during one of his raids.
In the Middle Ages: Shortly after the collapse of the Roman empire in Italy, the European Middle Ages began with an expedition of imperial Byzantine general Belisarius against the Vandals. But as that empire dwindled, its warfare became more defensive.
The most prominent development of expeditionary warfare during the Middle Ages came from the environmental pressures in the Scandinavian region during the Middle Ages, and the emergence of the Viking migrations that combined raiding, longer term inland operations, occupation and settlement. These operations were conducted as sea, coastal and riverine operations, and sometimes were strategic in nature, reaching as far as Constantinople.
Expeditionary warfare in East Asia began very much in the same way it had in the Mediterranean with short-term raids by Japanese pirates. Because the wokou were weakly resisted by the Ming dynasty, the raiding eventually developed into fully-fledged expeditionary warfare with the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598).
During the Crusades: The development in expeditionary operations reached a new level when during the Crusades the element of political alliance as an influence on the military strategy was introduced, for example in the Sixth Crusade (AD 1228.)
The rise of European colonial empires: Although all expeditionary warfare until the invention of the combustion engine was largely dependent on sailing vessels, it was with the creation of sophisticated rigging systems of the European Renaissance that the Age of Sail allowed a significant expansion in expeditionary warfare, notably by the European colonial empires. Some have argued that this was the first revolution in military affairs that changed national strategies, operational methods, and tactics both at sea and on the land. One notable example of this evolution was the French invasion of Egypt (1798).
Though a significantly expanded expeditionary operation, the Crimean War was the first example of a planned expeditionary campaign that was directed as part of a multinational coalition strategy. It was also the first modern expeditionary operation that used steam-powered warships and telegraph communications.
The next development in the evolution of the expeditionary warfare was made during the expansion of the western European empires and the era of colonialism that also led to the inclusion of the expeditionary methods into the direct expression of national strategies to avoid full-scale conflicts in the shape of the gunboat diplomacy approach. It was at this time that naval troops previously used almost exclusively for defence of vessels or minor beach operations were expanded to enable extended littoral operations. The colonial experience, though largely confined to the period before the First World War, persisted well into the 20th century.
The World Wars:
First World War: The period of the First World War and its aftermath in the 1920s saw expeditionary warfare established as a systematic and planned type of operations with larger scope than simple transportations of troops to the theatre, such as the British Expeditionary Force in 1914, Russian Expeditionary Force in 1916, and the American Expeditionary Forces in 1917, and the beginnings of development in true combined operations at strategic, operational and tactical levels with the unsuccessful amphibious landing at Gallipoli. Not only did this operation combine the elements of overall war planning context, multinational deployment of forces as part of the same operation, and use of troops prepared for the landings (as opposed to disembarkation), as well as naval gunfire support that was limited during the era of sailing ships, but also included extensive use of combat engineering in support of the infantry. One of the most extensive and complex of expeditionary operations that followed the war was the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War that saw forces deployed in the Baltic region, the Arctic region, along the Black Sea coast, and in the Russian Far East.
Other expeditionary forces during WWI included:
Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914–1920
First Australian Imperial Force (Europe)
Indian Expeditionary Force 1914–1918
Hejaz Expeditionary Force (Ottoman Empire) 1916-1919
South African Overseas Expeditionary Force 1915–1919
New Zealand Expeditionary Force 1914–1918
Portuguese Expeditionary Corps 1917–1918
Second World War: Afrika Korps (Nazi Germany)
Corpo Aereo Italiano (Fascist Italy)
Corpo Truppe Volontarie
Brazilian Expeditionary Force
British Expeditionary Force
Canadian Corps
China Expeditionary Army (Imperial Japan)
Chinese Expeditionary Force (Chinese Army)
Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia
Second Australian Imperial Force
Contemporary:
European Union: EU Battlegroup
European Maritime Force
NATO: NATO Response Force
Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
United Kingdom: 3rd Division (United Kingdom)
16 Air Assault Brigade
3 Commando Brigade
Joint Expeditionary Force (Maritime)
Joint Expeditionary Force
Combined Joint Expeditionary Force
Joint Rapid Reaction Force
No. 83 Expeditionary Air Group
No. 901 Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 902 Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 903 Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 904 Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 906 Expeditionary Air Wing
Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 34 Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 38 Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 121 Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 135 Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 138 Expeditionary Air Wing
No. 140 Expeditionary Air Wing
United States: Carrier Strike Group
Carrier Strike Group 1
Carrier Strike Group 2
Carrier Strike Group 3
Carrier Strike Group 5
Carrier Strike Group 8
Carrier Strike Group 9
Carrier Strike Group 10
Carrier Strike Group 11
Carrier Strike Group 12
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command
Expeditionary Strike Group
Marine Expeditionary Force
I Marine Expeditionary Force
II Marine Expeditionary Force
III Marine Expeditionary Force
Marine Expeditionary Brigade
1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade
2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade
3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade
Marine Expeditionary Unit
11th Marine Expeditionary Unit
13th Marine Expeditionary Unit
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit
22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit
26th Marine Expeditionary Unit
31st Marine Expeditionary Unit
List of Air Expeditionary units of the United States Air Force (43 of them)
See also: Blue-water navy
Expeditionary energy economics
Expeditionary maneuver warfare
Loss of Strength Gradient
Military deployment
Military logistics
Over-the-beach capability
Power projection
Seabasing
Unsinkable aircraft carrier
References:
External links: Response Force Task Group (RFTG) (Royal Navy PDF) |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fabian strategy | Rome versus Carthage: The Second Punic War: This strategy derives its name from Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, the dictator of the Roman Republic given the task of defeating the great Carthaginian general Hannibal in southern Italy during the Second Punic War (218–201 BC). At the start of the war, Hannibal boldly crossed the Alps and invaded Italy. Due to his skill as a general, Hannibal repeatedly inflicted devastating losses on the Romans—quickly achieving two crushing victories over Roman armies at Trebia in 218 BC and Lake Trasimene in 217 BC. After these disasters, the Romans gave full authority to Fabius Maximus as dictator. Fabius initiated a war of attrition, fought through constant skirmishes, limiting the ability of the Carthaginians to forage for food and denying them significant victories.
Hannibal was handicapped by two weaknesses. First, he was commander of an invading foreign army (on Italian soil), and was effectively cut off from his home country in North Africa by difficulty of seaborne resupply over the Mediterranean Sea. As long as Rome's allies remained loyal, there was little he could do to win. Hannibal tried to convince the allies of Rome that it was more beneficial for them to side with Carthage (through a combination of victory and negotiation). Fabius calculated that, in order to defeat Hannibal, he had to avoid engaging him altogether (so as to deprive him of victories). He determined that Hannibal's largely extended supply lines (as well as the cost of maintaining the Carthaginian army in the field) meant that Rome had time on its side.
Fabius avoided battle as a deliberate strategy. He sent out small military units to attack Hannibal's foraging parties while keeping the Roman army in hilly terrain to nullify Carthaginian cavalry superiority. Residents of small villages in the path of the Carthaginians were ordered by Fabius to burn their crops creating scorched earth and take refuge in fortified towns. Fabius used interior lines to ensure that Hannibal could not march directly on Rome without having to first abandon his Mediterranean ports (supply lines). At the same time, Fabius began to inflict constant, small, debilitating defeats on the Carthaginians. This, Fabius had concluded, would wear down the invaders' endurance and discourage Rome's allies from switching sides, without challenging the Carthaginians to major battles. Once the Carthaginians were sufficiently weakened and demoralized by lack of food and supplies, Fabius and his well-fed legions would then fight a decisive battle in the hope of crushing the Carthaginians once and for all.
Hannibal's second weakness was that much of his army was made up of Spanish mercenaries and Gaulish allies. Their loyalty to Hannibal was shallow; though they disliked Rome, they mainly desired quick battles and raids for plunder. They were unsuited for long sieges, and possessed neither the equipment nor the patience for such tactics. The tedium of countless small-skirmish defeats sapped their morale, and they began to desert.
With no main Roman army to attack, Hannibal's army became virtually no threat to Rome, which was a walled city that required a long siege to take. Fabius's strategy struck at the heart of Hannibal's weakness. Time, not major battles, would cripple Hannibal.
Political opposition: Fabius's strategy, though a military success and tolerable to wiser minds in the Roman Senate, was unpopular; the Romans had been long accustomed to facing and besting their enemies directly on the field of battle. The Fabian strategy was, in part, ruined because of a lack of unity in the command of the Roman army. The magister equitum, Marcus Minucius Rufus, a political enemy of Fabius, famously exclaiming:
Are we come here to see our allies butchered, and their property burned, as a spectacle to be enjoyed? And if we are not moved with shame on account of any others, are we not on account of these citizens... which now not the neighboring Samnite wastes with fire, but a Carthaginian foreigner, who has advanced even this far from the remotest limits of the world, through our dilatoriness and inactivity?
As the memory of the shock of Hannibal's victories grew dimmer, the Roman populace gradually started to question the wisdom of the Fabian strategy, the very thing which had given them time to recover. It was especially frustrating to the mass of the people, who were eager to see a quick conclusion to the war. Moreover, it was widely believed that if Hannibal continued plundering Italy unopposed, the allies, believing that Rome was incapable of protecting them, might defect to the Carthaginians.
Since Fabius won no large-scale victories, the Senate removed him from command in 216 BC. Their chosen replacement, Gaius Terentius Varro, led the Roman army into a debacle at the Battle of Cannae. The Romans, after experiencing this catastrophic defeat and losing countless other battles, had by this point learned their lesson. They utilized the strategies that Fabius had taught them, which, they finally realized, were the only feasible means of driving Hannibal from Italy.
This strategy of attrition earned Fabius the cognomen "Cunctator" (The Delayer).
Later examples: During Antony's Atropatene campaign, the Parthians first destroyed the isolated baggage train and siege engines of the invaders. As Antony proceeded to lay siege on the Atropatenian capital, they began harassing the besiegers, forcing them to retreat.
During the Hanzhong Campaign in 219 AD, one year before the fall of ancient China's Han Dynasty, the warlord Liu Xuande and his strategist Fa Xiaozhi utilized a Fabian strategy to target and capture strategic locations from the forces of the rival warlord Cao Mengde. One of these attacks would result in the death of one of Mengde's top generals, Xiahou Miaocai.
During the Roman campaign against Persia prosecuted by Julian in 363 AD, the main Persian army under Shapur II let the numerically superior Romans advance deep into their territory, avoiding a full-scale battle at the expense of the destruction of their fortresses. As the fortified Persian capital seemed impregnable, Julian was lured into Persia's interior, where the Persians employed scorched earth tactics. Shapur II's army appeared later and engaged in continuous skirmishes only after the starving Romans were in retreat, resulting in a disastrous Roman defeat.
It is the strategy used by King Robert the Bruce in combination with scorched earth in the First War of Scottish Independence against the English after the disastrous defeats at the Battle of Dunbar, Battle of Falkirk and Battle of Methven. Eventually King Robert was able to regain the entire kingdom of Scotland which had been conquered by the English.
The strategy was used by the medieval French general Bertrand du Guesclin during the Hundred Years' War against the English following a series of disastrous defeats in pitched battles against Edward, the Black Prince. Eventually du Guesclin was able to recover most of the territory that had been lost.
The most noted use of Fabian strategy in American history was by George Washington, sometimes called the "American Fabius" for his use of the strategy during the first year of the American Revolutionary War. While Washington had initially pushed for traditional direct engagements using battle lines, he was convinced of the merits of using his army to harass the British rather than engage them, both by the urging of his generals in his councils of war, and by the pitched-battle disasters of 1776, especially the Battle of Long Island. In addition, given his background as a colonial officer who had participated in asymmetric campaigns against Native Americans, Washington predicted that this style would aid in defeating the traditional tactics of the British Army. John Adams' dissatisfaction with Washington's conduct of the war led him to declare, "I am sick of Fabian systems in all quarters."
Throughout history, the Fabian strategy has been employed all over the world. Used against Napoleon's Grande Armée in combination with scorched earth and guerrilla war, it proved decisive in defeating the French invasion of Russia. Sam Houston effectively employed a Fabian defense in the aftermath of the Battle of the Alamo, using delaying tactics and small-unit harrying against Santa Anna's much larger force, to give time for the Army of Texas to grow into a viable fighting force. When he finally met Santa Anna at San Jacinto, the resulting victory ensured the establishment of the Republic of Texas. During the First World War in German East Africa, Generals Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and Jan Smuts both used the Fabian strategy in their campaigns.
During the First Indochina War, the Viet Minh used the strategy by utilizing delaying and hit-and-run tactics and scorched-earth strategy against the better-equipped French forces, which prolonged the war and caused both the French high command and home front to grow weary of the fighting, ending with the decisive Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu. The Viet Cong and the PAVN would later use this strategy against the Americans and ARVN forces during the Vietnam War.
There are some indications that the Ukraine strategy in the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been a war of attrition.
Fabian socialism: Fabian socialism, the ideology of the Fabian Society (founded in 1884), significantly influenced the Labour Party in the United Kingdom. It utilizes the same strategy of a "war of attrition" to facilitate the society's aim to bring about a socialist state. The advocation of gradualism distinguished this brand of socialism from those who favor revolutionary action.
See also: Attrition warfare
Battle of annihilation
Fleet in being
Guerrilla warfare
U.S. Army Strategist
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | False flag | Use in warfare: In land warfare, such operations are generally deemed acceptable under certain circumstances, such as to deceive enemies, provided the deception is not perfidious and that all such deceptions are discarded before opening fire upon the enemy. Similarly, in naval warfare such a deception is considered permissible, provided the false flag is lowered and the true flag raised before engaging in battle. Auxiliary cruisers operated in such a fashion in both World Wars, as did Q-ships, while merchant vessels were encouraged to use false flags for protection. Such masquerades promoted confusion not just of the enemy but of historical accounts. In 1914 the Battle of Trindade was fought between the British auxiliary cruiser RMS Carmania and the German auxiliary cruiser SMS Cap Trafalgar, which had been altered to look like Carmania. (Contrary to some accounts, the Carmania had not been altered to resemble the Cap Trafalgar.)
Another notable example was the World War II German commerce raider Kormoran, which surprised and sank the Australian light cruiser HMAS Sydney in 1941 while disguised as a Dutch merchant ship, causing the greatest loss of life on an Australian warship. While Kormoran was fatally damaged in the engagement and its crew captured, the outcome represented a considerable psychological victory for the Germans.
The British used a Kriegsmarine ensign in the St Nazaire Raid and captured a German code book. The old destroyer Campbeltown, which the British planned to sacrifice in the operation, was provided with cosmetic modifications that involved cutting the ship's funnels and chamfering the edges to resemble a German Type 23 torpedo boat. By this ruse the British were able to get within two miles (3 km) of the harbour before the defences responded, where the explosive-rigged Campbeltown and commandos successfully disabled or destroyed the key dock structures of the port.
Air warfare: Between December 1922 and February 1923, a commission of jurists at the Hague drafted a set of rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare. They included:
Art. 3. A military aircraft must carry an exterior mark indicating its nationality and its military character.
Art. 19. The use of false exterior marks is forbidden.
This draft was never adopted as a legally binding treaty, but the International Committee of the Red Cross states in its introduction on the draft: "To a great extent, [the draft rules] correspond to the customary rules and general principles underlying treaties on the law of war on land and at sea", and as such these two non-controversial articles were already part of customary law.
Land warfare: In land warfare, the use of a false flag is similar to that of naval warfare: the trial of Otto Skorzeny, who planned and commanded Operation Greif, by a U.S. military tribunal at the Dachau Trials included a finding that Skorzeny was not guilty of a crime by ordering his men into action in American uniforms. He had relayed to his men the warning of German legal experts: if they fought in American uniforms, they would be breaking the laws of war; however, they probably were not doing so simply by wearing the American uniforms. During the trial, a number of arguments were advanced to substantiate this position and the German and U.S. military seem to have been in agreement.
In the transcript of the trial, it is mentioned that Paragraph 43 of the Field Manual published by the War Department, United States Army, on 1 October 1940, under the entry Rules of Land Warfare states: "National flags, insignias and uniforms as a ruse – in practice it has been authorized to make use of these as a ruse. The foregoing rule (Article 23 of the Annex of the IV Hague Convention), does not prohibit such use, but does prohibit their improper use. It is certainly forbidden to make use of them during a combat. Before opening fire upon the enemy, they must be discarded."
As pretexts for war:
Russo-Swedish War: In 1788, the head tailor at the Royal Swedish Opera received an order to sew a number of Russian military uniforms. These were then used by Swedes to stage an attack on Puumala, a Swedish outpost on the Russo-Swedish border, on 27 June 1788. This caused an outrage in Stockholm and impressed the Riksdag of the Estates, the Swedish national assembly, who until then had refused to agree to an offensive war against Russia. The Puumala incident allowed King Gustav III of Sweden, who lacked the constitutional authority to initiate unprovoked hostilities without the Estates' consent, to launch the Russo-Swedish War (1788–1790).
Franco-Prussian War: On July 13, 1870, Otto von Bismarck published the Ems Dispatch, an internal message from King Wilhelm I to Bismarck regarding certain demands made by the French ambassador. In the version purposefully released to the public, Bismarck instead made it sound like the King had gravely disrespected the ambassador – a ploy to trick Emperor Napoleon III into declaring war on the North German Confederation, with the end goal of unifying the northern and southern German states. This ploy would be successful, as Napoleon III would declare war six days later; and six months later, the Confederation would win and unify the German states.
Second Sino-Japanese War: In September 1931, Seishirō Itagaki and other Japanese mid- to junior-grade officers, without the knowledge of the Tokyo government, fabricated a pretext for invading Manchuria by blowing up a section of railway. Though the explosion was too weak to disrupt operations on the rail line, the Japanese nevertheless used the Mukden incident to seize Manchuria and create a puppet government in the form of the nominally independent state of Manchukuo.
World War II:
Gleiwitz incident: The Gleiwitz incident in 1939 involved Reinhard Heydrich fabricating evidence of a Polish attack against Germany to mobilize German public opinion for war and to justify the war with Poland. Alfred Naujocks was a key organiser of the operation under orders from Heydrich. It led to the deaths of Nazi concentration camp victims who were dressed as German soldiers and then shot by the Gestapo to make it seem that they had been shot by Polish soldiers. This, along with other false flag operations in Operation Himmler, would be used to mobilize support from the German population for the start of World War II in Europe.
The operation failed to convince international public opinion of the German claims, and both Britain and France – Poland's allies – declared war two days after Germany invaded Poland.
Winter War: On 26 November 1939, the Soviet army shelled Mainila, a Russian village near the Finnish border. Soviet authorities blamed Finland for the attack and used the incident as a pretext to invade Finland, starting the Winter War, four days later.
Cuban Revolution:
Operation Northwoods: Operation Northwoods, a 1962 plot proposed but never executed by the U.S. Department of Defense for a war with Cuba, involved scenarios such as fabricating the hijacking or shooting down of passenger and military planes, sinking a U.S. ship in the vicinity of Cuba, burning crops, sinking a boat filled with Cuban refugees, attacks by alleged Cuban infiltrators inside the United States, and harassment of U.S. aircraft and shipping and the destruction of aerial drones by aircraft disguised as Cuban MiGs. These actions would be blamed on Cuba, and would be a pretext for an invasion of Cuba and the overthrow of Fidel Castro's communist government. It was authorised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but then rejected by President John F. Kennedy. The surprise discovery of the documents relating to Operation Northwoods was a result of the comprehensive search for records related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy by the Assassination Records Review Board in the mid-1990s. Information about Operation Northwoods was later publicized by James Bamford.
Russian invasion of Ukraine: In January and February 2022, Western government agencies predicted that Russia would use a false flag operation in Ukraine. In the days leading up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, the Russian government intensified its disinformation campaign, with Russian state media promoting false flags on a nearly hourly basis purporting to show Ukrainian forces attacking Russia, in a bid to justify an invasion of Ukraine. Many of the disinformation videos were poor and amateur in quality, with mismatching metadata showing incorrect dates, and evidence from Bellingcat researchers, and other independent journalists, showed that the claimed attacks, explosions, and evacuations in Donbas were staged by Russia.
As a tactic to undermine political opponents:
Operation TPAJAX: On 4 April 1953, the CIA was ordered to undermine the government of Iran over a four-month period, as a precursor to overthrowing Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. One tactic used to undermine Mosaddegh was to carry out false flag attacks "on mosques and key public figures", to be blamed on Iranian communists loyal to the government.
The CIA operation was code-named TPAJAX. The tactic of a "directed campaign of bombings by Iranians posing as members of the Communist party", involved the bombing of "at least one" well known Muslim's house by CIA agents posing as Communists. The CIA determined that the tactic of false flag attacks added to the "positive outcome" of TPAJAX.
However, as "the C.I.A. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | False flag | As a tactic to undermine political opponents:
Operation TPAJAX: On 4 April 1953, the CIA was ordered to undermine the government of Iran over a four-month period, as a precursor to overthrowing Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. One tactic used to undermine Mosaddegh was to carry out false flag attacks "on mosques and key public figures", to be blamed on Iranian communists loyal to the government.
The CIA operation was code-named TPAJAX. The tactic of a "directed campaign of bombings by Iranians posing as members of the Communist party", involved the bombing of "at least one" well known Muslim's house by CIA agents posing as Communists. The CIA determined that the tactic of false flag attacks added to the "positive outcome" of TPAJAX.
However, as "the C.I.A. burned nearly all of its files on its role in the 1953 coup in Iran," the true extent of the tactic has been difficult for historians to discern.
Operation Susannah: In the summer of 1954, a group of Egyptian Jews recruited by Israeli army intelligence were caught with plans to bomb American, British, and Egyptian civil targets in Egypt. The bombs were timed to detonate several hours after closing time. The bombings were to be blamed on the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Communists, "unspecified malcontents", or "local nationalists", with the aim of creating a climate of sufficient violence and instability to induce the British government to refrain from evacuating its troops occupying Egypt's Suez Canal zone, a move that would embolden Egyptian President Nasser against Israel. However, the plot was exposed before launch and Egyptian authorities were able to tail an operative to his target, arrest him and later search his apartment where the entire plan, including the names of other agents and explosive materials, was held. Unknown to Israel Prime Minister Moshe Sharet, the exposé caused a scandal in Israel, with Israeli officials blaming one another for the operation and the Israeli defense minister, Pinhas Lavon, resigning under pressure. Later, two investigative committees found that Lavon was unaware of the operation.
Failed operations: Due to its deceptive nature a false flag operation can fail in such a manner as to implicate the perpetrator rather than the intended victim.
A notable example is an April 2022 FSB operation where would-be Ukrainian assassins of Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov were filmed while being arrested. The footage published by the FSB was however found to implicate the FSB as having staged the arrest. Together with weapons, drugs, Ukrainian passports and Nazi memorabilia the footage also prominently showed three expansion packs for the Sims 3 video game. Investigative journalist Eliot Higgins interpreted this to mean that the arrest was in fact staged, with its organizers misunderstanding an instruction "to get 3 SIMs". Further lending credence to the arrest being staged was footage of a note with a Russian phrase, which in fact read signature unclear. This was again interpreted as a misunderstood instruction, this time taken too literally. The FSB subsequently published a version of the footage with the Sims games blurred out.
Pseudo-operations: Pseudo-operations are those in which forces of one power disguise themselves as enemy forces. For example, a state power may disguise teams of operatives as insurgents and, with the aid of defectors, infiltrate insurgent areas. The aim of such pseudo-operations may be to gather short or long-term intelligence or to engage in active operations, in particular assassinations of important enemies. However, they usually involve both, as the risks of exposure rapidly increase with time and intelligence gathering eventually leads to violent confrontation. Pseudo-operations may be directed by military or police forces, or both. Police forces are usually best suited to intelligence tasks; however, military provide the structure needed to back up such pseudo-ops with military response forces. According to US military expert Lawrence Cline (2005), "the teams typically have been controlled by police services, but this largely was due to the weaknesses in the respective military intelligence systems."
The State Political Directorate (OGPU) of the Soviet Union set up such an operation from 1921 to 1926. During Operation Trust, they used loose networks of White Army supporters and extended them, creating the pseudo-"Monarchist Union of Central Russia" (MUCR) in order to help the OGPU identify real monarchists and anti-Bolsheviks.
An example of a successful assassination was United States Marine Sergeant Herman H. Hanneken leading a patrol of his Haitian Gendarmerie disguised as enemy guerrillas in 1919. The patrol successfully passed several enemy checkpoints in order to assassinate the guerilla leader Charlemagne Péralte near Grande-Rivière-du-Nord. Hanneken was awarded the Medal of Honor and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant for his deed.
During the Mau Mau uprising in the 1950s, captured Mau Mau members who switched sides and specially trained British troops initiated the pseudo-gang concept to successfully counter Mau Mau. In 1960, Frank Kitson, who was later involved in the Northern Irish conflict and is now a retired British general, published Gangs and Counter-gangs, an account of his experiences with the technique in Kenya. Information included how to counter gangs and measures of deception, including the use of defectors, which brought the issue a wider audience.
Another example of combined police and military oversight of pseudo-operations include the Selous Scouts in the former country Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), governed by white minority rule until 1980. The Selous Scouts were formed at the beginning of Operation Hurricane, in November 1973, by Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Ronald Reid-Daly. As with all Special Forces in Rhodesia, by 1977 they were controlled by COMOPS (Commander, Combined Operations) Commander Lieutenant General Peter Walls. The Selous Scouts were originally composed of 120 members, with all officers being white and the highest rank initially available for black soldiers being colour sergeant. They succeeded in turning approximately 800 insurgents who were then paid by Special Branch, ultimately reaching the number of 1,500 members. Engaging mainly in long-range reconnaissance and surveillance missions, they increasingly turned to offensive actions, including the attempted assassination of Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army leader Joshua Nkomo in Zambia. This mission was finally aborted by the Selous Scouts, and attempted again, unsuccessfully, by the Rhodesian Special Air Service.
Some offensive operations attracted international condemnation, in particular the Selous Scouts' raid on a Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) camp at Nyadzonya Pungwe, Mozambique in August 1976. ZANLA was then led by Josiah Tongogara. Using Rhodesian trucks and armored cars disguised as Mozambique military vehicles, 84 scouts killed 1,284 people in the camp, registered as a refugee camp by the United Nations (UN). Even according to Reid-Daly, most of those killed were unarmed guerrillas standing in formation for a parade. The camp hospital was also set ablaze by the rounds fired by the Scouts, killing all patients. According to David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, who visited the camp shortly before the raid, it was only a refugee camp that did not host any guerrillas. It was staged for UN approval.
According to a 1978 study by the Directorate of Military Intelligence, 68% of all insurgent deaths inside Rhodesia could be attributed to the Selous Scouts, who were disbanded in 1980.
If the action is a police action, then these tactics would fall within the laws of the state initiating the pseudo, but if such actions are taken in a civil war or during a belligerent military occupation then those who participate in such actions would not be privileged belligerents. The principle of plausible deniability is usually applied for pseudo-teams. (See the above section Laws of war). Some false flag operations have been described by Lawrence E. Cline, a retired US Army intelligence officer, as pseudo-operations, or "the use of organized teams which are disguised as guerrilla groups for long- or short-term penetration of insurgent-controlled areas".
"Pseudo-operations should be distinguished," notes Cline, "from the more common police or intelligence infiltration of guerrilla or criminal organizations. In the latter case, infiltration is normally done by individuals. Pseudo teams, on the other hand, are formed as needed from organized units, usually military or paramilitary. The use of pseudo teams has been a hallmark of a number of foreign counterinsurgency campaigns."
Similar false flag tactics were also employed during the Algerian civil war, starting in the middle of 1994. Death squads composed of Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS) security forces disguised themselves as Islamist terrorists and committed false flag terror attacks. Such groups included the Organisation of Young Free Algerians (OJAL) or the Secret Organisation for the Safeguard of the Algerian Republic (OSSRA). According to Roger Faligot and Pascal Kropp (1999), the OJAL was reminiscent of "the Organization of the French Algerian Resistance (ORAF), a group of counter-terrorists created in December 1956 by the Direction de la surveillance du territoire (Territorial Surveillance Directorate, or DST) whose mission was to carry out terrorist attacks with the aim of quashing any hopes of political compromise". |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | False flag | Similar false flag tactics were also employed during the Algerian civil war, starting in the middle of 1994. Death squads composed of Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS) security forces disguised themselves as Islamist terrorists and committed false flag terror attacks. Such groups included the Organisation of Young Free Algerians (OJAL) or the Secret Organisation for the Safeguard of the Algerian Republic (OSSRA). According to Roger Faligot and Pascal Kropp (1999), the OJAL was reminiscent of "the Organization of the French Algerian Resistance (ORAF), a group of counter-terrorists created in December 1956 by the Direction de la surveillance du territoire (Territorial Surveillance Directorate, or DST) whose mission was to carry out terrorist attacks with the aim of quashing any hopes of political compromise".
Espionage: In espionage, the term "false flag" describes the recruiting of agents by operatives posing as representatives of a cause the prospective agents are sympathetic to, or even the agents' own government. For example, during the Cold War, several female West German civil servants were tricked into stealing classified documents by agents of the East German Stasi intelligence service pretending to be members of West German peace advocacy groups (the Stasi agents were also described as "Romeos", indicating that they also used their sex appeal to manipulate their targets, making this operation a combination of the false flag and "honey trap" techniques).
According to ex-KGB defector Jack Barsky, "Many a right-wing radical had given information to the Soviets under a 'false flag', thinking they were working with a Western ally, such as Israel, when in fact their contact was a KGB operative."
Civilian usage: The term is popular amongst conspiracy theory promoters in referring to covert operations of various governments and claimed cabals. According to Columbia Journalism Review, this usage mostly "migrated to the right", however because some historical false flag incidents occurred, historians should not fully cede the usage of the term to conspiracy theorists. Perlman says "The real danger is if we use the nonattributive 'false flags' as shorthand for conspiracy theories, without explaining what they are and who is promoting them." At the same time, Perlman writes that "people yelling that any attack attributed to someone on 'their side' was committed by 'the other side' drown out the voices of reason."
Political campaigning: Political campaigning has a long history of this tactic in various forms, including in person, print media and electronically in recent years. This can involve when supporters of one candidate pose as supporters of another, or act as "straw men" for their preferred candidate to debate against. This can happen with or without the candidate's knowledge. The Canuck letter is an example of one candidate's creating a false document and attributing it as coming from another candidate in order to discredit that candidate.
In 2006, individuals practicing false flag behavior were discovered and "outed" in New Hampshire and New Jersey after blog comments claiming to be from supporters of a political candidate were traced to the IP address of paid staffers for that candidate's opponent.
On 19 February 2011, Indiana Deputy Prosecutor Carlos Lam sent a private email to Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker suggesting that he run a "'false flag' operation" to counter the protests against Walker's proposed restrictions on public employees' collective bargaining rights:
If you could employ an associate who pretends to be sympathetic to the unions' cause to physically attack you (or even use a firearm against you), you could discredit the unions ... Employing a false flag operation would assist in undercutting any support the media may be creating in favor of the unions.
The press had acquired a court order to access all of Walker's emails and Lam's email was exposed. At first, Lam vehemently denied it, but eventually admitted it and resigned.
Some conservative commentators suggested that pipe bombs that were sent to prominent Democrats prior to the 2018 mid-term elections were part of a false flag effort to discredit Republicans and supporters of then-President Donald Trump. Cesar Sayoc, motivated by his belief that Democrats were “evil”, was later convicted of mailing the devices to Trump's critics.
On the internet, a concern troll is a false flag pseudonym created by a user whose actual point of view is opposed to the one that the troll claims to hold. The concern troll posts in web forums devoted to its declared point of view and attempts to sway the group's actions or opinions while claiming to share their goals, but with professed "concerns". The goal is to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt within the group often by appealing to outrage culture. This is a particular case of sockpuppeting and safe-baiting.
Ideological: Proponents of political or religious ideologies will sometimes use false flag tactics. This can be done to discredit or implicate rival groups, create the appearance of enemies when none exist, or create the illusion of organized and directed persecution. This can be used to gain attention and sympathy from outsiders, in particular the media, or to convince others within the group that their beliefs are under attack and in need of protection.
In retaliation for writing The Scandal of Scientology, some members of the Church of Scientology stole stationery from author Paulette Cooper's home and then used that stationery to forge bomb threats and have them mailed to a Scientology office. The Guardian's Office also had a plan for further operations to discredit Cooper known as Operation Freakout, but several Scientology operatives were arrested in a separate investigation and the plan was exposed.
According to PolitiFact, some false flag conspiracy theories (such as claims that mass shootings are hoaxes) are themselves spread by astroturfing, which is an attempt to create false impression of popularity in a belief.
See also:
Concepts: Agent provocateur
Black propaganda
Casus belli
Denial and deception
Fear mongering
Frameup
Front organization
Joe job, a similar online concept
Mimicry
Red herring
State terrorism
Strategy of tension
References:
External links: The dictionary definition of false flag at Wiktionary |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Feigned retreat | History:
Antiquity: Sun Tzu (544?–496? BCE) wrote, in the Chinese military treatise The Art of War: "Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight." This advice cautioned against pursuing an enemy that unexpectedly runs away or shows a weaker force, as it may be bait for an ambush.
Herodotus reported that the Spartans used the feigned-retreat tactic at the Battle of Thermopylae (480 BCE) to defeat a force of Persian Immortals.
Before the Battle of Agrigentum, in Sicily (262 BCE)—the first pitched battle of the First Punic War, and the first large-scale military confrontation between Carthage and the Roman Republic—the Carthaginian general Hanno, son of Hannibal, was sent to provide relief to the Carthaginians besieged at Agrigentum by the Romans. Hanno told his Numidian cavalry to attack the Roman cavalry and then feign retreat. The Romans pursued the Numidians as they retreated and were brought to the main Carthaginian column, where they suffered many losses. The Roman siege lasted several months before the Romans defeated the Carthaginians and forced Hannibal to retreat.
In 221 BCE, Xenoetas, an Achaean Greek in the service of the Seleucid King Antiochus III the Great, was sent with an army against the rebel satrap of Media, Molon. Xenoetas crossed the Tigris River but fell into a trap laid by Molon, who feigned a retreat and, suddenly returning, surprised Xenoetas when most of the latter's forces were sunk in drunken sleep. Xenoetas was killed, and his army was cut to pieces.
The Lusitanians favored the tactic of retreating and then turning to attack pursuers when the latter had become disorganized in the chase. Their chieftain Caesarus employed it to defeat Lucius Mummius in 153 BCE, and later Viriathus would use it again to achieve victories against other Roman generals.
Middle ages: According to the Historia Regum Anglorum, following the invasion of the Danes, the rival kings Osberht and Ælla of the Northumbrian throne were said to "hav[e] united their forces and formed an army, came to the city of York" on 21 March 867. A majority of the Vikings gave the impression of fleeing from the approaching Northumbrians. "The Christians, perceiving their flight and terror", attacked, but found that the Vikings "were the stronger party". Surrounded, the Northumbrians "fought upon each side with much ferocity" until both Osberht and Ælla were killed.
In their 12 June 910 CE Battle of Lechfeld, fought south of Augsburg and known in Hungary as the Battle of Augsburg, the maneuverable Magyar (Hungarian) light cavalry, expertly wielding their composite bows, repeatedly used feigned retreats to draw out the heavy cavalry of one of King Louis the Child's two German forces. The Hungarians destroyed first the German heavy cavalry, then the approaching German infantry. (The Hungarians had successfully used similar tactics 11 years earlier, in 899 CE, against an Italian army at the Battle of Brenta River.) Ten days later, on 22 June 910 CE, in the Battle of Rednitz, the Hungarians annihilated King Louis' other German army.
During the second half of the 11th century, the Normans adapted this tactic and applied it successfully in different theatres of war such as in the Byzantine Empire, England, Southern Italy, and Outremer. Famous examples include the Battle of Dyrrhachium (1081) and the Battle of Hastings (1066) under William the Conqueror. It has been suggested, among others by Bernard Bachrach, that the Normans were influenced by the steppe tribe of the Alans that had settled in northern France in the fifth century.
At the same time, the Seljuk Turks used this tactic multiple times against various opponents in the Middle East. This ranged from feigned retreats when approaching the battle line to draw out individuals or groups of individuals during one engagement, to retreats lasting up to several days. Thus, at the Battle of Harran (7 May 1104) between the Crusader states of the Principality of Antioch and the County of Edessa, on the one hand, and the Seljuk Turks on the other, the Seljuks rode away from the Crusaders in a feigned retreat. The Crusaders pursued for some two days. When the Seljuks turned to fight, the Crusaders were caught unawares and were routed.
During the Mongol conquest of Khwarezmia (1219–21), on the third day of Genghis Khan's 1220 assault on its capital, Samarkand's garrison launched a counterattack. Genghis Khan, feigning retreat, drew about half of Samarkand's garrison outside the city's fortifications and slaughtered them in open combat.
Early Modernity: Spanish general Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba adopted the tornafluye or tornafuye, a Moor tactic which involved launching a light cavalry charge, retreating to lead the opposing force to give pursue, and then turning back to them again to attack with the advantage of confusion.
At the Battle of Kizaki, in Japan (June 1572), the forces of Shimazu Takahisa, outnumbered ten to one by those of Itō Yoshisuke, prevailed, using their famous feigned retreat.
Examples:
See also: List of military tactics
Hit-and-run tactics
Sigurd Snake-in-the-Eye (Viking, mid-9th century CE)
== Notes == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Feint | Attacks: A feint attack is designed to draw defensive action towards the point under assault. It is usually used as a diversion to force the enemy to concentrate more manpower in a given area, to weaken the opposing force in another area. Unlike a related diversionary maneuver, the demonstration, a feint involves actual contact with the enemy.
Retreats: A feint retreat, or feigned retreat, is performed by briefly engaging the enemy, then retreating. It is intended to draw the enemy pursuit into a prepared ambush, or to cause disarray. For example, the Battle of Hastings was lost when Saxons pursued the Norman cavalry. That forfeited the advantage of height and the line was broken, providing the opportunity to fight in single handed combat on a neutral vantage point, a battle for which the Saxons were not ready. The Parthian shot is another example of a feint retreat in which mounted Parthian archers would retreat from a battle and, still riding, they would turn their bodies back to shoot at the pursuing enemy.
Historic use:
Arabia during Muhammad era: Muhammad made extensive use of feints. One of the earliest examples was during the Invasion of Banu Lahyan. Muhammad set out in Rabi‘ Al-Awwal, or Jumada Al-Ula, in the 6 AH (July 627 AD) with 200 Muslim fighters and made a feint of heading for Syria and then soon changed route towards Batn Gharran, where 10 Muslims were killed in the Expedition of Al Raji. Bani Lahyan were on alert and got the news of his march. The tribe then immediately fled to the mountaintops nearby and thus remained out of his reach. On his way back, Muhammad despatched a group of ten horsemen to a place called Kura‘ Al-Ghamim, in the vicinity of the habitation of Quraish, in order to indirectly confirm his growing military power. All the skirmishes took 14 days, after which he left back for home.
Muhammad also ordered the Expedition of Abu Qatadah ibn Rab'i al-Ansari (Batn Edam) in December 629 to divert the attention from his intention of attacking Mecca. He dispatched eight men to attack a caravan passing through Edam.
China during the end of the Han dynasty: During the Battle of Fancheng general Xu Huang of Cao Wei was sent to oppose Guan Yu at Fancheng District. Knowing that most of his enemy's soldiers were composed of new recruits without training, Xu Huang did not go into battle straight away but camped behind the enemy to impose a deterrent effect. Meanwhile, he instructed his subordinates Xu Shang (徐商) and Lü Jian (呂建) to oversee the digging of trenches around the nearby enemy stronghold of Yancheng (偃城) to deceive the enemy into thinking that it was trying to cut off supplies into Yancheng. The deception worked, with the position being abandoned, which yielded Xu Huang a foothold on the battlefield. By then, a total of twelve camps had been gathered under the flag of Xu Huang. With the strengthened army, Xu Huang finally unleashed an attack on Guan Yu's camp. The enemy encirclement had five camps and so Xu Huang spread news that he was planning to attack the main camp. He secretly attacked the other four side camps instead. When Guan Yu saw that the four side camps had been destroyed, he personally led 5,000 horsemen to meet the attackers but was eventually outmatched. Many of his soldiers were forced into the nearby Han River and drowned. The siege on Fancheng was then lifted.
See also: Head fake
Ruse of war
Military deception
Telegraphing in sporting terminology, the unintentional act of giving away one's intention or planned actions to the opponent
References:
External links:
Media related to Diversionary tactics at Wikimedia Commons |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fifth column | Origin: The term "fifth column" originated in Spain (originally quinta columna) during the early phase of the Spanish Civil War. It gained popularity in the Loyalist faction media in early October 1936 and immediately started to spread abroad.
The exact origins of the term are not clear. Its first known appearance is in a secret telegram dated 30 September 1936, that was sent to Berlin by the German chargé d'affaires in Alicante, Hans Hermann Völckers. In the telegram, he referred to an unidentified "supposed statement by Franco" that "is being circulated" (apparently in the Republican zone or in the Republican-held Levantine zone). This "supposed statement" held that Franco had claimed that there were four Nationalist columns approaching Madrid, and a fifth column waiting to attack from the inside. The telegram was part of the secret German diplomatic correspondence and was discovered long after the civil war.
The first identified public use of the term is in the 3 October 1936 issue of the Madrid Communist daily Mundo Obrero. In a front-page article, the party propagandist Dolores Ibárruri referred to a statement very similar (or identical) to the one that Völckers had referred to in his telegram, but attributed it to General Emilio Mola rather than to Franco. On the same day, the PCE activist Domingo Girón made a similar claim during a public rally. During the next few days, various Republican papers repeated the story, but with differing detail; some attributed the phrase to General Queipo de Llano, while later some Soviet propagandists would claim it was coined by general Varela. By mid-October, the media was already warning of the "famous fifth column".
Historians have never identified the original statement referred to by Völckers, Ibárruri, Girón, de Jong, and others. The transcripts of Francisco Franco's, Gonzalo Queipo de Llano's, and Emilio Mola's radio addresses have been published, but they do not contain the term, and no other original statement containing this phrase has ever surfaced. Australian journalist Noel Monks, who took part in Mola's press conference on 28 October 1936, claimed that Mola referred to quinta columna on that day, but by that time the term had already been in use in the Republican press for more than three weeks.
Historiographic works offer differing perspectives on authorship of the term. Many scholars have no doubt about Mola's role and refer to "fifth column" as "a term coined in 1936 by General Emilio Mola", though they acknowledge that his exact statement cannot be verified. In some sources, Mola is named as a person who had used the term during an impromptu press interview, and different—though detailed—versions of the exchange are offered. Probably the most popular version describes the theory of Mola's authorship with a grade of doubt, either noting that it is presumed but has never been proven, or that the phrase "is attributed" to Mola, who "apparently claimed" so, or else noting that "la famosa quinta columna a la que parece que se había referido el general Mola" (the famous fifth column that General Mola seems to have referred to) Some authors consider it possible if not likely that the term has been invented by the Communist propaganda with the purpose of either raising morale or providing justification for terror and repression; initially it might have been part of the whispering campaign, but was later openly floated by Communist propagandists. There are also other theories afloat.
Some writers, mindful of the origin of the phrase, use it only in reference to military operations rather than the broader and less well-defined range of activities that sympathizers might engage in to support an anticipated attack.
Second World War: By the late 1930s, as American involvement in the war in Europe became more likely, the term "fifth column" was commonly used to warn of potential sedition and disloyalty within the borders of the United States. The fear of betrayal was heightened by the rapid fall of France in 1940, which some blamed on internal weakness and a pro-German "fifth column". A series of photos run in the June 1940 issue of Life magazine warned of "signs of Nazi Fifth Column Everywhere". In a speech to the House of Commons that same month, Winston Churchill reassured MPs that "Parliament has given us the powers to put down Fifth Column activities with a strong hand." In July 1940, Time magazine referred to talk of a fifth column as a "national phenomenon".
In August 1940, The New York Times mentioned "the first spasm of fear engendered by the success of fifth columns in less fortunate countries". One report identified participants in Nazi "fifth columns" as "partisans of authoritarian government everywhere", citing Poland, Czechoslovakia, Norway, and the Netherlands. During the Nazi invasion of Norway, the head of the Norwegian fascist party, Vidkun Quisling, proclaimed the formation of a new fascist government in control of Norway, with himself as Prime Minister, by the end of the first day of fighting. The word "quisling" soon became a byword for "collaborator" or "traitor".
The New York Times on 11 August 1940, featured three editorial cartoons using the term. John Langdon-Davies, a British journalist who covered the Spanish Civil War, wrote an account called The Fifth Column which was published the same year. In November 1940, Ralph Thomson, reviewing Harold Lavine's Fifth Column in America, a study of Communist and fascist groups in the US, in The New York Times, questioned his choice of that title: "the phrase has been worked so hard that it no longer means much of anything".
Immediately following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, US Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox issued a statement that "the most effective Fifth Column work of the entire war was done in Hawaii with the exception of Norway". In a column published in The Washington Post, dated 12 February 1942, the columnist Walter Lippmann wrote of imminent danger from actions that might be taken by Japanese Americans. Titled "The Fifth Column on the Coast", he wrote of possible attacks that could be made along the West Coast of the United States that would amplify damage inflicted by a potential attack by Japanese naval and air forces. Suspicion about an active fifth column on the coast led eventually to the internment of Japanese Americans.
During the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, an article in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette in December 1941 said the indigenous Moro Muslims were "capable of dealing with Japanese fifth columnists and invaders alike". Another in the Vancouver Sun the following month alleged that the large population of Japanese immigrants in Davao in the Philippines welcomed the invasion: "the first assault on Davao was aided by numbers of Fifth Columnists–residents of the town". However, postwar analysis of both Japanese and American military records, including the interrogation of surviving Japanese officers, fail to support the claims of a Japanese fifth column existing in the Philippines prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
Later usage: German minority organizations in Czechoslovakia formed the Sudeten German Free Corps, which aided Nazi Germany. Some claimed they were "self-defense formations" created in the aftermath of World War I and unrelated to the German invasion two decades later. More often their origins were discounted and they were defined by the role they played in 1938–39: "The same pattern was repeated in Czechoslovakia. Henlein's Free Corps played in that country the part of fifth column".
In 1945, a document produced by the US Department of State compared the earlier efforts of Nazi Germany to mobilize the support of sympathizers in foreign nations to the superior efforts of the international communist movement at the end of World War II: "a communist party was in fact a fifth column as much as any [German] Bund group, except that the latter were crude and ineffective in comparison with the Communists". Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., wrote in 1949: "the special Soviet advantage—the warhead—lies in the fifth column; and the fifth column is based on the local Communist parties".
In 1979, Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq, orchestrated a purge of political dissidents within the Ba'ath Party. Hussein claimed that he had uncovered a fifth column within the organization and ordered Muhyi Abdul-Hussein Mashhadi to confess his alleged involvement and that of 68 other politicians, who were promptly arrested. Twenty-two of the arrested, including Mashhadi, were executed.
Zainichi Koreans living in Japan, particularly those affiliated with the organization Chongryun (which is itself affiliated with the government of North Korea) are sometimes seen as a "fifth column" by some Japanese, and have been the victims of verbal and physical attacks. These have occurred more frequently since the government of Kim Jong Il acknowledged it had abducted Japanese citizens from Japan and tested ballistic missiles near the waters of and over mainland Japan.
A significant number of Israeli Arabs, who compose approximately 20% of Israel's population, identify more with the Palestinian cause than with the State of Israel or Zionism. As a result, many Israeli Jews, including politicians, rabbis, journalists, and historians, view them (and/or the main Israeli Arab political group, the Joint List) as a fifth column. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fifth column | Twenty-two of the arrested, including Mashhadi, were executed.
Zainichi Koreans living in Japan, particularly those affiliated with the organization Chongryun (which is itself affiliated with the government of North Korea) are sometimes seen as a "fifth column" by some Japanese, and have been the victims of verbal and physical attacks. These have occurred more frequently since the government of Kim Jong Il acknowledged it had abducted Japanese citizens from Japan and tested ballistic missiles near the waters of and over mainland Japan.
A significant number of Israeli Arabs, who compose approximately 20% of Israel's population, identify more with the Palestinian cause than with the State of Israel or Zionism. As a result, many Israeli Jews, including politicians, rabbis, journalists, and historians, view them (and/or the main Israeli Arab political group, the Joint List) as a fifth column.
Counter-jihad literature has sometimes portrayed Western Muslims as a "fifth column", collectively seeking to destabilize Western nations' identity and values for the benefit of an international Islamic movement intent on the establishment of a caliphate in Western countries. Following the 2015 attack by French-born Muslims on the offices of Charlie Hebdo in Paris, the leader of the UK Independence Party Nigel Farage said that Europe had "a fifth column living within our own countries". In 2001, Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn talked about Muslim immigrants being a "fifth column", on the night he was dismissed as leader of Liveable Netherlands.
In 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin called Russian citizens who are against the Russian invasion of Ukraine as fifth columnists and "national traitors".
Members of the American and European far-right have been widely described as fifth columnists in light of Russian interference in the 2016 United States presidential election and presidency of Donald Trump and leading up to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. American conservative journalist Tucker Carlson, in particular, has faced allegations of fifth columnist behavior, especially after he decided to visit Russia and interview Vladimir Putin.
In 2024, following claims that taxpayer funds were improperly given to the UNRWA due to family interests in Gaza during the Israel–Hamas war, Humza Yousaf, the First Minister of Scotland, revealed that he had been subjected to "smears" throughout his political life including allegations he was a "fifth columnist" because of his faith and race.
In popular culture: The title of Ernest Hemingway's only play "The Fifth Column" (1938) is a translation of General Mola's phrase la quinta columna In early 1937, Hemingway had been in Madrid, reporting the war from the loyalist side, and helping make the film The Spanish Earth. He returned to the US to publicize the film and wrote the play, in the Hotel Florida in Madrid, on his next visit to Spain later that year.
In the US, an Australian radio play, The Enemy Within, proved to be very popular, though this popularity was due to the belief that the stories of fifth column activities were based on real events. In December 1940, the Australian censors had the series banned.
British reviewers of Agatha Christie's 1941 novel N or M? used the term to describe the plot's depiction of two British turncoats working on behalf the German government in Britain during World War II.
In Frank Capra's film Meet John Doe (1941), newspaper editor Henry Connell warns the politically naïve protagonist, John Doe, about a businessman's plans to promote his own political ambitions using the apolitical John Doe Clubs. Connell says to John: "Listen, pal, this fifth-column stuff is pretty rotten, isn't it?", identifying the businessman with anti-democratic interests in the United States. When Doe agrees, he adds: "And you'd feel like an awful sucker if you found yourself marching right in the middle of it, wouldn't you?"
Alfred Hitchcock's Saboteur (1942) features Robert Cummings asking for help against "fifth columnists" conspiring to sabotage the American war effort. The film was also released under the name Fifth Column in Dutch (Die van de 5de kolom), Finnish (Viidennen kolonnan mies) and French (Cinquième colonne). Soon the term was being used in popular entertainment.
Several World War II–era animated shorts include the term. Cartoons of Porky Pig asked any "fifth columnists" in the audience to leave the theater immediately. In Looney Tunes' Foney Fables, the narrator of a comic fairy tale described a wolf in sheep's clothing as a "fifth columnist". There was a Merrie Melodies cartoon released in 1943 titled The Fifth-Column Mouse. Comic books also contained references to the fifth column.
Graham Greene, in The Quiet American (1955), uses the phrase "Fifth Column, Third Force, Seventh Day" in the second chapter.
In the 1959 British action film Operation Amsterdam, the term "fifth columnists" is used repeatedly to refer to Nazi-sympathizing members of the Dutch Army.
The V franchise is a set of TV shows, novels and comics about an alien invasion of Earth. A group of aliens opposed to the invasion and assist the human Resistance Movement is called The Fifth Column.
In the episode "Flight Into the Future" from the 1960s TV show Lost In Space, Dr. Smith is referred to as the fifth columnist of the Jupiter 2 expedition. In the first episode, he was a secret agent sent to sabotage the mission who got caught on board at liftoff.
There is an American weekly news podcast called "The Fifth Column", hosted by Kmele Foster, Matt Welch, Michael C. Moynihan, and Anthony Fisher.
Robert A. Heinlein's 1941 story "The Day After Tomorrow", originally titled "Sixth Column", refers to a fictional fifth column that
destroyed the European democracies from within in the tragic days that led up to the final blackout of European civilization. But this would not be a fifth column of traitors, but a sixth column of patriots whose privilege it would be to destroy the morale of invaders, make them afraid, unsure of themselves.
In Foyle's War, series 2 episode 3, "War Games", one line reads: "It's the Second salvage collection I've missed, they've got me down as a fifth columnist."
In Fallout: London, a total conversion mod for the 2015 Bethesda Softworks action role-playing game Fallout 4, there is a populist faction known as the "5th Column" whose declared aim is to tear down the existing government and rebuild it. Their propaganda style and black uniforms are a likely reference to the British Union of Fascists, which was founded in 1932 by Sir Oswald Mosley and banned by the British government in 1940 after the start of World War II amid suspicion that its supporters might form a pro- Nazi "fifth column".
See also:
Notes:
References:
Further reading:
Mylonas, Harris; Radnitz, Scott (2022). Enemies Within: The Global Politics of Fifth Columns. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-762794-5.
The German Fifth Column in Poland. London: Polish Ministry of Info. 1941.
Bilek, Bohumil (1945). Fifth Column at Work. London: Trinity.
Loeffel, Robert (2015). The Fifth Column in World War II: Suspected Subversives in the Pacific War and Australia. Palgrave.
Britt G. The Fifth column is Here / George Britt. New York: Wilfred Funk, Inc., 1940
Lavine H. Fifth column in America / Harold Lavine (1915-). New York: Doubleday, Doran, Incorporated, 1940 |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | History: Since World War I, achieving and maintaining air superiority has been considered essential for victory in conventional warfare.
Fighters continued to be developed throughout World War I, to deny enemy aircraft and dirigibles the ability to gather information by reconnaissance over the battlefield. Early fighters were very small and lightly armed by later standards, and most were biplanes built with a wooden frame covered with fabric, and a maximum airspeed of about 100 mph (160 km/h). As control of the airspace over armies became increasingly important, all of the major powers developed fighters to support their military operations. Between the wars, wood was largely replaced in part or whole by metal tubing, and finally aluminum stressed skin structures (monocoque) began to predominate.
By World War II, most fighters were all-metal monoplanes armed with batteries of machine guns or cannons and some were capable of speeds approaching 400 mph (640 km/h). Most fighters up to this point had one engine, but a number of twin-engine fighters were built; however they were found to be outmatched against single-engine fighters and were relegated to other tasks, such as night fighters equipped with radar sets.
By the end of the war, turbojet engines were replacing piston engines as the means of propulsion, further increasing aircraft speed. Since the weight of the turbojet engine was far less than a piston engine, having two engines was no longer a handicap and one or two were used, depending on requirements. This in turn required the development of ejection seats so the pilot could escape, and G-suits to counter the much greater forces being applied to the pilot during maneuvers.
In the 1950s, radar was fitted to day fighters, since due to ever increasing air-to-air weapon ranges, pilots could no longer see far enough ahead to prepare for the opposition. Subsequently, radar capabilities grew enormously and are now the primary method of target acquisition. Wings were made thinner and swept back to reduce transonic drag, which required new manufacturing methods to obtain sufficient strength. Skins were no longer sheet metal riveted to a structure, but milled from large slabs of alloy. The sound barrier was broken, and after a few false starts due to required changes in controls, speeds quickly reached Mach 2, past which aircraft cannot maneuver sufficiently to avoid attack.
Air-to-air missiles largely replaced guns and rockets in the early 1960s since both were believed unusable at the speeds being attained, however the Vietnam War showed that guns still had a role to play, and most fighters built since then are fitted with cannon (typically between 20 and 30 mm (0.79 and 1.18 in) in caliber) in addition to missiles. Most modern combat aircraft can carry at least a pair of air-to-air missiles.
In the 1970s, turbofans replaced turbojets, improving fuel economy enough that the last piston engine support aircraft could be replaced with jets, making multi-role combat aircraft possible. Honeycomb structures began to replace milled structures, and the first composite components began to appear on components subjected to little stress.
With the steady improvements in computers, defensive systems have become increasingly efficient. To counter this, stealth technologies have been pursued by the United States, Russia, India and China. The first step was to find ways to reduce the aircraft's reflectivity to radar waves by burying the engines, eliminating sharp corners and diverting any reflections away from the radar sets of opposing forces. Various materials were found to absorb the energy from radar waves, and were incorporated into special finishes that have since found widespread application. Composite structures have become widespread, including major structural components, and have helped to counterbalance the steady increases in aircraft weight—most modern fighters are larger and heavier than World War II medium bombers.
Because of the importance of air superiority, since the early days of aerial combat armed forces have constantly competed to develop technologically superior fighters and to deploy these fighters in greater numbers, and fielding a viable fighter fleet consumes a substantial proportion of the defense budgets of modern armed forces.
The global combat aircraft market was worth $45.75 billion in 2017 and is projected by Frost & Sullivan at $47.2 billion in 2026: 35% modernization programs and 65% aircraft purchases, dominated by the Lockheed Martin F-35 with 3,000 deliveries over 20 years.
Classification: A fighter aircraft is primarily designed for air-to-air combat. A given type may be designed for specific combat conditions, and in some cases for additional roles such as air-to-ground fighting. Historically the British Royal Flying Corps and Royal Air Force referred to them as "scouts" until the early 1920s, while the U.S. Army called them "pursuit" aircraft until the late 1940s (using the designation P, as in Curtiss P-40 Warhawk, Republic P-47 Thunderbolt and Bell P-63 Kingcobra). The UK changed to calling them fighters in the 1920s, while the US Army did so in the 1940s. A short-range fighter designed to defend against incoming enemy aircraft is known as an interceptor.
Recognized classes of fighter include:
Air superiority fighter
Fighter-bomber
Heavy fighter
Interceptor
Light fighter
All-weather fighter (including the night fighter)
Reconnaissance fighter
Strategic fighter (including the escort fighter and strike fighter)
Of these, the Fighter-bomber, reconnaissance fighter and strike fighter classes are dual-role, possessing qualities of the fighter alongside some other battlefield role. Some fighter designs may be developed in variants performing other roles entirely, such as ground attack or unarmed reconnaissance. This may be for political or national security reasons, for advertising purposes, or other reasons.
The Sopwith Camel and other "fighting scouts" of World War I performed a great deal of ground-attack work. In World War II, the USAAF and RAF often favored fighters over dedicated light bombers or dive bombers, and types such as the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt and Hawker Hurricane that were no longer competitive as aerial combat fighters were relegated to ground attack. Several aircraft, such as the F-111 and F-117, have received fighter designations though they had no fighter capability due to political or other reasons. The F-111B variant was originally intended for a fighter role with the U.S. Navy, but it was canceled. This blurring follows the use of fighters from their earliest days for "attack" or "strike" operations against ground targets by means of strafing or dropping small bombs and incendiaries. Versatile multi role fighter-bombers such as the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet are a less expensive option than having a range of specialized aircraft types.
Some of the most expensive fighters such as the US Grumman F-14 Tomcat, McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle, Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor and Russian Sukhoi Su-27 were employed as all-weather interceptors as well as air superiority fighter aircraft, while commonly developing air-to-ground roles late in their careers. An interceptor is generally an aircraft intended to target (or intercept) bombers and so often trades maneuverability for climb rate.
As a part of military nomenclature, a letter is often assigned to various types of aircraft to indicate their use, along with a number to indicate the specific aircraft. The letters used to designate a fighter differ in various countries. In the English-speaking world, "F" is often now used to indicate a fighter (e.g. Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II or Supermarine Spitfire F.22), though "P" used to be used in the US for pursuit (e.g. Curtiss P-40 Warhawk), a translation of the French "C" (Dewoitine D.520 C.1) for Chasseur while in Russia "I" was used for Istrebitel, or exterminator (Polikarpov I-16).
Air superiority fighter: As fighter types have proliferated, the air superiority fighter emerged as a specific role at the pinnacle of speed, maneuverability, and air-to-air weapon systems – able to hold its own against all other fighters and establish its dominance in the skies above the battlefield.
Interceptor: The interceptor is a fighter designed specifically to intercept and engage approaching enemy aircraft. There are two general classes of interceptor: relatively lightweight aircraft in the point-defence role, built for fast reaction, high performance and with a short range, and heavier aircraft with more comprehensive avionics and designed to fly at night or in all weathers and to operate over longer ranges. Originating during World War I, by 1929 this class of fighters had become known as the interceptor.
Night and all-weather fighters: The equipment necessary for daytime flight is inadequate when flying at night or in poor visibility. The night fighter was developed during World War I with additional equipment to aid the pilot in flying straight, navigating and finding the target. From modified variants of the Royal Aircraft Factory B.E.2c in 1915, the night fighter has evolved into the highly capable all-weather fighter.
Strategic fighters: The strategic fighter is a fast, heavily armed and long-range type, able to act as an escort fighter protecting bombers, to carry out offensive sorties of its own as a penetration fighter and maintain standing patrols at significant distance from its home base.
Bombers are vulnerable due to their low speed, large size and poor maneuvrability. The escort fighter was developed during World War II to come between the bombers and enemy attackers as a protective shield. The primary requirement was for long range, with several heavy fighters given the role. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | Night and all-weather fighters: The equipment necessary for daytime flight is inadequate when flying at night or in poor visibility. The night fighter was developed during World War I with additional equipment to aid the pilot in flying straight, navigating and finding the target. From modified variants of the Royal Aircraft Factory B.E.2c in 1915, the night fighter has evolved into the highly capable all-weather fighter.
Strategic fighters: The strategic fighter is a fast, heavily armed and long-range type, able to act as an escort fighter protecting bombers, to carry out offensive sorties of its own as a penetration fighter and maintain standing patrols at significant distance from its home base.
Bombers are vulnerable due to their low speed, large size and poor maneuvrability. The escort fighter was developed during World War II to come between the bombers and enemy attackers as a protective shield. The primary requirement was for long range, with several heavy fighters given the role. However they too proved unwieldy and vulnerable, so as the war progressed techniques such as drop tanks were developed to extend the range of more nimble conventional fighters.
The penetration fighter is typically also fitted for the ground-attack role, and so is able to defend itself while conducting attack sorties.
Piston engine fighters:
1914–1918: World War I: The word "fighter" was first used to describe a two-seat aircraft carrying a machine gun (mounted on a pedestal) and its operator as well as the pilot. Although the term was coined in the United Kingdom, the first examples were the French Voisin pushers beginning in 1910, and a Voisin III would be the first to shoot down another aircraft, on 5 October 1914.
However at the outbreak of World War I, front-line aircraft were mostly unarmed and used almost exclusively for reconnaissance. On 15 August 1914, Miodrag Tomić encountered an enemy airplane while on a reconnaissance flight over Austria-Hungary which fired at his aircraft with a revolver, so Tomić fired back. It was believed to be the first exchange of fire between aircraft. Within weeks, all Serbian and Austro-Hungarian aircraft were armed.
Another type of military aircraft formed the basis for an effective "fighter" in the modern sense of the word. It was based on small fast aircraft developed before the war for air racing such with the Gordon Bennett Cup and Schneider Trophy. The military scout airplane was not expected to carry serious armament, but rather to rely on speed to "scout" a location, and return quickly to report, making it a flying horse. British scout aircraft, in this sense, included the Sopwith Tabloid and Bristol Scout. The French and the Germans didn't have an equivalent as they used two seaters for reconnaissance, such as the Morane-Saulnier L, but would later modify pre-war racing aircraft into armed single seaters. It was quickly found that these were of little use since the pilot couldn't record what he saw while also flying, while military leaders usually ignored what the pilots reported.
Attempts were made with handheld weapons such as pistols and rifles and even light machine guns, but these were ineffective and cumbersome. The next advance came with the fixed forward-firing machine gun, so that the pilot pointed the entire aircraft at the target and fired the gun, instead of relying on a second gunner. Roland Garros bolted metal deflector plates to the propeller so that it would not shoot itself out of the sky and a number of Morane-Saulnier Ns were modified. The technique proved effective, however the deflected bullets were still highly dangerous.
Soon after the commencement of the war, pilots armed themselves with pistols, carbines, grenades, and an assortment of improvised weapons. Many of these proved ineffective as the pilot had to fly his airplane while attempting to aim a handheld weapon and make a difficult deflection shot. The first step in finding a real solution was to mount the weapon on the aircraft, but the propeller remained a problem since the best direction to shoot is straight ahead. Numerous solutions were tried. A second crew member behind the pilot could aim and fire a swivel-mounted machine gun at enemy airplanes; however, this limited the area of coverage chiefly to the rear hemisphere, and effective coordination of the pilot's maneuvering with the gunner's aiming was difficult. This option was chiefly employed as a defensive measure on two-seater reconnaissance aircraft from 1915 on. Both the SPAD S.A and the Royal Aircraft Factory B.E.9 added a second crewman ahead of the engine in a pod but this was both hazardous to the second crewman and limited performance. The Sopwith L.R.T.Tr. similarly added a pod on the top wing with no better luck.
An alternative was to build a "pusher" scout such as the Airco DH.2, with the propeller mounted behind the pilot. The main drawback was that the high drag of a pusher type's tail structure made it slower than a similar "tractor" aircraft.
A better solution for a single seat scout was to mount the machine gun (rifles and pistols having been dispensed with) to fire forwards but outside the propeller arc. Wing guns were tried but the unreliable weapons available required frequent clearing of jammed rounds and misfires and remained impractical until after the war. Mounting the machine gun over the top wing worked well and was used long after the ideal solution was found. The Nieuport 11 of 1916 used this system with considerable success, however, this placement made aiming and reloading difficult but would continue to be used throughout the war as the weapons used were lighter and had a higher rate of fire than synchronized weapons. The British Foster mounting and several French mountings were specifically designed for this kind of application, fitted with either the Hotchkiss or Lewis Machine gun, which due to their design were unsuitable for synchronizing. The need to arm a tractor scout with a forward-firing gun whose bullets passed through the propeller arc was evident even before the outbreak of war and inventors in both France and Germany devised mechanisms that could time the firing of the individual rounds to avoid hitting the propeller blades. Franz Schneider, a Swiss engineer, had patented such a device in Germany in 1913, but his original work was not followed up. French aircraft designer Raymond Saulnier patented a practical device in April 1914, but trials were unsuccessful because of the propensity of the machine gun employed to hang fire due to unreliable ammunition. In December 1914, French aviator Roland Garros asked Saulnier to install his synchronization gear on Garros' Morane-Saulnier Type L parasol monoplane. Unfortunately the gas-operated Hotchkiss machine gun he was provided had an erratic rate of fire and it was impossible to synchronize it with the propeller. As an interim measure, the propeller blades were fitted with metal wedges to protect them from ricochets. Garros' modified monoplane first flew in March 1915 and he began combat operations soon after. Garros scored three victories in three weeks before he himself was downed on 18 April and his airplane, along with its synchronization gear and propeller was captured by the Germans. Meanwhile, the synchronization gear (called the Stangensteuerung in German, for "pushrod control system") devised by the engineers of Anthony Fokker's firm was the first system to enter service. It would usher in what the British called the "Fokker scourge" and a period of air superiority for the German forces, making the Fokker Eindecker monoplane a feared name over the Western Front, despite its being an adaptation of an obsolete pre-war French Morane-Saulnier racing airplane, with poor flight characteristics and a by now mediocre performance. The first Eindecker victory came on 1 July 1915, when Leutnant Kurt Wintgens, of Feldflieger Abteilung 6 on the Western Front, downed a Morane-Saulnier Type L. His was one of five Fokker M.5K/MG prototypes for the Eindecker, and was armed with a synchronized aviation version of the Parabellum MG14 machine gun. The success of the Eindecker kicked off a competitive cycle of improvement among the combatants, both sides striving to build ever more capable single-seat fighters. The Albatros D.I and Sopwith Pup of 1916 set the classic pattern followed by fighters for about twenty years. Most were biplanes and only rarely monoplanes or triplanes. The strong box structure of the biplane provided a rigid wing that allowed the accurate control essential for dogfighting. They had a single operator, who flew the aircraft and also controlled its armament. They were armed with one or two Maxim or Vickers machine guns, which were easier to synchronize than other types, firing through the propeller arc. Gun breeches were in front of the pilot, with obvious implications in case of accidents, but jams could be cleared in flight, while aiming was simplified. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | The success of the Eindecker kicked off a competitive cycle of improvement among the combatants, both sides striving to build ever more capable single-seat fighters. The Albatros D.I and Sopwith Pup of 1916 set the classic pattern followed by fighters for about twenty years. Most were biplanes and only rarely monoplanes or triplanes. The strong box structure of the biplane provided a rigid wing that allowed the accurate control essential for dogfighting. They had a single operator, who flew the aircraft and also controlled its armament. They were armed with one or two Maxim or Vickers machine guns, which were easier to synchronize than other types, firing through the propeller arc. Gun breeches were in front of the pilot, with obvious implications in case of accidents, but jams could be cleared in flight, while aiming was simplified.
The use of metal aircraft structures was pioneered before World War I by Breguet but would find its biggest proponent in Anthony Fokker, who used chrome-molybdenum steel tubing for the fuselage structure of all his fighter designs, while the innovative German engineer Hugo Junkers developed two all-metal, single-seat fighter monoplane designs with cantilever wings: the strictly experimental Junkers J 2 private-venture aircraft, made with steel, and some forty examples of the Junkers D.I, made with corrugated duralumin, all based on his experience in creating the pioneering Junkers J 1 all-metal airframe technology demonstration aircraft of late 1915. While Fokker would pursue steel tube fuselages with wooden wings until the late 1930s, and Junkers would focus on corrugated sheet metal, Dornier was the first to build a fighter (the Dornier-Zeppelin D.I) made with pre-stressed sheet aluminum and having cantilevered wings, a form that would replace all others in the 1930s. As collective combat experience grew, the more successful pilots such as Oswald Boelcke, Max Immelmann, and Edward Mannock developed innovative tactical formations and maneuvers to enhance their air units' combat effectiveness.
Allied and – before 1918 – German pilots of World War I were not equipped with parachutes, so in-flight fires or structural failures were often fatal. Parachutes were well-developed by 1918 having previously been used by balloonists, and were adopted by the German flying services during the course of that year. The well known and feared Manfred von Richthofen, the "Red Baron", was wearing one when he was killed, but the allied command continued to oppose their use on various grounds.
In April 1917, during a brief period of German aerial supremacy a British pilot's average life expectancy was calculated to average 93 flying hours, or about three weeks of active service. More than 50,000 airmen from both sides died during the war.
1919–1938: Inter-war period: Fighter development stagnated between the wars, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, where budgets were small. In France, Italy and Russia, where large budgets continued to allow major development, both monoplanes and all metal structures were common. By the end of the 1920s, however, those countries overspent themselves and were overtaken in the 1930s by those powers that hadn't been spending heavily, namely the British, the Americans, the Spanish (in the Spanish civil war) and the Germans.
Given limited budgets, air forces were conservative in aircraft design, and biplanes remained popular with pilots for their agility, and remained in service long after they ceased to be competitive. Designs such as the Gloster Gladiator, Fiat CR.42 Falco, and Polikarpov I-15 were common even in the late 1930s, and many were still in service as late as 1942. Up until the mid-1930s, the majority of fighters in the US, the UK, Italy and Russia remained fabric-covered biplanes.
Fighter armament eventually began to be mounted inside the wings, outside the arc of the propeller, though most designs retained two synchronized machine guns directly ahead of the pilot, where they were more accurate (that being the strongest part of the structure, reducing the vibration to which the guns were subjected). Shooting with this traditional arrangement was also easier because the guns shot directly ahead in the direction of the aircraft's flight, up to the limit of the guns range; unlike wing-mounted guns which to be effective required to be harmonised, that is, preset to shoot at an angle by ground crews so that their bullets would converge on a target area a set distance ahead of the fighter. Rifle-caliber .30 and .303 in (7.62 and 7.70 mm) calibre guns remained the norm, with larger weapons either being too heavy and cumbersome or deemed unnecessary against such lightly built aircraft. It was not considered unreasonable to use World War I-style armament to counter enemy fighters as there was insufficient air-to-air combat during most of the period to disprove this notion.
The rotary engine, popular during World War I, quickly disappeared, its development having reached the point where rotational forces prevented more fuel and air from being delivered to the cylinders, which limited horsepower. They were replaced chiefly by the stationary radial engine though major advances led to inline engines gaining ground with several exceptional engines—including the 1,145 cu in (18,760 cm3) V-12 Curtiss D-12. Aircraft engines increased in power several-fold over the period, going from a typical 180 hp (130 kW) in the 900 kg (2,000 lb) Fokker D.VII of 1918 to 900 hp (670 kW) in the 2,500 kg (5,500 lb) Curtiss P-36 of 1936. The debate between the sleek in-line engines versus the more reliable radial models continued, with naval air forces preferring the radial engines, and land-based forces often choosing inlines. Radial designs did not require a separate (and vulnerable) radiator, but had increased drag. Inline engines often had a better power-to-weight ratio.
Some air forces experimented with "heavy fighters" (called "destroyers" by the Germans). These were larger, usually twin-engined aircraft, sometimes adaptations of light or medium bomber types. Such designs typically had greater internal fuel capacity (thus longer range) and heavier armament than their single-engine counterparts. In combat, they proved vulnerable to more agile single-engine fighters.
The primary driver of fighter innovation, right up to the period of rapid re-armament in the late 1930s, were not military budgets, but civilian aircraft racing. Aircraft designed for these races introduced innovations like streamlining and more powerful engines that would find their way into the fighters of World War II. The most significant of these was the Schneider Trophy races, where competition grew so fierce, only national governments could afford to enter.
At the very end of the inter-war period in Europe came the Spanish Civil War. This was just the opportunity the German Luftwaffe, Italian Regia Aeronautica, and the Soviet Union's Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily needed to test their latest aircraft. Each party sent numerous aircraft types to support their sides in the conflict. In the dogfights over Spain, the latest Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters did well, as did the Soviet Polikarpov I-16. The later German design was earlier in its design cycle, and had more room for development and the lessons learned led to greatly improved models in World War II. The Russians failed to keep up and despite newer models coming into service, I-16s remaining the most common Soviet front-line fighter into 1942 despite being outclassed by the improved Bf 109s in World War II. For their part, the Italians developed several monoplanes such as the Fiat G.50 Freccia, but being short on funds, were forced to continue operating obsolete Fiat CR.42 Falco biplanes.
From the early 1930s the Japanese were at war against both the Chinese Nationalists and the Russians in China, and used the experience to improve both training and aircraft, replacing biplanes with modern cantilever monoplanes and creating a cadre of exceptional pilots. In the United Kingdom, at the behest of Neville Chamberlain (more famous for his 'peace in our time' speech), the entire British aviation industry was retooled, allowing it to change quickly from fabric covered metal framed biplanes to cantilever stressed skin monoplanes in time for the war with Germany, a process that France attempted to emulate, but too late to counter the German invasion. The period of improving the same biplane design over and over was now coming to an end, and the Hawker Hurricane and Supermarine Spitfire started to supplant the Gloster Gladiator and Hawker Fury biplanes but many biplanes remained in front-line service well past the start of World War II. While not a combatant in Spain, they too absorbed many of the lessons in time to use them.
The Spanish Civil War also provided an opportunity for updating fighter tactics. One of the innovations was the development of the "finger-four" formation by the German pilot Werner Mölders. Each fighter squadron (German: Staffel) was divided into several flights (Schwärme) of four aircraft. Each Schwarm was divided into two Rotten, which was a pair of aircraft. Each Rotte was composed of a leader and a wingman. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | The period of improving the same biplane design over and over was now coming to an end, and the Hawker Hurricane and Supermarine Spitfire started to supplant the Gloster Gladiator and Hawker Fury biplanes but many biplanes remained in front-line service well past the start of World War II. While not a combatant in Spain, they too absorbed many of the lessons in time to use them.
The Spanish Civil War also provided an opportunity for updating fighter tactics. One of the innovations was the development of the "finger-four" formation by the German pilot Werner Mölders. Each fighter squadron (German: Staffel) was divided into several flights (Schwärme) of four aircraft. Each Schwarm was divided into two Rotten, which was a pair of aircraft. Each Rotte was composed of a leader and a wingman. This flexible formation allowed the pilots to maintain greater situational awareness, and the two Rotten could split up at any time and attack on their own. The finger-four would be widely adopted as the fundamental tactical formation during World War Two, including by the British and later the Americans.
1939–1945: World War II: World War II featured fighter combat on a larger scale than any other conflict to date. German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel noted the effect of airpower: "Anyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an enemy in complete command of the air, fights like a savage…" Throughout the war, fighters performed their conventional role in establishing air superiority through combat with other fighters and through bomber interception, and also often performed roles such as tactical air support and reconnaissance.
Fighter design varied widely among combatants. The Japanese and Italians favored lightly armed and armored but highly maneuverable designs such as the Japanese Nakajima Ki-27, Nakajima Ki-43 and Mitsubishi A6M Zero and the Italian Fiat G.50 Freccia and Macchi MC.200. In contrast, designers in the United Kingdom, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States believed that the increased speed of fighter aircraft would create g-forces unbearable to pilots who attempted maneuvering dogfights typical of the First World War, and their fighters were instead optimized for speed and firepower. In practice, while light, highly maneuverable aircraft did possess some advantages in fighter-versus-fighter combat, those could usually be overcome by sound tactical doctrine, and the design approach of the Italians and Japanese made their fighters ill-suited as interceptors or attack aircraft.
European theater: During the invasion of Poland and the Battle of France, Luftwaffe fighters—primarily the Messerschmitt Bf 109—held air superiority, and the Luftwaffe played a major role in German victories in these campaigns. During the Battle of Britain, however, British Hurricanes and Spitfires proved roughly equal to Luftwaffe fighters. Additionally Britain's radar-based Dowding system directing fighters onto German attacks and the advantages of fighting above Britain's home territory allowed the RAF to deny Germany air superiority, saving the UK from possible German invasion and dealing the Axis a major defeat early in the Second World War. On the Eastern Front, Soviet fighter forces were overwhelmed during the opening phases of Operation Barbarossa. This was a result of the tactical surprise at the outset of the campaign, the leadership vacuum within the Soviet military left by the Great Purge, and the general inferiority of Soviet designs at the time, such as the obsolescent Polikarpov I-15 biplane and the I-16. More modern Soviet designs, including the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-3, LaGG-3 and Yakolev Yak-1, had not yet arrived in numbers and in any case were still inferior to the Messerschmitt Bf 109. As a result, during the early months of these campaigns, Axis air forces destroyed large numbers of Red Air Force aircraft on the ground and in one-sided dogfights. In the later stages on the Eastern Front, Soviet training and leadership improved, as did their equipment. By 1942 Soviet designs such as the Yakovlev Yak-9 and Lavochkin La-5 had performance comparable to the German Bf 109 and Focke-Wulf Fw 190. Also, significant numbers of British, and later U.S., fighter aircraft were supplied to aid the Soviet war effort as part of Lend-Lease, with the Bell P-39 Airacobra proving particularly effective in the lower-altitude combat typical of the Eastern Front. The Soviets were also helped indirectly by the American and British bombing campaigns, which forced the Luftwaffe to shift many of its fighters away from the Eastern Front in defense against these raids. The Soviets increasingly were able to challenge the Luftwaffe, and while the Luftwaffe maintained a qualitative edge over the Red Air Force for much of the war, the increasing numbers and efficacy of the Soviet Air Force were critical to the Red Army's efforts at turning back and eventually annihilating the Wehrmacht.
Meanwhile, air combat on the Western Front had a much different character. Much of this combat focused on the strategic bombing campaigns of the RAF and the USAAF against German industry intended to wear down the Luftwaffe. Axis fighter aircraft focused on defending against Allied bombers while Allied fighters' main role was as bomber escorts. The RAF raided German cities at night, and both sides developed radar-equipped night fighters for these battles. The Americans, in contrast, flew daylight bombing raids into Germany delivering the Combined Bomber Offensive. Unescorted Consolidated B-24 Liberators and Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bombers, however, proved unable to fend off German interceptors (primarily Bf 109s and Fw 190s). With the later arrival of long range fighters, particularly the North American P-51 Mustang, American fighters were able to escort far into Germany on daylight raids and by ranging ahead attrited the Luftwaffe to establish control of the skies over Western Europe.
By the time of Operation Overlord in June 1944, the Allies had gained near complete air superiority over the Western Front. This cleared the way both for intensified strategic bombing of German cities and industries, and for the tactical bombing of battlefield targets. With the Luftwaffe largely cleared from the skies, Allied fighters increasingly served as ground attack aircraft.
Allied fighters, by gaining air superiority over the European battlefield, played a crucial role in the eventual defeat of the Axis, which Reichmarshal Hermann Göring, commander of the German Luftwaffe summed up when he said: "When I saw Mustangs over Berlin, I knew the jig was up."
Pacific theater: Major air combat during the war in the Pacific began with the entry of the Western Allies following Japan's attack against Pearl Harbor. The Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service primarily operated the Mitsubishi A6M Zero, and the Imperial Japanese Army Air Service flew the Nakajima Ki-27 and the Nakajima Ki-43, initially enjoying great success, as these fighters generally had better range, maneuverability, speed and climb rates than their Allied counterparts. Additionally, Japanese pilots were well trained and many were combat veterans from Japan's campaigns in China. They quickly gained air superiority over the Allies, who at this stage of the war were often disorganized, under-trained and poorly equipped, and Japanese air power contributed significantly to their successes in the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore, the Dutch East Indies and Burma.
By mid-1942, the Allies began to regroup and while some Allied aircraft such as the Brewster Buffalo and the P-39 Airacobra were hopelessly outclassed by fighters like Japan's Mitsubishi A6M Zero, others such as the Army's Curtiss P-40 Warhawk and the Navy's Grumman F4F Wildcat possessed attributes such as superior firepower, ruggedness and dive speed, and the Allies soon developed tactics (such as the Thach Weave) to take advantage of these strengths. These changes soon paid dividends, as the Allied ability to deny Japan air superiority was critical to their victories at Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal and New Guinea. In China, the Flying Tigers also used the same tactics with some success, although they were unable to stem the tide of Japanese advances there.
By 1943, the Allies began to gain the upper hand in the Pacific Campaign's air campaigns. Several factors contributed to this shift. First, the Lockheed P-38 Lightning and second-generation Allied fighters such as the Grumman F6 Hellcat and later the Vought F4 Corsair, the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt and the North American P-51 Mustang, began arriving in numbers. These fighters outperformed Japanese fighters in all respects except maneuverability. Other problems with Japan's fighter aircraft also became apparent as the war progressed, such as their lack of armor and light armament, which had been typical of all pre-war fighters worldwide, but the problem was particularly difficult to rectify on the Japanese designs. This made them inadequate as either bomber-interceptors or ground-attack aircraft, roles Allied fighters were still able to fill. Most importantly, Japan's training program failed to provide enough well-trained pilots to replace losses. In contrast, the Allies improved both the quantity and quality of pilots graduating from their training programs. By mid-1944, Allied fighters had gained air superiority throughout the theater, which would not be contested again during the war. The extent of Allied quantitative and qualitative superiority by this point in the war was demonstrated during the Battle of the Philippine Sea, a lopsided Allied victory in which Japanese fliers were shot down in such numbers and with such ease that American fighter pilots likened it to a great 'turkey shoot'. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | This made them inadequate as either bomber-interceptors or ground-attack aircraft, roles Allied fighters were still able to fill. Most importantly, Japan's training program failed to provide enough well-trained pilots to replace losses. In contrast, the Allies improved both the quantity and quality of pilots graduating from their training programs. By mid-1944, Allied fighters had gained air superiority throughout the theater, which would not be contested again during the war. The extent of Allied quantitative and qualitative superiority by this point in the war was demonstrated during the Battle of the Philippine Sea, a lopsided Allied victory in which Japanese fliers were shot down in such numbers and with such ease that American fighter pilots likened it to a great 'turkey shoot'. Late in the war, Japan began to produce new fighters such as the Nakajima Ki-84 and the Kawanishi N1K to replace the Zero, but only in small numbers, and by then Japan lacked the trained pilots or sufficient fuel to mount an effective challenge to Allied attacks. During the closing stages of the war, Japan's fighter arm could not seriously challenge raids over Japan by American Boeing B-29 Superfortresses, and was largely reduced to Kamikaze attacks.
Technological innovations: Fighter technology advanced rapidly during the Second World War. Piston-engines, which powered the vast majority of World War II fighters, grew more powerful: at the beginning of the war fighters typically had engines producing between 1,000 hp (750 kW) and 1,400 hp (1,000 kW), while by the end of the war many could produce over 2,000 hp (1,500 kW). For example, the Spitfire, one of the few fighters in continuous production throughout the war, was in 1939 powered by a 1,030 hp (770 kW) Merlin II, while variants produced in 1945 were equipped with the 2,035 hp (1,517 kW) Rolls-Royce Griffon 61. Nevertheless, these fighters could only achieve modest increases in top speed due to problems of compressibility created as aircraft and their propellers approached the sound barrier, and it was apparent that propeller-driven aircraft were approaching the limits of their performance. German jet and rocket-powered fighters entered combat in 1944, too late to impact the war's outcome. The same year the Allies' only operational jet fighter, the Gloster Meteor, also entered service. World War II fighters also increasingly featured monocoque construction, which improved their aerodynamic efficiency while adding structural strength. Laminar flow wings, which improved high speed performance, also came into use on fighters such as the P-51 Mustang, while the Messerschmitt Me 262 and the Messerschmitt Me 163 featured swept wings that dramatically reduced drag at high subsonic speeds. Armament also advanced during the war. The rifle-caliber machine guns that were common on prewar fighters could not easily down the more rugged warplanes of the era. Air forces began to replace or supplement them with cannons, which fired explosive shells that could blast a hole in an enemy aircraft – rather than relying on kinetic energy from a solid bullet striking a critical component of the aircraft, such as a fuel line or control cable, or the pilot. Cannons could bring down even heavy bombers with just a few hits, but their slower rate of fire made it difficult to hit fast-moving fighters in a dogfight. Eventually, most fighters mounted cannons, sometimes in combination with machine guns. The British epitomized this shift. Their standard early war fighters mounted eight .303 in (7.7 mm) caliber machine guns, but by mid-war they often featured a combination of machine guns and 20 mm (0.79 in) cannons, and late in the war often only cannons. The Americans, in contrast, had problems producing a cannon design, so instead placed multiple .50 in (12.7 mm) heavy machine guns on their fighters. Fighters were also increasingly fitted with bomb racks and air-to-surface ordnance such as bombs or rockets beneath their wings, and pressed into close air support roles as fighter-bombers. Although they carried less ordnance than light and medium bombers, and generally had a shorter range, they were cheaper to produce and maintain and their maneuverability made it easier for them to hit moving targets such as motorized vehicles. Moreover, if they encountered enemy fighters, their ordnance (which reduced lift and increased drag and therefore decreased performance) could be jettisoned and they could engage enemy fighters, which eliminated the need for fighter escorts that bombers required.
Heavily armed fighters such as Germany's Focke-Wulf Fw 190, Britain's Hawker Typhoon and Hawker Tempest, and America's Curtiss P-40, F4U Corsair, P-47 Thunderbolt and P-38 Lightning all excelled as fighter-bombers, and since the Second World War ground attack has become an important secondary capability of many fighters.
World War II also saw the first use of airborne radar on fighters. The primary purpose of these radars was to help night fighters locate enemy bombers and fighters. Because of the bulkiness of these radar sets, they could not be carried on conventional single-engined fighters and instead were typically retrofitted to larger heavy fighters or light bombers such as Germany's Messerschmitt Bf 110 and Junkers Ju 88, Britain's de Havilland Mosquito and Bristol Beaufighter, and America's Douglas A-20, which then served as night fighters. The Northrop P-61 Black Widow, a purpose-built night fighter, was the only fighter of the war that incorporated radar into its original design. Britain and America cooperated closely in the development of airborne radar, and Germany's radar technology generally lagged slightly behind Anglo-American efforts, while other combatants developed few radar-equipped fighters.
A concept originated from German engineer Bernhard J. Schrage in 1943 as a response to the increasing threat posed by Allied heavy bombers, particularly at night. The Schrage Musik system involved mounting upward-facing cannon turrets, typically twin 20mm or 30mm guns, in the belly of German night fighters such as the Messerschmitt Bf 110 and later versions of the Junkers Ju 88. These guns were angled upwards to target the vulnerable underside of enemy bombers.
1946–present: Post–World War II period: Several prototype fighter programs begun early in 1945 continued on after the war and led to advanced piston-engine fighters that entered production and operational service in 1946. A typical example is the Lavochkin La-9 'Fritz', which was an evolution of the successful wartime Lavochkin La-7 'Fin'. Working through a series of prototypes, the La-120, La-126 and La-130, the Lavochkin design bureau sought to replace the La-7's wooden airframe with a metal one, as well as fit a laminar flow wing to improve maneuver performance, and increased armament. The La-9 entered service in August 1946 and was produced until 1948; it also served as the basis for the development of a long-range escort fighter, the La-11 'Fang', of which nearly 1200 were produced 1947–51. Over the course of the Korean War, however, it became obvious that the day of the piston-engined fighter was coming to a close and that the future would lie with the jet fighter.
This period also witnessed experimentation with jet-assisted piston engine aircraft. La-9 derivatives included examples fitted with two underwing auxiliary pulsejet engines (the La-9RD) and a similarly mounted pair of auxiliary ramjet engines (the La-138); however, neither of these entered service. One that did enter service – with the U.S. Navy in March 1945 – was the Ryan FR-1 Fireball; production was halted with the war's end on VJ-Day, with only 66 having been delivered, and the type was withdrawn from service in 1947. The USAAF had ordered its first 13 mixed turboprop-turbojet-powered pre-production prototypes of the Consolidated Vultee XP-81 fighter, but this program was also canceled by VJ Day, with 80% of the engineering work completed.
Rocket-powered fighters: The first rocket-powered aircraft was the Lippisch Ente, which made a successful maiden flight in March 1928. The only pure rocket aircraft ever mass-produced was the Messerschmitt Me 163B Komet in 1944, one of several German World War II projects aimed at developing high speed, point-defense aircraft. Later variants of the Me 262 (C-1a and C-2b) were also fitted with "mixed-power" jet/rocket powerplants, while earlier models were fitted with rocket boosters, but were not mass-produced with these modifications.
The USSR experimented with a rocket-powered interceptor in the years immediately following World War II, the Mikoyan-Gurevich I-270. Only two were built.
In the 1950s, the British developed mixed-power jet designs employing both rocket and jet engines to cover the performance gap that existed in turbojet designs. The rocket was the main engine for delivering the speed and height required for high-speed interception of high-level bombers and the turbojet gave increased fuel economy in other parts of flight, most notably to ensure the aircraft was able to make a powered landing rather than risking an unpredictable gliding return. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | Later variants of the Me 262 (C-1a and C-2b) were also fitted with "mixed-power" jet/rocket powerplants, while earlier models were fitted with rocket boosters, but were not mass-produced with these modifications.
The USSR experimented with a rocket-powered interceptor in the years immediately following World War II, the Mikoyan-Gurevich I-270. Only two were built.
In the 1950s, the British developed mixed-power jet designs employing both rocket and jet engines to cover the performance gap that existed in turbojet designs. The rocket was the main engine for delivering the speed and height required for high-speed interception of high-level bombers and the turbojet gave increased fuel economy in other parts of flight, most notably to ensure the aircraft was able to make a powered landing rather than risking an unpredictable gliding return.
The Saunders-Roe SR.53 was a successful design, and was planned for production when economics forced the British to curtail most aircraft programs in the late 1950s. Furthermore, rapid advancements in jet engine technology rendered mixed-power aircraft designs like Saunders-Roe's SR.53 (and the following SR.177) obsolete. The American Republic XF-91 Thunderceptor –the first U.S. fighter to exceed Mach 1 in level flight– met a similar fate for the same reason, and no hybrid rocket-and-jet-engine fighter design has ever been placed into service.
The only operational implementation of mixed propulsion was Rocket-Assisted Take Off (RATO), a system rarely used in fighters, such as with the zero-length launch, RATO-based takeoff scheme from special launch platforms, tested out by both the United States and the Soviet Union, and made obsolete with advancements in surface-to-air missile technology.
Jet-powered fighters: It has become common in the aviation community to classify jet fighters by "generations" for historical purposes. No official definitions of these generations exist; rather, they represent the notion of stages in the development of fighter-design approaches, performance capabilities, and technological evolution. Different authors have packed jet fighters into different generations. For example, Richard P. Hallion of the Secretary of the Air Force's Action Group classified the F-16 as a sixth-generation jet fighter.
The timeframes associated with each generation remain inexact and are only indicative of the period during which their design philosophies and technology employment enjoyed a prevailing influence on fighter design and development. These timeframes also encompass the peak period of service entry for such aircraft.
1940s–1950s: First-generation: The first generation of jet fighters comprised the initial, subsonic jet-fighter designs introduced late in World War II (1939–1945) and in the early post-war period. They differed little from their piston-engined counterparts in appearance, and many employed unswept wings. Guns and cannon remained the principal armament. The need to obtain a decisive advantage in maximum speed pushed the development of turbojet-powered aircraft forward. Top speeds for fighters rose steadily throughout World War II as more powerful piston engines developed, and they approached transonic flight-speeds where the efficiency of propellers drops off, making further speed increases nearly impossible.
The first jets developed during World War II and saw combat in the last two years of the war. Messerschmitt developed the first operational jet fighter, the Me 262A, primarily serving with the Luftwaffe's JG 7, the world's first jet-fighter wing. It was considerably faster than contemporary piston-driven aircraft, and in the hands of a competent pilot, proved quite difficult for Allied pilots to defeat. The Luftwaffe never deployed the design in numbers sufficient to stop the Allied air campaign, and a combination of fuel shortages, pilot losses, and technical difficulties with the engines kept the number of sorties low. Nevertheless, the Me 262 indicated the obsolescence of piston-driven aircraft. Spurred by reports of the German jets, Britain's Gloster Meteor entered production soon after, and the two entered service around the same time in 1944. Meteors commonly served to intercept the V-1 flying bomb, as they were faster than available piston-engined fighters at the low altitudes used by the flying bombs. Nearer the end of World War II, the first military jet-powered light-fighter design, the Luftwaffe intended the Heinkel He 162A Spatz (sparrow) to serve as a simple jet fighter for German home defense, with a few examples seeing squadron service with JG 1 by April 1945. By the end of the war almost all work on piston-powered fighters had ended. A few designs combining piston- and jet-engines for propulsion – such as the Ryan FR Fireball – saw brief use, but by the end of the 1940s virtually all new fighters were jet-powered.
Despite their advantages, the early jet-fighters were far from perfect. The operational lifespan of turbines were very short and engines were temperamental, while power could be adjusted only slowly and acceleration was poor (even if top speed was higher) compared to the final generation of piston fighters. Many squadrons of piston-engined fighters remained in service until the early to mid-1950s, even in the air forces of the major powers (though the types retained were the best of the World War II designs). Innovations including ejection seats, air brakes and all-moving tailplanes became widespread in this period.
The Americans began using jet fighters operationally after World War II, the wartime Bell P-59 having proven a failure. The Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star (soon re-designated F-80) was more prone to wave drag than the swept-wing Me 262, but had a cruise speed (660 km/h (410 mph)) as high as the maximum speed attainable by many piston-engined fighters. The British designed several new jets, including the distinctive single-engined twin boom de Havilland Vampire which Britain sold to the air forces of many nations.
The British transferred the technology of the Rolls-Royce Nene jet-engine to the Soviets, who soon put it to use in their advanced Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 fighter, which used fully swept wings that allowed flying closer to the speed of sound than straight-winged designs such as the F-80. The MiG-15s' top speed of 1,075 km/h (668 mph) proved quite a shock to the American F-80 pilots who encountered them in the Korean War, along with their armament of two 23 mm (0.91 in) cannons and a single 37 mm (1.5 in) cannon. Nevertheless, in the first jet-versus-jet dogfight, which occurred during the Korean War on 8 November 1950, an F-80 shot down two North Korean MiG-15s.
The Americans responded by rushing their own swept-wing fighter – the North American F-86 Sabre – into battle against the MiGs, which had similar transsonic performance. The two aircraft had different strengths and weaknesses, but were similar enough that victory could go either way. While the Sabres focused primarily on downing MiGs and scored favorably against those flown by the poorly-trained North Koreans, the MiGs in turn decimated US bomber formations and forced the withdrawal of numerous American types from operational service.
The world's navies also transitioned to jets during this period, despite the need for catapult-launching of the new aircraft. The U.S. Navy adopted the Grumman F9F Panther as their primary jet fighter in the Korean War period, and it was one of the first jet fighters to employ an afterburner. The de Havilland Sea Vampire became the Royal Navy's first jet fighter. Radar was used on specialized night-fighters such as the Douglas F3D Skyknight, which also downed MiGs over Korea, and later fitted to the McDonnell F2H Banshee and swept-wing Vought F7U Cutlass and McDonnell F3H Demon as all-weather / night fighters. Early versions of Infra-red (IR) air-to-air missiles (AAMs) such as the AIM-9 Sidewinder and radar-guided missiles such as the AIM-7 Sparrow whose descendants remain in use as of 2021, were first introduced on swept-wing subsonic Demon and Cutlass naval fighters.
1950s–1960s: Second-generation: Technological breakthroughs, lessons learned from the aerial battles of the Korean War, and a focus on conducting operations in a nuclear warfare environment shaped the development of second-generation fighters. Technological advances in aerodynamics, propulsion and aerospace building-materials (primarily aluminum alloys) permitted designers to experiment with aeronautical innovations such as swept wings, delta wings, and area-ruled fuselages. Widespread use of afterburning turbojet engines made these the first production aircraft to break the sound barrier, and the ability to sustain supersonic speeds in level flight became a common capability amongst fighters of this generation.
Fighter designs also took advantage of new electronics technologies that made effective radars small enough to carry aboard smaller aircraft. Onboard radars permitted detection of enemy aircraft beyond visual range, thereby improving the handoff of targets by longer-ranged ground-based warning- and tracking-radars. Similarly, advances in guided-missile development allowed air-to-air missiles to begin supplementing the gun as the primary offensive weapon for the first time in fighter history. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | Technological advances in aerodynamics, propulsion and aerospace building-materials (primarily aluminum alloys) permitted designers to experiment with aeronautical innovations such as swept wings, delta wings, and area-ruled fuselages. Widespread use of afterburning turbojet engines made these the first production aircraft to break the sound barrier, and the ability to sustain supersonic speeds in level flight became a common capability amongst fighters of this generation.
Fighter designs also took advantage of new electronics technologies that made effective radars small enough to carry aboard smaller aircraft. Onboard radars permitted detection of enemy aircraft beyond visual range, thereby improving the handoff of targets by longer-ranged ground-based warning- and tracking-radars. Similarly, advances in guided-missile development allowed air-to-air missiles to begin supplementing the gun as the primary offensive weapon for the first time in fighter history. During this period, passive-homing infrared-guided (IR) missiles became commonplace, but early IR missile sensors had poor sensitivity and a very narrow field of view (typically no more than 30°), which limited their effective use to only close-range, tail-chase engagements. Radar-guided (RF) missiles were introduced as well, but early examples proved unreliable. These semi-active radar homing (SARH) missiles could track and intercept an enemy aircraft "painted" by the launching aircraft's onboard radar. Medium- and long-range RF air-to-air missiles promised to open up a new dimension of "beyond-visual-range" (BVR) combat, and much effort concentrated on further development of this technology.
The prospect of a potential third world war featuring large mechanized armies and nuclear-weapon strikes led to a degree of specialization along two design approaches: interceptors, such as the English Electric Lightning and Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21F; and fighter-bombers, such as the Republic F-105 Thunderchief and the Sukhoi Su-7B. Dogfighting, per se, became de-emphasized in both cases. The interceptor was an outgrowth of the vision that guided missiles would completely replace guns and combat would take place at beyond-visual ranges. As a result, strategists designed interceptors with a large missile-payload and a powerful radar, sacrificing agility in favor of high speed, altitude ceiling and rate of climb. With a primary air-defense role, emphasis was placed on the ability to intercept strategic bombers flying at high altitudes. Specialized point-defense interceptors often had limited range and few, if any, ground-attack capabilities. Fighter-bombers could swing between air-superiority and ground-attack roles, and were often designed for a high-speed, low-altitude dash to deliver their ordnance. Television- and IR-guided air-to-surface missiles were introduced to augment traditional gravity bombs, and some were also equipped to deliver a nuclear bomb.
1960s–1970s: Third-generation jet fighters: The third generation witnessed continued maturation of second-generation innovations, but it is most marked by renewed emphases on maneuverability and on traditional ground-attack capabilities. Over the course of the 1960s, increasing combat experience with guided missiles demonstrated that combat would devolve into close-in dogfights. Analog avionics began to appear, replacing older "steam-gauge" cockpit instrumentation. Enhancements to the aerodynamic performance of third-generation fighters included flight control surfaces such as canards, powered slats, and blown flaps. A number of technologies would be tried for vertical/short takeoff and landing, but thrust vectoring would be successful on the Harrier.
Growth in air-combat capability focused on the introduction of improved air-to-air missiles, radar systems, and other avionics. While guns remained standard equipment (early models of F-4 being a notable exception), air-to-air missiles became the primary weapons for air-superiority fighters, which employed more sophisticated radars and medium-range RF AAMs to achieve greater "stand-off" ranges, however, kill probabilities proved unexpectedly low for RF missiles due to poor reliability and improved electronic countermeasures (ECM) for spoofing radar seekers. Infrared-homing AAMs saw their fields of view expand to 45°, which strengthened their tactical usability. Nevertheless, the low dogfight loss-exchange ratios experienced by American fighters in the skies over Vietnam led the U.S. Navy to establish its famous "TOPGUN" fighter-weapons school, which provided a graduate-level curriculum to train fleet fighter-pilots in advanced Air Combat Maneuvering (ACM) and Dissimilar air combat training (DACT) tactics and techniques.
This era also saw an expansion in ground-attack capabilities, principally in guided missiles, and witnessed the introduction of the first truly effective avionics for enhanced ground attack, including terrain-avoidance systems. Air-to-surface missiles (ASM) equipped with electro-optical (E-O) contrast seekers – such as the initial model of the widely used AGM-65 Maverick – became standard weapons, and laser-guided bombs (LGBs) became widespread in an effort to improve precision-attack capabilities. Guidance for such precision-guided munitions (PGM) was provided by externally-mounted targeting pods, which were introduced in the mid-1960s.
The third generation also led to the development of new automatic-fire weapons, primarily chain-guns that use an electric motor to drive the mechanism of a cannon. This allowed a plane to carry a single multi-barrel weapon (such as the 20 mm (0.79 in) Vulcan), and provided greater accuracy and rates of fire. Powerplant reliability increased, and jet engines became "smokeless" to make it harder to sight aircraft at long distances.
Dedicated ground-attack aircraft (like the Grumman A-6 Intruder, SEPECAT Jaguar and LTV A-7 Corsair II) offered longer range, more sophisticated night-attack systems or lower cost than supersonic fighters. With variable-geometry wings, the supersonic F-111 introduced the Pratt & Whitney TF30, the first turbofan equipped with afterburner. The ambitious project sought to create a versatile common fighter for many roles and services. It would serve well as an all-weather bomber, but lacked the performance to defeat other fighters. The McDonnell F-4 Phantom was designed to capitalize on radar and missile technology as an all-weather interceptor, but emerged as a versatile strike-bomber nimble enough to prevail in air combat, adopted by the U.S. Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. Despite numerous shortcomings that would not be fully addressed until newer fighters, the Phantom claimed 280 aerial kills (more than any other U.S. fighter) over Vietnam. With range and payload capabilities that rivaled that of World War II bombers such as B-24 Liberator, the Phantom would become a highly successful multirole aircraft.
1970s–2000s: Fourth-generation: Fourth-generation fighters continued the trend towards multirole configurations, and were equipped with increasingly sophisticated avionics- and weapon-systems. Fighter designs were significantly influenced by the Energy-Maneuverability (E-M) theory developed by Colonel John Boyd and mathematician Thomas Christie, based upon Boyd's combat experience in the Korean War and as a fighter-tactics instructor during the 1960s. E-M theory emphasized the value of aircraft-specific energy maintenance as an advantage in fighter combat. Boyd perceived maneuverability as the primary means of getting "inside" an adversary's decision-making cycle, a process Boyd called the "OODA loop" (for "Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action"). This approach emphasized aircraft designs capable of performing "fast transients" – quick changes in speed, altitude, and direction – as opposed to relying chiefly on high speed alone.
E-M characteristics were first applied to the McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle, but Boyd and his supporters believed these performance parameters called for a small, lightweight aircraft with a larger, higher-lift wing. The small size would minimize drag and increase the thrust-to-weight ratio, while the larger wing would minimize wing loading; while the reduced wing loading tends to lower top speed and can cut range, it increases payload capacity and the range reduction can be compensated for by increased fuel in the larger wing. The efforts of Boyd's "Fighter mafia" would result in the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon (now Lockheed Martin's).
The F-16's maneuverability was further enhanced by its slight aerodynamic instability. This technique, called "relaxed static stability" (RSS), was made possible by introduction of the "fly-by-wire" (FBW) flight-control system (FLCS), which in turn was enabled by advances in computers and in system-integration techniques. Analog avionics, required to enable FBW operations, became a fundamental requirement, but began to be replaced by digital flight-control systems in the latter half of the 1980s. Likewise, Full Authority Digital Engine Controls (FADEC) to electronically manage powerplant performance was introduced with the Pratt & Whitney F100 turbofan. The F-16's sole reliance on electronics and wires to relay flight commands, instead of the usual cables and mechanical linkage controls, earned it the sobriquet of "the electric jet". Electronic FLCS and FADEC quickly became essential components of all subsequent fighter designs. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | The F-16's maneuverability was further enhanced by its slight aerodynamic instability. This technique, called "relaxed static stability" (RSS), was made possible by introduction of the "fly-by-wire" (FBW) flight-control system (FLCS), which in turn was enabled by advances in computers and in system-integration techniques. Analog avionics, required to enable FBW operations, became a fundamental requirement, but began to be replaced by digital flight-control systems in the latter half of the 1980s. Likewise, Full Authority Digital Engine Controls (FADEC) to electronically manage powerplant performance was introduced with the Pratt & Whitney F100 turbofan. The F-16's sole reliance on electronics and wires to relay flight commands, instead of the usual cables and mechanical linkage controls, earned it the sobriquet of "the electric jet". Electronic FLCS and FADEC quickly became essential components of all subsequent fighter designs.
Other innovative technologies introduced in fourth-generation fighters included pulse-Doppler fire-control radars (providing a "look-down/shoot-down" capability), head-up displays (HUD), "hands on throttle-and-stick" (HOTAS) controls, and multi-function displays (MFD), all essential equipment as of 2019. Aircraft designers began to incorporate composite materials in the form of bonded-aluminum honeycomb structural elements and graphite epoxy laminate skins to reduce weight. Infrared search-and-track (IRST) sensors became widespread for air-to-ground weapons delivery, and appeared for air-to-air combat as well. "All-aspect" IR AAM became standard air superiority weapons, which permitted engagement of enemy aircraft from any angle (although the field of view remained relatively limited). The first long-range active-radar-homing RF AAM entered service with the AIM-54 Phoenix, which solely equipped the Grumman F-14 Tomcat, one of the few variable-sweep-wing fighter designs to enter production. Even with the tremendous advancement of air-to-air missiles in this era, internal guns were standard equipment.
Another revolution came in the form of a stronger reliance on ease of maintenance, which led to standardization of parts, reductions in the numbers of access panels and lubrication points, and overall parts reduction in more complicated equipment like the engines. Some early jet fighters required 50 man-hours of work by a ground crew for every hour the aircraft was in the air; later models substantially reduced this to allow faster turn-around times and more sorties in a day. Some modern military aircraft only require 10-man-hours of work per hour of flight time, and others are even more efficient.
Aerodynamic innovations included variable-camber wings and exploitation of the vortex lift effect to achieve higher angles of attack through the addition of leading-edge extension devices such as strakes.
Unlike interceptors of the previous eras, most fourth-generation air-superiority fighters were designed to be agile dogfighters (although the Mikoyan MiG-31 and Panavia Tornado ADV are notable exceptions). The continually rising cost of fighters, however, continued to emphasize the value of multirole fighters. The need for both types of fighters led to the "high/low mix" concept, which envisioned a high-capability and high-cost core of dedicated air-superiority fighters (like the F-15 and Su-27) supplemented by a larger contingent of lower-cost multi-role fighters (such as the F-16 and MiG-29).
Most fourth-generation fighters, such as the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet, HAL Tejas, JF-17 and Dassault Mirage 2000, are true multirole warplanes, designed as such from the start. This was facilitated by multimode avionics that could switch seamlessly between air and ground modes. The earlier approaches of adding on strike capabilities or designing separate models specialized for different roles generally became passé (with the Panavia Tornado being an exception in this regard). Attack roles were generally assigned to dedicated ground-attack aircraft such as the Sukhoi Su-25 and the A-10 Thunderbolt II.
A typical US Air Force fighter wing of the period might contain a mix of one air superiority squadron (F-15C), one strike fighter squadron (F-15E), and two multirole fighter squadrons (F-16C). Perhaps the most novel technology introduced for combat aircraft was stealth, which involves the use of special "low-observable" (L-O) materials and design techniques to reduce the susceptibility of an aircraft to detection by the enemy's sensor systems, particularly radars. The first stealth aircraft introduced were the Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk attack aircraft (introduced in 1983) and the Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit bomber (first flew in 1989). Although no stealthy fighters per se appeared among the fourth generation, some radar-absorbent coatings and other L-O treatments developed for these programs are reported to have been subsequently applied to fourth-generation fighters.
1990s–2000s: 4.5-generation: The end of the Cold War in 1992 led many governments to significantly decrease military spending as a "peace dividend". Air force inventories were cut. Research and development programs working on "fifth-generation" fighters took serious hits. Many programs were canceled during the first half of the 1990s, and those that survived were "stretched out". While the practice of slowing the pace of development reduces annual investment expenses, it comes at the penalty of increased overall program and unit costs over the long-term. In this instance, however, it also permitted designers to make use of the tremendous achievements being made in the fields of computers, avionics and other flight electronics, which had become possible largely due to the advances made in microchip and semiconductor technologies in the 1980s and 1990s. This opportunity enabled designers to develop fourth-generation designs – or redesigns – with significantly enhanced capabilities. These improved designs have become known as "Generation 4.5" fighters, recognizing their intermediate nature between the 4th and 5th generations, and their contribution in furthering development of individual fifth-generation technologies.
The primary characteristics of this sub-generation are the application of advanced digital avionics and aerospace materials, modest signature reduction (primarily RF "stealth"), and highly integrated systems and weapons. These fighters have been designed to operate in a "network-centric" battlefield environment and are principally multirole aircraft. Key weapons technologies introduced include beyond-visual-range (BVR) AAMs; Global Positioning System (GPS)–guided weapons, solid-state phased-array radars; helmet-mounted sights; and improved secure, jamming-resistant datalinks. Thrust vectoring to further improve transient maneuvering capabilities has also been adopted by many 4.5th generation fighters, and uprated powerplants have enabled some designs to achieve a degree of "supercruise" ability. Stealth characteristics are focused primarily on frontal-aspect radar cross section (RCS) signature-reduction techniques including radar-absorbent materials (RAM), L-O coatings and limited shaping techniques.
"Half-generation" designs are either based on existing airframes or are based on new airframes following similar design theory to previous iterations; however, these modifications have introduced the structural use of composite materials to reduce weight, greater fuel fractions to increase range, and signature reduction treatments to achieve lower RCS compared to their predecessors. Prime examples of such aircraft, which are based on new airframe designs making extensive use of carbon-fiber composites, include the Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, Saab JAS 39 Gripen, and HAL Tejas Mark 1A.
Apart from these fighter jets, most of the 4.5 generation aircraft are actually modified variants of existing airframes from the earlier fourth generation fighter jets. Such fighter jets are generally heavier and examples include the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, which is an evolution of the F/A-18 Hornet, the F-15E Strike Eagle, which is a ground-attack/multi-role variant of the F-15 Eagle, the Su-30SM and Su-35S modified variants of the Sukhoi Su-27, and the MiG-35 upgraded version of the Mikoyan MiG-29. The Su-30SM/Su-35S and MiG-35 feature thrust vectoring engine nozzles to enhance maneuvering. The upgraded version of F-16 is also considered a member of the 4.5 generation aircraft.
Generation 4.5 fighters first entered service in the early 1990s, and most of them are still being produced and evolved. It is quite possible that they may continue in production alongside fifth-generation fighters due to the expense of developing the advanced level of stealth technology needed to achieve aircraft designs featuring very low observables (VLO), which is one of the defining features of fifth-generation fighters. Of the 4.5th generation designs, the Strike Eagle, Super Hornet, Typhoon, Gripen, and Rafale have been used in combat.
The U.S. government has defined 4.5 generation fighter aircraft as those that "(1) have advanced capabilities, including— (A) AESA radar; (B) high capacity data-link; and (C) enhanced avionics; and (2) have the ability to deploy current and reasonably foreseeable advanced armaments."
2000s–2020s: Fifth-generation: Currently the cutting edge of fighter design, fifth-generation fighters are characterized by being designed from the start to operate in a network-centric combat environment, and to feature extremely low, all-aspect, multi-spectral signatures employing advanced materials and shaping techniques. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | Of the 4.5th generation designs, the Strike Eagle, Super Hornet, Typhoon, Gripen, and Rafale have been used in combat.
The U.S. government has defined 4.5 generation fighter aircraft as those that "(1) have advanced capabilities, including— (A) AESA radar; (B) high capacity data-link; and (C) enhanced avionics; and (2) have the ability to deploy current and reasonably foreseeable advanced armaments."
2000s–2020s: Fifth-generation: Currently the cutting edge of fighter design, fifth-generation fighters are characterized by being designed from the start to operate in a network-centric combat environment, and to feature extremely low, all-aspect, multi-spectral signatures employing advanced materials and shaping techniques. They have multifunction AESA radars with high-bandwidth, low-probability of intercept (LPI) data transmission capabilities. The infra-red search and track sensors incorporated for air-to-air combat as well as for air-to-ground weapons delivery in the 4.5th generation fighters are now fused in with other sensors for Situational Awareness IRST or SAIRST, which constantly tracks all targets of interest around the aircraft so the pilot need not guess when he glances. These sensors, along with advanced avionics, glass cockpits, helmet-mounted sights (not currently on F-22), and improved secure, jamming-resistant LPI datalinks are highly integrated to provide multi-platform, multi-sensor data fusion for vastly improved situational awareness while easing the pilot's workload. Avionics suites rely on extensive use of very high-speed integrated circuit (VHSIC) technology, common modules, and high-speed data buses. Overall, the integration of all these elements is claimed to provide fifth-generation fighters with a "first-look, first-shot, first-kill capability".
A key attribute of fifth-generation fighters is a small radar cross-section. Great care has been taken in designing its layout and internal structure to minimize RCS over a broad bandwidth of detection and tracking radar frequencies; furthermore, to maintain its VLO signature during combat operations, primary weapons are carried in internal weapon bays that are only briefly opened to permit weapon launch. Furthermore, stealth technology has advanced to the point where it can be employed without a tradeoff with aerodynamics performance, in contrast to previous stealth efforts. Some attention has also been paid to reducing IR signatures, especially on the F-22. Detailed information on these signature-reduction techniques is classified, but in general includes special shaping approaches, thermoset and thermoplastic materials, extensive structural use of advanced composites, conformal sensors, heat-resistant coatings, low-observable wire meshes to cover intake and cooling vents, heat ablating tiles on the exhaust troughs (seen on the Northrop YF-23), and coating internal and external metal areas with radar-absorbent materials and paint (RAM/RAP).
The AESA radar offers unique capabilities for fighters (and it is also quickly becoming essential for Generation 4.5 aircraft designs, as well as being retrofitted onto some fourth-generation aircraft). In addition to its high resistance to ECM and LPI features, it enables the fighter to function as a sort of "mini-AWACS", providing high-gain electronic support measures (ESM) and electronic warfare (EW) jamming functions. Other technologies common to this latest generation of fighters includes integrated electronic warfare system (INEWS) technology, integrated communications, navigation, and identification (CNI) avionics technology, centralized "vehicle health monitoring" systems for ease of maintenance, fiber optics data transmission, stealth technology and even hovering capabilities. Maneuver performance remains important and is enhanced by thrust-vectoring, which also helps reduce takeoff and landing distances. Supercruise may or may not be featured; it permits flight at supersonic speeds without the use of the afterburner – a device that significantly increases IR signature when used in full military power.
Such aircraft are sophisticated and expensive. The fifth generation was ushered in by the Lockheed Martin/Boeing F-22 Raptor in late 2005. The U.S. Air Force originally planned to acquire 650 F-22s, but now only 187 will be built. As a result, its unit flyaway cost (FAC) is around US$150 million. To spread the development costs – and production base – more broadly, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program enrolls eight other countries as cost- and risk-sharing partners. Altogether, the nine partner nations anticipate procuring over 3,000 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fighters at an anticipated average FAC of $80–85 million. The F-35, however, is designed to be a family of three aircraft, a conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) fighter, a short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) fighter, and a Catapult Assisted Take Off But Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR) fighter, each of which has a different unit price and slightly varying specifications in terms of fuel capacity (and therefore range), size and payload.
Other countries have initiated fifth-generation fighter development projects. In December 2010, it was discovered that China is developing the 5th generation fighter Chengdu J-20. The J-20 took its maiden flight in January 2011. The Shenyang FC-31 took its maiden flight on 31 October 2012, and developed a carrier-based version based on Chinese aircraft carriers. United Aircraft Corporation with Russia's Mikoyan LMFS and Sukhoi Su-75 Checkmate plan, Sukhoi Su-57 became the first fifth-generation fighter jets in service with the Russian Aerospace Forces on 2020, and launch missiles in the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022. Japan is exploring its technical feasibility to produce fifth-generation fighters. India is developing the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), a medium weight stealth fighter jet designated to enter into serial production by late 2030s. India also had initiated a joint fifth generation heavy fighter with Russia called the FGFA. As of 2018 May, the project is suspected to have not yielded desired progress or results for India and has been put on hold or dropped altogether. Other countries considering fielding an indigenous or semi-indigenous advanced fifth generation aircraft include South Korea, Sweden, Turkey and Pakistan.
2020s–present: Sixth-generation: As of November 2018, France, Germany, China, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States have announced the development of a sixth-generation aircraft program.
France and Germany will develop a joint sixth-generation fighter to replace their current fleet of Dassault Rafales, Eurofighter Typhoons, and Panavia Tornados by 2035. The overall development will be led by a collaboration of Dassault and Airbus, while the engines will reportedly be jointly developed by Safran and MTU Aero Engines. Thales and MBDA are also seeking a stake in the project. Spain officially joined the Franco-German project to develop a Next-Generation Fighter (NGF) that will form part of a broader Future Combat Air Systems (FCAS) with the signing of a letter of intent (LOI) on February 14, 2019.
Currently at the concept stage, the first sixth-generation jet fighter is expected to enter service in the United States Navy in 2025–30 period. The USAF seeks a new fighter for the 2030–50 period named the "Next Generation Tactical Aircraft" ("Next Gen TACAIR"). The US Navy looks to replace its F/A-18E/F Super Hornets beginning in 2025 with the Next Generation Air Dominance air superiority fighter.
The United Kingdom's proposed stealth fighter is being developed by a European consortium called Team Tempest, consisting of BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, Leonardo S.p.A. and MBDA. The aircraft is intended to enter service in 2035.
Weapons: Fighters were typically armed with guns only for air to air combat up through the late 1950s, though unguided rockets for mostly air to ground use and limited air to air use were deployed in WWII. From the late 1950s forward guided missiles came into use for air to air combat. Throughout this history fighters which by surprise or maneuver attain a good firing position have achieved the kill about one third to one half the time, no matter what weapons were carried. The only major historic exception to this has been the low effectiveness shown by guided missiles in the first one to two decades of their existence.
From WWI to the present, fighter aircraft have featured machine guns and automatic cannons as weapons, and they are still considered as essential back-up weapons today. The power of air-to-air guns has increased greatly over time, and has kept them relevant in the guided missile era. In WWI two rifle (approximately 0.30) caliber machine guns was the typical armament, producing a weight of fire of about 0.4 kg (0.88 lb) per second. In WWII rifle caliber machine guns also remained common, though usually in larger numbers or supplemented with much heavier 0.50 caliber machine guns or cannons. The standard WWII American fighter armament of six 0.50-cal (12.7mm) machine guns fired a bullet weight of approximately 3.7 kg/sec (8.1 lbs/sec), at a muzzle velocity of 856 m/s (2,810 ft/s). British and German aircraft tended to use a mix of machine guns and autocannon, the latter firing explosive projectiles. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | The power of air-to-air guns has increased greatly over time, and has kept them relevant in the guided missile era. In WWI two rifle (approximately 0.30) caliber machine guns was the typical armament, producing a weight of fire of about 0.4 kg (0.88 lb) per second. In WWII rifle caliber machine guns also remained common, though usually in larger numbers or supplemented with much heavier 0.50 caliber machine guns or cannons. The standard WWII American fighter armament of six 0.50-cal (12.7mm) machine guns fired a bullet weight of approximately 3.7 kg/sec (8.1 lbs/sec), at a muzzle velocity of 856 m/s (2,810 ft/s). British and German aircraft tended to use a mix of machine guns and autocannon, the latter firing explosive projectiles. Later British fighters were exclusively cannon-armed, the US were not able to produce a reliable cannon in high numbers and most fighters remained equipped only with heavy machine guns despite the US Navy pressing for a change to 20 mm.
Post war 20–30 mm revolver cannon and rotary cannon were introduced. The modern M61 Vulcan 20 mm rotary cannon that is standard on current American fighters fires a projectile weight of about 10 kg/s (22 lb/s), nearly three times that of six 0.50-cal machine guns, with higher velocity of 1,052 m/s (3450 ft/s) supporting a flatter trajectory, and with exploding projectiles. Modern fighter gun systems also feature ranging radar and lead computing electronic gun sights to ease the problem of aim point to compensate for projectile drop and time of flight (target lead) in the complex three dimensional maneuvering of air-to-air combat. However, getting in position to use the guns is still a challenge. The range of guns is longer than in the past but still quite limited compared to missiles, with modern gun systems having a maximum effective range of approximately 1,000 meters. High probability of kill also requires firing to usually occur from the rear hemisphere of the target. Despite these limits, when pilots are well trained in air-to-air gunnery and these conditions are satisfied, gun systems are tactically effective and highly cost efficient. The cost of a gun firing pass is far less than firing a missile, and the projectiles are not subject to the thermal and electronic countermeasures than can sometimes defeat missiles. When the enemy can be approached to within gun range, the lethality of guns is approximately a 25% to 50% chance of "kill per firing pass".
The range limitations of guns, and the desire to overcome large variations in fighter pilot skill and thus achieve higher force effectiveness, led to the development of the guided air-to-air missile. There are two main variations, heat-seeking (infrared homing), and radar guided. Radar missiles are typically several times heavier and more expensive than heat-seekers, but with longer range, greater destructive power, and ability to track through clouds.
The highly successful AIM-9 Sidewinder heat-seeking (infrared homing) short-range missile was developed by the United States Navy in the 1950s. These small missiles are easily carried by lighter fighters, and provide effective ranges of approximately 10 to 35 kilometres (6 to 20 mi). Beginning with the AIM-9L in 1977, subsequent versions of Sidewinder have added all-aspect capability, the ability to use the lower heat of air to skin friction on the target aircraft to track from the front and sides. The latest (2003 service entry) AIM-9X also features "off-boresight" and "lock on after launch" capabilities, which allow the pilot to make a quick launch of a missile to track a target anywhere within the pilot's vision. The AIM-9X development cost was U.S. $3 billion in mid to late 1990s dollars, and 2015 per unit procurement cost is $0.6 million each. The missile weighs 85.3 kg (188 lbs), and has a maximum range of 35 km (22 miles) at higher altitudes. Like most air-to-air missiles, lower altitude range can be as limited as only about one third of maximum due to higher drag and less ability to coast downward.
The effectiveness of infrared homing missiles was only 7% early in the Vietnam War, but improved to approximately 15%–40% over the course of the war. The AIM-4 Falcon used by the USAF had kill rates of approximately 7% and was considered a failure. The AIM-9B Sidewinder introduced later achieved 15% kill rates, and the further improved AIM-9D and J models reached 19%. The AIM-9G used in the last year of the Vietnam air war achieved 40%. Israel used almost totally guns in the 1967 Six-Day War, achieving 60 kills and 10 losses. However, Israel made much more use of steadily improving heat-seeking missiles in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In this extensive conflict Israel scored 171 of 261 total kills with heat-seeking missiles (65.5%), 5 kills with radar guided missiles (1.9%), and 85 kills with guns (32.6%). The AIM-9L Sidewinder scored 19 kills out of 26 fired missiles (73%) in the 1982 Falklands War. But, in a conflict against opponents using thermal countermeasures, the United States only scored 11 kills out of 48 fired (Pk = 23%) with the follow-on AIM-9M in the 1991 Gulf War.
Radar guided missiles fall into two main missile guidance types. In the historically more common semi-active radar homing case the missile homes in on radar signals transmitted from launching aircraft and reflected from the target. This has the disadvantage that the firing aircraft must maintain radar lock on the target and is thus less free to maneuver and more vulnerable to attack. A widely deployed missile of this type was the AIM-7 Sparrow, which entered service in 1954 and was produced in improving versions until 1997. In more advanced active radar homing the missile is guided to the vicinity of the target by internal data on its projected position, and then "goes active" with an internally carried small radar system to conduct terminal guidance to the target. This eliminates the requirement for the firing aircraft to maintain radar lock, and thus greatly reduces risk. A prominent example is the AIM-120 AMRAAM, which was first fielded in 1991 as the AIM-7 replacement, and which has no firm retirement date as of 2016. The current AIM-120D version has a maximum high altitude range of greater than 160 km (100 mi), and cost approximately $2.4 million each (2016). As is typical with most other missiles, range at lower altitude may be as little as one third that of high altitude.
In the Vietnam air war radar missile kill reliability was approximately 10% at shorter ranges, and even worse at longer ranges due to reduced radar return and greater time for the target aircraft to detect the incoming missile and take evasive action. At one point in the Vietnam war, the U.S. Navy fired 50 AIM-7 Sparrow radar guided missiles in a row without a hit. Between 1958 and 1982 in five wars there were 2,014 combined heat-seeking and radar guided missile firings by fighter pilots engaged in air-to-air combat, achieving 528 kills, of which 76 were radar missile kills, for a combined effectiveness of 26%. However, only 4 of the 76 radar missile kills were in the beyond-visual-range mode intended to be the strength of radar guided missiles. The United States invested over $10 billion in air-to-air radar missile technology from the 1950s to the early 1970s. Amortized over actual kills achieved by the U.S. and its allies, each radar guided missile kill thus cost over $130 million. The defeated enemy aircraft were for the most part older MiG-17s, −19s, and −21s, with new cost of $0.3 million to $3 million each. Thus, the radar missile investment over that period far exceeded the value of enemy aircraft destroyed, and furthermore had very little of the intended BVR effectiveness.
However, continuing heavy development investment and rapidly advancing electronic technology led to significant improvement in radar missile reliabilities from the late 1970s onward. Radar guided missiles achieved 75% Pk (9 kills out of 12 shots) in operations in the Gulf War in 1991. The percentage of kills achieved by radar guided missiles also surpassed 50% of total kills for the first time by 1991. Since 1991, 20 of 61 kills worldwide have been beyond-visual-range using radar missiles. Discounting an accidental friendly fire kill, in operational use the AIM-120D (the current main American radar guided missile) has achieved 9 kills out of 16 shots for a 56% Pk. Six of these kills were BVR, out of 13 shots, for a 46% BVR Pk. Though all these kills were against less capable opponents who were not equipped with operating radar, electronic countermeasures, or a comparable weapon themselves, the BVR Pk was a significant improvement from earlier eras. However, a current concern is electronic countermeasures to radar missiles, which are thought to be reducing the effectiveness of the AIM-120D. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fighter aircraft | The percentage of kills achieved by radar guided missiles also surpassed 50% of total kills for the first time by 1991. Since 1991, 20 of 61 kills worldwide have been beyond-visual-range using radar missiles. Discounting an accidental friendly fire kill, in operational use the AIM-120D (the current main American radar guided missile) has achieved 9 kills out of 16 shots for a 56% Pk. Six of these kills were BVR, out of 13 shots, for a 46% BVR Pk. Though all these kills were against less capable opponents who were not equipped with operating radar, electronic countermeasures, or a comparable weapon themselves, the BVR Pk was a significant improvement from earlier eras. However, a current concern is electronic countermeasures to radar missiles, which are thought to be reducing the effectiveness of the AIM-120D. Some experts believe that as of 2016 the European Meteor missile, the Russian R-37M, and the Chinese PL-15 are more resistant to countermeasures and more effective than the AIM-120D.
Now that higher reliabilities have been achieved, both types of missiles allow the fighter pilot to often avoid the risk of the short-range dogfight, where only the more experienced and skilled fighter pilots tend to prevail, and where even the finest fighter pilot can simply get unlucky. Taking maximum advantage of complicated missile parameters in both attack and defense against competent opponents does take considerable experience and skill, but against surprised opponents lacking comparable capability and countermeasures, air-to-air missile warfare is relatively simple. By partially automating air-to-air combat and reducing reliance on gun kills mostly achieved by only a small expert fraction of fighter pilots, air-to-air missiles now serve as highly effective force multipliers.
See also: List of fighter aircraft
List of United States fighter aircraft
Warbird
Notes:
References:
Citations:
Bibliography: Ahlgren, Jan; Linner, Anders; Wigert, Lars (2002), Gripen, the First Fourth Generation Fighter, Swedish Air Force and Saab Aerospace, ISBN 91-972803-8-0
Burton, James (1993), The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 978-1-61251-369-0
Blume, August G. (1968). Miller, Jr., Thomas G. (ed.). "Cross and Cockade Journal". History of the Serbian Air Force. Vol. 9, no. 3. Whittier, California: The Society of World War I Aero Historians.
Coox, Alvin (1985), Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939, Stanford University Press, ISBN 0-8047-1160-7
Coram, Robert (2002), Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, Little, Brown, and Company, ISBN 0-316-88146-5
Cross, Roy (1962), The Fighter Aircraft Pocket Book, Jarrold and Sons, Ltd.
Eden, Paul (2004), The Encyclopedia of Aircraft of WWII, Amber Books, Ltd, London, ISBN 1-904687-07-5
Glenny, Misha (2012). The Balkans: 1804–2012. New York, New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-1-77089-273-6.
Grove, Eric; Ireland, Bernard (1997), Jane's War at Sea, Harper Collins Publishers, UK, ISBN 0-00-472065-2
Gunston, Bill; Spick, Mike (1983), Modern Air Combat, Crescent Books, ISBN 91-972803-8-0
Hammond, Grant T. (2001), The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security, Smithsonian Institution Press, ISBN 1-56098-941-6
Huenecke, Klaus (1987), Modern Combat Aircraft Design, Airlife Publishing Limited, ISBN 0-517-412659
Lee, John (1942), Fighter Facts and Fallacies, William Morrow and Company
Munson, Kenneth (1976). Fighters Attack and Training Aircraft 1914-1919, Revised Edn, Blandford.
Shaw, Robert (1985), Fighter Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 0-87021-059-9
Spick, Mike (1995), Designed for the Kill: The Jet Fighter—Development and Experience, United States Naval Institute, ISBN 0-87021-059-9
Spick, Mike (1987), An Illustrated Guide to Modern Fighter Combat, Salamander Books Limited, ISBN 0-86101-319-0
Spick, Mike (2000), Brassey's Modern Fighters, Pegasus Publishing Limited, ISBN 1-57488-247-3
Sprey, Pierre (1982), "Comparing the Effectiveness of Air-to-Air Fighters: F-86 to F-18" (PDF), U.S. DoD Contract MDA 903-81-C-0312, archived from the original (PDF) on 27 August 2021, retrieved 2 July 2016
Stevenson, James (1993), The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 1-55750-775-9
Stimson, George (1983), Introduction to Airborne Radar, Hughes Aircraft Company
Stuart, William (1978), Northrop F-5 Case Study in Aircraft Design, Northrop Corp.
Wagner, Raymond (2000), Mustang Designer: Edgar Schmued and the P-51, Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press
External links:
Fighter generations comparison chart on theaviationist.com |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fire and movement | History: The Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus was likely the first to use the tactic in wartime, in the Thirty Years' War, against his Habsburg opponents.
Fire and movement became particularly important when more and more rifled muskets and breech-loading weapons, later followed by machine guns, were fielded on the battlefields of the 19th century. The increased accuracy, range and rate of fire translated into more firepower, allowing smaller units to operate more independently. This marked the transition from first- to second-generation warfare that saw the increasing application of fire and movement on the tactical level.
During the First Boer War, it was a standard Boer tactic, and contributed to a series of victories, culminating at the Battle of Majuba Hill.
According to Stephen Biddle, the effective use of fire and maneuver was the key to ending the stalemates on the lines of the Western Front during the final months of World War I. Since that time, he argues, mastery of fire and maneuver has been one of the central components of successful military tactics in modern land warfare.
Overview: Fire and movement can be performed by any unit made up of at least two soldiers. The first part of the military unit suppresses the enemy by firing from behind cover, while the second advances. After a short time, the advancing unit will halt behind cover and open fire, allowing the first unit to advance. The two parts of the unit will repeat the cycle until the objective is met. Enemy suppression can also be achieved with direct and/or indirect fire from combat support units. Artillery, mortars and armor are a few examples of combat support units often used in fire and movement.
In the United States military, a basic fire and movement tactic is called bounding overwatch. There also exists several variations of overwatch, generally adding further description to more accurately describe the specific maneuver.
A unit fires upon an enemy to distract or suppress them allowing another unit to assault, flank or encircle the enemy. The enemy will be pinned down and cannot react, and will be forced to take cover until the flanking unit engages them.
Phase 1: Suppression: Heavy and continuous suppressive fire keeps an opponent in a defensive posture (hunkered in their foxholes instead of taking aimed shots) and therefore limits the enemy's overall firepower. Suppressive fire also prevents the enemy from properly assessing the attack and organizing a coherent and coordinated defense or counter-attack.
Phase 2: Advance: While a base of fire is set up, the second unit will advance to cover in front, in the process setting up a new base of fire at this point. After a new base of fire has been set up, the first unit will advance, under cover of the new fire base, to a new position and set up another base of fire.
Phase 3: Assault: These actions are repeated until the units have closed upon the enemy position. At this point they engage directly with the enemy, often with grenade-throwing, close-quarters battle techniques, and hand-to-hand combat.
In film: This tactic was used in the British film, Bravo Two Zero. A small unit of SAS soldiers is attacked from the rear in open desert by a mechanized unit of the Iraq Army. Turning to face the threat, the SAS fought in a series of bounds and over watches while utilizing overwhelming firepower to get within hand grenade range, thereby eliminating the attack from the rear.
The tactic is also used in the Michael Mann film Heat. After a bank robbery is foiled by police, the criminal gang use their overwhelming firepower (automatic rifles, versus the police's handguns and shotguns) to escape. The film is frequently cited as one of the most realistic depictions of fire and movement in cinema, and has been shown to Army and Special Forces members as a classic example of the practice. Ex-Special Air Service member Andy McNab was a technical advisor for the film.
Fire and Cover tactics are used in the film Full Metal Jacket when they move into the destroyed city to engage the sniper.
See also: Infiltration tactics
Bounding overwatch
Center Peel
Overwatch (military tactic)
Siege
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fire support | Overview: Fire support generally consists of fire from heavy or crew-served weaponry with high firepower, including strikes and barrages from artillery, mortars, rocket artillery, and missiles; naval gunfire support from naval artillery; airstrikes, strafes, and close air support from military aircraft; and drone strikes from unmanned combat aerial vehicles; among various other forms. Fire support is typically ordered and directed by an observer (e.g. artillery observer, forward air controller, etc.) on the front line, and provided by a weapon crew or operator in the rear, usually from a fortification, vehicle, or facility (such as a fire support base).
Fire support is used to support and supplement military units that may lack the capabilities or firepower offered by fire support. For example, an infantry unit needing heavy explosives to bombard an enemy emplacement, or a large smoke screen to cover their advance, and lacking the ability to do so themselves (e.g. insufficient effectiveness using grenades), may call for fire support from a capable nearby mortar unit.
Fire support can reduce friendly casualties whilst devastating enemy capabilities and morale. Effective use of fire support—as seen during the 2018 Battle of Khasham of the Syrian Civil War, where an outnumbered force used various forms of fire support to their advantage, avoiding serious casualties—may help swing a battle in one's favor.
History: Varying forms of fire support have existed since the advent of early cannons and rockets, which were used to bombard enemy positions and fortifications to support infantry. Warships have long provided fire support using their cannons. The use of fire support in its current form developed during World War I and World War II, when combined arms and advances in technology and tactics made fire support increasingly effective.
Definition: Fire support is defined as "assistance to infantry and armored units by artillery fire, naval gunfire, and airplane strafing and bombing."
Early cannons (1300-1599): Early versions of artillery included the Roman ballista, essentially a large, mounted version of a crossbow that fired a single arrow. The first documented use of bombards, (large mortars) in Europe as we know them today was at the siege of Algeciras in 1343. By the 1470s, casting and metal work dramatically improved, giving way to the modern cannon. In the early 15th century, cast iron balls were invented for cannons. These balls, combined with gunpowder, were commonly used during sieges. By around 1550, the French had begun categorizing their guns by caliber, leading to a more organized formation of artillery.
Renaissance and revolutionary cannons (1600-1790): Circa 1650, the French garrison gun was invented. The garrison gun was usually mounted and tied down to reduce recoil, and could be mounted in very small spaces. By the mid-18th century artillery pieces were making an appearance in North America, most notably during the French and Indian War. Artillery was later used by the Americans in their war for independence. The Continental Army used cannons captured at Fort Ticonderoga to win the Battle of Yorktown, the last major battle of the American Revolution.
Fire support during World War I and World War II (1914-1945): During the first World War, fire support was mostly used preemptively before an infantry attack. Artillery was often used to destroy enemy forces and positions, as well as obstacles in and near trenches. During this time, we also see the introduction of chemical fire support, using chemical compounds inside of shells in addition to conventional armaments. During the second World War, there was a joint usage of fire support by field artillery, naval fire support and air support. Field artillery was mainly in the western and eastern theaters, while naval fire support was used during the pacific theater, however a large number of ships were used to give fire support on D-Day. During World War II there was a large use of aerial fire support that included major improvements in technology in all theaters and campaigns of the second world war.
Fire support in Vietnam (1955–1974): During the Vietnam War, fire support was used to flush out Viet Cong positions. Most notably, napalm was used to destroy forests and jungles, resulting in less cover for the enemy.
Fire support in recent warfare (since 1975): During Operation Desert Storm the United States used fire support, particularly onboard naval craft to bombard positions. During this operation, we also see the introduction of drones into combat, as a way to provide fire support from the air without a manned aircraft. During Operation Desert storm, Artillery was used to achieve a decisive victory by coalition forces. More recently Artillery has been used in the Russo-Ukrainian war to bombard troops and key positions. When the war first broke out, the United States sent artillery aid including shells, cannons and Patriot missile defense systems to aid Ukraine. As of 2023, Fire support by tanks and artillery have been used by the Israeli Defense Force to bombard key positions in the war against Hamas.
Gallery:
See also: Fire support base
Fire support team
References:
Admin. “U.S. and German Field Artillery in World War II: A Comparison.” The Army Historical Foundation, 7 Apr. 2023, armyhistory.org/u-s-and-german-field-artillery-in-world-war-ii-a-comparison/. Accessed 14 May 2024.
Alexd. “Guadalcanal: The Joint Fight: The National WWII Museum: New Orleans.” The National WWII Museum | New Orleans, The National World War II Museum, 8 Feb. 2023, www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/guadalcanal-joint-fight-0. Accessed 14 May 2024.
“Artillery Played ‘decisive’ Role in 1st Gulf War.” AUSA, 7 Aug. 2020, www.ausa.org/news/artillery-played-%E2%80%98decisive%E2%80%99-role-1st-gulf-war. Accessed 14 May 2024.
Blosser, Kelly. “Naval Surface Fire Support—Mission Planning and Coordination.” US Navy, 1996, Accessed 02 May 2024.
“Bombardments and Barrages: Preparing American Artillery for the Front in World War I.” American Battle Monuments Commission, 24 Oct. 2017, www.abmc.gov/news-events/news/bombardments-and-barrages-preparing-american-artillery-front-world-war-i#:~:text=New%20techniques%20they%20learned%20allowed,fire%20into%20a%20defined%20area. Accessed 14 May 2024.
Coyne, James. “Weapons - Drones (Rpvs) | The Gulf War | Frontline.” PBS, Public Broadcasting Service, 1993, www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/weapons/drones.html#:~:text=According%20to%20a%20May%201991,Corps%2094%3B%20the%20Army%2048. Accessed 14 May 2024.
Golonka, Adrian. “The Role of Artillery in Joint Fire Support.” Safety & Defense, Safeth & Defense, 3 Nov. 2021, sd-magazine.eu/index.php/sd/article/view/136. Accessed 14 May 2024.
Admin. “U.S. and German Field Artillery in World War II: A Comparison.” The Army Historical Foundation, 7 Apr. 2023, armyhistory.org/u-s-and-german-field-artillery-in-world-war-ii-a-comparison/. Accessed 14 May 2024.
Alexd. “Guadalcanal: The Joint Fight: The National WWII Museum: New Orleans.” The National WWII Museum | New Orleans, The National World War II Museum, 8 Feb. 2023, www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/guadalcanal-joint-fight-0. Accessed 14 May 2024.
“Artillery Played ‘decisive’ Role in 1st Gulf War.” AUSA, 7 Aug. 2020, www.ausa.org/news/artillery-played-%E2%80%98decisive%E2%80%99-role-1st-gulf-war. Accessed 14 May 2024.
Blosser, Kelly. “Naval Surface Fire Support—Mission Planning and Coordination.” US Navy, 1996, Accessed 02 May 2024.
“Bombardments and Barrages: Preparing American Artillery for the Front in World War I.” American Battle Monuments Commission, 24 Oct. 2017, www.abmc.gov/news-events/news/bombardments-and-barrages-preparing-american-artillery-front-world-war-i#:~:text=New%20techniques%20they%20learned%20allowed,fire%20into%20a%20defined%20area. Accessed 14 May 2024.
Coyne, James. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fire support | 2020, www.ausa.org/news/artillery-played-%E2%80%98decisive%E2%80%99-role-1st-gulf-war. Accessed 14 May 2024.
Blosser, Kelly. “Naval Surface Fire Support—Mission Planning and Coordination.” US Navy, 1996, Accessed 02 May 2024.
“Bombardments and Barrages: Preparing American Artillery for the Front in World War I.” American Battle Monuments Commission, 24 Oct. 2017, www.abmc.gov/news-events/news/bombardments-and-barrages-preparing-american-artillery-front-world-war-i#:~:text=New%20techniques%20they%20learned%20allowed,fire%20into%20a%20defined%20area. Accessed 14 May 2024.
Coyne, James. “Weapons - Drones (Rpvs) | The Gulf War | Frontline.” PBS, Public Broadcasting Service, 1993, www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/weapons/drones.html#:~:text=According%20to%20a%20May%201991,Corps%2094%3B%20the%20Army%2048. Accessed 14 May 2024.
Golonka, Adrian. “The Role of Artillery in Joint Fire Support.” Safety & Defense, Safeth & Defense, 3 Nov. 2021, sd-magazine.eu/index.php/sd/article/view/136. Accessed 14 May 2024.
A graduate of the Naval Academy in 1930 Commander McMillian has had considerable and varied experience in connection with gunfire support strategy and tactics. He prepared the gunfire support plans for Attu. “Gunfire Support Lessons Learned in World War II.” U.S. Naval Institute, 10 Dec. 2020, www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1948/august/gunfire-support-lessons-learned-world-war-ii. Accessed 14 May 2024.
Manucy, Albert C. Artillery through the Ages: A Short Illustrated History of Cannon, Emphasizing Types Used in America. Division of Publications, National Park Service, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 1985.
O’Donohue, Daniel. Jont Fire Support. United States Military, 2019, Joint Publication 3-09, Accessed 29 Apr. 2024.
Ratiliff, Timothy. “Field Artillery and Fire Support at the Operational Level: An Analysis of Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom.” School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Military, 2017, pp. 1–49.
Why, Robert A. “The Evolution of Fire Support Doctrine Was Driven by Airmobile Doctrine and New Weapon Systems During the Vietnam War.” Mansfield State University, 2004, pp. 1–90.
“World War II Aviation.” Homepage, Smithosnian, 13 July 2006, airandspace.si.edu/exhibitions/world-war-ii-aviation-uh. Accessed 14 May 2024.
A graduate of the Naval Academy in 1930 Commander McMillian has had considerable and varied experience in connection with gunfire support strategy and tactics. He prepared the gunfire support plans for Attu. “Gunfire Support Lessons Learned in World War II.” U.S. Naval Institute, 10 Dec. 2020, www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1948/august/gunfire-support-lessons-learned-world-war-ii. Accessed 14 May 2024.
Manucy, Albert C. Artillery through the Ages: A Short Illustrated History of Cannon, Emphasizing Types Used in America. Division of Publications, National Park Service, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 1985.
O’Donohue, Daniel. Jont Fire Support. United States Military, 2019, Joint Publication 3-09, Accessed 29 Apr. 2024.
Ratiliff, Timothy. “Field Artillery and Fire Support at the Operational Level: An Analysis of Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom.” School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Military, 2017, pp. 1–49.
Why, Robert A. “The Evolution of Fire Support Doctrine Was Driven by Airmobile Doctrine and New Weapon Systems During the Vietnam War.” Mansfield State University, 2004, pp. 1–90.
“World War II Aviation.” Homepage, Smithosnian, 13 July 2006, airandspace.si.edu/exhibitions/world-war-ii-aviation-uh. Accessed 14 May 2024. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fire-control radar | Operational phases: Fire-control radars operate in three different phases:
Designation or vectoring phase
The fire-control radar must be directed to the general location of the target due to the radar's narrow beam width. This phase is also called "lighting up". It ends when lock-on is acquired.
Acquisition phase
The fire-control radar switches to the acquisition phase of operation once the radar is in the general vicinity of the target. During this phase, the radar system searches in the designated area in a predetermined search pattern until the target is located or redesignated. This phase terminates when a weapon is launched.
Tracking phase
The fire-control radar enters into the track phase when the target is located. The radar system locks onto the target during this phase. This phase ends when the target is destroyed.
Performance: The performance of a fire-control radar is determined primarily by two factors: radar resolution and atmospheric conditions. Radar resolution is the ability of the radar to differentiate between two targets closely located. The first, and most difficult, is range resolution, finding exactly how far is the target. To do this well, in a basic fire-control radar system, it must send very short pulses. Bearing resolution is typically ensured by using a narrow (one or two degree) beam width. Atmospheric conditions, such as moisture lapse, temperature inversion, and dust particles affect radar performance as well. Moisture lapse and temperature inversion often cause ducting, in which RF energy is bent as it passes through hot and cold layers. This can either extend or shorten the radar horizon, depending on which way the RF is bent. Dust particles, as well as water droplets, cause attenuation of the RF energy, resulting in a loss of effective range. In both cases, a lower pulse repetition frequency makes the radar less susceptible to atmospheric conditions.
Countermeasures: Most fire-control radars have unique characteristics, such as radio frequency, pulse duration, pulse frequency and power. These can assist in identifying the radar, and therefore the weapon system it is controlling. This can provide valuable tactical information, like the maximum range of the weapon, or flaws that can be exploited, to combatants that are listening for these signs. During the Cold War Soviet fire control radars were often named and NATO pilots would be able to identify the threats present by the radar signals they received.
Surface based: One of the first successful fire-control radars, the SCR-584, was used effectively and extensively by the Allies during World War II for anti-aircraft gun laying. Since World War II, the U.S. Army has used radar for directing anti-aircraft missiles including the MIM-23 Hawk, the Nike series and currently the MIM-104 Patriot.
Ship based: Examples of fire-control radars currently in use by the United States Navy:
Mk 95 — Continuous Wave Illuminator (NATO Sea sparrow Surface Missile System)
Mk 92 — Combined Antenna System (Mk 75 Gun, formerly SM-1 missiles)
AN/SPG-62 — Continuous Wave Illuminator (AEGIS)
AN/SPQ-9B — Pulse Doppler (Mk 45 lightweight gun)
Aircraft based: After World War II, airborne fire control radars have evolved from the simpler gun and rocket laying AN/APG-36 system used in the F-86D to the active electronically scanned array-based AN/APG-81 of the F-35 Lightning II.
See also: Index of aviation articles
Radar configurations and types
List of radars
List of military electronics of the United States
Ship gun fire-control system
References: US Navy, Fire Controlman, Volume 02—Fire Control Radar Fundamentals (Revised)
External links: AN/APG Fire Control Systems at GlobalSecurity.org |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fire-control system | Naval fire control:
Origins: The original fire-control systems were developed for ships.
The early history of naval fire control was dominated by the engagement of targets within visual range (also referred to as direct fire). In fact, most naval engagements before 1800 were conducted at ranges of 20 to 50 yards (20 to 50 m).
Even during the American Civil War, the famous engagement between USS Monitor and CSS Virginia was often conducted at less than 100 yards (90 m) range.
Rapid technical improvements in the late 19th century greatly increased the range at which gunfire was possible. Rifled guns of much larger size firing explosive shells of lighter relative weight (compared to all-metal balls) so greatly increased the range of the guns that the main problem became aiming them while the ship was moving on the waves. This problem was solved with the introduction of the gyroscope, which corrected this motion and provided sub-degree accuracies. Guns were now free to grow to any size, and quickly surpassed 10 inches (250 mm) calibre by the 1890s. These guns were capable of such great range that the primary limitation was seeing the target, leading to the use of high masts on ships.
Another technical improvement was the introduction of the steam turbine which greatly increased the performance of the ships. Earlier reciprocating engine powered capital ships were capable of perhaps 16 knots, but the first large turbine ships were capable of over 20 knots. Combined with the long range of the guns, this meant that the target ship could move a considerable distance, several ship lengths, between the time the shells were fired and landed. One could no longer eyeball the aim with any hope of accuracy. Moreover, in naval engagements it is also necessary to control the firing of several guns at once.
Naval gun fire control potentially involves three levels of complexity. Local control originated with primitive gun installations aimed by the individual gun crews. Director control aims all guns on the ship at a single target. Coordinated gunfire from a formation of ships at a single target was a focus of battleship fleet operations. Corrections are made for surface wind velocity, firing ship roll and pitch, powder magazine temperature, drift of rifled projectiles, individual gun bore diameter adjusted for shot-to-shot enlargement, and rate of change of range with additional modifications to the firing solution based upon the observation of preceding shots.
The resulting directions, known as a firing solution, would then be fed back out to the turrets for laying. If the rounds missed, an observer could work out how far they missed by and in which direction, and this information could be fed back into the computer along with any changes in the rest of the information and another shot attempted.
At first, the guns were aimed using the technique of artillery spotting. It involved firing a gun at the target, observing the projectile's point of impact (fall of shot), and correcting the aim based on where the shell was observed to land, which became more and more difficult as the range of the gun increased.
Between the American Civil War and 1905, numerous small improvements, such as telescopic sights and optical rangefinders, were made in fire control. There were also procedural improvements, like the use of plotting boards to manually predict the position of a ship during an engagement.
World War I: Then increasingly sophisticated mechanical calculators were employed for proper gun laying, typically with various spotters and distance measures being sent to a central plotting station deep within the ship. There the fire direction teams fed in the location, speed and direction of the ship and its target, as well as various adjustments for Coriolis effect, weather effects on the air, and other adjustments. Around 1905, mechanical fire control aids began to become available, such as the Dreyer Table, Dumaresq (which was also part of the Dreyer Table), and Argo Clock, but these devices took a number of years to become widely deployed. These devices were early forms of rangekeepers.
Arthur Pollen and Frederic Charles Dreyer independently developed the first such systems. Pollen began working on the problem after noting the poor accuracy of naval artillery at a gunnery practice near Malta in 1900. Lord Kelvin, widely regarded as Britain's leading scientist first proposed using an analogue computer to solve the equations which arise from the relative motion of the ships engaged in the battle and the time delay in the flight of the shell to calculate the required trajectory and therefore the direction and elevation of the guns.
Pollen aimed to produce a combined mechanical computer and automatic plot of ranges and rates for use in centralised fire control. To obtain accurate data of the target's position and relative motion, Pollen developed a plotting unit (or plotter) to capture this data. To this he added a gyroscope to allow for the yaw of the firing ship. Like the plotter, the primitive gyroscope of the time required substantial development to provide continuous and reliable guidance. Although the trials in 1905 and 1906 were unsuccessful, they showed promise. Pollen was encouraged in his efforts by the rapidly rising figure of Admiral Jackie Fisher, Admiral Arthur Knyvet Wilson and the Director of Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes (DNO), John Jellicoe. Pollen continued his work, with occasional tests carried out on Royal Navy warships.
Meanwhile, a group led by Dreyer designed a similar system. Although both systems were ordered for new and existing ships of the Royal Navy, the Dreyer system eventually found most favour with the Navy in its definitive Mark IV* form. The addition of director control facilitated a full, practicable fire control system for World War I ships, and most RN capital ships were so fitted by mid 1916. The director was high up over the ship where operators had a superior view over any gunlayer in the turrets. It was also able to co-ordinate the fire of the turrets so that their combined fire worked together. This improved aiming and larger optical rangefinders improved the estimate of the enemy's position at the time of firing. The system was eventually replaced by the improved "Admiralty Fire Control Table" for ships built after 1927.
World War II: During their long service life, rangekeepers were updated often as technology advanced, and by World War II they were a critical part of an integrated fire-control system. The incorporation of radar into the fire-control system early in World War II provided ships the ability to conduct effective gunfire operations at long range in poor weather and at night. For U.S. Navy gun fire control systems, see ship gun fire-control systems.
The use of director-controlled firing, together with the fire control computer, removed the control of the gun laying from the individual turrets to a central position; although individual gun mounts and multi-gun turrets would retain a local control option for use when battle damage limited director information transfer (these would be simpler versions called "turret tables" in the Royal Navy). Guns could then be fired in planned salvos, with each gun giving a slightly different trajectory. Dispersion of shot caused by differences in individual guns, individual projectiles, powder ignition sequences, and transient distortion of ship structure was undesirably large at typical naval engagement ranges. Directors high on the superstructure had a better view of the enemy than a turret mounted sight, and the crew operating them were distant from the sound and shock of the guns. Gun directors were topmost, and the ends of their optical rangefinders protruded from their sides, giving them a distinctive appearance.
Unmeasured and uncontrollable ballistic factors, like high-altitude temperature, humidity, barometric pressure, wind direction and velocity, required final adjustment through observation of the fall of shot. Visual range measurement (of both target and shell splashes) was difficult prior to the availability of radar. The British favoured coincidence rangefinders while the Germans favoured the stereoscopic type. The former were less able to range on an indistinct target but easier on the operator over a long period of use, the latter the reverse.
Submarines were also equipped with fire control computers for the same reasons, but their problem was even more pronounced; in a typical "shot", the torpedo would take one to two minutes to reach its target. Calculating the proper "lead" given the relative motion of the two vessels was very difficult, and torpedo data computers were added to dramatically improve the speed of these calculations.
In a typical World War II British ship the fire control system connected the individual gun turrets to the director tower (where the sighting instruments were located) and the analogue computer in the heart of the ship. In the director tower, operators trained their telescopes on the target; one telescope measured elevation and the other bearing. Rangefinder telescopes on a separate mounting measured the distance to the target. These measurements were converted by the Fire Control Table into the bearings and elevations for the guns to fire upon. In the turrets, the gunlayers adjusted the elevation of their guns to match an indicator for the elevation transmitted from the Fire Control table—a turret layer did the same for bearing. When the guns were on target they were centrally fired.
Even with as much mechanization of the process, it still required a large human element; the Transmitting Station (the room that housed the Dreyer table) for HMS Hood's main guns housed 27 crew.
Directors were largely unprotected from enemy fire. It was difficult to put much weight of armour so high up on the ship, and even if the armour did stop a shot, the impact alone would likely knock the instruments out of alignment. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fire-control system | Rangefinder telescopes on a separate mounting measured the distance to the target. These measurements were converted by the Fire Control Table into the bearings and elevations for the guns to fire upon. In the turrets, the gunlayers adjusted the elevation of their guns to match an indicator for the elevation transmitted from the Fire Control table—a turret layer did the same for bearing. When the guns were on target they were centrally fired.
Even with as much mechanization of the process, it still required a large human element; the Transmitting Station (the room that housed the Dreyer table) for HMS Hood's main guns housed 27 crew.
Directors were largely unprotected from enemy fire. It was difficult to put much weight of armour so high up on the ship, and even if the armour did stop a shot, the impact alone would likely knock the instruments out of alignment. Sufficient armour to protect from smaller shells and fragments from hits to other parts of the ship was the limit.
The performance of the analog computer was impressive. The battleship USS North Carolina during a 1945 test was able to maintain an accurate firing solution on a target during a series of high-speed turns.
It is a major advantage for a warship to be able to maneuver while engaging a target.
Night naval engagements at long range became feasible when radar data could be input to the rangekeeper. The effectiveness of this combination was demonstrated in November 1942 at the Third Battle of Savo Island when the USS Washington engaged the Japanese battleship Kirishima at a range of 8,400 yards (7.7 km) at night. Kirishima was set aflame, suffered a number of explosions, and was scuttled by her crew. She had been hit by at least nine 16-inch (410 mm) rounds out of 75 fired (12% hit rate).
The wreck of Kirishima was discovered in 1992 and showed that the entire bow section of the ship was missing.
The Japanese during World War II did not develop radar or automated fire control to the level of the US Navy and were at a significant disadvantage.
Post-1945: By the 1950s gun turrets were increasingly unmanned, with gun laying controlled remotely from the ship's control centre using inputs from radar and other sources.
The last combat action for the analog rangekeepers, at least for the US Navy, was in the 1991 Persian Gulf War when the rangekeepers on the Iowa-class battleships directed their last rounds in combat.
Aircraft based fire control:
World War II bomb sights: An early use of fire-control systems was in bomber aircraft, with the use of computing bombsights that accepted altitude and airspeed information to predict and display the impact point of a bomb released at that time. The best known United States device was the Norden bombsight.
World War II aerial gunnery sights: Simple systems, known as lead computing sights also made their appearance inside aircraft late in the war as gyro gunsights. These devices used a gyroscope to measure turn rates, and moved the gunsight's aim-point to take this into account, with the aim point presented through a reflector sight. The only manual "input" to the sight was the target distance, which was typically handled by dialing in the size of the target's wing span at some known range. Small radar units were added in the post-war period to automate even this input, but it was some time before they were fast enough to make the pilots completely happy with them. The first implementation of a centralized fire control system in a production aircraft was on the B-29.
Post-World War II systems: By the start of the Vietnam War, a new computerized bombing predictor, called the Low Altitude Bombing System (LABS), began to be integrated into the systems of aircraft equipped to carry nuclear armaments. This new bomb computer was revolutionary in that the release command for the bomb was given by the computer, not the pilot; the pilot designated the target using the radar or other targeting system, then "consented" to release the weapon, and the computer then did so at a calculated "release point" some seconds later. This is very different from previous systems, which, though they had also become computerized, still calculated an "impact point" showing where the bomb would fall if the bomb were released at that moment. The key advantage is that the weapon can be released accurately even when the plane is maneuvering. Most bombsights until this time required that the plane maintain a constant attitude (usually level), though dive-bombing sights were also common.
The LABS system was originally designed to facilitate a tactic called toss bombing, to allow the aircraft to remain out of range of a weapon's blast radius. The principle of calculating the release point, however, was eventually integrated into the fire control computers of later bombers and strike aircraft, allowing level, dive and toss bombing. In addition, as the fire control computer became integrated with ordnance systems, the computer can take the flight characteristics of the weapon to be launched into account.
Land based fire control:
Anti-aircraft based fire control: By the start of World War II, aircraft altitude performance had increased so much that anti-aircraft guns had similar predictive problems, and were increasingly equipped with fire-control computers. The main difference between these systems and the ones on ships was size and speed. The early versions of the High Angle Control System, or HACS, of Britain's Royal Navy were examples of a system that predicted based upon the assumption that target speed, direction, and altitude would remain constant during the prediction cycle, which consisted of the time to fuze the shell and the time of flight of the shell to the target. The USN Mk 37 system made similar assumptions except that it could predict assuming a constant rate of altitude change. The Kerrison Predictor is an example of a system that was built to solve laying in "real time", simply by pointing the director at the target and then aiming the gun at a pointer it directed. It was also deliberately designed to be small and light, in order to allow it to be easily moved along with the guns it served.
The radar-based M-9/SCR-584 Anti-Aircraft System was used to direct air defense artillery since 1943. The MIT Radiation Lab's SCR-584 was the first radar system with automatic following, Bell Laboratory's M-9 was an electronic analog fire-control computer that replaced complicated and difficult-to-manufacture mechanical computers (such as the Sperry M-7 or British Kerrison predictor). In combination with the VT proximity fuze, this system accomplished the astonishing feat of shooting down V-1 cruise missiles with less than 100 shells per plane (thousands were typical in earlier AA systems). This system was instrumental in the defense of London and Antwerp against the V-1.
Although listed in Land based fire control section anti-aircraft fire control systems can also be found on naval and aircraft systems.
Coast artillery fire control: In the United States Army Coast Artillery Corps, Coast Artillery fire control systems began to be developed at the end of the 19th century and progressed on through World War II.
Early systems made use of multiple observation or base end stations (see Figure 1) to find and track targets attacking American harbors. Data from these stations were then passed to plotting rooms, where analog mechanical devices, such as the plotting board, were used to estimate targets' positions and derive firing data for batteries of coastal guns assigned to interdict them.
U.S. Coast Artillery forts bristled with a variety of armament, ranging from 12-inch coast defense mortars, through 3-inch and 6-inch mid-range artillery, to the larger guns, which included 10-inch and 12-inch barbette and disappearing carriage guns, 14-inch railroad artillery, and 16-inch cannon installed just prior to and up through World War II.
Fire control in the Coast Artillery became more and more sophisticated in terms of correcting firing data for such factors as weather conditions, the condition of powder used, or the Earth's rotation. Provisions were also made for adjusting firing data for the observed fall of shells. As shown in Figure 2, all of these data were fed back to the plotting rooms on a finely tuned schedule controlled by a system of time interval bells that rang throughout each harbor defense system.
It was only later in World War II that electro-mechanical gun data computers, connected to coast defense radars, began to replace optical observation and manual plotting methods in controlling coast artillery. Even then, the manual methods were retained as a back-up through the end of the war.
Direct and indirect fire control systems: Land based fire control systems can be used to aid in both Direct fire and Indirect fire weapon engagement. These systems can be found on weapons ranging from small handguns to large artillery weapons.
Modern fire control systems: Modern fire-control computers, like all high-performance computers, are digital. The added performance allows basically any input to be added, from air density and wind, to wear on the barrels and distortion due to heating. These sorts of effects are noticeable for any sort of gun, and fire-control computers have started appearing on smaller and smaller platforms. Tanks were one early use that automated gun laying had, using a laser rangefinder and a barrel-distortion meter. Fire-control computers are useful not just for aiming large cannons, but also for aiming machine guns, small cannons, guided missiles, rifles, grenades, and rockets—any kind of weapon that can have its launch or firing parameters varied. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fire-control system | Direct and indirect fire control systems: Land based fire control systems can be used to aid in both Direct fire and Indirect fire weapon engagement. These systems can be found on weapons ranging from small handguns to large artillery weapons.
Modern fire control systems: Modern fire-control computers, like all high-performance computers, are digital. The added performance allows basically any input to be added, from air density and wind, to wear on the barrels and distortion due to heating. These sorts of effects are noticeable for any sort of gun, and fire-control computers have started appearing on smaller and smaller platforms. Tanks were one early use that automated gun laying had, using a laser rangefinder and a barrel-distortion meter. Fire-control computers are useful not just for aiming large cannons, but also for aiming machine guns, small cannons, guided missiles, rifles, grenades, and rockets—any kind of weapon that can have its launch or firing parameters varied. They are typically installed on ships, submarines, aircraft, tanks and even on some small arms—for example, the grenade launcher developed for use on the Fabrique Nationale F2000 bullpup assault rifle. Fire-control computers have gone through all the stages of technology that computers have, with some designs based upon analogue technology and later vacuum tubes which were later replaced with transistors.
Fire-control systems are often interfaced with sensors (such as sonar, radar, infra-red search and track, laser range-finders, anemometers, wind vanes, thermometers, barometers, etc.) in order to cut down or eliminate the amount of information that must be manually entered in order to calculate an effective solution. Sonar, radar, IRST and range-finders can give the system the direction to and/or distance of the target. Alternatively, an optical sight can be provided that an operator can simply point at the target, which is easier than having someone input the range using other methods and gives the target less warning that it is being tracked. Typically, weapons fired over long ranges need environmental information—the farther a munition travels, the more the wind, temperature, air density, etc. will affect its trajectory, so having accurate information is essential for a good solution. Sometimes, for very long-range rockets, environmental data has to be obtained at high altitudes or in between the launching point and the target. Often, satellites or balloons are used to gather this information.
Once the firing solution is calculated, many modern fire-control systems are also able to aim and fire the weapon(s). Once again, this is in the interest of speed and accuracy, and in the case of a vehicle like an aircraft or tank, in order to allow the pilot/gunner/etc. to perform other actions simultaneously, such as tracking the target or flying the aircraft. Even if the system is unable to aim the weapon itself, for example the fixed cannon on an aircraft, it is able to give the operator cues on how to aim. Typically, the cannon points straight ahead and the pilot must maneuver the aircraft so that it oriented correctly before firing. In most aircraft the aiming cue takes the form of a "pipper" which is projected on the heads-up display (HUD). The pipper shows the pilot where the target must be relative to the aircraft in order to hit it. Once the pilot maneuvers the aircraft so that the target and pipper are superimposed, he or she fires the weapon, or on some aircraft the weapon will fire automatically at this point, in order to overcome the delay of the pilot. In the case of a missile launch, the fire-control computer may give the pilot feedback about whether the target is in range of the missile and how likely the missile is to hit if launched at any particular moment. The pilot will then wait until the probability reading is satisfactorily high before launching the weapon.
See also: Target acquisition
Counter-battery radar
Director (military)
Fire-control radar
List of U.S. Army fire control and sighting material by supply catalog designation
Predicted impact point
Ship gun fire-control systems
Tartar Guided Missile Fire Control System
References:
Further reading: Baxter, James Phinney (1946). Scientists Against Time. Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 0-26252-012-5.
Campbell, John (1985). Naval Weapons of World War Two. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-459-4.
Fairfield, A.P. (1921). Naval Ordnance. The Lord Baltimore Press.
Frieden, David R. (1985). Principles of Naval Weapons Systems. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-537-X.
Friedman, Norman (2008). Naval Firepower: Battleship Guns and Gunnery in the Dreadnought Era. Seaforth. ISBN 978-1-84415-701-3.
Hans, Mort; Taranovich, Steve (10 December 2012). "Design hindsight from the tail-gunner position of a WWII bomber, Part one". EDN. Retrieved 18 August 2020.
Pollen, Antony (1980). The Great Gunnery Scandal — The Mystery of Jutland. Collins. ISBN 0-00-216298-9.
Roch, Axel. "Fire-Control and Human-Computer Interaction: Towards a History of the Computer Mouse (1940-1965)". Stanford University. Archived from the original on 15 February 2020. Retrieved 18 August 2020.
Schleihauf, William (2001). "The Dumaresq and the Dreyer". Warship International. XXXVIII (1). International Naval Research Organization: 6–29. ISSN 0043-0374.
Schleihauf, William (2001). "The Dumaresq and the Dreyer, Part II". Warship International. XXXVIII (2). International Naval Research Organization: 164–201. ISSN 0043-0374.
Schleihauf, William (2001). "The Dumaresq and the Dreyer, Part III". Warship International. XXXVIII (3). International Naval Research Organization: 221–233. ISSN 0043-0374.
Wright, Christopher C. (2004). "Questions on the Effectiveness of U.S. Navy Battleship Gunnery: Notes on the Origin of U.S. Navy Gun Fire Control System Range Keepers". Warship International. XLI (1): 55–78. ISSN 0043-0374.
External links:
Between Human and Machine: Feedback, Control, and Computing Before Cybernetics – Google Books
BASIC programs for battleship and antiaircraft gun fire control Archived 2012-10-03 at the Wayback Machine
National Fire Control Symposium |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Flanking maneuver | Tactical flanking: The flanking maneuver is a basic military tactic with several variations. Flanking an enemy entails attacking from one or more sides, at an angle to the enemy's direction of engagement. There are three standard flanking maneuvers.
The first maneuver is the ambush, where a unit performs a surprise attack from a concealed position. Units friendly to the ambushing unit may be hidden to the sides of the ambush site to surround the enemy, but care must be taken in setting up fields of fire to avoid friendly fire. Ambush as a tactic is typically favored by smaller, more mobile forces, usually ones with favorable terrain. An example of this would be the Battle of Beaver Dams, where the British ambushed the Americans, halting their advance further inland to Canada.
The second type is used during an attack, where a unit encounters an enemy defensive position. Upon receiving fire from the enemy, the unit commander may decide to order a flank attack. A part of the attacking unit pins the enemy in place with suppressive fire, preventing them from returning fire, retreating or changing position to meet the flank attack. The flanking force then advances to the enemy flank and attacks them at close range. Coordination to avoid friendly fire is also important in this situation. This is employed largely by forces meeting each other with equal strength.
The third form of flanking maneuvers is the double envelopment, which involves simultaneous flank attacks on both sides of the enemy. An example is Hannibal's victory over the Roman army at the Battle of Cannae. Double envelopment can only be performed by widening friendly units or formations or opening gaps between them which results in weakening the center and similar battles to that of Gaugamela. Thus, it was often employed when severely outnumbering the opponent or against those without sufficient cavalry support.
Maneuvering: Flanking on land in the pre-modern era was usually achieved with cavalry (and rarely, chariots) due to their speed and maneuverability, while heavily armored infantry was commonly used to pin the enemy in place, as in the Battle of Pharsalus. Armored vehicles such as tanks replaced cavalry as the main force of flanking maneuvers in the 20th century, as seen in the Battle of France in World War II.
Defense: The use of flanking has been a consistent part of warfare since its invention. The responsibility of defending against flanks falls on the commander, who has to make the choice of how to best use terrain. In addition, the proper adjustment and positioning of soldiers is imperative in ensuring a protected flank.
Terrain: A commander could prevent being flanked by anchoring one or both parts of his line on terrain impassable to his enemies, such as gorges, lakes or mountains. Notable examples of this being the Spartans at the Battle of Thermopylae, Hannibal at the Battle of Lake Trasimene, and the Romans at the Battle of Watling Street. Although not strictly impassable, woods, forests, rivers, uneven, and marshy ground can also be used to anchor a flank: Henry V at Agincourt. However, in such instances, it was still wise to have skirmishers covering the flanks.
Fortification: In exceptional circumstances, an army may be fortunate enough to be able to anchor a flank with a friendly castle, fortress, or walled city. In such circumstances, it was necessary not to fix the line to the fortress but to allow a killing space between the fortress and the battle line so that any enemy forces attempting to flank the field forces could be brought under fire from the garrison. Natural strongholds formed by terrain can also be incorporated into the battle line: the Union positions of Culp's Hill, Cemetery Hill on the right flank, and Big Round Top and Little Round Top on the left flank at the Battle of Gettysburg. If time and circumstances allowed, field fortifications could be created or expanded to protect the flanks, as the Allied forces did with the hamlet of Papelotte and the farmhouse of Hougoumont on the left and right flanks at the Battle of Waterloo.
Formations: When the terrain favors neither side, it is down to the disposition of forces in the battle line to prevent flanking attacks. As long as they have had a place on the battlefield, it was the role of cavalry to be placed on the flanks of the infantry battle line. With speed and greater tactical flexibility, the cavalry could both make flanking attacks and guard against them. It was the marked superiority of Hannibal's cavalry at the Battle of Cannae that allowed him to chase off the Roman cavalry and complete the encirclement of the Roman legions. With equally-matched cavalry, commanders have been content to allow inaction, with the cavalry of both sides preventing the other from action.
In a case of no cavalry, inferior cavalry or in armies whose cavalry had gone off on their own (a common complaint), the lack of resulting advantage left the outcome depending on the disposition of the infantry to guard against flanking attacks. It was the danger of being flanked by the numerically superior Persians that led Miltiades to lengthen the Athenian line at the Battle of Marathon by decreasing the depth of the centre. The importance of the flank positions led to the practise, which became tradition of placing the best troops on the flanks. At the Battle of Platea, the Tegeans squabbled with the Athenians on who should have the privilege of holding a flank; both having conceded the honour of the right flank (the critical flank in the hoplite system) to the Spartans. That is the source of the tradition of giving the honour of the right to the most senior regiment present, which has persisted into the modern era.
With troops confident and reliable enough to operate in separate dispersed units, the echelon formation may be adopted. That can take different forms with either equally strong "divisions" or a massively reinforced wing or centre supported by smaller formations in step behind it (forming either a staircase like, or arrow like arrangement). When the foremost unit engages with the enemy the echeloned units remain out of action. The idea is for the enemy to attack the exposed flanks of the foremost unit, but the units immediately echeloned behind the foremost unit would then push forward taking the flankers themselves in the flank. If the echeloned unit is being attacked in turn, the unit behind it would move forward to again attack the flanks of the would be flankers. In theory a cascade of such engagements could occur all along the line for as many units as there were in echelon. In practise, that almost never happened since most enemy commanders saw it for what it was and so resisted the temptation of the initial easy flanking attack.
That prudence was used in the manifestation of the oblique order in which one wing was massively reinforced, creating a local superiority in numbers that could obliterate that part of the enemy line that it was sent against. The weaker echeloned units was sufficient to fix the greater portion of the enemy troops into inaction. With the battle on the wing won, the reinforced flank would turn and roll up the enemy battle line from the flank.
In the Roman chequer board formation, readopted by Renaissance militaries, each of the units in the front line could be thought of as having two lines of units echeloned behind it.
As warfare increased in size and scope and armies increased, armies could no longer hope to have a contiguous battle line. To be able to maneuver, it was necessary to introduce intervals between units and these intervals could be used to flank individual units in the battle line by fast acting-units such as cavalry. To guard against that, the infantry subunits were trained to be able to form squares rapidly that gave the cavalry no weak flank to attack. During the age of gunpowder, intervals between units could be increased because of the greater reach of the weapons, which raised the possibility of cavalry finding a gap in the line to exploit. Thus, the mark of good infantry was the rapid ability to form from line to square and back again.
Operational flanking: On an operational level army, commanders may attempt to flank and wrong foot entire enemy armies, rather than just being content with doing so at a tactical battalion or brigade level. The most infamous example of such an attempt was the modified Schlieffen Plan used by the Germans during the opening stages of the First World War. That was an attempt to avoid facing the French armies head on, but instead flank them by swinging through neutral Belgium.
Second fronts: Just as at the tactical level, where a commander can attempt to anchor his flanks, commanders try to do the same at the operational level. Examples are the Second World War's German Winter Line in Italy anchored by the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic Seas and the trench systems of the Western Front which ran from the North Sea to the Alps. Attacking such positions would be expensive in casualties and more than likely lead to stalemate. Flanking attacks into areas outside the main zone of contention might be attempted to break the stalemates.
If successful, such operations can be shattering, such as at the Inchon, and break into lightly held rear echelons of an enemy when its front line forces are committed elsewhere. Even when they are not entirely successful, such as at Anzio, the operations can relieve pressure on troops on the main battle front by forcing the enemy to divert resources to contain the new front.
The operations may have strategic objectives such as the Invasion of Italy itself, the Gallipoli, and the Normandy landings. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Flanking maneuver | Examples are the Second World War's German Winter Line in Italy anchored by the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic Seas and the trench systems of the Western Front which ran from the North Sea to the Alps. Attacking such positions would be expensive in casualties and more than likely lead to stalemate. Flanking attacks into areas outside the main zone of contention might be attempted to break the stalemates.
If successful, such operations can be shattering, such as at the Inchon, and break into lightly held rear echelons of an enemy when its front line forces are committed elsewhere. Even when they are not entirely successful, such as at Anzio, the operations can relieve pressure on troops on the main battle front by forcing the enemy to divert resources to contain the new front.
The operations may have strategic objectives such as the Invasion of Italy itself, the Gallipoli, and the Normandy landings.
Such a strategy is not new, as Hannibal attacked Rome by going over the Alps, rather than taking the obvious route. In return, Scipio Africanus was able to defeat Hannibal not by trying to face him in Italy but by first undermining his power base in Iberia and then attacking his home city, Carthage.
Strategic flanking: Flank attacks on the strategic level are seen when a nation or group of nations surround and attack an enemy from two or more directions, such as the Allies surrounding Nazi Germany in World War II. In those cases, the flanked country usually has to fight on two fronts at once, placing it at a disadvantage.
The danger of being strategically flanked has driven the political and diplomatic actions of nations even in peacetime. For example, the fear of being strategically flanked by the other in The Great Game between the British and the Russian Empires led to the expansion of both of them into China and the British eastwards into South-East Asia. The British feared that British India would be surrounded by a Persian and Central Asia satellite to Russia in the west and north and a Russian-dominated China in the east. A China under British influence would mean that the Russians would be penned in from the south and the east. Initially, the Russians were more successful than the British in gaining territorial concessions in China, but the British were able to counteract that by cultivating the emerging Empire of Japan as a counterweight to the Russians, a relationship that culminated in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
The Cold War had its own Great Game, with the US and USSR competing for influence in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. The division of Europe, the proxy wars in Asia, and events like the Cuban Missile Crisis were all of great strategic importance to the two competing hegemonies.
Historical examples:
See also: Battleplan (documentary TV series)
Pincer movement
Encirclement
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fleet in being | Use of the term: The term was first used in 1690 when Lord Torrington, commander of the Royal Navy forces in the English Channel, found himself facing a stronger French fleet. He proposed avoiding a sea battle, except under very favourable conditions, until he could be reinforced. By thus keeping his "fleet in being", he could maintain an active threat which would force the enemy to remain in the area and prevent them from taking the initiative elsewhere.
Secondary use: Rudyard Kipling published a series of articles about the British Channel Fleet under the title A Fleet in Being: Notes of Three Trips with the Channel Squadron in 1898, but did not use the term in the sense described here.
Concept: The "fleet in being" concept is based on the assumption that the fleet is relatively safe in port, even if near the enemy. While this is not necessarily true in the modern era, for much of human history a fleet that was at harbor was much less exposed to attack and to other hazards such as storms. This made it difficult, or even impossible, for an enemy to damage the fleet without taking disproportionate losses.
The enemy cannot simply ignore the fleet in being because it always has the option to sortie and attack wherever there are favourable terms. However, the blockading force has to be significant enough that the fleet in being cannot realistically attack it themselves. This creates a stalemate that favours the defender because the attacker always must deploy a superior force to counter them, and those units are unable to perform any other duties.
After the Battle of Taranto and the attack on Pearl Harbor, however, it became obvious that air power made a fleet concentrated in a port vulnerable, and a fleet in being became too risky to be practical. A port is a known location for an enemy to focus attacks on and a handful of aircraft or submarines can damage or sink multiple warships, even in the presence of advanced defenses. As a result, it is preferable for modern fleets to be at sea where their position is not fully known, which provides a degree of protection.
This has not made a fleet in being completely irrelevant because there are situations where an enemy is unwilling or unable to attack the fleet in harbour, such as for political reasons.
An example of this is during the Falklands Conflict. After looking at the alternatives, "The strategy that was accepted for the Argentine Navy [in the 1982 Falklands War] was one of a 'fleet in being' concept ... The fleet would not conduct a direct attack; they would only attack when the odds were in their favor. Otherwise, they would remain outside any declared British exclusion zones and wait for a target of opportunity." The Argentines were not able to make any positive use of their "fleet in being", because the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano by HMS Conqueror showed that the World War II-era cruisers and other assets of the Argentine Navy were vulnerable to attack from contemporary submarines.
The idea of a "fleet in being" can be generalised to forces other than naval. A fortress under siege is essentially an "army in being", which ties up enemy forces without taking the risk of fighting a battle.
While less developed there are a few similar cases for air forces. During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein used his air force with an operational doctrine analogous to "fleet in being". The mere presence of the Iraqi Air Force in hardened bunkers forced the coalition attacking Iraq to act cautiously and to escort its bomber sorties, until the aircraft shelters were found to be vulnerable.
In all cases the principle is the same. As long as a smaller force exists and has the choice to engage or not, the larger force is only able to conduct operations in sufficient strength to destroy the complete smaller force. This limits the enemy options significantly, and may even deny actions entirely. The closer that the smaller force is to the larger in strength, the more significant the effect will be.
History:
Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905: The first modern example was the stand-off between the Imperial Russian Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) at Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. Russia possessed three battle-fleets: one in the Baltic Sea, the second in the Black Sea, and the third in the Far East. The Pacific squadron in the Far East was stationed at Vladivostok and Port Arthur. With the latter being closer to the land war, Port Arthur became strategically more important.
The IJN possessed only one battle-fleet to the Russian Navy's three; therefore it was imperative that the IJN not have to fight all three of them simultaneously. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902 effectively eliminated the Black Sea fleet by keeping it blocked in the Black Sea, lest they risk war with Britain. However, the Baltic Fleet (later renamed the 2nd Pacific Squadron) had orders to reinforce the Port Arthur squadron sometime in 1905. It would be the IJN's mission to preempt that move.
Only after Port Arthur's "fleet in being" was eliminated could the Baltic Fleet and Japanese fleet square off; and this would happen the following year, during the Battle of Tsushima in May 1905.
In order to permanently eliminate Port Arthur's battle-squadron, the IJN initiated three operations. The first was a surprise destroyer torpedo attack inside the harbor in early February 1904. This was quickly followed up with an attempt to block the harbor's entrance by sinking old steam ships (block ships) in the channel. The third and final attempt of permanently bottling up the fleet was the mining of the waters surrounding the harbor's entrance. Although this last attempt also failed, it had the unintended consequence of robbing the Russian Navy of one of its most brilliant naval officers, Admiral Stepan Makarov. When his flagship, the battleship Petropavlovsk, struck one of those mines she sank almost immediately, drowning Makarov with the crew.
The "fleet in being" remained so, until under the new command of Admiral Vilgelm Vitgeft, the Port Arthur squadron was ordered to break out and steam for Vladivostok on 10 August 1904. Vitgeft's exit from Port Arthur resulted in the Battle of the Yellow Sea, an excessively long-ranged gun duel that resulted in no capital warships being sunk on either side, but finally eliminated Port Arthur's "fleet in being", as its warships became dispersed to neutral ports (where they were interned), and the survivors were so heavily damaged that they were no longer serviceable.
World War I: A later example is the stand-off between the German High Seas Fleet and the British Grand Fleet during World War I. Germany largely preferred to keep its fleet intact rather than taking the risk of losing a major engagement with the larger Royal Navy, particularly after the Battle of Jutland.
World War II: In World War II, actions of the Italian Regia Marina in 1940 also demonstrate the idea of a "fleet in being". After a number of minor battles against the Royal Navy that were mostly inconclusive, the bulk of Italian fleet was left in Taranto from where it could sortie very quickly against any British attempt to reach Malta, exerting a "disproportionate influence on British strategy and fleet disposition". Even after the great tactical success of the British aircraft carrier attack on Taranto in November 1940, the British failure to deliver a decisive blow to the Italian fleet resulted in the Royal Navy tying up substantial naval forces in the Mediterranean for the next three years.
Even more so than other surface vessels in Nazi Germany's Kriegsmarine (navy), the German battleship Tirpitz served her entire career as a "fleet in being" in her own right. Although remarkably she never fired a shot at an enemy ship, her mere presence in the Norwegian fiords forced the Royal Navy and their allies to allocate powerful warships in defending Arctic convoys, and caused a major convoy (PQ 17) to scatter, suffering huge losses, mainly to U-boats and aircraft. A 1943 midget submarine attack and successive airstrikes launched by the RAF and the Fleet Air Arm removed the threat by November 1944, when the Tirpitz was sunk at Tromsø by Lancaster bombers.
See also: Command of the sea
Red Sea Flotilla
References:
General and cited references: Harper, Steven R. (17 June 1994). "Submarine Operations During the Falklands War (AD-A279 55)" (PDF). United States Naval War College. p. 12. Archived from the original on May 22, 2011.
Hattendorf, John B. (Winter 2014). "The Idea of a 'Fleet in Being' in Historical Perspective". Naval War College Review. 67 (1). Article 6. JSTOR 26397437. Archived from the original on 9 July 2020.
Mahan, Captain A. T. (June 1906). "Reflections, Historic and Other, Suggested by the Battle of the Japan Sea (Tsushima)". US Naval Institute Proceedings. XXXVI (2). US Naval Institute.
Maltby, William S. (1994). "The Origins of a global strategy: England from 1558 to 1713". In Williamson Murray; et al. (eds.). The making of strategy: rulers, states, and war. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-56627-8.
Tikowara, Hesibo (1907). |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fleet in being | "The Idea of a 'Fleet in Being' in Historical Perspective". Naval War College Review. 67 (1). Article 6. JSTOR 26397437. Archived from the original on 9 July 2020.
Mahan, Captain A. T. (June 1906). "Reflections, Historic and Other, Suggested by the Battle of the Japan Sea (Tsushima)". US Naval Institute Proceedings. XXXVI (2). US Naval Institute.
Maltby, William S. (1994). "The Origins of a global strategy: England from 1558 to 1713". In Williamson Murray; et al. (eds.). The making of strategy: rulers, states, and war. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-56627-8.
Tikowara, Hesibo (1907). Before Port Arthur in a Destroyer: The Personal Diary of a Japanese Naval Officer. Translated by Captain R. Grant (from the Spanish) (1st and 2nd ed.). London: John Murray. OCLC 31387560.
Wennerholm, Colonel Bertil; Schyldt, Colonel Stig (23 May 2000). Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademien avd III. Swedish Royal War Academy. p. 13.
Further reading: Virilio, Paul (1986) [1977]. Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology. New York: Semiotext(e). |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Flying wedge | Military tactics:
Antiquity:
Greeks and Romans: The wedge (έμβολον, embolon in Greek; cuneus in Latin, colloquially also caput porcinum, "boar's head"), was used by both infantry and cavalry. The men deployed in a triangular or trapezoid formation with the tip leading the way. According to Arrian and Asclepiodotus, the wedge was first used by the Scythians, and then the Thracians. Philip II of Macedon adopted it from them as the main formation of his Companion cavalry and Alexander the Great faced Persian cavalry arrayed thus, as Arrian attests. The advantage of the wedge was that it offered a narrow point for piercing enemy formations and concentrated the leaders at the front. It was easier to turn than a square formation because everyone followed the leader at the apex, "like a flight of cranes".
As an infantry formation it is attested by Frontinus to have been used by the Romans in Pydna against the Macedonian line of Perseus. It was also used to great effect by the Roman legions, with the wedge proving effective in campaigns in Britain, such as during Boudicca's Revolt, where a greatly outnumbered Roman army used it to defeat the Iceni.
Scandinavian and Germanic: Keilerkopf or Keil (wild boar's head, wedge, Latin: cuneus, meaning throng) is a German phrase to describe the attack formation ("Tactical body") of the prehistoric infantry of the Celts and Germanic tribes. It is generally believed that the Germanic tribes were more successful with this tactic than the Celts. It was used to force the Roman forces to split and was later applied specifically to the weakest units.
Due to the high discipline this formation required and the relatively high probability of failure, it is assumed that the front lines were filled with the best and most heavily armoured warriors of the Germanic sibbs who had to break the Roman front line.
Here the individual warrior tried to gain fame and glory in the battle. The most distinguished princes and their acolytes stood at the head of the Keil. However, this was also the most dangerous point, whence the need to be heavily armoured. But an army leader who survived a lost battle often forfeited his life (usually suicide). Warriors who had fled were hanged or slain.
According to the Roman historian Tacitus, the Keil was a tightly packed crowd, strong on all sides, not only in front and back, but also on the flanks. The formation was not like a wedge but more like a rectangle with forty warriors in the first line and 1,600 men strong. In this formation, the wingmen are at most risk. It was therefore well possible that the wing marched with some caution and held back a bit, so that the center stormed further and looked like a wedge. The outer ranks of the rear on the other hand swelled slightly. The goal was to hit hard at the same time and to drive a 40 yard wide hole into the enemy line, according to the German historian Hans Delbrück.
According to Richard Burton, the central body consisted of heavily armed, warriors protecting less-armored archers to the sides. The triangular formation was used to overwhelm an enemy with a frontal assault. Family groups and tribes were placed side-by-side in units to maintain its cohesion in battle. The tactic was a formidable assault strategy against defenders in line or column, however, attackers faced annihilation in the event of retreat because the wedge became an ill-defined mob if its forward momentum collapsed.
When the Germanic Keil was advancing against the enemy, they sang the baritus or barditus, the battle song (battle cry); it begins with a muffled grumbling and swells with the heat of the battle up to the roar of the waves beating against the rocks. According to Germanic legend and Tacitus, Hercules once visited German soil and they sang of him first of all heroes.
The Middle Ages: In the Middle Ages, the tactic was especially effective against defensive shield wall formations when defenders would link their shields together to form an all-but impenetrable barrier. Armored, heavily armed infantry could use their momentum in wedge formation to drive open small sections in the shield wall. This would break up the shield wall exposing the defenders to flank attacks.
Western Europe: Two complete descriptions of an infantry wedge are given by Saxo Grammaticus in his Gesta Danorum. In Book I, he describes a shallow wedge, with the front rank of two men then each thereafter doubled. In Book VII, he depicts a sharper pointed formation 10 men deep with the first rank being composed of 2 men, each rank composed of 2 more. Thus, each wedge was composed of 110 men, 10 deep, 2 men on its tip, and 20 on its base. According to the Vikings, the wedge formation, called by them svinfylking, cf. the Latin caput porcinum, was invented by Odin himself.
A triangular or wedge formation was also used in the medieval period by the Flemish and Swiss infantry.
Deep wedges of cavalry were used by German armies in the later Middle Ages. At the Battle of Pillenreuth in 1450, both the armies of Albrecht Achilles and Nuremberg fought in wedge formation. The Nuremberg cavalry was drawn up in a wedge led by 5 picked knights, then seven, then nine, then 11. The following twenty ranks held 250 ordinary men-at-arms, then a final rank of 14 picked men to hold the formation together. Sir Charles Oman refers to an unpublished manual of 1480 by Philip of Seldeneck which describes the formation, calling it the Spitz. He gives examples of various formations varying from 200 men to 1000. The formation of 1000 men places seven men in the first rank, with each rank increasing by two men back to the eighth rank with 21. The remaining men are in a column 20 men wide behind the point. The banner would be carried in the seventh rank.
The use of the cavalry wedge in 13th Century Castile is described in the Siete Partidas, a law code compiled for king Alfonso X of Castile
Byzantium: Byzantine Emperor Nikephoros Phocas analyzes the wedge formation of the Byzantine Cataphracts in the third chapter of his Praecepta Militaria. There, he relates that the wedge must be formed by 354 cataphracts and 150 horse archers to a total number of 504 men. The row of the first line comprised 20 horsemen, the second 24, the third 28, down to the 12th line, which consisted of 64 men. If such a number of men is not available, he proposes that the wedge be formed by 304 cataphracts and 80 horse archers, or a total of 384 men, the first line comprising 10 men. In his next chapter (Ordinance on Cavalry Deployment), he ordains that the wedge must be accompanied by two cavalry units, which will guard its flanks. A wedge whose ranks are not complete in the middle is shaped as an Λ instead of a Δ and is called a hollow wedge, or in Greek κοιλέμβολον,
koilembolon.
Modern warfare: The wedge is still used in modern armies, especially by tanks and other armored units. An example of this is the Panzerkeil or "armored wedge" used by the German Wehrmacht in World War II.
The hollow wedge formation remains one of the basic infantry formations at the squad and section level, especially when crossing open ground. However unlike in ancient and medieval times, the formation is used not to maximise effectiveness in melee combat, but to maximise the situational awareness and firepower of a unit. The intervals between soldiers is designed to give mutually supporting lines of sight that do not obscure one another forward and to the sides, and this also corresponds to mutually supporting overlapping arcs of fire. The squad automatic weapon will usually anchor one of the flanks of a fireteam wedge. In a platoon wedge the command group and platoon machine guns are placed in the hollow of the wedge.
Exactly the same principles of mutually supporting lines of sight and fire, apply to an armored vehicles deployed in a wedge formation.
There are many advantages to using this formation. It provides more overwatch as a result of the area it spans. Bounding overwatch can also be transitioned fast and efficiently. The regiment can change formation with ease and the front of it has a significant amount of strength from its crossfire.
Drill formation: The wedge formation is used ceremonially by cadets at the United States Air Force Academy during the annual graduation parade, when the soon-to-be commissioned first-class cadets (seniors) leave the Cadet Wing. This is the reverse of the acceptance parade, held each fall, when the new fourth-class cadets (freshmen) join the Cadet Wing in the inverted wedge formation.
Civilian applications:
Policing: Police and law enforcement riot squads sometimes charge in flying wedge formations, to break into a dense crowd as a snatch squad to arrest a leader or speaker, or to chop a long demonstration march into segments. It can also be used to escort VIPs through hostile crowds. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Flying wedge | It provides more overwatch as a result of the area it spans. Bounding overwatch can also be transitioned fast and efficiently. The regiment can change formation with ease and the front of it has a significant amount of strength from its crossfire.
Drill formation: The wedge formation is used ceremonially by cadets at the United States Air Force Academy during the annual graduation parade, when the soon-to-be commissioned first-class cadets (seniors) leave the Cadet Wing. This is the reverse of the acceptance parade, held each fall, when the new fourth-class cadets (freshmen) join the Cadet Wing in the inverted wedge formation.
Civilian applications:
Policing: Police and law enforcement riot squads sometimes charge in flying wedge formations, to break into a dense crowd as a snatch squad to arrest a leader or speaker, or to chop a long demonstration march into segments. It can also be used to escort VIPs through hostile crowds.
Sports: Although originally permitted in most full contact team sports, the use of the flying wedge is now banned for safety reasons in rugby union, rugby league, and American football. The principle is similar to the military application: the ball carrier starts an attack and is joined on both sides by teammates who drive them forward towards the goal line. However due to the number of deaths and serious injuries related to the flying wedge, any attempt at this formation is now punished by in-game penalties.
In American football, the formation was developed by Lorin F. Deland and first introduced by Harvard in a collegiate game against Yale in 1892. Teammates would lock themselves together with the ball carrier using their hands and arms and rush forward. But despite its practicality, it was outlawed two seasons later in 1894 because of its contribution to serious injury.
The penalty against assisting the runner, which forbids the locking together of players as well as pushing and pulling the ball carrier to increase force in the same manner as the historic flying wedge, remains in the American football rule books; its eradication has been so complete that the foul has not been called in the National Football League since 1991. The concept of wedge-shaped formations continued to influence several football plays in the modern game, particularly on kickoff returns, until 2009 when NFL league owners agreed to stop its use.
Recent changes in the rules at various levels regarding runbacks of free kicks are stricter still in that they restrict blocking by teammates close together even without touching each other. The "wedge" commonly referred to in interference on free kick returns simply meant such a close group of blockers. Wedge blocking using only the shoulders to push forward teammates not holding the ball is still legal. Some leagues went still farther in theoretically not allowing any transfer of momentum between teammates in blocking but that prohibition is not strictly enforced.
See also: Armored spearhead
V formation
Diamond formation
Notes:
External links: "Infantry Squad Operations:Movement". global security.org. United States Army Infantry Training School. January 1996. Retrieved November 13, 2014.
Chinese riot police show off their skills in breaking up a demonstration
Footage of the Argentina national rugby union team carrying out a flying wedge against England in the 1995 Rugby World Cup |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Foot drill | Drill in antiquity: Vegetius composed his treatise on the Roman Empire's military, De Re Militari, at some point between 378 and 390 CE during the reign of Valentinian II in the Western Roman Empire. This work consists of three separate, yet related books, the first establishing methods of training and selecting new recruits, the second and third books a continuation of the first, describing in detail training and discipline matters as they pertained not only to the troops, but also to the leadership in times of training and battle, as well as positing an argument for reforms in the army.
Within these books can be found a detailed guide for drill of the army. Among these drills, the military step describes how initial training should consist of "constant practice of marching quick and together. Nor is anything of more consequence either on the march or in the line than that they should keep their ranks with the greatest exactness. For troops who march in an irregular and disorderly manner are always in great danger of being defeated. They should march with the common military step twenty miles in five summer-hours, and with the full step, which is quicker, twenty-four miles in the same number of hours. If they exceed this pace, they no longer march but run, and no certain rate can be assigned."
History of drill: Drill became less common after the fall of the Western Roman Empire and the resultant disappearance of professional armies from Western Europe. In the Middle Ages the individualist nature of Knightly combat, focusing on individual skills and heroism, coupled with the ad-hoc nature of the supporting levies meant that there was no place for mass subordination of troops through Drill. The rise of the mercenary during the renaissance led to some level of military professionalisation: this led to co-ordinated and practiced military units such as the Swiss mercenaries but standardisation was still lacking.
The mass use of firearms in the later 16th Century led to the resurgence of what was considered at the time "Roman-Style Drill". This movement was pioneered by Maurice of Nassau. Intended to enable his soldiers to efficiently handle their firearms, it describes forty-two movements from taking up the weapon to firing. As armies became full-time and more professionalised over the course of the 17th Century it became a natural progression for drill to expand its remit from weapons handling to the manoeuvre and forming of bodies of troops. The most notable figure of the early 17th Century was Gustavus Adolphus, who fielded one of the largest standing armies of the Thirty Years' War before his death in battle.
What would today be known strictly as foot drill emerged over the course of the 17th Century. This period is known as the Pike and Shot period, where muskets and arquebus without bayonets were defended from infantry and cavalry by blocks of pikemen. The requirement for quick and accurate movement of these large bodies of troops in order to outmanoeuvre their opponents on the tactical level led to the introduction of standardised movements and commands. These were the first versions of foot drill, intended to allow a group of disparate individuals to form one organised body of men, moving singlemindedly with united purpose. Additionally, in the confusion of battle it was found that the clear and concise nature of drill commands allowed the individual soldier to cope with the psychological stresses of battle. The apogee of this style of warfare is arguably the English Civil War, as the last major war using these methods before the introduction of the bayonet created "The Queen of Battles": the Line Infantry.
Line infantry won or lost on the rigidity of their foot drill. In the later 17th century that drill evolved into a tool for the complete subordination of the individual. The Prussians demanded automatonic levels of drill competence. Constant and heavy drilling would change a man from a civilian to a soldier, obedient to commands reflexively. This instituted both discipline and subordination. In a period when private soldiers were recruited from what was considered the basest social class, it was considered particularly important to "break the man" into service. For all this harshness, desertion remained commonplace.
In battle, drill was a force multiplier. With the muskets of the era having short ranges owing to the nature of their ammunition and the reluctance of men to kill one another at short range, it was necessary for battalions to form up as broad lines 2 to 4 ranks deep at distances averaging 25 yards (approx 20 m). In such conditions, particularly when one considers the nightmarish nature of the ubiquitous cannonade and the buildup of smoke from musket discharge, drill allowed the soldier to withdraw into himself and react to commands. There are anecdotal reports of soldiers in this almost trance-like state reaching out to try and catch cannonballs at the end of their arcs, with unpleasant results. The psychological boost which being part of an effectively faceless mass and surrendering one's fate to that of the corporate group provided enabled men to stand in the face of the enemy that bit longer than their foes. As such, the better the drill, the better – in theory – the soldiers. These elements were found to be particularly powerful in colonial theatres by most European states, where massed drill and the discipline that imbued allowed small expeditionary forces to repeatedly defeat larger indigenous forces.
Additionally, greater drill equated to greater manoeuvrability. When troops were thoroughly drilled they could move confidently at speed without their formations – carefully proscribed in order to maximise the use of their weapons – breaking up, particularly over rough ground. When formations broke up precious time would have to be spent reforming them in the face of the enemy: additionally, loose formations breed confusion. The difference between a body of troops and a disorganised crowd is a narrow one. As such, when faced with musketry, cavalry or cannonade a loose formation would be more prone to succumbing to panic and rout. Proficiency in drill further enabled the creativity of generals. Troops who are new to drill are unconfident and tend to panic or become confused when new commands are introduced. Troops who do many drills can more easily be taught new formations, building off the base of experience previously garnered. In a period when all war was foot drill, this could obviously prove an advantage. As an example, the British used an unorthodox two rank line during the later 18th and early-to-mid 19th Centuries as a force multiplier. In the Peninsular Campaign they were able to adapt this formation from strictly linear to a shallow crescent. Coordinating even a minor formation change for roughly 200 men was considered an impressive feat.
Drill was exported to the rest of the world on the back of Colonial victories, with most Imperial nations training local armed forces in European-style drill. One famous example of this trend were the Indian Sepoys of the British Empire.
As weapons gained in range and accuracy, foot drill became less and less important in battle. Advances as formed lines and columns were still attempted - they worked during the Crimean War but were becoming dangerously obsolete by the time of the Franco-Prussian War. The last widespread use of formed infantry in the attack, particularly in columns, was in the first few weeks of the First World War.
Origins of modern drill in the U.S. Military: United States military drill originated in 1778, as part of a training program implemented by Baron Friedrich von Steuben to improve the discipline and organisation of soldiers serving in the Continental Army. The following year Baron von Steuben, by then a Major General and the Inspector General of the Continental Army, wrote the Army's first field manual, "The Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States", which has come to be more commonly known as the "Blue Book". The methods of drill that von Steuben initiated remained largely unchanged between their inception and the time of the American Civil War. One major change to come about since that time is that troops now march at a cadence of 120 steps per minute, instead of the original 76 steps per minute at the time of the American Revolution.
The stated aim of drill is to "enable a commander or noncommissioned officer to move his unit from one place to another in an orderly manner; to aid in disciplinary training by instilling habits of precision and response to the leader’s orders; and to provide for the development of all soldiers in the practice of commanding troops."
Between branches of the military, as well as between the military forces of various countries, the methods of drill will vary. In the United States Armed Forces, the basis of drill procedures can be traced to von Steuben's "Blue Book".
Drill in the modern day: Drill today is used as a teaching tool for instilling discipline into new recruits in armies the world over, although style and diligence varies from nation to nation. Some of the most famous drill in the world remains that of the Guards Division.
Drill is most commonly seen at ceremonial and public functions and has evolved into something of an art-form. Many nations have dedicated Drill Teams, although the Guards Division, faithful to the history of Foot Drill, remain full service combat infantry.
References:
External links: E-text of English translation of De Re Militari
Homepage of De Re Militari: The Society for Medieval Military History, an academic association that is concerned about medieval warfare
An English translation of De Re Militari by Lieutenant John Clarke (1767)
Army Study Guide.com Pubs and Forms |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Force concentration | Mass of decision: Force concentration became integral to the Prussian military operational doctrine of the mass of decision, which aimed to cause disproportionate losses on the enemy and therefore destroy the enemy's ability to fight.
From an empirical examination of past battles, the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) concluded:
[...] we may infer, that it is very difficult in the present state of Europe, for the most talented General to gain a victory over an enemy double his strength. Now if we see double numbers prove such a weight in the scale against the greatest Generals, we may be sure, that in ordinary cases, in small as well as great combats, an important superiority of numbers, but which need not be over two to one, will be sufficient to ensure the victory, however disadvantageous other circumstances may be.
Lanchester's laws: During the First World War Frederick W. Lanchester formulated Lanchester's laws that calculated that the combat power of a military force is the square of the number of members of that unit so that the advantage a larger force has is the difference of the squares of the two forces, i.e.
If force A has say 2 units and force B has 3 units, then the advantage force B has is 3²−2² or 5.
If force A still has 2 units and force B has 4 units then the advantage force B has is 4²−2² or 12.
If force A still has 2 units and force B has 5 units then the advantage force B has is 5²−2² or 21.
So a two to one advantage in units will quadruple the firepower and inflict four times the punishment, three times as many units will have nine times the combat ability and so on. Basically the greater the numerical superiority that one side has, the greater the damage he can inflict on the other side and the smaller the cost to himself.
Mathematical model: There is no battlefield where battle tactics can be reduced to a pure race of delivering damage while ignoring all other circumstances. However, in some types of warfare, such as a battle for air superiority, confrontation of armoured forces in World War II or battleship-based naval battles, the ratio of armed forces could become the dominant factor. In that case, equations stated in Lanchester's laws model the potential outcome of the conflict fairly well. Balance between the two opponent forces incline to the side of superior force by the factor of
(
P
o
w
e
r
2
P
o
w
e
r
1
)
2
{\displaystyle \left({\frac {Power_{2}}{Power_{1}}}\right)^{2}}
. For example, two tanks against one tank are superior by a factor of four.
This result could be understood if the rate of damage (considered as the only relevant factor in the model) is solved as a system of differential equations. The rate in which each army delivers damage to the opponent is proportional to the number of units – in the model each unit shoots at a given rate – and to the ability or effectiveness of each surviving unit to kill the enemy. The sizes of both armies decrease at different rates depending on the size of the other, and casualties of the superior army approach zero as the size of the inferior army approaches zero. This can be written in equations:
d
d
t
N
1
=
−
c
2
N
2
{\displaystyle {\frac {d}{dt}}N_{1}=-c_{2}N_{2}}
d
d
t
N
2
=
−
c
1
N
1
{\displaystyle {\frac {d}{dt}}N_{2}=-c_{1}N_{1}}
N
1
{\displaystyle N_{1}}
is the number of units in the first army
d
d
t
N
2
{\displaystyle {\frac {d}{dt}}N_{2}}
is the rate in which army 1 damages army 2 (affected by unit quality or other advantage)
c
1
{\displaystyle c_{1}}
is a coefficient which describes army 1's ability to inflict damage per unit per time.
The above equations result in the following homogeneous second-order linear ordinary differential equations:
d
2
d
t
2
N
1
=
c
2
c
1
N
1
{\displaystyle {\frac {d^{2}}{dt^{2}}}N_{1}=c_{2}c_{1}N_{1}}
d
2
d
t
2
N
2
=
c
2
c
1
N
2
{\displaystyle {\frac {d^{2}}{dt^{2}}}N_{2}=c_{2}c_{1}N_{2}}
To determine the time evolution of
N
1
{\displaystyle N_{1}}
and
N
2
{\displaystyle N_{2}}
, these equations need to be solved using the known initial conditions (the initial size of the two armies prior to combat).
This model clearly demonstrates (see picture) that an inferior force can suffer devastating losses even when the superior force is only slightly larger, in case of equal per-unit qualitative capabilities: in the first example (see picture, top plot) the superior force starts only 40% larger, yet it brings about the total annihilation of the inferior force while suffering only 40% losses. Quality of the force may outweigh the quantitative inferiority of the force (middle plot) when it comes to battle outcomes.
Business strategy: In the 1960s, Lanchester's laws were popularised by the business consultant Nobuo Taoka and found favour with a segment of the Japanese business community. The laws were used to formulate plans and strategies to attack market share. The "Canon–Xerox copier battle" in the UK, for example, reads like a classic people's war campaign. In this case, the laws supported Canon's establishment of a "revolutionary base area" by concentrating resources on a single geographical area until dominance could be achieved, in this case in Scotland. After this, they carefully defined regions to be individually attacked again with a more focused allocation of resources. The sales and distribution forces built up to support these regions in turn were used in the final "determined push in London with a numerically larger salesforce".
Hypothetical example: Imagine two equally matched sides each with two infantry and two armoured divisions. Now visualize a straight defensive line with the two infantry and two armoured divisions, deployed equally along the length of the line. Hypothetically the attacker can win by concentrating his armour at one point (with his infantry holding the rest of the line).
Traditionally it is accepted that a defending force has a 3:1 advantage over an attacker. In other words, a defending force can hold off three times its own number of attackers. Imagine, then, that the defensive line is four units in length, so that each portion of the line can be held by a single defending division. Assume that they can take on the oncoming armour on equal terms (with ATGWs, pre-prepared artillery fireplans etc.) and that they have had time to dig in. This single unit should be able to hold off 3 times its own number. With the attacking force having only two armoured units, the defenders should have the advantage.
However, as the defensive line increases from the imaginary four units in length, the advantage slips from the defender to the attacker. The longer the line to be held, the thinner the defenders will be spread. With the defender having sacrificed his mobility to dig in, the attacker can choose where and when to attack. Either penetrating the line or turning a flank and thus being able to destroy the enemy in detail. Thus, concentrating two divisions and attacking at a single point generates a far greater force than is achieved by spreading two divisions into a line and pushing forward on a broad front.
Concentration of force in this scenario requires mobility (to permit rapid concentration) and power (to be effective in combat once concentrated). The tank embodies these two properties and for the past seventy years has been seen as the primary weapon of conventional warfare. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Force concentration | With the attacking force having only two armoured units, the defenders should have the advantage.
However, as the defensive line increases from the imaginary four units in length, the advantage slips from the defender to the attacker. The longer the line to be held, the thinner the defenders will be spread. With the defender having sacrificed his mobility to dig in, the attacker can choose where and when to attack. Either penetrating the line or turning a flank and thus being able to destroy the enemy in detail. Thus, concentrating two divisions and attacking at a single point generates a far greater force than is achieved by spreading two divisions into a line and pushing forward on a broad front.
Concentration of force in this scenario requires mobility (to permit rapid concentration) and power (to be effective in combat once concentrated). The tank embodies these two properties and for the past seventy years has been seen as the primary weapon of conventional warfare.
No one side has a monopoly on military art, and what is obvious to one side is obvious to the other. A far more likely scenario is that both forces will choose to use their infantry to hold a line and to concentrate their armour, and rather than a line in the sand, the infantry line would be more of a trip wire, to warn of where the enemy has chosen to launch his attack, with the armoured forces jostling to find the right place to attack or counterattack. Other considerations, then, must come into play for a decisive blow to be achieved.
Such considerations may be economic or political in nature, e.g. one side is unable or unwilling to allow the sanctity of its soil to be violated, and thus insists on defending a line on a map.
History: Force concentration has been a part of the military commander's repertoire since the dawn of warfare, though maybe not by that name. Commanders have always tried to have the advantage of numbers. The declined flank for example, was one way of achieving a force concentration during a battle.
Disposition of Roman Legions: At the beginning of the Roman Empire, in the first years of the first millennium, Rome's Legions were grouped into battle groups of three or four Legions, on the Rhine, on the Danube and in the Levant. By the third century A.D. these Legions had been dispersed along the frontiers in frontier fortifications, and within the Empire as internal security troops. In the first case Rome's military might was disposed in a manner in which it had a concentration of force capable of offensive action; in the second case it could defend effectively but could only attack and counterattack with difficulty.
Guerrilla warfare: As they are usually the smaller in number an appreciation of force concentration is especially important to guerrilla forces, who find it prudent initially to avoid confrontations with any large concentrations of government/occupying forces. However, through the use of small attacks, shows of strength, atrocities etc. in out of the way areas, they may be able to lure their opponents into spreading themselves out into isolated outposts, linked by convoys and patrols, in order to control territory. The guerrilla forces may then attempt to use force concentrations of their own; using unpredictable and unexpected concentrations of their forces, to destroy individual patrols, convoys and outposts. In this way they can hope to defeat their enemy in detail.
Regular forces, in turn, may act in order to invite such attacks by concentrations of enemy guerrillas, in order to bring an otherwise elusive enemy to battle, relying on its own superior training and firepower to win such battles. This was successfully practiced by the French during the First Indochina War at the Battle of Nà Sản, but a subsequent attempt to replicate this at Dien Bien Phu led to decisive defeat.
Aerial warfare: During World War I the Central Powers became increasingly unable to meet the Allied Powers in terms of outright number of fighter aircraft. To overcome this shortcoming rather than deploying their fighters uniformly along the fronts, the Germans concentrated their fighters into large mobile Jagdgeschwader formations, the most famous of which was Manfred von Richthofen's Flying Circus, that could be moved rapidly and unexpectedly to different points along the front. This allowed them to create a local superiority in numbers, that could achieve air supremacy in a local area in support of ground operations or just to destroy Allied fighters in the overall strategy of attrition.
Similarly the Second World War Big Wing was one tactic that was evolved to cause maximum damage to the enemy with the minimum of casualties.
Blitzkrieg: Modern armour warfare doctrine was developed and established during the run up to World War II. A fundamental key to conventional Warfare is the concentration of force at a particular point (the [der] Schwerpunkt). Concentration of force increases the chance of victory in a particular engagement. Correctly chosen and exploited, victory in a given engagement or a chain of small engagements is often sufficient to win the battle.
Defence of France 1944: The Nazi defence of France in 1944 could have followed one of the two models offered in the hypothetical example. The first was to distribute the available forces along the Atlantic Wall and throw the invading Allies back into the sea where and when they landed. The second was to keep the German Panzers concentrated and well away from the beaches. Territory could then be conceded to draw the invasion force away from their lodgement areas from which it would be nipped off by the cutting of their supply lines and then defeated in detail. The superiority of concentrated forces using maneuver warfare in the hypothetical example carried the proviso of "all other things being equal"; by 1944 things were far from being equal.
With Allied air superiority not only were major force concentrations vulnerable to tactical and heavy bombers themselves, but so were the vital assets—bridges, marshalling yards, fuel depots, etc.—needed to give them mobility. As it was in this case, the blitzkrieg solution was the worst of both worlds, neither being far enough forward to maximise the use of their defensive fortifications, nor far enough away and concentrated to give it room to manoeuvre.
Similarly, for the Japanese in the final stages of the Island hopping campaign of the Pacific War, with Allied naval and air superiority and non-existent room to manoeuvre, neither a water's edge defensive strategy nor a holding back and counterattacking strategy could succeed.
Cold War and beyond: For much of the Cold War, to combat the overwhelming Soviet supremacy in armour and men, NATO planned to use much of West German territory as a flood plain in a defence in depth to absorb and disperse the momentum of a massed Soviet attack. Mobile anti-tank teams and counterattacking NATO armies would seek to cut off the leading Soviet echelons from their supporting echelons and then reduce the isolated elements with superior air power and conventional munitions, and if this failed, with nuclear munitions.
In an effort to avoid the use of nuclear munitions in an otherwise conventional war, the US invested heavily in a family of technologies it called "Assault Breaker", the two parts of these programmes were an enhanced realtime intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance capability, and the second part a series of stand off precision guided air-launched and artillery weapon systems, such as the MLRS, ICMs, M712 Copperhead, and the BLU-108 submunition. Against such weapons massed concentrations of armour and troops would no longer be a virtue but a liability. From the mid eighties and onward a much greater level of force dispersal became desirable rather than concentration.
See also:
References:
Sources: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, online version available, especially Book 3, Chapter VIII ("Superiority of Numbers"), and Chapter XI ("Assembly of Forces in Space").
Dunnigan, James F. How To Make War, 2003, HarperCollins Publishers, New York. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Force dispersal | Military aviation: In respect of military aviation, dispersal of aircraft, especially fighter and bomber aircraft, was historically a very common strategy of planning, construction and operation of military aerodromes and airbases. Original military aerodromes would store their aircraft (when not being operated) in one or more large co-located facilities such as aircraft hangars; however, these were highly visible and therefore vulnerable easy prey for attacking forces; the successful bombing of an aircraft hangar could result in the destruction (or significant incapacitation) of the entire squadron (or more) of aircraft contained therein. The answer was to disperse individual aircraft around the aerodrome, and originally consisted of a number of individual parking spaces or hardstandings at various interval distances, typically around the perimeter track of class A airfields. These dispersed locations, originally being little more than an exposed circular (or similar-shaped) compacted earth or concrete pad a few metres from the perimeter track, originally had no protection or defence (from incoming munitions, nor inclement weather for protection of ground-crew required to operate on the aircraft).
With the ever-increasing accuracy of weapons targeting and delivery making individual aircraft dispersals viable targets, additional methods of protection were required; dispersed revetments were one of the first solutions for protection, and often consisted of raised earth banks (typically on three 'sides' of a C- or E-shaped structure to partially encircle an individual dispersal). More significant protection evolved with the construction of taller reinforced concrete blast walls for each dispersal. A notable example of surviving instances of both methods are found at the now former RAF Coltishall in Norfolk, England; on its north-western perimeter taxiway is a World War II-specific dual 'fighter pen' which could be used by a pair of Hawker Hurricane fighters, and along its south and south-eastern perimeter taxiways are a larger number of Cold War-era blast-wall protected dual dispersed revetments arranged in V formations, which afforded protection for jet fighters such as the contemporary Gloster Javelin. These structures at RAF Coltishall are now deemed significantly important structures of British military heritage, the WWII fighter pen and eight of the dual Cold War blast revetments have been granted scheduled monument protection by English Heritage (now known as Historic England).
The United States military utilised semi-circular covered shelters, albeit with an open front, with the distinctive appearance or style of half an igloo. Notable examples of these individual aircraft shelters are found at the former Marine Corps Air Station Ewa in Hawaii; they were constructed after many parked aircraft were destroyed during the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor.
Further evolution of protection for dispersed aircraft resulted in the hardened aircraft shelter (HAS); effectively, a reinforced 'mini hangar' constructed of high-grade reinforced concrete with heavy-grade steel doors. A hardened aircraft shelter can typically accommodate two fighter aircraft, along with all required ground support equipment needed to facilitate the preparation for flight of said aircraft. Most hardened aircraft shelters (especially those constructed to NATO standards) are able to be hermetically sealed, thereby offering protection against ingress of any chemical and / or biological weapon.
Other notable examples of airbase dispersal include the Swedish Air Force's Bas 60 and later Bas 90 system.
Aircraft weapons storage: The storage of aircraft weapons on an airbase requires their dispersal away from workplace and accommodation locations of base personnel. The weapon storage area (WSA), also known as the 'bomb dump' in British military parlance, would typically be located in a remote area (often as far as physically possible) away from all other buildings and structures of an airbase, and consisted of a number of small protective bunkers, contained by security fences and access-limited gates.
In a further development, hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) were also able to facilitate dispersal for aircraft munitions, when a Weapons Storage and Security System (WSSS) vault, also known as Weapon Security and Survivability System (WS3), were constructed within the floor of the HAS, and enabled the safe and secure storage of tactical nuclear bombs for use on aircraft within the HAS. This facility enabled the functions of weapons dispersal together with the operational requirement of quick reaction alert (QRA), whereby armed aircraft were required to be available in a state of high preparedness, allowing the QRA aircraft to be launched or 'scrambled' within a very short timeframe. The WSSS / WS3 eliminated the need for transporting of live lethal weapons by road vehicles from their remote weapon storage area to the required bomber aircraft.
Gallery:
See also: Force concentration
List of military tactics
References:
Further reading: Cocroft, Wayne D.; Thomas, Roger J.C. (2003). Cold War - Building for Nuclear Confrontation 1946-1989. English Heritage. ISBN 9781873592694.
Osborne, Mike (2004). Defending Britain: twentieth-century military structures in the landscape. Tempus. ISBN 9780752431345.
External links: Media related to Dispersal (military) at Wikimedia Commons |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Force multiplication | History: Notable historical examples of force multiplication include:
Fortifications: e.g. the Theodosian Wall of Constantinople
Reliance on air force by the Coalition in the Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq
Doctrinal changes: During the First World War, the Germans experimented with what were called "storm tactics" in which a small group of highly-trained soldiers (stormtroopers) would open a salient through which much larger forces could penetrate. That met with only limited success by breaking through the first lines of defence but lacking the staying power to break the opposing forces entirely. The 1939 blitzkrieg, which broke through with coordinated mechanized ground forces with aircraft in close support, was vastly more effective.
Towards the end of the Second World War, the German Army introduced Kampfgruppe combat formations, which were composed of whatever units happened to be available. Though poor quality ones generally constituted the major part of them, they often performed successfully because of their high degree of flexibility and adaptability. Mission-type tactics, as opposed to extremely specific directives, which give no discretion to the junior commander, are now widely used by modern militaries because of their force multiplication. Originating from German concepts of Auftragstaktik, those tactics may be developing even more rapidly in the concept of network-centric warfare (NCW) in which subordinate commanders receive information not only from their own commanders but also from adjacent units.
A different paradigm was one of the results of the theories of John Boyd, the "high-low mix" in which a large number of less expensive aircraft, coupled with a small number of extremely capable "silver bullet" aircraft, had the effect of a much larger force. Boyd's concept of quick action is based on the repeated application of the "Boyd loop", consisting of the steps
Observe: make use of the best sensors and other intelligence available
Orient: put the new observations into a context with the old
Decide: select the next action based on the combined observation and local knowledge
Act: carry out the selected action, ideally while the opponent is still observing your last action.
Boyd's concept is also known as the OODA Loop and is a description of the decision-making process that Boyd contended applies to business, sports, law enforcement and military operations. Boyd's doctrine is widely taught in the American military, and one of the aims of network centric warfare is to "get inside his OODA loop." In other words, one should go from observation to action before the enemy can get past orientation, preventing him from ever being able to make an effective decision or put it into action. Small unit leadership is critical to this, and NCW's ability to disseminate information to small unit leaders enables such tactics.
Network-centric warfare can provide additional information and can help prevent friendly fire but also allows "swarm tactics"
and the seizing of opportunities by subordinate forces. (Edwards 2000, p. 2) defines "a swarming case is any historical example in which the scheme of maneuver involves the convergent attack of five (or more) semiautonomous (or autonomous) units on a targeted force in some particular place. "Convergent" implies an attack from most of the points on the compass."
Another version of "swarming" is evident in air-to-ground attack formations in which the attack aircraft do not approach from one direction, at one time, or at the same altitude, but schedule the attacks so each one requires a Boyd-style OODA iteration to deal with a new threat. Replacement training units (RTU) were "finishing schools" for pilots that needed to know not just the school solution, but the actual tactics being used in Vietnam. Referring to close air support, "In the RTU, new pilots learned the rules of the road for working with a forward air controller (FAC). The hardest part was finding the small aircraft as it circled over the target area. The fast-moving fighters used directional finding/steering equipment to get close enough to the slow, low FAC until someone in the flight could get an eyeball on him—a tally-ho. Once the FAC was in sight, he would give the fighters a target briefing—type of target, elevation, attack heading, location of friendlies, enemy defensive fire, best egress heading if hit by enemy fire, and other pertinent data. Usually the fighters would set up a circle, called a wheel or "wagon wheel", over the FAC, and wait for him to mark the target. Once the target was marked, the flight leader would attack first.
Psychology: Napoleon is well known for his comment "The moral is to the physical as three to one." Former United States Secretary of State and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell has said: "Perpetual optimism is a force multiplier." Morale, training, and ethos have long been known to result in disproportionate effects on the battlefield.
Psychological warfare can target the morale, politics, and values of enemy soldiers and their supporters to effectively neutralize them in a conflict.
Protecting local cultural heritage sites and investing in the relationships between local civilians and military forces can be seen as force multipliers leading to benefits in meeting or sustaining military objectives.
Technology: Ranged weapons that hit their target can be far more effective than those that miss. That is why rifled muskets for infantry and rangefinders for artillery became commonplace in the 19th century.
Two new weapons of World War I, barbed wire and the machine gun, multiplied defensive forces, leading to the stalemate of trench warfare.
Aircraft carriers: Aircraft carriers, such as the USS Gerald R. Ford, can carry more than 75 aircraft with fuel and ammunition for all tasks that an aircraft carrier should need like air to air, air to naval and air to ground missions. When deployed, aircraft carriers are a massive force multiplier that can turn any engagement in favour of those that have the aircraft carrier. Carriers can hold different type of aircraft to different usage meaning the force multiplier can vary depending on the specific task at hand.
Tankers: Airborne tanker aircraft, such as the Boeing KC-135 are a very significant force multiplier. They can carry fuel so bomber and fighter aircraft can take off loaded with extra weapons instead of full fuel tanks. The tankers also increase the range and time loitering within or near the target areas by off-loading fuel when it is needed. Tankers can also be used to rapidly deploy fighters, bombers, SIGNET, Airborne Command Post, and cargo aircraft from the United States to the areas where they are needed. The force multiplier of a KC-135R can be anywhere from 1.5 to as much as 6 when used near the target area.
Bombers: At one extreme, a stealth aircraft like the Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit strategic bomber can attack a target without needing the large numbers of escort fighter aircraft, electronic-warfare aircraft, Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, and other supporting aircraft that would be needed were conventional bombers used against the same target.
Precision-guided munitions (PGM) give an immense multiplication. The Thanh Hoa Bridge in North Vietnam had been only mildly damaged by approximately 800 sorties by aircraft armed with conventional Unguided bombs, but had one of its spans destroyed by a 12-plane mission, of which 8 carried laser-guided bombs. Two small subsequent missions, again with laser-guided bombs, completed the destruction of this target. Precision guided munitions are one example of what has been called the Revolution in Military Affairs. In World War II, British night bombers could hit, at best, an area of a city.
Modern PGMs commonly put a bomb within 3–10 meters of its target (see Circular error probable), and most carry an explosive charge significant enough that this uncertainty is effectively voided. See the use of heavy bombers in direct support of friendly troops in Afghanistan, using the technique of Ground-Aided Precision Strike.
Fighter combat: Fighter aircraft coordinated by an AWACS control aircraft, so that they can approach targets without being revealed by their own radar, and who are assigned to take specific targets so that duplication is avoided, are far more effective than an equivalent number of fighters dependent on their own resources for target acquisition.
In exercises between the Indian and US air forces, the Indian pilots had an opportunity to operate with AWACS control, and found it extremely effective. India has ordered AWACS aircraft, using Israeli Phalcon electronics on a Russian airframe, and this exercise is part of their preparation. Officer and pilot comments included "definitely was a force multiplier. Giving you an eye deep beyond you". "We could pick up incoming targets whether aircraft or missiles almost 400 kilometers away. It gives a grand battle coordination in the air".
Creating local forces: The use of small numbers of specialists to create larger effective forces is another form of multiplication. The basic A Team of US Army Special Forces is a 12-man unit that can train and lead a company-sized unit (100–200 men) of local guerrillas.
Deception: Deception can produce the potential effect of a much larger force. The fictitious First United States Army Group (FUSAG) was portrayed to the World War II Germans as the main force for the invasion of Europe. Operation Bodyguard
successfully gave the impression that FUSAG was to land at the Pas de Calais, convincing the Germans that the real attack at Normandy was a feint. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Force multiplication | Officer and pilot comments included "definitely was a force multiplier. Giving you an eye deep beyond you". "We could pick up incoming targets whether aircraft or missiles almost 400 kilometers away. It gives a grand battle coordination in the air".
Creating local forces: The use of small numbers of specialists to create larger effective forces is another form of multiplication. The basic A Team of US Army Special Forces is a 12-man unit that can train and lead a company-sized unit (100–200 men) of local guerrillas.
Deception: Deception can produce the potential effect of a much larger force. The fictitious First United States Army Group (FUSAG) was portrayed to the World War II Germans as the main force for the invasion of Europe. Operation Bodyguard
successfully gave the impression that FUSAG was to land at the Pas de Calais, convincing the Germans that the real attack at Normandy was a feint. As a result of the successful deception, the Normandy force penetrated deeply, in part, because the Germans held back strategic reserves that they thought would be needed at the Pas de Calais, against what was a nonexistent force. FUSAG's existence was suggested by the use of decoy vehicles that the Allies allowed to be photographed, fictitious radio traffic generated by a small number of specialists, and the Double Cross System. Double Cross referred to turning all surviving German spies in the UK into double agents, who sent back convincing reports that were consistent with the deception programs being conducted by the London Controlling Section.
See also: Asymmetric warfare
C4ISTAR
Lanchester's laws
List of established military terms
Network-centric warfare
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Force multiplier | History: Notable historical examples of force multiplication include:
Fortifications: e.g. the Theodosian Wall of Constantinople
Reliance on air force by the Coalition in the Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq
Doctrinal changes: During the First World War, the Germans experimented with what were called "storm tactics" in which a small group of highly-trained soldiers (stormtroopers) would open a salient through which much larger forces could penetrate. That met with only limited success by breaking through the first lines of defence but lacking the staying power to break the opposing forces entirely. The 1939 blitzkrieg, which broke through with coordinated mechanized ground forces with aircraft in close support, was vastly more effective.
Towards the end of the Second World War, the German Army introduced Kampfgruppe combat formations, which were composed of whatever units happened to be available. Though poor quality ones generally constituted the major part of them, they often performed successfully because of their high degree of flexibility and adaptability. Mission-type tactics, as opposed to extremely specific directives, which give no discretion to the junior commander, are now widely used by modern militaries because of their force multiplication. Originating from German concepts of Auftragstaktik, those tactics may be developing even more rapidly in the concept of network-centric warfare (NCW) in which subordinate commanders receive information not only from their own commanders but also from adjacent units.
A different paradigm was one of the results of the theories of John Boyd, the "high-low mix" in which a large number of less expensive aircraft, coupled with a small number of extremely capable "silver bullet" aircraft, had the effect of a much larger force. Boyd's concept of quick action is based on the repeated application of the "Boyd loop", consisting of the steps
Observe: make use of the best sensors and other intelligence available
Orient: put the new observations into a context with the old
Decide: select the next action based on the combined observation and local knowledge
Act: carry out the selected action, ideally while the opponent is still observing your last action.
Boyd's concept is also known as the OODA Loop and is a description of the decision-making process that Boyd contended applies to business, sports, law enforcement and military operations. Boyd's doctrine is widely taught in the American military, and one of the aims of network centric warfare is to "get inside his OODA loop." In other words, one should go from observation to action before the enemy can get past orientation, preventing him from ever being able to make an effective decision or put it into action. Small unit leadership is critical to this, and NCW's ability to disseminate information to small unit leaders enables such tactics.
Network-centric warfare can provide additional information and can help prevent friendly fire but also allows "swarm tactics"
and the seizing of opportunities by subordinate forces. (Edwards 2000, p. 2) defines "a swarming case is any historical example in which the scheme of maneuver involves the convergent attack of five (or more) semiautonomous (or autonomous) units on a targeted force in some particular place. "Convergent" implies an attack from most of the points on the compass."
Another version of "swarming" is evident in air-to-ground attack formations in which the attack aircraft do not approach from one direction, at one time, or at the same altitude, but schedule the attacks so each one requires a Boyd-style OODA iteration to deal with a new threat. Replacement training units (RTU) were "finishing schools" for pilots that needed to know not just the school solution, but the actual tactics being used in Vietnam. Referring to close air support, "In the RTU, new pilots learned the rules of the road for working with a forward air controller (FAC). The hardest part was finding the small aircraft as it circled over the target area. The fast-moving fighters used directional finding/steering equipment to get close enough to the slow, low FAC until someone in the flight could get an eyeball on him—a tally-ho. Once the FAC was in sight, he would give the fighters a target briefing—type of target, elevation, attack heading, location of friendlies, enemy defensive fire, best egress heading if hit by enemy fire, and other pertinent data. Usually the fighters would set up a circle, called a wheel or "wagon wheel", over the FAC, and wait for him to mark the target. Once the target was marked, the flight leader would attack first.
Psychology: Napoleon is well known for his comment "The moral is to the physical as three to one." Former United States Secretary of State and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell has said: "Perpetual optimism is a force multiplier." Morale, training, and ethos have long been known to result in disproportionate effects on the battlefield.
Psychological warfare can target the morale, politics, and values of enemy soldiers and their supporters to effectively neutralize them in a conflict.
Protecting local cultural heritage sites and investing in the relationships between local civilians and military forces can be seen as force multipliers leading to benefits in meeting or sustaining military objectives.
Technology: Ranged weapons that hit their target can be far more effective than those that miss. That is why rifled muskets for infantry and rangefinders for artillery became commonplace in the 19th century.
Two new weapons of World War I, barbed wire and the machine gun, multiplied defensive forces, leading to the stalemate of trench warfare.
Aircraft carriers: Aircraft carriers, such as the USS Gerald R. Ford, can carry more than 75 aircraft with fuel and ammunition for all tasks that an aircraft carrier should need like air to air, air to naval and air to ground missions. When deployed, aircraft carriers are a massive force multiplier that can turn any engagement in favour of those that have the aircraft carrier. Carriers can hold different type of aircraft to different usage meaning the force multiplier can vary depending on the specific task at hand.
Tankers: Airborne tanker aircraft, such as the Boeing KC-135 are a very significant force multiplier. They can carry fuel so bomber and fighter aircraft can take off loaded with extra weapons instead of full fuel tanks. The tankers also increase the range and time loitering within or near the target areas by off-loading fuel when it is needed. Tankers can also be used to rapidly deploy fighters, bombers, SIGNET, Airborne Command Post, and cargo aircraft from the United States to the areas where they are needed. The force multiplier of a KC-135R can be anywhere from 1.5 to as much as 6 when used near the target area.
Bombers: At one extreme, a stealth aircraft like the Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit strategic bomber can attack a target without needing the large numbers of escort fighter aircraft, electronic-warfare aircraft, Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, and other supporting aircraft that would be needed were conventional bombers used against the same target.
Precision-guided munitions (PGM) give an immense multiplication. The Thanh Hoa Bridge in North Vietnam had been only mildly damaged by approximately 800 sorties by aircraft armed with conventional Unguided bombs, but had one of its spans destroyed by a 12-plane mission, of which 8 carried laser-guided bombs. Two small subsequent missions, again with laser-guided bombs, completed the destruction of this target. Precision guided munitions are one example of what has been called the Revolution in Military Affairs. In World War II, British night bombers could hit, at best, an area of a city.
Modern PGMs commonly put a bomb within 3–10 meters of its target (see Circular error probable), and most carry an explosive charge significant enough that this uncertainty is effectively voided. See the use of heavy bombers in direct support of friendly troops in Afghanistan, using the technique of Ground-Aided Precision Strike.
Fighter combat: Fighter aircraft coordinated by an AWACS control aircraft, so that they can approach targets without being revealed by their own radar, and who are assigned to take specific targets so that duplication is avoided, are far more effective than an equivalent number of fighters dependent on their own resources for target acquisition.
In exercises between the Indian and US air forces, the Indian pilots had an opportunity to operate with AWACS control, and found it extremely effective. India has ordered AWACS aircraft, using Israeli Phalcon electronics on a Russian airframe, and this exercise is part of their preparation. Officer and pilot comments included "definitely was a force multiplier. Giving you an eye deep beyond you". "We could pick up incoming targets whether aircraft or missiles almost 400 kilometers away. It gives a grand battle coordination in the air".
Creating local forces: The use of small numbers of specialists to create larger effective forces is another form of multiplication. The basic A Team of US Army Special Forces is a 12-man unit that can train and lead a company-sized unit (100–200 men) of local guerrillas.
Deception: Deception can produce the potential effect of a much larger force. The fictitious First United States Army Group (FUSAG) was portrayed to the World War II Germans as the main force for the invasion of Europe. Operation Bodyguard
successfully gave the impression that FUSAG was to land at the Pas de Calais, convincing the Germans that the real attack at Normandy was a feint. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Force multiplier | Officer and pilot comments included "definitely was a force multiplier. Giving you an eye deep beyond you". "We could pick up incoming targets whether aircraft or missiles almost 400 kilometers away. It gives a grand battle coordination in the air".
Creating local forces: The use of small numbers of specialists to create larger effective forces is another form of multiplication. The basic A Team of US Army Special Forces is a 12-man unit that can train and lead a company-sized unit (100–200 men) of local guerrillas.
Deception: Deception can produce the potential effect of a much larger force. The fictitious First United States Army Group (FUSAG) was portrayed to the World War II Germans as the main force for the invasion of Europe. Operation Bodyguard
successfully gave the impression that FUSAG was to land at the Pas de Calais, convincing the Germans that the real attack at Normandy was a feint. As a result of the successful deception, the Normandy force penetrated deeply, in part, because the Germans held back strategic reserves that they thought would be needed at the Pas de Calais, against what was a nonexistent force. FUSAG's existence was suggested by the use of decoy vehicles that the Allies allowed to be photographed, fictitious radio traffic generated by a small number of specialists, and the Double Cross System. Double Cross referred to turning all surviving German spies in the UK into double agents, who sent back convincing reports that were consistent with the deception programs being conducted by the London Controlling Section.
See also: Asymmetric warfare
C4ISTAR
Lanchester's laws
List of established military terms
Network-centric warfare
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fortification | Nomenclature: Many United States Army installations are known as forts, although they are not always fortified. During the pioneering era of North America, many outposts on the frontiers, even non-military outposts, were referred to generically as forts. Larger military installations may be called fortresses; smaller ones were once known as fortalices. The word fortification can refer to the practice of improving an area's defense with defensive works. City walls are fortifications but are not necessarily called fortresses.
The art of setting out a military camp or constructing a fortification traditionally has been called castrametation since the time of the Roman legions. Laying siege to a fortification and of destroying it is commonly called siegecraft or siege warfare and is formally known as poliorcetics. In some texts, this latter term also applies to the art of building a fortification.
Fortification is usually divided into two branches: permanent fortification and field fortification. Permanent fortifications are erected at leisure, with all the resources that a state can supply of constructive and mechanical skill, and are built of enduring materials. Field fortifications—for example breastworks—and often known as fieldworks or earthworks, are extemporized by troops in the field, perhaps assisted by such local labour and tools as may be procurable and with materials that do not require much preparation, such as soil, brushwood, and light timber, or sandbags (see sangar). An example of field fortification was the construction of Fort Necessity by George Washington in 1754.
There is also an intermediate branch known as semi-permanent fortification. This is employed when in the course of a campaign it becomes desirable to protect some locality with the best imitation of permanent defences that can be made in a short time, ample resources and skilled civilian labour being available. An example of this is the construction of Roman forts in England and in other Roman territories where camps were set up with the intention of staying for some time, but not permanently.
Castles are fortifications which are regarded as being distinct from the generic fort or fortress in that it describes a residence of a monarch or noble and commands a specific defensive territory. An example of this is the massive medieval castle of Carcassonne.
History:
Neolithic Europe: From very early history to modern times, walls have been a necessity for many cities. Amnya Fort in western Siberia has been described by archaeologists as one of the oldest known fortified settlements, as well as the northernmost Stone Age fort. In Bulgaria, near the town of Provadia a walled fortified settlement today called Solnitsata starting from 4700 BC had a diameter of about 300 feet (91 m), was home to 350 people living in two-storey houses, and was encircled by a fortified wall. The huge walls around the settlement, which were built very tall and with stone blocks which are 6 feet (1.8 m) high and 4.5 feet (1.4 m) thick, make it one of the earliest walled settlements in Europe but it is younger than the walled town of Sesklo in Greece from 6800 BC.
Uruk in ancient Sumer (Mesopotamia) is one of the world's oldest known walled cities. The Ancient Egyptians also built fortresses on the frontiers of the Nile Valley to protect against invaders from neighbouring territories, as well as circle-shaped mud brick walls around their cities. Many of the fortifications of the ancient world were built with mud brick, often leaving them no more than mounds of dirt for today's archaeologists. A massive prehistoric stone wall surrounded the ancient temple of Ness of Brodgar 3200 BC in Scotland. Named the "Great Wall of Brodgar" it was 4 metres (13 ft) thick and 4 metres tall. The wall had some symbolic or ritualistic function. The Assyrians deployed large labour forces to build new palaces, temples and defensive walls.
Bronze Age Europe: In Bronze Age Malta, some settlements also began to be fortified. The most notable surviving example is Borġ in-Nadur, where a bastion built in around 1500 BC was found. Exceptions were few—notably, ancient Sparta and ancient Rome did not have walls for a long time, choosing to rely on their militaries for defence instead. Initially, these fortifications were simple constructions of wood and earth, which were later replaced by mixed constructions of stones piled on top of each other without mortar. In ancient Greece, large stone walls had been built in Mycenaean Greece, such as the ancient site of Mycenae (famous for the huge stone blocks of its 'cyclopean' walls). In classical era Greece, the city of Athens built two parallel stone walls, called the Long Walls, that reached their fortified seaport at Piraeus a few miles away.
In Central Europe, the Celts built large fortified settlements known as oppida, whose walls seem partially influenced by those built in the Mediterranean. The fortifications were continuously being expanded and improved. Around 600 BC, in Heuneburg, Germany, forts were constructed with a limestone foundation supported by a mudbrick wall approximately 4 metres tall, probably topped by a roofed walkway, thus reaching a total height of 6 metres. The wall was clad with lime plaster, regularly renewed. Towers protruded outwards from it.
The Oppidum of Manching (German: Oppidum von Manching) was a large Celtic proto-urban or city-like settlement at modern-day Manching (near Ingolstadt), Bavaria (Germany). The settlement was founded in the 3rd century BC and existed until c. 50–30 BC. It reached its largest extent during the late La Tène period (late 2nd century BC), when it had a size of 380 hectares. At that time, 5,000 to 10,000 people lived within its 7.2 km long walls. The oppidum of Bibracte is another example of a Gaulish fortified settlement.
Bronze and Iron Age Near East: The term casemate wall is used in the archaeology of Israel and the wider Near East, having the meaning of a double wall protecting a city or fortress, with transverse walls separating the space between the walls into chambers. These could be used as such, for storage or residential purposes, or could be filled with soil and rocks during siege in order to raise the resistance of the outer wall against battering rams. Originally thought to have been introduced to the region by the Hittites, this has been disproved by the discovery of examples predating their arrival, the earliest being at Ti'inik (Taanach) where such a wall has been dated to the 16th century BC. Casemate walls became a common type of fortification in the Southern Levant between the Middle Bronze Age (MB) and Iron Age II, being more numerous during the Iron Age and peaking in Iron Age II (10th–6th century BC). However, the construction of casemate walls had begun to be replaced by sturdier solid walls by the 9th century BC, probably due the development of more effective battering rams by the Neo-Assyrian Empire. Casemate walls could surround an entire settlement, but most only protected part of it. The three different types included freestanding casemate walls, then integrated ones where the inner wall was part of the outer buildings of the settlement, and finally filled casemate walls, where the rooms between the walls were filled with soil right away, allowing for a quick, but nevertheless stable construction of particularly high walls.
Ancient Rome: The Romans fortified their cities with massive, mortar-bound stone walls. The most famous of these are the largely extant Aurelian Walls of Rome and the Theodosian Walls of Constantinople, together with partial remains elsewhere. These are mostly city gates, like the Porta Nigra in Trier or Newport Arch in Lincoln.
Hadrian's Wall was built by the Roman Empire across the width of what is now northern England following a visit by Roman Emperor Hadrian (AD 76–138) in AD 122.
Indian subcontinent: A number of forts dating from the Later Stone Age to the British Raj are found in the mainland Indian subcontinent (modern day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal). "Fort" is the word used in India for all old fortifications. Numerous Indus Valley Civilization sites exhibit evidence of fortifications. By about 3500 BC, hundreds of small farming villages dotted the Indus floodplain. Many of these settlements had fortifications and planned streets. The stone and mud brick houses of Kot Diji were clustered behind massive stone flood dykes and defensive walls, for neighbouring communities bickered constantly about the control of prime agricultural land. The fortification varies by site. While Dholavira has stone-built fortification walls, Harrapa is fortified using baked bricks; sites such as Kalibangan exhibit mudbrick fortifications with bastions and Lothal has a quadrangular fortified layout. Evidence also suggested of fortifications in Mohenjo-daro. Even a small town—for instance, Kotada Bhadli, exhibiting sophisticated fortification-like bastions—shows that nearly all major and minor towns of the Indus Valley Civilization were fortified. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fortification | Numerous Indus Valley Civilization sites exhibit evidence of fortifications. By about 3500 BC, hundreds of small farming villages dotted the Indus floodplain. Many of these settlements had fortifications and planned streets. The stone and mud brick houses of Kot Diji were clustered behind massive stone flood dykes and defensive walls, for neighbouring communities bickered constantly about the control of prime agricultural land. The fortification varies by site. While Dholavira has stone-built fortification walls, Harrapa is fortified using baked bricks; sites such as Kalibangan exhibit mudbrick fortifications with bastions and Lothal has a quadrangular fortified layout. Evidence also suggested of fortifications in Mohenjo-daro. Even a small town—for instance, Kotada Bhadli, exhibiting sophisticated fortification-like bastions—shows that nearly all major and minor towns of the Indus Valley Civilization were fortified. Forts also appeared in urban cities of the Gangetic valley during the second urbanisation period between 600 and 200 BC, and as many as 15 fortification sites have been identified by archaeologists throughout the Gangetic valley, such as Kaushambi, Mahasthangarh, Pataliputra, Mathura, Ahichchhatra, Rajgir, and Lauria Nandangarh. The earliest Mauryan period brick fortification occurs in one of the stupa mounds of Lauria Nandangarh, which is 1.6 km in perimeter and oval in plan and encloses a habitation area.Mundigak (c. 2500 BC) in present-day south-east Afghanistan has defensive walls and square bastions of sun dried bricks.
India currently has over 180 forts, with the state of Maharashtra alone having over 70 forts, which are also known as durg, many of them built by Shivaji, founder of the Maratha Empire.
A large majority of forts in India are in North India. The most notable forts are the Red Fort at Old Delhi, the Red Fort at Agra, the Chittor Fort and Mehrangarh Fort in Rajasthan, the Ranthambhor Fort, Amer Fort and Jaisalmer Fort also in Rajasthan and Gwalior Fort in Madhya Pradesh.
The Arthashastra the Indian treatise on military strategy describes six major types of forts differentiated by their major modes of defenses.
Sri Lanka: Forts in Sri Lanka date back thousands of years, with many being built by Sri Lankan kings. These include several walled cities. With the outset of colonial rule in the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka was occupied by several major colonial empires that from time to time became the dominant power in the Indian Ocean. The colonists built several western-style forts, mostly in and around the coast of the island. The first to build colonial forts in Sri Lanka were the Portuguese; these forts were captured and later expanded by the Dutch. The British occupied these Dutch forts during the Napoleonic wars. Most of the colonial forts were garrisoned up until the early 20th century. The coastal forts had coastal artillery manned by the Ceylon Garrison Artillery during the two world wars.
Most of these were abandoned by the military but retained civil administrative officers, while others retained military garrisons, which were more administrative than operational. Some were reoccupied by military units with the escalation of the Sri Lankan Civil War; Jaffna fort, for example, came under siege several times.
China: Large tempered earth (i.e. rammed earth) walls were built in ancient China since the Shang dynasty (c. 1600–1050 BC); the capital at ancient Ao had enormous walls built in this fashion (see siege for more info). Although stone walls were built in China during the Warring States (481–221 BC), mass conversion to stone architecture did not begin in earnest until the Tang dynasty (618–907 AD). The Great Wall of China had been built since the Qin dynasty (221–207 BC), although its present form was mostly an engineering feat and remodelling of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644 AD).
In addition to the Great Wall, a number of Chinese cities also employed the use of defensive walls to defend their cities. Notable Chinese city walls include the city walls of Hangzhou, Nanjing, the Old City of Shanghai, Suzhou, Xi'an and the walled villages of Hong Kong. The famous walls of the Forbidden City in Beijing were established in the early 15th century by the Yongle Emperor. The Forbidden City made up the inner portion of the Beijing city fortifications.
Philippines:
Spanish colonial fortifications: During the Spanish Era several forts and outposts were built throughout the archipelago. Most notable is Intramuros, the old walled city of Manila located along the southern bank of the Pasig River. The historic city was home to centuries-old churches, schools, convents, government buildings and residences, the best collection of Spanish colonial architecture before much of it was destroyed by the bombs of World War II. Of all the buildings within the 67-acre city, only one building, the San Agustin Church, survived the war.
Partial listing of Spanish forts:
Intramuros, Manila
Cuartel de Santo Domingo, Santa Rosa, Laguna
Fuerza de Cuyo, Cuyo, Palawan
Fuerza de Cagayancillo, Cagayancillo, Palawan
Real Fuerza de Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Zaragoza, Zamboanga City
Fuerza de San Felipe, Cavite City
Fuerza de San Pedro, Cebu
Fuerte dela Concepcion y del Triunfo, Ozamiz, Misamis Occidental
Fuerza de San Antonio Abad, Manila
Fuerza de Pikit, Pikit, Cotabato
Fuerza de Santiago, Romblon, Romblon
Fuerza de Jolo, Jolo, Sulu
Fuerza de Masbate, Masbate
Fuerza de Bongabong, Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro
Cotta de Dapitan, Dapitan, Zamboanga del Norte
Fuerte de Alfonso XII, Tukuran, Zamboanga del Sur
Fuerza de Bacolod, Bacolod, Lanao del Norte
Guinsiliban Watchtower, Guinsiliban, Camiguin
Laguindingan Watchtower, Laguindingan, Misamis Oriental
Kutang San Diego, Gumaca, Quezon
Baluarte Luna, Luna, La Union
Local fortifications: The Ivatan people of the northern islands of Batanes built their so-called idjang on hills and elevated areas to protect themselves during times of war. These fortifications were likened to European castles because of their purpose. Usually, the only entrance to the castles would be via a rope ladder that would only be lowered for the villagers and could be kept away when invaders arrived.
The Igorots built forts made of stone walls that averaged several meters in width and about two to three times the width in height around 2000 BC.
The Muslim Filipinos of the south built strong fortresses called kota or moong to protect their communities. Usually, many of the occupants of these kotas are entire families rather than just warriors. Lords often had their own kotas to assert their right to rule, it served not only as a military installation but as a palace for the local Lord. It is said that at the height of the Maguindanao Sultanate's power, they blanketed the areas around Western Mindanao with kotas and other fortifications to block the Spanish advance into the region. These kotas were usually made of stone and bamboo or other light materials and surrounded by trench networks. As a result, some of these kotas were burned easily or destroyed. With further Spanish campaigns in the region, the sultanate was subdued and a majority of kotas dismantled or destroyed. kotas were not only used by the Muslims as defense against Spaniards and other foreigners, renegades and rebels also built fortifications in defiance of other chiefs in the area. During the American occupation, rebels built strongholds and the datus, rajahs, or sultans often built and reinforced their kotas in a desperate bid to maintain rule over their subjects and their land. Many of these forts were also destroyed by American expeditions, as a result, very very few kotas still stand to this day.
Notable kotas:
Kota Selurong: an outpost of the Bruneian Empire in Luzon, later became the City of Manila.
Kuta Wato/Kota Bato: Literally translates to "stone fort" the first known stone fortification in the country, its ruins exist as the "Kutawato Cave Complex"
Kota Sug/Jolo: The capital and seat of the Sultanate of Sulu. When it was occupied by the Spaniards in the 1870s they converted the kota into the world's smallest walled city.
Pre-Islamic Arabia:
During Muhammad's lifetime: During Muhammad's era in Arabia, many tribes made use of fortifications. In the Battle of the Trench, the largely outnumbered defenders of Medina, mainly Muslims led by Islamic prophet Muhammad, dug a trench, which together with Medina's natural fortifications, rendered the confederate cavalry (consisting of horses and camels) useless, locking the two sides in a stalemate. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fortification | Kuta Wato/Kota Bato: Literally translates to "stone fort" the first known stone fortification in the country, its ruins exist as the "Kutawato Cave Complex"
Kota Sug/Jolo: The capital and seat of the Sultanate of Sulu. When it was occupied by the Spaniards in the 1870s they converted the kota into the world's smallest walled city.
Pre-Islamic Arabia:
During Muhammad's lifetime: During Muhammad's era in Arabia, many tribes made use of fortifications. In the Battle of the Trench, the largely outnumbered defenders of Medina, mainly Muslims led by Islamic prophet Muhammad, dug a trench, which together with Medina's natural fortifications, rendered the confederate cavalry (consisting of horses and camels) useless, locking the two sides in a stalemate. Hoping to make several attacks at once, the confederates persuaded the Medina-allied Banu Qurayza to attack the city from the south. However, Muhammad's diplomacy derailed the negotiations, and broke up the confederacy against him. The well-organized defenders, the sinking of confederate morale, and poor weather conditions caused the siege to end in a fiasco.
During the Siege of Ta'if in January 630, Muhammad ordered his followers to attack enemies who fled from the Battle of Hunayn and sought refuge in the fortress of Taif.
Islamic world:
Africa: The entire city of Kerma in Nubia (present day Sudan) was encompassed by fortified walls surrounded by a ditch. Archaeology has revealed various Bronze Age bastions and foundations constructed of stone together with either baked or unfired brick.
The walls of Benin are described as the world's second longest man-made structure, as well as the most extensive earthwork in the world, by the Guinness Book of Records, 1974. The walls may have been constructed between the thirteenth and mid-fifteenth century CE or, during the first millennium CE. Strong citadels were also built other in areas of Africa. Yorubaland for example had several sites surrounded by the full range of earthworks and ramparts seen elsewhere, and sited on ground. This improved defensive potential—such as hills and ridges. Yoruba fortifications were often protected with a double wall of trenches and ramparts, and in the Congo forests concealed ditches and paths, along with the main works, often bristled with rows of sharpened stakes. Inner defenses were laid out to blunt an enemy penetration with a maze of defensive walls allowing for entrapment and crossfire on opposing forces.
A military tactic of the Ashanti was to create powerful log stockades at key points. This was employed in later wars against the British to block British advances. Some of these fortifications were over a hundred yards long, with heavy parallel tree trunks. They were impervious to destruction by artillery fire. Behind these stockades, numerous Ashanti soldiers were mobilized to check enemy movement. While formidable in construction, many of these strongpoints failed because Ashanti guns, gunpowder and bullets were poor, and provided little sustained killing power in defense. Time and time again British troops overcame or bypassed the stockades by mounting old-fashioned bayonet charges, after laying down some covering fire.
Defensive works were of importance in the tropical African Kingdoms. In the Kingdom of Kongo field fortifications were characterized by trenches and low earthen embankments. Such strongpoints ironically, sometimes held up much better against European cannon than taller, more imposing structures.
Medieval Europe: Roman forts and hill forts were the main antecedents of castles in Europe, which emerged in the 9th century in the Carolingian Empire. The Early Middle Ages saw the creation of some towns built around castles. These cities were only rarely protected by simple stone walls and more usually by a combination of both walls and ditches. From the 12th century, hundreds of settlements of all sizes were founded all across Europe, which very often obtained the right of fortification soon afterward.
The founding of urban centres was an important means of territorial expansion and many cities, especially in eastern Europe, were founded precisely for this purpose during the period of Eastern Colonisation. These cities are easy to recognise due to their regular layout and large market spaces. The fortifications of these settlements were continuously improved to reflect the current level of military development. During the Renaissance era, the Venetian Republic raised great walls around cities, and the finest examples, among others, are in Nicosia (Cyprus), Rocca di Manerba del Garda (Lombardy), and Palmanova (Italy), or Dubrovnik (Croatia), which proved to be futile against attacks but still stand to this day. Unlike the Venetians, the Ottomans used to build smaller fortifications but in greater numbers, and only rarely fortified entire settlements such as Počitelj, Vratnik, and Jajce in Bosnia.
Development after introduction of firearms: Medieval-style fortifications were largely made obsolete by the arrival of cannons on the 14th century battlefield. Fortifications in the age of black powder evolved into much lower structures with greater use of ditches and earth ramparts that would absorb and disperse the energy of cannon fire. Walls exposed to direct cannon fire were very vulnerable, so were sunk into ditches fronted by earth slopes.
This placed a heavy emphasis on the geometry of the fortification to allow defensive cannonry interlocking fields of fire to cover all approaches to the lower and thus more vulnerable walls.
The evolution of this new style of fortification can be seen in transitional forts such as Sarzanello in North West Italy which was built between 1492 and 1502. Sarzanello consists of both crenellated walls with towers typical of the medieval period but also has a ravelin like angular gun platform screening one of the curtain walls which is protected from flanking fire from the towers of the main part of the fort. Another example is the fortifications of Rhodes which were frozen in 1522 so that Rhodes is the only European walled town that still shows the transition between the classical medieval fortification and the modern ones. A manual about the construction of fortification was published by Giovanni Battista Zanchi in 1554.
Fortifications also extended in depth, with protected batteries for defensive cannonry, to allow them to engage attacking cannons to keep them at a distance and prevent them from bearing directly on the vulnerable walls.
The result was star shaped fortifications with tier upon tier of hornworks and bastions, of which Fort Bourtange is an excellent example. There are also extensive fortifications from this era in the Nordic states and in Britain, the fortifications of Berwick-upon-Tweed and the harbour archipelago of Suomenlinna at Helsinki being fine examples.
19th century: The arrival of explosive shells in the 19th century led to yet another stage in the evolution of fortification. Star forts did not fare well against the effects of high explosives and the intricate arrangements of bastions, flanking batteries and the carefully constructed lines of fire for the defending cannon could be rapidly disrupted by explosive shells.
Worse, the large open ditches surrounding forts of this type were an integral part of the defensive scheme, as was the covered way at the edge of the counter scarp. The ditch was extremely vulnerable to bombardment with explosive shells.
In response, military engineers evolved the polygonal style of fortification. The ditch became deep and vertically sided, cut directly into the native rock or soil, laid out as a series of straight lines creating the central fortified area that gives this style of fortification its name.
Wide enough to be an impassable barrier for attacking troops, but narrow enough to be a difficult target for enemy shellfire, the ditch was swept by fire from defensive blockhouses set in the ditch as well as firing positions cut into the outer face of the ditch itself.
The profile of the fort became very low indeed, surrounded outside the ditch covered by caponiers by a gently sloping open area so as to eliminate possible cover for enemy forces, while the fort itself provided a minimal target for enemy fire. The entrypoint became a sunken gatehouse in the inner face of the ditch, reached by a curving ramp that gave access to the gate via a rolling bridge that could be withdrawn into the gatehouse.
Much of the fort moved underground. Deep passages and tunnel networks now connected the blockhouses and firing points in the ditch to the fort proper, with magazines and machine rooms deep under the surface. The guns, however, were often mounted in open emplacements and protected only by a parapet; both in order to keep a lower profile and also because experience with guns in closed casemates had seen them put out of action by rubble as their own casemates were collapsed around them.
Gone were citadels surrounding towns: forts were to be moved to the outside of the cities some 12 km to keep the enemy at a distance so their artillery could not bombard the city center. From now on a ring of forts were to be built at a spacing that would allow them to effectively cover the intervals between them.
The new forts abandoned the principle of the bastion, which had also been made obsolete by advances in arms. The outline was a much-simplified polygon, surrounded by a ditch. These forts, built in masonry and shaped stone, were designed to shelter their garrison against bombardment. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fortification | The guns, however, were often mounted in open emplacements and protected only by a parapet; both in order to keep a lower profile and also because experience with guns in closed casemates had seen them put out of action by rubble as their own casemates were collapsed around them.
Gone were citadels surrounding towns: forts were to be moved to the outside of the cities some 12 km to keep the enemy at a distance so their artillery could not bombard the city center. From now on a ring of forts were to be built at a spacing that would allow them to effectively cover the intervals between them.
The new forts abandoned the principle of the bastion, which had also been made obsolete by advances in arms. The outline was a much-simplified polygon, surrounded by a ditch. These forts, built in masonry and shaped stone, were designed to shelter their garrison against bombardment. One organizing feature of the new system involved the construction of two defensive curtains: an outer line of forts, backed by an inner ring or line at critical points of terrain or junctions (see, for example, Séré de Rivières system in France).
Traditional fortification however continued to be applied by European armies engaged in warfare in colonies established in Africa against lightly armed attackers from amongst the indigenous population. A relatively small number of defenders in a fort impervious to primitive weaponry could hold out against high odds, the only constraint being the supply of ammunition.
20th and 21st centuries: Steel-and-concrete fortifications were common during the 19th and early 20th centuries. However, the advances in modern warfare since World War I have made large-scale fortifications obsolete in most situations. In the 1930s and 1940s, some fortifications were built with designs taking into consideration the new threat of aerial warfare, such as Fort Campbell in Malta. Despite this, only underground bunkers are still able to provide some protection in modern wars. Many historical fortifications were demolished during the modern age, but a considerable number survive as popular tourist destinations and prominent local landmarks today.
The downfall of permanent fortifications had two causes:
The ever-escalating power, speed, and reach of artillery and airpower meant that almost any target that could be located could be destroyed if sufficient force were massed against it. As such, the more resources a defender devoted to reinforcing a fortification, the more combat power that fortification justified being devoted to destroying it, if the fortification's destruction was demanded by an attacker's strategy. From World War II, bunker busters were used against fortifications. By 1950, nuclear weapons were capable of destroying entire cities and producing dangerous radiation. This led to the creation of civilian nuclear air raid shelters.
The second weakness of permanent fortification was its very permanency. Because of this, it was often easier to go around a fortification and, with the rise of mobile warfare in the beginning of World War II, this became a viable offensive choice. When a defensive line was too extensive to be entirely bypassed, massive offensive might could be massed against one part of the line allowing a breakthrough, after which the rest of the line could be bypassed. Such was the fate of the many defensive lines built before and during World War II, such as the Siegfried Line, the Stalin Line, and the Atlantic Wall. This was not the case with the Maginot Line; it was designed to force the Germans to invade other countries (Belgium or Switzerland) to go around it, and was successful in that sense.
Instead field fortification rose to dominate defensive action. Unlike the trench warfare which dominated World War I, these defences were more temporary in nature. This was an advantage because since it was less extensive it formed a less obvious target for enemy force to be directed against.
If sufficient power were massed against one point to penetrate it, the forces based there could be withdrawn and the line could be re-established relatively quickly. Instead of a supposedly impenetrable defensive line, such fortifications emphasized defence in depth, so that as defenders were forced to pull back or were overrun, the lines of defenders behind them could take over the defence.
Because the mobile offensives practised by both sides usually focused on avoiding the strongest points of a defensive line, these defences were usually relatively thin and spread along the length of a line. The defence was usually not equally strong throughout, however.
The strength of the defensive line in an area varied according to how rapidly an attacking force could progress in the terrain that was being defended—both the terrain the defensive line was built on and the ground behind it that an attacker might hope to break out into. This was both for reasons of the strategic value of the ground, and its defensive value.
This was possible because while offensive tactics were focused on mobility, so were defensive tactics. The dug-in defences consisted primarily of infantry and antitank guns. Defending tanks and tank destroyers would be concentrated in mobile brigades behind the defensive line. If a major offensive was launched against a point in the line, mobile reinforcements would be sent to reinforce that part of the line that was in danger of failing.
Thus the defensive line could be relatively thin because the bulk of the fighting power of the defenders was not concentrated in the line itself but rather in the mobile reserves. A notable exception to this rule was seen in the defensive lines at the Battle of Kursk during World War II, where German forces deliberately attacked the strongest part of the Soviet defences, seeking to crush them utterly.
The terrain that was being defended was of primary importance because open terrain that tanks could move over quickly made possible rapid advances into the defenders' rear areas that were very dangerous to the defenders. Thus such terrain had to be defended at all costs.
In addition, since in theory the defensive line only had to hold out long enough for mobile reserves to reinforce it, terrain that did not permit rapid advance could be held more weakly because the enemy's advance into it would be slower, giving the defenders more time to reinforce that point in the line. For example, the Battle of the Hurtgen Forest in Germany during the closing stages of World War II is an excellent example of how difficult terrain could be used to the defenders' advantage.
After World War II, intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching much of the way around the world were developed, so speed became an essential characteristic of the strongest militaries and defenses. Missile silos were developed, so missiles could be fired from the middle of a country and hit cities and targets in another country, and airplanes (and air carriers) became major defenses and offensive weapons (leading to an expansion of the use of airports and airstrips as fortifications). Mobile defenses could be had underwater, too, in the form of nuclear submarines capable of firing missiles. Some bunkers in the mid to late 20th century came to be buried deep inside mountains and prominent rocks, such as Gibraltar and the Cheyenne Mountain Complex. On the ground itself, minefields have been used as hidden defences in modern warfare, often remaining long after the wars that produced them have ended.
Demilitarized zones along borders are arguably another type of fortification, although a passive kind, providing a buffer between potentially hostile militaries.
Military airfields: Military airfields offer a fixed "target rich" environment for even relatively small enemy forces, using hit-and-run tactics by ground forces, stand-off attacks (mortars and rockets), air attacks, or ballistic missiles. Key targets—aircraft, munitions, fuel, and vital technical personnel—can be protected by fortifications.
Aircraft can be protected by revetments, hesco barriers, hardened aircraft shelters and underground hangars which will protect from many types of attack. Larger aircraft types tend to be based outside the operational theatre.
Munition storage follows safety rules which use fortifications (bunkers and bunds) to provide protection against accident and chain reactions (sympathetic detonations). Weapons for rearming aircraft can be stored in small fortified expense stores closer to the aircraft. At Bien Hoa South Vietnam on the morning of 16 May 1965, as aircraft were being re-fuelled and armed, a chain reaction explosion destroyed 13 aircraft, killed 34 personnel, and injured over 100; this, along with damage and losses of aircraft to enemy attack (by both infiltration and stand-off attacks), led to the construction of revetments and shelters to protect aircraft throughout South Vietnam.
Aircrew and ground personnel will need protection during enemy attacks and fortifications range from culvert section "duck and cover" shelters to permanent air-raid shelters. Soft locations with high personnel densities such as accommodation and messing facilities can have limited protection by placing prefabricated concrete walls or barriers around them, examples of barriers are Jersey Barriers, T Barriers or Splinter Protection Units (SPUs). Older fortification may prove useful such as the old 'Yugo' pyramid shelters built in the 1980s which were used by US personnel on 8 Jan 2020 when Iran fired 11 ballistic missiles at Ayn al-Asad Airbase in Iraq.
Fuel is volatile and has to comply with rules for storage which provide protection against accidents. Fuel in underground bulk fuel installations is well protected though valves and controls are vulnerable to enemy action. Above-ground tanks can be susceptible to attack.
Ground support equipment will need to be protected by fortifications to be usable after an enemy attack.
Permanent (concrete) guard fortifications are safer, stronger, last longer and are more cost-effective than sandbag fortifications. Prefabricated positions can be made from concrete culvert sections. The British Yarnold Bunker is made from sections of a concrete pipe. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fortification | Older fortification may prove useful such as the old 'Yugo' pyramid shelters built in the 1980s which were used by US personnel on 8 Jan 2020 when Iran fired 11 ballistic missiles at Ayn al-Asad Airbase in Iraq.
Fuel is volatile and has to comply with rules for storage which provide protection against accidents. Fuel in underground bulk fuel installations is well protected though valves and controls are vulnerable to enemy action. Above-ground tanks can be susceptible to attack.
Ground support equipment will need to be protected by fortifications to be usable after an enemy attack.
Permanent (concrete) guard fortifications are safer, stronger, last longer and are more cost-effective than sandbag fortifications. Prefabricated positions can be made from concrete culvert sections. The British Yarnold Bunker is made from sections of a concrete pipe.
Guard towers provide an increased field of view but a lower level of protection.
Dispersal and camouflage of assets can supplement fortifications against some forms of airfield attack.
Counter-insurgency: Just as in colonial periods, comparatively obsolete fortifications are still used for low-intensity conflicts. Such fortifications range in size from small patrol bases or forward operating bases up to huge airbases such as Camp Bastion/Leatherneck in Afghanistan. Much like in the 18th and 19th century, because the enemy is not a powerful military force with the heavy weaponry required to destroy fortifications, walls of gabion, sandbag or even simple mud can provide protection against small arms and anti-tank weapons—although such fortifications are still vulnerable to mortar and artillery fire.
Forts: Forts in modern American usage often refer to space set aside by governments for a permanent military facility; these often do not have any actual fortifications, and can have specializations (military barracks, administration, medical facilities, or intelligence).
However, there are some modern fortifications that are referred to as forts. These are typically small semi-permanent fortifications. In urban combat, they are built by upgrading existing structures such as houses or public buildings. In field warfare they are often log, sandbag or gabion type construction.
Such forts are typically only used in low-level conflicts, such as counterinsurgency conflicts or very low-level conventional conflicts, such as the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation, which saw the use of log forts for use by forward platoons and companies. The reason for this is that static above-ground forts cannot survive modern direct or indirect fire weapons larger than mortars, RPGs and small arms.
Prisons and others: Fortifications designed to keep the inhabitants of a facility in rather than attacker out can also be found, in prisons, concentration camps, and other such facilities. Those are covered in other articles, as most prisons and concentration camps are not primarily military forts (although forts, camps, and garrison towns have been used as prisons and/or concentration camps; such as Theresienstadt, Guantanamo Bay detention camp and the Tower of London for example).
Field fortifications:
Notes:
References: This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Jackson, Louis Charles (1911). "Fortification and Siegecraft". In Chisholm, Hugh (ed.). Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 10 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 679–725.
Bibliography: July, Robert Pre-Colonial Africa, Charles Scribner, 1975.
Murray, Nicholas. "The Development of Fortifications", The Encyclopedia of War, Gordon Martel (ed.). WileyBlackwell, 2011.
Murray, Nicholas. The Rocky Road to the Great War: The Evolution of Trench Warfare to 1914. Potomac Books Inc. (an imprint of the University of Nebraska Press), 2013.
Osadolor, Osarhieme Benson, "The Military System of Benin Kingdom 1440–1897", (UD), Hamburg University: 2001 copy.
Thornton, John Kelly Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500–1800, Routledge: 1999, ISBN 1857283937.
External links:
Fortress Study Group
Military Architecture at the Wayback Machine (archived 5 December 2018)
ICOFORT |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Forward operating base | Description: In its most basic form, a forward operating base consists of a ring of barbed wire around a position with a fortified entry control point, or ECP. An ECP is a controlled entry and exit point of the FOB and typically has positions to protect personnel against personnel-borne improvised explosive devices (PBIED) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), plus blast mitigation with standoff protection.
More advanced FOBs include an assembly of berms, concrete barriers, gates, guard towers, pillboxes and bunkers and other force protection infrastructure. They are often built from Hesco bastions.
Bases in Iraq:
Bases in Afghanistan:
FOBs in the United States:
Other reported Coalition installations in Afghanistan 2001–2016:
See also: Advance airfield
Advanced Landing Ground
Fire support base
Forward Operating Site
Loss of Strength Gradient
Main Operating Base
Naval outlying landing field
Satellite airfield
List of established military terms
References:
== External links == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Fourth-generation warfare | Elements: Fourth-generation warfare is defined as conflicts which involve the following elements:
Complex and long term
Terrorism (tactic)
A non-national or transnational base – highly decentralized
A direct attack on the enemy's culture, including genocidal acts against civilians.
All available pressures are used – political, economic, social and military
Occurs in low-intensity conflict, involving actors from all networks
Non-combatants are tactical dilemmas
Lack of hierarchy
Small in size, spread out network of communication and financial support
Use of insurgency tactics as subversion, terrorism and guerrilla tactics
Decentralised forces
History: The concept was first described by the authors William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (US Army), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (US Army), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR) in a 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article titled "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation". In 2006, the concept was expanded upon by USMC Colonel Thomas X. Hammes (Ret.) in his book, The Sling and The Stone.
The generations of warfare described by these authors are:
First generation: tactics of line and column; which developed in the age of the smoothbore musket. Lind describes First Generation of warfare as beginning after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 ending the Thirty Years' War and establishing the state's need to organize and conduct war. 1GW consisted of tightly ordered soldiers with top-down discipline. These troops would fight in close order and advance slowly. This began to change as the battlefield changed. Old line and column tactics are now considered suicidal as the bow and arrow/sword morphed into the rifle and machine gun.
Second generation: tactics of linear fire and movement, with reliance on indirect fire. This type of warfare can be seen in the early stages of World War I where there was still strict adherence to drill and discipline of formation and uniform. However, there remained a dependence on artillery and firepower to break the stalemate and move towards a pitched battle.
Third generation: tactics of infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them; and defence in depth. The 3GW military seeks to bypass the enemy, and attack his rear forward, such as the tactics used by German Stormtroopers in World War I against the British and French in order to break the trench warfare stalemate (Lind 2004). These aspects of 3GW bleed into 4GW as it is also warfare of speed and initiative. However, it targets both military forces and home populations.
The use of fourth-generation warfare can be traced to the Cold War period, as superpowers and major powers attempted to retain their grip on colonies and captured territories. Unable to withstand direct combat against bombers, tanks, and machine guns, non-state entities used tactics of education/propaganda, movement-building, secrecy, terror, and/or confusion to overcome the technological gap.
Fourth-generation warfare has often involved an insurgent group or other violent non-state actor trying to implement their own government or reestablish an old government over the current ruling power. However, a non-state entity tends to be more successful when it does not attempt, at least in the short term, to impose its own rule, but tries simply to disorganize and delegitimize the state in which the warfare takes place. The aim is to force the state adversary to expend manpower and money in an attempt to establish order, ideally in such a highhanded way that it merely increases disorder, until the state surrenders or withdraws.
Fourth-generation warfare is often seen in conflicts involving failed states and civil wars, particularly in conflicts involving non-state actors, intractable ethnic or religious issues, or gross conventional military disparities. Many of these conflicts occur in the geographic area described by author Thomas P.M. Barnett as the Non-Integrating Gap, fought by countries from the globalised Functioning Core.
Fourth-generation warfare has much in common with traditional low-intensity conflict in its classical forms of insurgency and guerrilla war. As in those small wars, the conflict is initiated by the "weaker" party through actions which can be termed "offensive". The difference lies in the manner in which 4GW opponents adapt those traditional concepts to present day conditions. These conditions are shaped by technology, globalization, religious fundamentalism, and a shift in moral and ethical norms which brings legitimacy to certain issues previously considered restrictions on the conduct of war. This amalgamation and metamorphosis produces novel ways of war for both the entity on the offensive and that on the defensive.
Characteristics: Fourth-generation warfare is normally characterized by a violent non-state actor (VNSA) fighting a state. This fighting can be physically done, such as by modern examples Hezbollah or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In this realm, the VNSA uses all three levels of fourth generation warfare. These are the physical (actual combat; it is considered the least important), mental (the will to fight, belief in victory, etc.,) and moral (the most important, this includes cultural norms, etc.) levels.
A 4GW enemy has the following characteristics: lack of hierarchical authority, lack of formal structure, patience and flexibility, ability to keep a low profile when needed, and small size. A 4GW adversary might use the tactics of an insurgent, terrorist, or guerrilla in order to wage war against a nation's infrastructure. Fourth generation warfare takes place on all fronts: economical, political, the media, military, and civilian. Conventional military forces often have to adapt tactics to fight a 4GW enemy.
Resistance can also be below the physical level of violence. This is via non-violent means, such as Mahatma Gandhi's opposition to the British Empire or the marches led by Martin Luther King Jr. Both desired their factions to deescalate the conflict while the state escalates against them, the objective being to target the opponent on the moral and mental levels rather than the physical level. The state is then seen as oppressive and loses support.
Another characteristic of fourth-generation warfare is that unlike in third generation warfare, the VNSA's forces are decentralized. With fourth generation warfare, there may even be no single organization and that smaller groups organize into impromptu alliances to target a bigger threat (that being the state armed forces or another faction). As a result, these alliances are weak and if the state's military leadership is smart enough they can split their enemy and cause them to fight amongst themselves.
Fourth-generation warfare goals:
Survival.
To convince the enemy's political decision makers that their goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.
Yet, another factor is that political centers of gravity have changed. These centers of gravity may revolve around nationalism, religion, or family or clan honor.
Disaggregated forces, such as guerrillas, terrorists, and rioters, which lack a center of gravity, deny to their enemies a focal point at which to deliver a conflict ending blow. As a result, strategy becomes more problematic while combating a VNSA.
It has been theorized that a state vs. state conflict in fourth-generation warfare would involve the use of computer hackers and international law to obtain the weaker side's objectives, the logic being that the civilians of the stronger state would lose the will to fight as a result of seeing their state engage in alleged atrocities and having their own bank accounts harmed.
Three principal attributes of the new-age terrorism were held to be their hybrid structure (as opposed to the traditional microscopic command and control pattern), importance given to systemic disruption vis-a-vis target destruction, and sophisticated use of technological advancements (including social media and mobile communications technology). A terrorist network could be designed to be either acephalous (headless like Al-Qaeda after Bin Laden) or polycephalous (hydra-headed like Kashmiri separatists). Social media networks supporting the terrorists are characterized by positive feedback loops, tight coupling and non-linear response propagation (viz. a small perturbation causing a large disproportionate response).
Criticism: Fourth-generation warfare theory has been criticized on the grounds that it is "nothing more than repackaging of the traditional clash between the non-state insurgent and the soldiers of a nation-state."
Strategic Studies Institute writer and United States Army War College professor Antulio J. Echevarria II, in his article Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths, argues what is being called fourth generation warfare are simply insurgencies. He also claims that 4GW was "reinvented" by Lind to create the appearance of having predicted the future. Echevarria writes: "The generational model is an ineffective way to depict changes in warfare. Simple displacement rarely takes place, significant developments typically occur in parallel." The critique was rebutted by John Sayen, a military historian and retired Lt. Col. in the Marine Corps Reserve.
Lieutenant General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., USMC, characterizes fourth-generation warfare theory as "elegant irrelevance" and states that "its methods are unclear, its facts contentious and open to widely varying interpretations, and its relevance questionable."
Rod Thornton argues that Thomas Hammes and William S. Lind are "providing an analytical lens through which to view the type of opposition that exists now 'out there' and to highlight the shortcomings of the current US military in dealing with that opposition." Instead of fourth generation warfare being an explanation for a new way of warfare, it allows the blending of different generations of warfare with the exception that fourth generation also encompasses new technology. Fourth generation warfare theorists such as Lind and Hammes wish to make the point that it "is not just that the military's structure and equipment are ill-suited to the 4GW problem, but so is its psyche".
See also:
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Frogman | Scope of operations: Tactical diving is a branch of professional diving carried out by armed forces and tactical units. They may be divided into:
Combat or assault divers.
Special mission work divers (called "clearance divers" in the British Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy), who do general work underwater.
Work divers who are trained in defusing mines and removing other explosives underwater.
These groups may overlap, and the same men may serve as assault divers and work divers, such as the Australian Clearance Diving Branch (RAN).
The range of operations performed by these operatives includes:
Amphibious assault: stealthy deployment of land or boarding forces. The vast majority of combat swimmer missions are simply to get "from here to there" and arrive suitably equipped and in sufficient physical condition to fight on arrival. The deployment of tactical forces by water to assault land targets, oil platforms, or surface ship targets (as in boardings for seizure of evidence) is a major driver behind the equipping and training of combat swimmers. The purposes are many, but include feint and deception, counter-drug, law enforcement, counter-terrorism, and counter-proliferation missions.
Sabotage: This includes putting limpet mines on ships.
Clandestine surveying: Surveying a beach before a troop landing, or other forms of unauthorized underwater surveying in denied waters.
Clandestine underwater work, e.g.:
Recovering underwater objects.
Clandestine fitting of monitoring devices on submarine communications cables in enemy waters.
Investigating unidentified divers, or a sonar echo that may be unidentified divers. Police diving work may be included.
Checking ships, boats, structures, and harbors for limpet mines and other sabotage; and ordinary routine maintenance in war conditions.
Underwater mine clearance and bomb disposal.
Typically, a diver with closed circuit oxygen rebreathing equipment will stay within a depth limit of 20 feet (6.1 m) with limited deeper excursions to a maximum of 50 feet (15 m) because of the risk of seizure due to acute oxygen toxicity. The use of nitrox or mixed gas rebreathers can extend this depth range considerably, but this may be beyond the scope of operations, depending on the unit.
Mission descriptions: US and UK forces use these official definitions for mission descriptors:
Stealthy
keeping out of sight (e.g., underwater) when approaching the target.
Covert
carrying out an action of which the enemy may become aware, but whose perpetrator cannot easily be discovered or apprehended. Covert action often involves military force which cannot be hidden once it has happened. Stealth on approach, and frequently on departure, may be used.
Clandestine
it is intended that the enemy does not find out then or afterwards that the action has happened – for example, installing eavesdropping devices. Approach, installing the devices, and departure are all to be kept from the knowledge of the enemy. If the operation or its purpose is exposed, then the actor will usually make sure that the action at least remains "covert", or unattributable.
Defending against frogmen: Anti-frogman techniques are security methods developed to protect watercraft, ports and installations, and other sensitive resources both in or nearby vulnerable waterways from potential threats or intrusions by frogmen.
Equipment: Frogmen on clandestine operations use rebreathers, as the bubbles released by open-circuit scuba would reveal them to surface lookouts and make a noise which hydrophones could easily detect.
Origins of the name: A few different explanations have been given for the origin of the term frogman.
Paul Boyton adopted the stage name The Fearless Frogman. In the 1870s, he was a long distance swimmer who wore a rubber immersion suit, with hood.
In an interview with historian Erick Simmel, John Spence claimed that the name "frogman" was coined while he was training in a green waterproof suit, "Someone saw me surfacing one day and yelled out, 'Hey, frogman!' The name stuck for all of us."
History: In ancient Roman and Greek times, there were instances of men swimming or diving for combat, sometimes using a hollow plant stem or a long bone as a snorkel. Diving with snorkel is mentioned by Aristotle (4th century BC). The earliest descriptions of frogmen in war are found in Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War. The first instance was in 425 BC, when the Athenian fleet besieged the Spartans on the small island of Sphacteria. The Spartans managed to get supplies from the mainland by underwater swimmers towing submerged sacks of supplies. In another incident of the same war, in 415 BC, the Athenians used combat divers in the port of Syracuse, Sicily. The Syracuseans had planted vertical wooden poles in the bottom around their port, to prevent the Athenian triremes from entering. The poles were submerged, not visible above the sea level. The Athenians used various means to cut these obstacles, including divers with saws. It is believed that the underwater sawing required snorkels for breathing and diving weights to keep the divers stable.
Also, in the writings of Al-Maqrizi, it is also claimed that the naval forces of the Fatimid Caliphate, in an engagement with Byzantine forces off the coast of Messina henceforth referred to as the Battle of the Straits, employed a novel strategy with strong similarities to modern-day frogmen tactics. In the writings of Heinz Halm, who studied and translated the writings of Al-Maqrizi and other contemporary Islamic historians, it is described: "They would dive from their own ship and swim over to the enemy ship; they would fasten ropes to its rudder, along which earthenware pots containing Greek fire were then made to slide over to the enemy ship, and shattered on the sternpost." Apparently, this tactic succeeded in destroying many Byzantine vessels, and the battle ended in a major Fatimid victory; according to the Arab historians, a thousand prisoners were taken, including the Byzantine admiral, Niketas, with many of his officers, as well as a heavy Indian sword which bore an inscription indicating that it had once belonged to Muhammad.
The Hungarian Chronicon Pictum claims that Henry III's 1052 invasion of Hungary was defeated by a skillful diver who sabotaged Henry's supply fleet. The unexpected sinking of the ships is confirmed by German chronicles.
On 4 November 1918, during World War I, Italian frogmen sunk the Austro-Hungarian ship Viribus Unitis.
Italy started World War II with a commando frogman force already trained. Britain, Germany, the United States, and the Soviet Union started commando frogman forces during World War II.
First frogmen: The word frogman appeared first in the stage name The Fearless Frogman of Paul Boyton, who since the 1870s broke records in long distance swimming to demonstrate a newly invented rubber immersion suit, with an inflated hood.
The first modern frogmen were the World War II Italian commando frogmen of Decima Flottiglia MAS (now "ComSubIn": Comando Raggruppamento Subacquei e Incursori Teseo Tesei) which formed in 1938 and was first in action in 1940. Originally these divers were called "Uomini Gamma" because they were members of the top secret special unit called "Gruppo Gamma", which originated from the kind of Pirelli rubber skin-suit nicknamed muta gamma used by these divers. Later they were nicknamed "Uomini Rana," Italian for "frog men", because of an underwater swimming frog kick style, similar to that of frogs, or because their fins looked like frog's feet.
This special corps used an early oxygen rebreather scuba set, the Auto Respiratore ad Ossigeno (A.R.O), a development of the Dräger oxygen self-contained breathing apparatus designed for the mining industry and of the Davis Submerged Escape Apparatus made by Siebe, Gorman & Co and by Bergomi, designed for escaping from sunken submarines. This was used from about 1920 for spearfishing by Italian sport divers, modified and adapted by the Italian navy engineers for safe underwater use and built by Pirelli and SALVAS from about 1933, and so became a precursor of the modern diving rebreather.
For this new way of underwater diving, the Italian frogmen trained in La Spezia, Liguria, using the newly available Genoese free diving spearfishing equipment; diving mask, snorkel, swimfins, and rubber dry suit, the first specially made diving watch (the luminescent Panerai), and the new A.R.O. scuba unit. This was a revolutionary alternative way to dive, and the start of the transition from the usual heavy underwater diving equipment of the hard hat divers which had been in general use since the 18th century, to self-contained divers, free of being tethered by an air line and rope connection.
Wartime operations: After Italy declared war, the Decima Flottiglia MAS (Xª MAS) attempted several frogmen attacks on British naval bases in the Mediterranean between June 1940 and July 1941, but none were successful, because of equipment failure or early detection by British forces. On September 10, 1941, eight Xª MAS frogmen were inserted by submarine close to the British harbour at Gibraltar, where using human torpedoes to penetrate the defences, sank three merchant ships before escaping through neutral Spain. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Frogman | scuba unit. This was a revolutionary alternative way to dive, and the start of the transition from the usual heavy underwater diving equipment of the hard hat divers which had been in general use since the 18th century, to self-contained divers, free of being tethered by an air line and rope connection.
Wartime operations: After Italy declared war, the Decima Flottiglia MAS (Xª MAS) attempted several frogmen attacks on British naval bases in the Mediterranean between June 1940 and July 1941, but none were successful, because of equipment failure or early detection by British forces. On September 10, 1941, eight Xª MAS frogmen were inserted by submarine close to the British harbour at Gibraltar, where using human torpedoes to penetrate the defences, sank three merchant ships before escaping through neutral Spain. An even more successful attack, the Raid on Alexandria, was mounted on 19 December on the harbour at Alexandria, again using human torpedoes. The raid resulted in disabling the battleships HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Valiant together with a destroyer and an oil tanker, but all six frogmen were captured. Frogmen were deployed by stealth in Algeciras, Spain, from where they launched a number of limpet-mine attacks on Allied shipping at anchor off Gibraltar. Some time later they refitted the interned Italian tanker Olterra as a mothership for human torpedoes, carrying out three assaults on ships at Gibraltar between late 1942 and early 1943, sinking six of them.
Nazi Germany raised a number of frogmen units under the auspices of both the Kriegsmarine and the Abwehr, often relying on Italian expertise and equipment. In June 1944, a K-Verband frogman unit failed to destroy the bridge at Bénouville, now known as Pegasus Bridge, during the Battle of Normandy. In March 1945, a frogman squad from the Brandenburgers was deployed from their base in Venice to destroy the Ludendorff Bridge over the Rhine which had been captured by the US Army in the Battle of Remagen. Seven frogmen swam 17 kilometres (11 mi) downriver to the bridge carrying explosives, but were spotted by Canal Defence Lights. Four died, two from hypothermia, and the rest were captured.
The British Royal Navy had captured an Italian human torpedo during a failed attack on Malta; they developed a copy called the Chariot and formed a unit called the Experimental Submarine Flotilla, which later merged with the Special Boat Service. A number of Chariot operations were attempted, most notably Operation Title in October 1942, an attack on the German battleship Tirpitz, which had to be abandoned when a storm hit the fishing boat which was towing the Chariots into position. Operation Principal in January 1943 was an attack by eight Chariots on La Maddalena and Palermo harbours; although all the Chariots were lost, the new Italian cruiser Ulpio Traiano was sunk. The last and most successful British operation resulted in sinking two liners in Phuket harbour in Thailand in October 1944. Royal Navy divers did not use fins until December 1942.
Wartime developments: In 1933 Italian companies were already producing underwater oxygen rebreathers, but the first diving set known as SCUBA was invented in 1939 by Christian Lambertsen, who originally called it the Lambertsen Amphibious Respirator Unit (LARU) and patented it in 1940. He later renamed it the Self Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus, which, contracted to SCUBA, eventually became the generic term for both open circuit and rebreather autonomous underwater breathing equipment.
Lambertsen demonstrated it to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) (after already being rejected by the U.S. Navy) in a pool at a hotel in Washington D.C. OSS not only bought into the concept, they hired Lambertsen to lead the program and build up the dive element of their Maritime Unit. The OSS was the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency; the maritime element still exists inside the CIA's Special Activities Division.
John Spence, an enlisted member of the U.S. Navy, was the first man selected to join the OSS group.
Postwar operations: In April 1956, Commander Lionel Crabb, a wartime pioneer of Royal Navy combat diving, disappeared during a covert inspection of the hull of the Soviet Navy Sverdlov-class cruiser, Ordzhonikidze, while she was moored in Portsmouth Harbour.
The Shayetet 13 commandos of the Israeli Navy have carried out a number of underwater raids on harbors. They were initially trained by veterans of Xª MAS and used Italian equipment. As part of Operation Raviv in 1969, eight frogmen used two human torpedoes to enter Ras Sadat naval base near Suez, where they destroyed two motor torpedo boats with mines.
During the 1982 Falklands War, the Argentinian Naval Intelligence Service planned an attack on British warships at Gibraltar. Code named Operation Algeciras, three frogmen, recruited from a former anti-government insurgent group, were to plant mines on the ships' hulls. The operation was abandoned when the divers were arrested by Spanish police and deported.
In 1985, the French nuclear weapons tests at Moruroa in the Pacific Ocean was being contested by environmental protesters led by the Greenpeace campaign ship, Rainbow Warrior. The Action Division of the French Directorate-General for External Security devised a plan to sink the Rainbow Warrior while it was berthed in harbor at Auckland in New Zealand. Two divers from the Division posed as tourists and attached two limpet mines to the ship's hull; the resulting explosion sank the ship and killed a Netherlands citizen on board. Two agents from the team, but not the divers, were arrested by the New Zealand Police and later convicted of manslaughter. The French government finally admitted responsibility two months later.
In the U.S. Navy, frogmen were officially phased out in 1983 and all active duty frogmen were transferred to SEAL units. In 1989, during the U.S. invasion of Panama, a team of four U.S. Navy SEALs using rebreathers conducted a combat swimmer attack on the Presidente Porras, a gunboat and yacht belonging to Manuel Noriega. The commandos attached explosives to the vessel as it was tied to a pier in the Panama Canal, escaping only after being attacked with grenades. Three years later during Operation Restore Hope, members of SEAL Team One swam to shore in Somalia to measure beach composition, water depth, and shore gradient ahead of a Marine landing. The mission resulted in several of the SEALs becoming ill as Somalia's waters were contaminated with raw sewage.
In 1978, the U.S. Navy Special Operations Officer (1140) community was established by combining Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Expendable Ordnance Management officers with Diving and Salvage officers. Special Ops Officers would become qualified in at lease two functional areas - normally EOD or Diving and Salvage, and Expendable Ordnance management. Officers trained in diving and salvage techniques were now allowed to follow a career pattern that took advantage of their training, and Unrestricted line officers were now permitted to specialize in salvage, with repeat tours of duty, and advanced training. Career patterns were developed to ensure that officers assigned to command were seasoned in salvage operations and well qualified in the technical aspects of their trade. "The combination gave a breadth and depth of professionalism to Navy salvage that had not been possible before."
Gallery:
See also: List of military diving units
Lionel Crabb – Royal Navy frogman and MI6 diver
Military diving
Underwater Demolition Team
References:
Further reading: Frogman operations: Decima Flottiglia MAS, Underwater Demolition Team, human torpedo, Sinking of the Rainbow Warrior, Russian commando frogmen
Bush, Elizabeth Kauffman (2004). America's first frogman : the Draper Kauffman story. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-098-6. OCLC 55699399.
Fraser, Ian (1957). Frogman V.C. Angus & Robertson. OCLC 1599838.
Pugh, Marshal (1956). Frogman: Commander Crabb's story. OCLC 1280137.
Welham, Michael G.; Welham, Jacqui (1990). Frogman Spy: the mysterious disappearance of Commander 'Buster' Crabb. W.H. Allen. ISBN 1-85227-138-8. OCLC 21979335.
Tony Groom: DIVER. Royal Naval Clearance Divers work in the Falklands conflict. ISBN 978-1574092691.
External links: Media related to Frogman at Wikimedia Commons
Panerai during World War Two Archived 2019-04-14 at the Wayback Machine
Frogman - Training, Equipment, and Operations of Our Navy's Undersea Fighters - C.B. Colby Archived 2019-03-09 at the Wayback Machine
List of books about frogmen |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Frontal assault | Battles with notably successful frontal assaults: Battle of Bunker Hill – After two failed attempts, the British army succeeds in capturing the heights.
Battle of Missionary Ridge – Union army storms Missionary Ridge after flank attacks are stalled.
Battle of Pea Ridge – Union army routs Confederate forces in a frontal assault on the second day.
Battle of Spotsylvania Court House – Union army captures the "Mule Shoe" salient.
Brusilov Offensive – Russian army breaks Austro-Hungarian lines during the First World War, though infiltration tactics were used.
Battle of Vimy Ridge – Operationally, a frontal assault, though new platoon-based tactics enabled tactical maneuver at the lowest levels.
Battles with notably unsuccessful frontal assaults: Battle of Carillon – A classic example of tactical military incompetence.
Battle of Gettysburg – Pickett's Charge aims at the Union center and is repulsed.
Battle of Fredericksburg – Union army fails to take Marye's Heights.
Battle of Franklin – Repeated Confederate charges are repulsed.
Battle of Balaklava – The Charge of the Light Brigade.
Battle of Cold Harbor – Union assaults repulsed by Confederate forces with heavy casualties.
Battle of Longewala – Failure of Pakistan Army's 206 and 51 Brigades with 2000-3000 men and 40 tanks attack on 120 Indian soldiers of the A company of the Punjab Regiment defending the Longewala border post.
See also: List of established military terms
List of military tactics
Military science
Rush (computer and video games) |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Full-spectrum dominance | US military doctrine: As early as April 2001 the United States Department of Defense defined "full-spectrum superiority" (FSS) as:
The cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, maritime, and space domains and information environment, which includes cyberspace, that permits the conduct of joint operations without effective opposition or prohibitive interference.
The doctrine of Full Spectrum Operations replaced the prior one, which was known as AirLand Battle. AirLand Battle had been taught in one form or another since 1982.
The United States military's doctrine espoused a strategic intent to be capable of achieving FSS state in a conflict, either alone or with allies, by defeating any adversary and controlling any situation across the range of military operations.
The stated intent implies significant investment in a range of capabilities: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection.
Criticism: Critics of US imperialism have referred to the term as proof of the ambitions of policymakers in the US and their alleged desire for total control. Harold Pinter referred to the term in his 2005 Nobel Prize in Literature acceptance speech Art, Truth and Politics:
I have said earlier that the United States is now totally frank about putting its cards on the table. That is the case. Its official declared policy is now defined as "full spectrum dominance". That is not my term, it is theirs. "Full spectrum dominance" means control of land, sea, air and space and all attendant resources.
Metaphorical use: Full spectrum dominance is used in a number of non-military fields to describe a comprehensive tactical effort to support a strategy.
In marketing, full spectrum dominance may refer to an integrated campaign that takes into account reaching an audience across a wide variety of platforms and media to guarantee visibility and reinforcement. That might include simultaneous integration of online promotions with direct marketing, public relations, social media and other tactical marketing vehicles.
See also: Geostrategy
Network-centric warfare
Psychological warfare
Overmatch
References:
Further reading:
Engdahl, F. William Full Spectrum Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy in the New World Order Boxborough, MA: 2009 Third Millennium Press. 268 pages.
Mahajan, Rahul Mahajan, Rahul (2003). Full Spectrum Dominance, U.S. power in Iraq and beyond. ISBN 9781583225783. New York: 2003 Seven Stories Press.
Vest, Jason "Missed Perceptions". Archived from the original on 15 May 2008. Retrieved 20 May 2007. Government Executive, 1 December 2005 |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Geneva Conventions | History: The Swiss businessman Henry Dunant went to visit wounded soldiers after the Battle of Solferino in 1859. He was shocked by the lack of facilities, personnel, and medical aid available to help these soldiers. As a result, he published his book, A Memory of Solferino, in 1862, on the horrors of war. His wartime experiences inspired Dunant to propose:
A permanent relief agency for humanitarian aid in times of war
A government treaty recognizing the neutrality of the agency and allowing it to provide aid in a war zone
The former proposal led to the establishment of the Red Cross in Geneva. The latter led to the 1864 Geneva Convention, the first codified international treaty that covered the sick and wounded soldiers on the battlefield. On 22 August 1864, the Swiss government invited the governments of all European countries, as well as the United States, Brazil, and Mexico, to attend an official diplomatic conference. Sixteen countries sent a total of twenty-six delegates to Geneva. On 22 August 1864, the conference adopted the first Geneva Convention "for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field". Representatives of 12 states and kingdoms signed the convention:
For both of these accomplishments, Henry Dunant became co recipient of the first Nobel Peace Prize in 1901.
On 20 October 1868 the first unsuccessful attempt to expand the 1864 treaty was undertaken. With the 'Additional Articles relating to the Condition of the Wounded in War' an attempt was initiated to clarify some rules of the 1864 convention and to extend them to maritime warfare. The Articles were signed but were only ratified by the Netherlands and the United States of America. The Netherlands later withdrew their ratification. The protection of the victims of maritime warfare would later be realized by the third Hague Convention of 1899 and the tenth Hague Convention of 1907.
In 1906 thirty-five states attended a conference convened by the Swiss government. On 6 July 1906 it resulted in the adoption of the "Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field", which improved and supplemented, for the first time, the 1864 convention. It remained in force until 1970 when Costa Rica acceded to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The 1929 conference yielded two conventions that were signed on 27 July 1929. One, the "Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field", was the third version to replace the original convention of 1864. The other was adopted after experiences in World War I had shown the deficiencies in the protection of prisoners of war under the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The "Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War" was not to replace these earlier conventions signed at The Hague, rather it supplemented them.
There was considerable debate over whether the Geneva Convention should prohibit indiscriminate forms of warfare, such as aerial bombings, nuclear bombings and starvation, but no agreement was reached on those forms of violence.
Inspired by the wave of humanitarian and pacifistic enthusiasm following World War II and the outrage towards the war crimes disclosed by the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, a series of conferences were held in 1949 reaffirming, expanding and updating the prior Geneva and Hague Conventions. It yielded four distinct conventions:
The First Geneva Convention "for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field" was the fourth update of the original 1864 convention and replaced the 1929 convention on the same subject matter.
The Second Geneva Convention "for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea" replaced the Hague Convention (X) of 1907. It was the first Geneva Convention on the protection of the victims of maritime warfare and mimicked the structure and provisions of the First Geneva Convention.
The Third Geneva Convention "relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War" replaced the 1929 Geneva Convention that dealt with prisoners of war.
In addition to these three conventions, the conference also added a new elaborate Fourth Geneva Convention "relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War". It was the first Geneva Convention not to deal with combatants, rather it had the protection of civilians as its subject matter. The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions had already contained some provisions on the protection of civilians and occupied territory. Article 154 specifically provides that the Fourth Geneva Convention is supplementary to these provisions in the Hague Conventions.
Despite the length of these documents, they were found over time to be incomplete. The nature of armed conflicts had changed with the beginning of the Cold War era, leading many to believe that the 1949 Geneva Conventions were addressing a largely extinct reality: on the one hand, most armed conflicts had become internal, or civil wars, while on the other, most wars had become increasingly asymmetric. Modern armed conflicts were inflicting an increasingly higher toll on civilians, which brought the need to provide civilian persons and objects with tangible protections in time of combat, bringing a much needed update to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
In light of these developments, two Protocols were adopted in 1977 that extended the terms of the 1949 Conventions with additional protections. In 2005, a third brief Protocol was added establishing an additional protective sign for medical services, the Red Crystal, as an alternative to the ubiquitous Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems, for those countries that find them objectionable.
Commentaries: The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Commentary (The Commentaries) is a series of four volumes of books published between 1952 and 1958 and containing commentaries to each of the four Geneva Conventions. The series was edited by Jean Pictet who was the vice-president of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Commentaries are often relied upon to provide authoritative interpretation of the articles.
Contents: The Geneva Conventions are rules that apply only in times of armed conflict and seek to protect people who are not or are no longer taking part in hostilities.
The first convention dealt with the treatment of wounded and sick armed forces in the field. The second convention dealt with the sick, wounded, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea. The third convention dealt with the treatment of prisoners of war during times of conflict. The fourth convention dealt with the treatment of civilians and their protection during wartime.
Individuals who fulfill the criteria of protected persons in international armed conflicts are protected by the 1949 conventions. Those not listed as protected persons in such conflicts are instead protected by international human rights law and general treaties concerning the legal status of aliens in belligerent nations.
Conventions: In international law and diplomacy the term convention refers to an international agreement, or treaty.
The First Geneva Convention "for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field" (first adopted in 1864, revised in 1906, 1929 and finally 1949);
The Second Geneva Convention "for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea" (first adopted in 1949, successor of the Hague Convention (X) 1907);
The Third Geneva Convention "relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War" (first adopted in 1929, last revision in 1949);
The Fourth Geneva Convention "relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War" (first adopted in 1949, based on parts of the Hague Convention (II) of 1899 and Hague Convention (IV) 1907).
With two Geneva Conventions revised and adopted, and the second and fourth added, in 1949 the whole set is referred to as the "Geneva Conventions of 1949" or simply the "Geneva Conventions". Usually only the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are referred to as First, Second, Third or Fourth Geneva Convention. The treaties of 1949 were ratified, in whole or with reservations, by 196 countries.
Protocols: The 1949 conventions have been modified with three amendment protocols:
Protocol I (1977) relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
Protocol II (1977) relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
Protocol III (2005) relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem
Application: The Geneva Conventions apply at times of war and armed conflict to governments who have ratified its terms. The details of applicability are spelled out in Common Articles 2 and 3.
Common Article 2 relating to international armed conflict (IAC): This article states that the Geneva Conventions apply to all the cases of international armed conflict (IAC), where at least one of the warring nations has ratified the Conventions. Primarily:
The Conventions apply to all cases of declared war between signatory nations. This is the original sense of applicability, which predates the 1949 version.
The Conventions apply to all cases of armed conflict between two or more signatory nations. This language was added in 1949 to accommodate situations that have all the characteristics of war without the existence of a formal declaration of war, such as a police action. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Geneva Conventions | The details of applicability are spelled out in Common Articles 2 and 3.
Common Article 2 relating to international armed conflict (IAC): This article states that the Geneva Conventions apply to all the cases of international armed conflict (IAC), where at least one of the warring nations has ratified the Conventions. Primarily:
The Conventions apply to all cases of declared war between signatory nations. This is the original sense of applicability, which predates the 1949 version.
The Conventions apply to all cases of armed conflict between two or more signatory nations. This language was added in 1949 to accommodate situations that have all the characteristics of war without the existence of a formal declaration of war, such as a police action.
The Conventions apply to a signatory nation even if the opposing nation is not a signatory, but only if the opposing nation "accepts and applies the provisions" of the Conventions.
Article 1 of Protocol I further clarifies that armed conflict against colonial domination and foreign occupation also qualifies as an international conflict.
When the criteria of international armed conflict have been met, the full protections of the Conventions are considered to apply.
Common Article 3 relating to non-international armed conflict (NIAC): This article states that the certain minimum rules of war apply to armed conflicts "not of an international character." The International Committee of the Red Cross has explained that this language describes non-international armed conflict (NIAC) "where at least one Party is not a State." For example, it would apply to conflicts between state forces and non-state actors (NSAs), or between two NSAs, or to other conflicts that have all the characteristics of war, whether carried out within the confines of one country or not.
There are two criteria to distinguish non-international armed conflicts from lower forms of violence. The level of violence has to be of certain intensity, for example when the state cannot contain the situation with regular police forces. Also, involved non-state groups need to have a certain level of organization, like a military command structure.
The other Geneva Conventions are not applicable in this situation but only the provisions contained within Article 3, and additionally within the language of Protocol II. The rationale for the limitation is to avoid conflict with the rights of Sovereign States that were not part of the treaties. When the provisions of this article apply, it states that:
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
taking of hostages;
outrages upon dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; and
the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
During the negotiation of the Geneva Conventions, France and Britain were initially staunchly opposed to Common Article 3. However, to save face during negotiations and make strategic concessions, France and Britain deliberately introduced ambiguous language in the text of Common Article 3 that made it easy for states to avoid the obligations of the rule. As a consequence, Common Article 3 only concerns with humane treatment and does not deal with methods and means of hostilities, such as bombings committed by non-state armed groups or state forces against civilian targets in the Algerian War and the Troubles.
On February 7, 2002, President Bush adopted the view that Common Article 3 did not protect al Qaeda prisoners because the United States-al Qaeda conflict was "not of an international character." The Supreme Court of the United States invalidated the Bush Administration view of Common Article 3, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, by ruling that Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions applies to detainees in the "War on Terror", and that the Guantanamo military commission process used to try these suspects was in violation of U.S. and international law. In response to Hamdan, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which President Bush signed into law on October 17, 2006. Like the Military Commissions Act of 2006, its successor the Military Commissions Act of 2009 explicitly forbids the invocation of the Geneva Conventions "as a basis for a private right of action."
"... Common Article 3 continues the conventional practice (reflected in both the 'Lieber' and 'The Hague' provisions) of according humanitarian protections only to 'belligerents' who defer to the laws and customs of war: not to 'insurrectionists' who defy these norms from the very outset of hostilities. Observance of the rules of warfare is what elevates an 'insurrectionist' to the legally cognizable status of 'belligerent' under the 'International law of war'; nothing short of such an 'observance' suffices to effect this transformation from the infra legal to legal."
IAC and/or NIAC classification: Whether the conflict is an IAC or a NIAC or both depends on the nature and circumstances of the situation. Since there is a general prohibition against the use of force between States (as is reflected within article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter) with respect to Common Article 2, it is generally presumed that any use of such military force which is governed by international humanitarian law (IHL) is attributable to deliberate belligerent intent.
Regarding Common Article 3, the ICRC in its 2016 commentary stated the provision includes not just a conflict between territorial government forces and NSAs or NSAs themselves, but also a foreign military intervention against a NSA only if the territorial state consents to such intervention in its territory. Should the intervening country do so without the consent of the territorial state or in support of a NSA against that state, then Common Article 2 applies.
For example, the American-led intervention in the Syrian civil war became both an IAC with Syria and a NIAC with the Islamic State because the U.S. intervened in Syrian territory without the former's consent. On the other hand, Russia intervened in Syrian territory against the Free Syrian Army upon invitation by Syria, making Russia's participation subject only to Common Article 3 and therefore Protocol II (which Russia ratified on September 29, 1989).
The U.S.-led NATO invasion of Afghanistan from October 7 to December 17, 2001 was initially an IAC because it waged war against the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under Taliban rule. Once the new Karzai administration was established and recognized internationally, the conflict changed from an IAC to a NIAC, with NATO troops under International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Resolute Support Mission (RSM) auspices assisting the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan with its consent in battling Taliban insurgents. In contrast, the Soviet–Afghan War was an IAC because the Soviet Union invaded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) to remove Afghan communist leader Hafizullah Amin from power, then installed puppet leader Babrak Karmal, who "invited" Soviet troops to intervene against the Afghan mujahideen fighters.
While non-state armed groups are automatically presumed to engage in NIACs, they also can cross into the threshold of an IAC. The 2020 ICRC commentary on the Third Geneva Convention requires two elements for this classification: "the group must in fact fight on behalf of that Party" and "that Party must accept both the fighting role of the group and the fact that the fighting is done on its behalf." It further states that "[w]here a Party to a conflict has overall control over the militia, volunteer corps or organized resistance movement that has a fighting function and fights on the State's behalf, a relationship of belonging for the purposes of Article 4A(2) exists." For example, the Viet Cong was under effective control and direction by North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, therefore Common Article 2 solely applied to the conflict.
Enforcement:
Protecting powers: The term protecting power has a specific meaning under these Conventions. A protecting power is a state that is not taking part in the armed conflict, but that has agreed to look after the interests of a state that is a party to the conflict. The protecting power is a mediator enabling the flow of communication between the parties to the conflict. The protecting power also monitors the implementation of these Conventions, such as by visiting the zone of conflict and prisoners of war. The protecting power must act as an advocate for prisoners, the wounded, and civilians.
Grave breaches: Not all violations of the treaty are treated equally. The most serious crimes are termed grave breaches and provide a legal definition of a war crime. Grave breaches of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions include the following acts if committed against a person specifically protected by the conventions:
willful killing, torture or inhumane treatment, including biological experiments
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health
compelling a protected person to serve in the armed forces of a hostile power
willfully depriving a protected person of the right to a fair trial if accused of a war crime. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Geneva Conventions | The protecting power is a mediator enabling the flow of communication between the parties to the conflict. The protecting power also monitors the implementation of these Conventions, such as by visiting the zone of conflict and prisoners of war. The protecting power must act as an advocate for prisoners, the wounded, and civilians.
Grave breaches: Not all violations of the treaty are treated equally. The most serious crimes are termed grave breaches and provide a legal definition of a war crime. Grave breaches of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions include the following acts if committed against a person specifically protected by the conventions:
willful killing, torture or inhumane treatment, including biological experiments
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health
compelling a protected person to serve in the armed forces of a hostile power
willfully depriving a protected person of the right to a fair trial if accused of a war crime.
Also considered grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention are the following:
taking of hostages
extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly
unlawful deportation, transfer, or confinement.
Nations that are party to these treaties must enact and enforce legislation penalizing any of these crimes. Nations are also obligated to search for persons alleged to commit these crimes, or persons having ordered them to be committed, and to bring them to trial regardless of their nationality and regardless of the place where the crimes took place.
The principle of universal jurisdiction also applies to the enforcement of grave breaches when the United Nations Security Council asserts its authority and jurisdiction from the UN Charter to apply universal jurisdiction. The UNSC did this when they established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to investigate and/or prosecute alleged violations.
Right to a fair trial when no crime is alleged: Soldiers, as prisoners of war, will not receive a trial unless the allegation of a war crime has been made. According to article 43 of the 1949 Conventions, soldiers are employed for the purpose of serving in war; engaging in armed conflict is legitimate, and does not constitute a grave breach. Should a soldier be arrested by belligerent forces, they are to be considered "lawful combatants" and afforded the protectorate status of a prisoner of war (POW) until the cessation of the conflict. Human rights law applies to any incarcerated individual, including the right to a fair trial.
Charges may only be brought against an enemy POW after a fair trial, but the initial crime being accused must be an explicit violation of the accords, more severe than simply fighting against the captor in battle. No trial will otherwise be afforded to a captured soldier, as deemed by human rights law. This element of the convention has been confused during past incidents of detainment of US soldiers by North Vietnam, where the regime attempted to try all imprisoned soldiers in court for committing grave breaches, on the incorrect assumption that their sole existence as enemies of the state violated international law.
Legacy: Although warfare has changed dramatically since the Geneva Conventions of 1949, they are still considered the cornerstone of contemporary international humanitarian law. They protect combatants who find themselves hors de combat, and they protect civilians caught up in the zone of war. These treaties came into play for all recent non-international armed conflicts, including the War in Afghanistan, the Iraq War, the invasion of Chechnya (1994–2017), and the Russo-Georgian War. The Geneva Conventions also protect those affected by non-international armed conflicts such as the Syrian civil war.
The lines between combatants and civilians have blurred when the actors are not exclusively High Contracting Parties (HCP). Since the fall of the Soviet Union, an HCP often is faced with a non-state actor, as argued by General Wesley Clark in 2007. Examples of such conflict include the Sri Lankan Civil War, the Sudanese Civil War, and the Colombian Armed Conflict, as well as most military engagements of the US since 2000.
Some scholars hold that Common Article 3 deals with these situations, supplemented by Protocol II (1977). These set out minimum legal standards that must be followed for internal conflicts. International tribunals, particularly the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), have clarified international law in this area. In the 1999 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic judgement, the ICTY ruled that grave breaches apply not only to international conflicts, but also to internal armed conflict. Further, those provisions are considered customary international law.
Controversy has arisen over the US designation of irregular opponents as "unlawful enemy combatants" (see also unlawful combatant), especially in the SCOTUS judgments over the Guantanamo Bay detention camp brig facility Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and Rasul v. Bush, and later Boumediene v. Bush. President George W. Bush, aided by Attorneys-General John Ashcroft and Alberto Gonzales and General Keith B. Alexander, claimed the power, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, to determine that any person, including an American citizen, who is suspected of being a member, agent, or associate of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or possibly any other terrorist organization, is an "enemy combatant" who can be detained in U.S. military custody until hostilities end, pursuant to the international law of war.
The application of the Geneva Conventions in the Russo-Ukrainian War (2014–present) has been troublesome because some of the personnel who engaged in combat against the Ukrainians were not identified by insignia, although they did wear military-style fatigues. The types of comportment qualified as acts of perfidy under jus in bello doctrine are listed in Articles 37 through 39 of the Geneva Convention; the prohibition of fake insignia is listed at Article 39.2, but the law is silent on the complete absence of insignia. The status of POWs captured in this circumstance remains a question.
Educational institutions and organizations including Harvard University, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Rohr Jewish Learning Institute use the Geneva Convention as a primary text investigating torture and warfare.
New challenges: Artificial intelligence and autonomous weapon systems, such as military robots and cyber-weapons, are creating challenges in the creation, interpretation and application of the laws of armed conflict. The complexity of these new challenges, as well as the speed in which they are developed, complicates the application of the Conventions, which have not been updated in a long time. Adding to this challenge is the very slow speed of the procedure of developing new treaties to deal with new forms of warfare, and determining agreed-upon interpretations to existing ones, meaning that by the time a decision can be made, armed conflict may have already evolved in a way that makes the changes obsolete.
See also: Attacks on humanitarian workers
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Customary international humanitarian law
Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict
Geneva Conference (disambiguation)
Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights
German Prisoners of War in the United States
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 – traditional rules on fighting wars
Human rights
Human shield
International Committee of the Red Cross
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
International humanitarian law
Laws of war
Lieber Code General Order 100
Nuremberg Principles
Reprisals
Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project
Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868
Targeted killing
References:
Further reading: Matthew Evangelista and Nina Tannenwald (eds.). 2017. Do the Geneva Conventions Matter? Oxford University Press.
Giovanni Mantilla, "Conforming Instrumentalists: Why the USA and the United Kingdom Joined the 1949 Geneva Conventions," European Journal of International Law, Volume 28, Issue 2, May 2017, Pages 483–511.
Helen Kinsella, "The image before the weapon : a critical history of the distinction between combatant and civilian" Cornell University Press.
Boyd van Dijk (2022). Preparing for War: The Making of the Geneva Conventions. Oxford University Press.
External links:
The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 public domain audiobook at LibriVox
Texts and commentaries of 1949 Conventions & Additional Protocols
The Geneva Conventions: the core of international humanitarian law, ICRC
Rules of war (in a nutshell)—video
Commentaries:
GCI: Commentary
GCII: Commentary
GCIII: Commentary
GCIV: Commentary |